G.R. No.
184823 October 6, 2010 On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review7 with the CTA for
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute
expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his favor, or
under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes
erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove
not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the
procedural due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods
within which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would
result in the denial of his claim.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to set aside the July 30, 2008 Decision1 and the October 6,
2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing, producing, and processing
of steel and its by-products.3 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) as a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity4 and its products,
"close impression die steel forgings" and "tool and dies," are registered
with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer status.5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of
input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total
amount of ₱3,891,123.82 with the petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
the refund/credit of the same input VAT. The case was docketed as CTA
Case No. 7065 and was raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.
In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July
1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, it generated and recorded zero-rated
sales in the amount of ₱131,791,399.00,8 which was paid pursuant to
Section 106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997 (NIRC);9 that for the said period, it incurred and paid
input VAT amounting to ₱3,912,088.14 from purchases and
importation attributable to its zero-rated sales;10and that in its
application for refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-
Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center, it only claimed the
amount of ₱3,891,123.82.11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following special
and affirmative defenses, to wit:
4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to
administrative investigation by the Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the
period in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales
contemplated under Sections 106(A) (2) (a), and 108(B) (1) of
the Tax Code of 1997;
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the
two (2) year period prescribed in Section 229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the
taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain
the burden is fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant
for the same partake of the nature of exemption from
taxation.13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of
the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting respondent’s claim for
refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim
a refund, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may,
within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales,
except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not
been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the
following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is engaged in sales which are zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VAT-registered; (3)
the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable
quarter when such sales were made; and (4) the creditable input tax
due or paid must be attributable to such sales, except the transitional
input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against
the output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied
[with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner,
such as the Sales Invoices (Exhibits "II" to "II-262," "JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK"
to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is engaged in sales which are zero-
rated.
The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate
of Registration with OCN 1RC0000148499 (Exhibit "C") with the BIR
proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative
claim for refund on September 30, 2004 (Exhibit "N") and the present
Petition for Review on September 30, 2004, both within the two (2)
year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, which is from September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some
documents and claims of petitioner that are baseless and have not
been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund
or issuance of a tax credit certificate representing unutilized excess
input VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002,
which are attributable to its zero-rated sales for the same period, but in
the reduced amount of ₱3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.82
Less:
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37
Net Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,850,103.45
Less:
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,239,119.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO
REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in]
the reduced amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY NINE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100 PESOS
(₱3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input VAT incurred for the
months of July to September 2002.
SO ORDERED.14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration,15 insisting that the administrative and the
judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax
refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.
He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the
claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the
two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004.16 He cited as
basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,17 which provides that when the law
speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner
argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the
judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the
NIRC.18 According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative
claim is a "condition precedent"19 before a judicial claim can be filed.
He explained that the rationale of such requirement rests not only on
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the
fact that the CTA is an appellate body which exercises the power of
judicial review over administrative actions of the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioner’s Motion
for Partial Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner thus elevated
the matter to the CTA En Banc via a Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s
Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in favor of respondent.
However, as to the reckoning point for counting the two-year period,
the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed
beyond the period allowed by law and hence, the honorable Court has
no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner further contends
that respondent's filing of the administrative and judicial [claims]
effectively eliminates the authority of the honorable Court to exercise
jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax
imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the amount of
his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the
close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided,
however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on
a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25)
days from the close of each taxable quarter within which to file a
quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts. In the case
at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period of July 1, 2002
to September 30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC,
respondent has until October 25, 2002 within which to file its quarterly
return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied when it
filed its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under
Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC should start from the payment of tax
subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent filed its VAT
Return for the taxable third quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus,
respondent's administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on
September 30, 2004 were filed on time because AICHI has until October
20, 2004 within which to file its claim for refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the
1997 NIRC requires the previous filing of an administrative claim for
refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not be the case as the law
does not prohibit the simultaneous filing of the administrative and
judicial claims for refund. What is controlling is that both claims for
refund must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the
findings and conclusion spelled out in the assailed January 4, 2008
Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second Division.
What the instant petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and
appreciate the evidence in their own perspective of things, which
unfortunately had already been considered and passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the January 4,
2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second
Division in CTA Case No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company of Asia,
Inc. petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent" are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his
Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of
whether respondent’s judicial and administrative claims for tax
refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period
provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of
the NIRC.24
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative and judicial
claims for tax refund/credit were filed in violation of Sections 112(A)
and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil
Code,26 since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for
tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year
period, which expired on September 29, 2004.27
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying Section
114(A) of the NIRC in determining the start of the two-year period as
the said provision pertains to the compliance requirements in the
payment of VAT.28 He asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of
the same Code that should apply because it specifically provides for the
period within which a claim for tax refund/ credit should be made.29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim
with the BIR and the judicial claim with the CTA were filed on the same
day.30 He opines that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and
the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires
the prior filing of an administrative claim.31 He insists that such
procedural requirement is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA is an appellate body
exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR.32
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its
unutilized input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002
as a matter of right because it has substantially complied with all the
requirements provided by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the
CTA En Banc in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the
prescriptive period for the claim for tax refund/credit. Respondent
believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC must be read together with
Section 114(A) of the same Code.34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial
claims, respondent contends that it first filed an administrative claim
with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center of the DOF before it filed a judicial claim with the CTA.35 To
prove this, respondent points out that its Claimant Information Sheet
No. 4970236 and BIR Form No. 1914 for the third quarter of
2002,37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as Annexes "M"
and "N," respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the
CTA.38 Respondent further contends that the non-observance of the
120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit
in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both
claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period.39 In support
thereof, respondent cites Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc.40 where it was ruled that "[i]f, however, the
[CIR] takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is
about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the [CTA]
before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of
the [CIR]."41 Lastly, respondent argues that even if the period had
already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity considering
that it is not a jurisdictional requirement.42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close
of the taxable quarter when the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the Second Division of the CTA
applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales – Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may,
within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales,
except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not
been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of
zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section
108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds
thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further,
That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or
services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be
directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall
be allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections
114 and 229 of the NIRC, which read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax
imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the amount of
his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the
close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided,
however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on
a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with
Section 236, shall file a return and pay the tax due thereon within
twenty-five (25) days from the date of cancellation of registration:
Provided, That only one consolidated return shall be filed by the
taxpayer for his principal place of business or head office and all
branches.
xxxx
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. –
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim
for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but
such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax,
penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the
face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment
appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year period
for filing a claim for refund/credit of unutilized input VAT should start
from the date of payment of tax and not from the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year
prescriptive period, however, has already been resolved in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation,44 where we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the
applicable provision in determining the start of the two-year period for
claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and that Sections
204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply
only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal
revenue taxes."45 We explained that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no
uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise
used for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed
within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when
the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless
of whether said tax was paid or not. As the CA aptly puts it, albeit it
erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec. 112 (A), "[P]rescriptive
period commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor
from the time the official receipt was issued." Thus, when a zero-rated
VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent transaction,
said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of
the unutilized creditable input VAT. The reckoning frame would always
be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction was
made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be that as it may, and
given that the last creditable input VAT due for the period covering the
progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the third quarter of 1996
ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for unutilized creditable input
VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years after
September 30, 1996 or, to be precise, on September 30, 1998.
Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on December
10, 1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec.
204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which, for the purpose of refund, prescribes
a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for the filing
of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C) and 229 respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and
Refund or Credit Taxes. – The Commissioner may –
xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties
imposed without authority, refund the value of internal revenue
stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser,
and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been
rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of
destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed
unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for
credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or
penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an
overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or
refund.
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have
been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any
manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the
face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment
appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period,
reckoned from date of payment of the tax or penalty, for the filing of a
claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both provisions apply only
to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal
revenue taxes.
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an
indirect tax which can be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee,
or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the taxpayer. The fact
that the subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt
client, resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transaction,
does not, standing alone, deprive the taxpayer of its right to a refund
for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the erroneous, illegal, or
wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of the
NIRC, providing a two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the
close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales or transactions
were made pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to the
instant case, and not to the other actions which refer to erroneous
payment of taxes.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously
applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the NIRC in computing the two-year
prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized input VAT.
To be clear, Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the
refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should be
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the
administrative claim was timely filed.
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code,47 which provides that a year is
equivalent to 365 days, and taking into account the fact that the year
2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the two-year period to
file a claim for tax refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 expired on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group,
Inc.,49 we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a
year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987,
which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the
latter that must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori
derogat priori.50 Thus:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter –
the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed
of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law,
governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the
time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998)
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14,
6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14
7th calendar month We therefore
October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998 hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000)
was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day
8th calendar month respondent
November 15, 1998 to December filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
14, 1998
reglementary period.51
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for
tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002
10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s administrative
claim was timely filed.
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
The filing of the judicial claim was premature
12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14,However,
1999 notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim,
we
Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14,are constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for
1999
having been filed in violation of Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14,provides
1999 that:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14,x1999
xxx
16th calendar month (D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be
July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue
17th calendar month the tax14,
August 15, 1999 to September credit
1999certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents
18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999
in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A)
and (B) hereof.
19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November
In case 14, 1999
of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit,
or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application
20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within
21st calendar month thirty (30)
December 15, 1999 to January days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or
14, 2000
after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the
22nd calendar month decision
January 15, 2000 to February or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis
14, 2000
supplied.)
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days,
from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant or
of the
deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s
recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt
of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR
fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the
taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were
simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously, respondent did
not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period.
For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA
premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period
is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long as both the
administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year
prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent’s
view. Subsection (A) of the said provision states that "any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated
may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales."
The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed
with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in
the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which
states that the CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render
nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already provides for a
specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the decision or
inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC
envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before
the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2) when no decision is made after
the 120-day period. In both instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within
which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day
period is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling,
Co., Inc.53 relied upon by respondent, we find the same inapplicable as
the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229
of the NIRC. And as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to
refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit of
input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no
jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30,
2008 Decision and the October 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Tax Appeals
Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. 7065 for having
been prematurely filed.
G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,
vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by
ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules) are the
April 30, 20082 and August 1, 20083 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed the
petition and denied the motion for reconsideration,
respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the January 28, 2008
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 of
Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the Orders dated
September 4, 20065 and November 16, 20066 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 50 of Caloocan City,
permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634.
The facts are simple and undisputed:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by
Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private complainant in Criminal Case
Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co
(Co), which were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan
City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases
were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a copy of the June9,
2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record
received a copy a day after.8 On July 2, 2004, Uy, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon.
Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49,
granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s
motion for reconsideration.10 When Co moved for recusation,
Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the criminal cases
per Order dated January 10, 2005.11 The cases were,
thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On
March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the
criminal cases.12 It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit
on May 23, 2005.13 Co’s motion for reconsideration was,
subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005.14 Co then filed
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the
Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096.15
We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13,
2006.16 There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the
dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.17
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-
59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the inhibition
of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on
July 13, 2006.18 Uy opposed the motion, contending that the
motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by
this Court in G.R. No. 171096.19 In spite of this, Judge Esteban
V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting
Co’s motion.20 When the court subsequently denied Uy’s
motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed
a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On
January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC
Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and
setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to
proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.22 Co then filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid,
dismissed the petition and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for
TRO/WPI.
According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in
this petition:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST PETITIONER ONTHE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF
THESE CASES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN
REVIVING THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH
WERE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT
TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and
3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY
PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:
a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS
COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL
DISMISSAL;
b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE
BASIS FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;
c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ARE REVIVED IPSO FACTO BY THE FILING OF
MOTION TO REVIVE THESE CASES.23
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 should
be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right
to speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his
arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9,
2003, there was already a "vexatious, capricious and
oppressive" delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic
Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998)24 and Section 2,
Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure25 mandating that the entire trial period should not
exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is
deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction
over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same
based on a mere motion because its revival would already put
him in double jeopardy.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally
dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003
Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists
that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court’s
issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the
one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year
period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003
when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the
motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
The petition is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this
petition were also the meat of the controversy in Co’s
previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed per
Resolution dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became
final and executory on March 20, 2006. While the first petition
was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, this Court
nonetheless stated therein that "[i]n any event, the petition
