Statute

An act of a legislature that declares, proscribes, or commands something; a specific law

, expressed in writing.
A statute is a written law passed by a legislature on the state or federal level. Statutes s
et forth general propositions of lawthat courts apply to specific situations. A statute may
forbid a certain act, direct a certain act, make a declaration, or set forthgovernmental m
echanisms to aid society.
A statute begins as a bill proposed or sponsored by a legislator. If the bill survives the le
gislative committee process and isapproved by both houses of the legislature, the bill be
comes law when it is signed by the executive officer (the president onthe federal level or
the governor on the state level). When a bill becomes law, the various provisions in the
bill are calledstatutes. The term statute signifies the elevation of a bill from legislative pr
oposal to law. State and federal statutes arecompiled in statutory codes that group the s
tatutes by subject. These codes are published in book form and are available atlaw libra
ries.
Lawmaking powers are vested chiefly in elected officials in the legislative branch. The v
esting of the chief lawmaking powerin elected lawmakers is the foundation of a represen
tative democracy. Aside from the federal and state constitutions, statutespassed by elec
ted lawmakers are the first laws to consult in finding the law that applies to a case.
The power of statutes over other forms of laws is not complete, however. Under the U.S
. Constitution and state constitutions,federal and state governments are comprised of a
system of checks and balances among the legislative, executive, andjudicial branches.
As the system of checks and balances plays out, the executive and judicial branches ha
ve the opportunityto fashion laws within certain limits. The Executive
Branch may possess certain lawmaking powers under the federal orstate constitutions,
and the judiciary has the power to review statutes to determine whether they are valid u
nder thoseconstitutions. When a court strikes down a statute, it in effect creates a law of
its own that applies to the general public.
Laws created through judicial opinion stand in contradistinction to laws created in statut
es. Case law has the same legallybinding effect as statutory law, but there are important
distinctions between statutes and case law. Case law is written byjudges, not by electe
d lawmakers, and it is written in response to a specific case before the court. A judicial o
pinion may beused as precedent for similar cases, however. This means that the judicial
opinion in the case will guide the result in similarcases. In this sense a judicial opinion c
an constitute the law on certain issues within a particular jurisdiction. Courts canestablis
h law in this way when no statute exists to govern a case, or when the court interprets a
statute.
For example, if an appeals court holds that witness testimony on memory recovered thr
ough therapy is not admissible at trial,that decision will become the rule for similar case
s within the appeals court's jurisdiction. The decision will remain law untilthe court rever
ses itself or is reversed by a higher court, or until the state or federal legislature passes
a statute that overridesthe judicial decision. If the courts strike down a statute and the le
gislature passes a similar statute, the courts may have anopportunity to declare the new
statute unconstitutional. This cycle can be repeated over and over if legislatures contin
uallytest the constitutional limits on their lawmaking powers.
Judicial opinions also provide legal authority in cases that are not covered by statute. Le
gislatures have not passed statutesthat govern every conceivable dispute. Furthermore,
the language contained in statutes does not cover every possiblesituation. Statutes ma
y be written in broad terms, and judicial opinions must interpret the language of relevant
statutesaccording to the facts of the case at hand. Regulations passed by administrativ
e agencies also fill in statutory gaps, andcourts occasionally are called on to interpret re
gulations as well as statutes.
Courts tend to follow a few general rules in determining the meaning or scope of a statut
e. If a statute does not providesatisfactory definitions of ambiguous terms, courts must i
nterpret the words or phrases according to ordinary rules ofgrammar and dictionary defi
nitions. If a word or phrase is technical or legal, it is interpreted within the context of the
statute.For example, the term interest can refer to a monetary charge or ownership of pr
operty. If the term interest appears in thecontext of a statute on real estate ownership, a
court will construe the word to mean property ownership. Previousinterpretations of sim
ilar statutes are also helpful in determining a statute's meaning.
Statutes are not static and irreversible. A statute may be changed or repealed by the la
wmaking body that enacted it, or itmay be overturned by a court. A statute may lapse, or
terminate, under the terms of the statute itself or under legislative rulesthat automaticall
y terminate statutes unless they are reapproved before a certain amount of time has pa
ssed.
Although most legal disputes are covered at least in part by statutes, TORT and contract
disputes are exceptions, in that theyare largely governed by case law. Criminal
Law, patent law, tax law, Property
Law, and Bankruptcy law are among theareas of law that are covered first and foremo
st by statute

Statutory Construction
Definition
The process of determining what a particular statute means so that a court
may apply it accurately.

Overview
Any question of statutory interpretation begins with looking at the plain
language of the statute to discover its original intent. To discover a statute's
original intent, courts first look to the words of the statute and apply their
usual and ordinary meanings.
If after looking at the language of the statute the meaning of the statute
remains unclear, courts attempt to ascertain the intent of the legislature by
looking at legislative history and other related sources. Courts generally
steer clear of any interpretation that would create an absurd result which the
Legislature did not intend.
Because legislators may intend different things when they vote for a bill,
statutory construction is often fairly difficult. Statutes are sometimes
ambiguous enough to support more than one interpretation. In these cases,
courts are free to interpret statutes themselves. Once a court interprets the
statute, other courts usually will not go through the exercise again, but
rather will enforce the statute as interpreted by the other court, similar
to stare decisis.

Rules Often Followed for Statutory Interpretation

 Statutes should be internally consistent. A particular section of the statute

should not be inconsistent with the rest of the statute.
 When the legislature enumerates an exception to a rule, one can infer that
there are no other exceptions.
 When the legislature includes limiting language in an earlier version of a
statute, but deletes it prior to enactment of the statute, it can be presumed
that the limitation was not intended by the legislature.
 The legislature is presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it
includes language in one section but omits it in another.
 Where legislation and case law conflict, courts generally presume that
legislation takes precedence over case law.
 The Rule of Lenity: in construing an ambiguous criminal statute, a court
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.
 A court may also look at: the common usage of a word, case law,
dictionaries, parallel reasoning, punctuation

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION
The various methods and tests used by the courts for determining the meaning of a law.
As the Supreme Court has explained: "[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always
turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). Indeed, "[w]hen the words of a
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: `judicial inquiry is
complete.' " Id."Congress is presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it
includes language in one section but omits it in another." Estate of Bell v.
Commissioner, 928 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1991).
"The clear import of treaty language controls unless `application of the words of the
treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or
expectations of its signatories.' " Sumitomo Shoji Amer., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S.
176, 180, (1982).

The Meaning of Section 9

It has been argued both that the meaning of section 9 is not clear and unambiguous and
that to give section 9 its plain meaning would produce a patently absurd result in that it
would frustrate the application of the principal operative provisions of the Rates Act. Our
response is based, in part, upon Nugget Hydroelectric, where we were faced with a
remarkably similar problem of statutory construction. We were forced to decide whether
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (Policies Act) preempted the state
action doctrine with respect to gas and electric utilities. Id. One provision of the Policies Act
provided that "[n]othing in this Act or in any amendment made by this Act affects . . . the
applicability of the antitrust laws to any electric utility or gas utility." Id., quoting 16 U.S.C. S
2603(1). Nugget argued that the term "antitrust laws" referred only to statutory law and not
to the common law state action doctrine. It also argued that the statute was ambiguous and
that the legislative history revealed that Congress clearly intended the Policies Act to
preempt the state action doctrine. Id. We held that the language of the statute was clear,
that it precluded us from holding that Policies Act preempted the state action doctrine, and
that it did not produce an absurd result. See id. Therefore, we refused to look any further
than the face of the statute.

Application of Broad Purposes

Application of "broad purposes" of legislation at the expense of specific provisions ignores
the complexity of the legislative problems Congress is called upon to address and the
dynamics of legislative action. Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some
vague social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply on the
means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation may reflect hard-
fought compromises. Invocation of the "plain purpose" of legislation at the expense of the
terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in the end,
prevents the effectuation of congressional intent. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1986).

Supreme Court Rules

The Supreme Court has set forth the general rule that "[w]here a particular Amendment
`provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of
government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of "substantive
due process," must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'" Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct.
807, 813 (1994) (plurality) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).The
canon of construction, invoked frequently in cases in which the issue is whether to imply a
private right of action, that courts must "presum[e] that a remedy was deliberately omitted
from a statute . . . when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme
including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement." E.g., Northwest Airlines,
451 U.S. at 97; see also Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527,
533 (1989) ("It is an `elemental canon' of statutory interpretation that where a statute
expressly provides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional
remedies. Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). In such
cases, `[i]n the absence of strong indicia of contrary congressional intent, we are compelled
to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.'"
(quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
15 (1981))). In the cases in which the canon traditionally has been applied, the question has
been whether the statute at issue permits an implied private right of action. The canon
serves to ensure that courts do not upset a "comprehensive legislative scheme" by creating
additional "procedures for enforcement" that Congress did not intend. Northwest Airlines,
451 U.S. at 97.
"When Congress includes a specific term in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it should not be implied where it is excluded." Arizona Elec. Power
Co-op. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987); see also West Coast Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Arcata Community Recycling Ctr., 846 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).

Statutory Interpretation
Every question of statutory interpretation starts with the language of the statute. "The
primary indication of [Congress'] intent is the language of the statute." United States v.
Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 115
S.Ct. 2357 (1995).
Two well-established canons of statutory interpretation:. First, courts must ascertain the
intent of the Legislature to effectuate the purpose of the law (DuBois v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387); Second, they must adopt an interpretation that
avoids an absurd result the Legislature did not intend. (Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d
666, 673.)
When Congress enumerates an exception or exceptions to a rule, we can infer that no
other exceptions apply. Koniag v. Koncor Forest Resource, 39 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir.
1994); Horner v. Adnrzjewski, 811 F.2d 571, 574-75 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 912
(1987); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction S 47.23 (5th
Ed. 1992).
When Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill, but deletes it prior
to enactment, we presume that the limitation was not intended. Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983).
When Congress does not direct whether a rule should be uniform, the courts determine if a
uniform federal rule is appropriate based on the three-part test set out in United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). "Under that test, a court must determine . . . (1)
whether the issue requires `a nationally uniform body of law,'; (2) `whether application of
state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program'; and (3) whether
`application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state
law.'" Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458 (quoting Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29).
Prohibition against construing statutes so as to render any of their provisions superfluous.
See Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991).
Courts begin "with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent." (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.)
To discover that intent we first look first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual
and ordinary meaning. (Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744; DaFonte
v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601.) "Where the words of the statute are clear, we
may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of
the statute or from its legislative history." (Burden v. Snowden, supra, 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION -LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Legislative intent is what a legislature as a whole had in mind when it passed a
particular statute. Normally, any given statute is interpreted by looking just at the
statute's language. But when the language is ambiguous or unclear, courts try to glean
the legislative intent behind words by looking at legislative interpretations (for instance,
reports issued by legislative committees) which were relied upon by legislators when
voting on the statute.
Statutes are often ambiguous enough to support more than one interpretation, and the
material reflecting legislative intent is frequently sparse. This leaves courts free to
interpret statutes according to their own predilections. Once a court interprets the
legislative intent, however, other courts will usually not go through the exercise again,
but rather will enforce the statute as interpreted by the other court.practice. It is defined
to be "the drawing in inference by the act of reason, as to the intent of an instrument,
from given circumstances, upon principles deduced from men's general motives,
conduct and action." This definition may, perbaps, not be sufficiently complete,
inasmuch as the term instrument generally implies something reduced into writing,
whereas construction, is equally necessary to ascertain the meaning of engagements
merely verbal. In other respects it appears to be perfectly accurate. The Treatise
of Equity, defines interpretation to be the collection of the meaning out of signs the
most probable.
There are two kinds of constructions; the first, is literal or strict; this is uniformly the
construction given to penal statutes. The other is liberal, and applied, usually, to
remedial laws, in order to enforce them according to their spirit.
In the Supreme Court of the United States, the rule which has been uniformly
observed in construing statutes, is to adopt the construction made by the courts of the
country by whose legislature the statute was enacted. This rule may be susceptible of
some modification when applied to British statutes which are adopted in any of these
states. By adopting them, they become our own, as entirely as if they had been enacted
by the legislature of the state.
The received construction, in England, at the time they are admitted to operate in this
country indeed, to the time of our separation from the British empire - may very properly
be considered as accompanying the statutes themselves, and forming an integral part
of them. But, however we may respect the subsequent decisions (and certainly they are
entitled to great respect,) we do not admit their absolute authority. If the English courts
vary their construction of a statute, which is common to the two countries, we do not
hold ourselves bound to fluctuate with them.
The great object which the law has in all cases, in contemplation, as furnishing the
leading principle of the rules to be observed in the construction of contracts, is, that
justice is to be done between the parties, by enforcing the performance of their
agreement, according to the sense in which it was mutually understood and relied upon
at the time of making it.
When the contract is in writing, the difficulty lies only in the construction of the words;
when it is to be made out by parol testimony, that difficulty is augmented by the possible
mistakes of the witnesses as to the words used by the parties; but still, when the
evidence is received, it must be assumed as correct, when a construction is to be put
upon it.

Principal Rules in Contract Construction

The following are the principal rules to be observed in the construction of contracts.
When. the words used are of precise and unambiguous meaning, leading to no absurdity,
that meaning is to be taken as conveying the intention of the parties. But should there be
manifest absurdity in the application of such meaning, to the particular occasion, this will let
in construction to discover the true intention of the parties: for example;

 1. When words are manifestly inconsistent with the declared purpose and object of
the contract, they will be rejected; as if, in a contract of sale, the price of the thing
sold should be acknowledged as received, while the obligation of the seller was not
to deliver the commodity. When words are omitted so as to defeat the effect of the
contract, they will be supplied by the obvious sense and inference from the context;
as, if the contract stated that the seller, for the consideration of one hundred dollars,
sold a horse, and the buyer promised to pay him for the said horse one hundred, the
word dollars would be supplied. When the words, taken in one sense, go to defeat
the contract, while they are susceptible of another construction which will give effect
to the design of the parties, and not destroy it, the latter will be preferred.
 2. The plain, ordinary, and popular sense of the words, is to be preferred to the more
unusual, etymological, and recondite meaning or even to the literal, and strictly
grammatical construction of the words, where these last would lead to any inefficacy
or inconsistency.
 3. When a peculiar meaning has been stamped upon the words by the usage of a
particular trade or place in which the contract occurs, such technical or peculiar
meaning will prevail. It is as if the parties in framing their contract had made use of a
foreign language, which the court is not bound to understand, but which on evidence
of its import, must be applied. But the expression so made technical and appropriate,
and the usage by which it has become so, must be so clear that the court cannot
entertain a doubt upon the subject. Technical words are to be taken according to
their approved and known use in the trade in which the contract is entered into, or to
which it relates, unless they have manifestly been understood in another sense by
the parties.
 4. The place where a contract has been made, is a most material consideration in its
construction. Generally, its validity is to be decided by the law of the place where it is
 made; if valid there, it is considered valid every where. Its construction is to be
according to the laws of the place where it is made for example, where a note was
given in China, payable eighteen months after date, without any stipulation as to the
amount of interest, the court allowed the Chinese interest of one per centum per
month from the expiration of the eighteen mouths.
 5. Previous conversations, and all that passes in the course of correspondence or
negotiation leading to the contract, are entirely superseded by the written
agreement. The parties having agreed to reduce the terms of their contract to
writing, the document is constituted as the only true and final exposition of their
admissions and intentions; and nothing which does not appear in the written
agreement will be considered as a part of the contract. But this rule admits of some
exceptions; as, where a declaration is made before a deed is executed, showing the
design with which it was to be executed, in cases of frauds and trusts, though no
trust was declared in the writing.
 6. All contracts made in general terms, in the ordinary course of trade, are
presumed to incorporate the usage and custom of the trade to which they relate. The
parties are presumed to know such usages, and not to intend to exclude them. But
when there is a special stipulation in opposition to, or inconsistent with the custom,
that will of course prevail.
 7 . When there is an ambiguity which impedes the execution of the contract, it is
first, if possible, to be resolved, on a view of the whole contract or instrument, aided
by the admitted views of the parties, and, if indispensable, parol evidence may be
admitted to clear it, consistently with the words.
 8. When the words cannot be reconciled with any practicable or consistent
interpretation, they are to be considered as not made use of "perinde sunt ac si
scripts non essent."

It is the duty of the court to give a construction to all written instruments.