Republic of the Philippines Version of the Prosecution
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179090 June 5, 2009
LEONILO SANCHEZ alias NILO, Appellant,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, Appellees.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
1 whereabouts of the latter’s father. BBB did not answer but his mother, MMM, told appellant that
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated February 20, 2007
which affirmed the Decision3 dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran
City, Bohol, convicting appellant Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo (appellant) of the crime of Other Acts
of Child Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 4 in relation to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 603,5 with a modification of the penalty imposed.
The Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information 6 dated
August 29, 2001 which reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias
Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically
one [VVV],7 a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and
which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as
amended; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during
the trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No.
1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the
trial, two varying versions emerged.
Private complainant VVV was born on March 24, 1984 in Mentalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu to FFF
and MMM.8
On September 24, 1997, VVV's father, FFF, started leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by
Escolastico Ronquillo (Escolastico), located at Lajog, Clarin, Bohol. FFF and his family occupied
the house beside the fishpond which was left by the former tenant.9
On September 2, 2000 at around 7:00 in the morning, while VVV was cutting grass in their yard,
appellant arrived looking for FFF who was then at another fishpond owned by Nilda Parilla located
in Boacao, Clarin, Bohol. VVV knew appellant because he is the husband of Bienvenida Ronquillo
(Bienvenida), one of the heirs of Escolastico.10She noticed that appellant had a sanggot (sickle)
tucked in his waist.
Appellant then went to VVV’s house and inquired from VVV’s younger brother, BBB, the
FFF was not around. Right then and there, appellant told them to leave the place and started
destroying the house with the use of his sickle. As a result, appellant destroyed the roof, the wall
and the windows of the house.11 MMM got angry and told appellant that he could not just drive
them away since the contract for the use of the fishpond was not yet terminated. VVV was then
sent by MMM to fetch a barangay tanod. She did as ordered but barangay tanod Nicolas Patayon
refused to oblige because he did not want to interfere in the problem concerning the fishpond. On
her way back to their house, VVV saw appellant coming from his shop with a gallon of gasoline,
headed to their house. Appellant warned VVV to better pack up her family’s things because he
would burn their house.12
Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB, get a piece of wood from the back of their
house to defend themselves and their house from appellant. However, appellant approached BBB,
grabbed the piece of wood from the latter and started beating him with it. 13 At the sight, VVV
approached appellant and pushed him. Irked by what she did, appellant turned to her and struck
her with the piece of wood three (3) times, twice on the left thigh and once below her right
buttocks. As a result, the wood broke into several pieces. VVV picked up some of the broken
pieces and threw them back at appellant. MMM restrained BBB, telling him not to fight back. After
which, appellant left, bringing with him the gallon of gasoline.14
FFF arrived at about 10:00 in the morning of that day. When he learned about what had
happened, FFF brought his daughter to the Clarin Health Center for medical attention and
treatment.15 Dr. Vicente Manalo (Dr. Manalo) attended to VVV and issued her a medical
certificate16 dated September 2, 2000, stating that VVV sustained the following:
CONTUSION WITH HEMATOMA PROXIMAL
LATERAL PORTION OF THIGH, RIGHT
TIME TO HEAL: 3-4 DAYS, BARRING COMPLICATIONS
From the health center, FFF and VVV went to the Clarin Police Station where they had the
incident blottered.17Thereafter, FFF requested Eliezer Inferido to take pictures of the injuries
sustained by VVV.18
Version of the Defense
Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and operated the fishpond from 1982 to 1987.
Sometime in 1997, FFF occupied the fishpond and the nipa hut beside the same, by virtue of a
Memorandum of Agreement19 (MOA) entered into by FFF with the Heirs of Escolastico, as
represented by Segundino Ronquillo. After the MOA expired in 1998, appellant and his wife,
Bienvenida, decided to discontinue the lease because they did not understand the management
and accounting of FFF. They made several demands on him to return possession of the fishpond
but FFF refused, asking for a written termination of the contract from all the heirs of Escolastico.
To solve the problem, appellant and Bienvenida engaged the services of FFF as caretaker of the
fishpond, providing him with fingerlings, fertilizers and all necessary expenses.
This notwithstanding, FFF still failed to make an accounting. Thus, on September 2, 2000, at
around 7:00 in the morning, after pasturing his cattle, appellant dropped by the house of FFF to
ask him to make a detailed accounting because he and his wife were not satisfied with the harvest
in August of 2000. MMM, however, retorted, saying that they would no longer make any
accounting, as Benny Ronquillo, brother of appellant’s wife, would finance the next cropping.
Displeased with MMM's statement, appellant got angry and demanded that they leave the
fishpond. FFF's family resented this demand and a commotion ensued. BBB got a piece of wood
and struck appellant but the latter was able to parry the blow. Appellant got hold of the piece of
wood which actually broke. Intending not to hurt anybody, appellant threw the same behind him.
Suddenly from behind, VVV appeared, got hold of the said piece of wood and hit appellant once at
the back of his shoulder. Appellant testified that the blow was not strong enough to injure him.20
Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal case was filed by VVV against him for
allegedly beating her. Appellant denied that he beat VVV, saying that the instant case was
fabricated and was being used as a means to extort money from him. 21 Moreover, appellant
asseverated that Ronald Lauren22 (Ronald) witnessed the incident.
Ronald testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a piece of wood but appellant was able to
parry the blow; that appellant threw away the piece of wood; that when appellant threw the piece
of wood, there was no one there at the time; and that appellant left the place immediately.23
The RTC's Ruling
On July 30, 2003, the RTC found that at the arraignment, appellant, through former counsel Atty.
Theodore Cabahug (Atty. Cabahug), admitted that he hit VVV, although unintentionally. Thus,
appellant had the burden of proving that, at the time VVV was hit, appellant was performing a
lawful act. The RTC ruled that the evidence did not favor appellant because his demand for FFF's
family to vacate the fishpond, coupled with threats and punctuated with actual use of force,
exceeded the limits allowed by law. The RTC also held that the injuries sustained by VVV were
distinguishable, indicating that the blow was forceful, and that the force used was strong. Thus,
the RTC disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds LEONILO SANCHEZ y Aranas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, and applying in
his favor the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court imposes on him the indeterminate sentence
of an imprisonment of Six (6) years of prision [correccional] as minimum to seven (7) years and
four (4) months of prision mayor as maximum, with costs against him. The Court orders him to pay
[VVV] the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) for civil indemnity and the sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) for damages; the awards for civil indemnity and damages are
without subsidiary penalties in case of insolvency.
IN ACCORDANCE with letter (f) of Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610, the Court exercising its
discretion also imposes on Leonilo Sanchez y Aranas the penalty of a fine of Two Thousand
Pesos (₱2,000.00) without subsidiary penalty in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.24
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 contending that appellant never admitted that he hit
VVV. The RTC, however, denied the motion in its Order26 dated August 8, 2003 for being pro
forma. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA.27
The CA's Ruling
On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of the proceedings taken during appellant's
arraignment before the RTC belied appellant's contention that his defense was one of absolute
denial. The CA pointed to a manifestation of appellant's counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in open court that
appellant was putting up an affirmative defense because the act of hitting VVV was unintentional.
Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed by appellant cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence to the factual
findings of the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed against appellant was not
defective inasmuch as the allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA held that the
prosecution had fully established the elements of the offense charged, i.e., Other Acts of Child
Abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. However, the CA opined that the RTC erred in
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law because R.A. No. 7610 is a special law. Lastly, the CA
deleted the award of civil indemnity and damages for utter lack of basis. The fallo of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed Judgment dated July 30, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City in Criminal Case No. 11110 finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Republic
Act No. 7610 and Presidential Decree No. 603 is hereby UPHELD with MODIFICATION as to the
penalty imposed. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum of prision mayor. The fine
imposed is retained.
The Order dated August 8, 2003 denying appellant's motion for reconsideration is
hereby AFFIRMED.
The award of civil indemnity and damages in the assailed Decision is deleted.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.28
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 which the CA denied in its Resolution30 dated July
11, 2007.
Hence, this Petition claiming that the CA erred:
1. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF
THE STATE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[;]
2. IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION
[OVER] THE CASE DESPITE A DEFECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALLEGED THAT
THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF IS (sic) NOT COVERED BY THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, AS AMENDED[; AND]
3. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED
(VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(a) OF R.A. NO. 7610) NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
ACT COMPLAINED OF IS OBVIOUSLY COVERED BY THE REVISED PENAL CODE
(Act No. 3815) AS SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY.31
Appellant posits that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt; that the
RTC erred when it shifted the burden of proof to appellant; that the RTC and CA erred in ruling
that appellant interposed an affirmative defense when, all throughout his testimony before the
RTC, he denied having inflicted any injury on VVV; and that appellant and his counsel did not sign
any written stipulation for appellant to be bound thereby, hence, the burden of proof still rests in
the prosecution. Moreover, appellant claims that VVV and her family had ill motive to implicate him
because of the pressure he exerted against them to give up the fishpond. Appellant pointed out
that VVV, in her testimony, made material inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the
back of their house. Appellant also claims that he had no motive or intention of harming anyone,
otherwise, he would have done so earlier that day; that if BBB was also beaten, he should have
submitted himself for medical treatment and examination; and that the Information charging
appellant was substantially and jurisdictionally defective as the acts complained of were covered
by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant submits that, if duly proven, the acts
complained of are clearly constitutive of Slight Physical Injuries punishable under Article 266 32 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant, likewise, posits that the instant case is not one for child abuse, since VVV was neither
punished in a cruel and unusual manner nor deliberately subjected to excessive indignities or
humiliation. The act was not cruel since the injury was merely slight per medical findings; the
location of the injury was on the thigh which is not unusual; and VVV was not beaten in front of
many people as to humiliate her. Lastly, no evidence was submitted by the prosecution, such as a
testimony of a child psychologist, or even of VVV's teacher who could have observed changes in
the victim's behavior, as to prove that the injury was prejudicial to the victim's development.
Appellant alleges that the charge was obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight
physical injuries, in order to subject him to a much heavier penalty. Appellant prays for acquittal
based on reasonable doubt and, in the alternative, if found guilty, he should be convicted only of
the crime of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code.33
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asseverates that the instant Petition
is fatally defective because it raises purely factual issues contrary to the mandatory provisions of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during
appellant's arraignment on November 6, 2001 clearly shows that appellant, through Atty.
Cabahug, raised an affirmative defense, hence, appellant cannot now change his theory; that the
prosecution established the fact that appellant committed the acts complained of by virtue of the
direct, positive and categorical testimonies of VVV, corroborated by MMM and duly supported by
the medical examination conducted by Dr. Manalo and the entry in the police blotter; that VVV's
and MMM's statements are consistent with their allegations in their respective complaint-affidavits;
and that appellant failed to present any reason or ground to set aside the decisions of the RTC
and the CA. Furthermore, the OSG argues that there is no ambiguity in the Information as the
allegations are clear and explicit to constitute the essential elements of the offense of child abuse,
to wit: (a) minority of the victim; (b) acts complained of are prejudicial to the development of the
child-victim; and (c) the said acts are covered by the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7610 and
P.D. No. 603. The OSG submits that appellant cannot now feign ignorance of the offense under
which he was specifically charged, and to which he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when
arraigned.34
However, the OSG opines that the CA erred in modifying the indeterminate sentence imposed by
the RTC. The offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse as defined and punished under Section 10(a)
of R.A. No. 7610, a special law, carries the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period which is
a penalty defined in the Revised Penal Code. The OSG states that the RTC correctly applied the
first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing appellant to an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor, as maximum, the minimum term thereof being within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to the prescribed penalty, as there were no attendant mitigating
and/or aggravating circumstances. Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be denied and
the assailed CA Decision be modified as aforementioned but affirmed in all other respects. 35
Our Ruling
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a
child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
 (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.36
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 5937 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
In this connection, our ruling in Araneta v. People38 is instructive:
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59
of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c)
child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development.
The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse,
cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from
the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can
be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if
he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child
abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an
act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated.lavvphi1 It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a)
of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child’s development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child
abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth penalized act cannot be
interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an
analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.39
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as
slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the
protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution.40 As defined in the law,
child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of
appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
In the same manner, we reject appellant's claim that the Information filed against him was
defective. In Resty Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa,41 we held that what controls is not the
title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein. Without
doubt, the averments in the Information clearly make out the offense of child abuse under Section
10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The following were alleged: (1) the minority of VVV; (2) the acts
constituting physical abuse, committed by appellant against VVV; and (3) said acts are clearly
punishable under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to P.D. No. 603. Indeed, as argued by the OSG, the
commission of the offense is clearly recited in the Information, and appellant cannot now feign
ignorance of this.
Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial. Notably, the RTC found VVV and MMM to be
credible witnesses, whose testimonies deserve full credence. It bears stressing that full weight and
respect are usually accorded by the appellate court to the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses.42 Equally noteworthy is the fact that the CA did not disturb the RTC's appreciation of
the witnesses’ credibility. Thus, we apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on such findings, are
accorded respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is
when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted
cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. We
have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no reason to deviate from the
findings of both courts and their uniform conclusion that appellant is indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse.43
However, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the CA deserves review. The imposable penalty
under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 is prision mayor in its minimum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC imposed upon appellant the penalty of six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor, as maximum. The CA modified this by imposing upon appellant the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, of prision
mayor, postulating that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the RTC should have imposed on
appellant an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same."44 On the other hand, the OSG contends that the RTC appropriately applied the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, citing our ruling in People v. Simon.45
We agree with the OSG.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
To repeat, the penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum period. This
penalty is derived from, and defined in, the Revised Penal Code. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a
special law, the rules in the Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or
determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where the special law adopted penalties
from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in
felonies.46 In People v. Simon,47 the Court applied the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court applied the
same principle to cases involving illegal possession of firearms. In those instances, the offenses
were also penalized under special laws. Finally, in Dulla v. Court of Appeals,49 a case involving
sexual abuse of a child as penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court
likewise applied the same first clause of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This case should be no
exception.