lacks sufficient showing that respondent court had committed
any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant
the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our
February 13, 2006 Resolution in G.R. No. 171096, the same
already constitutes as res judicata between the parties. On
this ground alone, this petition should have been dismissed
outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised
in the present petition, Co’s arguments are nonetheless
untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is
baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the
alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the
trial was attended with malice or that the same was made
without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the
prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a
relative term and necessarily a flexible concept."26 In
determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the
entirety of the proceedings.27 The factors to balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice
caused by such delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of
everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which,
after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard
must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.29 "While the Court recognizes the accused's right to
speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration
of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable
length of time are what offend the right of the accused to
speedy trial."30
Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of
the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which
are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar
in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution
with the express conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or
both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court
issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a
copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.31 In this
case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon
which was served on the private complainant at least three
days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of
the Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in open court that Co
moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per
records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue
her complaint."33 The importance of a prior notice to the
offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly
explained in People v. Lacson:34
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private
interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or
parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a
priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended
party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor,
if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn
must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the
victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing
or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such
service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become
illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs
of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively
comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds,
including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the
accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby
depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to
make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of
the case with the consequent release of the accused from
detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended
party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from
Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction
or loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and
prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the
civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive
disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ
of preliminary attachment against his property.35
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s
supposition that the dismissal of the cases became permanent
one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not
after notice to the offended party. When the Rules states that
the provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year
after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the
case, it should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course,
there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process; thus, said in one case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the
issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of
the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has
control of the prosecution without the criminal case having
been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to
comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal.36
We hasten to add though that if the offended party is
represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the
reckoning period should commence to run from the time such
private counsel was actually notified of the order of
provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a
counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should
be sent to the latter at his/her given address.37 Section 2,
Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be made
upon the latter.38
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to
revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made
prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable.
Such interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to
permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at
the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly
not comply. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that
most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with
clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and
functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all
times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters
within the prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible
that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply
exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of
revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is
inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to
revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s
categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private
counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on
July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on
July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is
reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning
period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private
counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court
should take into account 2004 as a leap year and that the one-
year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the
date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We
still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases against
Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless
of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.39 Equally so,
under the Administrative Code of 1987, a yearis composed of
12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This
was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was subsequently
reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi
Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,41 thus:
x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a
specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains;
"day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise
to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain." It is the
"period of time running from the beginning of a certain
numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month." To illustrate, one
calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January
1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January
31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29,
2008.42
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987 to this case, the one-year period reckoned from
the time Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003
2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003
3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003
4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003
5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003
6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004
7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004
9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004
10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004
11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004
12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the
instant petition was filed as a dilatory tactic to prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As
correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the "Motion
for Permanent Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised herein
were already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of
his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and
vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay
the trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty. Maglaque’s
conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03,
Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse
court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath
also upholds in particular:
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients x x x.1âwphi1
This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the
need for the prompt termination of litigation is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses
Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation,43 We said:
The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers
who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the
duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on
the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of
merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices
of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A
lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which
affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside
the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City
that permanently dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to
be paid by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque
for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rule on
Forum Shopping.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z.
LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the
husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces
Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November
11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA
thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of
the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of
the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in
the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was
living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil
ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized
in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel,
Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to
EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria
L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria
L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia,
and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of
marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live
apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a
written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975,
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of
his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in
Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm
named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON)
where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA
purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the
6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City,
consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15,
1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of
LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over
the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT
No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered
bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA
and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for
which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in
the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100);
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the
same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716.
The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until
the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium
unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment
found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased
out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to
his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his
own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture
and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject
properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage
between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts
that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of
the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the
extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the
said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY.
LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio
Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject
properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared
the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the
same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the
condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be
conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad
administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY.
LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to
SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial
upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit
located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
(517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired
by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus
Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium
unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the
plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been
madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the
RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS
NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT,
BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER
ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN
BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to
the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA
WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF
PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY.
LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT,
ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND
BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed
modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA
until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce
decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in
our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27,
2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at
the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-
appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the
sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage
of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage)
was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or
under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence
the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to
be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review
on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement executed
by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence,
their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing
the Dominican Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to
ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the
divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and,
secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the
late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any
rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both
Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10,
1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was
the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The
Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect
that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between
Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16 even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed,
the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws
have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited
to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment
of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however,
the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This
finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.20
The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital
union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only
upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into
any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September
10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is
because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the
time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of
the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any
marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage.
Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership
of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of
the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for
any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article
175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue
of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the
separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the
spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared
absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the
wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of
any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may
appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures as may
protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of
articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501
shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late
Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question
that the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action
for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed,
the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were
identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce.21
With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under
Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy
and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also
legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna
and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent
marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce
Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous,
or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly
states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is
considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous,
the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with
Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror
both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the
burden of proof to confirm such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-
ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner
to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of
property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in
her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein
who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is
without basis because they failed to substantiate their
allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in
the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not
sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on
the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more
vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives
the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable
relief can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the
facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the
party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her
actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit
in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in
direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans
Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco
Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate
contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the
entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium
unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of
₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the
lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof
of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29
that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions
and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the
properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income
derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-
ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the
petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions through the
following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that her own independent funds were used to buy the law
office condominium and the law books subject matter in
contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article
144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code
to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a
man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not
married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under
Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership
would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many
situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were
without impediment to marry each other (for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man
and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the
Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima
faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to
arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule
and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such
valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147.
The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in
bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal
partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was
an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not
recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an
actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed
to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were
indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in
the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the
Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to
Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977,
which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of
Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on
April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was
payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was
for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979,
also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check,
Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980.
None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by
plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject
condominium unit. The connection was simply not
established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of
₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for
SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of
the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that
the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY.
LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together
with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff
does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The
same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna.
The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank
and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners
and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for
them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761
were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof
are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The
phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but
logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in
the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she had anything to contribute and that she
actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and
for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was
ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law
books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of
the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by
the CA both because they were substantiated by the records
and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit
and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming
the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her
mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31
did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence
of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his
own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be
justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to
their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death.
Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro
indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of
the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs
of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances
handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and
docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to
nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated
in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ
of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent
Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed
G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the
CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside
certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said
case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26
years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam,
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen
Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca
gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on,
Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of
the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican
court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution
of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint
custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the
same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the
couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically
stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during
their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at
502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the
issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the
Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed
as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13
and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the
petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been
living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of
Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time
before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094
and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente
Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch
256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that
Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for
their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter
alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on
June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition,
insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no
valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted
another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed
adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on
the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying
Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting
Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as
follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in
Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount
of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php
220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration
of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce
judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of
defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to
preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the
above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a
petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April
30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of
the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon
the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of
P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the
aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime,
on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued.
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but
the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September
2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for
certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision
dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-
094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation
to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision
reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to
state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to
dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of
action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of
action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to
have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union
having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the
foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American
citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to
contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she
being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree
was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged
Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that
her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen.
The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of
her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American
citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status
and having made representations to that effect during
momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she
applied for and eventually secured an American passport on
January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated
the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her
marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a
purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus
soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about
being an American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and
impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R.
No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of
errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of
which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in
enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would
have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil
Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed
CA decision submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON
ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its
outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset.
First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the
time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce
secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction.32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting
of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself
into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered
in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second,
whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are
its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she
applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the
principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American
passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently
professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the
marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34
in which she stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of
Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No.
RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized,
however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000
upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's
recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by
Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate
No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT*
whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color
of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face:
none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935
Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995,
and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero
in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel
purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following
material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of
Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or
almost five years from the date of the order of recognition;
and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on
October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on
October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate
could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995
when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation
only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent
aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the
issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the
Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22,
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the
certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of
Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the
Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ
which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services and implement the laws governing
citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for
Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on
Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall
automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official
copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the
Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order
No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before
the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an
Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis
ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her
Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after
then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement
confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events
which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or
confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino
citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as
Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no
identification certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a
Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to
the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later,
or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a
Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that
Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City
RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that
petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996,
it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a
month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was
no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original
petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on
October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece
of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate
from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached
consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through
her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31
May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate
No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had
sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together
with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos.
362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca
was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was
in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented
herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very
least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce,
her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American
citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which
pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly
submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the
existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42
years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia
Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who
personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR.
JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age,
married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x,
revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of
February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing
him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis
ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the
national laws of the United States of America, a country which
allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil
Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and
duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4,
1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia
v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid
under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when
she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has
not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And
neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court
nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds
true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge
the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction
to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our
Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof
to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally
secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in
said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid
and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized
as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau
Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at
the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured
abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship
of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca,
the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction.
As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In
plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband
and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally
pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA
M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved
x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could
no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil
Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as
follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements
for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor
further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their
citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship
during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No.
406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996
bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which
they acquired during their marriage consists only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990
issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila
registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to
Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was
affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered
that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the
parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City,
Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by
reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby
ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision
of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement
contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that
her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the
Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action.
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the
concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation
of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on
lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying
petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence
attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes
the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie
binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation
of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their
daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had
discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support
given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix,
having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before
her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She
would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support,
which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In
this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and
Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente
owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until
the child concerned shall have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need
to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her
entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of
her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by
the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and
June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190755 November 24, 2010
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO ONG, Respondent.
Facts :
On March 18, 1996, spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy
secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi City in the amount of
PhP 16 million. The loan was secured by three (3) residential
lots, five (5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Under the loan
agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan would be short-term and
would mature on February 28, 1997, while the balance of PhP
10 million would be payable in seven (7) years. The Spouses Sy
could no longer pay their loan which resulted to the sale of
three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to
Angelina Gloria Ong, Evangeline’s mother, under a Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
Evangeline’s father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land
Bank to inform them about the sale and assumption of
mortgage. Land Bank Banch Head told Alfredo that there was
nothing wrong with agreement with the Spouses Sy and
provided him requirements for the assumption of mortgage.
Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of
mortgage was not approved by Land Bank. On December 12,
1997, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money
with damages against Land Bank, as Alfredo’s payment was
not returned by Land Bank. Alfredo said that Land Bank’s
foreclosure without informing him of the denial of his
assumption of the mortgage was done in bad faith and that he
was made to believed that P750,000 would cause Land Bank
to approve his assumption to the mortgage.6 He also claimed
incurring expenses for attorney’s fees of PhP 150,000, filing
fee of PhP 15,000, and PhP 250,000 in moral damages.7 This
prompted Alfredo to file a case with RTC against Land Bank.
On its decision to the case, RTC held that the contract
approving the assumption of mortgage was not perfected as a
result of the credit investigation conducted on Alfredo where
he was disapproved.
. As such, it ruled that it would be incorrect to consider Alfredo
a third person with no interest in the fulfillment of the
obligation under Article 1236 of the Civil Code. Although Land
Bank was not bound by the Deed between Alfredo and the
Spouses Sy, the appellate court found that Alfredo and Land
Bank’s active preparations for Alfredo’s assumption of
mortgage essentially novated the agreement.
Issues :
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Art. 1236 of the Civil Code does not apply and in finding that
there is novation.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misconstrued the
evidence and the law when it affirmed the trial court
decision’s ordering Land Bank to pay Ong the amount of
Php750,000.00 with interest at 12% annum.
Ruling :
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification to the
appealed decision that recourse against Land Bank. Land Bank
contends that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code backs their claim that
Alfredo should have sought recourse against the Spouses Sy
instead of Land Bank. The court agreed with Land Bank on the
point mentioned as to the first part of paragraph 1 of Art.
1236. However,. Alfredo made a conditional payment so that
the properties subject of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage which Land Bank required from him would be
approved. Thus, he made payment not as a debtor but as a
prospective mortgagor. Furthermore, the contract between
Alfredo and Land Bank was not perfected nor consummated
because of the adverse disapproval of the proposed
assumption. The Supreme Court did not agree with the Court
of Appeals that there was novation in the contract between
the parties because not all elements of novation were present.
The court further stresses that the instant case would not
have been litigated had Land Bank been more circumspect in
dealing with Alfredo. The bank chose to accept payment from
Alfredo even before a credit investigation was underway and
also failed to informed him of the disapproval. The court
found that there was negligence to a certain degree on the
part of Land Bank in handling the transaction with Alfredo. A
bank as a business entity should observe a higher standard of
diligence when dealing with the public which Land Bank
neglect to observe in this case.
The petitioner’s appeal was denied by the Supreme Court and
the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed with
modification in that the amount of PhP 750,000 will earn
interest at 6% per annum and the total aggregate monetary
awards will in turn earn 12% per annum from the finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
G.R. No. 152411 September 29, 2004
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44209, as
well as its Resolution2 denying the petitioner’s motion for the
reconsideration thereof. Themo1 mo2 Court of Appeals set
aside the Decision3 of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the
respondent against the petitioner for sum of money and
damages.
The Facts of the Case
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP)
decided to construct an integrated system of research
organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the
project, laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased
for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños. Providentially,
the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward
and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture,
including the fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the
go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish
the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the
Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine
Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the
laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the
BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the FEMF. Lirio
directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to proceed
with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and requested
Padolina to forward the contract of the project to FEMF for its
approval.
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the
issuance of the purchase order and downpayment for the
office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus:
1.
Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the
BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention : Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment: 40% or ₱1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the
BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan Tanyag, Taguig, Metro Manila
Downpayment: 50% or ₱286,687.504
Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as
soon as possible before the issuance of the purchase orders
and the downpayment for the goods, and would be
transmitted to the FEMF as soon as possible.
In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector
Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the
fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of
FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for
copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract5 for the
project, and that such contract and drawings had to be
finalized before the down payment could be remitted to the
PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to forward
any sample contract.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and
laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly
inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive
Assistant Lirio.
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted ₱600,000 to PHILAB as
downpayment for the laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH
project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to
FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial
payment of ₱800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued
Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the
form of checks drawn by FEMF and delivered to PHILAB,
through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the
Chancellor of UP Los Baños and FEMF, represented by its
Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial
support and donate sums of money to UP for the construction
of buildings, installation of laboratory and other capitalization
for the project, not to exceed ₱29,000,000.00. The obligations
of FEMF under the MOA are the following:
ARTICLE II
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION
2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives
of promoting philantrophic and scientific projects through
financial support to such projects that will contribute to the
country’s economic development, shall grant such financial
support and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH
COMPLEX as may be necessary for the construction of
buildings, installation of laboratories, setting up of offices and
physical plants and facilities and other capital investment of
the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its component
Research Institutes not to exceed ₱29 Million. For this
purpose, the FOUNDATION shall:
(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the
RESEARCH COMPLEX; and
(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum
of TWENTY-NINE MILLION PESOS (₱29,000,000.00) for the
construction of the buildings of the National Institutes of
Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) and the
installation of their laboratories and their physical plants and
other facilities to enable them to commence operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the
approval of the Board of Trustees of the FOUNDATION,
continue to support the activities of the RESEARCH COMPLEX
by way of recurrent additional grants and donations for
specific research and development projects which may be
mutually agreed upon and, from time to time, additional
grants and donations of such amounts as may be necessary to
provide the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research
Institutes with operational flexibility especially with regard to
incentives to staff purchase of equipment/facilities, travel
abroad, recruitment of local and expatriate staff and such
other activities and inputs which are difficult to obtain under
usual government rules and regulations.6
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on
November 25, 1982.7
In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract
for the installation of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by
January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a
Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero of
the need to submit the contract so that it could be submitted
to FEMF for its evaluation and approval.8 Instead of
submitting the said contract, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an
accomplishment report on the project as of February 28, 1983,
and requested payment thereon.9 By May 1983, PHILAB had
completed 78% of the project, amounting to ₱2,288,573.74
out of the total cost of ₱2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already
paid forty percent (40%) of the total cost of the project. On
May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote Lirio and furnished him the
progress billing from PHILAB.10 On August 11, 1983, the FEMF
made another partial payment of ₱836,119.52 representing
the already delivered laboratory and office furniture after the
requisite inspection and verification thereof by
representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB. The
payment was made in the form of a check, for which PHILAB
issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF through Padolina.11
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No.
01643 in the amount of ₱702,939.40 for the final payment of
laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB,
and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of the
accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same.
BIOTECH forwarded the invoice to Lirio on December 18, 1984
for its payment.12 Lirio, in turn, forwarded the invoice to
Gapud, presumably sometime in the early part of 1985.
However, the FEMF failed to pay the bill. PHILAB reiterated its
request for payment through a letter on May 9, 1985.13
BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the
payment of PHILAB’s bill.14 It sent another letter to Gapud, on
November 22, 1985, again appealing for the payment of
PHILAB’s bill.15 In a Letter to BIOTECH dated December 5,
1985, PHILAB requested payment of ₱702,939.40 plus interest
thereon of ₱224,940.61.16 There was, however, no response
from the FEMF. On February 24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH,
appealing for the payment of its bill even on installment
basis.17
President Marcos was ousted from office during the February
1986 EDSA Revolution. On March 26, 1986, Navasero wrote
BIOTECH requesting for its much-needed assistance for the
payment of the balance already due plus interest of
₱295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of laboratory
furniture.18
On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino
asking her help to secure the payment of the amount due
from the FEMF.19 The letter was referred to then Budget
Minister Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP
President Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986. On September 30,
1986, Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños,
wrote then Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga, submitting PHILAB’s claim
to be officially entered as "accounts payable" as soon as the
assets of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.20
In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of
the relevant contract and the MOA for its perusal.21
Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy
of the contract executed between PHILAB and FEMF. In a
Letter dated October 20, 1987, Navasero informed De Guzman
that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding
the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to
BIOTECH.
Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages against UP. In the complaint, PHILAB prayed that it
be paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY NINE & 40/100 (₱702,939.40) plus an additional
amount (as shall be determined during the hearing) to cover
the actual cost of money which at the time of transaction the
value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (₱11.00:$1) and
twenty seven (27%) percent interest on the total amount from
August 1982 until fully paid;
(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00)
exemplary damages;
(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (₱50,000.00) as and for
attorney’s fees; and
(4) Cost of suit.22
PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials,
particularly MR. WILLIAM PADOLINA, Director, asked plaintiff
to supply and install several laboratory furnitures and
equipment at BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein
defendant located at its campus in College, Laguna, for a total
contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100
(₱2,939,058.90);
4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said
laboratory furnitures and equipment at defendant’s BIOTECH
Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on installment
basis:
a) ₱600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August
24, 1982;
b) ₱800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October
22, 1982;
c) ₱836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August
11, 1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE & 40/100
(₱702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight
years, defendant arrogantly and maliciously made plaintiff
believe that it was going to pay the balance aforestated, that
was why plaintiff’s President and General Manager himself,
HECTOR C. NAVASERO, personally went to and from UP Los
Baños to talk with defendant’s responsible officers in the hope
of expecting payment, when, in truth and in fact, defendant
had no intention to pay whatsoever right from the start on a
misplaced ground of technicalities. Some of plaintiff’s demand
letters since year 1983 up to the present are hereto attached
as Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H hereof;
6. That by reason of defendant’s malicious, evil and
unnecessary misrepresentations that it was going to pay its
obligation and asking plaintiff so many red tapes and
requirements to submit, compliance of all of which took
plaintiff almost eight (8) years to finish, when, in truth and in
fact, defendant had no intention to pay, defendant should be
ordered to pay plaintiff no less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary damages, so that other
government institutions may be warned that they must not
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the people they
serve.23
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had
no cause of action against it because it was merely the
donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH;
and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the
PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP
specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory
furniture supplied by PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint without prejudice to PHILAB’s
recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
without prejudice to plaintiff's recourse to the assets of the
Marcos Foundation for the unpaid balance of ₱792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.24
Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
alleging that the trial court erred in finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject
laboratory furniture and equipment was between PHILAB and
the Marcos Foundation; and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the
Philippines, is liable to pay the respondent the balance of the
purchase price.25
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and
held that there was never a contract between FEMF and
PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the
MOA between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party
thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP did not
bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it
is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: "No one should unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another."
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court’s decision, UP, now the petitioner, filed its
petition for review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY
THE LAW ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE
MARCOS FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL
PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE
TO PHILAB.26
Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts
may not be the subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is
generally restricted to questions of law.27 However, this rule
is not absolute. The Court may review the factual findings of
the CA should they be contrary to those of the trial court.28
Correspondingly, this Court may review findings of facts when
the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of
facts.29

On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA
overlooked the evidentiary effect and substance of the
corresponding letters and communications which support the
statements of the witnesses showing affirmatively that an
implied contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the
FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract
existed between it and the respondent as it could not have
entered into any agreement without the requisite public
bidding and a formal written contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did
not err in not applying the law on contracts between the
respondent and the FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it was
never privy to the MOA entered into between the petitioner
and the FEMF. The respondent adds that what the FEMF
donated was a sum of money equivalent to ₱29,000,000, and
not the laboratory equipment supplied by it to the petitioner.
The respondent submits that the petitioner, being the
recipient of the laboratory furniture, should not enrich itself at
the expense of the respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
It bears stressing that the respondent’s cause of action is one
for sum of money predicated on the alleged promise of the
petitioner to pay for the purchase price of the furniture,
which, despite demands, the petitioner failed to do. However,
the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner ever obliged
itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence,
the respondent is not entitled to its claim against the
petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the
MOA executed by the petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not
bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect only
between the parties and their assigns.30 A contract cannot be
binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a
party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted
with knowledge thereof.31 Likewise admitted by the parties,
is the fact that there was no written contract executed by the
petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the
fabrication and delivery of office and laboratory furniture to
the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the
petitioner and the respondent entered into a contract of sale
over the said laboratory furniture. The parties are in accord
that the FEMF had remitted to the respondent partial
payments via checks drawn and issued by the FEMF to the
respondent, through Padolina, in the total amount of
₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the project of
₱2,934,068.90 and that the respondent received the said
checks and issued receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is also
no controversy that the petitioner did not pay a single centavo
for the said furniture delivered by the respondent that the
petitioner had been using ever since.
We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an
implied-in-fact contract of sale was entered into between the
respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one implied
from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to
contract. It arises where the intention of the parties is not
expressed, but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It
is a contract, the existence and terms of which are manifested
by conduct and not by direct or explicit words between parties
but is to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language
used, or things done by them, or other pertinent
circumstances attending the transaction. To create contracts
implied in fact, circumstances must warrant inference that
one expected compensation and the other to pay.32 An
implied-in-fact contract requires the parties’ intent to enter
into a contract; it is a true contract.33 The conduct of the
parties is to be viewed as a reasonable man would view it, to
determine the existence or not of an implied-in-fact
contract.34 The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties
must be considered to determine their intention. An implied-
in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is
indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.35
In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time
Padolina contacted it for the fabrication and supply of the
laboratory furniture until the go-signal was given to it to
fabricate and deliver the furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary,
that the FEMF was to pay for the same. Indeed, Padolina
asked the respondent to prepare the draft of the contract to
be received by the FEMF prior to the execution of the parties
(the respondent and FEMF), but somehow, the respondent
failed to prepare one. The respondent knew that the
petitioner was merely the donee-beneficiary of the laboratory
furniture and not the buyer; nor was it liable for the payment
of the purchase price thereof. From the inception, the FEMF
paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent,
for which the latter unconditionally issued receipts to and
under the name of the FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was
aware that it was the Marcos Foundation who would be
paying for this particular transaction for the completion of this
particular transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly,
there were occasions during our inspection in Los Baños, at
the installation site, there were occasions, two or three
occasions, when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the
President, I think, or manager of PHILAB, and we appraised
him that it was really between the foundation and him to
which includes (sic) the construction company constructing
the building. He is fully aware that it is the foundation who
(sic) engaged them and issued the payments.36
The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed
the petitioner and sought its assistance for the collection of
the amount due from the FEMF:

Dear Dr. Padolina:
May we request for your much-needed assistance in the
payment of the balance still due us on the laboratory furniture
we supplied and installed two years ago?
Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds
as soon as possible to keep up our operations.
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.37
The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking
her assistance for the payment of the amount due, in which
the respondent admitted it tried to collect from her
predecessor, namely, the former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos:
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
At the instance of the national government, subject laboratory
furnitures were supplied by our company to the National
Institute of Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH),
University of the Philippines, Los Baños, Laguna, in 1984.
Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100
(₱2,939,058.90), the previous administration had so far paid
us the sum of ₱2,236,119.52 thus leaving a balance of PESOS:
ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100 (₱1,412.748.61) inclusive of
interest of 24% per annum and 30% exchange rate
adjustment.
On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount
from your predecessor, the latest of which was subject invoice
(01643) we submitted to DR. W. PADOLINA, deputy director of
BIOTECH. But this, notwithstanding, our claim has remained
unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto
attached for easy reference.
Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we
sincerely hope that payment of this obligation will soon be
made as this is one project the Republic of the Philippines has
use of and derives benefit from.38
Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and
statements of accounts for the payments of the laboratory
furniture it delivered to the petitioner which the petitioner,
through Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its payment.
However, the FEMF failed to pay the last statement of account
of the respondent because of the onset of the EDSA upheaval.
It was only when the respondent lost all hope of collecting its
claim from the government and/or the PCGG did it file the
complaint against the petitioner for the collection of the
payment of its last delivery of laboratory furniture.
We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for
the claim of the respondent based on the maxim that no one
should enrich itself at the expense of another.
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party
benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead
it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or
unlawfully.39
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the
claimant must unequivocally prove that another party
knowingly received something of value to which he was not
entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be
unjust for the person to keep the benefit.40 Unjust
enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure
to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received
under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable
obligation to account for them; to be entitled to
remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request.41 Unjust enrichment is not itself a
theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.42
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him. (Boldface supplied)
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential
elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been
enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground,
and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.43
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary
action, available only when there is no other remedy on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an
obtainable action under any other institution of positive law,
that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in
rem verso will not lie.44
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the
New Civil Code do not obtain in this case. The respondent had
a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-
in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim.
The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture under
the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the
laboratory furniture.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated
February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as
follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent]
for short) filed this present complaint for damages for unfair
competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin
[petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation ([petitioner] for
short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made
automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and
metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street,
Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992,
[respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant
and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made
automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware
items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of
[respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s]
office, and in view of the fact that some of the [respondent’s]
employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had
developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially
its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered
that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the
same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same
material and colors but was selling these products at a lower
price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to
the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic
in place of rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive
underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer
bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions,
among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same
automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from
[respondent’s] idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also,
[petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all of
which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary
to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have
caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and
unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as of
the date of [respondent’s] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled
[respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur
expenses in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation
expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the
[respondent] except for the following facts: that it is engaged
in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items
made of plastic and metal and that there’s physical proximity
of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office, and that
someof [respondent’s] employees had transferred to
[petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had developed
familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic
made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can
be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive parts
are mere reproductions of original parts and their
construction and composition merely conforms to the
specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they
intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it
"originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent]
indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it
still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these
as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore,
[respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of these
plastic-made automotive parts as there are other
establishments which were already openly selling them to the
public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent.
It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of
respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts
amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that
under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s property
rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing
similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of
respondent’s and the selling of the sameproducts to
respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the years,
will have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the
defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00)
Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand
(₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The
court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from
manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those
manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual
property protecting a good belonging to another,the copying
thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair
competition as competition is promoted by law to benefit
consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure
away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It points
out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded
in the market and the copying of these can be done by
simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent
registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case to
prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the
characteristics of unfair competition are present in the instant
case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are
contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its
products and employing its former employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with
modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said
decision read:
Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest
steps in advancing its business interest against Jesichris,
however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC of
actual damages. One is entitled to actual damages as one has
duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by
Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed that there
was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to
2002. No amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is
a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for
1999-2002, it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in
comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if
this pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other
products of Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair
competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris.
It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in
order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s
award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is also
maintained.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April
15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award
of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is
deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However,
the same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a
Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner
raises the following issues for our resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human
relations when the parties are not competitors and there is
actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should
there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper
although no rights have been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on
automotive parts, should it be considered in the light of the
said copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this
Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether
or not Jesichris has established "goodwill?"6
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not
petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls
under Article 28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations, and not
unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the
present suit is a damage suit and the products are not covered
by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent
registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very
much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws.
Under the present article, which follows the extended concept
of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term
coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor,
bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds,
interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts,
or any malicious interference with the latter’s business.8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not
petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition
in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or
any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give
rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be
prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of unjust,
oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive
others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a
living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and
not competition where the means usedare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have
two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a
competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which
are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or
"shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in
the language of our law, these include force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor;
the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong
perpetrated by unconscionable means.9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being
engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts.
Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to
good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed
respondent’s formeremployees, deliberately copied
respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling
these products to respondent’s customers.10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that
petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of respondent and
petitioner’s act of copying the subject plastic parts of
respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was
in bad faith in competing with the business of
[respondent].1âwphi1 [Petitioner’s] acts can be characterized
as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate,
in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that
[petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic
kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of
plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the services of the
then mold setter and maintenance operator of [respondent],
De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman
was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since
quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being made. It
baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold
setter and maintenance operator to remedy its problem.
[Petitioner’s] engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is
banking on his experience gained from working for
[respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a
warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired
because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner].
Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he
applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same position
he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events
relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like
the situation with De Guzman.11
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair
competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his
business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made
automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent
to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade
secrets of the respondent.12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of
business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless
of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out
of business so that later on he can take advantage of the
effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton
wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony
of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in
competing with the business of respondent, to wit:
[Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr.,
admitted that it was never engaged in the business of plastic-
made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product
Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of
kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr.
Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have known
the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have known
it to be manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic)
physically become familiar with these products, plastic
automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products,
in terms of color, size, shape and composition as those sold by
Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’
employees to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with
Jesichris Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe
four (4) years. I don’t know the exact date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris
Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it
not?

Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they
transfer to you?
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January
2001, will you kindly inform this court what unusual even (sic)
transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What is that?

Mr. Salinas: First, November 1. A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going
to the market and then I passed by the place where they were
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000? having a drinking spree, sir.

Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at
year. And the other one, just one month ago. that time?

That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
business was buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s]
witness, Joel Torres: Q: And who else was there?

Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product A: William Salinas, sir.
Corporation?
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you
A: Yes, sir. spotted upon them drinking?

Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this A: Jun Molina called me, sir.
Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?
Q: And what happened after that?

A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was
able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something, sir.
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?
A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo,
dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."
Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court
whom did you gather to be referred to as your "amo"?
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article
28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos
(₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its
place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal
damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly
be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February 10,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of
attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 182836 : October 13, 2009]
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY
OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the
Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of
respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño
(Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to
Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn
child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union)
filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement
Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE The Company agrees to grant a
bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the
employee's legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers
and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE The Company shall
grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in
the following manner:
xxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS'Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate
dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is
single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters
only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death
certificate).4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child.
Hortillano's wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5
January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.5 According
to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female
fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity
leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death
benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano's
claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted
to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of
conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their
dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a
Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and
Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of
whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose
Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said
issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably
settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective
Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave
and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained
that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did
not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born
alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The
Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK
Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister
companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were
able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan),
an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a
fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to
receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution
under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan's child was
only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to
Hortillano's child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only
died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel
are located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the
representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with
their respective employees' unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with
the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which
provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall
be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express
provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child,
a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two
elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and
(2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillano's case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and
4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality
could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never
acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of
thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from
the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term
dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a
dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire
the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear
and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used
in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed
automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to
have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in
the CBA - the death of whom would have qualified the parent-
employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits - bound the
Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the
employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel,
referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence,
given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither
could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave
and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an
unborn child constituted "company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits,
thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of
bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as provided
under Article X, Section 2 of the parties' CBA, three (3) indispensable
elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must
be of employee's "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be
"legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident
insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3)
of the parties' CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present:
(a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee's
"dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper
legal document to be presented.18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employee's legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to
be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could
not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid
of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was
already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or
delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were
lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered
ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P.
Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the
amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00)
representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the
herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Review on Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting
Hortillano's claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death
benefits because no death of an employee's dependent had occurred.
The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded
from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the
CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did
not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that
its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was
qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the
status of a child could only be determined upon said child's birth,
otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine
qua non for Hortillano's entitlement to bereavement leave and other
death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed
Atty. Montaño's Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate
court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel's] exposition on the legal sense in
which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court,
and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the
grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended
to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being
born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of
premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a
"death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event
causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead
fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed
a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a legitimate
dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death
benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel's] theory, there
can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does
not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with
anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant
parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant
to assuage the employee and the latter's immediate family, extend to
them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel's] insistence that
the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly
misses this crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20,
2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that
the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal
meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality
can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under
Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be
of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an
employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under
Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death
must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee;
and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such
death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental
Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its
fundamental argument for denying Hortillano's claim for bereavement
leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper
interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the
CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous,
then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of
the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither
management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for
bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of
the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil
Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides
that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and
Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40,
41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in
relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect,
is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since
his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in
issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired
any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were
passed on to or assumed by the child's parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter's death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all
a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides
that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality
could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the
CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies
on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without
the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
Hortillano's child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational
life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano's wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question
that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The
CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that
the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality,
as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall
be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn
fetus in the mother's womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status in
relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have
expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and
lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of
the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to
be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children
have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two
classes of children - - legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited
jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon
his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said
child legitimate upon her conception. ???ñr?b l?š
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of
Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC).
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent
Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were
married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and
to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of
a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both
parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab
initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void
from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid
a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed
to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties
went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States
and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not
pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC
issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for
want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed
the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was
similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never
intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live
as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose
was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign
citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire
American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties
freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and
willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent
should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the
concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented
to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition,
reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by
way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments
in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a
marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This
has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of
availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a
couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually
concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely
to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence
of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together
at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining
the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes
and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a
sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the
notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to
allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry
but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The
Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a
marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all.
Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a
marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a
marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the
spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as
such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put
an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have
never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter
into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v.
Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely
for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid
marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of
Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has,
therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in
order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment
of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s
motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be
similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered
into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’
supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent
is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given"
consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is
best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in
jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke,
with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter
into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence,
the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab
initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for
any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be
bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to
be married would allow them to further their objective, considering
that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is
for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility
that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish
a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that
the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is
no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void
or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to
lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in
a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to
utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage
void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a
sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab
initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of
fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances
listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely,
(1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of
drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the
listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both
conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of
marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would
only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply
have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes.
Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself
out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims
and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the
needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is
ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No.
31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
(RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire
Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29,
2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then
dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding
gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians,
also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to
which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the
couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the
couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the
presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal
and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte
for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime
charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere,
testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil
sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the
wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk
down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their
wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She
heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign
the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception,
had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She
also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard
the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each
other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went
to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a
certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a
ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was
tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine
pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further
ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the
couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352
of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No.
3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the
Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any
of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the
regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of
not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not
more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and
provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying
these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the
amount of ₱200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in
"blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage
ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more
credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The
RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be
Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed
that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for
the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to
the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It
added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a
requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent
on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under
Article 350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the
imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since
it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following
grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague
and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage
ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally
constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and
Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the
verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband
and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration
in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and
attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner
likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each
other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of
separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in
ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony.
Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a
"marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted
the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral
guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in
violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude
the filing of the present case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide
for a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of
the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount
to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the
Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were
taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn,
was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no
substantial amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code
provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly
defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they
take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form
of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets
the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony:
first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second,
heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the
parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary
to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating
and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge
may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and
to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and
material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.
It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the
judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it
from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and
even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances
of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had
indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each
other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning
their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these
clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense
failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and
Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of
separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony.
Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been
duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement
gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting
its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement
that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the
Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and that our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount
interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and
the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is
within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission
of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the
petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the
minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While
the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the
presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code
and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by
the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential
requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage
ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The
marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a
marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the
requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as
discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the
couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the
crime. The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall
be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage
Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections
39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the
Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or
minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by
the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in
force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents,
grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or
sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in
accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared
illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage
in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any
provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or
by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in
the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in
the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not
Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not
include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the
MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of
the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is
only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point,
Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of
Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was
enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of
₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No.
31028.
SO ORDERED.
JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for
themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:
REPORT THIS AD
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of
the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law
be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of
the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the
following principal issues:
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Right to Life
Right to Health
Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
Due Process
Equal Protection
Involuntary Servitude
Delegation of Authority to the FDA
Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its
implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.
The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate
to decide. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention
– of the judiciary in that balancing operation. Lest it be
misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not
have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every
claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with
the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty. In this case, the Court is of the
view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the
RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US)
constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but
also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right
to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the
application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy
of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this
case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny
that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance
with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are
not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. Considering that it is the right to
life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue,
the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before
taking action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is
well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The
rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction
of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” In this
case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him,
“fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is
only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected. This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is
devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.
Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by
those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to
the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is
implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to
health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These
provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions. In Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
It is not within the province of the Court to determine
whether the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in the
support of modem reproductive health measures is moral
from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or
wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should
be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does
have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes
the guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the
petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his
conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s. The Court is
of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers
a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free
exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the
RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the
principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right
to free exercise of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must
be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines
to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a
constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take
over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used
to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict
the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part
of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant
to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes
the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be
noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to
the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor
to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the “promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health.”
The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of
force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion
and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide
it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will. While the rendering of such
service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest. Consistent with what the Court had
earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long
as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to
render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA
does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is
the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be
understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as “health products.” Being the country’s
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with
the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.
Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the
mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe
includes “service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of
the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public
be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in
Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence,
let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains
to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of
skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health
workers, it will be the national government that will provide
for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not
absolute. The national government still has the say when it
comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
[G.R. NO. 167746 : August 28, 2007]
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325
dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of
marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against
respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he
and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went
to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who
could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got married on
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went
through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit
Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was
likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license.
The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with
the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985,
respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due
hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage
contract5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent
asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office
of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's
representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose
Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named
Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress
with whom he has three children.8Petitioner only filed the annulment of
their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in
fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent
prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of
merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its
Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on
the first five (5) days of each month; andcralawlibra ry
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing
the petitioner's appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is
presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any
evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties'
marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the
questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues
for resolution:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when
it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis
despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at
the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when
it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact
that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the
trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face
of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when
it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the
case of Sy v. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330
SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when
it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and
promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the
respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he
and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a
"fixer" who arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place at
the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.
Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and
respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was
issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that
"Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.
Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December
1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void
ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same
Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time
of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and cralawl ibra ry
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage,
in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn
the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the
absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage
void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil
Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was
issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due
search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported
marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based
on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void
ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has
no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification
issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized
without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17
September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15
November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that
the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license
which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void
on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was
issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of
Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in
this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.
Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A.
Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done
in the regular conduct of official business.27 The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona,
Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of
Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient
basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the
absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
validity of the marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage
license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license
number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument
fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a
mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage
contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a
party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place
without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil
marriage took place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an
educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He
knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He
cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from
the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer
palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance
such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of
marriage betrays his bad faith.34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in
a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There
is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in
church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was
executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner. ς ηα ñrοb lε š ν ιr†υ αl l αω lιbrαrÿ
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they
presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract
executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City
Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's testimony as follows'
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary
document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am
referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don't remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License? cralaw lib ra ry
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a
Marriage Contract and I don't know if it is good enough for the
marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church
that you have with you already a Marriage Contract? cralaw lib rary
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same
marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage
License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing
participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner - - that they appeared before a
"fixer" who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the
ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel - - will not strengthen his posture. The
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to
the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer
needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that
said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in
favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled;
on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack
of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of
Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated
via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4
Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert
left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition
for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law;
to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire
to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.
It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8
in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially
for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he,
thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies
as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the
RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support
Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative
history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino,
in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227,
amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording,
as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge
the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign
court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already
severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still
subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse].
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the
law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be
of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
(other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity
and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation,
we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to
obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are
not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy
of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based
on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign
one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must
be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of
Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep
and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they
shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name
and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in
the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the
foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No.
4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No.
181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order
from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry,
but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce
decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the
entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under
the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order."
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation
or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must
be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these
basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not
be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry –
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or
a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which
the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and
tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a
pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition
in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the
case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court
of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent
has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he
may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition
was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court
based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife
and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on
bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a)
in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not,
of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having
a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material
interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous
marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable.
Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the
Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local
registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides
that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought
(among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted
that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which
allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited
Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that
the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative
to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the
trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21
The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack
of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a
"third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x
x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this
case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the
petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza
ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as
required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence,
this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that
the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply
with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the
case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32
The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the
first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held
that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action
if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured
spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of
the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize
the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court
held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or
a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court
judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40
which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no
reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain
her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including
the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57
The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back
on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects
the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity
of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who
is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed
to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts
have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the
rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does
not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize
a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove
as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of
a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the
Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the
State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There
is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights
and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting
the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband
or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a
criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled
that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80
Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to
sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in
the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82
The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for
recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry
in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate
a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution
of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by
the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No.
8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is
already effective in the country where it was rendered. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared
that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains
a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is
not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where
the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him
or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question
of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by
default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity
of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states
that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of
a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry
in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No.
Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the
Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.1
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo
allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage
license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation2 and
issued them to the contracting parties.3 He notarized these
affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage.4 These "package
marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City.5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of
cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were
notarized on the day of the contracting parties’ marriages.6
The affidavits contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod
City, Philippines.

(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular
No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows
municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio
and notarize documents only if connected with their official
functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation
are not connected with a judge’s official functions and duties
as solemnizing officer.9 Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex
officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he
solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits.
He also did not require the parties to present their competent
pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the
law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and elementary to
ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that
Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn Tupal.
Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly
making false statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex
only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay Frialyn’s
case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of
cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation was connected with his official functions and
duties as a judge.13 The Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary14 does not prohibit
judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage they will solemnize.15 Thus, Judge Rojo did
not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public. Thus,
he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he
notarized.16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the
affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces
of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to
the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be
the same persons who executed the affidavit.17 The parties’
identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and
Talisay City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage they solemnized.19 He pleaded "not to make
him [complainant Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and
chopping block"20 since other judges also notarized affidavits
of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court
Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-
90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that
Judge Rojo be fined ₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that
repeating the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal
trial court judges’ official functions and duties. Under the
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary,21 a judge’s duty is to personally examine the
allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing
the marriage ceremony.22 Nothing in the Guidelines
authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of
cohabitation, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended a fine of ₱1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation
notarized.23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New
Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges
may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in
their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents,
contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their
official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated February
26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court
(MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function of
notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No.
296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of
1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. But
the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the
scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in
the notarization of documents connected only with the
exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may
not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation
and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and
other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of
Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict
with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule
5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers
or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial
jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or
notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that
there are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor
notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to
municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public
may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any
act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided
that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the
Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer
(Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29,
1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or
notary public in such municipality or circuit.24
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were
documents not connected with the exercise of his official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or
notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have
complied with all the essential and formal requisites of
marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage
license.26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to
parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal
disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing
the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine
the marriage license presented.28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife
for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry,
they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.29
Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation
sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally
examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other.31
The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he
personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of
the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage
by the Members of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the
solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of
cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage effecting legal
ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a)
personally interview the contracting parties to determine their
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of
the contracting parties as to the fact of having lived together
as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence
of any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute
a sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and
that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who
notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation
cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the
affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties
have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal
impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the
judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected
with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent
with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for
marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the
affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage
ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements
in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be
expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite
the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of
the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with their official
function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he solemnized their
marriages]."33 He notarized documents not connected with
his official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus,
Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not expressly
prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
Thus, he cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing
officer’s duties to examine the affidavit of cohabitation and to
issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been
complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot
objectively examine a document he himself notarized. Article
34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary
assume that "the person authorized by law to administer
oaths" who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the
"solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage ceremony
are two different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits
municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private
documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges."34 Since a marriage
license is a public document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of
cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he
notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he notarizes a public
document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until
notarized. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity."35 The affidavit
of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose," remains a
private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As
discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a
judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to
"eliminate competition between judges and private lawyers in
transacting legal conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v.
Judge Moya37 where this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty
of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale.
Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation, he did "not compete with private law
practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business."38 Thus, he did not violate Circular
No. 1-90.
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the
context in which this court stated that "[judges] should not
compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in
transacting legal conveyancing business."39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to
documents used to transact "legal conveyancing business." So
long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his
official functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court fined
Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of candidacy. In Ellert
v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon for
notarizing the verification page of an answer filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The
documents involved in these cases were not used to transact
"legal conveyancing business." Nevertheless, this court found
Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular No.
1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which
were not connected with his official function and duty to
solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in Bacolod
City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are
lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judge’s court
constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the
practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to
the contrary.43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if
the signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the
notary public must require the signatory to present a
competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person
appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the
instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public
does not personally know the signatory, he must require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized,
he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their
affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties
were personally known to him or that the parties presented
their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge
Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the
affidavits of cohabitation. They personally appeared before
him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also
interviewed them on their qualifications to contract marriage.
Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation need not
present their competent pieces of evidence of identity.44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he
interviewed them do not make the parties personally known
to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to
subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties,
the notary public must at least be acquainted with them.45
Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties
personally known to the notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v. Judge How46
where this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper considerations x x x"47 were
defenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His good
faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold
him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in
situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does
not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable
legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible
margins of error."49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or
notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial
jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know
the signatory to the document they will notarize or require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These
are basic legal principles and procedure Judge Rojo violated.
Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is
not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,50
"[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer."51 If the law involved is basic, ignorance
constitutes "lack of integrity."52 Violating basic legal principles
and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a serious charge:53

a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations;54
other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective
upon service on him of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in
Bacolod City and Talisay City.

b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for SO ORDERED.
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;55 or G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
₱40,000.00.56 vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have
been dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other
judges’ practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in G.R. No. 179474
Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
months sufficient sanction. vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the
requirements of the law.1âwphi1 They should act with caution DECISION
with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the
ethical requirements as in this case will be dealt with strictly. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and
Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated
24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained
the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony
was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute
the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent
to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led
to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced
to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a
boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some
three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to
the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing
three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were
told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package
could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so.
However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of
paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was
in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper
lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he
perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his
marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their
age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that
while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on
31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative
complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman,
since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found
Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension
from service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of
the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose]
could have already detected that something was amiss,
unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for
[Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of
paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that,
by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would
kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him,
more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of
paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was
belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his
wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12,
1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is
now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his
company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe
that the only reason why her name was written in his
company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is
just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not
his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under
oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N.,
page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that
the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by
her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all
the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s
action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil
Code which requires that the action for annulment of
marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four
years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent
was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration
of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the
time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at
the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be
without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed
that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did
not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled
that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of
fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by
law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the
following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation
was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage,
the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed.
Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action
for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a
party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the
discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had
only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993
that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion
that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized
under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
between man and woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the
period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by
the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of
Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa
was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of
the Civil Code did not require that either one of the
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription
was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which
does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application
of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed
by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered
an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED
and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab
initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the
ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis
of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority,
that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five
(5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
– meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known
to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence
of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to
no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated
10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review
before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be
reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting.
Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R.
No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate
the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF
THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF
HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar
from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain
in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose
only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed
against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose
from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose
and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall
jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners
Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the
Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa,
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which
they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does
not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and
formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said
affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a
fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces
the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote
Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of
Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID
card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the
issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their
union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license
is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To
wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of
marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil
marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6)
mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license
may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof,
they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained
the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37
One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether
the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to
the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to
apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that,
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us
with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76
applies only to those who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The
Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of
the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.
The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material
fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as
a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76
also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the
requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.43
The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose
was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own
testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether
they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to
decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to
this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in
this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that
the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November
1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect
the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal
requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant
merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa
meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage,
this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the
case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of
marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied.
There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into
a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that
every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate
them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of
Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least,
for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an
abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of
deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in
our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the
Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by
law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to
an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence
of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore,
the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to
the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required
to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if
there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby
profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It
must be stated that equity finds no room for application
where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of
marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that
Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose
and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he
sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated
sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached
except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn
a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the
rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the
date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It
covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and
(2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in
1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus,
in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years. The couple got married on the same
date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil
rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not
live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
(trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is
married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming
that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to
save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got
married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license.
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the
child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of
mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support
to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been,
his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule
that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court
declared that the child was born during the subsistence and
validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA
testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal
knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s
"forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of
his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."6
Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7
April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily
admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action
for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the
very same case. There was no participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that
there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the
Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage.
The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an
action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should
have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support
the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently
and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.7
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for
that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly
annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by
the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was
celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the
affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained
a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The
false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10
Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is
only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In
any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action
for support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that
a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between the parties. The refiling of another case for
declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties
would be presented would entail enormous expenses and
anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would
increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims
that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and
his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his
legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required
respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant
petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and
rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of
their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she
pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward
testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in
answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover,
she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the
trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to
DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null
and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the
action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it
states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from
petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage.
Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in
the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,
and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial
court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the
findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child
of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the
trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for
support and second, whether the child is the daughter of
petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may
be collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled
that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim
for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did
not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they
had been living together for more than five years.24 However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or
before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as
the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted
that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO
who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living,
Parañaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of
the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the
petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter,
but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former
girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit
petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would
go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage
ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and
"D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs.
"D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-
1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16
October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision
and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
72322 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July
1997,3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded “not guilty,” while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5 redarc law
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married
to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him.
Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29
July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law
that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was
“without responsibility.”7reda rclaw
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be
included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been
under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married.
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his
second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but
in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of
a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife,
Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had
met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions
the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner
denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August
and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married
Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the
more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial
court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not
known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like
Santos.8 redarclaw
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her
marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission
that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their
marriage.”9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10 reda rclaw
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused
Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage
to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without
complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties
have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner
asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and
wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the
absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null
and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11 redarclaw
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused
that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to
pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
something this court can not do. The best support to her argument
would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of
their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was
not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the
credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the
previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution
witnesses’ narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos.
Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated
that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to
Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy.12 redarclaw
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused
in the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos’s previous
marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction
for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is
void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that
their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from
a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together
exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges
that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only
four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-
year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is
void.
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition
should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband’s
subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s denial of any knowledge
of Santos’s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible
testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that
petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
provides: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
In Montañez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of
bigamy as follows: Lawl ibra ryofCRAlaw
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x;
(c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the
crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.16 instructs that she should have had
knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the
fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.
The Ruling of the Court
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner’s that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only
knowledge of Santos’s first marriage as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an
eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another
persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime
them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno:18 reda rclaw of bigamy.”22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
accomplice to the crime.
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the
offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty
spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence
included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied) imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree,23prision
correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
knowledge of Santos’s marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two
found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of years, four months and one day to four years and two months of
the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner
visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next
disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month
petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was and one day to six months imprisonment.
the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had The criminal liability of petitioner
already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal resulting from her marriage to
wife of Santos. Santos

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of
modify the factual findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court’s essential requisites for validity.25 If the accused wants to raise the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense
it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal
and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.20
redarc law
case.26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the
validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are
with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, void ab initio.28
redarclaw

we disagree with the lower courts’ imposition of the principal

penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The
to her the penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of the
to prision mayor as maximum. marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her
union with Santos was in vain.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they
issues and facts,29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
the whole case open for review,30 this Court now resolves to correct Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
the error of the courts a quo. solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the
petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under
absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage
of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw

ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

The legal effects in a criminal case
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five marriage
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous
of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on
marriage. her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license
despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less
exempted from a marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as than her marriage contract.
husband and wife for at least five years before their marriage.31 reda rc law

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more
or less in February 199632 and that after six months of courtship,33 she
married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her
in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never
cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-
laws,34and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On
cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner
that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her
piglets.36 redarclaw
bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal
prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between spouses.38In Tenebro v. Court
of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal
laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing
individuals “to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.”

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal
only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her
that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of
prior to their marriage. the sanctity of marriage.40 redarclaw
 crime.
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its
aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an
an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.”41If the cause inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a protected by the State.”45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping therefore with this
courts. 42As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, bigamy.
or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.43
redarclaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby
But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an
Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well that SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height
of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to [G.R. NO. 173614 : September 28, 2007]
escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B.
MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an
acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when
Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 DECISION
August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage
license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated
one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast,
petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,1 dated 3 May
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan,
her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of
Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the
its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B.
Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad)
filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo,
Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein respondents,
namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle
and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26
August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February
2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioner's marriage to Eulogio, respondents
averred that the same was entered into without the requisite
marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family
Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not
have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to
Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter's death, or on 1
May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of
marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and
Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised
the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to
Eulogio's serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio
lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21
years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from
the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were
born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli,
on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She
further contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and
solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative
defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground
that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by
the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its
position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the
Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides
in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and
simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that
only the husband or the wife may file the petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading
of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive
and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs
of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in
bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void.12
(Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative
defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED
with costs de officio.13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said
motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006,
reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC
reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog,15 which was on
the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse
have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the
death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void
marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are
deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to
declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance,
thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal v.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the
Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a
deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his
marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Niñal v. Bayadog is now
superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal v. Bayadog by
approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order
further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic)
the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of
nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal and
is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the
case of Niñal v. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view
of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal v.
Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to
determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage
will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their
successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the
heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said
parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be
proper that it should solely be the parent who should be
allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void.
However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already
a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such
vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of
procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal
rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal
standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage
entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal
and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such
union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask
for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be
given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to
file the petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the
Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is
applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are
still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the
void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the
(sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not
filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of
civil procedure which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006
states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this
case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the
said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised
therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law
as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the
Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated
route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has
the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants
are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this
Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief
from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in
the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ
is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals
or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of
courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has
the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of
the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain
the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the
instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal
which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person
were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father's marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling
for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The
Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to determine
the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil
Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a different
milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can
be gleaned from the facts, petitioner's marriage to Eulogio
was celebrated in 2004.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no
room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on 3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March
2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is
no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and
application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines,
and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner
to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely
falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.'
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil
expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear,
no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.25
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court
a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to
challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to
Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE
CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II,
respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond
for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family
Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession
of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status
of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money,
and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare
unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They
left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case
No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code
is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159,
situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa,
Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen
Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-
325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of
Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by
Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-
B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1
to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan,
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ.
METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090,
being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No.
6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-
B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND
AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la
parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la
calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el
punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la
Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las
Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la
parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his
estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid
the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook
to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred
and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are
now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No.
139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot
is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in
the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo
II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos.
219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares
in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion
of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331
square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated
in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter
portion was later divided between petitioner and
respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise
agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil
Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts
in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally
divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as
Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a
quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of
nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of
property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC
in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was
a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he
entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the
subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of
the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer.
They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding
the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's
marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was
the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with
another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for
the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked
that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the
certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for
summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the
contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no
record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for
summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in
another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-
2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255,
Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that
co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's)
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's
(petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on
May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the
requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is
not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the
late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest
thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant
complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058
in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names
of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another
title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of
defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another
title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on
June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal,
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary
judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad
and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is
entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary
judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy
as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was
appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee.
Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a
declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic)
to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no
genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the
disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of
the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment
of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for
summary judgment practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the
foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to
prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of
marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13,
1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned.
The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for
thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the
very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her
participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer
and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by
which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule
is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint
for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1,
Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved." (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the
rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal
of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal
requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to
Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial
number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of
evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in
the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the
same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court,
We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility
of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations
underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial
of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary
evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not
take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the
subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was
not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party
who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same
may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship
between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on
the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed
appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the
illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not
altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's
illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that
matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo
Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to
support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the
rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it
may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of
Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light
of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo
Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the
shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could
have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits
in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining
to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration
and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following
issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying
petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution,
Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that
contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided
a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a
serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now
Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for
judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions,
made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the
laws and misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring
supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage
may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the
capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for
nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely
within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the
pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise
considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the
rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal
of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules
on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have
no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has
been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down
by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is
found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally
conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall
be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for
nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of
summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment
of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14
(Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested
the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case.
The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court
should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and
intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public
prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence,
the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to
be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of
marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the
public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on
the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or
the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before
the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband
or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17
(Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are
the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage.
They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build
the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play.
Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut,
but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets
forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The
Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of
the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended
to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under
the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to
cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although
the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the
Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare
the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring
an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the
Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear
to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff
is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of
Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the
time the respondents were married, or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a
party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of
action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and
whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to
P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then
the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare
nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29
(Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not
petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died
intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law
on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse
and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory
heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the
Civil Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as
compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a
brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir,
he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and
1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring
supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32
Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be
the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad.
This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother
and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the
direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if
Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to
the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil
Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is
found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire
estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of
petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent
upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground
that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does
not have proper interest. For although the marriage in
controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still,
petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of
descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35
excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the
merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action
if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the
deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of
respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to
vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes
of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the
ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We
should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration
is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having
been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from
his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support
its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II
is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded
credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by
Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of
legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring
supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate
status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article
167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.37
Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos,
the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity
of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its
decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the
merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its
calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner

for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of
property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be
so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that
the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard

to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo