130.02.10 Maliksi Vs Commission On Elections

G.R. No. 203302. March 12, 2013.
*
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HOMER T.
SAQUILAYAN, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; There is no denial of due process
where there is opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings. It is settled that “opportunity to be heard” does not only mean
oral arguments in court but also written arguments through pleadings.—
There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings. It is settled that “opportunity
to be heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court but also written
arguments through pleadings. Thus, the fact that a party was heard on his
motion for reconsideration negates any violation of the right to due
process. The Court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.
Election Law; Automated Election System (AES); The picture
images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS), are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture
in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3)
of R.A. No. 9369; In short, both the ballot images in the Compact Flash
(CF) cards and the printouts of such images have the same evidentiary
value as the official physical ballots filled up by the voters.—We have
already ruled that the ballot images in the CF cards, as well as the
printouts of such images, are the functional equivalent of the official
physical ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an election
protest. In the recent consolidated cases of Vinzons-Chato v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Panotes and Panotes v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Vinzons-Chato, 689 SCRA 107
(2013), the Court ruled that “the picture images of the ballots, as scanned
and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully
capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No.
_______________
* EN BANC.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 215
Maliksi vs. Commission on Elections
9369.” The Court declared that the printouts of the ballot images in the
CF cards “are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by
the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an
electoral protest.” In short, both the ballot images in the CF cards and the
printouts of such images have the same evidentiary value as the official
physical ballots filled up by the voters.
Same; Same; Evidence; The ballot images are not secondary
evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the
Compact Flash (CF) cards are both original documents. The ballot
images in the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the official
physical ballots.―The ballot images, which are digital, are electronically
generated and written in the CF cards when the ballots are fed into the
PCOS machine. The ballot images are the counterparts produced by
electronic recording which accurately reproduce the original, and thus are
the equivalent of the original. As pointed out by the COMELEC, “[t]he
digital images of the physical ballots are electronically and
instantaneously generated by the PCOS machines once the physical
ballots are fed into and read by the machines.” Hence, the ballot images
are not secondary evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot
images in the CF cards are both original documents. The ballot images in
the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the official physical
ballots.
BERSAMIN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Automated Election System (AES); View that despite
the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the
printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots
adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots
to be the primary or best evidence of the voters’ will.―The picture
images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the
equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 689 SCRA 107 (2013), the
Court held that “the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully
capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the
functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and,
thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral
protest.” That the two
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
documents―the official ballot and its picture image―are considered
“original documents” simply means that both of them are given equal
probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is
not considered as weightier than the other. But this juridical reality does
not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral
Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the
picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them
without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight
accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture
images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their
respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the
primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the
picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown
that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.
Same; Same; Due Process; View that the printing of the picture
images of the ballots may be resorted to only after the proper
Revision/Recount Committee has first determined that the integrity of the
ballots and the ballot box was not preserved.—Section 6, Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In Re: Comelec Rules of Procedure on
Disputes In An Automated Election System in Connection with the May
10, 2010 Elections) itself requires that “the Recount Committee
determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or has
not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition that
(the ballots) cannot be recounted” before the printing of the image of
the ballots should be made, and that such printing should be done “in
the presence of the parties,” to wit: x x x x (g) Only when the Recount
Committee, through its chairman, determines that the integrity of the
ballots has been preserved or that no signs of tampering of the ballots are
present, will the recount proceed. In case there are signs that the ballots
contained therein are tampered, compromised, wet or are otherwise in
such a condition that it could not be recounted, the Recount Committee
shall follow paragraph (l) of this rule. x x x x (l) In the event the Recount
Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been
violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a
condition that it cannot be recounted, the Chairman of the Committee
shall request from the Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD), the printing of
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 217
the image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used
in the May 10, 2010 elections in the presence of the parties. Printing of
the ballot images shall proceed only upon prior authentication and
certification by a duly authorized personnel of the Election Records and
Statistics Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are
genuine and not substitutes. (As amended by COMELEC Resolution No.
9164, March 16, 2011) x x x x All the foregoing rules on revision of
ballots stipulate that the printing of the picture images of the ballots
may be resorted to only after the proper Revision/Recount
Committee has first determined that the integrity of the ballots and
the ballot box was not preserved. The foregoing rules further require
that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the
printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or
recount proceedings, and that it is the Revision/Recount Committee
that determines whether the ballots are unreliable.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is during the revision or recount
conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties are
allowed to be represented, with their representatives witnessing the
proceedings and timely raising their objections in the course of the
proceedings.—There is a good reason for thus fixing where and by whom
the decryption and the printing should be conducted. It is during the
revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when
the parties are allowed to be represented, with their representatives
witnessing the proceedings and timely raising their objections in the
course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the Revision/Recount
Committee makes any determination that the ballots have been tampered
and have become unreliable, the parties are immediately made aware of
such determination. Here, however, it was not the Revision/Recount
Committee or the RTC exercising its original jurisdiction over the protest
that made the finding that the ballots had been tampered, but the First
Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Maliksi was not
immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First
Division did not even issue any written resolution stating its reasons for
ordering the printing of the picture images.
Same; Same; Same; View that the blatant disregard of Maliksi’s
right to be informed of the decision to print the picture
images of the ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the
appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by the invocation of the fact that
Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration.—The
blatant disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print
the picture images of the ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings
during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by the invocation of
the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for
reconsideration. To be exact, the motion for reconsideration was actually
directed against the entire resolution of the First Division, while Maliksi’s
claim of due process violation is directed only against the First Division’s
recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against
him. I note that the First Division did not issue any order directing the
recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance to
seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount
through a seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context,
he had no real opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount
proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Right to be Heard; View that Based on the
pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns v. COMELEC, the
power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the
parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims.—The
COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the deviation of the First
Division. Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns
v. COMELEC, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will
ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only
after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing
claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters
is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of
the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them.
Same; Same; View that the First Division should not conduct the
proceedings now being assailed because it was then exercising appellate
jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed the First
Division to conduct the recount in the first instance. The recount
proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, are to be conducted by the COME-
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 219
LEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction
over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous
regions), provincial and city officials.—We should not ignore that the
parties’ participation during the revision/recount proceedings would not
benefit only the parties. Such participation was as vital and significant for
the COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the
COMELEC’s proceedings attain credibility as to the result. In this regard,
the COMELEC was less than candid, and was even cavalier in its conduct
of the decryption and printing of the picture images of the ballots and the
recount proceedings. The COMELEC En Banc was merely content with
listing the guidelines that the First Division had followed in the
appreciation of the ballots and the results of the recount. In short, there
was vagueness as to what rule had been followed in the decryption and
printing proceeding. Moreover, I respectfully point out that the First
Division should not conduct the proceedings now being assailed because
it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule
of procedure allowed the First Division to conduct the recount in the first
instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, are to be conducted by the COMELEC
Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over
all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions),
provincial and city officials.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Mary Charlene V. Hernandez for petitioner.
Charles Perfecto A. Mercado for private respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
Before the Court
_______________ is a petition for certiorari assailing the 14
1 Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
September 2012 Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed the 15 August 2012
Resolution3 of the COMELEC First Division in EAC (AE) No. A-
22-2011.
The Antecedent Facts
Emmanuel L. Maliksi (Maliksi) and Homer T. Saquilayan
(Saquilayan) were both mayoralty candidates for the Municipality
of Imus, Cavite during the 10 May 2010 Automated National and
Local Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC)
proclaimed Saquilayan as the duly elected municipal mayor
garnering a total of 48,181 votes as against Maliksi’s 39,682
votes. Thus, based on the MBC’s canvass, Saquilayan won over
Maliksi by 8,499 votes.
Maliksi filed an election protest before the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 (trial court), questioning the
results of the elections in 209 clustered precincts. The case was
docketed as Election Protest No. 009-10. In its 15 November 2011
Decision, the trial court declared Maliksi as the duly elected
Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite. The trial court ruled that
Maliksi garnered 41,088 votes as against Saquilayan’s 40,423
votes. Thus, based on the trial court’s recount, Maliksi won over
Saquilayan by a margin of 665 votes. The dispositive portion of
the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the
Election Protest filed by Emmanuel L. Maliksi meritorious. Accordingly,
Emmanuel L. Maliksi is hereby DECLARED as the duly elected Mayor
of the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite after
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 59-64. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner
Lucenito N. Tagle took no part while Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim inhibited
himself from the case.
3 Id., at pp. 95-126. Signed by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C.
Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 221
having obtained the highest number of legal votes of 41,088 as against
Protestant Homer T. Saquilayan’s 40,423 votes or a winning margin of
665 votes in favor of the former.
Thus, the election and proclamation of Homer T. Saquilayan as Mayor
of Imus, Cavite is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and he is
COMMANDED to immediately CEASE and DESIST from performing
the duties and functions of said office.
Finally, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 14 of A.M. 10-4-1-SC, the Clerk
of Court is hereby DIRECTED to personally deliver the copy of the
signed and promulgated decision on the counsels of the parties.
SO ORDERED.4
Saquilayan filed an appeal before the COMELEC, docketed as
EAC (AE) No. A-22-2011. Meanwhile, in a Special Order dated
28 November 2011, the trial court granted Maliksi’s motion for
execution pending appeal.
On 2 December 2011, Saquilayan also filed with the
COMELEC a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
or status quo order with prayer for early consideration, docketed
as SPR (AE) No. 106-2011, assailing the trial court’s Special
Order of 28 November 2011 granting execution pending appeal. A
COMELEC First Division Order dated 20 December 20115
enjoining the trial court from enforcing its 28 November 2011
Special Order was not implemented since only Presiding
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Sarmiento) voted to grant the
temporary restraining order while Commissioners Armando C.
Velasco (Velasco) and Christian Robert S. Lim (Lim) dissented.
The Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
The COMELEC First Division, after inspecting the ballot
boxes, ruled that it was apparent that the integrity of the
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 95-96. The RTC decision was penned by Judge Cesar A.
Mangrobang.
5 Id., at pp. 130-131.
ballots had been compromised. To determine the true will of the
electorate, and since there was an allegation of ballot tampering,
the COMELEC First Division examined the digital images of the
contested ballots stored in the Compact Flash (CF) cards. The
COMELEC First Division used the following guidelines in
appreciating the contested ballots:
1. On Marked Ballots.―The rule is that no ballot should be discarded
as marked unless its character as such is unmistakable. The distinction
should always be between marks that were apparently, carelessly, or
innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely
placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future identification
of the ballot, which invalidate it. In the absence of any circumstance
showing that the intention of the voter to mark the ballot is unmistakable,
or any evidence aliunde to show that the words or marks were
deliberately written or put therein to identify the ballots, the ballots
should not be rejected.
2. On ballots claimed to have been shaded by two or more
persons.―Unlike in the manual elections where it is easy to identify if a
ballot has been written by two persons, in case of an automated election,
it would be very hard if not impossible to identify if two persons shaded a
single ballot. The best way to identify if a ballot has been tampered is to
go to the digital image of the ballot as the PCOS machine was able to
capture such when the ballot was fed by the voter into the machine when
he cast his vote. In the absence of any circumstance showing that the
ballot was shaded by persons other than the voter, the ballots should not
be rejected to give effect to the voter’s intent.
3. On ballots with ambiguous votes.―It has been the position of the
Commission to always take into consideration [that] the intent of the
voter shall be given effect, taking aside any technicalities. A ballot
indicates the voter’s will. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every
ballot is presumed valid unless there is a clear reason to justify its
rejection. The object in the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and
carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with
reasonable certainty.
4. On spurious ballots.―Ballots have security features like bar codes,
ultra-violet inks and such other security marks to be able to preserve its
integrity and the PCOS machines were programmed to
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 223
accept genuine and valid ballots only. Further, the ballots used in the
elections were precinct specific, meaning, the PCOS machine assigned to
a specific precinct will only accept those ballots designated to such
precinct. This follows that the digital images stored in the CF cards are
digital images of genuine, authentic and valid ballots. In the absence of
any evidence proving otherwise, the Commission will not invalidate a
vote cast which will defeat the sovereign will of the electorate.
5. On over-voting.―It has been the position of the Commission that
over-voting in a certain position will make the vote cast for the position
stray but will not invalidate the entire ballot, so in case of over-voting for
the contested position, such vote shall be considered stray and will not be
credited to any of the contending parties.
6. On rejected ballots.―As correctly observed by [the] court a quo,
with all the security features of the ballot, the PCOS machines will only
accept genuine ballots and will reject it if, inter alia, fake, duplicate,
ballots intended for another precinct, or has been fed an[d] accepted by
the machines already. Bearing in mind the voter’s will, rejected ballots
can still be claimed by the parties and be admitted as valid votes, if, upon
further examination, it is found that the ballot is genuine and was
inadvertently rejected by the machine.6
After the counting and appreciation of the ballot images in the
CF cards of the appealed clustered precincts, the COMELEC First
Division came up with the following findings:
Clustered Ruling of Trial Ruling of Votes Votes
Precinct Court COMELEC for for
No. First Division Saqui- Maliksi
layan
96 84 ballots were Upon examining 235 270
declared stray the digital images
because both slots of the ballots,
for Maliksi and there was no
Saquilayan were over-voting.
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 102-104.
shaded.
61 68 ballots were declared Upon examining the 230 173
stray because both slots digital images of the
for Maliksi and ballots, there was no
Saquilayan were shaded. over-voting.
51 133 ballots were Upon examining the 212 182
declared stray because digital images of the
both slots for Maliksi ballots, there was no
and Saquilayan were over-voting.
shaded. 2 ballots were
declared stray because
the slots for Maliksi and
Astillero were both
shaded.
both slots for Maliksi ballots, there was no
and Saquilayan were over-voting. 1 ballot was
shaded. 1 ballot was rejected by the PCOS
declared stray because machine but it was clear
the slots for Maliksi and that the intent of the voter
Astillero were both was to vote for Maliksi.
shaded.
36 92 ballots were declared Upon examining the 154 202
stray because both slots digital images of the
for Maliksi and ballots there was no over-
Saquilayan were shaded. voting. 2 ballots were
rejected by the
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 225
PCOS machine but it was clear
that the intent of the voters was to
vote for Maliksi.
03 33 ballots were Upon examining the digital 73 89
declared stray images of the ballots, there was
because both no over-voting. 1 ballot was
slots for Maliksi rejected by the PCOS machine
and Saquilayan but it was clear that the intent of
were shaded. the voter was to vote for
Saquilayan.
because both no over-voting.
slots for Maliksi
and Saquilayan
were shaded.
because both no over-voting. 2 ballots were
slots for Maliksi rejected by the PCOS machine
and Saquilayan but it was clear that the intent of
were shaded. the voters was to vote for Maliksi.
declared stray because the digital images of the
both slots for Maliksi ballots, there was no over-
and Saquilayan were voting. 1 ballot was
shaded. 1 ballot was rejected by the PCOS
declared stray because machine but it was clear
the slots for Maliksi that the intent of the voter
and Dominguez were was to vote for
both shaded. Saquilayan.
both slots for Maliksi ballots, there was no over-
and Saquilayan were voting. 2 ballots were
shaded. rejected by the PCOS
machine but it was clear
that the intent of the voters
was to vote for
Saquilayan.
both slots for the ballots, there was no over-
mayoralty position voting. 1 ballot was
were shaded. rejected by the PCOS
machine but it was clear
that the intent of the voter
was to vote for Maliksi.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 227
declared stray the digital images of the ballots,
because 2 there was no over-voting. 1 ballot
slots for the was rejected by the PCOS machine
mayoralty but it was clear that the intent of
position were the voter was to vote for
shaded. Saquilayan.