In the absence of any modifying circumstances, and because it is favorable to appellant, we find
the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
proper.lawphi1

As a final word, we reiterate our view in Araneta,50 to wit:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development." This piece of legislation supplies the
inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised
Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute
that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and
exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which child
traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.51

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 20, 2007 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 27817 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Leonilo Sanchez is
hereby sentenced to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional,
as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186080 August 14, 2009
JULIUS AMANQUITON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of Barangay Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. As a purokleader and barangay tanod, he was responsible for the maintenance of
cleanliness, peace and order of the community.
At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner heard an explosion. He, together with two
auxiliary tanod, Dominador Amante1 and a certain Cabisudo, proceeded to Sambong Street where
the explosion took place. Thereafter, they saw complainant Leoselie John Bañaga being chased
by a certain Gil Gepulane. Upon learning that Bañaga was the one who threw the pillbox 2 that
caused the explosion, petitioner and his companions also went after him.
On reaching Bañaga’s house, petitioner, Cabisudo and Amante knocked on the door. When no
one answered, they decided to hide some distance away. After five minutes, Bañaga came out of
the house. At this juncture, petitioner and his companions immediately apprehended him.
Bañaga's aunt, Marilyn Alimpuyo, followed them to the barangay hall.
Bañaga was later brought to the police station. On the way to the police station, Gepulane
suddenly appeared from nowhere and boxed Bañaga in the face. This caused petitioner to order
Gepulane’s apprehension along with Bañaga. An incident report was made.3
During the investigation, petitioner learned Bañaga had been previously mauled by a group made
up of a certain Raul, Boyet and Cris but failed to identify two others. The mauling was the result of
gang trouble in a certain residental compound in Taguig City. Bañaga’s mauling was recorded in a
barangay blotter which read:
10-30-201
Time: 10-15 p.m.
RECORD purposes
Dumating dito sa Barangay Head Quarters si Dossen4 Bañaga is Alimpuyo 16 years old student
nakatira sa 10 B Kalachuchi St. M.B.T. M.M.
Upang ireklamo yong sumapak sa akin sina Raul[,] Boyet [at] Cris at yong dalawang sumapak ay
hindi ko kilala. Nang yari ito kaninang 10:p.m. araw ng [M]artes taong kasalukuyan at yong labi ko
pumutok at yong kabilang mata ko ay namaga sa bandang kanan. Ang iyong kaliwang mukha at
pati yong likod ko ay may tama sa sapak.
Patunay dito ang aking lagda.
Dossen Banaga (sgd.)
Thereafter, an Information for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, RA 5 71606 in relation to
Section 5 (j) of R.A. 8369 was filed against petitioner, Amante and Gepulane. The Information
read:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Julius Amanquiton, Dominador
Amante and Gil Gepulane of the crime of Violations of Section 10 (a) Article VI, Republic Act No.
7610 in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. No. 8369 committed as follows:
That on the 30th day of October, 2001, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with one
another, armed with nightstick, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence, a form of physical abuse, upon the person of Leoselie John A.
[Bañaga], seventeen (17) years old, a minor, by then and there manhandling him and hitting him
with their nightsticks, thus, constituting other acts of child abuse, which is inimical or prejudicial to
child’s development, in violation of the above-mentioned law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner and Amante both pleaded not guilty. Gepulane remains at-large.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Paulito Cruz, medico-legal
officer of the Taguig-Pateros District Hospital who attended to Bañaga on October 30, 2001,
Bañaga himself, Alimpuyo and Rachelle Bañaga (complainant’s mother).
The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Amante and Briccio Cuyos, then deputy chief
barangay tanodof the same barangay. Cuyos testified that the blotter notation entered by
Gepulane and Bañaga was signed in his presence and that they read the contents thereof before
affixing their signatures.
On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.7 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused JULIUS AMANQUITON and
DOMINADOR AMANTE "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article VI Sec. 10 (a)
of Republic Act 7610 in relation to Section 3 (j) of Republic Act 8369, hereby sentences accused The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was discussed in People v. Berroya:14
JULIUS AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE a straight penalty of thirty (30) days
of Arresto Menor.1avvphi1 [Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed
against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited
Both accused Julius Amanquiton and Dominador Amante are hereby directed to pay Leoselie means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public
John A. Banaga the following: officers, as therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in
striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if
1. Actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00; not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no
conviction where there is reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof beyond reasonable doubt
requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
2. Moral Damages in the amount of P 30,000.00; and
mind.

3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P 20,000.00.

The case against the accused Gil Gepulane is hereby sent to the ARCHIVES to be revived upon
the arrest of the accused. Let [a] warrant of arrest be issued against him.
SO ORDERED.
Amanquiton’s motion for reconsideration was denied.8
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due course. On August 28, 2008, the CA
rendered a decision9which affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty. The dispositive
portion of the assailed CA decision read:
The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt (of the crime of
child abuse) solely on the supposed positive identification by the complainant and his witness
(Alimpuyo) of petitioner and his co-accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
We note Bañaga’s statement that, when he was apprehended by petitioner and Amante, there
were many people around.15 Yet, the prosecution presented only Bañaga and his aunt, Alimpuyo,
as witnesses to the mauling incident itself. Where were the other people who could have testified,
in an unbiased manner, on the alleged mauling of Bañaga by petitioner and Amante, as
supposedly witnessed by Alimpuyo?16 The testimonies of the two other prosecution witnesses, Dr.
Paulito Cruz and Rachelle Bañaga, did not fortify Bañaga’s claim that petitioner mauled him, for
the following reasons: Dr. Cruz merely attended to Bañaga’s injuries, while Rachelle testified that
she saw Bañaga only after the injuries have been inflicted on him.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Decision appealed from We note furthermore that, Bañaga failed to controvert the validity of the barangay blotter he signed
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of regarding the mauling incident which happened prior to his apprehension by petitioner. Neither did
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum up to eight (8) he ever deny the allegation that he figured in a prior battery by gang members.
years of prision mayor minimum as maximum. In addition to the damages already awarded, a fine
of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) is hereby solidarily imposed the proceeds of which shall be All this raises serious doubt on whether Bañaga’s injuries were really inflicted by petitioner, et al.,
administered as a cash fund by the DSWD. to the exclusion of other people. In fact, petitioner testified clearly that Gepulane, who had been
harboring a grudge against Bañaga, came out of nowhere and punched Bañaga while the latter
IT IS SO ORDERED. was being brought to the police station. Gepulane, not petitioner, could very well have caused
Bañaga's injuries.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.10
Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually caused the bloodied condition of Bañaga’s
face because she had to first put down the baby she was then carrying when the melee
Hence, this petition. Petitioner principally argues that the facts of the case as established did not started.17 More importantly, Alimpuyo stated that she was told by Bañaga that, while he was
constitute a violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7160 and definitely did not prove the guilt allegedly being held by the neck by petitioner, others were hitting him. Alimpuyo was obviously
of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. testifying not on what she personally saw but on what Bañaga told her.

The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.11 An accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt.12 It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side
with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion,
with moral certainty.13
While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the trustworthiness of
witnesses, when there appear in the records facts and circumstances of real weight which might
have been overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to sift fact from
fiction.
We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case. Where the evidence on an issue
of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused.18 If inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a
conviction.19
weakness of the defense. Thus, when the evidence of the prosecution is not enough to sustain a
conviction, it must be rejected and the accused absolved and released at once.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 28, 2008 decision and January 15,
2009 resolution of Court of Appeals are reversed and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Julius Amanquiton
is hereby ACQUITTED of violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7160.

Time and again, we have held that: SO ORDERED.

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." This piece of legislation
supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the
Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a
statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse
and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which child
traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is
expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but
includes also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to the child’s development."20

However, this noble statute should not be used as a sharp sword, ready to be brandished against
an accused even if there is a patent lack of proof to convict him of the crime. The right of an
accused to liberty is as important as a minor’s right not to be subjected to any form of abuse. Both
are enshrined in the Constitution. One need not be sacrificed for the other.

There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations protecting a child from any and all forms of abuse.
While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of children abound amidst social ills, care has to be
likewise taken that wayward youths should not be cuddled by a misapplication of the law. Society,
through its laws, should correct the deviant conduct of the youth rather than take the cudgels for
them. Lest we regress to a culture of juvenile delinquency and errant behavior, laws for the
protection of children against abuse should be applied only and strictly to actual abusers.

The objective of this seemingly catch-all provision on abuses against children will be best
achieved if parameters are set in the law itself, if only to prevent baseless accusations against
innocent individuals. Perhaps the time has come for Congress to review this matter and institute
the safeguards necessary for the attainment of its laudable ends.

We reiterate our ruling in People v. Mamalias:21

We emphasize that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to send people to the
gaol but to do justice. The prosecution’s job is to prove that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182941 July 3, 2009
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the review on certiorari1 of the
Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals4 (CA) that affirmed with modification his
conviction for the crime of qualified rape rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159,
Pasig City, in its decision of April 5, 2006.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA5 was playing with her friend BBB in the second floor of her
family’s house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that
he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with
her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by
inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to Dolores
Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to the barangay office. AAA
was later subjected to physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent
with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings, the
petitioner was charged with rape under the following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his
(accused) sister, AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latter’s will and consent.
Contrary to law.6
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He
claimed that he was selling cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape. He also claimed that AAA
only invented her story because she bore him a grudge for the beatings he gave her. The parties’
mother (CCC) supported the petitioner’s story; she also stated that AAA was a troublemaker. Both
CCC and son testified that the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident
happened.7
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped her; she confirmed the
petitioner’s claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ROBERT SIERRA y
CANEDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape (Violation of R.A. 8353 in relation
to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby sentences the said juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the victim the amount of ₱75,000
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, and ₱25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAA’s credibility. He also invoked
paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) 9 to exempt
him from criminal liability considering that he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was
committed.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction with modification as to penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting Robert Sierra, the assailed
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The award of damages are likewise
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.10
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the CA held:
As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that Robert is not exempt from
liability. First, it was not clearly established and proved by the defense that Robert was 15 years
old or below at the time of the commission of the crime. It was incumbent for the defense to
present Robert’s birth certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344. Neither is
the suspension of sentence available to Robert as the Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the
law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court
shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in
that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article
192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted
from Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the
other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty
for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are
disqualified from having their sentences suspended.11
The CA denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
THE ISSUES
The petitioner no longer assails the prosecution’s evidence on his guilt of the crime charged; what
he now assails is the failure of the CA to apply paragraph 1, Section 6 12 of R.A. No. 9344 under
the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9344 on the
petitioner’s exemption from criminal liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the defense to present
the petitioner’s birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of
proving his age lies with the prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v. Hon.
Gubaton13 thereby denying the petitioner the benefit of exemption from criminal liability
under R.A. No. 9344.
The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the burden of proof for
purposes of determining exemption from criminal liability based on the age of the petitioner at the
time the crime was committed.
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution as the party who
stands to lose the case if no evidence is presented to show that the petitioner was not a 15-year
old minor entitled to the exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344. 14 He
additionally claims that Sections 3,15 7,16 and 6817 of the law also provide a presumption of minority
in favor of a child in conflict with the law, so that any doubt regarding his age should be resolved in
his favor.
The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence on record – specifically: the
allegation of the Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and CCC that the prosecution never
objected to, and the findings of the RTC – established that he was not more than 15 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime.
The People’s Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the
burden belongs to the petitioner who should have presented his birth certificate or other
documentary evidence proving that his age was 15 years or below. The OSG also stressed that
while petitioner is presumed to be a minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence suspended
following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton.18
THE COURT’S RULING
We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the prosecution’s evidence and the findings of the lower courts on the
petitioner’s guilt, since the petition opens the whole case for review and the issues before us are
predicated on the petitioner’s guilt of the crime charged. A determination of guilt is likewise
relevant under the terms of R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal, not on
the civil, liability.
We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA decision and the records of the case,
to deviate from the lower courts’ findings of guilt. The records show that the prosecution
established all the elements of the crime charged through the credible testimony of AAA and the
other corroborating evidence; sexual intercourse did indeed take place as the information
charged.19 As against AAA’s testimony, the petitioner could only raise the defenses of denial and
alibi – defenses that, in a long line of cases, we have held to be inherently weak unless supported
by clear and convincing evidence; the petitioner failed to present this required evidentiary
support.20 We have held, too, that as negative defenses, denial and alibi cannot prevail over the
credible and positive testimony of the complainant.21 We sustain the lower courts on the issue of
credibility, as we see no compelling reason to doubt the validity of their conclusions in this regard.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground – i.e., exemption from criminal liability under
R.A. No. 9344 – that implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in no way swayed the
conclusion we made above, as the defense is entitled to present all alternative defenses available
to it, even inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defense’s claim of exemption from liability was
made for the first time in its appeal to the CA. While this may initially imply an essential change of
theory that is usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness, 22 no essential change is really
involved as the claim for exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evidence submitted
below and with the lower courts’ conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. An
exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the
accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he
cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted by law. In admitting this
type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful, too, that the appeal of a criminal case (even one
made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review, even on questions that the parties did not
raise.23 By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into every circumstance and
resolve every doubt in favor of the accused.24 It is with these considerations in mind and in
obedience to the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of
children in conflict with the law should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable law on exemption from
liability compelling because of the patent errors the CA committed in these regards. Specifically,
the CA’s findings of fact on the issues of age and minority, premised on the supposed absence of
evidence, are contradicted by the evidence on record; it also manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.25
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that the ages of both the
petitioner and the complaining victim are material and are at issue. The age of the petitioner is
critical for purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344,
while the age of the latter is material in characterizing the crime committed and in considering the
resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent
is to promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a
system that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being
through a variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders,
counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs and other
alternatives to institutional care.26 More importantly in the context of this case, this law modifies as
well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders; it changed what
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, previously
provided – i.e., from "under nine years of age" and "above nine years of age and under fifteen"
(who acted without discernment) – to "fifteen years old or under" and "above fifteen but below 18"
(who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing
exemption, the new law – as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did – presumes
that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so that
their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be held accountable. 27 The current
law also drew its changes from the principle of restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the
ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors of these ages a chance to right their
wrong through diversion and intervention measures.28
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal liability because he was not
more than 15 years old at the time the rape took place. The CA disbelieved this claim for the
petitioner’s failure to present his birth certificate as required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344. 29 The
CA also found him disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence because the imposable
penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua to death.
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, refers to the duty of a party
to present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a
criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution
which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes
its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required
elements. At this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the
prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the
accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable therefor. In the
present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and had done everything that the law
requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense which now claims, by an
affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability
because of his age when he committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution,
has the burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he
committed the rape charged.30
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are not elements of the
crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances. To impose the
burden of proof on the prosecution would make minority and age integral elements of the crime
when clearly they are not. 31 If the prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden relates to
proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape.32
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence
to Prove the Accused’s Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the petitioner was only
15 years old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how
the age of a child in conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to
the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344 provides the implementing
details of this provision by enumerating the measures that may be undertaken by a law
enforcement officer to ascertain the child’s age:
(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the child’s age, such as
(a) Child’s birth certificate;
(b) Child’s baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the child’s school
records, dental records, or travel papers.
(2) x x x
 (3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of such
documents, the law enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to determine age
by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age (e.g. date of
birthday, grade level in school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age of the
child (e.g. relatives, neighbors, teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height, built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
xxx
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having been passed only in 2006), does not
depart from the jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence that may be admitted as
satisfactory proof of the accused’s minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,33 we accepted testimonial evidence to prove the minority
and age of the accused in the absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing
the date of birth. This was followed by U.S. v. Roxas 34 where the defendant’s statement about his
age was considered sufficient, even without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a
minor of 16 years at the time he committed the offense charged. Subsequently, in People v.
Tismo,35 the Court appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that
he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense in the absence of any
contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution. Then, in People v.
Villagracia,36 we found the testimony of the accused that he was less than 15 years old sufficient
to establish his minority. We reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v. Morial 37 and David v.
Court of Appeals,38 and ruled that the allegations of minority and age by the accused will be
accepted as facts upon the prosecution’s failure to disprove the claim by contrary evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on the accused’s minority and
age upon the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory
evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove
the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on
the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection
on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused’s
and/or his relatives’ testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and CCC both testified regarding
his minority and age when the rape was committed.39 Second, the records before us show that
these pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected to by the prosecution. And lastly, the
prosecution did not present any contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15 years
old when the crime was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that any doubt on
the age of the child must be resolved in his favor.40 Hence, any doubt in this case regarding the
petitioner’s age at the time he committed the rape should be resolved in his favor. In other words,
the testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old when the crime took place should be read to
mean that he was not more than 15 years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A. No.
9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, and established
jurisprudence in accord with the latest statutory developments, the CA therefore cannot but be in
error in not appreciating and giving evidentiary value to the petitioner’s and CCC’s testimonies
relating to the former’s age.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect and that he is no longer a
minor (he was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the
benefit of total exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants.41 As we explained in discussing
Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 934442 in the recent case of Ortega v. People:43
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the
time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred
to the appropriate local social welfare and development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling,
therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at
the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of the commission of the
offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised
from 9 to 15 years old. [Emphasis supplied]
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the RPC, as
amended, which provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the accused who is not found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the records of this case
indicates that the petitioner is a habitual criminal.
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the accused shall continue to be
civilly liable despite his exemption from criminal liability; hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA
despite his exemption from criminal liability. The extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he
would have been liable for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, that the
petitioner is guilty of qualified rape because of his relationship with AAA within the second civil
degree of consanguinity and the latter’s minority.44 Both courts accordingly imposed the civil
liability corresponding to qualified rape.
The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings, does not appear to be a disputed
matter. Their mother, CCC, declared in her testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her children.
The prosecution and the defense likewise stipulated in the proceedings below that the relationship
exists. We find, however, that AAA’s minority, though alleged in the Information, had not been
sufficiently proven.45 People v. Pruna46 laid down these guidelines in appreciating the age of the
complainant:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set
the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him. [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA. They do not likewise show that the
petitioner ever expressly and clearly admitted AAA’s age at the time of the rape. Pursuant to
Pruna, neither can his failure to object to AAA’s testimony be taken against him.
Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade the crime to qualified rape –
i.e., relationship within the third degree of consanguinity and minority of the victim – does not
exist. The crime for which the petitioner should have been found criminally liable should therefore
only be simple rape pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not qualified rape. The civil
liability that can be imposed on the petitioner follows the characterization of the crime and the
attendant circumstances.
Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of ₱50,000.00 but increase the awarded
exemplary damages ₱30,000.00, both pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 47 Moral damages are
automatically awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof; the law assumes that the
victim suffered moral injuries entitling her to this award.48Article 2230 of the Civil Code justifies the
award of exemplary damages because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
relationship between AAA and petitioner and dwelling.49 As discussed above, the relationship
(between the parties) is not disputed. We appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance
based on AAA’s testimony that the rape was committed in their house.50 While dwelling as an
aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the Information, established jurisprudence holds that
it may nevertheless be appreciated as basis for the award of exemplary damages.51lavvphi1
We modify the awarded civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, the latter being the civil
indemnity appropriate for simple rape52 on the finding that rape had been committed.53
In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no need to discuss the petition’s third
assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 29, 2008 and Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-
H.C. No. 02218 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-H for rape filed against
petitioner Robert Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is REFERRED to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer who shall proceed in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9344. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Unless there are other valid causes for petitioner’s continued detention, we hereby ORDER his
IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the above terms.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City for its immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
report to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008
MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 14,
2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael
Padua’s petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration. Padua’s petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004 3 and July 28,
20044 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for
probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the
RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,5 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,6 otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous drugs. 7 The
Information reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y
Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of violation of
Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i),
committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17)
years old, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-
buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was
found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.8
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of
not guilty.9
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua’s counsel manifested that
his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the
benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 7010 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor
interposed no objection.11 Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order12 stating that the
former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and
pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision13 dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the
crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of
Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and
therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine
pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation15 dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a
minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential
Decree No. 96816 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section
70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to
conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days
from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said
petition within five days from receipt of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-
Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation. 18
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an
Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24 19 of Rep. Act No.
9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y
Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the
Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y
Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D.
603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the
suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find
application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor
Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for
Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A.
9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was
[v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with
Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court
is of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of
violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the
provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
"Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968,
as amended." (underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l
should be, as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.20
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004.
He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the
Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 21
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied.
Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL
OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A
MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER
RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.22
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its
Comment23 as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in applying Section 24, Article II
of R.A. 9165 instead of Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.
II.
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law" has no application to the instant case.24
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua’s petition for
certiorari assailing the trial court’s order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Padua’s right
under Rep. Act No. 9344,25 the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3) Does
Section 3226 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law" have application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for
certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess
of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave
abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for probation shows that the RTC
neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the
law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Padua’s petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for
selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person
convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed
by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation
Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 29 If a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.30 Furthermore,
there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be
no departure.31
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344,
the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has
application in this case. Section 6836 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC
both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 3837 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be
retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a
child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence. Section 4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18
years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of
sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over
and thus, could no longer be considered a child39 for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus,
the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is
concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the
Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section
24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted
of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70
to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 1132 and 1533 of the Act. The law
considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and
pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically
disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors
alike, are given the chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that
had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug
traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared
so.35

The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective
of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a
penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under
Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous
drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200793 June 4, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated
August 16, 2011, which affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of Branch 94, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City dated December 11, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-
00-91971 finding accused-appellant Milan Roxas y Aguiluz guilty of five counts of rape against
AAA,3 a minor who was 9 years old at the time of the first rape and 10 years old at the time of the
succeeding four rapes.
Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant Roxas, charging him as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967: That on or about the 9th day of August 1998 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there blindfolding her,
then removed her shorts and underwear then accused inserted his penis inside her
vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent.4
2. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968:
That on or about the 28th day of July 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there
blindfolding her and removing her shorts and underwear and inserting his penis
inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and
without her consent.5
3. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 9 years of age by then and there laying
her on the chairs inside the bathroom, then blindfolded her and then removed her
shorts and underwear then accused inserted his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.6
4. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970:
That on or about the 20th day of March 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there laying
her down on a bed inside his grandparents’ room then blindfolded her, then
removed her shorts and underwear, then accused inserted his penis inside her
vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without
her consent.7
5. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971:
That on or about the 11th day of May 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there
removing her shorts and underwear and inserting his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent.8 Accused-appellant Roxas entered a plea of Not Guilty to all the crimes
charged.9
The prosecution’s factual account based on the testimony of AAA was concisely stated by the
Office of the Solicitor General in its Appellee’s Brief, as follows:
On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of age, was at her grandmother [CCC]’s
house located on [XXX], Quezon City. In the morning of said date, she was at the dirty kitchen
with her aunt [ZZZ] who was then washing clothes. Her aunt asked her if she had already taken a
bath, she replied in the negative.
Her uncle, accused-appellant, overheard their conversation so he volunteered to give [AAA] a
bath. Subsequently, he brought her upstairs to the bathroom.
While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told [AAA] to turn around. After she complied with
his directive, he blindfolded her. [AAA] started to wonder what the accused-appellant was doing so
she told him that he was supposed to give her a bath. Accused-appellant told her that they would
play first for a while.
He turned her around three (3) times and then, removed her shorts and underwear. After that, he
sat on a chair, which was inside the bathroom, and raised both of her legs.
Thereafter, she felt him on top of her. She also felt accused-appellant’s penis enter her vagina
which she found painful.
She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but accused-appellant got angry and poked a sharp
instrument on her neck. [AAA] did not report the incident because accused-appellant threatened to
cut her tongue and to kill her and her mother.
[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was at the same house of her paternal
grandparents. She was on the terrace on the second floor of the house when accused-appellant,
who was in her grandparents’ bedroom at that time, called her. She hesitated to go near him
because she was afraid that he might rape her again.
Accused-appellant then went to the terrace and dragged her to the bedroom of her grandparents.
She could not run anymore nor shout for help because aside from the fact that there was nobody
else in the room, accused-appellant was holding a pointed weapon.
While [AAA] and accused-appellant were inside the room, he blindfolded her, removed her shorts
and underwear, and then laid her down the bed. Thereafter, he moved on top of her and inserted
his penis in her vagina. Again, she did not report the incident because of accused-appellant’s
threats should she report the incident to anybody.
Another incident of rape took place on 11 May 1998while [AAA] was again at her paternal
grandparents’ house. On the said date, she was alone in the living room on the second floor of the
house when accused-appellant called her. She did not accede to his bidding because she was
scared of him. Thereafter, he shouted at her and demanded that she come near him, so she went
to him.
He brought her inside her grandmother’s bedroom and upon reaching the room, he immediately
blindfolded her and poked a bladed weapon on her neck. He turned her around three (3) times,
removed her shorts and underwear, laid her down the bed, moved on top of her, and inserted his
penis in her vagina. Again, the accused-appellant threatened her so she did not report what had
happened.
[AAA]’s ordeal did not stop there. She was raped for the fourth time on 28 July 1998 at her
paternal grandparents’ house.1âwphi1 She and the accused were incidentally alone in the living
room on the second floor of the house. He asked her to go with him inside the bedroom of her
grandparents, but she did not get up from her seat. So accused-appellant pulled her toward the
bedroom. She tried to free herself, but he poked a pointed instrument at her.
Accused-appellant committed the same acts he had perpetrated on [AAA] during her three
[previous] rape incidents: he removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed, moved on
top of her and thereafter, inserted his penis in her vagina. She was again threatened by the
accused-appellant not to tell anybody about the incident or else he would cut her tongue and kill
her and her mother.
The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09 August 1998. At that time, [AAA] was at the
terrace on the second floor of her paternal grandparents’ house; and accused-appellant also
happened to be there. He pulled her and brought her inside the room, blindfolded her, and turned
her around three (3) times. He employed the same method in raping her: he removed her shorts
and underwear, laid her on the bed and moved on top of her. She tried to push him and raise her
shorts and panty, but she did not succeed because he poked a pointed instrument on her neck.
Thereafter, he inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, she did not report the incident to anyone
because she was scared of his threats.10 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
In contrast, the defense presented four witnesses: AAA’s mother (BBB), AAA’s two brothers (DDD
and EEE), and Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology. The defense’s statement of the antecedent facts as contained in the Appellant’s Brief is
reproduced here:
Accused Milan Roxas denied having raped [AAA] on all the five (5) counts of rape.
[DDD], brother of herein private complainant, testified that his aunt in the maternal side, [Tita
YYY], induced him by giving toys if he would tell his father that the accused was raping his sister,
[AAA]. Upon prodding of his maternal aunt, [DDD],who was only eight (8) years old then, told his
father that he saw the accused rape his sister. His father ran amuck which led to the filing of the
instant case.
On subsequent days, while [DDD]and [AAA] were in a grocery store buying something, their [Tito
XXX], [Tito WWW] and [Tita YYY] arrived on board an FX vehicle. [Tita YYY] told [DDD] that they
will be going to buy toys. [DDD] said that he will first ask permission from his grandfather, but [Tita
YYY] said that it would only take a few minutes and they will bring them home afterwards. [AAA]
was brought to SSDD, a place under the administration of the DSWD, while [DDD] was brought to
Caloocan. On the following day, he was brought to Muñoz, in a rented house of his [Tita YYY] and
her husband. [DDD] stayed there for almost a year. He was forbidden to go outside as the door
was always locked. When [his Tita VVV] arrived from Japan they went to Tarlac where his paternal
grandmother fetched him.
[EEE], brother of herein private complainant, likewise testified that when [his Tita VVV] arrived,
they went to North Olympus, Quezon City where [his] maternal relatives reside. On one occasion,
he saw his sister, [AAA] and his maternal uncle [Tito XXX] entered one of the bedrooms. He tried
to open the door to see what the duo were doing, but it was locked. [EEE] looked for a wire and
was able to open the door. He saw private complainant on top of his [TitoXXX], both naked. When
the duo saw him, private complainant and his [Tito XXX] stood up. The latter threatened him not to
tell anybody or he will cut off his tongue.
On November 26, 1999, [BBB], mother of the private complainant testified that her two (2)
children, [AAA] and [DDD], were missing. She looked for them, but to no avail. So she went to the
police station to have it blottered. Later did she know when she called her sister who resides in
Project 6, Quezon City that [DDD] was brought to Ilocos and [AAA] at the SSDD in Kamuning by
her 3 brothers and sister. She filed a case of kidnapping against his brother [Tito WWW]. [Tito
WWW], however, promised to return her children if she will have the said case dismissed which
she did.
She denied the allegations that[her] brother-in-law, herein accused, raped her daughter, [AAA]. In
fact, before the filing of the present rape cases there was one rape case filed on September 22,
1999 which was dismissed because [AAA] retracted her statements. As told to [BBB] by her
daughter [AAA], she was not raped by herein accused. She told a lie and made the false
accusation against the accused, because she does not want to put the blame on any of her
maternal relatives. [AAA] was greatly indebted to her maternal grandmother and her maternal
uncles and aunts because they had taken care of her since she was three (3) years old.
Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology testified
that based on her examination of the accused, she concluded that he is suffering from a mild
mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old. She observed that the
subject was aware that he was being accused of rape, but he had consistently denied the
allegations against him.11 (Citations omitted.)
The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on December 11, 2007, finding accused-appellant
Roxas guilty as charged in each of the five Informations filed against him. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in all five (5) counts of rape as recited in the information[s] and
sentences accused MILAN ROXAS:
1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in
the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in
the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in
the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in
the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs; and
5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in
the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
To credit in favor of the herein accused the full period of his detention in accordance with law.
Resultantly, all pending incidents are deemed moot and academic.12
The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on the
ground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay
merely testified that he was an eighteen-year old with a mental development comparable to that of
children between nine to ten years old. The RTC found the testimony of AAA credible, and found
the testimonies of the defense witnesses to be "flimsy."
Accused-appellant Roxas elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473. Accused-appellant Roxas submitted the following
Assignment of Errors in the appellate court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.13
On August 16, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, modifying the
Judgment of the RTC as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated 11 December 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in the case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Milan
Roxas y Aguiluz", docketed therein as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971, is
AFFIRMED with modification that accused-appellant is ordered to pay private complainant on
each count civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
₱75,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, for each count of
rape.14 Hence, accused-appellant Roxas interposed this appeal, where he, in his Supplemental
Brief, presented an Additional Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.15
Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA is replete with inconsistencies and
narrations that are contrary to common experience, human nature and the natural course of
things.16 Accused-appellant Roxas likewise points out that under Republic Act No. 9344 or the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, minors fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from
criminal responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas claims that since he has a mental age of nine
years old, he should also be "exempt from criminal liability although his chronological age at the
time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen years old."17
In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 18 is explicit in
providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her
birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the
age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by
accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning
may the court interpret or construe its true intent.19
On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully examined AAA’s testimony and found
ourselves in agreement with the assessment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As
observed by the appellate court:
We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner, without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the veracity of her testimony.
She recalled the tragic experience and positively identified accused-appellant as the one who
ravished her on five occasions. Her testimony was unshaken by a grueling cross-examination and
there is no impression whatsoever that the same is a mere fabrication. For her to come out in the
open and publicly describe her harrowing experience at a trial can only be taken as a badge of her
sincerity and the truth of her claims.20
We further underscore that AAA was merely 14 years old at the time she testified. We have 21
repeatedly held that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering
not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter
to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity.22
It is likewise axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to
observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide
who among them is telling the truth.23 As the trial court further observed, the defense witnesses
were not eyewitnesses. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as provided in the Rules of
Court.24 AAA’s mother and brothers were not present when the five rapes allegedly occurred, and
therefore any testimony on their part as to whether or not the complained acts actually happened
is hearsay.
We shall now discuss the criminal liability of accused-appellant Roxas. As stated above, the trial
court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
The first rape incident was committed in July 1997, and therefore the law applicable is Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The succeeding counts of rape were committed after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8353 on
October 22,1997, which transported the rape provision of the Revised Penal Code to Title 8 under
Crimes against Persons, and amended the same to its present wording:
Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. — Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Article 335 (old rape provision) and Article
266-B was sufficiently proven, the allegation of the relationship between AAA and accused-
appellant Roxas is considered insufficient under present jurisprudence. This Court has thus held:
However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the victim, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within
the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the
victim is his niece. In the same manner, it is irrelevant that "AAA" testified that appellant is her
uncle. We held in People v. Velasquez:
However, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant, applying
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.1âwphi1 We have consistently held that the circumstances
under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, the attendance of which could
mandate the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances which cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information. Even in cases
where such circumstances are proved, the death penalty cannot be imposed where the
information failed to allege them. To impose the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying
circumstance which has not been alleged in the information would violate the accused's
constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
While the informations in this case alleged that accused-appellant is the uncle of the two victims,
they did not state that he is their relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
The testimonial evidence that accused-appellant's wife and Luisa de Guzman are sisters is
immaterial. The circumstance that accused-appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree must be alleged in the information. In the case at bar, the
allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy
the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It was necessary to specifically allege that such
relationship was within the third civil degree. Hence, accused-appellant can only be convicted of
simple rape on two counts, for which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in each case.25
In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas’s "niece" in each
Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon,
for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there was no other aggravating
circumstance alleged in the Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless proper even as we overturn the lower
courts’ appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
For consistency with prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages to ₱50,000.00 each, for each count of rape. The award of exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 for each count, on the other hand, is in line with recent
jurisprudence.26 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03473 dated August 16, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of
civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the complainant are reduced to ₱50,000.00 each,
for each count of rape, plus legal interest upon the amounts of indemnity and damages awarded
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated October 26, 2000
which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50,
dated May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate
informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA, 6 then about eight (8) years of
age. The accusatory portions thereof respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of
YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with
the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.9 Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM.10 Among her siblings CCC,
BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events,
AAA's family members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were
good neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own
home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that
petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years
old and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega 12 (Luzviminda), mother of
petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who
was sick.13 During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA
slept together with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala.
There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the
petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort
room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she
felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he
would spank her.14 AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the
house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that
time, Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner
called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which
was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and
brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the
vagina of AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two
(2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.16
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water
in their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both
naked from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and
making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left.
Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM.17
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner
inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident
that petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA
did not report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that
when BBB reported the matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After
waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and
she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF
and MMM were not able to sleep that night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM
called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what
petitioner did to her daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a
doctor for examination.18
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural
Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was
molested.20 Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann
Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an
unofficial written report21 showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia
minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries
she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and
could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification
that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN
Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement
required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA. 23 As such, petitioner
stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for
brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father
FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape.
However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega.24 He is
the second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the
accusations made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends;
when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room
together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he
never touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in
any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely accompanied and
helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he
may have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his
parents, went to AAA's house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all the other children
at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the
instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda,
saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that
they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as
they were together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister; 27 BBB was lying;
AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other;
petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening;
however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM
to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as
AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring
AAA to a doctor for examination.28
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the
time of the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and
the rest of her siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA;
when MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with
AAA and her youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she
was at AAA's house watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were
having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could clearly see all the
children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear
any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that
petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and
MMM immediately stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual
as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed
at BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's
statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's house.
However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a
belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance,
Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for
examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA
was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the
examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did
Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to
Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who
recommended that they should seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both
agreed on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner
stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every Saturday,
petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Every
time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations
occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently,
AAA's parents filed the instant cases.29
The RTC's Ruling
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the
positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified
with honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for
AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of
both families. Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in this wise:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of
RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2)
Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day
of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
The accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as
indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for
his provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release
pending appeal.31
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's
defense of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim
AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill
motive. The CA also held that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors
were irrelevant, as it is established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ
consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined
that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great
weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF
SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF
THE CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT,
THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF
COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM
WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET
FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING
THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this
Court, we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case.
Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration
was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are
true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would
leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into
consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such
allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged
rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications
that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it
disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and,
consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor
of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the
barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and
contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of
AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner
claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to extort money
from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson
indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the
same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the
medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the
alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost a year, in
order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable
that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart from the initial
confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and
BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.35
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his
disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both
doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest
penetration of the lips of the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of
AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape
was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in
accusing petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the
presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation
made by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly
the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not.
Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said crime,
as manifested in his covert acts.36
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was
enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.38 The law establishes a
comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law 39 (CICL) and children at
risk40 with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as
prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared
towards their development. In order to ensure its implementation, the law, particularly Section
841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with
certain duties and functions42 such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile
delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and
rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. —
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity
of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to
appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or
other applicable laws.

provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68
of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.43
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. —
Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time
of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer,
upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to
the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided
under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the
youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best
interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained pending trial, the
Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if
not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she
is detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a
youth detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. —
The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within
ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with
the law under their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion
and Court Proceedings. — If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending
diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with
the local social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with
the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case
may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court
executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the law has
already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the
child may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However,
with the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue
arises, namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case,
considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.
VIII
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a
prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the
complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that
basis.44 The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive
for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the
malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having
sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough
motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM
and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the
embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM
inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from
petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape
committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the
victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual
penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required. 46 Therefore, it is not
necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the
slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes
rape.47
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits
a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or
voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. 48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed,
no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the
part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus,
Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
 crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of
performing a criminal act.
In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the
provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the
RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in
2006, and with the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as
defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of
R.A. No. 9344 is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under
Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the
provisions of Section 3851 of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if
finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws
favorable to the accused may be given retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the
law itself provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and
below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child
shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the
CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive
application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched
principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication
of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in
certain instances involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations
on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I
humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW
PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND
RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO
DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS
FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE
AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the
capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities
are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of
children who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those
who currently have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this
measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or
through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before
that. That is why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will
conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical
facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have
to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and
the capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue
should also be incorporated in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes
effective, all those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the
present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be subject to incarceration
under this law, will be immediately released. Is that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . .
provides, for example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure,
et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in
detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address
the counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and
absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago
amendment is accepted.55
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I
would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a
transitory provision that would make this law apply also to those who might
already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their
penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory
Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically,
Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15)
years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately
be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare
and development officer." So that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to
cite the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional
amendment, subject to style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have
to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate
provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to
prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he
should be given the benefit of the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.56
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a
statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the
law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the
purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law,
and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of
the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent
is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and
promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.57
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.58 In this case, the plain
meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most
favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the
new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the
alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony,
and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the
proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of
the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape
committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant
exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed
by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
This award is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a
conviction for rape.
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has
compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times over.
Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly,
complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years
old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act
No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they
are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt
possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age
exempts them from criminal liability under the new law. 60
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of
rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6)
when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s greater protection.
However, this consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of
which is not subject to review by this Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein
appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion
to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our
task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and
we have done so in this case.62
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local
social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in
the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council (JJWC).
SO ORDERED.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil
indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the
necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in
recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. 59

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to
protect our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing
number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it
has not escaped us that major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth
mentioning that in the Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165,
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that: