On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner, vs. LUCIA the will of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed
D. ABENA, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J : p
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking to reverse the Decision 1 dated October 13, 2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756, which affirmed the
Decision 2 dated March 2, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will and
testament of Margarita S. Mayores probated and designated respondent
Lucia D. Abena as the executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance
of letters testamentary in favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of
decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the
decedent's lifelong companion since 1929. CTAIDE
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any
ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings
predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins
Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia,
Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and
Testament 3 on February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her
undivided share of a real property located at Singalong Manila,
consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino
M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. She likewise
bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at
San Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and
covered by TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and
Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita
also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise
designated as sole executor of her will.
HacADE
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The
case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.
as SP Proc. No. M-1607 and consolidated with SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the
last will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent as the
executor of the will. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1) declaring the will as probated;
2) declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will
who will serve as such without a bond as
stated in paragraph VI of the probated will;
3) ordering the issuance of letters testamentary in favor
of Lucia Abena. IAETSC
So ordered. 4
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated October 13, 2000,
affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals' decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
appeal having no merit in fact and in law, is
hereby ORDERED DISMISSED and the appealed Decision
of the trial court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with cost to
oppositors-appellants.
SO ORDERED. 5
Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
INVALIDATING THE WILL SINCE IT DID NOT
CONFORM TO THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY
LAW;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE
WILL BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED THROUGH
UNDUE INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE[;] AND HSaIDc
 III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PETITIONER,
HER SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL HEIRS OF
MARGARITA S. MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION TO HER. 6
Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals
erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the
formalities required by law, (2) whether said court erred in not declaring
the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and
pressure, and (3) whether it erred in not declaring petitioner and her
siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters of
administration to petitioner.
cCaSHA
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, 7 argues that Margarita's will
failed to comply with the formalities required under Article 805 8 of the
Civil Code because the will was not signed by the testator in the presence
of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another. She
also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the
will are not the same or similar, indicating that they were not signed on
the same day. She further argues that the will was procured through
undue influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will,
Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon
respondent and her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps
allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to decide on her own.
Petitioner thus concludes that Margarita's total dependence on respondent
and her nephews compelled her to sign the will. Petitioner likewise
argues that the Court of Appeals should have declared her and her
siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only living
collateral relatives in accordance with Articles 1009 9 and 1010 10 of the
Civil Code. HaTAEc
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum 11 that the
petition for review raises questions of fact, not of law and as a rule,
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. She also points out
that although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined there was no
compelling reason to review the petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded
to tackle the assigned errors and rule that the will was validly executed,
sustaining the findings of the trial court that the formalities required by
law were duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also concurred with
the findings of the trial court that the testator, Margarita, was of sound
mind when she executed the will.
After careful consideration of the parties' contentions, we rule in
favor of respondent.
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure
questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the
will was signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses and of
one another, whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on the pages
of the will were signed on the same day, and whether or not undue
influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to sign the
will, are all questions of fact.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section
1 12 of Rule 45 limits this Court's review to questions of law only. THaDEA
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following
recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; CcTHaD
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and
 (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. 13 STcHEI
We find that this case does not involve any of the
abovementioned exceptions.
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by
the Court of Appeals, reveal that petitioner's arguments lack basis. The
RTC correctly held:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors
[Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita
Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a will at the
time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The
oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence,
said allegation and contradict the presumption that the testator
was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In
fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in
some occasions, attended to the testator months before her
death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a
normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the
testator does not warrant hospitalization. . . . Not one of the
oppositor's witnesses has mentioned any instance that they
observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be
construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator
may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not
necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The]
testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought. aHECST
Anent the contestants' submission that the will is
fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states
that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and
in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the
attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not
accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part
of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is
of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of
the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to
invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject
instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C
which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an
omission of some of the pages. The error must have been
brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole
instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of
the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal
interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code
which reads:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or
fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article
805."
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors
that the signatures of the testator were affixed on different
occasions based on their observation that the signature on the
first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance
as compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After
examination of the signatures, the court does not share the
same observation as the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit "H-
3") shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is
no evidence to show that the first signature was procured
earlier than February 2, 1987. cTEICD
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue
influence was exerted on the testator to execute the subject
will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in a good
mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the
subject will (See Exhibit "H").
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally
capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the
notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will
that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See
Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have
been substantially complied with in the subject notarial
will. 14 (Emphasis supplied). IcDCaT
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings
of the RTC. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of
the decedent under Article 887 15 of the Civil Code and as the decedent
validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and probated,
petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedent's estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41756 is AFFIRMED. HASDcC
Costs against petitioner.
 SO ORDERED.
(Samaniego-Celada v. Abena, G.R. No. 145545, [June 30, 2008], 579 PHIL
|||
60-69)
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, namely,
ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON,
CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON,
AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, petitioners, vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE a.k.a.
"GAUDIOSO E. YPON," and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS of TOLEDO CITY,respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court
of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review
on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, raising a pure question of
law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 2011 2 and August 31,
2011 3 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of
cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their
cousins, 4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with
Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras
Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No.