127 248 ballots Upon examining the digital images 332 304
were declared of the ballots, there was no over-
stray because voting. 1 ballot was rejected by the
both slots for PCOS machine but it was clear that
Maliksi and the intent of the voter was to vote
Saquilayan for Maliksi.
were shaded.
stray because voting. 3 ballots (1 for Saquilayan,
both slots for 2 for Maliksi) were rejected by the
Maliksi and PCOS machine but it was clear that
Saquilayan the intent of the voters was to vote
were shaded. for the candidate of choice.
slots for Maliksi
and Saquilayan
were shaded.
because 2 slots no over-voting. 1 ballot was
for the rejected by the PCOS machine
position were the voter was to vote for Maliksi.
shaded.
because 2 slots no over-voting. 2 ballots were
for the rejected by the PCOS machine
shaded. Saquilayan.
slots for Maliksi
and Saquilayan
were shaded.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 229
stray because voting.
2 slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
stray because voting. 2 ballots were rejected by the
2 slots for the PCOS machine but it was clear that
mayoralty the intent of the voters was to vote
position were for the candidate of choice.
shaded.
stray because voting. 3 ballots (1 for Maliksi, 2 for
2 slots for the Saquilayan) were rejected by the
mayoralty PCOS machine but it was clear that
position were the intent of the voters was to vote
shaded. for the candidate of choice.
were declared of the ballots, there was no
stray because
2 slots for the
mayoralty
position were over-voting. 3 ballots (2 for
shaded. Maliksi, 1 for Saquilayan) were
rejected by the PCOS machine but
it was clear that the intent of the
voters was to vote for the
candidate of choice.
88 75 ballots were Upon examining the digital images 142 223
declared stray of the ballots, there was no over-
because 2 slots voting. 2 ballots were rejected by
for the the PCOS machine but it was clear
mayoralty that the intent of the voters was to
position were vote for Maliksi.
shaded.
stray because 2 voting. 1 ballot was rejected by the
slots for the PCOS machine but it was clear
mayoralty that the intent of the voter was to
shaded.
were declared of the ballots,
stray because 2
slots for
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 231
the mayoralty there was no over-voting. 1 ballot
position were was rejected by the PCOS machine
shaded. but it was clear that the intent of the
voter was to vote for Maliksi.
2 slots for the Saquilayan) were rejected by the
mayoralty PCOS machine but it was clear that
position were the intent of the voters was to vote
shaded. for the candidate of choice.
stray because voting.
2 slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
2 slots for the Saquilayan) were
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
rejected by the PCOS machine
but it was clear that the intent of
the voters was to vote for the
candidate of choice.
47 186 ballots Upon examining the digital 250 226
were declared images of the ballots, there was
stray because 2 no over-voting. 1 ballot was
slots for the rejected by the PCOS machine
shaded. Saquilayan.
stray because 2 no over-voting.
slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
because 2 slots no over-voting.
for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
stray because 2 no over-voting. 2
slots for the
mayoralty
position were
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 233
shaded. ballots (1 for Maliksi, 1 for
Saquilayan) were rejected by the
PCOS machine but it was clear
that the intent of the voters was to
vote for the candidate of choice.
shaded. Saquilayan.
slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
stray because 2 no over-voting. 2 ballots were
slots for the rejected by machine but it was
mayoralty clear that the
position were
shaded.
intent of the voters was to vote
for Saquilayan.
slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
position were the voter was to vote for Maliksi.
shaded.
shaded. Saquilayan.
were declared images of the ballots,
stray because 2
slots for
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 235
the mayoralty there was no
position were over-voting.
shaded.
were of the ballots, there was no over-
declared voting. 1 ballot was rejected by the
stray because PCOS machine but it was clear that
2 slots for the the intent of the voter was to vote
mayoralty for Maliksi.
position were
shaded.
declared voting.
stray because
2 slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
declared voting. 3 ballots (2 for Maliksi, 1
stray because for Saquilayan) were rejected by the
shaded.
95 215 ballots Upon examining 288 270
were
declared stray the digital images of the ballots,
because 2 slots there was no over-voting.
for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
stray because 2 voting. 1 ballot was rejected by the
slots for the PCOS machine but it was clear
mayoralty that the intent of the voter was to
position were vote for Saquilayan.
shaded.
stray because 2 voting. 2 ballots were rejected by
slots for the the PCOS machine but it was clear
mayoralty that the intent of the voters was to
shaded.
stray because 2 voting. 2 ballots were rejected by
slots for the the PCOS machine
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 237
but it was clear that the intent of the
voters was to vote for Maliksi.
declared voting.
stray because
2 slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
declared voting.
stray because
2 slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
declared voting.
stray because
2 slots for the
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
shaded.
shaded.
declared voting. 1 ballot was rejected by the
stray because PCOS machine but it was clear that
2 slots for the the intent of the voter was to vote
mayoralty for Saquilayan.
position were
shaded.
2 slots for the PCOS machine but it was clear
mayoralty
position were
shaded.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 239
that the intent of
the voters was to
vote for the can-
didate of choice.
The COMELEC First Division found that Maliksi obtained a
total of 40,092 votes, broken down as follows: (a) 29,170 votes in
the clustered precincts not appealed as per statement of votes by
precinct, and (b) 10,922 votes in the appealed clustered precincts.
On the other hand, Saquilayan obtained a total of 48,521 votes,
broken down as follows: (a) 35,908 votes in the clustered
precincts not appealed as per statement of votes by precinct, and
(b) 12,613 votes obtained in the appealed clustered precincts.
Saquilayan won over Maliksi by 8,429 votes. Thus, in a
Resolution promulgated on 15 August 2012, the COMELEC First
Division nullified the trial court’s decision and declared
Saquilayan as the duly-elected Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
The COMELEC First Division noted that Maliksi attached a
photocopy of an official ballot to his election protest. The
COMELEC First Division stated that unless one of the clustered
precincts had a photocopying machine, it could only mean that an
official ballot was taken out of the polling place to be
photocopied, in violation of Section 30(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8786.7 The dispositive portion of the 15 August
2012 Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to:
1. NULLIFY the pronouncement of the lower court that protestant-
appellee EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI is the duly-elected Municipal
Mayor of Imus, Cavite and HEREBY DECLARES HOMER T.
SAQUILAYAN as the duly-elected Municipal Mayor of the above-
mentioned municipality;
_______________
7 Revised General Instructions for the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) on the
Voting, Counting, and Transmission of Results in Connection with the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections.
2. Further, the Law Department is hereby DIRECTED:
i.To conduct an investigation as to who were responsible for the
tampering of the ballot boxes for purposes of filing the appropriate
information for violation of election laws; and
ii.To conduct an investigation as to possible violation of election laws
and Comelec Resolutions by herein protestant-appellee EMMANUEL
L. MALIKSI as to how he was able to secure a photocopy of the
official ballot which he attached in his Election Protest.
SO ORDERED.8
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
First Division’s Resolution and for the voluntary inhibition of
Commissioners Sarmiento, Velasco, and Lim from further acting
on the case.
The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
In its 14 September 2012 Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc
denied Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the 15
August 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the COMELEC First
Division did not err in ordering the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images in the CF cards instead of
recounting the physical ballots. The COMELEC En Banc stated
that when the case was elevated to it on appeal, it immediately
noted an “unprecedented number of double-votes involving 8,387
ballots―exclusively affecting the position of Mayor and
specifically affecting the ballots for Saquilayan.”9 The
COMELEC En Banc further noted:
_______________
8 Rollo, pp. 125-126.
9 Id., at p. 60.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 241
x x x. Worth noting also is that these 8,387 ballots all came from 53
clustered precincts specifically pinpointed by Maliksi as his pilot
precincts (which is 20% of the total precincts he protested)―thereby
affecting a total of 33.38% or more than one-third (1/3) of the total
ballots cast in those precincts. We find this too massive to have not been
detected on election day, too specific to be random and too precise to be
accidental―which leaves a reasonable mind no other conclusion except
that those 8,387 cases of double-shading were purposely machinated.
These dubious and highly suspicious circumstances left us with no other
option but to dispense with the physical ballots and resort to their digital
images. To recount the tampered ballots will only yield us tampered
results defeating the point of this appeal.10
The COMELEC En Banc also ruled that it is free to adopt
procedures that will ensure the speedy disposition of its cases as
long as the parties are amply heard on their opposing claims. The
COMELEC En Banc ruled that the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images in the CF cards are not without
basis since a Division, through its Presiding Commissioner, may
take such measures as he may deem proper to resolve cases
pending before it. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that Maliksi
was not denied due process because he never questioned the Order
of decryption by the COMELEC First Division nor did he raise
any objection in any of his pleadings. Further, the ballot images
are not mere secondary images, as Maliksi claimed. The digital
images of the physical ballots, which are instantaneously written
in the CF cards by the PCOS11 machines the moment the ballots
are read and counted, are equivalent to the original for the purpose
of the best evidence rule. The COMELEC En Banc accorded
higher evidentiary value to the ballot images because their
integrity are more secure for the following reasons:
_______________
10 Id.
11 Precinct Count Optical Scan.
(1) the digital images are encrypted to prevent unauthorized alteration
or access;
(2) the ballot images cannot be decrypted or in anyway accessed
without the necessary decryption key;
(3) the ballot images may only be decrypted using a special system
designed by the COMELEC and not by any ordinary operating system or
computer;
(4) the CF cards storing the digital images of all the ballots used in the
10 May 2010 elections are kept in a secured facility within the
Commission to prevent unauthorized access.12
The COMELEC En Banc further ruled that the result of the
revision proceedings in the trial court could not be admitted
because of the finding by the COMELEC First Division that the
recounted ballots were tampered. The COMELEC En Banc
explained:
The allegation of post-election fraud of Saquilayan was in fact
confirmed by the First Division when upon examination of the scanned
digital images of all the double-shaded ballots, they were found to bear
no traces of double-shading―instead they contain clear and unambiguous
votes for Saquilayan. This finding of the First Division proves that
double-votes did not exist when the PCOS machines counted them on
election day, [w]hich in turn proves that the ballots recounted and
admitted by the trial court were tampered and were clear products of
post-election fraud. Under these circumstances, the doctrines in
Rosal v. COMELEC and Varias v. COMELEC edict that the tampered
revision result which was the basis of the appealed decision cannot be
admitted and cannot be used to overturn the the official count.13
(Emphasis in the original; citations omitted)
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that Maliksi had no
basis to call for the inhibition of Commissioners Sarmiento
_______________
12 Rollo, p. 62.
13 Id.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 243
and Velasco. Commissioner Lim voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc’s 14
September 2012 Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION of Protestant-Appellee EMMANUEL L.
MALIKSI is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, we are
AFFIRMING the August 15, 2012 Resolution of the First Division
NULLIFYING the November 15, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 22 of Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.14
Hence, Maliksi filed the present petition before this Court.
In a Resolution dated 11 October 2012, this Court issued a
temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC En Banc to
desist from implementing its 14 September 2012 Resolution.
The Issues
The overriding issue in this petition for certiorari is whether
the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed
Resolution dated 14 September 2012. In resolving this issue, we
shall examine:
(1) whether Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First
Division ordered on appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images in the CF cards;
(2) whether the ballot images in the CF cards are mere secondary evidence that
should only be used when the physical ballots are not available;
_______________
14 Id., at p. 63.
(3) whether the issue of tampering of ballots and ballot boxes was belatedly
raised by Saquilayan; and
(4) whether there were grounds for the inhibition of Commissioners Sarmiento
and Velasco.
The Ruling of this Court

We dismiss the petition.
The Alleged Violation of Due Process
Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process when the
COMELEC First Division directed the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images in the CF cards for the first time
on appeal without notice to him, thus depriving him of his right to
be present and observe the decryption proceedings.
The records point to the contrary.
In a Motion dated 21 March 2011 filed before the trial court,15
Saquilayan moved for the printing of the images of the ballots in
the CF cards of the contested clustered precincts. Thus, it cannot
be said that Saquilayan asked for decryption of the ballot images
for the first time only on appeal. Saquilayan had called the
attention of the trial court to the unusually large number of
double-shaded ballots affecting only the position of Mayor, giving
rise to a strong suspicion of tampering of the ballots and ballot
boxes. However, the trial court did not immediately act on his
motion, as shown by Saquilayan’s Omnibus Motion To Resolve
16
and For Issuance
_______________ of Order dated 14 April 2011.
15 Id., at pp. 283-285, Motion To Print Picture Images Of The Ballots Stored
In The Memory Cards Of The Clustered Precincts.
16 Id., at pp. 286-292.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 245
In an Omnibus Order17 dated 3 May 2011, the trial court
granted Saquilayan’s motion for the printing of the ballot images
in the CF cards. The trial court gave Saquilayan a period of 30
days within which to accomplish the printing of the ballot images.
Saquilayan received a copy of the Omnibus Order on 10 May
2011. On 11 May 2011, he sent a letter to the COMELEC
requesting it to forward at the soonest time the CF cards of the
protested precincts to the COMELEC Election Records and
Statistics Department (ERSD) to enable the decrypting and
printing of the ballot images. It turned out that the CF cards were
still with the trial court. Thus, in a Manifestation and Request18
dated 20 May 2011, Saquilayan asked the trial court to forward
the CF cards of the protested precincts to the ERSD to enable the
COMELEC to decrypt and print the ballot images.
In an Order19 dated 17 June 2011, the trial court noted that the
ERSD already specified the main and back-up CF cards that were
used in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections in Imus,
Cavite and the decryption and copying of the ballot images was
scheduled to start on 21 June 2011. The trial court then requested
the ERSD to specify the procedure that the ERSD would
undertake for the decryption of the ballot images. In a letter20
dated 20 June 2011, Maliksi wrote the ERSD requesting that
further proceedings be deferred and held in abeyance in deference
to the 17 June 2011 Order of the trial court requiring the ERSD to
specify the procedure it would undertake for the decryption.
Thereafter, Maliksi filed a Motion to Consider That Period Has
Lapsed to Print Ballot’s Picture Images,21 alleging that Saquilayan
was only given a maximum of 30 days within which to
accomplish the printing of the ballot images. Maliksi
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 293-295.
18 Id., at pp. 298-300.
19 Id., at pp. 302-303.
20 Id., at p. 304.
21 Id., at pp. 307-309.
alleged that the period, which was until 22 June 2011, had lapsed
and Saquilayan should be considered barred from having access to
the electronic data in the COMELEC’s back-up server to print the
ballot images in the CF cards. The trial court granted Maliksi’s
motion in its Order dated 3 August 2011.22 The trial court stated
that Saquilayan should have included in his motion to have access
to the electronic data a request for the trial court to turn over to the
COMELEC the CF cards in its possession. As it turned out, the
delay in the turn over of the CF cards likewise delayed the
printing of the ballot images in the CF cards.
It is clear from the foregoing events that the delay in the
printing of the ballot images could not be attributed to Saquilayan
alone. In its 17 June 2011 Order, the trial court set a conference on
27 June 2011 upon Maliksi’s motion to request the ERSD to
specify the procedure it would undertake in decrypting the CF
cards. Maliksi then requested for the deferment of the printing of
the ballot images in his 20 June 2011 letter to ERSD. However,
during the 27 June 2011 hearing, Maliksi’s counsel filed in open
court his Motion to Consider That Period Has Lapsed to Print
Ballot’s Picture Images. The trial court acted on the motion by
requiring Saguilayan’s counsel to comment within five days. The
original reason for the hearing, which was for ERSD to specify
the procedure it would undertake in decrypting the CF cards, was
not even taken up. The trial court eventually granted Maliksi’s
motion and declared that the period given to Saquilayan had
lapsed. The failure of the trial court to turn over the CF cards to
the ERSD, as well as the move of Maliksi for the ERSD to specify
the procedure in decrypting the CF cards, contributed significantly
to the delay in the printing of the ballot images.
The records also showed that Maliksi was aware of the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by
_______________
22 See Rollo, p. 359. Omnibus Order dated 1 September 2011.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 247
the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC First Division
issued an Order23 dated 28 March 2012 directing Saquilayan to
deposit the required amount for expenses for the supplies,
honoraria, and fee for the decryption of the CF cards, and a copy
of the Order was personally delivered to Maliksi’s counsel.24
Maliksi’s counsel was likewise given a copy of Saquilayan’s
Manifestation of Compliance with the 28 March 2012 Order.25 In
an Order26 dated 17 April 2012, the COMELEC First Division
directed Saquilayan to deposit an additional amount for expenses
for the printing of additional ballot images from four clustered
precincts, and a copy of the Order was again personally delivered
to Maliksi’s counsel.27 The decryption took weeks to finish.
Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received
notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot
images by the COMELEC First Division. In addition, Maliksi
raised his objections to the decryption in his motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. The Court has
ruled:
x x x. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. x x x.28
_______________
23 Rollo, p. 362.
24 Id., at p. 361.
25 Id., at p. 363.
26 Id., at p. 366.
27 Id., at p. 365.
28 Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190529, 29 April 2010, 619 SCRA 585, 596.
There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings.29 It is settled
that “opportunity to be heard” does not only mean oral arguments
in court but also written arguments through pleadings.30 Thus, the
fact that a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration
negates any violation of the right to due process.31 The Court has
ruled that denial of due process cannot be invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.32
Evidentiary Value of the Digital Ballot Images
Maliksi assailed the use by the COMELEC First Division of
the ballot images in the CF cards. He alleged that the best and
most conclusive evidence are the physical ballots themselves, and
when they cannot be produced or when they are not available, the
election returns would be the best evidence of the votes cast.
We do not agree. We have already ruled that the ballot images
in the CF cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the
functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by
the voters, and may be used in an election protest.
In the recent consolidated cases of Vinzons-Chato v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Panotes and Panotes v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Vinzons-Chato,33
the Court ruled that “the picture images of the ballots, as scanned
and recorded by the PCOS, are like-
_______________
29 Atty. Octava v. Commission on Elections, 547 Phil. 647; 518 SCRA 759
(2007).
30 Salonga v. CA, 336 Phil. 514; 269 SCRA 534 (1997).
31 See German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 258 Phil.
289; 177 SCRA 495 (1989).
32 Mendiola v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 100671, 7 April 1993,
221 SCRA 295.
33 G.R. Nos. 199149 and 201350, 22 January 2013, 689 SCRA 107.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 249
wise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No.
9369.”34 The Court declared that the printouts of the ballot images
in the CF cards “are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots
filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of
revision of votes in an electoral protest.” In short, both the ballot
images in the CF cards and the printouts of such images have the
same evidentiary value as the official physical ballots filled up by
the voters.
In Vinzons-Chato and Panotes, the Court explained in length:
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines “official ballot” where AES is
utilized as the “paper ballot, whether printed or generated by the
technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by
a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form.”
An automated election system, or AES, is a system using appropriate
technology which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting,
consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other
electoral process. There are two types of AES identified under R.A. No.
9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2) direct recording electronic
system. A paper-based election system, such as the one adopted during
the May 10, 2010 elections, is the type of AES that “use paper ballots,
records and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits
electronically the results of the vote count. On the other hand, direct
recording electronic election system “uses electronic ballots, records,
votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-
optical component that can be activated by the voter, processes data by
means of com-
_______________
34 Republic Act No. 9369 refers to “AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436,
ENTITLED ‘AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY,
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
881, AS AMENDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTIONS LAWS,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’”
puter programs, record voting data and ballot images, and transmits
voting results electronically.
As earlier stated, the May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based
technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by
shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each
voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the
ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As established during
the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in
encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were found to
be digitized representations of the ballots cast.
We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the picture
images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
“official ballots” that faithfully captures (sic) in electronic form the votes
cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such,
the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots
filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of
votes in an electoral protest.
It bears stressing that the digital images of the ballots captured by the
PCOS machine are stored in an encrypted format in the CF cards.
“Encryption is the process of encoding messages (or information) in such
a way that eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that authorized
parties can. In an encryption scheme, the message or information
(referred to as plaintext) is encrypted using an encryption algorithm,
turning it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is usually done with the use
of an encryption key, which specifies how the message is to be encoded.
Any adversary that can see the ciphertext, should not be able to determine
anything about the original message. An authorized party, however, is
able to decode the ciphertext using a decryption algorithm, that usually
requires a secret decryption key, that adversaries do not have access to.”35
(Citations omitted)
Hence, the COMELEC First Division did not gravely abuse its
discretion in using the ballot images in the CF cards.
_______________
35 Supra note 33.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 251
Maliksi further alleged that the ballot images in the CF cards
should merely be considered as secondary evidence and should be
resorted to only when the physical ballots are not available or
could not be produced.
Maliksi is mistaken.
Rule 4 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC36 is clear on this issue. It
states:
SECTION 1. Original of an Electronic Document.―An electronic
document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
SECTION 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals.―When a
document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time
with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same
impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or
electronic recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such
copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the
original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be
admissible to the same extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original;
or
(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit
the copy in lieu of the original. (Emphasis supplied)
The ballot images, which are digital, are electronically
generated and written in the CF cards when the ballots are fed into
the PCOS machine. The ballot images are the counterparts
produced by electronic recording which accurately reproduce the
original, and thus are the equivalent of the original. As pointed out
by the COMELEC, “[t]he digital images of the physical ballots
are electronically and instantaneously
_______________
36 Rules on Electronic Evidence.
generated by the PCOS machines once the physical ballots are fed
into and read by the machines.”37 Hence, the ballot images are not
secondary evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot
images in the CF cards are both original documents. The ballot
images in the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the
official physical ballots.
The Court notes that Maliksi did not raise any allegation that
the use of the ballot images falls under any of the exceptions
under Section 2, Rule 4 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC that would make
their use inadmissible as original ballots.
Tampering of Ballots and Ballot Boxes
Maliksi alleged that there was no allegation of ballot and ballot
box tampering before the trial court. He further alleged that the
COMELEC First Division did not explain how it came to the
conclusion that the integrity of the ballot boxes had been
compromised or that there was ballot tampering.
The records reveal otherwise.
Contrary to Maliksi’s claim, Saquilayan questioned the
integrity of the ballot boxes and election paraphernalia before the
trial court. In an Urgent Manifestation of Concern and
Objections38 dated 8 June 2010, Saquilayan manifested his serious
concern regarding the integrity of the ballot boxes and election
paraphernalia which remained under the effective control of
Maliksi. Saquilayan informed the trial court that his watchers
were being limited to the outside of the building where the ballot
boxes and election paraphernalia were kept, thus preventing them
from looking over the security of the ballot boxes and election
paraphernalia. In the same manifestation, Saquilayan categorically
stated that he was “questioning the integrity of the ballot boxes
and other election para-
_______________
37 Rollo, p. 507.
38 Id., at pp. 261-265.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 253
phernalia.”39 Saquilayan also alleged in the same manifestation
that the trial court could have prescribed a procedure that would
allow his watchers to view the ballot boxes and other election
paraphernalia that “would have prevented to some degree the
tampering of the boxes and election material[s].”40 Clearly,
Saquilayan raised before the trial court the issue of tampering of
the ballots and ballot boxes.
Further, the COMELEC En Banc clarified in its Comment41
that the COMELEC First Division ordered the decryption,
printing, and examination of the digital images because the
COMELEC First Division “discovered upon inspection that the
integrity of the ballots themselves was compromised and that the
ballot boxes were tampered.”42 The COMELEC First Division
properly invoked Section 6(f), Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which states:
Sec. 6. Powers and Duties of the Presiding Commissioner.―
The powers and duties of the Presiding Commissioner of a Division when
discharging its functions in cases pending before the Division shall be as
follows:
xxxx
(f) To take such other measures as he may deem proper upon
consultation with the other members of the Division.
In this case, the COMELEC En Banc categorically stated that
the recounting of the physical ballots in the revision before the
trial court yielded dubious results. The COMELEC En Banc
stressed:
x x x. Worth noting also is that these 8,387 ballots all came from 53
clustered precincts specifically pinpointed by Maliksi as his pilot
precincts (which is 20% of the total pre-
_______________
39 Id., at p. 262.
40 Id., at p. 264.
41 Id., at pp. 484-516.
42 Id., at p. 500.
cincts he protested)―thereby affecting a total of 33.38% or more
than one-third (1/3) of the total ballots cast in those precincts. We
find this too massive to have not been detected on election day, too
specific to be random and too precise to be to be accidental―which
leaves a reasonable mind no other conclusion except that those 8,387
cases of double-shading were purposely machinated. These dubious
and highly suspicious circumstances left us with no other option but
to dispense with the physical ballots and resort to their digital
images. To recount the tampered ballots will only yield us tampered
results defeating the point of this appeal.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The tampering of the ballots and ballot boxes had been fully
established and it justified the decryption of the ballot images in
the CF cards.
Inhibition of Commissioners Sarmiento and Velasco
Maliksi alleged that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused
its discretion when it included in the body of its 14 September
2012 Resolution a discussion of his motion for the inhibition of
Commissioners Sarmiento and Velasco instead of leaving it to
their own discretion and prerogative.
We see nothing wrong with the inclusion of the matter of
inhibition in the Resolution. Commissioners Sarmiento and
Velasco signed the Resolution which means they concurred with
the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling that the motion for their
inhibition had no basis. Maliksi himself pointed out that the
matter of inhibition is better left to the Commissioner’s discretion
and thus, he could not impose the inhibition of Commissioners
Sarmiento and Velasco just because Commissioner Lim inhibited
himself from the case. Commissioners Sarmiento and Velasco are
not even required, although they are neither prohibited, to
individually explain their vote or to
_______________
43 Id., at p. 60.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 255
individually answer the motion for inhibition, like what
Commissioner Lim did. In this case, the COMELEC En Banc
ruled on the motion for inhibition. Moreover, the dissent of
Commissioners Lim and Velasco in SPR (AE) No. 106-2011 is
not a prejudgment of EAC (AE) No. A-22-2011. While the two
cases involved the same parties, the only issue in SPR (AE) No.
106-2011 is the issuance of a temporary restraining order to stop
the execution of the trial court’s decision pending appeal.
Contrary to Maliksi’s allegation, the ruling in SPR (AE) No. 106-
2011 on the temporary restraining order is not a confirmation of
the validity of the decision subject of the appeal in EAC (AE) No.
A-22-2011. In the same manner, the fact that Commissioner Elias
R. Yusoph did not take part in SPR (AE) No. 106-2011 does not
mean he should also take no part in EAC (AE) No. A-22-2011
considering that they involve different issues.
In sum, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc when it issued the assailed Resolution of 14
September 2012.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the
Resolution promulgated on 14 September 2012 by the
Commission on Elections En Banc which affirmed the 15 August
2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections First Division
declaring HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN as the duly-elected
Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite. We LIFT the temporary
restraining order issued on 11 October 2012. This decision is
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY considering that the remainder of
Saquilayan’s term of office is only less than five (5) months.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J.), Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perlas-
Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Mendoza
and Reyes, JJ., Join the dissent of Justice Bersamin.
Perez, J. I certify that J. Perez left his vote of concurrence with
the ponencia of J. Carpio. (Sgd.) Sereno, C.J.
Bersamin, J., Please see my dissent.
DISSENT
BERSAMIN, J.:
I DISSENT.
Petitioner Emmanuel L. Maliksi and respondent Homer T.
Saquilayan vied for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Imus, Cavite during the May 10, 2010 Elections. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Saquilayan as the winner
garnering 48,181 votes, while Maliksi came in second with 39,682
votes. Maliksi filed an election protest in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Imus, Cavite, alleging discrepancies and irregularities in
the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Based on the results of the revision, the RTC rendered its
November 15, 2011 decision, declaring Maliksi as the duly-
elected Mayor, thus:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the
Election Protest filed by Emmanuel L. Maliksi meritorious. Accordingly,
Emmanuel L. Maliksi is hereby DECLARED as the duly elected Mayor
of the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite after having obtained the
highest number of legal votes of 41,088 as against Protestant Homer T.
Saquilayan’s 40,423 votes or a winning margin of 665 votes in favor of
the former.
Thus, the election and proclamation of Homer T. Saquilayan as Mayor
of Imus, Cavite is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and he is
COMMANDED to immediately CEASE and DESIST from performing
the duties and functions of said office.
Finally, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 14 of A.M. 10-4-1-SC, the Clerk
of Court is hereby DIRECTED to personally deliver the copy
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 257
of the signed and promulgated decision on the counsels of the parties.
SO ORDERED.1
Aggrieved, Saquilayan sought recourse from the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) by appeal (docketed as EAC (AE) No.
A-22-2011).
In the meantime, Maliksi moved for execution pending appeal,
and the RTC granted his motion. Thus, Maliksi was seated as
Mayor, prompting Saquilayan to assail the grant of the motion via
petition for certiorari in the COMELEC (docketed as SPR (AE)
No. 106-2011).
After the parties filed their respective briefs in EAC (AE) No.
A-22-2011, the COMELEC First Division issued an order dated
March 28, 2012, requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount
necessary for the printing of the ballot images, thus:
xxxx
In as much as the printing of ballot image in the instant case would
entail expense for supplies, honoraria, one-time fee for the use of the
system in the decryption of the CF cards, and storage fee for the ballot
boxes, it is hereby RESOLVED that the appellant be directed to deposit
to the Cash Division of the Commission, the amount of One Hundred
Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Fourteen Pesos (P119,714.00)
WHEREFORE, appellant shall deposit the required amount within
three days from receipt hereof.
The Division Clerk of the Commission is DIRECTED to immediately
purchase the necessary supplies needed in the printing of ballot image,
hence, is authorized [to] withdraw the amount above stated. She shall
submit the liquidation report on the cash advance within thirty (30) days
from termination of proceedings.
SO ORDERED.2
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 95-96.
2 Id., at p. 362.
The First Division later issued another order dated April 17,
2012, requiring Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.3
Finally, on August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a
resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision,4 to wit:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES, to:
1. NULLIFY the pronouncement of the lower court that
protestant-appellee EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI is the duly-
elected Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite and HEREBY
DECLARES HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN as the duly-elected
Municipal Mayor of the above-mentioned municipality;
2. Further, the Law Department is hereby DIRECTED:
i. To conduct an investigation as to who were responsible for
the tampering of the ballot boxes for purposes of filing the
appropriate information for violation of election laws; and
ii. To conduct an investigation as to possible violation of
election laws and Comelec Resolutions by herein protestant-
appellee EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI as to how he was able to
secure a photocopy of the official ballot which he attached in
his Election Protest.
SO ORDERED.5
In its resolution, the First Division ratiocinated that:
xxxx
The Commission (First Division) took into consideration the
allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon inspecting the
ballot boxes, it is apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been
compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the
_______________
3 Id., at p. 366.
4 Id., at pp. 95-126.
5 Id., at p. 125.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 259
electorate, we decided to go over the digital image of the appealed
ballots.
In appreciating the appealed ballots, the Commission used the
following guidelines:
xxxx
Pursuant to this principle, to be able to determine fully the true will of
the electorate, we scrutinized the appealed ballots by using its digital
images since there is an allegation of ballot tampering.
xxxx
After counting and appreciation of the appealed clustered precincts by
this Commission (First Division), protestant-appellee Maliksi got FORTY
THOUSAND NINETY-TWO (40,092) votes while protestee-appellant
Saquilayan got FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY-ONE (48,521) or a difference of EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE (8,429) votes.6
xxxx
Maliksi filed an omnibus motion,7 seeking, inter alia, the
reconsideration of the First Division Resolution based on the
following arguments, namely: (a) the decryption proceedings
violated his right to due process and were null and void for being
held without notice to the parties; and (b) ballot images were
secondary evidence that could be resorted to only in the event that
the ballots were unavailable, or when sufficient proof existed that
tampering or substitution had taken place.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
resolution, disposing as follows:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION of Protestant-Appellee EMMANUEL L.
MALIKSI is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, we are
AF-
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 102-124.
7 Id., at pp. 76-92.
FIRMING the August 15, 2012 Resolution of the First Division
NULLIFYING the November 15, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 22 of Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.8
Maliksi brought this special civil action for certiorari,
reiterating that: (a) his right to due process of law was violated
when he was not notified of the decryption, printing and
examination of the digital images of the ballots; and (b) the
printouts of the picture images of the ballots were secondary
evidence to be resorted to only when the ballots were not
available, or when there was evidence that the integrity of the
ballots had not been preserved.
I vote to grant the petition for certiorari.
I submit that the proceedings conducted by the First Division,
the results of which became the basis of the questioned resolution,
were void and ineffectual for being in abject violation of Maliksi’s
right to due process of law.
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that
are regarded as the equivalents of the original official ballots
9
themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representa-
_______________
8 Id., at p. 63.
9 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election Contests, Rule 1, Section 3
(r) defines “electronic document” as follows:
xxxx
(r) Electronic document—refers to the record of information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of
written expression, described or however represented, by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally-signed
documents and any printout or output, readable by sight or other means that
accurately reflects the electronic document.
For purposes of these Rules, an electronic document refers to either the
picture image of the ballots or the electronic copies of the electronic returns,
the statements of votes, the certificates of
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 261
tives Electoral Tribunal,10 the Court held that “the picture images
of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes
cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As
such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the
paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.”
That the two documents―the official ballot and its picture
image―are considered “original documents” simply means that
both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when
either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier
than the other.
_______________
canvass, the audit log, and other electronic data processed by the PCOS and
consolidation machines.
xxxx
Likewise, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In Re: COMELEC Rules of
Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System in Connection with
the May 10, 2010 Elections), Rule 2, Section 1(q) defines “electronic
document” as follows:
xxxx
(q) Electronic document refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved
or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any
print-out or output, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic document.
For purposes of these Rules, electronic documents refer to either the
picture image of the ballots and the electronic copies of the electronic
returns, the statements of votes, the certificates of canvass, the audit log, and
of the other electronic data relative to the processing done by the PCOS
machines and the various consolidation machines.
xxxx
10 G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 107.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the
COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the
ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to
the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the
rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective
proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary
or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture
images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown
that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.
For instance, Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the
2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election Contests, which
governs the proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts exercising
original jurisdiction over election protests, provides:
(m) In the event that the revision committee determines that the
integrity of the ballots and the ballot box have not been preserved, as
when proof of tampering or substitution exists, it shall proceed to
instruct the printing of the picture image of the ballots stored in the data
storage device for the precinct. The court shall provide a non-partisan
technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication
process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a
substitute. Only after this determination can the printed picture
image be used for the recount.
A similar procedure is found in the 2010 Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
Rule 43. Conduct of the revision.―The revision of votes shall be
done through the use of appropriate PCOS machines or manually and
visually, as the Tribunal may determine, and according to the following
procedures:
xxxx
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 263
(q) In the event that the RC determines that the integrity of the
ballots and the ballot box was not preserved, as when there is proof of
tampering or substitution, it shall proceed to instruct the printing of the
picture image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data
storage device for the same precinct. The Tribunal may avail itself of
the assistance of the COMELEC for the service of a non-partisan
technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication
process to ensure that the data or images stored are genuine and not
merely substitutes. It is only upon such determination that the
printed picture image can be used for the revision of votes.
xxxx
Also, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal’s
Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots requires a preliminary
hearing to be held for the purpose of determining whether the
integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010
elections was not preserved, as when there is proof of tampering
or substitutions, to wit:
Section 10. Revision of Ballots
xxxx
(d) When it has been shown, in a preliminary hearing set by the
parties or by the Tribunal, that the integrity of the ballots and ballot
boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved, as when
there is proof of tampering or substitutions, the Tribunal shall direct
the printing of the picture images of the ballots of the subject precinct
stored in the data storage device for the same precinct. The Tribunal shall
provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary
authentication process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine
and not a substitute. It is only upon such determination that the
printed picture image can be used for the revision. (as amended per
Resolution of February 10, 2011).
xxxx
Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In Re:
Comelec Rules of Procedure on Disputes In An Automated
Election System in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Elec-
tions) itself requires that “the Recount Committee determines
that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not
been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition
that (the ballots) cannot be recounted” before the printing of
the image of the ballots should be made, and that such
printing should be done “in the presence of the parties,” to
wit:
xxxx
(g) Only when the Recount Committee, through its chairman,
determines that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved or that no
signs of tampering of the ballots are present, will the recount proceed. In
case there are signs that the ballots contained therein are tampered,
compromised, wet or are otherwise in such a condition that it could not
be recounted, the Recount Committee shall follow paragraph (l) of this
rule.
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the
integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved, or
are wet and otherwise in such a condition that it cannot be recounted, the
Chairman of the Committee shall request from the Election Records and
Statistics Department (ERSD), the printing of the image of the ballots of
the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in the May 10, 2010
elections in the presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall
proceed only upon prior authentication and certification by a duly
authorized personnel of the Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine and not
substitutes. (As amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, March 16,
2011)
xxxx
All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots stipulate that
the printing of the picture images of the ballots may be
resorted to only after the proper Revision/Recount Committee
has first determined that the integrity of the ballots and the
ballot box was not preserved. The foregoing rules further
require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF
cards and
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 265
the printing of the decrypted images take place during the
revision or recount proceedings, and that it is the
Revision/Recount Committee that determines whether the
ballots are unreliable.
There is a good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the
decryption and the printing should be conducted. It is during the
revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount
Committee when the parties are allowed to be represented, with
their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising
their objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover,
whenever the Revision/Recount Committee makes any
determination that the ballots have been tampered and have
become unreliable, the parties are immediately made aware of
such determination.
Here, however, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or
the RTC exercising its original jurisdiction over the protest that
made the finding that the ballots had been tampered, but the First
Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Maliksi was
not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the
First Division did not even issue any written resolution stating its
reasons for ordering the printing of the picture images.
The parties were formally notified that the First Division had
found that the ballots had been tampered only when they received
the resolution of August 15, 2012, whereby the First Division
nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the
duly elected Mayor. Even so, the resolution of the First Division
that effect was unusually mute about the factual bases for the
finding of ballot box tampering, and did not also particularize how
and why the First Division was concluding that the integrity of the
ballots had been compromised. All that the First Division uttered
as justification was a simple generality of the same being apparent
from the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon
inspection of the ballot boxes, viz.:
xxxx
The Commission (First Division) took into consideration the
allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon inspecting the
ballot boxes, it is apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been
compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the
electorate, we decided to go over the digital image of the appealed
ballots.11 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It was the COMELEC En Banc’s assailed resolution of
September 14, 2012 that later on provided the explanation to
justify the First Division’s resort to the picture images of the
ballots, by observing that the “unprecedented number of double-
votes” exclusively affecting the position of Mayor and the votes
for Saquilayan had led to the belief that the ballots had been
tampered. However, that observation did not cure the First
Division’s lapse and did not erase the irregularity that had already
invalidated the First Division’s proceedings.
The blatant disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the
decision to print the picture images of the ballots and to conduct
the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be
brushed aside by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able
to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be exact, the
motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire
resolution of the First Division, while Maliksi’s claim of due
process violation is directed only against the First Division’s
recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered
against him. I note that the First Division did not issue any order
directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was
deprived of the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to
assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable petition
for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real
opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.
_______________
11 Rollo, p. 102.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 267
I disagree that the service of the orders requiring Saquilayan to
make the cash deposits for the printing of the picture images made
Maliksi aware of the First Division’s decision to print the picture
images. The orders still did not meet the requirement of due
process because they did not specifically inform Maliksi that the
ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor did the orders offer
the factual bases for the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for
Maliksi to surmise on the factual bases for finding the need to
print the picture images still violated the principles of fair play,
because the responsibility and the obligation to lay down the
factual bases and to inform Maliksi as the party to be potentially
prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders of the First
Division.
As I see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself
the conduct of the revision/recount proceedings and recounted the
ballots, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest
to the RTC and directing the reconstitution of the Revision
Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images
and the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite
unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Division’s
unwarranted deviation from the standard procedures by invoking
the COMELEC’s power to “take such measures as [the Presiding
Commissioner] may deem proper,” and even citing the Court’s
minute resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-
List v. Commission on Elections12 to the effect that the
“COMELEC has the power to adopt procedures that will ensure
the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not interfere
with its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are
amply heard on their opposing claims.”13
The COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the deviation
of the First Division. Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of
Barangay Concerns v. COMELEC, the power of
_______________
12 G.R. No. 199050, August 28, 2012.
13 Rollo, pp. 60-61.
the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to
all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing
claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and
matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so
lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be
thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them.
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections14 is instructive on when
notice to and the participation of the parties are required. In that
case, after the revision of the ballots and after the election protest
case was submitted for decision, the ballots and ballot boxes were
transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection
with a protest case pending therein. The petitioner later learned
that the COMELEC, with the permission of the SET, had
meanwhile conducted proceedings within the SET’s premises. The
petitioner claimed that his right to due process was violated
because he was not given notice by the COMELEC that it would
be conducting further proceedings within the SET premises. The
Court held otherwise, however, and pointed out:
After consideration of the respondents’ Comments and the petitioner’s
petition and Reply, we hold that the contested proceedings at the SET
(“contested proceedings[”]) are no longer part of the adversarial
aspects of the election contest that would require notice of hearing
and the participation of the parties. As the COMELEC stated in its
Comment and without any contrary or disputing claim in the petitioner’s
Reply:
“However, contrary to the claim of petitioner, public respondent in
the appreciation of the contested ballots in EPC No. 2007-44
simultaneously with the SET in SET Case No. 001-07 is not conducting
“further proceedings” requiring notice to the parties. There is no
revision or correction of the ballots because EPC No. 2007-04 was
already submitted for resolution. Public respondent, in coordinating with
the SET, is sim-
_______________
14 G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009, 603 SCRA 692.
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 269
ply resolving the submitted protest case before it. The parties necessarily
take no part in said deliberation, which require utmost secrecy. Needless
to state, the actual decision-making process is supposed to be conducted
only by the designated members of the Second Division of the public
respondent in strict confidentiality.”
In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal
deliberations of the COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of
appreciating the evidence presented and deciding the provincial election
contest on the merits. These deliberations are no different from judicial
deliberations which are considered confidential and privileged. We find it
significant that the private respondent’s Comment fully supported the
COMELEC’s position and disavowed any participation in the contested
proceeding the petitioner complained about. The petitioner, on the other
hand, has not shown that the private respondent was ever present in any
proceeding at the SET relating to the provincial election contest.
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material
considerations in the COMELEC’s handling of the Bulacan provincial
election contest after the transfer of the ballot boxes to the SET; no
proceedings at the instance of one party or of COMELEC has been
conducted at the SET that would require notice and hearing because
of the possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is
under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is taking
in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election
contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we see
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election
contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.15
(Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the First Division denominated the proceedings it
conducted as an “appreciation of ballots” like in Mendoza.
Unlike in Mendoza, however, the proceedings conducted by
the First Division were adversarial, in
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 716-717.
that the proceedings included the decryption and printing of
the picture images of the ballots and the recount of the votes
were to be based on the printouts of the picture images. The
First Division did not simply review the findings of the RTC
and the Revision Committee, but actually conducted its own
recount proceedings using the printouts of the picture image
of the ballots. As such, the First Division was bound to notify
the parties to enable them to participate in the proceedings.
We should not ignore that the parties’ participation during
the revision/recount proceedings would not benefit only the
parties. Such participation was as vital and significant for the
COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the
COMELEC’s proceedings attain credibility as to the result. In
this regard, the COMELEC was less than candid, and was
even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing of
the picture images of the ballots and the recount proceedings.
The COMELEC En Banc was merely content with listing the
guidelines that the First Division had followed in the
appreciation of the ballots and the results of the recount. In
short, there was vagueness as to what rule had been followed
in the decryption and printing proceeding.
Moreover, I respectfully point out that the First Division
should not conduct the proceedings now being assailed
because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to
which no existing rule of procedure allowed the First Division
to conduct the recount in the first instance. The recount
proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, are to be conducted by the
COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive
original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective
re-
VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 271
gional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city
officials.16
On the other hand, we have Section 6 (l), Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9164, which clearly requires the parties’ presence
during the printing of the images of the ballots, thus:
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity
of the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and
otherwise in such a condition that it cannot be recounted, the Chairman of
the Committee shall request from the Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD), the printing of the image of the ballots of the
subject precinct stored in the CF card used in the May 10, 2010 elections
in the presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall
proceed only upon prior authentication and certification by a duly
authorized personnel of the Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine and not
substitutes. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
I write this dissent not to validate the victory of any of the
parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court
as yet. I dissent only because the Court should not countenance a
denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a
cornerstone of our legal system.17
I am mindful of the urgent need to speedily resolve this protest
because the term of the Mayoralty position involved is about to
end. Accordingly, I urge that we quickly remand this case to the
COMELEC, instead of to the RTC, for the conduct of the
decryption, printing and recount proceedings, with due
_______________
16 COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, Rule 6, Section 1.
17 Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91486, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA
635.
notice to all the parties and opportunity for them to be present and
to participate during such proceedings. Nothing less serves the
ideal objective safeguarded by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the
petition for certiorari, and to REMAND the protest to the
Commission on Elections for the decryption of the picture images
of the ballots after due authentication, for the printing of the
decrypted ballot images, and for the conduct of the recount
proceedings using the printouts of the ballot images, with notice
to and in the presence of the parties or their representatives.
Petition dismissed, resolution dated 14 September 2012
affirmed.
Notes.―The source code is the “human readable instructions
that define what the computer equipment will do.” (Center for
People Empowerment in Governance vs. Commission on
Elections, 631 SCRA 41 [2010])
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9369 is clear in that “once an Automated Election System (AES)
technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall
promptly make the source code of that technology available and
open to any interested political party or groups which may
conduct their own review thereof.” (Ibid.)
――o0o――

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