T-2246. 5 In their complaint, they alleged thatMagdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno)
died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA,
2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. 6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, 7 to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno's collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest. 8
STaIHc
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son
of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2)
letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport. 9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed
that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint
fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real
parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been
judicially declared as Magdaleno's lawful heirs. 10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011
Order, 11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established
their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration, 12 this did not mean that they could
already be considered as the decedent's compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary,
Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno's son — and
hence, his compulsory heir — through the documentary evidence he
submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract
Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport. 13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel's failure to state the
date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Compliance was issued. 14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. T-2246, 15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of
whether or not the RTC's dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper. HEcTAI
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. 16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of
action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 17 In this relation, a
complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for. 18 Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. 19
 As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was
plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and for the recovery of property. 22 (Emphasis and underscoring
based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed supplied; citations omitted)
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special
title issued in the latter's favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations,
proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the
if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in
sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily
the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent's lawful heirs
submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
should be made in the corresponding special proceeding 20 precludes the
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered
RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from
judgment thereon, 23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but
granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, 21 the
had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. 24 ITDSAE

Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are
the decedent's lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for
such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case: DaTEIc
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of
who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.
This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which
a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that
the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court
ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar
nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper
special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining
whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard
decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before
it. 25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination
of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether
proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on
Gaudioso's heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any
subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the
late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.
(Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680 (Resolution), [July 8, 2013],
|||

was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals . . .: 713 PHIL 570-578)

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v.
Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper probate court in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,
this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who
claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be
 AVELINA
ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her
heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR
A. OROSCO, petitioners, vs. SPS. DOMINGO and
EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the
CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J : p Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 dated March 30, 2012 and
September 25, 2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 93035, which reversed and set aside the Decision dated
January 20, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in
Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 10407.
The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:
On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina
Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a
Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 6, 2002 before the court a quo. In it, petitioners alleged that
Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and
Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964,
survived by his wife Victoria, six legitimate children, and one
illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo,
petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the mother of
petitioner Salvador; (3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5)
Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and (7) Carlos
Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30,
1983. TCAHES
On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in
Legazpi City consisting of two thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (2,869)
square meters, more or less, which was covered by Tax Declaration ARP
No. (TD) 0141.
In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2)
documents by her daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda)
and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in this
case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the
titling of the lot. It was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina
realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.
As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to
them, Avelina sought the intervention of the RTC to declare null and
void the two (2) documents in order to reinstate TD 0141 and so correct
the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.
In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the
facilitate the titling of the subject property. Paragraph 9 of their Answer
reads:
Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina
together with the other heirs of Eulalio Abarientos brought out
the idea to [respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez to
have the property described in paragraph 8 of the complaint
registered under the Torrens System of Registration. To
facilitate the titling of the property, so that the same could
be attractive to prospective buyers, it was agreed that the
property's tax declaration could be transferred to
[respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez and
Domingo Gualvez who will spend all the cost of titling
subject to reimbursement by all other heirs in case the
property is sold; That it was agreed that all the heirs will be
given their corresponding shares on the property; That
pursuant to said purpose Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with
the knowledge and consent of the other heirs signed and
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact,
[petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by [respondent]
spouses and all the delinquent taxes paid by
[respondents]. 3HDCAaS
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009
annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with regard to the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents
and was not therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina did not really intend to sell her share
in the property as it was only executed to facilitate the titling of such
property. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered, as follows:
 1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the
Estate of the Deceased Spouses Eulalio
Abarientos and Victoria Villareal, dated
December 4, 2001 as well as the subject Deed
of Absolute Sale, notarized on February 6,
2002, covering the property described in par. 8
of the Amended Complaint are hereby ordered
ANNULLED;
2. That defendant City Assessor's Officer of Legazpi
City is hereby ordered to CANCEL the Tax
Declaration in the name of private
[respondents] spouses Gualvez under ARP No.
4143 and to REINSTATE the Tax Declaration
under ARP No. 0141 in the name of Eulalio
Abarientos;
3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina
Abarientos Rebusquillo is hereby ordered to
return or refund to [respondents] spouses
Domingo Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez, the
PhP50,000.00 given by the latter spouses to
the former. 4TIDaCE
Assailing the trial court's decision, respondents interposed an
appeal with the CA arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled
being a public document that has for its object the creation and
transmission of real rights over the immovable subject property. The fact
that Avelina's testimony was not offered in evidence, so respondents
argued, the signature on the adverted deed remains as concrete proof of
her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents contended that the
Complaint filed by petitioners Avelina and Salvador before the RTC is
not the proper remedy provided by law for those compulsory heirs
unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.
Pending the resolution of respondents' appeal, Avelina died
intestate on September 1, 2009 leaving behind several living
heirs 5 including respondent Emelinda.
In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted
the appeal and reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA
held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
simply on petitioners' allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio,
considering that issues on heirship must be made in administration or
intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the
appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be
nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.
Aggrieved by the CA's Decision, petitioner Avelina, as
substituted by her heirs except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner
Salvador are now before this Court ascribing reversible error on the part
of the appellate court.
We find merit in the instant petition.
It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be
made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action.
However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to administration
proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a
good and compelling reason for such recourse. 6Hence, the Court had
allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as
when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered
judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial. 7 In Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran, 8this Court held: CSDTac
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or
wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate,
executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1
of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will,
or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs
of Portugal A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the
only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the
status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of
the fact that the parties to the civil case — subject of the
present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
 In fine, under the circumstances of the present case,
there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate
the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial . . . . (emphasis supplied)
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only
one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the
inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches,
to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of
the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light
of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that
they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of
Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs
with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the RTC in its
Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted the
veracity of the following facts during the pre-trial: ScAaHE
IV — UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the
stipulation of facts in the Pre-Trial Order)
A. . . .
B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez
admitted the following facts:
1. Identity of the parties;
2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private
[respondents] to sue and be sued;
3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is
not the only surviving heir of deceased
spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;
4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-
owner/possessor of a portion of the subject
property;
5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of
Avelina Abarientos;
6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a
daughter of [petitioner] Avelina
A. Rebusquillo;
7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov.
10, 1923;
8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of
Estate of the Deceased and Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by [petitioner] Avelina
A. Rebusquillo on the subject
property. 9 (emphasis supplied) SaITHC
In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is
with more reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an
unnecessary superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly
rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court,an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of
the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court is patently clear that self-adjudication is only warranted when there
is only one heir:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. — . . . If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of
Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of
the co-heirs by right of representation of his mother. Without a doubt,
Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is
"the only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS
AND VICTORIA VILLAREAL." 10 The falsity of this claim renders her
act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid.
The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelina's prayer to declare
the affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong she has committed.
In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina
in favor of respondents was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC.
Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute
ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole
heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject
property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the
absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot portion.
What she could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership
of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of respondents
and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the
ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence,
the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.
The Civil Code provides: aDcTHE
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute
or relative. — The former takes place when the parties do
not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties
conceal their true agreement. (emphasis supplied)
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious
contract is void. — A relative simulation, when it does not
prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato
Ureta, 11 this Court explained the concept of the simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract
but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be
bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute
simulation is that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way
alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an
absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the
parties may recover from each other what they may have
given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false
cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the
contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still bound
by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites
of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the
content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely
binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest. (emphasis supplied)acHTIC
In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from
respondents' very own Answer to petitioners' Complaint. As respondents
themselves acknowledge, the purpose of the Deed of Absolute Sale was
simply to "facilitate the titling of the [subject] property," not to transfer
the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore, respondents concede that
petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property and that there is
no indication that respondents ever took possession of the subject
property after its supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive
possession of the subject property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals
from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership and is a clear
badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. 12
Contrary to the appellate court's opinion, the fact that the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized
does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by
the parole evidence rule. The form of a contract does not make an
otherwise simulated and invalid act valid. The rule on parole evidence is
not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
the exceptions: DEcTCa
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — . . .
However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in
the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis
supplied)
The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true
intent and agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in
the present case. Again, respondents themselves admit in their Answer
that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale
were only executed to facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is,
therefore, justified to apply the exceptions provided in the second
paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true intent of the parties,
which shall prevail over the letter of the document. That said,
considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for
being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded from presenting
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement. 13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated March 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 25,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 20,
2009 in Civil Case No. 10407 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. CSDTac
 (Rebusquillo v. Spouses Gualvez, G.R. No. 204029, [June 4, 2014], 735
|||
PHIL 434-447)
HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS, vs.
RICARDO BASBAS as represented by
EUGENIOBASBAS, respondents.
PEREZ, J : p
A claim of status as heir of a decedent must always be substantially
supported by evidence as required under our law. The resolution of a case, in
this instance, an action for annulment of title and reconveyance of real
property, cannot be further stalled and waylaid by a mere assertion of a party
of an ostensible conflicting claims of heirship of the common decedent. Not
all rights to property and incidents thereof, such as titling, ought to be
preceded by a declaration of heirship, albeit supposedly traced to a single
decedent and original titleholder.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 99853 1 which reversed and set aside the rulings, after trial and then
on appeal, of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Sta. Rosa, Laguna in Civil Case No. 1913 2 and Civil Case No. B-
6334, 3 respectively. The trial courts annulled TCT No. 294295 issued in the
name of Crispiniano Talampas Basbas (Crispiniano) and herein respondent
Ricardo Talampas Basbas (Ricardo), covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate, the subject property, and originally titled to the decedent,
SeveroBasbas (Severo) under Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.).
Crispiniano and Ricardo and all their successors-in-interest were ordered to
reconvey the subject property to petitioners.
Both parties, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas (Valentin), and
respondent Ricardo trace their claim of ownership over herein subject
property to Severo.
Petitioners filed an Action for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance
with Damages against Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo seeking to: (1)
annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 issued in the names of
Crispiniano and Ricardo covering the contested lot, and (2) recover
possession of the subject property before the Municipal Trial Court, Santa
Rosa, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 1913.
Countering petitioners' allegations, Crispiniano and Ricardo denied
petitioners' ownership over Lot No. 39 and contended that upon Severo's
death, he was survived by two heirs, Valentin (grandfather of petitioners) and
Nicolas Basbas (Nicolas) (paternal grandfather of Crispiniano and Ricardo)
who evenly divided Severo's estate, comprising of two lots, herein subject
property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, and Lot No. 40,
adjacent thereto, among them. Lot No. 40 was inherited by Valentin, while
Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas.
The pertinent documents presented in evidence by both parties
include:
(1) Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the name of
Severo;
(2) Order of the Land Registration Court, Regional Trial
Court, Biñan, Laguna dated 1 June 1989, granting
the Petition for Reconstitution of Title covering
Lot No. 39 filed by Crispiniano and Ricardo;
(3) TCT No. T-294295 covering Lot No. 39 issued in the
names of Crispiniano and Ricardo; and
(4) Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of decedent Severo.
The undisputed facts uniformly found by all three lower courts, at
the first instance, the MTC, the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals are: cEISAD
. . . Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo .
. . died on July 14, 1911. They had a child
named Valentin (Basbas). During Severo's lifetime, he acquired
a parcel of land in Santa Rosa, Laguna otherwise known as Lot
No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Lot No. 39 is adjacent
to Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate which lot was
acquired, by purchase, by Valentin Basbas. Sometime in 1995,
[herein petitioners Heirs of Valentin Basbas] discovered that
[respondents] Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas were able to
secure for themselves Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295
over Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Sometime in
1987, [respondents], through Crispiniano Basbas, filed a Petition
for Reconstitution of Title before the Regional Trial Court,
Biñan, Laguna, docketed as LRC Case No. B-758, covering Lot
No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Subsequently
thereafter, or on June 1, 1989, an Order was issued by the RTC
granting the aforesaid petition. On the basis of said Order, the
title covering Lot No. 39 was ordered reconstituted in the name
 of the heirs of Severo Basbas and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-1684 (N.A.) was issued. On November 13, 1993,
[therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas y Talampas and
[respondent] Ricardo Basbas y Talampas executed an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of deceased Severo Basbas . . .
stating among others that the only heirs of Severo Basbas are
Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha. On the basis of said
Extra-Judicial Settlement . . ., the Registry of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 and
in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 was
issued in the names of [therein] defendants
Crispiniano Basbas and [respondent] Ricardo Basbas . . . .
[Petitioners] then brought the matter to the Barangay but no
settlement was reached. Hence, this instant action. 4
Significantly, the Pre-Trial Order of the MTC, dated 2 September
1998, contained the following Stipulation of Facts:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.
2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle
name Talampas.
3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is
a son of [Severo] Basbas.
4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo's]
name. 5
After trial, where both parties presented evidence, the MTC ruled,
thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
[petitioners] and against defendants [including herein respondent
Ricardo] as follows:
1) declaring TCT No. T-294295 in the name of the defendants
[including herein respondent Ricardo] as NULL and
VOID;
2) ordering the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo]
to reconvey to [petitioners] Lot No. 39 of the Santa
Rosa Detached Estate, and to surrender possession
thereon in favor of the [petitioners];
3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna to issue a
new certificate of title covering said Lot No. 39 in favor
of the heirs of Severo Basbas; and
4) ordering the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo]
and their successors-in-interest to pay [petitioners] the
sum of Php50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. 6
On appeal to the RTC by Crispiniano and Ricardo docketed as Civil
Case No. B-6334, judgment of the MTC was affirmed in toto.
Insistent on their stance, Crispiniano and Ricardo appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
In a subsequent turn of events, the appellate court reversed, applying
our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario, 7 and set aside the
uniform rulings of the trial courts:
The court a quo erred in affirming the decision of the
MTC, as the MTC had ruled on filiation and heirship, matters
which fall within the jurisdiction of a probate court, which the
MTC or RTC of Sta. Rosa, Laguna were not designated to be. It
is also proper that these particular matters be threshed out in a
special proceeding.
In Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario, it was ruled that it is decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as it involves the establishment of a status or right.
The case at bar is an action for annulment of title,
reconveyance with damages, a civil action, whereas matters
which involve the settlement and distribution of the estate of a
deceased person as well as filiation and heirship partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. With both
parties claiming to be the heirs of Severo Basbas, it is but proper
to thresh out this issue in a special proceeding, since
[Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo] seeks to establish his
status as one of the heirs entitled to the property in dispute.
Before the action for annulment of title, reconveyance with
damages can be resolved, this Court opines that the matter of
heirship should be adjudicated upon first. The trial court cannot
make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
The MTC and the RTC, both acting in their general
jurisdiction, are devoid of authority to render an adjudication
and resolve the issue of annulment of title and reconveyance of
the real property in favor of the respondents. We reiterate that
the question of who are the heirs of Severo Basbas should be
 adjudged first in a probate court prior to the resolution of the
action for annulment of title and reconveyance.ScHAIT
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. 8
Hence, this appeal by certiorari of petitioners — Heirs of Valentin,
raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 24 OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA AFFIRMING THAT OF
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTA ROSA,
LAGUNA'S DECISION FINDING FOR THE PETITIONERS:
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING IN
HEIRS OF GUIDO AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY VERSUS
HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, THAT PRIOR TO THE
RESOLUTION OF THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF
TITLE AND RECONVEYANCE, THE DETERMINATION
OF WHO THE HEIRS ARE SHOULD FIRST BE ADJUDGED
IN A PROBATE COURT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RENDER JUDGMENT
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED RELATIVE TO
THE ISSUES RAISED AND RULED UPON BY THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTA ROSA, LAGUNA
AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BIÑAN,
LAGUNA. 9
In ruling in favor of petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, the trial courts
found that petitioners fully established their filiation with the decedent
Severo, the original titleholder of Lot No. 39 and from whom all parties trace
their claim of ownership over the subject property. Oppositely, the trial
courts found wanting, lacking documentary evidence, the different claims of
heirship of Crispiniano and herein respondent Ricardo, through Severo's
purported other son or nephew, Nicolas. The MTC, affirmed in toto by the
RTC, declared, thus:
[Petitioners] have fully established their true filiation
with the late Severo Basbas from whom the subject property
came from. Through their own evidence, testimonial and
documentary, it was established that Severo Basbas was married
to Ana Rivera. They had one (1) child named Valentin Basbas . .
. . Valentin Basbas had no other brother nor sister. He (Valentin)
was married to Irene Beato. Valentin bore four (4) children,
namely: (1) Pedro Basbas; (2) Lucas Basbas; (3) Feliz Basbas,
Sr.; and (4) Remigia Basbas. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As shown, [petitioners] are now the great grandchildren
of the late Severo Basbas who died in Santa Rosa, Laguna on
July 5, 1911.
The defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo]
on the other hand claim that they are also the legal heirs of the
late Severo Basbas. Such a claim, however, was not supported
by any document. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As correctly pointed out by [petitioners] that assuming,
for the sake of argument, that Nicolas Basbas, predecessor of
these defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo], was the
son of Severo Basbas, then Nicolas Basbas must have been an
illegitimate child of Severo Basbas, in which case his filiation
should be first established before he can claim to be an heir. But
this cannot be done anymore, simply because an action for
recognition should have been made or brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parents . . . . It could not even be
applied under the exception of said law . . ., as no evidence was
ever adduced to that effect. The only conclusion, therefore, is
that Nicolas Basbas was neither a legitimate nor an illegitimate
son of Severo Basbas, so that defendants [including herein
respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late
Severo Basbas.
. . . [T]he defendants [including herein respondent
Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas. They
(defendants) [including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed that
they derived their title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in
representation of Felomino Basbas, an alleged son of the late
Severo Basbas; that SeveroBasbas gave Lot No. 39 to
Nicolas Basbas; and that Lot No. 40 was also given by
Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas. Such a claim has no basis at
all. The [petitioners] evidence, specifically the Friar Lands
Certificate . . . and the Certification from the DENR . . . show
 that Valentin Basbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate by purchase from the government way back on
April 1, 1913, contrary to the allegations of the defendants
[including herein respondent Ricardo] that the same was given
by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas as the latter's share in the
inheritance. 10
In marked contrast, the Court of Appeals zeroed in on the claim of
Crispiniano and Ricardo that they are descendants, likewise great
grandchildren, of Severo and inherited Lot No. 39 from their father
Felomino Basbas, Severo's grandson from the latter's son, Nicolas, who
received the subject property as his share in Severo's estate. On the whole,
the appellate court ruled that the MTC and the RTC, acting in their general
jurisdiction, did not have authority to rule on issues of filiation and heirship
of the parties to the decedent Severo, such matters to be sorted and
established in a special proceeding and falling within the jurisdiction of a
probate court.CDAHaE
The pivotal issue in this case turns on the applicability of our ruling
in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court's ruling unqualifiedly
applying Heirs of Yaptinchay. Mistakenly, the Court of Appeals glosses over
facts, not controverted by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo:
(1) Valentin was a legitimate child of Severo and Ana
Rivera; and
(2) Petitioners are themselves legitimate descendants
of Valentin.
Not only is the petitioners' heirship to Severo uncontroverted. The
status of Valentin as a compulsory heir of Severo and of petitioners' statuses
as heirs ofValentin and Severo are stipulated facts agreed to by Crispiniano
and respondent Ricardo:
1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.
2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle
name Talampas.
3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is
a son of [Severo] Basbas.
4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo's]
name. 11
On the other hand, Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo miserably
fail to establish the status of their ascendant and purported predecessor-in-
interest, Nicolas. In fact, the testimony of respondent Ricardo tells about the
status of Valentin, not about Nicolas' status, as a compulsory heir of Severo:
Q Now, do you know also [petitioners] in this case the heirs
of Valentin Basbas, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know them Mr. Witness?
A They are my relatives, sir.
Q Will you tell us specifically what is your relationship with
[petitioners] in this case, Mr. Witness?
A They are my cousins, I used to call them "Kuya."
Q How come you became the relatives of [petitioners,] (sic) Mr.
Witness?
A My father and the father of [petitioners] are relatives.
Q Specifically, what is the name of the father of [petitioners],
Mr. Witness?
A Valentin Basbas.
Q What is the name of your father?
A Felomino Basbas.
Q How is Felomino and Valentin related?
A They are cousins.
Court
How come they became [your] cousins?
A Their family names are both Basbas.
Q And that is your only basis in saying that they are relatives?
A No.
Q So, what other basis?
A Severo Basbas is the eldest and he bore a child name[d]
Nicolas Basbas and Nicolas Basbas bore a child
name[d] Felomino Basbas who [had] two sons named
Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas.
 xxx xxx xxx Court
Q Who was the father of Valentin Basbas then? xxx xxx xxx
A Severo Basbas. What is the middlename (sic) of Severo Basbas?
Q You said a while ago that Nicolas Basbas is the son of A I don't know.
Severo Basbas and now you are saying
that Valentin Basbas is the son of Severo Basbas, you Court
mean to say that Valentin Basbas and Who is the son of Severo Basbas?
Nicolas Basbas are brothers?
A Nicolas Basbas.
A Yes, Nicolas is the eldest [older] th[a]n Valentin Basbas.
Q What is the maiden name (sic) of Nicolas Basbas?
Q So, it is clear now that Nicolas and Valentin Basbas are
brothers? A I don't know. 13
A That is what I know. That is what my brother told me. 12 In all, Valentin's long-possessed status as a legitimate child and thus,
heir of Severo, need no longer be the subject of a special proceeding for
Mauro Basbas (Mauro), one of the defendants before the trial court,
declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court of Appeals. There is no
while testifying, also failed to shed light on the status of Nicolas as an heir of
need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo.
Severo, insisting only that Nicolas is Severo's son as told to him by his
grandfather, Felomino Basbas. Mauro even categorically answered that the And, contraposed to the fact that Valentin's status as a legitimate
wife of Severo is Ana Rivera, further establishing the legitimacy child of Severo is already established, Nicolas' status as a purported heir of
of Valentin as the son of Severo and Ana Rivera: Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas' right thereto expiring upon his
death.
Q Who is the father of Felomino Basbas?
A Nicolas Basbas. Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondent's end that Nicolas
was born of a valid marriage, only that he is Severo's son. Nonetheless, even
Q You mean to tell us that Nicolas is the son of Severo Basbas? if respondents were minded to establish the status of Nicolas, whether he is a
A Yes. CEaDAc
legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done.

Q Do you happen to know the mother of Felomino Basbas?
Code and Article 285 of the Civil Code state:
A Yes.
Q Would you tell us?
A Catalina Mane.
Q Since you seem to be so well informed about the family of
Severo Basbas, can you tell us who was the wife of
Severo Basbas?
A Ana Rivera.
Q How can you say now unless you are implying that
Severo Basbas had an illegitimate son, how can you
explain now why the surname. . . the middle name of
your grandfather is [not] Rivera?
Article 165, in relation to Articles 173 and 175, of the Family
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this
Code.
Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in
a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the
 same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
CHAPTER 4
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
SECTION 1. — Recognition of Natural Children
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural
children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in
which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four
years from the finding of the document.
Our ruling in Raymundo v. Vda. de Suarez 14 is instructive:
Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling
in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein respondents must
first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an
action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly,
conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.
We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not
applicable.
Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of
Marcelo Sr. and Teofista — and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs — has
been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v.
Court of Appeals. True, this Court is not a trier of facts, but as
the final arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that herein
respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father,
Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have
been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower
court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and
Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling
in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of
their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.
AEIDTc
As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez,
"Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that
portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the
sale with regard to said portion." There is clearly no intimation
in our decision for the RTC to have to determine an already
settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo
Sr.
Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or
indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children
of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein
respondents first prove their libation to Marcelo Sr. The
following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity
of herein respondents, and the latter's status as legitimate
children:
1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to
10649 where Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned
the RTC, Branch 151's Orders dated October 10, 1984 and
October 14, 1986. Although the CA ruled against Teofista and
herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as
legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and
2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which
incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as children of
Teofista, merely successors-in-interest of the latter to the
property and by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in Civil
Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res
judicata. We subsequently reversed this ruling on the wrong
application of res judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. We
retained and affirmed, however, the CA's factual finding of
herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We
categorically held therein that "the proprietary interest of [herein
respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different
from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents]
became co-owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but
through their own right as children of their deceased father [,
Marcelo Sr.]." Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status
of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be
indirectly or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action
to annul a judicial sale.
Articles 262, 263, 265 and 266 of the Civil Code, the
applicable law at the time of Marcelo's death, support the
foregoing conclusion, to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may
impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following
cases:
 (1) If the husband should die before the
expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the
complaint, without having desisted from the same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child shall be brought within one year from the recording of
birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same
place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen
months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term
shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved
by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the
preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous
possession of status of a legitimate child.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for
failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a
semblance of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of
the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast,
the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes
herein respondent as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs.
The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo
Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates
the properties she owns in common with her children, herein
respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein
respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
interminably. 15
Thus, we find no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of
the heirs of Severo in order to resolve petitioners' Action for Annulment of
Title and Reconveyance of the subject property.
Prescinding from the foregoing, a closer scrutiny of the documents
presented in evidence by Crispiniano and Ricardo before the trial court,
betray the fraudulence of their claim.
1. Order of the RTC, Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna in LRC B-758, a
Petition for Reconstitution of Title filed by Crispiniano and respondent
Ricardo:
Petitioner alleges that a certain parcel of residential
land, situated in the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Province of
Laguna is registered in the name of the legal heirs of
Severo Basbas as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title
No. (N.A.) of the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Exhibit "E");
that the aforementioned duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (N.A.) was lost during the latter part of the Japanese
Occupation when the petitioner and his family evacuated from
their residence to evade the atrocities being committed by the
Japanese soldiers; that after peace and order was restored,
diligent efforts were exerted in trying to find the said certificate
of title, but the same proved futile; and that pursuant to the
provisions of R.A. No. 26, petitioner desires that the original
copy of said title be reconstituted and thereafter have the full
technical description of Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached
Estate be inscribed therein.CDHcaS
Pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26 copies
of the petition, notice of hearing, plan and technical description
of Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate were forwarded
to the Office of the Land Registration Commission for
appropriate action. On January 18, 1989, this Court received the
Report (Exhibit "C") of the Acting Administrator of the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA).
xxx xxx xxx
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.
During the hearing of the petition, Atty. Agapito G.
Carait, counsel for the petitioner, presented Crispiniano Basbas.
Together with his testimony, the following documentary
evidence were presented, to wit:
Exhibits "A" - the publication in the Official
Gazette;
"B" - Certificate of Posting;
"C" - Report;
"D" - Certification form from the Register
of Deeds; and
"E" - Friar Lands Sale Certificate.
 CRISPINIANO BASBAS, 70 years old, widower and a
resident of Santa Rosa, Laguna, stated that he is the petitioner in
this case; that the parcel of land involved in this case is situated
at Aplaya, Santa Rosa, Laguna and is identified as Lot No. 39 of
the Santa Rosa Detached Estate with an area of 330 sq. m.; that
he was born in that property; that this parcel of land was covered
by a title in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas; that the title
was lost during the Japanese Occupation when his father
Felomino Basbas who was then in possession of the duplicate
title, evacuated to the Province of Rizal particularly in Tanay;
that later on his father moved to Sta. Maria, Laguna; that he was
with his father when they evacuated to a place called Laranga;
that while there, he saw the title in the possession of his father in
the "maleta" where he kept it; that when they returned to Santa
Rosa, Laguna, he asked his father regarding the Transfer
Certificate of Title and his father told him that the title was lost
in the mountains of Rizal; the petitioner verified from the Office
of the Register of Deeds if said title is still intact with their
office; that the Register of Deeds issued a certification (Exhibit
"D") to the effect that Lot 39 of Santa Rosa Detached Estate has
no record on file with the office; that petitioner went to the
Bureau of Lands to verify the title and found out that the said
patent was issued in the name of the legal heirs of
Severo Basbas (Exhibit "E"); that the children of the petitioner
are now in possession of Lot 39; that the petitioner's father had
paid the realty taxes and after his death, he (petitioner) continued
paying the taxes; that his father exerted all efforts to recover or
find the said title but the same proved futile; and that to his own
knowledge, Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot
No. 39 has never been encumbered, sold or given as security for
the performance of any obligation.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority, in his REPORT dated January 18, 1989 recommends:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing information
relative to Lot No. 39, Santa Rosa Detached Estate, is
respectfully submitted for consideration in the
resolution of the instant petition, and if the Honorable
Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification
pursuant to Section 15 Republic Act No. 26 to grant the
same, the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (N.A.) may be used as a source of the desired
reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Republic Act
No. 26, Provided, however, that in case the petition is
granted, the reconstituted title should be made subject
to such encumbrances as may be subsisting, and
provided, further that no certificate of title covering the
same parcel of land exists in the Office of the Register
of Deeds concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be in order and
meritorious and there being no objection on the part of the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) as to the technical
description of Lot No. 39, the same is hereby GRANTED. The
Court hereby orders the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba
Branch to reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. (N.A.) in
the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas who appear in the
aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title at the time the original
was lost and/or destroyed as the registered owners, using as basis
the technical description of Lot 39, certified by the Bureau of
Lands, and thereafter to annotate on the corresponding title the
full technical description of Lot No. 39 of the Sta. Rosa
Detached Estate.
For this purpose, the Clerk of Court is directed to
forward to the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, a
certified copy of the Report of the Acting Administrator, Land
Registration Authority dated January 18, 1989, the copy of the
technical description, which documents shall be used by the
Register of Deeds as bases for reconstitution and inscription. 16
2. Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Severo executed by
Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo:
EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
DECEASED SEVERO BASBAS
xxx xxx xxx
That FELOMINO BASBAS is our father and likewise
died intestate last October 30, 1976 leaving no will or debts and
the share of MELENCIO CASUBHA was sold and bought by us
last 5 December 1977, xerox copy of such Deed is hereto
attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part of this Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased
SEVERO BASBAS; HTaSEA
That there is no pending testate or intestate proceedings
against said estate;
That in view thereof the aforenamed CRISPINIANO
and RICARDO both surnamed BASBAS do hereby adjudicate
 unto themselves the aforedescribed parcel of land subject to the
provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court as follows:
CRISPINIANO BASBAS — undivided share and
RICARDO BASBAS — undivided share; 17
Ultimately, we agree with the disquisition of the trial courts in
annulling TCT No. 294295 and ordering the reconveyance of Lot No. 39 to
petitioners:
. . . [We proceed to] the next issue as to "whether or not
the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Severo Basbas executed by Crispiniano and RicardoBasbas is
valid." The Court believes otherwise. Simply because the
defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the
legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas. They (defendants)
[including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed that they derived
their title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in representation of
Felomino Basbas, an alleged [grand] son of the late
Severo Basbas; that Severo Basbas gave Lot No. 39 to
Nicolas Basbas; and that Lot No. 40 was also given by
Severo Basbas to ValentinBasbas. Such a claim has no basis at
all. The [petitioners'] evidence, specifically the Friar Lands
Certificate . . . and the Certification from the DENR . . . show
that ValentinBasbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate by purchase from the government way back on
April 1, 1913, contrary to the allegations of the defendants
[including herein respondent Ricardo] that the same was given
by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas as the latter's share in the
inheritance.
Claiming to be the only heirs of Felomino Basbas (their
father), and that Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha are the
only heirs of the late Severo Basbas, Crispiniano Basbas and
Ricardo Basbas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
of Deceased Severo Basbas on November 12, 1993, whereby
they adjudicated to themselves Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate . . . . On the basis of the said Extra-Judicial
Settlement, Crispiniano Basbas filed a Petition For The
Reconstitution of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 39 of the
Santa Rosa Detached Estate . . . before the Regional Trial Court
of Biñan, Laguna, and after hearing, an Order was issued
granting the aforesaid petition. Subsequently thereafter, TCT
No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the names of the Heirs of
Severo Basbas was cancelled and a new title (TCT No. 294295)
was issued in the names of Crispiniano Basbas and
Ricardo Basbas, defendants [therein.]
Based on the evidence on hand, defendants [including
herein respondent Ricardo] acquired the property in question
through fraud and, therefore, an implied trust was created in
favor of [petitioners] under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code,
which provides, thus:
If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the person from whom the property comes.
What right or rights, therefore, do they have, under
these circumstances? Since a constructive trust was created,
[petitioners] have the right to recover the property subject of this
action. The fact that the decision of the RTC, Biñan, Laguna
approving/granting the petition for the reconstitution of the title
covering Lot No. 39 and said decision has obtained its finality, is
of no moment. It has been held: "the rule that registration of real
property under the Torrens System has the effect of constructive
notice to the whole world cannot be availed of when the purpose
of the action is to compel a trustee to convey the property
registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust. In
other words, the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an
action to enforce a trust . . . .
The fact that the subject lot was already registered in
the defendants' [including herein respondent Ricardo] name and
indeed a Tax Declaration was issued in their favor for taxation
purposes, and they have paid the taxes due thereon, are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. Hence, it has been held:
When a person obtains a certificate of title to a
land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of
the rights of a true owner, he is considered guilty of
fraud, and he may be compelled to transfer the land to
the defrauded owner so long as the property has not
passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value .
. . . Also it has been held "that an original owner of
registered land may seek annulment of the transfer
thereof on the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is
reconveyance . . . . 18
We add that Valentin's rights to the succession vested from the
moment of death of the decedent Severo. 19 In turn, petitioners', as Heirs
of Valentin, who is an uncontested heir of decedent Severo, rights to the
succession vested from the moment of Valentin's death. As such, they own
Lot No. 39, undisputedly titled in Severo's name and forming part of Severo's
estate, and are entitled to the titling thereof in their names.
 In this regard, we note that the Court of Appeals did not reverse the
trials courts' factual finding on Cripiniano's and Ricardo's fraudulent titling of
Lot No. 39 in their names. The evidence presented by Crispiniano and
Ricardo highlight the fraudulence of their claim:
1. Title to Lot No. 39 is not in their names, neither is it titled in the
name of their predecessors-in-interest, Nicolas and Felomino Basbas;
2. Crispiniano and Ricardo are not the only heirs of Severo, if they
are even heirs to begin with. ScEaAD

One final note. Severo, as well as Valentin, have been long dead. It is
well-nigh that title to the subject property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate, appear in the names of the petitioners, Heirs of Valentin,
herein declared heirs of Severo, or their successors-in-interest, to finally
settle title thereto and prevent occurrences of fraudulent titling thereof.
Hence, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin and their successors-in-interest, are
directed to take the appropriate action for titling of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99853 is REVERSED. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court and the Municipal Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
Petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas and their successors-in-interest, are
likewise DIRECTED to take the appropriate action for titling of Lot No. 39
of Santa Rosa Detached Estate with dispatch, and NOTIFY this Court within
ten (10) days of such action.
SO ORDERED.
(Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, G.R. No. 188773, [September 10, 2014], 742
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PHIL 658-680)