Criminal Law II: Penalties and Retroactivity

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
COLLEGE OF LAW
CRIMINAL LAW II
ATTY. ISAGANI G. CALDERON
PENALTIES
PENALTY is the suffering that inflicted by the state for the transgression of law.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PENALTIES
PURPOSE OF PENALTIES
• Retribution or Expiation the penalty is commensurate with the gravity of the
offense.
• Correction or Reformation as shown by the rules which regulates the

execution of penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty.
THEORIES JUSTIFYING PENALTIES

• Prevention - the state must punish the criminal to prevent or suppress the
danger to the state arising from the criminal acts of the offender.
• Self-Defense - the state has a right to punish the criminal as a measure of self-
defense so as to protect society from the threat and wrong inflicted by the
criminal.
• Reformation - the object of punishment in criminal cases is to correct and

reform the offender.
• Exemplarity - the criminal is punished to serve as an example to deter others

from committing crimes.
• Justice - that the crime must be punished by the state as an act of retributive
justice, a vindication of absolute right and moral law violated by the criminal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
Article III of 1987 Constitution
Section 18 (1)
• No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
• No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a

crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19 (1)
• Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Section 20
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of poll tax.
Section 22
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
IN RE: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI

FACTS: Kay Villegas Kami Inc claims to be a recognized non-stock, nonprofit
corporation and contest the validity of R.A No. 6163 Sec.8 saying it violates due process,
the rights of association, freedom of expression and an ex post facto law.
RULING: Petition denied, penalty in law imposed to acts committed after approval of
law. Future acts are punishable.
EX POST FACTO DEFINED
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a. Makes a criminal done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when
done.
b. Aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was.
c. Inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed.
d. Alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different
tests.
e. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of right which when done was lawful.
f. Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction of acquittal or
proclamation of amnesty.
PEOPLE VS FERRER
FACTS: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac Trial Court Judge that declared RA 1700
or the Anti Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder and dismissing the information of
subversion against Feliciano Co, a leader of the CPP and Nilo Tayag and other five
members being a leader and member of the NPA inciting, instigating people to unite
and overthrow the Philippine Government. The accused maintain that RA 1700 creates
a presumption of guilt among CPP-NPA members and that they are punished for mere
membership.
Issue: Whether RA 1700 or the Anti Subversive Act of 1957 is a bill of attainder
RULING: No. The court holds the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of
attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of the judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order
for the statute to be measured as a bill of attainder the following requisite must be
present: (1) the statute specifies persons, groups; (2) the statute is applied retroactively
and reached pass conduct.
The government has yet to prove at trial that the accused joined the party
knowingly, willfuly, and by overt acts, and that they joined the party knowing its
subversive objective and with specific intent to further its goal which is to overthrow the
government by all means necessary including force, deceit, etc.
The presumption of guilt among the organization would be correct if the statute
were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further
its goals.
PEOPLE VS BRACAMONTE
FACTS: September 23, 1987, appellant Bracamonte and his companions robbed the
house of Violeta Parnala. Appellants killed their maid including her son. Bracamonte
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the crime of robbery and double homicide
under Art.294 (1) of Revised Penal Code in which R.A 7659 re imposes the death penalty
that took effect on December 31, 1993.
Issue: Whether the death penalty be given retroactive effect
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the imposition of death penalty would violate
the basic rule in Criminal Law, that if the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in
force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied which in this case
shall be applied, which is Art 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code sans the death penalty
clause by virtue of section 19 (1). Article III of the Constitution provides, excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the congress hereafter provides for it. Any death imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
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PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
FACTS: That on September 17,1995, Rolando Valdez and his companions flagged down
and fired at the tricycle using unlicensed firearms which the victims were riding. Valdez
was sentenced with death for frustrated murder and double frustrated murder and
reclusion perpetua for illegal possession of firearms. A new law, RA8294 ammended
earlier firearm laws making illegal possession of firearms merely an aggravating
circumstance and not a separate offense.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: The accused holds that there should be no separate
conviction for illegal possession of firearms in view of R.A 8294.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A 8294 should be given retroactive application in view of two
separate charges.
RULING: The Supreme Court held the contention of the accused with regard to the
charge of illegal possession of firearms. The Supreme Court states that penal laws can
be given a retroactive effect if it benefits the accused. R.A 8294 states that no separate
conviction for illegal possession of firearms if other offense are involved. Clearly, R.A
8294 is advantageous to the accused as it will spare him with the separate conviction
under the charge of illegal possession of firearms. Hence, the new law should be given
retroactive application.
With regard to the charge of multiple murders, the Supreme Court held that R.A
8294 should not be given retroactive application as it does not favor the accused. It
only aggravates the crime. The new law treats the use of unlicensed firearms as a
special aggravating circumstance thereby increasing the penalty from four reclusion
perpetua to four-fold death.
ARTICLE 21. (REVISED PENAL CODE)

"Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine Lege" No felony shall be punished by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.
 A felony shall be punishable only by the penalty prescribed by law at the time of
its commission.
ARTICLE 22.Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
Penal laws may be given a retroactive effect provided that:

a. It favors the person guilty of a felony;
b. The person is not a habitual criminal.
Exceptions:
1. When the act is decriminalized.
2. When the law is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual criminal.
Exceptions to the exception: (when a law even though favorable to an accused will not
be given retroactive effect)
The exception does not apply to the following instances:
1. Where the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or
existing causes and actions.
2. Where the offender is a habitual delinquent under Article 62 of the RPC
 Habitual Delinquent is a person who, within a period of 10 years from the date
of his release or last conviction of the crimes of Serious Physical Injuries, Less
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Serious Physical Injuries, Theft, Robbery, Estafa, or Falsification, is guilty of any

of the said crimes a third time or oftener. (Keyword: SLTREF)
 Recidivist is a person who at the time of his trial for an offense had previously
been convicted by final judgment of a crime embraced in the same title of
the RPC.
ARTICLE 4 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
The court can sua sponte apply the retroactivity of a penal law irrespective of whether
or not the acused applied for it.
PEOPLE VS PATALIN
FACTS: Patalin and Mijaque were convicted of robbery and rape against the Aliman
family. This occured on August 11,1984 and this crime at the time was punishable by
death. The 1987 Constitution abolished death penalty and reduced them to reclusion
perpetua. Then Congress eventually restored the death penalty on January 1, 1994 by
virtue of R.A 7659. The case was promulgated on June 14, 1995.
ISSUE: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to
herein accused, did they gain a vested right that any future act restoring death penalty
would no longer cover them?
RULING: Yes. The subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a

right that accrued under the old law. Courts have given statutes a strict construction to
prevent their retroactive operation. Clearly, accused right to be benefited by the
abolition of the death penalty by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This
benefit cannot be taken away from them.
PEOPLE VS GALLO
FACTS: Maritess is Romeo Gallo‘s only daughter. Maritess got raped numerous times by
her own father from 1993. Maritess finally reported it to her auntie who prompted
authorities to act. Death penalty is imposed as Gallo‘s punishment on Jan 1998.
Gallo now filed a motion to reopen the case seeking a modification of the death
sentence to reclusion perpetua in line with a new court ruling involving rules in criminal
procedure which requires that aggravating circumstances must be duly alleged in the
information for it to be appreciated during trial. In Gallo‘s case, the attending
circumstances were not alleged in the information.
Issue: Whether court rulings or changes in rules of court particularly on criminal

procedure should also be given retroactive application.
RULING: Yes. Supreme Courts held in favor of the accused. Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article
62 of this Code, although at the time of publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Gallo is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of Garcia ruling, which has
the force and effect of a law. It forms part of our penal statutes as it is favorable to an
accused who is not a habitual criminal, notwithstanding that final sentence had
already been pronounced against him.
PEOPLE VS GANO
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Facts: Gano was convicted of robbery with homicide. However, new rules require that
qualifying and aggravating circumstances be alleged in the information for them to be
appreciated.
Issue: Whether the new rule should be given retroactive effect.
Ruling. Yes. Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1
December 2000 states:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute
but in the terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and
for the court to pronounce judgment.
Pursuant to the aforequoted amended provisions, the Rules now require that the
information or complaint allege not only the qualifying but the aggravating
circumstances as well, otherwise, the same cannot be properly appreciated. Guided
by the consecrated rule that when a penal statute, substantive and remedial or
procedural, is favorable to the accused, the courts shall give it a retroactive
application and so we must in this case as the Information does not allege dwelling as
an aggravating circumstance.
PEOPLE VS RAMIREZ
FACTS: At around 11 in the evening Elmer Morales, Myrna Pasobillo, Sonia Dagdagan
and Nida were walking along the GuadalupeBridge, MakatiCity when accused Arnold
Ramirez, about an arm length away, pulled out his gun, declared hold up, took
everything of value and ordered them to walk away silently. Before the group could
move any further, Nida became hysterical and shouted for help alarming the accused
who fired at them killing Myrna. Ramirez was found convicted of robbery with homicide
and was sentenced to death.
In the advent of new court rulings, the aggravating circumstances were not
alleged. The new rule specifically requires qualifying and aggravating circumstances to
be alleged in the information.
ISSUE: Whether the new rule should be given retroactive effect.
RULING: Yes. For aggravating circumstances to be appreciated, they must be alleged

in the information. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Under Art. 294 of the PRC, any person found guilty of robbery with with the use of
violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, when by reason or occasion of robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the lesser penatly of reclusion perpetya should be imposed on Ramirez.
PEOPLE VS BUAYABAYAN
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FACTS:: Paulino Buayabayan and others all armed, entered the house of Dioscoro
Abalanes, killed the latter by shooting him in the neck then forcibly took the sum of
P30,000.00 from the victims wife an also from Rolando Verdida an amount of P10,000.00.
After the robbery, they all fled.
ISSUE: Can the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the commission of the
crime be appreciated when it is not properly alleged in the information?
RULING: No, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even generic
aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information. With regard to its
Section 9, the use of the word "must" indicate that the requirement is mandatory and
therefore, the failure to comply with section 9, Rule 110 means that the generic
aggravating circumstances though proven at trial cannot be appreciated if such
circumstances are not stated in the information.
Effects of Repeal of Penal Laws
Total Repeal
When the repeal is total, absolute or expressed, criminal liability under the former
law is obliterated. Therefore, if an accused has a pending case which was expressly
decriminalized by a new law, such case will be automatically dismissed. For those who
are convicted or serving time, they shall be released.
Total Repeal
As to pending Case will be
cases. dismissed.
As to those who Convicts shall be
are convicted or released unless the
are serving time new law expressly
provides that
detention
continues.
As to Criminal Criminal liability is
Liability extinguished.
With reenactment
Criminal liability still subsists
1. when the provisions of the former law are reenacted
2. when the repeal is implied
3. when there is a saving clause of the former law.
 Therefore if a repealing law still punishes an act criminalized under an old law,
criminal liability still subsists.
 As to implied repeal- the repeal of penal law which impliedly repealed an old
penal law revives the old law. 3 laws are needed. The first law makes an act
criminal. The second law impliedly repealed the first law. A third law now
repealed the second law.
PEOPLE VS PIMENTEL
FACTS:In 1983, accused Tujan was charged with Subversion under R.A No. 1700 and a
warrant of arrest was issued but was not served for he was at large. On 1990 Tujan was
arrested on the basis of the warrant on subversion, but when he was arrested, an
unlicensed firearm .38 calibers with ammunition was in his possession. Consequently,
tujan was charged the 2nd time with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
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ISSUE: Whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy with the filling of the second
information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of
subversion.
RULING: Requisite of a double jeopardy (1) a valid complaint or information; (2)

competent court; (3) defendant has pleaded to the charge; (4) defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or terminated without his
express consent. In the case at bar, requirement are not present.
F. ARTICLE 23. Pardon

Effect of pardon by the offended party. – A pardon by the offended party does not
extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil
liabilities with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express
waiver.
NOTE: Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code states:

“Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. – …
(Adultery and Concubinage) The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both
the guilty parties if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape,* or acts
of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender
has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons,
as the case may be…”
Exception: Express pardon by the offended party will bar criminal prosecution in the
following cases:
1. Concubinage
2. Adultery
3. Seduction
4. Abduction
5. Rape *
6. Acts of Lasciviousness
Note: Since Rape is now a crime against persons, it should be considered deleted from
the list.
As regards to the private crimes of concubinage, adultery, seduction,

abduction, rape (now excluded) and acts of lasciviousness, the rules are as follows:
1. The offended spouse (in adultery and concubinage) must file the criminal
complaint against both the guilty parties, if they are both alive. If pardon is
extended, it must also be for both of the guilty parties.
2. The pardon extended by the offended party in private crimes enumerated in
Article 344, RPC must be made before the institution of the criminal action.
The pardon in seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness must be express
(in writing). But in adultery and concubinage, a pardon, whether express or implied, will
bar a criminal prosecution. (People v. Sensano et al., 58 Phil. 73; People v. Cornejo, 60
Phil 785)
However, pardon by the offended party to be effective must be given before

the institution of the criminal action. (People v. Lim, 206 SCRA 176)
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ARTICLE 36. Pardon; its effects- A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
 A pardon has no effect on the criminal aspect. Criminal liability is not

extinguished. Only civil liability can be condoned by the offended party. A
crime is an infraction against the State which may not be interfered with by a 3 rd
person while the civil liability is personal between the accused and the offended
party.
For CASARAPA, pardon by the offended party is only a bar to criminal prosecution.
Art 89 does not mention pardon by the offended party as a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability.
RA 8353 classifies rape as a crime against persons. The only way to pardon an
offender is through a subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the rape
victim.
AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE,

RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape Law of
1997."
Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter
be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as
amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there
shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be
known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
"Chapter Three: Rape…..‖
"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between

the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty
imposed.
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or
the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
In concubinage, adultery, seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness or CASAA:

1. In adultery and concubinage, the offended spouse must file the case against
both the guilty parties. If pardon is extended, it must also be for both. The
offended party may not institute criminal action if he or she shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
2. The pardon, to be effective must be made before institution of criminal
action (people v lim, 206 scra 176). Prosecution will proceed even if pardon
was given just a day after the filing of criminal action
The pardon in seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness must be express/
in writing but implied pardon is allowed for concubinage and adultery (People vs
Cornejo, People vs Sensano).
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What then constitutes implied pardon for adultery and concubinage?
 It is deemed that the husband has consented or impliedly pardoned his wife
when no action is taken by him to assert his right as husband despite knowing for
7 years that his wife was having extramarital affairs (People vs Sansano).
 It is deemed that the wife had impliedly pardoned the husband when there is
obvious lack of interest in prosecuting as evidenced by failure to attend trial and
returning back to live with his husband as a family (People vs Cornejo).
Pardon given by parents, grandparents or guardian without the offended

minor‘s consent is not valid as the consent of the offended party is needed (People vs
Luna). Pardon given by the offended minor alone is not also valid as the pardon must
be given by boththe parents and the offended party (People vs Makilang).
PEOPLE VS LUNA
FACTS: Juan Luna attempted to abduct 12 years of age Juana Isidro. He was
condemned to 1 year, 8 months and 20 days of prision correccional with accessories
and payment of costs. Tomas Rivera, a representative of her daughter, granted express
pardon in favor of Luna, remitting the penalty to which he may have become liable,
having been granted generously with out consideration of recompense or coercion.
ISSUE: Whether or not penal action or liability to the penalty fixed for its punishment may
be extinguished by the pardon made by the father in behalf of a minor.
RULING: The Supreme Court said that granting of a pardon, in the name or behalf of a
minor is not sufficient to extinguish penal action. In order that the pardon produce its
effects it must be made by the person injured or in case the person is a minor the
parents or guardian of such person must take part in granting thereof. But the granting
of pardon by this person alone, in the name or in behalf of the minor is not sufficient,
because, as the offense, essentially and directly affects the injured party, she alone is
entitled to remit the offense and to authorize the extinction of the penal action.
PEOPLE VS SENSANO
FACTS: Ursula Sensano committed adultery and concubinage to Marcelo Ramos
against her husband Mariano Ventura. Ursula asks and beg that she will be a faithful
wife but Marcelo did not accept. Thereafter, Ursula and her child went back to
Marcelo. Mariano went to Hawaii and in his return, he charged them of adultery for
second time.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Seven years of absence from the Philippine Island, and
knowing about the illicit relationship since then before he leaves the country constitutes
implied pardon.
CONTENTION OF COMPLAINANT: No pardon is given and he is unaware of wife‘s

conduct.
ISSUE: By doing nothing and failing to assert his right as a husband despite acquisence
to the fact of adultery, is Mariano Ventura estopped from instituting criminal action?
RULING: Yes. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to
take any action against the accused within the seven years. Apart from the fact that
the husband was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as offended
party or offended spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this
case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous
relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to
institute this criminal proceeding.
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PEOPLE VS CORNEJO
FACTS: Offended party is the legitimate wife of the appellant Francisco Cornejo and
the other appellant Esmeralda de Guzman. Emilia filed a complaint for concubinage
against the appellants but said case was dismissed due to non appearance and
express pardon of the offended party. Subsequently on march 8, 1993 another
complaint for the said offense was filed against said appellant and found guilty.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: There was an expressed pardon by the offended party.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon by the offended party may extinguish the criminal liability
of the accused.
RULING: Although under the former law a pardon by the offended party did not
extinguish the criminal action, it now extinguishes said action according to the Revised
Penal Code in force and in this provision being favorable to the accused, is applicable
to the facts that took place before it became effective.
PEOPLE VS NERY
FACTS: Nery and Federico Matillano entered into agreement that the former will deliver
a sum of P230.00 as payment of 2 diamond rings given by the latter. However, Nery
failed to comply with the agreement which forced Federico to file a complaint against
Nery.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Nery argues that she was not able to deliver the money
since her prospective buyer withdraws from the transaction and that she was looking
for another buyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise of novation of contract entered into extinguish
the criminal liability.
RULING: Supreme Court rejected the theory of novation by Nery because the alleged
novation occurred after the criminal case had been instituted and while it was pending
in the trial. Public offense which must be prosecuted and punish by the government on
its own motion through complete separation should have been made of the damage
suffered by the offended party and not affected by compromise.
Novation is not one of the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby
criminal liability can be extinguished.
PEOPLE VS LIM
FACTS:Delilah was raped by her cousin Ruben. Considering that accused and victim
are cousins, both parties have come up with an agreement not to press charges.
However, the prosecutor filed the information for rape before accused‘s acts were
condoned.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: he was pardoned by the victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is valid after the criminal action has been instituted.
RULING: Supreme Court ruled that pardon must be made prior to the institution of the
criminal action.
In any case, to warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim‘s pardon or
retraction should be made prior to the institution of a criminal case. The present case
was filed on Feb. 24 1988 while the Affidavit of desistance was executed only on March
1, 1988.
PEOPLE VS MAKILANG
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FACTS: On July 30, 1996, accused Erlindo Makilang by means of force and intimidation
raped Evelyn Makilang 12 years old against her will in Binan Laguna.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Appellant argues that assuming he committed the

crime; he should nonetheless be entitled to an acquittal since Evelyn herself
categorically declared that she had already forgiven her father.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is entitled to the provision of pardon when the offended
party who is a minor is the only person granting pardon without parent or guardian‘s
consent..
RULING: No. In cases where the offended party is a minor, the pardon must be given by
both the parents and the offended party. Here, while it appears that Evelyn forgave
appellant, the records are bereft of any similar act from her mother. Thus, appellant‘s
plea that he was effectively pardoned must fail.
ARTICLE 24.Measures of prevention or safety which are not considered penalties. – The
following shall not be considered as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their
detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring confinement in a
hospital.
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80 and
for the purposes specified therein.
3. Suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to
institute proceedings.
4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative
or disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their subordinates.
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil law may establish in
penal form.
Reason: Preventive and corrective measures are not penalties because they are not
imposed as a result of conviction in judicial proceedings. Penalty is always imposed
upon conviction in a criminal case. Preventive measures take place before conviction
while corrective measures are imposed not in a criminal case.
Art 24 gives justification for detaining the accused. Otherwise the accused‘s
rights to due process and presumption of innocence are violated.
Preventive suspension is intended to enable the disciplining authority to

investigate charges against a respondent by preventing the latter from influencing
witnesses against him.
The fines mentioned in paragraph 4 are not imposed by the court because if
they do, it constitutes a penalty. However a superior officer in the exercise of
administrative power may impose it as a corrective measure.
An example of deprivation of rights Par. 5 is loss of parental authority.
ART. 228. PARENTAL AUTHORITY TERMINATES PERMANENTLY:

(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
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ART. 229. UNLESS SUBSEQUENTLY REVIVED BY A FINAL JUDGMENT, PARENTAL AUTHORITY

ALSO TERMINATES:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the
purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of
parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising

parental authority. (327a)
II. IMPOSABLE PENALTIES AND THEIR GRADATION (ART. 25), DURATION AND EFFECTS
ARTICLE 25.Penalties which may be imposed. – The penalties which may be imposed,
according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in the following:
SCALE
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES
Capital punishment:
Death
Afflictive penalties:
Reclusion perpetua
Reclusion temporal
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Prision mayor
Correctional penalties:
Prision correccional
Arresto mayor
Suspension
Destierro
Light penalties:
Arresto menor
Public censure
Penalties common to the three preceding classes:

Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.
ACCESSORY PENALTIES
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession
or calling,
Civil interdiction,
Indemnification,
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,
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Payment of costs.
A. Principal Penalties
Principal Penalty – that provided by law for a felony and which is imposed by the court
expressly upon conviction
Classification of the Principal Penalties:
According to divisibility:
 Divisible – those that have fixed duration and are divisible into 3 periods known
as minimum, medium and maximum
 Indivisible – those that do not have duration (Death, Reclusion Perpetua, Public
Censure)
According to gravity:
 Capital
 Afflictive
 Correctional
 Light
According to subject matter:
 Corporal (death)
 Deprivation of freedom (reclusion perpetua)
 Reduction of freedom (destierro)
 Deprivation of rights (disqualification and suspension)
 Pecuniary (fine)
1. Capital Punishment
ARTICLE 40.Death – Its accessory penalties. – The death penalty, when it is not executed
by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute
disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date of
sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Death Penalty: Accessory Penalties if not executed (Article 40 of the RPC)

1) Perpetual absolute disqualification; and
2) Civil Interdiction.
RA 7659 (AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES,
AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL
PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) – approved December 13, 1993
Crimes punishable by death under this Act:

a) Treason
b) Qualified Piracy
c) Qualified Bribery
d) Parricide
e) Murder
f) Infanticide
g) Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
h) Robbery with Homicide/ Rape/ Intentional Mutilation/ Arson
i) Rape with Homicide
j) Rape with the use of a deadly weapon
k) Rape committed by 2 or more persons
l) Qualified Rape
m) Destructive Arson
n) Plunder
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o) Violation of certain provisions of the Dangerous Drug Act

p) Carnapping
RA 8177 (AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF

CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 81 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659) –
approved March 20, 1996
NOTE: Article 81 of the RPC (as further amended by RA 8177) ―Art. 81. When and
how the death penalty is to be executed. – The death sentence shall be
executed with the preference to any other penalty and shall consist in putting
the person under the sentence to death by lethal injection. The death sentence
shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the
proceedings prior to the execution.
―The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that
the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous
death of the convict.
―Pursuant to this, all personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task.
―The authorized physician of the Bureau of Corrections, after thorough
examination, shall officially make a pronouncement of the convict‘s death and
shall certify thereto in the records of the Bureau of Corrections.
―The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one (1) year nor
later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become final and
executor without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times.‖
NOTE: Section 3. Implementing Rules. – The Secretary of Justice in

coordination with the Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections shall,
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate the rules to
implement its provisions.
(See also Article III, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution, Articles 40, 47, 81-85 of the
Revised Penal Code)
Article 40.Death - Its accessory penalties. - The death penalty, when it is not executed
by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute
disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date of
sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
ARTICLE 47.In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic Review of
Death Penalty Cases. – The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must
be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy (70)
years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the supreme
court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty,
in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records
shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the
court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the
filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (Amended by R.A. No. 9346.)
The death penalty shall not be imposed in the following instances:
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(1) When the guilty person is below 18 years of age at the time of the commission
of the crime.
(2) When the guilty person is more then 70 years of age.
(3) When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court,
the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death
penalty.
In all three instances, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
Note: There is now an intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeals. It is no longer

an automatic review by the Supreme Court. This is now the prevailing rule.
The purpose of such review is geared towards the protection of the accused.
Under the law, the accused is entitled to have the sentence and all the facts and
circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the Court of Appeals to the end
that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such
procedure is merciful. It gives two (2) chances to the accused (First, in the Court of
Appeals, thereafter, in the Supreme Court).
Basis of the Death Penalty Law: Retribution
RA 9346 (AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES) –
approved June 24, 2006
This Act provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC; or
b) The penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.
HARDEN VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

FACTS: Fred Harden transferred an amount to other bank accounts in foreign countries,
wherein the said amount are part of the conjugal property. His wife moved to the court
ordering Fred to return all these amounts but failed to do so. Because of civil
disobedience or civil contempt, the court ordered his arrest as well as his confinement
to Bilibid Prison, this means an indefinite time of imprisonment until he complies with the
court order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the punishment is unjust or excessive.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that punishments are cruel when it involves torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment imposed upon him is not cruel. It implies there is
something in human and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life. In the case at bar, if the term of imprisonment is indefinite and might last through
the natural life of the petitioner, the sentence imposed upon him will end if he complies
with the court order. The judgment cannot be said to be excessive or unjust because its
as if ―he carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket‖. Its purpose is to coerce the
contender to do an act within his power to perform.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MUNOZ

Facts: Munoz and his co-accused were charged of murder. They were sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. During the pendency of their trial, the 1987 Constitution took effect.
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED: With the 1987 Consitution suspending the penalty of death,
the imposable penalty upon them is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
CONTENTION OF STATE: It is not the intent of the 1987 Constitution to adjust the two
remaining periods into three divisible periods.
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ISSUE: Whether the 1987 Constitution intended to adjust the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and other lower periods too.
RULING: No. The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

The requirement to have a corresponding modification in the other
periods as a result of the abolidition of the death penalty is not expressed or intended.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEDRO EMPANTE

FACTS:On or about January 18, 1997 at about 8:00 in the evening at Barangay Unidos,
Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, above-named accused through threats, force and
intimidation and with the use of a hunting knife succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with his, then, 15-year-old daughter, Elvie Empante, against the latter‘s will and consent.
Two more cases were later filed in court against accused-appellant. Information
alleged that sometime in November 1994 at 10 a.m. at their house, the accused
through threats, force and intimidation and with the use of a hunting knife had carnal
knowledge with his, then, 12-year-old daughter, Elvie, against her will and consent. The
same occurred again at around 10 p.m. on December 24, 1996.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Accused argues that the trial court erred in imposing
the extreme penalty of death despite the plea of the accused for humanitarian
consideration as well as the plea of guilty, and the defense of intoxication which
mitigates his liability deserves a penalty of reclusion perpetua only.
ISSUE: Whether the presence of mitigating circumstances warrant the imposition of

reclusion perpetua as a lesser penalty instead of death penalty.
RULING: No. The Court finds no reason to alter, much less to reverse, the decision of the
trial court. The evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-
appellant.
The trial court judge correctly rejected the claim of intoxication as a mitigating
circumstance. To be considered mitigating, intoxication must be shown to have so
impaired his will power that he did not know what he was doing or could not
comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.
To be considered a mitigating circumstance, a plea of guilty must be made
spontaneously by the accused, in open court, prior to the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution. In the cases at bar, accused-appellant at first pleaded not guilty and
only confessed his guilt after the prosecution‘s first witness was nearly finished with her
testimony.
But even if the plea of guilty entered by accused satisfied the requisites laid
down by law, it would not serve to mitigate his liability for qualified rape and justify the
imposition of a lighter penalty. As provided by Article 335 (RPC), as amended by RA
7659, the seven circumstances enumerated in this provision are special qualifying
circumstances, the presence of any of which takes the case out of the purview of
simple rape and effectively qualifies the same by increasing the penalty one degree
higher. Qualified rape is punishable by death, which must be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. LORENZO VENERACION, Presiding Judge (RTC,
National Capital Judicial Region), HENRY LAGARTO and ERNESTO CORDERO
FACTS: On or about the 2nd day of August 1994, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together with one ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY alias ―JR,‖ JEOFREY and HENRY
LAGARTO and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior
strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is,
by taking Angel Alquiza y Lagman into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing
her to a nearby warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head
with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said Angel Lagman,
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a minor, 7 years of age, against the latter‘s will and consent and on said occasion the
said accused together with their confederates caused her fatal injuries which were the
direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.
After trial and presentation of evidence, the trial court, (under respondent Judge
Veneracion) finding the defendants Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, sentenced accused with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law.
The prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration asking for the modification of
penalty from reclusion perpetua to death as provided by art. 335 of the RPC as
ammended by RA 7659. Such motion was denied by Judge Veneracion.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Respondent judge claims that the Court cannot take
cognizance of the said Motion for Reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction.
RULING: NOTE: Section 11 of RA 7659 provides:

“Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape
is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide
is committed, the penalty shall be death…”
After weighing the evidence of the prosecution and defendant at trial, the
respondent judge found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Since the law in force at the time the crime was committed was RA 7659, the
respondent judge was bound by its provisions. Said provision does not leave any room
for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge. Respondent judge is found to
have acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua where
the law clearly imposes the penalty of death.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSEFINA ESPARAS

FACTS: On the 20th day of May, 1994, in the City of Pasay, the accused illegaly imported
into the country, shabu with a total weight of 20.09314 kg. She was brought to jail but
later on escaped. A trial in absencia was held finding her guilty and sentencing her to
death.
CONTENTION OF THE COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED: Despite the appellant still at large, the
sentence has to be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether automatic review is necessary in cases where an accused sentenced to

death has escaped prison.
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RULING: Yes. The power of the Supreme Court to review a decision imposing death
penalty can not be waived either by the court or accused. Such procedure is merciful.
It gives second chance to life.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LEO ECHEGARAY

FACTS: Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, Leo Echegaray by force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with his, then, 10-year-old daughter, herein private complainant, Rodessa
Echegaray, without her consent, to her damage and prejudice. This sexual assault was
repeated 4 times. The victim initially did not disclose this information to anyone because
the accused threatened to kill the victim‘s mother.
Leo Echegaray now assails the validity of RA 7659 saying that it is excessive.
CONTENTION OF THE PEOPLE: The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as charged, aggravated by the fact that the
same was committed by the accused who is the stepfather/father of the complainant,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, as provided for under RA 7659.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: RA 7659 is excessive and unconstitutional for since it

prescribes death penalty to crimes where no life has been taken such as rape.
ISSUE: Whether prescribing death penalty for crimes where the offended party was not
killed is excessive and unconstitutional.
RULING:No.Majority of the members of the Supreme Court has held the validity of RA
7659 with only 4 Associate Justices dissenting and claiming that said law is indeed
unconstitutional. Insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, RA 7659 has
correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death.
The court does not agree that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the
death penalty is the attendance of the circumstance of death. Death penalty is
imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgiveable execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal
acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift masses from object
poverty, and because they have caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their
victim and society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety
of individuals and the survival of the government, they must be permanently prevented
from doing so.
ECHEGARAY VS SEC. OF JUSTICE, RESOLUTION DATED 4 AND 19 JANUARY, 1999

FACTS: Echegaray was granted a temporary restraining order for his scheduled
execution. The respondents then asked for the court to lift the TRO.
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED: There might be a repeal of RA 7659 and he might be

recommended for clemency.
CONTENTION OF STATE: Repeal of the law is not imminent. The final judgment must be
carried out.
RULING: This Court‘s resolution temporarily restraining the execution of the petitioner
must be put in its proper perspective as it has been gravely distorted especially by
those who make a living vilifying the courts.
The suspension was temporary, until Jan. 15, 199, coeval with the Constitutional
duration of the present regular Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no
repeal or modification of the law is going to be made. The extreme caution taken by
the Court was compelled among others by the fear that any error of the Court will
preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard.
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The TRO has served its purpose; no immediate repeal will be made. The TRO must
be lifted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GALIGAO

FACTS: Bobby Galigao, an unlettered fisherman was charged of three counts of rape
against his three daughters.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: The penalty for three counts of rape should not be
death penalty because the rapes were committed before R.A 8353 took effect on
October 22, 1997 amending Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not death penalty should be imposed as provide in Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A 8353.
RULING: The Supreme Court rendered judgment in favor of the accused. In death
penalty cases, the Supreme Court puts into question not only the guilt of the accused
but also the question of the imposition of the death penalty itself. In the case at bar, the
court acknowledged that the limited schooling of the accused, who is unlettered
fisherman shall be favorable, to him which should at least warrant the exercise of the
courts discretion imposing the death penalty.
The trial court convicted the accused on 3 counts of rape under the provisions of
RA 8353. However the crimes for which he was convicted were committed in 1996,
before RA 8353 took effect in 1997. Prior to its amendment by RA 8353, Art. 335 of RPC
required a criminal complaint before information can be filed. In the alleged case of
Daisy, no such complaint was made. The case must be dropped.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DOMANTAY

FACTS: Bernardino Domantay alias ―Junior Otot‖ was found guilty of rape with
homicide for killing and raping a 6 year old child named Jennifer Domantay.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Contends that his alleged confessions are in admissible
in evidence because they had been obtained in violation of his contitutional rights,
consisting of circumstantial evidence is inadequate to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo erred in appreciating Domantays extra judicial
confession and convicting him despite failure of prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING: The trial courts conviction of the accused is modified finding Domantay guilty
of the crime of Homicide not rape with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. As clearly stated in the Supreme Court, with respect to the extra-
judicial confession made by him, it was admissible for it was not done during custodial
investigation, does outside the prospective walls of the Miranda Rights.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MAHINAY

FACTS: Larry Mahinay who was a houseboy was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death by electrocution, due to the crime of rape with homicide he committed against
Maria Victoria Chan who was then 12 years of age. In the fulfillment of the crime,
Mahinay threw the body of Maria in the septic tank.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Accused claims to be 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime thus, not entitled to death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the capital punishment of death
in the crime of rape with homicide considering the appellant‘s age.
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RULING: The death penalty imposed by the trial court is correct. Rape is an ignominous
crime for which is neither can excuse nor does there exist any other rational justification
other than lust, and in criminal law, those who lust and kill ought not to last. Rape is
burdened with supreme penalty of death.
The death penalty shall be imposed except when the guilty person is under 18
years old at the time of the commission of the crime, or is more than 70 years old or
when on appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the majority
vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua.
Appellant tried to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years of age
at the time of the commission of the crime. Again, the record rebuffs appellant on this
point considering that he was proven to be more than 20 years when he did the
heinous act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LEONOR

Facts: Christopher Leonor stabbed and robbed dentist, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco. He
was convicted of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to death.
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED: Judgment must be modified by convicting him of Homicide

and not Robbery with Homicide and the mitigating circumstances of praeter
intentionem, sufficient provocation, voluntary surrender, voluntary confession, passion
and obfuscation must be appreciated.
RULING: Leonor is found guilty of Robbery with Homicide with no mitigating or

aggravating circumstances appreciated. The penalty for Robbery with Homicide is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the lower of the two indivisible penalties must be imposed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PARAISO

FACTS: Paraiso armed with gun and his companion John Doe with a fan knife entered
the house of Lolita Alipio, the moment she opened the door for her niece Shiela. They
Ransacked the house and took jewelries, wristwatch,video camera and P200.oo pesos.
Ferdinand was hogtied while Kim, Epifanio and Shiela saw that Lolita was brought her in
another room and after a while she came back bloodied, holding her breast. After
which she collapsed and died.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Accused Paraiso contends that there were facts and
circumstances that the court did not considered in his favor. He argues that he is one of
the neighbors of the witnesses which should make them identify him immediately and
report him to the police.
ISSUE: Does Supreme penalty of death should be imposed upon the accused despite of
his alleged contention?
RULING: Yes, supreme penalty of death must be imposed upon the accused since his
contention of the delay of witness in reporting the crime is untenable. Applying Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty proper to be imposed is death which is the
maximum penalty as provided by law. Because, in the instant acse, there are two
aggravating circumstances that was appreciated which aggravates the crime from
reclusion perpetua up to death and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset it.
As what Judge Davide Jr. quote ― May God have mercy on your soul, Rolando
Paraiso‖.
LIFE IMPRISONMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM RECLUSION PERPETUA:
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1) Life imprisonment does not have accessory penalties; Reclusion

perpetua has accessory penalties.
2) Life imprisonment is a penalty under special laws; Reclusion perpetua is
a penalty under the Revised Penal Code.
3) Life imprisonment has no fixed duration; Reclusion perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict
becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof
shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ADRONICO GREGORIO and RICARDO GREGORIO

FACTS: On May 8, 1986 in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental,
stabbed and hacked, Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo, killing them.
The trial court found and so held the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for both criminal charges of murder. As such, they are both sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment for each criminal charge.
RULING: The correct penalty should be reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. As held time and again, life imprisonment and
reclusion perpetua are different and distinct from each other.
As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court
imposed the penalty of „reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.‘ Evidently, it
considered the latter as the English translation of the former, which is not the case. Both
are different and distinct penalties.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GERRY and EDER BALLABARE

FACTS:In the afternoon of September 16, 1990, at Sitio Isumbo, Barangay Pulot II,
Municipality of Brooke‘s Point, Province of Palawan, two brothers were killed, namely
Juan Tacadao and Leonardo Tacadao, Jr. by the Ballabare brothers. Juan sustained a
gunshot wound to the head penetrating his brain, while Leonardo sustained a gunshot
wound to the chest penetrating his heart, as such, both injuries brought about the
instantaneous deaths of the two victims.
The trial court found that the prosecution had established sufficient evidence to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused are guilty of murder of Juan and
Leonardo Tacadao, and for which, the accused are sentenced to two penalties of
reclusion perpetua. They also rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the
Violation of PD 1866 sentencing said accused to suffer life imprisonment.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Accused-appellant contends that there can be no

finding of conspiracy in the case at bar. Accused contends also that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in finding him guilty of Murder and Illegal Possession of
Firearm. He stated that both offenses arose from a single incident and that as a result of
finding him guilty of separate crimes, he was placed in double jeopardy.
RULING: It is held that the proof provided by the prosecution is insufficient to show
conspiracy or treachery; therefore, the accused is guilty of homicide and not murder.
In previous cases, the SC held that Illegal Possession of Firearms does not absorb
the crime of homicide or murder under the RPC and therefore does not bar the
subsequent or simultaneous prosecution for the latter crime. In People v. Quijada it was
held that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of two
separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and
(2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, Section 1 paragraph 2.
Furthermore, the SC held that the trial court erred in imposing in this case the
penalty of life imprisonment for accused-appellant's violation of P.D. No. 1866, Section
1, paragraph 2. The crime of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form is
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punishable by the penalty of death. Since the offense was committed on September
16, 1990, at a time when the imposition of the death penalty was prohibited, the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should instead be imposed. This is
not the equivalent of the penalty of life imprisonment, as cases have time and again
explained.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BOBBY LUSA
FACTS: Sometime in September, 1993 in Barangay Alcalde, Tibig, Silang, Cavite, at 12
midnight , 14-year-old Michelle Lusa woke up to find her father touching her private
parts. She removed his hands and kicked the accused, which caused him to leave. But,
on October, 1993, at 3:00 a.m., the appellant succeeded in raping her and repeated it
for approximately 10 more times. When her aunt accosted her growing abdomen, she
disclosed her ordeal. Together with her aunt, Michelle executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay in the Silang Police Station. After which, they went to the Municipal Health
Office where she was found pregnant.
The victim went to Manila and stayed with the family of a certain Bibes, and
upon delivery, gave up her child for adoption since she would not be able to support
him.
With the Sinumpaang Salaysay and Medical Certificate, Michelle filed a
complaint against her father.
On April 12, 1995 the trial court convicted accused-appellant of rape and
accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Accused-appellant should be convicted of only one
count of rape as the prosecution failed to establish and prove all other rapes allegedly
committed after the first incident. The sentence imposed by the trial court was
―reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. This is erroneous since reclusion perpetua is not
the same as life imprisonment. Article 335 of the RPC (When and how rape is
committed) only mentions reclusion perpetua; on the other hand, life imprisonment is
imposed only as a penalty under special laws.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LARRY SABEROLA

FACTS: On June 14, 1993, victim, Fernando Peñalosa went to Barrio Santa Ana,
CaloocanCity to engage his game cock in a pakahig. He was invited by accused and
his brothers to a drinking spree at 4:00 p.m. At 10:00 p.m., witnesses Bertos and
Rebamonte heard shouts from their houses and saw accused-appellant and victim on
a tussle. They saw Saberola stab the victim on the left part of his chest, while the
accused-appellant‘s brother, Jaime, stabbed the victim on the left side, and another
brother, Benjamin, struck the victim with a piece of wood. Then they fled to their houses.
The trial court held the accused-appellant guilty of murder sentencing him to
imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 18 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
accused was credited with the full period of time he has undergone preventive
confinement pursuant to Article 29 of the RPC.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the accused-appellant‘s conviction but modified
the judgment. The CA increased the prison penalty of the accused to reclusion
perpetua, stating that the penalty for murder, at the time, was reclusion temporal to
death, as provided by Article 248 of the RPC. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period which is the
indivisible penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
RULING:The Court affirms the finding that accused-appellant committed murder and
the imposition of reclusion perpetua upon him.
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At the time of the commission of the crime, the penalty for Murder was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code provides
the rules for the determination of the appropriate penalty in such case.
In the case at bar, since there was no further aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, that is, reclusion
perpertua.
Accused-appellant is not entitled to the benefits of Indeterminate Sentence Law
because Section 2 of said law provides that the Act shall not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment. The term life
imprisonment has been construed to include reclusion perpetua.
ARTICLE 27.Reclusion perpetua. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from

twenty years and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal. – The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve
years and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. – The duration of the penalties of
prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to
twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory
penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. – The duration of the penalties of
prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and one day to
six years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its
duration be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one
month and one day to six months.
Arresto menor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one
day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. – The bond to keep the peace shall be required to
cover such period of time as the court may determine. (As amended by RA No. 7659)
ARTICLE 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their Accessory penalties. –
The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of
civil interdiction for life or during the period of sentence as the case may be, and that
of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
ARTICLE 42. Prision mayor – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of prision mayor shall
carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
Reclusion Perpetua As indivisible Penalty
Under RA 7659, the legal duration of Reclusion Perpetua is 20 years and 1 day to 40
years. However, the Supreme Court ruled that it is still an indivisible penalty as there is no
clear intent from the legislature to change its classification as an indivisible penalty;
hence, it has no legal duration (as indivisible penalties have no duration.)
 With the advent of RA 7659, the first ruling by the Supreme Court maintained that
although reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, Art. 65 of the RPC may be
applied, hence dividing it into 3 periods. (People vs. Lucas, 1994). However, upon
review by the SC, reclusion perpetua although having a definite term remains an
indivisible penalty for there is no clear legislative intent to alter its original
classification. (People vs Lucas, 1995)
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In imposing reclusion perpetua, there is no need to specify the length because

reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. In imposing the penalty, the judge must
simply state reclusion perpetua. The person sentenced to reclusion perpetua shall be
pardoned after undergoing the penalty for 30 years, unless by reason of his conduct or
some other serious cause, he shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of
pardon. (People vs Ramirez, April 17, 2000)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LUCAS 232 SCRA 537

This case is one wherein the Supreme Court ruled that even though reclusion perpetua
is an indivisible penalty, it may be divided into periods.
FACTS: Chanda Lucas was raped by her father Conrado Lucas, starting when she was 9
years old and ending when she was 17 years old. The rape happened every time the
mother was out, Chanda cannot resist because she was threatened to be killed
anytime by her father.
Lucas was convicted of 2 counts of rape and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for each count. Lucas now appeals his sentence. The Supreme Court in
deliberating whether Lucas is guilty or not went on to discuss further how reclusion
perpetua would be applied considering the amendments introduced by RA 7659.
CONTENTION OF LUCAS: He maintains his innocence and further advances that should
he be convicted, he must suffer the 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months of
reclusion perpetua in its minimum period.
CONTENTION OF STATE: He should be penalized of reclusion perpetua amounting to 40

years because of the presence of aggravating circumstance of relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not reclusion perpetua may be divided into periods for the purpose of
determining the proper duration based on attending circumstances.
RULING: Yes. It is an indivisible penalty with a defined period- 20 years and 1 day to 40
years. In any event, Art 65 may be applied dividing it into 3 periods such that reclusion
perpetua has now 3 periods in minimum, medium and maximum.
Reclusion Perpetua: minimum- 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8
months
Medium- 26 years 8 months and 1 day to 33 years
and 4 months
Maximum- 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years
Taking into consideration the presence of aggravating circumstance of

relationship the accused may finally be sentenced to 34 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LUCAS 240 SCRA 537

This is the prevailing doctrine.
FACTS: This is a review of the previous ruling by the Supreme Court wherein they divided
reclusion perpetua into three periods.
RULING: No.
Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty; it has no minimum, medium and
maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstance. The Court resolved to modify its decision on May 25, 1994 in
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this case by deleting the disquitions whether reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty
and setting aside its decision dividing it into 3 periods.
The court concludes that although Sec. 17 of RA 7659 has fixed the duration of
reclusion perpetua, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification
as an indivisible penalty. It remains an indivisible penalty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. VILLANUEVA

FACTS: Lea Villanueva was raped by her own father for almost 2 years and it happened
4 times a week.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: The penalty should be modified, invoking the case of
People vs. Lucas. The accused invokes that reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty,
that in his case there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so he should only
suffer the medium period of reclusion perpetua which is 26 years, 8 months and 1 day
to 33 years and 4 months.
RULING: No. Pursuant to Section 21 of R.A 7659, reclusion perpetua has now defined
duration from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. It may thus be said that although the law
has now fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua. It did not make it explicit intention to
convert it into a divisible penalty.
In the case at bar, Supreme Court ruled that since reclusion perpetua is an
invisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium and maximum period. It is imposed in its
entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the crime.
Lucas, 240 SCRA 66, modified past decisions.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RAMIREZ

FACTS: Ramirez was convicted for the murder of Jonathan Alquino. He was sentenced
to 40 years of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether it is necessary to specify the length of reclusion perpetua to 40 years.
RULING: No. There was no justification or need to specify the length because reclusion
perpetua is an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for life but the
person sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for 30
years, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be
considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD

FACTS: On the 31st day of August 1994, in the vicinity of the
NinoyAquinoInternationalAirport, PasayCity, the accused Richard Gatward along with
Zaw Win Naing transported heroin with a total weight of 5579.80 grams.
Citing the ruling in the first Lucas case, the trial court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment for 35 years of reclusion perpetua for the accused.
CONTENTION OF STATE: The penalty is erroneous as the penalty is an indivisible one.
RULING:No. The error of the trial court was in imposing penalties in these cases based on
the original doctrine in Lucas which was not yet final and executory and stillopen for
reconsideration and reversal which was further decided upon a re-examination dated
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January 9, 1995 where the court decided that it is still an indivisible penalty. The Court,
this time, held that in spite of the amendment putting the duration of reclusion
perpetua at 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, it should remain as an indivisible penalty
since there was never any intent on the part of Congress to reclassify it into a divisible
penalty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ALVARADO

FACTS: While the victim Zosimo were doing household chores with his wife, Alvarado
and his other companions arrived and hurdled the following challenged on Zosimo
―Lumabas ka kalbo kung matapang ka‖ as soon as Zosimo had gotten out their house,
Alvarados companions held him on both hands and Alvarado stab the helpless Zosimo
on the stomach with a bolo.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Accused Alvarado allege that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua be modified since the trial court did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. No
minimum, no medium and no maximum periods and it is imposed in its entirety
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended
the commission of the crime. Supreme Court observed that a modification in the
penalty imposed on the appellant is called for in view of the amendment of Article 27
of the Revised Penal Code that the duration of Reclusion Perpetua is from 20 years and
2 day to 40 years.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GERARDO LATUPAN

FACTS: Gerardo Latupan was convicted of double murder and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Death penalty at the time was suspended.
CONTENTION OF THE PEOPLE:Under Art. 248 of RPC, the penalty for murder at the time
of the commission of the crime in April 1991 was reclusion temporal to death. The
penalty for murder was death and since death penalty was suspended, life
imprisonment must be the sentence.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Under the RPC, reclusion perpetua is the substitute for
death, it being the most afflictive.
Issue: Whether reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty in cases where death penalty is
suspended.
RULING: No. Accused-appellant is liable, not for a complex crime of double murder,
but for two separate counts of murder and separate counts of physical injuries.
Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder at the time of commission of
the crime in April 1991 was reclusion temporal maximum to death. The trial court
sentenced accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. The proper imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The penalty of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are not the same. They
are distinct in nature, duration and in accessory penalties.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BATES

FACTS: Marcelo Bates was found guilty of the crime of murder for the death of Jose
Boholst. He was sentenced to 40 years or reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need to specify the duration of reclusion perpetua in
giving it as a sentence
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RULING: No. The trial court erred in imposing the penalty of 40 years of reclusion
perpetua. While Art. 27 of RPC as amended by RA 7659 fixes the duration of reclusion
perpetua , it still remains an indivisible penalty in the absence of clear legislative intent
to alter its classification. Hence, in applicable cases, reclusion perpetua should simply
be imposed without specifying its duration.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GUMAYAO

FACTS: Gumayao was convicted of murder. His sentence reads ―Considering the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which is not offset by any generic
aggravating circumstance, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua…‖
ISSUE: Whether or not reclusion perpetua may be affected by attending circumstances.
RULING: No. Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. As such, the circumstance of

voluntary surrender will not affect the penalty to be meted on the appellant, since
under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua must be
applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the crime.
ARTICLE 27.Reclusion temporal. – The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve
years and one day to twenty years.
ARTICLE 30.Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. –

The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall
produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office
or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
Note: A plebiscite is not contemplated in Article 30, paragraph 2, hence the offender
may vote in that exercise subject to applicable election laws.
a. Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification

ARTICLE 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. –
The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office,
profession, or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually
or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such
disqualification.
ARTICLE 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage. – The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty,
of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such
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office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of his disqualification.
b. Prision Mayor
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. – The duration of the penalties of prision
mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve
years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty,
in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
ARTICLE 42. Prision mayor – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of prision mayor shall
carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
Prision Mayor – 6 years and 1 day to 12 years (Article 27 of the RPC)
Accessory Penalties (as provided by Article 42 of the RPC):
1) Temporary absolute disqualification; and
2) Perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
CORRECTIONAL PENALTIES
Art. 39 (1)
Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine
mentioned in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a
subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the
following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he
shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third
of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one
year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
a. Prision Correccional
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. – The duration of the penalties of prision
correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six
years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its
duration be that of the principal penalty.
ARTICLE 43. Prision correccional – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension form public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Prision Correccional – 6 months and 1 day to 6 years (Article 27 of the RPC)
Accessory Penalties (as provided by Article 43 of the RPC):
1) Suspension from public office;
2) Suspension from the right to follow a profession or calling; and
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3) Perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.
b. Arresto Mayor
Arresto mayor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month
and one day to six months.
ARTICLE 44. Arresto – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of arresto shall carry with it
that of suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of
the sentence.
Arresto Mayor – one month and 1 day to 6 months (Article 27 of the RPC)
Accessory Penalties of Arresto (as provided by Article 44 of the RPC):
1) Suspension of the right to hold office; and
2) Suspension of the right of suffrage.
c. Suspension
ARTICLE 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession, or
calling, or the right of suffrage. – The suspension from public office, profession, or calling,
and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such
office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.
The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having
similar functions during the period of his suspension.
d. Destierro
Destierro (Article 87 of the RPC)
 Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or
places designated in the sentence, nor within the radius specified, which shall
not be more than 250 km and not less than 25 km from the place designated.
 A principal, correctional and divisible penalty.
Destierro is banishment from a certain place.

Courts may not extend banishment beyond 250 km. If a convict should enter the
prohibited place, he commits the crime of evasion of sentence under ART 157. He is
free to go anywhere else except from the specific area and surrounding radius where
he was vanished.
Cases where destierro is imposed:
(1) Serious physical injuries or death under exceptional circumstances (Article 247
of the RPC)
o Any legally married person who caught his spouse having sexual
intercourse with another
o Parents who catch their daughters, who are under 18 years of age, and
their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents
NOTE: Any person who shall promote or facilitate the
prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have
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consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be

entitled to the benefits of this provision.
(2) In case of failure to give bond for good behavior (Article 284 of the RPC)
o In cases of grave or light threats
(3) As a penalty for the concubine in concubinage (Article 334 of the RPC)
(4) In cases where after reducing the penalty by one or more degrees, destierro
is the proper penalty
In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is
destierro, he shall be released after 30 days of preventive imprisonment.
LIGHT PENALTIES
a. Arresto Menor
Arresto Menor – one day to thirty days (Article 27 of the RPC)
Accessory Penalties –Article 44 of the RPC- Art. 44. — The penalty of arresto shall carry
with it that of suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the
term of the sentence.
Note: Article 88 of the RPC… “The penalty of arresto
menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house of
the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of
the law, when the court so provides in its decision, taking
into consideration the health of the offender and other
reasons which may seem satisfactory to it…”
Art 39 (1), (2)

Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine
mentioned in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a
following rules:
shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third
of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one
year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary

imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if
for a light felony.
b. Public Censure
Penalties common to Afflictive, Correctional and Light Penalties

a. Fines
A fine whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty shall be
considered:
(a) An afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos;
(b) A correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200
pesos; and
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(c) Light penalty if it be less than 200 pesos. (Provided by Article 26 of the RPC)
When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall
not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less
grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony. (Art 39 (2), RPC)
The courts may impose a fine at their own discretion provided that it is within the
limits prescribed by law. In fixing the amount of fine in each case, attention shall be
given not only to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to
the wealth or means of the culprit. (Article 66 of the RPC; Imposition of fines)
b. Bond to Keep the Peace

Bond to Keep the Peace – the bond to keep the peace shall be required as to cover
such period of time as the court may determine.
ARTICLE 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. – It shall be the duty of any person
sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall
undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and
that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the
court in its judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of
the court to guarantee said undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of
the bond.
Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be
detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, if he shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a
light felony.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PAJOTAL

FACTS: On Oct 21, 1996 around 2:45 in the afternoon, Winfred Espina accompanied by
his nephew Arnold Bugayon where they just delivered some merchandise. Three men
stopped them on the road and boarded on the vehicle. One of the three men ordered
Espina to stop the vehicle and demanded for money. Espina gave the money but was
stabbed by one of the accused. One of the accused alighted from the vehicle and
attempted to stab Bugayon. The accused gang up on Espina inflicting 15 stab wounds.
Contention of Accused: Granting that the accused are guilty, the lower court erred in
convicting them for robbery with homicide since the crimes committed are only the
two separate crimes of simple robbery and homicide which will entitle them to the
imposition of a lesser penalty for each of the two felonies correspondingly.
Ruling: Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A No. 7659
any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. In the case
at bar, it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that homicide was committed by
accused appellant and his co accused by reason or on occasion of the robbery
committed against the victim. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty impose of two indivisible penalties and the crime
was committed in the presence of one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
shall be applied. Considering the presence in this case the aggravating circumstance
abuse of superior strength , the penalty of death imposed by the trial court is proper
and should be imposed.
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B. Accessory Penalties
ACCESSORY PENALTIES – that penalty deemed included in the imposition of the

principal penalty
The following are the accessory penalties:

1. Perpetual or Temporary Absolute Disqualification
The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office
shall produce the following effects: (Article 32 of the RPC)
(1) Deprivation of the public offices and employment which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
(2) Deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be
elected to such office.
(3) Disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.
(4) Loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
For (2) and (3): In case of temporary disqualification, disqualification shall last during the
term of the sentence.
2. Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification
The effects of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office,

profession or calling shall produce the following effects: (Article 31 of the RPC)
(1) Deprivation of the profession, office, employment, or calling affected;
(2) Disqualification for holding similar offices or employments.
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession
or calling
The penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the
right of suffrage shall: (Article 33 of the RPC)
(1) Disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession
or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence;
(2) Ban person from holding any other public office having similar functions
during the period of his suspension.
4. Civil Interdicition
ARTICLE 34. Civil Interdiction. – Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the
person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property,
and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or conveyance inter vivos.
Civil Interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the
rights of:
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(1) Parental authority

(2) Guardianship, either as to the person or property of the ward
(3) Marital authority
(4) The right to manage his property
(5) The right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter
vivos (inter vivos, meaning between living persons)
Civil interdiction is imposable when the penalty is:

(1) Death when not executed;
(2) Reclusion Perpetua; or
(3) Reclusion Temporal.
5. Indemnification
NOTE: Article 107 of the RPC, which provides for what is included in
Indemnification ---
(a) Consequential damages to the injured party
(b) Damages suffered by the injured party‘s family
(c) Damages suffered by a third person by reason of the crime
6. Bond
As provided by Art. 35, RPC
a. The offender must present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that the
offender will not commit the offense and if such offense be committed, they
will pay the amount determined by court.
b. The offender must deposit such amount with the clerk of court to guarantee
said undertaking or
c. The offender may be detained, if he cannot give the bond, for a period not
more than 6 months if prosecuted for grave or less gave felony, or for a
period not more than 30 days, if for a light felony. (Art 35).
7. Forfeiture or Confiscation of the Instruments and Proceeds of the Offense
ARTICLE 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime or instruments of
the crime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the
offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.
Outline of Article 45.
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1. Every penalty imposed carries with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of

the crime and the instruments or tools used in the commission of the
crime.
2. The proceeds, instruments, or tools of the crime are confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government.
3. Property of a 3rd person not liable for the offense is not subject to
confiscation and forfeiture.
4. Property not subject to lawful commerce (whether it belongs to the
accused or to a third person) shall be destroyed.
There is no forfeiture in the following cases:
1. No criminal case
2. Acquital
3. if the property belongs to a person not indicted
Instruments of the crime belonging to a 3 rd person who is innocent may be

recovered. Articles which are already forfeited, when the order of forfeiture is
already final, can not be returned even in case of acquittal. Such articles already
ceased to belong to the owner as they had been forfeited to the Government.
8. Payment of Costs
ARTICLE 37. Cost – What are included. – Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the
course of the judicial proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts of
previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not subject to
schedule.
COSTS OF THE SUIT – are the expenses of the litigation allowed and regulated by the
Rules of Court to be assessed against or to be recovered by a party in litigation
NOTE: No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the
Philippines unless otherwise provided by law.
Costs (in criminal cases) are chargeable only in case
of conviction. In case of acquittal, the costs are de oficio –
the parties shall bear their own expenses.
Art. 38.Pecuniary liabilities; Order of payment. — In case the
property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of
all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following
order:
1. The reparation of the damage caused.
2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The cost of the proceedings.
C. Subsidiary Penalty
ARTICLE 39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet the
fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a
following rules:
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shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph
is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term
of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no
fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave
or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no
subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal
institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of
time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same
deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason
of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial
circumstances should improve. (As amended by R.A. No. 5465, which lapsed into
law on April 21, 1969.)
Subsidiary penalty is an auxiliary personal liability to be suffered by the convict,

who has no property with which to pay the fine, at the rate of one day for each
Php8.00, subject to the rules provided for in Article 39.
The rules are:
(1) If the penalty imposed is Prision Correccional or Arresto and fine – subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed 1/3 of the term of the sentence, and in no
case to continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day
shall be counted against the prisoner.
(2) When the penalty imposed is fine only – the subsidiary imprisonment shall not
exceed 6 months, if the offense is grave or less grave felony; and not to
exceed 15 days, if light felony.
(3) When the penalty imposed is higher than Prision Correccional, no subsidiary
imprisonment.
(4) If the penalty imposed is not by confinement, but of fixed duration – the
nature of the subsidiary penalty is the same as that of the principal penalty
under the same rules in numbers 1, 2 and 3 above.
(5) In case the financial circumstances of the convict should improve, he shall
pay the fine.
Subsidiary penalty is proper only if the accused has no property with which to
pay the fine and not as a matter of choice on his part by opting to go to jail instead of
paying.
Even if the offender cannot pay the pecuniary liabilities by reason of insolvency,
the offender cannot be required to undergo subsidiary penalty in the following
instances:
(1) When the penalty imposed is higher than Prision Correccional.
(2) For failure to pay the costs of the proceedings there is no subsidiary penalty.
(3) When the penalty imposed is fine and a penalty not to be executed by
confinement in a penal institution and has no fixed duration, there is no
subsidiary penalty.
(4) When subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the decision.
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Subsidiary penalty is possible only when any of the following penalties is imposed:
(a) Prision correccional;
(b) Suspension and fine;
(c) Destierro;
(d) Arresto mayor;
(e) Arresto menor; and
(f) Fine only.
When the penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment, it is the penalty
actually imposed by the court not the penalty provided for by the Code which shall be
considered in determining whether or not subsidiary penalty should be imposed.
III. GRADATION OF FELONIES- ARTICLE 9:
Article 9 (RPC): Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies.
 Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25.
 Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their
maximum period are correctional.
 Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both; is provided.
IV. APPLICATION AND COMPUTATION OF PENALTIES
A. GENERAL RULES
1. See Articles 5, 21, 23, 28, 29, 46, 73 – 77
 Article 5.Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be

repressed
but which are not covered by the law. – Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which
is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made t5he subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence,
when strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in
the imposition of clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
 Article 21.Penalties that may be imposed. – No felony shall be

punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
 Article 23.Effect of pardon by the offended party. – A pardon by the

offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided
in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liabilities with regard to the interest
of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.
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 Article 28.Computation of Penalties. – If the offender shall be in prison,

the term of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed
from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become
final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the
penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the
day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial
authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the
other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the
defendant commences to serve his sentence.
 Article 29.Period of preventive imprisonment deducted form term of

imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention
prisoner agree voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following case:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously
twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their
sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during
which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for
a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of
the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is
not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on
appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to
which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As
amended by R.A. No. 6127, and further amended by E.O. No. 214, July
10, 1987.)
 Article 46.Penalty o be imposed upon principals in general. – The

penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in general
terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated
felony.
 Article 73.Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory

penalties. –
Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law,
carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40,
41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it must be understood that the
accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict.
 Article 74.Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. – In

case in which the law prescribes a penalty higher that another given
penalty, without specifically designating the name of the former, if
such higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and
the accessory of Article 40, shall be considered as the higher penalty.
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 Article 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more

degrees. – Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the
penalty of fine by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or
reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one fourth of the
maximum amount prescribed by law without however, changing the
minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard to fines that do not
consist of a fixed amount, but are made proportional.
 Article 76.Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. – The legal

period of duration of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided
into three parts, forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and
the maximum in the manner shown in the following table:
TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INLCUDED IN EACH
OF THEIR PERIODS
Penalties Time included Time included Time included Time included

in the penalty in its minimum in its medium in its maximum
in its entirety period period period
From 12 years From 12 years From 14 years, From 17 years
Reclusion and 1 day to and 1 day to 4 months and and 4 months
temporal 20 years. 14 years and 8 1 day to 17 and 1 day to
months. years and 4 20 years.
months.
Prision mayor, From 6 years Rom 6 years From 8 years From 10 years
absolute and 1 day to and 1 day to 8 and 1 day to and 1 day to
disqualification 12 years. years. 10 years. 12 years.
and temporary
disqualification
Prision From 6 months From 6 moths From 2 years, 4 From 4 years, 2

correccional, and 1 day to 6 and 1 day to 2 moths and 1 moths and 1
suspension and years. years and 4 day to 4 years day to 6 years.
destierro months. and 2 months.
Arresto mayor From 1 month From 1 month From 2 months From 4 moths
and 1 day to 6 to 2 months. and 1 day to 4 and 1 day to 6
months. months. months.
Arresto menor From 1 to 30 From 1 to 10 From 11 to 20 From 21 to 30

days. days. days. days.
 Article 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three

distinct penalties. – In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of three distinct penalties, each one shall form a period;
the lightest of them shall be the minimum, the next the medium, and
the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms
specially provided for in this code, the periods shall be distributed,
applying by analogy the prescribed rules.
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a. Executive Order 214, July 10, 1987. (the same as Art. 29 of the Revised
Penal Code)
b. People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil 658
Facts: Abelardo Formigones was sentenced by the CFI of Camarines sur to

suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the crime of parricide. He killed
his wife because of jealousy that his wife is having an illicit affair to his brother
Zacarias. The crime is attended by two mitigating circumstances (physical
defect and passion and obfuscation).
Ruling: Art. 63, paragraph 2, rule 3 will be applied; when the commission of
the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Parricide is
punishable from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, there are two
mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the act, the
penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
The SC credited the appellant with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone. The SC forwarded Formigones Case to the
office of the Chief Executive for lighter penalty.
2. Principals, Accomplices and Accessories in Consummated, Frustrated and

Attempted Felonies.
a. RPC, Arts 46, 50-57, 60-61
 Article 46.Penalty o be imposed upon principals in general. – The

penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in general
terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated
felony.
 Article 50.Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime.

– The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals in a frustrated
felony.
 Article 51.Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crime. –

A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals in an attempt
to commit a felony.
 Article 52.Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in a

consummated crime. – The penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon
the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony.
 Article 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission

of a consummated felony. – The penalty lower by two degrees than
that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed
upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.
 Article 54. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated

crime. – The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law
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for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the
commission of a frustrated felony.
 Article 55.Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated

crime. – The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law
for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the
commission of a frustrated felony.
 Article 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted

crime. – The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law
for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the
accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.
 Article 57.Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted

crime. – The penalty next lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for the attempt shall be imposed upon the accessories to the
attempt to commit a felony.
 Article 60.Exceptions to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. – The

provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not
be applicable to a case in which the law expressly prescribes the
penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be
imposed upon accomplices or accessories.
Table for Art 50- 57

Consummated Frustrated Attempted
Principals 0 or as provided 1 degree lesser 2 degrees lesser
Accomplices 1 degree lesser 2 degrees lesser 3 degrees lesser
Accessories 2 degrees lesser 3 degrees lesser 4 degrees lesser
 Article 61.Rules of graduating penalties. – For the purpose of

graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles
50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty
as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices
or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and
indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale
prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of
two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be
imposed to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be
the immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale.
one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another
indivisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be
composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible
penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said
respective graduated scale.
several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period
immediately following the minimum prescribed and of the two next
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following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which
shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise, from
the penalty immediately following in the above-mentioned respective
graduated scale.
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some
manner not specially provided for in the four preceding rules, the
courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties
upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to
commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.
b. People v. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 370
Facts: On April 25, 1996, Primo Campuhan was caught by Maria

pamintuan kneeling before her daughter Christel Pamintuan, 4 years of
age. Primo‘s short pants were down to his knees while Christel‘s pajamas
and panty were already removed. Corazon alleged that Primo was
holding and forcing his pennies to Christel‘s vagina. On 27 of May, 1997,
Primo Campuhan was found guilty of Statutory Rape and sentenced by
the RTC of Malabon to the extreme penalty of death. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Ruling: The rape was on its attempted stage because the alleged
touching is merely a stroked on the external surface of the female organ,
and there must be sufficient and convincing proof that the pennies
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ for rape to be
consummated.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the
impossible penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory
rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two degrees lower is reclusion
temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of
the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
3. Effects of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances
a. RPC, Arts. 62- 64, 67, 69
 Article 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating

circumstances and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken
into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in
conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a

crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in
defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
1.(a) When in the commission of the crime, advantage was
taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed
shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
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The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was

committed by any person who belongs to an organized / syndicated
crime group.
An organized / syndicated crime group means a group of two
or more persons collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one
another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating

circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of
necessity accompany the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from

the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with
the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve
to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices
and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of

the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had
knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their
cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects.
(a) Upon a third conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the

penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty
and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to
the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty
and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be
found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two
penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith,
shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be
habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his
release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical
injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of
said crimes a third time or oftener. (As amended by Section 23 of R.A.
no. 7659)
 Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all

cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only
one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
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2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating

circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall
be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow
them to offset one another in consideration of their number and
importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance
with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.
 Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three
periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain
three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of
three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall
observe for the application of the penalty the following rules,
according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating
circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its
medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the
commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum
period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the
commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum
period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are
present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the
other according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the
aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater
penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the
extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser
extent of the evil produced by the crime.
 Article 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of

exemption of the fourth circumstance of Article 12 are present.—
When all the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article
12 of this Code to exempt from criminal liability are not present, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have
been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
 Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not

wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
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prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable

by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period
which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of
the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
b. Lacanilao v. CA, 162 SCRA 563 (1988)
Facts: Bernardo Lacanilao, a police officer, was found guilty for the crime of
homicide because of the death of Ceferino Erese. He is performing his duty
as a policeman but shooting Erece was not necessary. The CA sentenced
him to indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum.
Ruling: The present case would have fallen under No. 5 of Article 11 if the two
conditions therefore, viz: (1) that the accused acted in the performance of
duty or lawful exercise of a right of office and (2) that the injury or offense
committed be necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office, concurred. But here only the first
condition is fulfilled, the second is wanting.
Consequently, Article 69 is applicable, for the requirement ―that the
majority of such conditions be present‘ is immaterial since there are only two
conditions in order that the circumstance in No. 5 of Article 11 may be taken
into account. Article 69 is, obviously, in favor of the accused as it provides for
a penalty lower than that prescribed by law when the crime committed is not
wholly justifiable, the intention of the legislature being to mitigate the penalty
by reason of the diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence, or intent,
or of the lesser perversity of the offender.
The petitioner is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of
from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
B. SPECIFIC RULES
1. Complex Crimes – Article 48

 Article. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
a. Kinds
1. Compound Crime – When a single act constitute two or more grave or

less grave felonies.
Requisites:
1) that only one single act is committed by the offender
2) that the single act produces
a) 2 or more grave felonies
b) one or more grave and one or more less grave felonies
c) 2 or more less grave felonies
2. Complex Crime Proper - When an offense is a necessary means for

committing the other.
Requisites:
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1) that at least 2 offenses are committed

2) that one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the
other
3) that both or all the offenses must be punished under the same
statute
b. Principle of Pro Reo in Criminal Law

Whenever a penal law is to be construed or applied and the law admits
of two interpretations – one lenient to the offender and one strict to the
offender – that which is lenient to the offender or favorable to the offender
will be adopted.
This is in consonance with the fundamental rule that all doubts should be
construed in favor of the accused and consistent with the presumption of
innocence of the accused.
c. Rebellion
i. People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
Facts: It was the height of the government action against communists and
the Hukbalahap guerillas. President Elpidio intensified the campaign
against them.
On January 20, 1951, the Congress of Labor organizations (CLO)
headquarters was raided. Amado V. Hernandez was arrested for various
activities with the CLO. Upon his request, he was charged in the Criminal
Information of Rebellion with Murder, Arson and Robbery. Five years after
his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with the court where his case was
pending. Petition for bail was denied on the ground that the complex
crime charged against Hernandez required the denial of bail.
Held: Petition for bail was granted. Rebellion cannot be complexed with
other crimes, such as murder and arson. Rebellion itself would include and
absorb the said crimes, thus granting the accused his right to bail. Murder
and arson are crimes inherent and concomitant when rebellion is taking
place. Rebellion in the RPC constitutes one single crime and that there is
no reason to complex it with other crimes.
ii. People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 99

Facts: Federico Geronimo and many others were charged with the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies and kidnapping at the
CFI of Camarines Sur. The trial court sentenced the appellants to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of their victims.
Ruling: A rebel, who, for some independent motives or personal motives,

commits murder or other common offenses in addition to rebellion, may be
prosecuted for and convicted of such common offenses.
iii. Ponce Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217

Facts: On February 27, 1990, Senate Majority leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement leaded by NBI Director Alfredo Lim. The
warrant of arrest charged Enrile, Gregorio Honasan and spouses Panlilio
with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1989. On February 27, 1990, Enrile filed a
petition for habeas corpus.
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Ruling: Petition was granted. The charged of complex rebellion with

murder and multiple frustrated murders is to be read as simple rebellion.
Murders, arson and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion.
iv. RA 6968- AN ACT PUNISHING THE CRIME OF COUP D'ÉTAT BY AMENDING

ARTICLES 134, 135 AND 136 OF CHAPTER ONE, TITLE THREE OF ACT NUMBERED
THIRTY-EIGHT HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
- This law allows rebellion and coup d‘etat to be complexed with
other crimes.
d. Related Cases
i. Napolis vs. CA, 43 SCRA 301

Facts: On October 1, 1956, Napolis and company forcedly entered the
dwelling of spouses Penaflor. They boxed Mr. Penaflor and take away the
spouses money. Nicanor Napolis appealed his conviction from the decision
of the CA which affirms the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of
the crime of robbery with force upon things and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day, prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day,
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Ruling: Robbery with force upon things is punishable under Art 299 and
robbery with intimidation against the person is punishable under Art 294 (5).
Since both of the elements of Art 299 and Art 294(5) are present, the crime
committed is complex. It calls for the imposition of the penalty of the most
serious offense in its maximum period. Therefore, the penalty must be
imprisonment from from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor to
nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal.
ii. People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA 17

Facts: Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, run amuck inside a train, killed
8 passengers and wounded 1 passenger. They were found guilty of
multiple attempted murder and attempted murder. The crime was
considered as complex because the trial court concluded that the killing
was a result of the single act of the twins to run amuck. They were made to
suffer the penalty for the most serious offence in its maximum, death
penalty.
Ruling: The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by
means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a
complex crime under Art. 48 of the RPC which refers to cases where a
single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is
necessary means for committing the other.
iii. People vs Bulaong

Facts: In the afternoon of December 5, 1972, Delena Segapo, 14, and her
sister, Nena, 8 cranad(both Bilaans), left their house at Barrio Landan,
Polomolok, South Cotabato, to perform an errand for their father. After
walking for about forty minutes, they boarded a passenger jeepney and
arrived in the public market of GeneralSantosCity at around six o‘clock in
the evening.
Before the two girls could ride, Claudio Bulaong appeared.
Bulaong alighted from his jeep, pointed his gun at the two sisters, held
Delena‘s neck and forced her and her sister to board his jeep.
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He conducted them to the New Bay View Hotel in the city where Bulaong
forced them to enter Room 304. He was still holding his gun with one hand
and with his other hand, he held Delena‘s arm. He threatened to kill the
two sisters if they would escape and refuse to enter the hotel room.
Bulaong raped the victims eight times.
Bulaong got convicted for 8 counts of rape.
Contention of State: Bulaong committed 8 counts of forcible abduction

with rape.
Contention of Accused: Forcible abduction with rape must be taken as

one crime for being a continuing crime.
Issue: Whether the crime of forcible abduction with rape is a continuing

crime.
Ruling: Yes. The trial court erred in imposing eight reclusion perpetuas.
Bulaong committed the continuing complex offense of forcible abduction
with rape
iii. People vs. Velasquez, 345 SCRA 728

Facts: The accused Reynaldo Velasquez was convicted with 2 counts of
simple rape in the following cases: In criminal case no. 97 – 0035 he had
carnal knowledge with one Karen Compomanes, 15 years old; and in
criminal case no. 97 – 0036 he forcibly abduct the latter for purpose of
having carnal knowledge with her.
Ruling: The trial court erroneously convicted Velasquez two counts of

simple rape for the two criminal information filed against Velasquez. The
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused forcibly abducted Karen and then rape her twice; he should be
convicted of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and
simple rape. The penalty for complex crime is the penalty for the most
serious crime which shall be imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the
more serious of the two crimes and is punishable with reclusion perpetua
under Art. 335 of the RPC and since reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible
penalty; it shall be imposed as it is. The subsequent rape committed by
Velasquez can no longer be considered as a separate complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape but only as a separate act of rape punishable
with reclusion perpetua.
iv. People vs. Delos Santos, 355 SCRA 415

Facts: Glen Delos Santos, driver of Isuzu Elf Truck, was convicted by the Trial
Court with the crimes of multiple murder, frustrated murder, and multiple
attempted murder for accidentally bumping members of PNP during an
endurance run on October 5, 1995 (2:00 am) in Cagayan de Oro. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death and ordered to indemnify each
group of heirs of the deceased.
Ruling: When the incident resulting in several deaths and injuries was not a
product of malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless
driving, the accused should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple murders with serious physical injuries. If a
reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two (2) or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.
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v. People vs. Gonzales, 359 SCRA 362, June 29, 2004

Facts: In an altercation because of traffic incident, Gonzales shot Valdez
FX car which result to the death of the latter‘s wife and wounding his two
sons. The Trial Court found the existence of treachery and convicted
Gonzales the crime of complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.
Ruling: Article 48 applies if a single act resulted to two or more grave and
less grave felonies or when an offense is necessary means of committing
another.
In the case at bar, the killing is not qualified by treachery because the
suddenness of the attack precede by altercation would not enable the
accused to adopt means to specifically ensure the execution of the crime
without risk coming from the intended victim. The crimes committed are
homicide and slight physical injuries. Considering that homicide is a grave
felony and slight physical injuries are light felonies, the acts produced does
not satisfy the definition of Art. 48.
vi. Monteverde vs. People, 387 SCRA 196

Facts: Petitioner Aurea A . Monteverde was a barangay chairman from
1991 to 1993 of 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She
was charged with estafa through falsification of public document. The
falsification involves a sales invoice in the amount of P13, 565.00 hich was
donated by Pagcor. The Sandiganbayan convicted her of falsification and
was acquitted on estafa because the alleged information does not show
that falsification was a necessary means to commit estafa. She appealed
the decision on the ground that since she was acquitted on the crime of
estafa, she could no longer be prosecuted in falsification because the
crime intended to be committed is not proven. Assuming that she was the
author of the falsification, there was no evidence that she benefited from
it.
Ruling: The acts attributed to petitioner in the case at bar cannot

constitute a complex crime. Her alleged actions showing falsification of a
public and or commercial document were not necessary to commit
estafa. Accused was acquitted.
The alleged falsification happened after the money was spent and to
explain how it was expended. Thus there is no complex crime since the
falsification is not necessary means for committing estafa (as charged) or
malversation (as suggested by Sandiganbayan). If at all, it was intended to
conceal the estafa or malversation.
Accused having been charged with two distinct crimes, acquittal in one,
will not necessary lead to acquittal in the other. Each crime will be
evaluated based on its own merits, and conviction will depend on the
proof of the elements of each particular offense. When a complex crime is
charged and the evidence fails to establish one of component offenses,
the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved.
The Sales invoice was not established beyond reasonable doubt to have
been forged or falsified.
vii. People vs. Comadre, 431 SCRA 366
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Facts: Antonio Comadre threw a hand grenade which exploded at the

roof of the house of Jaime Agbanlog. The incident resulted to the death of
Robert Agbanlog and causing less serious physical injuries to Jerry
Bullanday, Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo eugenio, Rey Camat, emelita Agbanlog
and Elena Agbalog. The trial court convicted Comadre of the complex
crime of murder with multiple attempted murders. A death penalty was
therefore imposed. Hence, the case is on automatic review pursuant to
Article 47 of the RPC.
Ruling: The single act of appellant by detonating a hand grenade may

quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses,
yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a
single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the
offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser
degree of perversity.
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the
presence of modifying circumstances, including the generic aggravating
circumstances in this case. The maximum penalty of murder is death. The
trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
The underlying philosophy of complex crime in the RPC, which follows the
pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single
penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The accused who commits
two crimes with single impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when
the crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions.
e. Single Larceny Doctrine

A doctrine in THEFT or ROBBERY cases which is very popular in the US
and other countries where taking a property/ies belonging to the same or
different person by a series of acts arising from a single criminal intent or
resolution constitutes only one crime.
Continued Crime
- exists when there is plurality of acts over a period of times; unity of
penal provision violated and unity of criminal intent or purpose which means
two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and
same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purpose.
A continuing crime is not a complex crime because the offender does
not perform a single act, but a series of acts and one offense is not a
necessary means of committing the other.
i. Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 219

Facts: On May 1, 1991, Miriam Defensor Santiago, the then Commissioner
of the Bureau of Immigration and Deprotation, was charged of vioalation
of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 as amended otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. A total of
thirty-two (32) criminal information were filed against her when she
authorized and signed in a single occasion the release order of 32
overstaying aliens. Each of the information, except the names of the
aliens, was a verbatim reproduction of each other.
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Issue: Whether the series of acts committed by Santiago (signing 32

different documents) arise from a single intent.
Ruling: Yes. There was only one crime committed in Santiago‘s case, and
hence, there should only be single information to be filed against her. The
signing of the release order of the 32 overstaying aliens arises from the
single intent or belief that there was no legal basis for their continued
detention.
ii. People v. Tabacco, 270, SCAR 32

Facts: Accused Mario Tabacco, armed with M – 14, inside a cockpit gym,
without warning press the trigger of his gun, shot and killed Ex mayor Jorge
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Regunton.
Tabacco was convicted of four counts of murder. Tabacco appealed the
decision and contended that he must be convicted of a complex crime
because the felonies were produce as a result of single act of pressing the
trigger.
Issue: Whether the crime stems from the single act of pressing the trigger.
Ruling: No. Clarifying the applicability of Article 48, there must be a

singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written in the
law.
The firing of several bullets by Tabacco although resulting from one

continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person felled by
different shots, is a victim of separate crime of murder. There is no showing
that only a single missile passed through the bodies of the victims. The
killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other.
To each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims,

corresponds a distinct and separate shots fired by the accused, which
made the accused criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting
from every single act that produce the same. The accused was guilty of
four counts of murder.
iii. People vs. Sanchez, GR No. 13116, August 29, 1999

Facts: Mayor Antonio sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Landrito Peradillas and
Artemio Averion was found guilty of murder for the death of Nelson
Penalosa, a supporter of a political rival and the latter‘s son Rickson
Penalosa. The trial court ruled that the death of the victims was a result of
a single act. Sanchez and company were found guilty of the crime of
complex crime of double murder. They were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the death of their two victims.
Malabanan who takes part on the killing testified that when they are
chasing Penalosa‘s car, he heard three successive burst directed to the
victim‘s car.
Issue: Whether the crime stems from the single act of pressing the trigger.
Ruling: No. It is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be
considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets
which actually produces them.
In the case at bar, Malanbanan heard three burst of gunfire from the two
armalites used by Corcolon and Peradillas. The accused are criminally
liable for as many offenses resulting from pressing the trigger.
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Therefore, accused are liable for two counts of murder committed against
the victims, Nelson and Rickson Penalosa, instead of the complex crime of
double murder.
f. Reckless Imprudence
i. Reodica vs. Ca, 242 SCAR 87

Facts: On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica
was driving a van along Dona Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van
hit the car of Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained slight
physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8, 542.00. The
RTC of Makati convicted petitioner of the quasi offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries.
Issue: Whether the resulting offenses constitute a complex crime.
Ruling: No. There is no complex crime because the crime of slight physical
injuries and damage to property are light felonies. Accused must be
answerable separately for each offense committed.
g. Two-Tiered Penalties
A two tiered penalty is that which occurs when the law provides that a
penalty to a particular crime is in addition to the penalty imposable for
another crime which results from the commission of such particular crime.
It‘s an additional penalty usually for those who abuse authority.
h. Instances Where There are No Complex Crimes

1. In case of continuing crimes.
2. When one offense is committed to conceal the other.
3. When the other crime is an indispensable part or an element of the other
offenses as defined.
4. Where one of the offenses is penalized by special law.
5. When the law provides one single penalty.
a. Robbery with homicide
b. Robbery with rape
c. Rape with homicide
d. Kidnapping with Serious Physical Injuries
e. Kidnapping with homicide
2. Special Complex Crimes

Special Complex Crimes/ Composite Crime
Made up of more than one crime, but which in the eyes of the law warrants a single
indivisible offense. They are regarded as special species of complex crime because
there is one specific penalty imposed. Examples are: rape with homicide when the
homicide is consummated, kidnapping with homicide, robbery with arson.
a. People v. Fabon, 328 SCRA 302, G.R. No. 133226

Facts: Locsin Fabon was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of robbery
with homicide accompanied by rape and intentional mutiliation. He was
sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.
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Ruling: When the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is

accompanied by another offense like rape or intentional mutiliation, such
additional offense is treated as an aggravating circumstance which would
result in the imposition of the maximum penalty of death.
In the case at bar, rape can not be used to aggravate the penalty because
it was not proven. However, dwelling which is alleged in the information is
proven to aggravate the penalty, considering that the crime was committed
at the house of the victim.
b. People v. Empante, 306 SCRA 251

Facts: Empante raped his daughter on three different occasions. The trialc
court convicted Empante to death penalty as provided by Art. 335 of the
RPC that death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is under 18 years old
and the offender is a parent, guardian, ascendant, step parent or relative by
affinity or consanguinity within the third civil degree.
Ruling: Qualified rape is punishable by single indivisible penalty of death,

which may be applied regardless of mitigating circumstances.
Note:
The Special complex crime of rape with homicide is treated by law in
the same degree as qualified rape-that is, when any of the 7 (now 10)
―attendant circumstances enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, the
penalty is death, but in cases where any of those circumstances is proven
though not alleged, the penalty cannot be death except if the
circumstances under Art 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition
of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC.
3. Crime different from That Intended – Article 49

 Article 49.Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime
committed is different from that intended. — In cases in which the felony
committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than

that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit,
the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than

that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the
penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be

applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an
attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty
for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the
attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.
 Art 49 has reference to the provision in the 1 st par of Art 4 which provides that
criminal liability shall be incurred ―by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended‖
 Art 49 applicable only in cases when there is a mistake in identity of the victim
of the crime and the penalty for the crime committed is different from that for
the crime intended to be committed.
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 Art 49 also has no application where a more serious consequence not

intended by the offender befalls the same person.
 Example: Juan only wanted to inflict a wound upon Pedro but because he
lost control of his right arm, he killed Pedro. Art 49 not applicable.
ART 49 ART 48
Lesser penalty to be imposed in its Penalty for the more serious crime shall be
maximum pd imposed in its maximum pd
4. Degree Of Participation and Storage of Commission – Articles 50 – 57, 60 – 61.
Consummated Frustrated Attempted

Principals 0 or as 1 degree 2 degrees lesser
provided lesser
Accomplices 1 degree lesser 2 degrees 3 degrees lesser
lesser
Accessories 2 degrees 3 degrees 4 degrees lesser
lesser lesser
a. Principal – Frustrated (Article 50)
b. Principal – Attempted (Article 51)
c. Accomplices – Consummated (Article 52)
d. Accessories – Consummated (Article 53)
e. Accomplices – Frustrated (Article 54)
f. Accessory – Frustrated (Article 55)
g. Accomplice – Attempted (Article 56)
h. Accessory – Attempted (Article 57)
i. Exemptions (Article 60, 346)

 Article 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. — The
provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be
applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty
provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon
accomplices or accessories.
 2 cases wherein the accomplice is punished w/ the same penalty imposed

upon the principal
a) ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and any person who by
abuse of authority or confidential relationship shall cooperate as
accomplices in the crimes of rape, acts of lasciviousness, seduction,
corruption of minors, white slave trade or abduction.
b) one who furnished the place for the perpetration of the crime of slight
illegal detention.
 Accessory punished as principal: Art 142 – punishes an accessory for
knowingly concealed certain evil practices.
 Cases when instead of a penalty 2 degrees lower, one degree for accessory:
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a) knowingly using counterfeited seal or forged signature or stamp of the

President
b) illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note
c) using a falsified document
d) using a falsified dispatch
 Article 346. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons

entrusted with the custody of the offended party. – The ascendants,
guardians, curators, teachers, and any person who, by abuse of authority o
confidential relationships, shall cooperate as accomplices in the
perpetration of the crimes embraced in chapters second, third, and fourth of
this title, shall be punished as principals.
Teachers or other persons in any other capacity entrusted with the
education and guidance of youth shall also suffer the penalty of temporary
special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special
disqualification.
Any person failing within terms of this article, and any other person
guilty of corruption of minors for the benefit of another, shall be punished by
special disqualification from filling the office of guardian.
5. Additional Penalty for Certain Accessories – Article 58

 Article 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories.
— Those accessories falling within the terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of
this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the
additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal
offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary
disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.
 Art.58 is limited only to grave and less grave felonies since it is not possible to
have accessories liable for light felonies. It is further limited to those whose
participation in the crime is characterized by the misuse of public office or
authority.
Example: a) A mayor aided in friend, a wanted criminal, in escaping

b) A senator gives protection to his jueteng lord friend
 Additional Penalties for Public Officers who are accessories
1. Absolute perpetual disqualification, if the principal offender is guilty of
a grave felony.
2. Absolute temporary disqualification if the principal offender is guilty of
less grave felony
6. Impossible Crime – Article 4, 59
 Article 4. Criminal Liability. – criminal Liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done
be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishement or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
 Article 59.Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime

because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. — When
the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts
for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced
by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
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impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such

person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the
court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown
by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
from 200 to 500 pesos.
 Basis for the imposition of proper penalty in impossible crimes: social danger
and degree of criminality shown by the offender.
Example: Juan fired a revolver at Pedro at the distance of 2 kilometers.

This shows stupidity rather than danger. Juan should not be punished as there
is neither social danger nor degree of criminality.
But if Juan was a convicted felon, act may be punished.
 Article limited to those cases of grave and less grave felonies.
7. Degrees – Article 61
 Article 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of
graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to
57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as
principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or
accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71
of this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two

indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their
full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated
scale.
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or

two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible
penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium
and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum
periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that
immediately following in said respective graduated scale.
4. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several

periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower
in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the
minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from
the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately
following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale.
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not
especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by
analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals
of the frustrated felony, orof attempt to commit the same, and upon
accomplices and accessories.
 The rules provided in this Art should also apply in determining the minimum of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL). It also applies in lowering the penalty
by one or two degrees by reason of the presence of the privileged mitigating
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circumstance or when the penalty is divisible and there are two or more
mitigating circumstances.
Graduated Scale in Art 71

 Indivisible Penalties:
a) Death
b) Reclusion Perpetua
 Divisible Penalties:
a) Reclusion Temporal
b) Prision Mayor
c) Prision Correccional
d) Arresto Mayor
e) Destierro
f) Arresto Menor
g) Public Censure
h) Fine
 Rule No. 1:
When the penalty is single and indivisible (ex. RP), the penalty next
lower shall be reclusion temporal.
 Rule No. 2:
a) when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties
Ex. penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death, the next lower
penalty is reclusion temporal
b) when the penalty is composed of one or more divisible penalties to

be imposed to their full extent
Ex.1) one divisible penalty is reclusion temporal. The penalty
immediately following RT is prision mayor.
2) 2 divisible penalties are prision correccional to prision mayor. The
penalty
immediately preceding the lesser of the penalties of prision correccional to
prision mayor is arresto mayor.
 Rule No. 3:
When the penalty is composed of 2 indivisible penalties and the
maximum period of a divisible penalty or when composed of one divisible
penalty the maximum of one divisible penalty
Ex. penalty for murder is reclusion temporal(max) to death. The point of
reference will be on the proper divisible penalty which is reclusion temporal.
Under the 3rd rule, the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal is composed
of the medium and minimum periods of reclusion temporal and the
maximum of prision mayor.
 Rule No.4:
When the penalty is composed of several periods
Ex. the ―several‖ periods contemplated in this rule correspond to
different divisible penalties. A penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period is an example of such.
The penalty immediately following the minimum of the entire sentence,
which is prision mayor medium, is prision mayor in its minimum and the 2
periods next following, which are prision correccional max and medium.
 Rule No.5:
When the penalty has only 2 periods
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Ex. Abduction punishable by prision correccional in its medium and

minimum. The next penalty following is formed by 2 periods to be taken
from the same penalty if possible or from the periods of the penalty
numerically following the lesser of the penalties prescribed. The penalty
next following prision correccional in its med and min shall be arresto
mayor in its med and max.
 Mitigating and Aggravating circumstances are first disregarded in the

application of the rules for graduating penalties. It is only after the penalty
next lower in degree is already determined that the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances should be considered.
8. Periods – Article 64
 Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three
periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three
periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application
of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances,

they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission

of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of

the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present,

the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other
according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no

aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating

circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that
prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the
extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent
of the evil produced by the crime.
9. Where Penalty is Not Composed of Three Periods

 Article 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three
periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed
of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing
articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty
prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.
COMPUTATIONS:
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A. Example: Prision Mayor (6 yrs, 1 day to 12 yrs)

1) subtract the minimum (disregard 1 day) from the maximum
12yrs – 6yrs = 6 yrs
2) divide the difference by 3
6 yrs / 3 = 2 yrs
3) use the minimum (6 yrs and 1 day) as the minimum of the
minimum
period. Then add the 2 yrs (disregarding the 1 day) to the minimum to get
the maximum of the minimum
6 yrs (minimum of the minimum)
+ 2 yrs (difference)
-------------------------------------------
8 yrs (maximum of the minimum).
Therefore, minimum period of prision mayor; 6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs
4) use the maximum of the minimum period as the minimum of the

medium period and add 1 day to distinguish from the minimum period.
Then add 2 years to the minimum of the medium (disregarding the 1 day)
to get the maximum of the medium period.
8 yrs (minimum of the medium)
-------------------------------------------
10 yrs (maximum of the medium)
Therefore, medium period of prision mayor; 8 yrs 1 day to 10 yrs
5) use the maximum of the medium period as the minimum of the

maximum pd, add 1 day to distinguish it from the medium period. Then
add 2 yrs to the minimum of the maximum pd (disregarding the 1 day) to
get the maximum of the maximum period)
10 yrs (maximum of the medium)

---------------------------------------------
12 yrs (maximum of the maximum)
Therefore, maximum period of prision mayor; 10 yrs 1 day to 12 yrs
 Computation above applicable to all others except arresto mayor
10. Effect of Mitigating, Aggravating and Qualifying Circumstances – Articles 62, 63,
65, 66 and 67.
 Article 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating

circumstances and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the
purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the
following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime

specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a
crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for
the purpose of increasing the penalty.
1.(a) When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by
the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
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The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed

by any person who belongs to an organized / syndicated crime group.
An organized / syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating
circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity
accompany the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the
moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended
party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or
mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to
whom such circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the
act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or
mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the
time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects.
(a) Upon a third conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to
the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced
to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to
the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two
penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no
case exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be
habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release
or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a
third time or oftener. (As amended by Section 23 of R.A. no. 7659)
 Par 1:Aggravating circumstances are not to be taken into account when:

a) they themselves constitute a crime
Ex. by ―means of fire‖ – arson
b) they are included by law in the definition of a crime
Example: the aggravating circumstances of trespass or

―escalamiento‖ is in itself a crime (Art. 280). The breaking of a roof, floor or
window may constitute malicious mischief. The burning of anything of
value may constitute arson. These aggravating circumstances, if
considered as felonies, do not increase the penalty.
Among the aggravating circumstances included in the definition of

a crime are taking advantage of public position in estafa under Art. 214,
abuse of confidence in qualified theft (Art. 310); the circumstances which
qualify homicide in murder (Art. 248); and the use of artifice involving
great waste and ruin in the crimes punished in Arts. 324 and 330.
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 Par 2: Same rules applies when the aggravating circumstance is inherent in

the crime
Example: Relationship is inherent in the crimes of parricide and

infanticide; abuse of confidence is inherent in malversation, qualified theft,
seduction and estafa; sex is inherent in crimes against chastity; taking
advantage of public position, in crimes committed by public officers;
premeditation is inherent in robbery, theft, estafa and similar offenses.
Nocturnity, abuse of superiority and craft are absorbed by treachery and are
therefore inherent in murder qualified by treachery. Premeditation, abuse of
superiority and treachery are inherent in treason.
 Par 3.Aggravating or mitigating circumstances arising from any of the ff

affect only those to whom such circumstances are attendant:
a) from the moral attributes of the offender
b) from his private relations w/ the offended party
c) from any other personal cause
Example: Four malefactors commit homicide. One of them is under

18. Another is drunk. The third is a recidivist, and the fourth is neither under
age, nor drunk, nor a recidivist. The first has in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of minority which does not affect his co-defendants. The
second has a different circumstances in his favor, drunkenness, which
does not extend to the other participants in the crime. The third has an
aggravating circumstance which affects him only. The fourth shall suffer
the penalty corresponding to him without taking into consideration the
aggravating circumstances affecting one or the extenuating
circumstances affecting the others.
Rule 3 is illustrated in the crime of parricide wherein a stranger had

participated. He is guilty of homicide or murder and not parricide. In the same
manner, the stranger who participated in the commission of qualified theft
involving abuse of confidence and who had no confidential relationship with the
victim is only guilty of simple theft. But the rule is different in malversation. A
private individual coordinating with the accountable public officer in committing
malversation is a co-principal in the crime.
In homicide, relationship aggravates the liability of the relative, who is a

co-principal, but not of the other principals who are not related to the victim.
Lack of instruction is mitigating as to the principal, who is actually illiterate, but
not with respect to the other principals who have educational attainment.
However, in adultery, the privileged mitigating circumstance of

abandonment would benefit both offenders, even if it was only the offending
wife who was abandoned.( Pp vs. Avelino )
 Par 4:the circumstances w/c consist of the ff shall serve to aggravate and
mitigate the liability only of those who had knowledge of them at the time of
the commission of the offense
a) material execution of the act
b) means employed to accomplish the crime
Groizard says that the circumstances attending the commission of a crime

either relate to the persons participating in the same or to its material execution,
or to the means employed. The former do not affect all the participants in the
crime, but only to those whom, they particularly apply; the latter have direct
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bearing upon the criminal liability of all defendants who had knowledge thereof
at the time of the commission of the crime, or of their cooperation therein.
Example: A and B killed C. In the execution of the act of killing, A

disguised himself in peace officer which was not made known to B. The
aggravating circumstance of disguising as a peace officer shall be appreciated
only against A, who employed the same in the killing of C. It is only logical that A
should be made to suffer a more serious penalty, as the idea is to affect only
those who have knowledge of it at the time of the execution of the act.
In the crime of murder, A hired B to kill C, to prevent the latter from being
a candidate for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. In the actual killing of C,
deliberately augmented the suffering of C chopping him into pieces and
scattering his remains in several places. The aggravating circumstances of
cruelty and outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse of C should be
appreciated only against B.
Example: A, B and C agreed to kill X so armed with guns, they proceeded

to the house of the latter whereupon A told B and C that he would stay in the
yard to prevent any relative of X from helping the victim. When B and C entered
the room of X, and saw him sleeping, it was C who shot him. The treachery that
attended the commission of the crime shall also affect B and not only C who
treacherously killed X in his sleep because B had knowledge of the treacherous
act being present actually during the shooting. A‘s liability is not aggravated by
treachery as he had no knowledge of it, being in the yard.
 Cases where the attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances are

not considered in the imposition of penalties.
 Penalty that is single and indivisible
 Felonies through negligence
 Penalty is a fine
 Penalty is prescribed by a special law
 Par 5:Habitual Delinquent is a person who within the period of 10 years from
the date of his (last) release or last conviction of the crimes of:
a) serious or less serious physical injuries
b) robbery
c) theft
d) estafa
e) Falsification is found guilty of any of the said crimes a third time or
oftener.
 Ten year period to be computed from the time of last release or

conviction
 Subsequent crime must be committed after conviction of the former
crime. Cases still pending are not to be taken into consideration.
HABITUAL DELINQUENCY RECIDIVISM

Crimes to be committed are Same title
specified
W/ in 10 years No time fixed by law
Must be found guilty 3rd time or Second conviction
oftener
Additional penalty is imposed Is not offset by MC, increases penalty
to maximum
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Habitual delinquency is not a crime. It is a circumstance that will authorize

the court to add an additional penalty for the present crime committed. It is only
a factor in determining the total penalty to be imposed upon the offender.
Habitual delinquency imposes an additional penalty, however, if the

same is imposed after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the crime, and the
total penalty would exceed the jurisdictional limit of the court, such situation will
not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the crime. (Pp vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 296)
In order that habitual delinquency may be appreciated against the

accused, it must be alleged and detailed in the information or complaint. The
dates of the commission of the previous crimes; the last conviction of release
must be contained or written in the information.
Under Article 22, when one is a habitual delinquent and he commits

felony or offense, any future punitive law that may favor him in relation to the
punishment imposed on him, will not be given a retroactive effect insofar as said
offender is concerned.
He is not also entitled to the application of the Indeterminate

Sentence Law.
Example:
CRIMES COMMITTED DATE OF DATE OF RELEASE

CONVICTION
Serious Physical Injury January, 1960 January, 1973
Theft February, 1968 February, 1975
Robbery March, 1980
In the example mentioned above, as regards the conviction for theft in

February, 1968 the starting point for the computation of the ten-year period is the
date of conviction for serious physical injuries in January, 1960 because that is
the last conviction with respect to the second conviction for theft in February,
1968. The date of release is not considered anymore because the conviction for
theft took place within ten years from the last conviction for serious physical
injuries. We ignore the date of release because it came after the conviction.
With respect to the third conviction for robbery in March 1980, the ten-
year period is to be computed not from the date of last conviction for theft in
February, 1968 because that would be beyond the period provided by law, but
from the date of release of the accused in February, 1975, as the law provides
for the computation of the ten-year period in the alternative, either from the last
conviction or release. Apparently, in the example given, the last or third
conviction is more than ten years from 1968, but within ten years from release.
The period of ten years is therefore satisfied. The offender in the example given is
a habitual delinquent.
 Rulings on Habitual Delinquency:
a) the law on habitual delinquency does not contemplate the exclusion from
the computation of prior conviction those falling outside the 10 yr period
immediately preceding the crime for w/c the defendant is being tried
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b) ten year period is counted not from the date of commission of the
subsequent offense but to the date of conviction thereof in relation to the
date of his last release or last conviction
c) when an offender has committed several crimes mentioned in the definition

of habitual delinquent, without being first convicted of any of them before
committing the others, he is not a habitual delinquent
d) convictions on the same day or at about the same time are considered as
one only (days, weeks..)
e) crimes committed on the same date, although convictions on different dates

are considered as one
f) previous convictions are considered every time a new offense is committed
g) commissions of those crimes need not be consummated
h) habitual delinquency applies to accomplice and accessories as long it is in

the crimes specified
i) a crime committed in the minority of the offender is not counted
j) imposition of additional penalty is mandatory and constitutional
k) modifying circumstances applicable to additional penalty
l) habitual delinquency is not a crime, it is simply a fact or circumstance which if

present gives rise to the imposition of additional penalty
m) penalty for habitual delinquency is a real penalty that determines jurisdiction
n) in imposing the additional penalty, recidivism is not aggravating. The

additional penalty must be imposed in its minimum
o) an offender can be a habitual delinquent w/o being a recidivist
Notes:
o In no case shall be the total penalties imposed upon the offender exceed
30 years
o The law does not apply to crimes described in Art. 155(alarms and
scandals)
o The imposition of the additional penalties on habitual delinquents are
constitutional, it is simply a punishment on future crimes on account of the
criminal propensities of the accused.
o Habitual delinquency applies at any stage of the execution because
subjectively, the offender reveals the same degree of depravity or
perversity as the one who commits a consummated crime.
o Habitual delinquency applies to all participants because it reveals
persistence in them of the inclination to wrongdoing and of the perversity
of character that led them to commit the previous crime.
Note: There is no habitual delinquency in offenses punished by special

laws. Courts cannot also take judicial notice of the previous convictions of the
accused. Facts of previous convictions must be established during the trial of the
accused.
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 Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all

cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended
the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset
one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the
purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules,
according to the result of such compensation.
 Article 66. Imposition of fines. — In imposing fines the courts may fix any
amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case
attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.
 Court must consider the following in imposing the fine:

a) mitigating and aggravating circumstances
b) the wealth and means of the culprit
 When the minimum of the fine is not fixed, the court shall have the discretion
provided it does not exceed the amount authorized by law
It is not only the mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances that the
court shall take into consideration, but primarily, the financial capability of
the offender to pay the fine.
If the fine imposed by the law appears to be excessive, the remedy is
to ask the Congress to amend the law by reducing the fine to a reasonable
amount.
11. Incomplete Justifying or Exempting Circumstances – articles 67, 69.
 Article 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of

exemption of the fourth circumstance of Article 12 are present.— When all
the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code
to exempt from criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
 Requisites of Art 12 par 4(Accident)

a) act causing the injury must be lawful
b) act performed w/ due care
c) injury was caused by mere accident
d) no fault or intention to cause injury
 If these conditions are not all present, then the ff penalties shall be imposed:
a) grave felony – arresto mayor max to prision correccional min
b) less grave felony – arresto mayor min to arresto mayor med
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 Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not

wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to
exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and
12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of
the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
12. Minority – Article 68

 Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years
of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is
one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article
80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not
exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he
acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the
crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always
in the proper period.
Notes:
 Art. 68 applies to such minor if his application for suspension of sentence is
disapproved or if while in the reformatory institution he becomes incorrigible
in which case he shall be returned to the court for the imposition of the
proper penalty.
 Art. 68 provides for 2 privileged mitigating circumstances

 under 15 but over 9 and has acted w/ discerment: 2 degrees lower
 under 18 but over 15: 1 degree lower
If the act is attended by two or more mitigating circumstance and no

aggravating circumstance, the penalty being divisible a minor over 15 but
under 18 may still get a penalty two degrees lower.
a. PD 603
THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE

Title 1. General Principles
xxxxx
Article 3.Rights of the Child. - All children shall be entitled to the rights herein
set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status,
religion, political antecedents, and other factors.
(1) Every child is endowed with the dignity and worth of a human being
from the moment of his conception, as generally accepted in medical
parlance, and has, therefore, the right to be born well.
(2) Every child has the right to a wholesome family life that will provide him
with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and moral
and material security.
The dependent or abandoned child shall be provided with the nearest

substitute for a home.
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(3) Every child has the right to a well-rounded development of his

personality to the end that he may become a happy, useful and active
member of society.
The gifted child shall be given opportunity and encouragement to

develop his special talents.
The emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted child shall be treated

with sympathy and understanding, and shall be entitled to treatment and
competent care.
The physically or mentally handicapped child shall be given the

treatment, education and care required by his particular condition.
(4) Every child has the right to a balanced diet, adequate clothing,
sufficient shelter, proper medical attention, and all the basic physical
requirements of a healthy and vigorous life.
(5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality

and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character.
(6) Every child has the right to an education commensurate with his
abilities and to the development of his skills for the improvement of his
capacity for service to himself and to his fellowmen.
(7) Every child has the right to full opportunities for safe and wholesome
recreation and activities, individual as well as social, for the wholesome use of
his leisure hours.
(8) Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper
influences, hazards, and other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his
physical, mental, emotional, social and moral development.
(9) Every child has the right to live in a community and a society that can
offer him an environment free from pernicious influences and conducive to
the promotion of his health and the cultivation of his desirable traits and
attributes.
(10) Every child has the right to the care, assistance, and protection of the
State, particularly when his parents or guardians fail or are unable to provide
him with his fundamental needs for growth, development, and improvement.
(11) Every child has the right to an efficient and honest government that
will deepen his faith in democracy and inspire him with the morality of the
constituted authorities both in their public and private lives.
(12) Every child has the right to grow up as a free individual, in an

atmosphere of peace, understanding, tolerance, and universal brotherhood,
and with the determination to contribute his share in the building of a better
world.
xxx
Article 189.Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is one

who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense.
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A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed to the care of his or her
father or mother, or nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of the court
and subject to its supervision. The same shall be done for a child over nine years
and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense,
unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Article 192.
The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed

modified by the provisions of this Chapter.
xxx
Article 192.Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful

Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court
should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against
him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability
chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of
conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such
minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any
training institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any
other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or,
for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports
and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or
responsible individual under whose care he has been committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a

representative of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency
or such other officer as the Court may designate subject to such conditions as it
may prescribe.
b. RA 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE

SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
xxx
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead
of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

chcumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law.
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c. Declarador vs. Hon. Gubaton, G.R. No. 1598208, August 18, 2006
Facts
Bansales was convicted of murder for killing his teacher (Declarador).
Bansales was 17 at the commission of the crime. The trial court suspended the
imposition of Bansales penalty and directed the accused to the
RegionalRehabilitaionCenter. Aggrieved by the decision; Declarador‘s party
filed an appeal.
Ruling
The SC judgment was in favor of Declarador. Based on the nature of the
crime charged and the impossible penalty not the penalty imposed by the trial
court. A person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the benefits of a
suspended sentence.
13. Service of Sentence

a. The Three-Fold Rule – RPC, Article 70.
If the convict were to suffer several penalties, the maximum duration of his
sentence shall not be more than three times the length of time corresponding to
the most severe penalty.
Example: A was sentenced to suffer four penalties; 6 years, 5 years, 5 years
and 7 years. The total of the penalties is 23 years. Applying the three fold rule,
multiply 7 by 3 and we have 21. A shall serve a total of 21 years only.
Under this rule, when a convict is to serve successive penalties, he will not
actually serve the penalties imposed by law. Instead, the most severe of the
penalties imposed on him shall be multiplied by three and the period will be the
only term of the penalty to be served by him. However, in no case should the
penalty exceed 40 years.
If the sentences would be served simultaneously, the Three-Fold rule does
not govern.
Although this rule is known as the Three-Fold rule, you cannot actually
apply this if the convict is to serve only three successive penalties. The Three-Fold
Rule can only be applied if the convict is to serve four or more sentences
successively.
The chronology of the penalties as provided in Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be followed.
It is in the service of the penalty, not in the imposition of the penalty, that
the Three-Fold rule is to be applied. The three-Fold rule will apply whether the
sentences are the product of one information in one court, whether the
sentences are promulgated in one day or whether the sentences are
promulgated by different courts on different days. What is material is that the
convict shall serve more than three successive sentences.
For purposes of the Three-Fold Rule, even perpetual penalties are taken
into account. So not only penalties with fixed duration, even penalties without
any fixed duration or indivisible penalties are taken into account. For purposes of
the Three-Fold rule, indivisible penalties are given equivalent of 30 years. If the
penalty is perpetual disqualification, it will be given and equivalent duration of
30 years, so that if he will have to suffer several perpetual disqualification, under
the Three-Fold rule, you take the most severe and multiply it by three. The Three-
Fold rule does not apply to the penalty prescribed but to the penalty imposed as
determined by the court.
Illustration:
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Penalties imposed are –

One prision correcional – minimum – 2 years and 4 months
One arresto mayor - 1 month and 1 day to 6 months
One prision mayor - 6 years and 1 day to 12 years
Do not commit the mistake of applying the Three- Fold Rule in this case.
Never apply the Three-Fold rule when there are only three sentences. Even if you
add the penalties, you can never arrive at a sum higher than the product of the
most severe multiplied by three.
The common mistake is, if given a situation, whether the Three-Fold Rule
could be applied. If asked, if you were the judge, what penalty would you
impose, for purposes of imposing the penalty, the court is not at liberty to apply
the Three-Fold Rule, whatever the sum total of penalty for each crime
committed, even if it would amount to 1,000 years or more. It is only when the
convict is serving sentence that the prison authorities should determine how long
he should stay in jail.
This rule will apply only if sentences are to be served successively.
 Article 70. Successive service of sentence. — When the culprit has to

serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature
of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity
shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as
may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or
penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding
paragraph the respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in
accordance with the following scale:
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10. Temporal absolute disqualification.
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for,
the right to follow a profession or calling, and
12. Public censure.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum
duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of
time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No
other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of
those imposed equals the same maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (
penal perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended by CA#217).
b. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 339

Facts: Arturo Mejorada was a public officer, a right of way agent of the office
of the District Engineer of Pasig. He was charged of graft and corruption
when he falsified the claims of 8 individuals whom he negotiated the
payment of their expropriated property. The Sandiganbayan imposed a
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penalty of imprisonment which totals to 56 years and 8 days of imprisonment.

Mejorada filed an appeal and contended that the penalty imposed is
contrary to the three fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate
penalties should not exceed forty (40) years.
Ruling: Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth
in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account
not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the
sentence imposed. Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of
penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything
mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the
prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of
these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing
eight penalties for the eight informations filed against the accused-petitioner.
Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as
many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since
for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed
by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter,
thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal
sanctions.
c. Rigor vs. Superintendent, 411 SCRA 646

Facts: Jose Victor Rigor was convicted by the trial court of illegal sale and
possession of methampethamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu. In
criminal case MC-99-1235-D, he was made to suffer SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE
(1) DAY OF arresto mayor maximum to FOUR (4) YEARS AND FOUR (4)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY; and in criminal case MC-99-1236-D, he was made
to suffer SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF arresto mayor maximum to
FOUR (4) YEARS AND FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY. After serving 1 year
and 5 months of imprisonment, he filed a petition for habeas corpus to
reduce his penalty for six (6) months and one (1) each for the two criminal
cases from which h was convicted. So that he should be released if his
petition be granted because he already served more than the total of the
penalty he prayed for.
Ruling: As to the ruling of Supreme Court in connection to Article 70, Under

Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, when an offender has to serve two or
more penalties, he should serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit. Otherwise said penalties shall be executed
successively, following the order of their respective severity, in such case, the
second sentence will not commence to run until the expiration of the first.
The nature of petitioner‘s sentences does not allow its simultaneous
service; hence he must serve it successively. Not only that he must serve it
successively, he must also serve it up to its maximum term.
Petitioner must therefore first serve the penalty in Crim. Case No. MC-
99-1235-D up to its maximum term, before service of the penalty in Crim. Case
No. MC-99-1236-D also up to its maximum term, or a total maximum period of
eight years and four months.
10. Graduated Scale – Articles 71 – 76
 Article 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law

prescribed a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another
given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in
graduating such penalty.
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The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in
which is comprised the given penalty.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,
4. Prision mayor,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Destierro,
8. Arresto menor,
9. Public censure,
10. Fine.
SCALE NO. 2
2. Temporal absolute disqualification
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be
voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling,
4. Public censure,
5. Fine.
 Article 72.Preference in the payment of the civil liabilities. — The civil liabilities
of a person found guilty of two or more offenses shall be satisfied by following
the chronological order of the dates of the judgments rendered against him,
beginning with the first in order of time.
 the penalties shall be satisfied according to the scale of Art 70
 Article 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory

penalties. — Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision
of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of Articles
40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory
penalties are also imposed upon the convict.
 Subsidiary penalties are deemed imposed. However, the subsidiary

imprisonment must be expressly stated in the decision.
The rule that the principal penalty imposed carries with it the
accessory penalties does not mean that the accused would serve subsidiary
imprisonment in case he is not able to pay the pecuniary liabilities imposed in
the judgment. Subsidiary imprisonment must be expressly ordered.
 Article 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. — In

cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given
penalty, without specially designating the name of the former, if such higher
penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory
penalties of Article 40, shall be considered as the next higher penalty.
 If the decision or law says higher than RP or 2 degrees than RT, then the
penalty imposed is RP or RT as the case may be. Death must be designated
by name.However, for the other penalties, this does not apply.
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Example: the penalty for crime X is 2 degrees lower than RP. The
penalty imposed is prision mayor.
 Article75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees.

— Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine
by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for
each degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law,
without however, changing the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard of fines that do not
consist of a fixed amount, but are made proportional.
 To get the lower degree:
 Max: reduce by one-fourth
 Min: the same
 With respect to the penalty of fine, if the fine has to be lowered by degree
either because the felony committed is only attempted or frustrated or
because there is an accomplice or an accessory participation, the fine is
lowered by deducting 1/4 of the maximum amount of the fine from such
maximum without changing the minimum amount prescribed by law.
Illustration:
If the penalty prescribed is a fine ranging from P200.00 to P500.00, but

the felony is frustrated so that the penalty should be imposed one degree
lower, 1/4 of P500.00 shall be deducted therefrom. This is done by deducting
P125.00 from P500.00, leaving a difference of P375.00. The penalty one
degree lower is P375.00. To go another degree lower, P125.00 shall again be
deducted from P375.00 and that would leave a difference of P250.00.
Hence, the penalty another degree lower is a fine ranging from P200.00 to
P250.00. If at all, the fine has to be lowered further, it cannot go lower than
P200.00. So, the fine will be imposed at P200.00. This rule applies when the
fine has to be lowered by degree.
 Article76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. — The legal period of

duration of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into three parts,
forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the
manner shown in the following table:
 Article77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct

penalties. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of
three distinct penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them
shall be the minimum the next the medium, and the most severe the
maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms
specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying
by analogy the prescribed rules.
 If there are 3 distinct penalties; there shall be a minimum, a medium and a

maximum
Example: Reclusion temporal max to death
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V. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW ( R.A. No. 4103 )
APPLICATION OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW EXPLAINED

In the case of People vs. Gabres, the Court has had occasion to so state that —
―Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be
‗that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed‘ under
the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed‘ for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on
the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination
of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the
periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered
only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
―The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not
be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the
matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of
the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law
accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused.
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant
is prision correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would
then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months . . .‖ (People v. Saley; GR 121179, July 2, ‘98)
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; APPLICABLE ALSO IN DRUG CASES:

The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the
case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has
appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law
and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment. The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence
shall be ascertained. It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that ―if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same‖ We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an
offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is
without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations,
such that it may be said that the ―offense is punished‖ under that law. There can be no
sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses
under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties
under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in
Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum ―within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense,‖ as is the rule for
felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore
provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but
an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio. Republic Act
No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their
technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of
said sentence, we have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law
to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in the
effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. (People v Martin Simon)
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WHEN THE BENEFITS OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW IS NOT APPLICABLE;

a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114), conspiracy or proposal to commit treason
(Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition
(Art. 139), or espionage (Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same (Art.
159). (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year.
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
j. those offenses or crimes not punishable by imprisonment such as Destierro and
suspension.
RECIDIVISTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, Feb.

22, 1974). Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime
is committed while he is on parole. (People v. Clareon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982).
(Bacar v. De Guzman)
NATURE OF PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA

In ―People -vs- Conrado Lucas, 240 SCRA 66, the Supreme Court declared that despite
the amendment of Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetua remained
an indivisible penalty. Hence, the penalty does not have any minimum, medium and
maximum period. Hence, there is no such penalty of medium period of reclusion
perpetua. (People versus Tiburcio Baculi, 246 SCRA)
IMPOSITION OF WRONG PENALTY: IT DOES NOT OBTAIN FINALITY

Suppose the court imposed a penalty of 25 years of reclusion perpetua for the crime of
rape and the accused did not appeal, does the judgment become final and
executory? No, such judgment is null and void because it imposed a non-existent
penalty. Hence, the court may nevertheless correct the penalty imposed on the
accused, that is, reclusion perpetua, it is merely performing a duty inherent in the
court. (People versus Nigel Gatward, GR No. 119772-73, February 7, 1997)
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (ISLAW)

ISLAW must be taken together with Art. 48, 50-57, 61,62, 64 ,65 ,68 ,69 and 71.
-Is a sentence with a minimum term and a maximum term which, the court is
mandated to impose for the benefit of a guilty person who is not disqualified therefore,
when the maximum imprisonment exceeds 1 year.
-the minimum sentence must be served and thereupon, the convict becomes
eligible for parole. When released, he does not become actually discharged because
the rest of his sentence is served out of prison under the supervision of a probation
officer.
PURPOSE
1. To prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty.
2. To enhance the economic usefulness of the accused since he may be
exempted from serving the entire sentence depending upon his behavior
and his physical, mental and moral record.
3. When the convict has served the maximum penalty he can be released on
parole by the bureau of pardons and parole.
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4. When the paroled convict violated any of the condition of the parole, he
can be rearrested to serve the maximum sentence.
When does ISLAW apply?

-applies both violations of the RPC and special laws where imprisonment would
exceed 1 year, application is MANDATORY and only to divisible penalties.
Why is the maximum period and minimum period specified?

1. Max period is important for imposition of maximum penalty
2. Min period is important for the determination of parole
ISLAW is not applicable when:

1. Offense is punishable with death, RP, or life imprisonment. (RP included by SC.
RP is deemed included in the term life imprisonment) Exception: if there are
privileged mitigating circumstances.
2. Convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason.
3. Convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage
4. Convicted of piracy
5. Habitual delinquents
 Recidivist are entitled to ISLAW
 Offender not disqualified even if the crime is committed while on
parole.
6. Person who have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence
7. Those who violated the terms of the conditional pardon.
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year
 Penalties not more than 1 year should be straight penalties
9. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension only
10. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the
ISLAW
Steps in applying ISLAW

1. Determine the crime committed, whether in the attempted, frustrated, or
consummated stage and the penalty imposable
2. What affects the penalty imposable? Determine the existence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Consider 1 st the existence of
privilege mitigating.
3. Lower by one degree from the penalty imposable or from the proper degree
to get the minimum. Judges has the discretion to fix the minimum in any
period of the minimum penalty.
4. From the minimum, go up 1 degree to get the maximum and apply art 64 to
get the maximum period.
Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. - In cases
in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single
divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a
period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe
for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or
are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall
impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act,

they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the

act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
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4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court
shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their
relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances,

the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its
maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime.
Article 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. - In
cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the
courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal
portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of
the three portions.
Article 66. Imposition of fines. - In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within
the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given,
not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the
wealth or means of the culprit.
Article 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth
circumstance of article 12 are present.- When all the conditions required in
circumstance number 4 of article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal liability are
not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of a
grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave
felony.
Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. - When
the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules
shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted
from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two
degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.
Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. -
A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if
the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be
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present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed
proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking.
Article 70. Successive service of sentences. - When the culprit has to serve two or more
penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit;
otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed
so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a
pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they
have been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the
respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the
following scale:
1. Death,
4. Prision mayor,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
10 Temporary absolute disqualification.
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to
follow a profession or calling, and
12. Public censure.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the
convict's sentence shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to
the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may
be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same
maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (penal
perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years.(As amended by Com. Act No. 217.)
Article 71. Graduated scales. - In the cases in which the law prescribes a penalty lower
or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in
article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
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The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is
comprised the given penalty.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following
graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,
4. Prision mayor,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Destierro,
8. Arresto menor,
9. Public censure,
10. Fine.
SCALE NO. 2
2. Temporary absolute disqualification
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to
follow a profession or calling,
4. Public censure,
5. Fine.
Article 72. Preference in the payment of the civil liabilities. - The civil liabilities of a person
found guilty of two or more offenses shall be satisfied by following the chronological
order of the dates of the final judgments rendered against him, beginning with the first
in order of time.
SECTION 3
Provision common to the last two preceding sections
Article 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory penalties. - Whenever

the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other
penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it
must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict.
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Article 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. - In cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without specifically
designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that of death, the
same penalty and the accessory penalties of article 40, shall be considered as the next
higher penalty.
Article 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees. -
Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or
more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one-
fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without, however, changing the
minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard to fines that do not consist of a fixed
amount, but are made proportional.
Article 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. - The legal period of duration
of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into three parts, forming three
periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner shown in the
following table:
TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH
OF THEIR PERIODS
Penalties Time included Time included Time included Time included

in the penalty in its minimum in its medium in its
in its entirety period period maximum
Reclusion temporal From 12 years From 12 years From 14 From 17
and 1 day to and 1 day to years, 8 years, 4
20 years. 14 years and months and 1 months and 1
8 months. day to 17 day to 20
years and 4 years.
months.
Prision mayor,absolute From 6 years From 6 years From 8 years From 10 years
disqualification and and 1 day to and 1 day to and 1 day to and 1 day to
special temporary 12 years. 8 years. 10 years. 12 years.
disqualification
Prision From 6 From 6 From 2 years, From 4 years,
correccional,suspension months and 1 months and 1 4 months and 2 months and
anddestierro day to 6 day to 2 years 1 day to 4 1 day to 6
years. and 4 years and 2 years.
months. months.
Arresto mayor From 1 month From 1 to 2 From 2 From 4
and 1 day to months. months and 1 months and 1
months. day to 4 day to 6
months. months.
Arresto menor From 1 to 30 From 1 to 10 From 11 to 20 From 21 to 30
days. days. days. days.
Article 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties. - In
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct penalties, each
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one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum, the next the
medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided for
in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying for analogy the prescribed rules.
RELATED CASES
US VS. FORMIGONES/ PEOPLE VS. FORMIGONES

FACTS: Abelardo Formigones, without any provocation stabbed his wife Agricola at the
back which caused her death. Formigones suspected that Agricola is having an illicit
affair his half-brother Zacarias.
CONTENTION OF STATE: The CFI of Camarines Sur found Formigones guilty of parricide
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Art 246 of the RPC.
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED: There are two mitigating circumstances present in the

commission of the crime. First Formigones is feeble minded that can be considered as
illness or suffering from physical defect. Second Formigones killed his wife because of
jealousy therefore he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. With these two mitigating circumstances and the
absence of any aggravating circumstance he should be given that application of Art.
64 (5) therefore the penalty to be imposed is next lower to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 64 (5) of the RPC is applicable in the case at bar.
RULING: Article 64 (5) is not applicable in the present case because this article is
applicable only to penalties which contain three periods. The penalty prescribed by
law for parricide is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Art. 246 of the RPC reclusion
perpetua is composed of only two indivisible penalties.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. ALFONSO OÑATE alias Bukay
Facts: The judgment of conviction of appellant for murder and imposing upon him the
penalty of "cadena perpetua" (should be reclusion perpetua) of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Criminal Case No. 9040, is appealed considering a lot
of factors.
Ruling: There can be no doubt, therefore, as to the guilt of appellant of the crime of
murder charged, qualified by "alevosia." However, he must be credited with mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, for which reason, the Solicitor General
recommends that in lieu of the life imprisonment imposed by the trial court, the
appellant be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to eighteen years, two
months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In this connection, in People
vs. Pantoja, 25 SCRA 468, it was held that "(t)he penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.) There being
one mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, the penalty-should be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law", and the
sentence actually imposed by the Court was the indeterminate penalty of from 16
years to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
We believe, however, that considering the (1) age of the appellant, as well as other
relevant factors in this case, such as (2) health, (3) mentality, heredity, and personal
habits, (4)conduct, environment, mode of life and criminal record, (5) education, both
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intellectual and moral, (6) proclivities and aptitudes with regard to the crime
committed, it would be more in keeping with the spirit and intent of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, which is "to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness."
PEOPLE VS. LOPE VIENTE

FACTS: On October 17, 1991 Lope Viente was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of car napping or violation of Republic Act 6359 for taking, stealing and
carrying the Isuzu passenger jitney driver by Narciso Cabatas owned by Lucila Crespino.
The trial court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) years and to indemnify
the offended party the sum of P 150,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the cost.
CONTENTION OF STATE: That the trial court erred in imposing upon Viente a straight
penalty of imprisonment for 30 years.
ISSUE: Whether trial court erred in imposing Viente a straight penalty of imprisonment for
30 years.
RULING: We agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in imposing upon
Viente a straight penalty of imprisonment for 30 years. The car napping in this case was
committed by means of violence against person. The penalty prescribed therefore
under sec. 14 of RA No. 6539 is imprisonment for not less than 17 years and 4 months
and more than 30 years under sec.1 of the Indeterminate Sentences Law, if an offence
is punished by special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term prescribed by the same. The proper penalty to be
imposed should not therefore, be 30 years but an indeterminate penalty which is
hereby at sentenced (17) years and (4) months as minimum (30) years as maximum.
Art. 63 of the RPC is the one applicable for this case because it refers to the application
of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two in-divisible
penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. Wherein it there are some mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance the lesser penalty shall be imposed.
Spouses JOSE and TRINIDAD BACAR complainants VS. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN
Jr. respondent
FACTS: On 11 April 1994, petitioner-spouses Jose and Trinidad Bacar prayed for dismissal
the service of respondent Judge Salvador P. De Guzman Jr. presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati Branch 142 on the ground of 1) gross ignorance of the
law and 2) rendering an unjust judgment in criminal cases nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 for
homicide and attempted homicide respectively.
The court finds the accused Gerardo Marcial guilty of the crime of Homicide in
criminal for the death of one Maximo Bacar (the accused is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor of fourteen
(14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal son of herein
petitioner-spouses and of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries for one Edgar Mabuyo (
to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor.) The accused is further
ordered to indemnity the heirs of the victim Maximo Bacar in the amount of P 50,000.00
as moral damages and to pay the amount of P 33, 572.00 as actual damages and cost
of suit.
Accused Gerardo Marcial filed motion for reconsideration of the joint judgment
which the lower court granted, as such they were given modification in consideration
to mitigating circumstances which reduced the penalty in Criminal case no. 89-1360 to
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six (6) years of prison mayor, while retaining the penalty in criminal case no. 89-2878 i.e
imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor.
ISSUE: Whether the imposition of a straight penalty of six years imprisonment on the
accused in his modified judgment in the case for homicide is contrary to Law.
RULING: The RTC Judge De Guzman is guilty of ignorance of the Law for imposing a
judgment of a straight penalty of six years imprisonment in his modified judgment.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence is prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to
enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental and
moral record. The requirement of imposing and indeterminate sentence in all criminal
offences whether punishable by the RPC or by special Laws with definite minimum and
maximum term, as the court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty
specified by the Law must, therefore be redeemed mandatory.
ERLINDA DE LA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari seeks a review and reversal of the February
28, 1992 Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed petitioner's
conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The
indeterminate penalty imposed by the RTC on appellant is clarified by CA so as to read:
From four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correcional as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED: Computation of penalty imposed based on Indeterminate

Sentence Law is incorrect.
Ruling: The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period (or imprisonment ranging from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 8 years), if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period (6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years), adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be."
Inasmuch as the amount of P715,000.00 is P693,000.00 more than the
abovementioned benchmark of P22,000.00, then, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision
mayor minimum would be increased by 69 years, as computed by the trial court. But
the law categorically declares that the maximum penalty should be not more than 20
years. The maximum penalty then shall not exceed 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense committed, which is prision correccional.
Finding no error in the penalty proposed by the Solicitor General and imposed by the
respondent Court, we thus sustain it.
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FELIX LADINO vs. HON. ALFONSO S. GARCIA
Facts: Petitioner and one Restituto Amistad were charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. TG-2450-95 filed in Branch 18 of the
Regional Trial Court in Tagaytay City, presided by respondent judge.
The trial court rendered an ―Order‖ on February 19, 1996, reciting the aforestated
antecedents, declaring both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, and sentencing each of them to a prison term of 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal,[1] and to severally pay the
civil liability.
Ruling: The sentence imposed by the trial court is erroneous. Felix Ladino and accused
Restituto Amistad are hereby SENTENCED to each serve an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. FELICISIMO NARVASA
FACTS: Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania seek the reversal of the
October 11, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, in
Criminal Case Nos. 2629-A, 2648-A and 2646-A, finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form and sentencing them to
reclusion perpetua.
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED: Crime is punishable only by reclusion temporal, thus

Indeterminate Sentence Law shall apply.
CONTENTION OF STATE: Crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua, thus Indeterminate

Sentence Law shall not apply.
RULING: Under RA 8294, appellants can be held liable only for homicide and penalized
with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, RA 8294
should be given retroactive effect.
For the death of Primo Camba, Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania are
found GUILTY of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance of using
unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are each
sentenced to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and ordered to pay the heirs of Primo Camba
P50,000 as death indemnity.
PEOPLE VS. CAMPUHAN 329 SCRA 270

FACTS:On April 25, 1996, Primo Campuhan was caught by Maria Pamintuan kneeling
before her daughter Chrysthel Pamintuan 4 years of age, whose pajamas and panty
were already removed down to his knees. Corazon alleged that Primo was holding and
forcing his penis into Chrysthel‘s vagina. On 27 of May 1977 Primo Campuhan was
found Guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the RTC of Malabon to the extreme
penalty of death, hence the case was elevated to Supreme Court on automatic
review.
CONTENTION OF STATE: The rape was consummated as proven by the testimony of

Corazon. the offence of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve
(R) as provided in Art. 335 par (3) of the RPC Chrysthel was only four years old when
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sexually molested, thus raising the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death, to the
single indivisible penalty of
death (RA 7659 Sec II)
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED: Primo assails that rape consummated as proven by the

obscene of any signs of physical injuries of penetration of Chrysthel‘s private parts.
There was impossibility that Corazon witness whether there is a penetration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged touching is not sufficient to warrant his Conviction on
consummated rape rather on its attempted stage to Lessen his penalty.
RULING: The rape is on attempted stage the alleged touching is merely a stroked on the
external surface of the female organ and there must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penis indeed touched the labia‘s or slid into the female organ for rape to
be consummated. The penalty for attempted is two (2) degrees lower than the
impossible penalty of death for the offence charged which is statutory rape of a minor
below (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, applying the
indeterminate sentence. Law and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be
taken from the maximum period of the reclusion temporal while the minimum shall be
taken from the medium period of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prison
mayor. Campuhan is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four
(4) months and (10) ten days of prison mayor medium As minimum to fourteen (14)
years (10) months and (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
VI. EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES
A. Execution of Penalties:
1.) General Rules:

 Art. 70 (Successive service of sentences). - Classifies the penalties
for the purpose of successive service of sentences according to
their severity.
Under Art.70 destierro is placed under
arresto menor. Destierro is considered lighter than arresto menor.
Under Art.25, destierro is placed above arresto menor because it is
classified as correctional penalty.
Rules on the Service of Sentence:
When there are two (2) or more penalties, the convict shall serve
them simultaneously if there nature so permits as in the following:
a. Perpetual absolute disqualification

b. Perpetual special disqualification
c. Temporary absolute disqualification
d. Temporary special disqualification
e. Suspension
f. Destierro
g. Public Censure
h. Fine and Bond to keep the peace
i. Civil Interdiction
j. Confiscation and Payment of costs
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Penalties in the form of imprisonment cannot be served

simultaneously but only successively.
If the first rule cannot be observed, the penalties shall be served

successively in the order of their severity as follows:
a. Death
b. Reclusion Perpetua
c. Reclusion Temporal
d. Prision Mayor
e. Prision Correccional
f. Arresto Mayor
g. Arresto Menor
h. Destierro
i. Perpetual absolute disqualification
j. Temporary absolute disqualification
k. Suspension from public office, the right to be voted for the
right to follow profession or calling
l. Public Censure.
 Art. 78 (When and how a penalty is to be executed). - No penalty

shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that
prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents
than those expressly authorized thereby.
 Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor,

prision correccional and arresto mayor. — The penalties of reclusion
perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional
and arresto mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and
penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code in force
or which may be provided by law in the future.
 Art. 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be

permitted to enter the place or places designated in the sentence,
nor within the radius therein specified, which shall not more than
250 and be not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.
 Art. 88. Arresto menor. — The penalty of arresto menor shall be

served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself
under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so
provides in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the
offender and other reasons which may seems satisfactory to it.
 Art. 47. (In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed).-
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be
imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:
1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.
2. When the guilty person is below 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime.
3. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court,
the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the
penalty.
In all three instances, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
 Art. 81-82. (When and how the death penalty is to be executed).
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The death sentence shall be executed with preference to

any other penalty and shall consist in putting the person under the
sentence to death by lethal injection.
The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one
year nor later than 18 months after the judgment has become final
and executory without prejudice to the exercise by the President of
his executive clemency powers at all times.
The court shall designate the working day for the execution,
but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be
communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the
execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least 8
hours following the notification, but before sunset.
During the interval, the culprit shall be furnished such
assistance as he may request and be attended in his last moments
by priests or ministers and to consult his lawyer; As well as in order to
make a will and confer with other members of his family.
 Art. 83. (Suspension of the execution of the death sentence).

The death sentence shall no be inflicted:
 Upon a woman while she is pregnant;
 Within one year after the delivery;
 Upon any person over 70 years of age; or
 Upon a convict who became insane after the final
judgment.
 Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness

the same. — The execution shall take place in the penitentiary of
Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed
only by the priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by
his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician
and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by
such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorize.
 Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and
its burial. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit
shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to
the execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or
scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and
investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the
decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall
order the burial of the body of the culprit at government expense,
granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the
family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the
burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with
pomp.
2.) Rules and regulation to implement RA No. 8177:
 SEE ARTICLE 81-82.
o In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete C. Lagran, (363 SCRA 275)
Subject Matter: Execution of Penalties
Facts: Sometime in April 1194, Pete C. Lagran was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by RTC of QC for three counts of violation of BP 22, and was
sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment for each count and to pay a fine of
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P125, 000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Said decision

later became final and executory. Lagran was committed to the Quezon City
Jail on February 24, 1999. On March 19, 2001, after two years and 4 days, Lagran
filed this present petition for habeas corpus.
Contention of the Accused: Lagran herein prays for his immediate release. He
contends that he has already finished serving his sentence with regards to Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code, which allows the simultaneous service of penalties
that are emanated from one court and one complaint. He adds that his
detention in the new Bilibid is now illegal.
Contention of the State: Lagran should still serve the remaining time of his
sentence for his sentence is not what the law contemplates in allowing
simultaneous service of sentences.
Issue: Whether or not Lagran should be released from prison, which is alleged to
be illegal as of March 19, 2001.
Held: Lagran should not be released from prison. He should be further detained
to finish his sentence. The tolerance of the law for simultaneous service of two or
more penalties is only if the nature of the penalties so permit. Penalties which
consist of deprivation of liberty, by reason of their nature, are not included in
those which the law permits to be simultaneously served. The SC ruled that
―where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the
terms should be served successively.‖
In the instant case, the nature of the penalties imposed upon Lagran (1 year
imprisonment for every count of the offense committed) does not allow him to
serve such penalties simultaneously. Instead, said penalties must be served
successively. Thus, Lagran cannot be released from prison because his sentence,
which was commenced on February 24, 1999, is not yet finished. His petition is
hereby dismissed by the SC for lack of merit.
B. Suspension of Sentence Based on Insanity or Minority:

1.) Insane Persons:
 Art. 79. (Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in
case of insanity).— When a convict shall become insane or an
imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution
of said sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the personal
penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance
number 1 of Article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases.
If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence
shall be executed, unless the penalty shall have prescribed in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed
if the insanity or Imbecility occurs while the convict is serving his
sentence.
2.) Minors:
o Supreme Court A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, (Sections 31-35)

RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW:
 Sec. 31. Promulgation of Sentence. - If after trial the Family

Court should find the juvenile in conflict with the law guilty, it shall
impose the proper penalty, including any civil liability which the
juvenile may have incurred, and promulgate the sentence in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
 Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders.

- The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by
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the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for
disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social
worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian
ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the
following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and
welfare of the juvenile: care, guidance, and supervision orders;
Drug and alcohol treatment;
Participation in group counseling and similar activities;
Commitment to the YouthRehabilitationCenter of the DSWD or
other centers for juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the
Secretary of the DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD
shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law
with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family
Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family
Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the
presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian,
and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in
conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of
sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time
of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or over.
 Sec. 33. Discharge of Juvenile Subject of Disposition Measure. -

Upon the recommendation of the SSCD and a duly authorized
officer of the DSWD, the head of an appropriate center or the duly
accredited child-caring agency which has custody over the
juvenile, the Family Court shall, after due notice to all parties and
hearing, dismiss the case against the juvenile who has been issued
disposition measures, even before he has reached eighteen (18)
years of age, and order a final discharge if it finds that the juvenile
has behaved properly and has shown the capability to be a useful
member of the community. If the Family Court, however, finds that
the juvenile has not behaved properly, has been incorrigible, has
not shown the capacity of becoming a useful member of society,
has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his disposition or
rehabilitation program, or should his continued stay in the training
institution where he has been assigned be not in his best interest, he
shall be brought before the court for execution of his judgment. If
the juvenile in conflict with the law has reached the age of
eighteen (18) years while in commitment, the Family Courtshall
determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the first
paragraph of this Section or to execute the judgment of
conviction. In the latter case, unless the juvenile has already
availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other
similar laws, he may apply for probation if qualified under the
provisions of the Probation Law. The final release of the juvenile
shall not extinguish his civil liability. The parents and other persons
exercising parental authority over the juvenile shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
juvenile living in their company and under the parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
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 Sec. 34. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - After

promulgation of sentence and upon application at any time by
the juvenile in conflict with the law within the period to appeal,
the Family Court may place the juvenile on probation, if he is
qualified under the Probation Law.
 Sec. 35. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The juvenile in conflict with

the law who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of
liberty, with the full time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment, if he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the
same or similar disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
except in any of the following cases:
When the juvenile is a recidivist or has been convicted previously
twice or more times of any crime; or
When upon being summoned for execution of sentence, he failed
to surrender voluntarily.
If the juvenile does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Whenever the juvenile has undergone preventive imprisonment for
a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released
immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review.
In case the maximum penalty to which the juvenile may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.
Any form of physical restraint imposed on the juvenile in conflict
with the law, including community service and commitment to a
rehabilitation center, shall be considered preventive imprisonment.
o Presidential Decree No. 603, (Arts. 189-204)

Chapter 3 of PD No.603, articles 189-204 speaks about the Youthful
Offenders:
 Art. 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is one

who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense.
A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall
be exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed to the
care of his or her father or mother, or nearest relative or family
friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its supervision.
The same shall be done for a child over nine years and under
fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense,
unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Article 192.
The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
deemed modified by the provisions of this Chapter.
 Art. 190. Physical and Mental Examination. - It shall be the duty of

the law-enforcement agency concerned to take the youthful
offender, immediately after his apprehension, to the proper
medical or health officer for a thorough physical and mental
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examination. Whenever treatment for any physical or mental

defect is indicated, steps shall be immediately undertaken to
provide the same.
The examination and treatment papers shall form part of the
record of the case of the youthful offender.
 Art. 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. - A

youthful offender held for physical and mental examination or trial
or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from the time of his
arrest be committed to the care of the Department of Social
Welfare or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in
the province or city which shall be responsible for his appearance
in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence of any
such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the
venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall
provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from other
detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon recommendation
of the Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies
authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on
recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable person
who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever required.
 Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful

Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings,
the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the
acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable
penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the
court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such
minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare,
or to any training institution operated by the government, or duly
licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall
have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as
the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the
agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been
committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision
by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare or any
duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court may
designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
 Art. 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender whose sentence is

suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same
manner as appeals in criminal cases.
 Art. 194. Care and Maintenance of Youthful Offender. - The

expenses for the care and maintenance of the youthful offender
whose sentence has been suspended shall be borne by his parents
or those persons liable to support him: Provided, That in case his
parents or those persons liable to support him can not pay all or
part of said expenses, the municipality in which the offense was
committed shall pay one-third of said expenses or part thereof; the
province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and
the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National
Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses;
and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of the
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internal revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid portion shall

be withheld and applied to the settlement of said indebtedness.
All city and provincial governments must exert efforts for the
immediate establishment of local detention homes for youthful
offenders.
 Art. 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The Department of Social

Welfare or its representative or duly licensed agency or individual
under whose care the youthful offender has been committed shall
submit to the court every four months or oftener as may be
required in special cases, a written report on the conduct of said
youthful offender as well as the intellectual, physical, moral, social
and emotional progress made by him.
 Art. 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is shown to the satisfaction of

the court that the youthful offender whose sentence has been
suspended, has behaved properly and has shown his capability to
be a useful member of the community, even before reaching the
age of majority, upon recommendation of the Department of
Social Welfare, it shall dismiss the case and order his final discharge.
 Art. 197. Return of the Youth Offender to Court. - Whenever the

youthful offender has been found incorrigible or has willfully failed
to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation programs, or
should his continued stay in the training institution be inadvisable,
he shall be returned to the committing court for the
pronouncement of judgment.
When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one
while in commitment, the court shall determine whether to dismiss
the case in accordance with the next preceding article or to
pronounce the judgment of conviction.
In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with the full time spent in
actual commitment and detention affected under the provisions of
this Chapter.
 Art. 198. Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct. - The

final release of a child pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter
shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages. Such release shall
be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the
recovery of civil damages.
 Art. 199. Living Quarters for Youthful Offenders Sentence. - When a

judgment of conviction is pronounced in accordance with the
provisions of Article 197, and at the time of said pronouncement
the youthful offender is still under twenty-one, he shall be
committed to the proper penal institution to serve the remaining
period of his sentence: Provided, That penal institutions shall
provide youthful offenders with separate quarters and, as far as
practicable, group them according to appropriate age levels or
other criteria as will insure their speedy rehabilitation: Provided,
further, That the Bureau of Prisons shall maintain agricultural and
forestry camps where youthful offenders may serve their sentence
in lieu of confinement in regular penitentiaries.
 Art. 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where a youthful offender has

been charged before any city or provincial fiscal or before any
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municipal judge and the charges have been ordered dropped, all
the records of the case shall be destroyed immediately thereafter.
Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court
acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an institution
and subsequently releases him pursuant to this Chapter, all the
records of his case shall be destroyed immediately after such
acquittal, dismissal or release, unless civil liability has also been
imposed in the criminal action, in which case such records shall be
destroyed after satisfaction of such civil liability. The youthful
offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law, to
be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by
reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact
related thereto in response to any inquiry made of him for any
purpose.
"Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those
which may be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation
and with any police department, or any other government agency
which may have been involved in the case.
 Art. 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil liability for
acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve upon the
offender's father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian.
Civil liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family
friend of the youthful offender.
 Art. 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social Welfare

shall establish regional rehabilitation centers for youthful offenders.
The local government and other non-governmental entities shall
collaborate and contribute their support for the establishment and
maintenance of these facilities.
 Art. 203. Detention Homes. - The Department of Local Government

and Community Development shall establish detention homes in
cities and provinces distinct and separate from jails pending the
disposition of cases of juvenile offenders.
 Art. 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian or Any Person in the

Commission of Delinquent Acts by Their Children or Wards. - A
person whether the parent or guardian of the child or not, who
knowingly or willfully,
(1) Aids, causes, abets or connives with the commission by a child
of a delinquency, or
(2) Does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a child's
being or becoming a juvenile delinquent, shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or to imprisonment for a
period not exceeding two years, or both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
o Rules on Juveniles in Conflict with Law, (Section 32):
Section 32 provides:
The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the
juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case fro
disposition conference within 15 days from the promulgation of
sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family
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Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall

proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition
measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile:
care, guidance, and supervision orders; drug and alcohol treatment;
participation in group counseling and similar activities; commitment to
the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for
juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the
DSWD.
The social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall
monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the
disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a
status and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set a
conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if
practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons
whose presence may be deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in
conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or
to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of
judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
o RA 9344, Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006:
Under RA 9344 minority is an exempting circumstance. It provides:

1. A child 15 years of age or under at the time of commission of
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
2. A child above 15 years but below 18 years of age shall
likewise be exempted from criminal liability and be subjected
to intervention program pursuant to Section 20, unless he/she
has acted with discernment. IF the accused acted with
discernment, he shall undergo diversion program without
undergoing proceeding. (Section 23).
Persons who have been convicted and already serving sentence at

the time of its effectivity and who were below 18 years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of the law. (Section 68)
Section 38 of RA provides:
―Automatic Suspension of Sentence.- Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, that suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.‖
―Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.‖
(RA 9344 merely amended Art. 192 of PD No. 603, as amended by A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC)
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Art. 192 of PD No. 603 as amended provides:

―The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in
conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or
to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of
judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.‖
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
I. Total Extinction:
A. Extinction in General:
 Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is

totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, this completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in
Article 344 of this Code.
 Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen
years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years;
with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall
prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six
months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest
penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules
contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.
 Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of

prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine Archipelago.
 Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed
by final sentence prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
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3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the

penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
 Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. — The period of

prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when
the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured,
should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no
extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
 Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of
the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
are expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
o Monsanto vs Factoran, (170 SCRA 190)

Subject Matter:Extinction in General
Facts: Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto, then
assistant treasurer of CalbayogCity, and three other accused, of the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them
imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional
to ten years and one day of prision mayor. She filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by
then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of
said pardon, petitioner wrote the CalbayogCity treasurer requesting that she
be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was
still vacant. Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote
the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to
the date of her preventive suspension.
Contention of the State: Acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public
officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
Contention of the Accused: Without that final judgment of conviction, the
accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her
employment remained suspended, and when pardon was issued before the
final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to
speak of.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the President, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.
Held:No. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms
part of the punishment for estafa thru falsification of public documents. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and
undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. While a
pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt, it
does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are historical
facts which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness
implicit in pardon, ordinary prudent man will take into account in their
subsequent dealings with the actor. Temporary absolute disqualification bars
the convict from public office or employment, such disqualification to last
during the term of the sentence. Even if the offender pardoned, as to the
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principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been
expressly remitted by the pardon.
o People vs. Patriarca, (341 SCRA 464)

Subject Matter: Extinction in General
Facts: That on or about the 30th day of June 1987 at about 10:00 o‘clock in
the evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
armed with guns, forcibly took away Alfredo Arevalo from his residence and
brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and assault and shoot Alfredo Arevalo thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wounds, which directly cause his death to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.
Issue: Whether or not criminal liability is extinguished by amnesty.
Held: The court acquitted the appellant. His application for amnesty was
approved and one of the acts listed in the resolution of the National Amnesty
Commission is the killing of the victim in this case. The approval was pursuant
to Proc. No 347 granting amnesty to all persons who shall apply who have
committed crimes on or before June 1, 1995 in pursuit of their political beliefs.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
executive with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of person or communities who may be
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward
and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage
unless such rights be expressly restored by 10 terms of the pardon and it in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence (Art.36).
o People vs. Abungan (341 SCRA 464)

Facts: Pedro Abungan, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton
Jr., were charged with murder for the death od Dirilo Sr. Abungan pleaded
not guilty upon his arraignment. After trial on the merits, the trial court
sentenced Pedro Abungan to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
such accessory thereto. Abungan appealed his case but died during the
pendency of his appeal.
Contention of the State: The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior
to the finality of conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising
from the delict or crime.
Contention of the Accused: Abungan, through counsel pleaded not guilty
upon his arraignment and appealed his case but died during the pendency
of his appeal at the NewBilibidPrisonHospital.
Issue: Whether or not the Death of the appellant during the pendency of his
appeal extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability.
Held: The death of the appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover,
because he died during the pendency of his appeal and before the finality
of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict
was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be
based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims
may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by
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law and procedural rules. Moreover, the death of Abungan would result in
the dismissal of the criminal case against him.
Thus, the criminal case against Pedro Abungan is dismissed and
appealed decision set aside.
o People vs. Recebido, (346 SCRA 881)

Facts: In 1985, Carol Dorol mortgaged her property, an agricultural land to
Aniceto Recibido but the parties did not execute a document on such
mortgage, Dorol instead gave Recebido a copy of the Deed of Sale. On
September 9, 1990, private complainant Dorol went to the house of
Recebido to redeem her property on his claim that she sold her to him in
1979. Dorol maintained that the transaction was a mortgaged. Dorol verified
from the Office of the Assessor that there exists on its file a Deed of Sale
dated August 13, 1979, allegedly executed by Dorol in favor of Recebido and
that was registered in the latter‘s name, here she discovered that her
signature that her signature on such documents was falsified. The year was
1999 when Dorol learned of the falsification.
Contention of the State: Aniceto Recebido is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of one year to three years and six months of prision correccional as
maximum and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment.
Contention of the Accused: Defense of prescription. The ten year prescriptive
period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed.
Issue: Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time
the information was filed.
Held: No. Under the RPC, the penalty imposed on the accused is a
correccional penalty in the same way that the fine imposed categorized as
correctional. Both the penalty and the fine prescribe in 10 years. Article 91,
RPC reads that: the period of prescription shall ―commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents.‖
In the case at bar, it was only on September 9, 1999 when the
complainant, Dorol came to know of the falsification committed by
Recebido. The prescriptive period of the crime had not yet elapsed at the
time the information was filed.
o People vs. Desierto, (363 SCRA 585)

Facts: A complaint was filed by the Solicitor General against private
respondents Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara
Lobregat, Rolando Dela Cuesta, Jose Eleazar Jr., Jose Conception, Danilo
Ursua, Narciso Pineda, and Augusto Orosa, for violation of RA 3019 otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This was dismissed by the
Graft Investigation Officer Emora Pagunuran which was approved by
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed.
Contention of the Ombudsman: Alleged offense had allegedly prescribed.
Following the case of People vs. Sandiganbayan, GIO I Pagunuran reckoned
the prescription period from the date the MOA was entered into, or on Nov.
20, 1974. As the case was filed only in Feb. 12, 1990, the Ombudsman ruled
that the same was filed beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years as fixed
under Sec.11 of RA 3019. And the questioned MOA was expressly confirmed
and ratified by PD 961 (1976) and PD 1468 (1978) and thus, was given
―legislative imprimatur‖.
Contention of the SOLGEN: The offense charged in the complaint falls within
the category of an ill-gotten wealth which under the Constitution is
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imprescriptible and that void contracts are not subject to ratification and/or
confirmation.
Issue: Whether or not the offense charged in complaint in violation of RA 3019
had already prescribed when the complaint was filed.
Held: Petition is granted. The office of Ombudsman should not have dismissed
the complaint on the basis of prescription which is erroneous. As a rule, if the
commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to
run on the day it was committed. However, in cases where the time of the
commission in unknown, prescription shall only run from its discovery and
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Ordinarily, there is no problem in determining the date when the crime
consists of a series of acts, especially when some or all these acts are
innocent in themselves.
o Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto,

(363 SCRA 489)
Facts: In 1968, Calinog Lqambino Sugar Mills applied to the PNB for a loan
amounting to P22, 132, 577. 00 which was approved. On March 24, 1997, Atty.
Orlando Salvador, PCGG consultant on Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loan,
filed with the ombudsman a complainant against Calinog Lambunao Sugar
Mills alleging that the ombudsman a complainant against Calinog
Lambunao Sugar Mills alleging that the account was a Behest loan, on the
ground that: it was under collateralized; the borrower corporation is
undercapitalized, and others. On May 29, 1997 the ombudsman dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescriptions the loan transactions occurred in
the years 1968, 78, 79, and 82. The 15 year prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under RA 3019 (Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) has already
passed.
Contention of the State: The ombudsman should annul and set aside his
decision dismissing the complaint against Calinog Sugar Mills and he should
file the necessary information for violation of RA 3019.
Contention of the Accused: The action is barred by prescription because the
complaint was filed 29 years after the crime was committed.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint filed by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee was within the prescriptive period.
Held: Yes. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the
following shall be considered: 1) the period of prescription for the offense
charged; 2) the time the period of prescription started to run; and 3) the time
the prescriptive period was interrupted.
RA 3019 provides for its own prescriptive period which is 15years,
however since it is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of
prescriptive period is provided in Act No. 3326, in section 2.
The period of prescription in the case at bar is 15 years; the date of
discovery of the offense was 1992, after an investigation by the Ad Hoc
Committee and the time the prescriptive period was interrupted was on the
day of filing of the complaint in the office of the ombudsman on March 24,
1997, 5 years from the time of discovery, thus the filing of the complaint was
within prescriptive period.
o Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo, (394 SCRA 221)

Facts: Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178
of the 1978 Election Code for striking the electric bulb and two kerosene
petromax lamps lighting the room where a voting center is located, during
the counting of the votes in said voting center plunging the room in
complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of
the Board of Election Tellers.
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On January 14, 1985 the trial court rendered and declared the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and sentenced petitioner to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3
years as maximum.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear
which prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner
and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was never
apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial
court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of
prescription of the penalty imposed upon him which was later denied.
Contention of the Accused: Petitioner maintains that Art. 93 of the RPC
provide that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. He further
contends that the judgment rendered on June 14, 1986 has prescribed on
October 24, 1996.
Contention of the Solicitor General: The Solicitor General pointed out the
meaning of ―escape‖ which means unlawful departure of prisoner from the
limits of his custody. As the petitioner has not been committed to prison he
cannot be said to have escaped there from.
Issue: Whether the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed.
Held:No. For the prescription by final sentence to commence to run, the
culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. The penalty
imposed has not prescribed because the circumstances of the case at
bench failed to satisfy the second element, to wit- ―That the convict evaded
the service of the sentence by escaping the service of his sentence.‖ As a
matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.
Petitioner was never brought to prison and even before the execution of the
judgment for his conviction, he was already hiding.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are
as follows:
1) That the penalty imposed by final sentence.
2) That the convict evaded the service of the sentence
by escaping during the term of his sentence.
3) That the convict who escaped from prison has not
given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a
foreign country with which we have no extradition
treaty or committed another crime.
4) That the penalty as prescribed, because of the lapse
of time from the date of the evasion of the service of
the sentence by the convict.
B. Particular Rules:
1.) Article 89:

CAUSES OF TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
a.) Death of the convict;
b.) Service of sentence;
c.) Amnesty;
d.) Absolute pardon;
e.) Prescription of crime;
f.) Prescription of penalty;
g.) Marriage between the offended party and the accused.
o Crisobal vs. Labrador, (71 Phil. 34)
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Facts: Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given

pardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he was already
holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon
notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred
that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in Malabon
because he was already convicted of final judgment ―for any crime
against property‖. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code.
The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is exempt from
the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the
respondent to his ―full civil and political rights, except that with respect
to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature
and involving no money or property responsibility.‖
Issue: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.
Held: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the
exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,
namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that
such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot
be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where
the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only
blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting
from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of
conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification
from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law
imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory
and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to
such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has
expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences f
conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to
respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that ―he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property responsibility,‖ it is absolute
insofar as it ―restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.
Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in
par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within the purview of the
pardoning power of the president, would lead to the impairment of
the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in the
Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would
be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature
except through legislative action.
o Pelobello vs. Palatino, (72 Phil 441)

Facts: Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello
filed a quo warrant to proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer
qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and
was even imprisoned.
Contention of Pelobello: Because of such conviction and
imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from
voting and being voted upon.
Contention of Palatino: Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the
Election Code which supports his contention.
Issue: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
Held: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then
Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by
President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was
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already after Palatino‘s election but prior to him assuming office. The
SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former
disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been
removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in
question.
o People vs. Nery (10 SCRA 244)

Facts: On November 15, 1954, in a market stall in BacolodCity, the said
accused received from Federico Matillano 2 diamond rings to be sold
by her on commission. The agreement was for the accused to deliver,
on the following the sum of P230.00 to her principal, to whom the
accused had represented having a ready buyer, and whatever
overprice could be obtained in the sale would be retained the
accused as her commission.
Soledad Nery failed to show up, Federico brought the
matter to attention of the police authorities of Bacolod on January 5,
1955. In no time, Soledad was found to the police station; then and
there, she promised, in to deliver the price of the rings on January 25,
1955.
Contention of the Accused: There is no prohibition in the law to prevent
the parties to a contract to novate it so that any incipient criminal
liability under the first is thereby avoided.
Contention of the State: Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa, the trial court imposed an indeterminate
sentence of no less than 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to not
more than 1 year and 1 day of prision correctional to indemnify
Federico Matillano the sum of 140.00 representing the unpaid balance,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P2.50
a day but not exceeding a third of the principal penalty; and to pay
the costs.
Issue: Whether or not there is no prohibition in our law to prevent the
parties to a contract to novate it so that any incipient liability under
the first is avoided.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there is no prohibition in our law to
prevent the parties to a contract to novate it so that any incipient
liability under the first is avoided. The novation theory applies prior to
the filing of the criminal information in court because up to that time
the original trust relation may be converted by the parties into an
ordinary creditor-debtor relationship.
Note: Novation extinguishes civil but not criminal liability.
o Llamado vs. CA, (270 SCRA 423)

Facts: A petition to review the decision of the CA is convicting Ricardo
A. Llamado in violation of BP Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of one year of
prision correccional and to pay a fine of P200, 000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to reimburse Leon Gaw the
amount of P186, 500.00 plus the costs of suit.
On November 11, 1983, private complainant entered into an
agreement with Ricardo Llamado whereby Pan-Asia Finance
Corporation would pay private complainant 10% of the P186, 500. 00
by November 14 or 15, and the balance will be rolled over for 90 days
in lieu of a bank dishonored check issued by Ricardo Llamado. Private
respondent was not however paid as agreed upon.
Contention of the Accused: Respondent CA erred because it refused
to apply the novation theory recognized by this Court, in Ong vs. CA,
124 SCRA 578, and Guingona, Jr. vs. City Fiscal of Manila, 128 SCRA
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577, despite admission by private complainant that before the charge

was filed in court or even the prosecutor he had entered into a new
agreement with petitioner supplanting the check in question; therefore
extinguishing the old debt.
Contention of the State: Novation theory should not be applied in the
case at bar.
Issue: Whether or not novation theory is applied.
Held: With regard to petitioner‘s allegation regarding the novation
theory recognized by the Court in certain cases, does not apply in the
case at bar. While private complainant agreed to petitioner‘s offer to
pay him 10% of the amount of the check on November 14 or 15, 1983
and the balance to be rolled over for 90 days, this turned out to be
only an empty promise which effectively delayed private
complainant‘s rulling of a case for Violation of BP 22 against petitioner
and his co-accused. As admitted by petitioner in his Memorandum,
private complainant was never paid as agreed upon.
2.) Prescription of Offenses (Arts. 90, 91):

PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES:
a.) Death, reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal- 20
years.
b.) Other afflictive penalties- 15 years.
c.) Correccional penalties- 10 yearsexcept arresto mayor
which prescribe in 5 years.
d.) Libel or similar offense- 1 year.
e.) Grave oral defamation and slander by deed- 6 months.
f.) Light offenses- 2 months.
WHEN DOES THE PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION OF A FELONY BEGIN TO RUN

AND WHEN IS IT SUSPENDED?
a.) Prescription commences to run from the day following the
commission of the offense or discovery of the crime by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents.
b.) The period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information.
c.) The period commences to run again when such
proceedings terminate: (a) without the accused being
convicted or acquitted; or (b) are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to the offender.
d.) Prescription shall not run when the offender is outside of the
Philippines, except when there is an extradition treaty.
o Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino, (122 SCRA 713)

Facts: On February 1, 1965 the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed
information against Rafael Yapdiangco for slight physical injuries done
on December 2, 1964. The latter filed a motion to quash the criminal
proceeding as the 60-day prescription period has lapsed. The trial
court dismissed his motion as the last day to file was on a Sunday, and
may be filed on the next succeeding business day; later, his motion for
reconsideration was also dismissed by the CFI-Rizal.
Contention of the State: Under Sec.31 of the Revised Administrative
Code, when the last day for doing an act required by law on a
Sunday or legal holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding
business day.
Contention of the Accused: The lower court erred in finding Sunday is a
legal efficient cause to interrupt the prescription of an offense. When
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an action would fall on a Sunday, that day must be excluded from the
count and the action on the Saturday preceding the bar.
Issue: Whether or not a Sunday or legal holiday is a legal efficient
cause which interrupts the prescription of an offense.
Held: The SC ruled in favor of Yadiangco. Sec.31 of the RAC deals with
the computation of time allowed doing a particular act, such the filing
of tax returns, taking an appeal, filing an answer to a complaint, etc. It
does not apply to lengthen a period fixed by the state to prosecute an
offense against it. The waiver to prosecute such offender is automatic
and by operation of law. When the 60th or last day to file an
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the 60-day period
cannot be extended to the next working day, prescription has
automatically set in.
The SC ruled that Rafael Yapdiangco‘s motion to quash is
granted and the information before the city court is dismissed.
o Eugenio Cabral vs. Hon. Benigno Puno, (70 SCRA 606)

Facts: Eugenio Cabral was accused to falsification of a public
document. An information regarding the falsification public document
was filed by Silvino San Diego on September 24, 1974. The falsification
was made on a deed of sale of a parcel of land dated August 14,
1948 which Eugenio Cabral falsified the signature of Silvino San Diego.
On March 25, 1975 the motion to quash and dismiss the information on
the ground of prescription, the private prosecutor who was not present
during the hearing of the motion to quash filed a motion dated April 8,
1975 for the reconsideration of said resolution.
Contention of the Accused: The resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing
the information on the ground of prescription of the crime became a
bar to another charge of falsification, including the revival of the
information. This is because the said resolution is deemed to be final
and executory. The private prosecutor must file reconsideration within
the reglementary period of 15 days after his receipt of a copy.
Contention of the State: The Private prosecutor submitted his comment
dated May 19, 1975 expressing the view that the crime, has not
prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered the
crime sometime in October 1970
Issue: Whether the crime of falsification has already prescribed.
Held:Yes. The SC granted the petition and the orders of respondent
judge are hereby set aside. The rules of court is explicit that an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense Article 89 of the RPC also provides
that prescription of the crime is an of the grounds for total extinction of
criminal liability. The crime of forgery prescribes 10 years. San Diego
had actual notice of the alleged forgery because the said sale was
registered in the register of deeds on August 26, 1948. The prescription
also made San Diego lost his right to intervene in the criminal case.
3.) Prescription of Penalties (Art.93):

 It is the loss or forfeiture of the right of the government to execute
the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time fixed by law.
 If the sentence is not yet final, the period of prescription will not
run because Art. 93 refer to the accused who shall evade the
service of their sentence. It does not also start to run where
despite his final conviction the accused is not arrested to serve his
sentence.
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 Prescription of penalty begins to run from the date the culprit

evades the service of sentence. It is interrupted:
a.) If the accused surrenders.
b.) If he is captured.
c.) If he should go to a foreign country with which the
Philippines has no extradition treaty.
d.) If he should commit another crime before the expiration
of the prescriptive period.
 Acceptance of a conditional pardon interrupts the prescriptive

period because it is similar to a case of one fleeing from this
jurisdiction. (People vs. Puntilos, June 15, 1938)
 There must be evasion of the sentence before prescriptive period

begins to run. Period of prescription commences to run from the
date the accused evades from the service of the sentence.
(Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G 5228)
 Prescription of penalty is applicable only if the convict has served

a portion or fraction of the penalty imposed upon him. In the
case at bar, if the accused jumped bail and did not appear
during the promulgation of decision. He did not serve a portion or
fraction of the penalty imposed. He has not evaded service of his
sentence hence; there is no prescriptive period to speak of.
(Tanega vs. Masakayan, February 28, 1967)
4.) Sec.1, Rule 119, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:

 Time to prepare for trial. After plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. The trial
shall commence within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial
order.
5.) Act No. 3326 as Amended by 3763:

 An act to establish periods of prescription for violations
penalized by special acts and municipal ordinances and to
provide when prescription shall begin to run.
 Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided

in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
 After a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both;
 After four years for those punished by imprisonment for
more than one month, but less than two years;
 After eight years for those punished by imprisonment for
two years or more, but less than six years; and
 After twelve years for any other offense punished by
imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of
treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months.
 Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of

the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding
for its investigation and punishment. (Sec.2, Par.1)
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 The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are

instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy. (Sec.2, Par.2)
II. Partial Extinction:
A. Extinction Under Articles 94-99:
 Art. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. – Criminal liability is

extinguished partially:
1) By conditional pardon.
2) By commutation of the sentence.
3) For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn
whole he is serving sentence.
 Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted to conditional pardon. –

Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the
obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein;
otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified
shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article
159 shall be applied to him.
 Art. 96. Effect of the commutation of sentence. – The commutation of

the original sentence for another of a different length and nature shall
have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the
former.
 Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good conduct of any
prisoner in any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the
following deductions from the period of his sentence:
1) During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good
behavior;
2) During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month
of good behavior;
3) During the following years until the 10 th year inclusive of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of 10 days for
each month of good behavior; and
4) During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a deduction of 15 days for each month of
good behavior.
 Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty.

 A special time allowance is given to a prisoner (serving
sentence) for loyalty (Art. 98) and a deduction of 1/5 of the
period of his sentence for a loyal prisoner (Art. 158).
 In order that a convict will be entitled to the special time
allowance for loyalty, the convict must have actually
escaped from detention.
 Art. 99. Who grants time allowances?

 It can be granted only by the Director of Prisons.
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o Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden, (108 Phil 353)

Facts: The CFI of Bohol Espuelas is guilty of the crime of inciting to sedition and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day of prision correccional as minimum to 5 years 4 months and 20 days of
prision correccional as maximum. He commenced to serve his sentence, but
before serving it to its full extent, the president granted him conditional
pardon by remitting the unexpired period of his sentence on condition that
he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Sometime
thereafter, he was found guilty with the crime of usurpation of authority or
official functions and sentenced to suffer 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor as minimum to 2 years, 1 month and 1 day of prision correccional as
maximum. On Nov. 8, 1957, upon the recommendation of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, the President ordered his recommitment to prison to
serve the unexpired period of his sentence.
Contention of the State: The Sol. Gen. maintains that the President may order
the reincarceration of Espuelas, upon violation of the terms of the conditional
pardon granted to and accepted by hi, to serve the unexpired term or
period of his sentence.
Contention of the Accused: He raised and opposed the contention of the
state that the President cannot do so.
Issue: Whether or not the President may order the reincarceration of Espuelas
to serve the unexpired term of his sentence.
Held: Yes, under Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President is
empowered ―to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of only such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of his pardon,
parole, or suspension of sentence.‖ In case the convict violates any
conditions of the conditional pardon, the President has the power to order his
recommitment. In the case at bar, Espuelas violated the condition, thus he
must serve his unexpired sentence.
o Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, (68 Phil. 154)

Facts: Tesoro was convicted by the Court of First Instance of falsification of an
official document, sentenced to an indeterminate term of 2 years to 3 years,
6 months and 21 days imprisonment, plus Fine of P200. By virtue of section 64
of the Administrative Code, he was granted pardon on Parole by the
Governor General on any crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner. In the latter part of Sept. 1937, he violated this condition; he
maintained an adulterous relation with the wife of his brother-in-law (Tesoro‘s
wife died in September 18, 1937).
Contention of the State: That Tesoro must serve the unexpired portion of the
maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison.
Contention of the Accused: The period during which he was out on parole
should be counted as service of his original sentence.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the accused is tenable.
Held: We do not subscribe to the contention of the accused. We said in
People vs. Tapel: ―when a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is
placed in the state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He
may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons. And the rule is well settled
that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed
by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the
court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by
virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence.‖
From the express terms of the parole that: ―should any of the
conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full
force and effect,‖ it is evident that the petitioner herein should serve the
unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.
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B. The Probation Law:
o Presidential Decree No. 968 (as amended):
Probation- is disposition under which the accused after conviction and

sentence is released subject to the condition imposed by the court and to
the supervision of a probation officer.
Purpose:
 Promote the correction and rehabilitation of the accused.
 Provide an opportunity for the reformation of an offender.
 Prevent the commission of crimes.
Probation may be granted even if the penalty imposed is fine only but
with subsidiary imprisonment.
Procedure:
 The convict must file before the trial court an application for
probation after he has been sentenced but before he begins to
serve the sentence. If the accused has been convicted and has
appealed the sentence of conviction, an application for probation
cannot be entertained. The prosecutor assigned to the court shall
be ordered to file his comments within 10 days from notice.
 Probation may be granted only on application of the offender. The
court has no power to put him on probation motu proprio. The filing
of an application is, therefore, jurisdictional.
 The court shall order the probation officer to conduct an
investigation of the offender if he is not disqualified.
 The probation officer shall submit his investigation report within 60
days from receipt of the court order.
 The court shall resolve the application within 15 days from receipt
of the report. It is discretionary with the court to grant or deny an
application for probation. The order granting or denying the
probation is not appealable.
 The probationer order shall take effect upon its issuance.
Requisite before an offender can be placed on Probation:

 A post sentence investigation report by the probation officer.
 A determination by the court that the best interest of the public
and the offender and the ends of justice will be served.
Offenders who are not entitle to probation:

Those sentenced to serve imprisonment for more than 6 years;
Those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national
security or public orders;
Those previously convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one
day/ or a fine not more than 200 pesos;
Those who have been once on probation; and
Those already serving sentence at the time of the approval of PD
968.
Conditions of probation:
a) Mandatory or general- once violated, the probation is cancelled.
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b) Discretionary or special- conditions which the courts may

additionally impose on the probationer. Probation statutes are
liberal in character and the court may impose any term it chooses,
as long as the probationer‘s constitutional rights are not violated.
o Cabatingan vs. Sandiganbayan, (101 SCRA 187)

Facts: In this case, the Sandiganbayan denied the application for probation
of the accused by relying mainly, if not totally, on the report of the Probation
Officer who recommended for the disapproval of the application for
probation on the ground that there is undue risk that she will again commit
another crime and that the probation will depreciate the seriousness of the
offense committed.
Contention of the Accused: Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of probation.
Contention of the State: The petition is denied because there is undue risk that
she will again commit another crime and that the probation will depreciate
the seriousness of the offense committed.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is entitle for probation.
Held: There is ample evidence showing that the petitioner is entitled to the
benefit of probation. She does not appear to be a hardened criminal who is
beyond correction or redemption. She has shown repentance for the offense
she has committed. The Sandiganbayan merely relied on a report of the
probation officer which in itself, is mostly hearsay and is controverted. The
case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan to conduct further hearings on
the application for probation.
o Tolentino vs. Judge Alconel, (121 SCRA 92)

Facts: In this case, petitioner Tolentino pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Violation of Section 4, Art. 11 of RA No. 6425, the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972.
After the prosecution had presented part of evidence, Tolentino, changed
his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser offense of illegal possession
of marijuana. Since no objection was interposed by the fiscal, Judge Alconel
allowed the change of plea. Thereupon, Tolentino was sentenced to
imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, to pay the fine
of 1000 pesos and the costs, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Tolentino applied for probation. After conducting the requisite
investigation, the probation officer recommended that Tolentino be placed
on two year probation upon the claim that the latter was already on his way
to reformation. Notwithstanding said recommendation, respondent judge
denied the application of probation.
Contention of Judge Alconel: He denied the application of probation on the
ground that it will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
Contention of Tolentino: He went to the SC on certiorari on the ground that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
Issue: Whether or not the court a quo correct in denying the application for
probation.
Held: ―Yes. It is evident that the potentiality of the offender to reform is not the
sole, much less the primordial factor, that should be considered in the grant
or denial of an application for probation. Equal regard to the demands of
justice and public interest must be observed. It was duly established that the
accused was caught inflagrante delicto of selling marijuana.‖ The grant of
probation shall depreciate the seriousness of the crime committed.
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the
discretion of the court. This discretion is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the
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accused. Proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country has remained a

serious threat to the well-being of the people. The penalties imposed in drug
cases were increased to take them out of probationable offenses. It will not
serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the community; particularly
the innocent and the gullible young if the accused were put on probation.
o Amandy vs. People, (161 SCRA 436)

Facts: Juanito Amandy (alias‖Dianak‖) was accused of violating Sec. 8 of RA
6425 of the Dangerous Drug Act due to his possession of dried Indian hemp
leaves or marijuana weighing 1.6 grams and 60 pieces of cigarette wrappers
at Padre Burgos, QuezonProvince on April 3, 1983. He was sentenced to 6
years and 1 day with costs and appreciated his voluntary plea of guilt and
drunkenness for his offense. After which, Amandy filed an application for
probation with a petition for release on recognizance that was denied by the
lower court prompting him to file for a motion for reconsideration that was
again denied.
Contention of the State: He was denied of his application for probation and
motion for reconsideration because in 1985, PD 1990 which amended BP 76
excludes an applicant to probation if he is sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of more than 6 years. The trial court has merely
complied with the expressed provision of the amendatory act.
Contention of the Accused: The petitioner‘s counsel claims that Amandy is a
good subject for probation and can still be reformed and rehabilitated as
shown by the recommendation of the Probation Officer, Amandy likewise
contends that PD 1990 did not intend to nullify BP 76 and did not intended to
deny probation benefits to those sentenced to 6 years and 1 day by the trial
court. The omission of 1 day is a result of misprint or inadvertence so he is
rightfully entitled with the probation.
Issue: Whether or not Amandy is worthy of probation given that his sentence
has exceeded more than 6 years.
Held: Amandy is not entitled to the probation law thus he should serve his
sentence fully because the removal of 1 day from the original 6 years and 1
day is redounded to the benefits to only of those offenders convicted of less
grave felonies. The intention of the law is to extend the beneficial effects of
the Probation law only to correctional penalties which have 6 years as their
ceiling and that penalties afflictive in scope and nature have to be
excluded. The proliferation of prohibited drugs is a threat to the well-being of
the people and requires a sentence commensurate to the gravity of the drug
menace and the increase of the penalty for the violation of the Dangerous
Drug Act.
o Llamado vs. CA, (174 SCRA 566)

Facts: Petitioner Ricardo Llamado was Treasurer of Asia Finance Corp.
Together with Jacinto Pascual Sr. President of the same corporation;
petitioner was prosecuted for violation of BP Blg. 22. The two had co-signed a
postdated check payable to respondent Leon Gaw is the amount of P186,
500. 00, which check was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds, the petitioner
then filed a petition for probation. Petitioner prayed that the running of the
period for filing of his Appellant‘s brief be held in abeyance until after the CA
shall have acted on his petition for Probation.
Issue: Whether petitioner‘s application for probation which was filed after a
notice of appeal had been filed with the trial court, after the record of the
case had been forward to the CA should be granted.
Held:No. Turning to petitioner‘s invocation of liberal interpretation of penal
statutes, we note at the outset that the Probation Law is not a penal statute.
We however understand petitioner‘s argument to be really that any statutory
language that appears to favor the accused in a criminal case should be
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given a liberal interpretation. Court, however have no authority to invoke

legal interpretation or the spirit of the law where the words of the statute
themselves, and as illuminated by the history of the statute, leave no room for
doubt or interpretation.
o Bala vs. Judge Martinez, (181 SCRA 459)

Facts: The petitioner had been indicated for removing and substituting the
picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United
States of America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a
genuine public of official document. On January, 1978, the trial court
adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of the
crime of falsification of a public document. The petitioner was then placed
under probation for period of 1 year, subject to the terms and conditions
enumerated therein. After a month, obtaining permission from the probation
officer, transfer his residence thru a verbal agreement.
Contention of the State: The State thru Fiscal Cajucom filed a motion to
revoke the probation of the petitioner for violating the terms and conditions.
Contention of the Accused: The petitioner filed his opposition to the motion
on the ground that he was no longer under probation, his probation period
having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such no
valid reason existed to revoke the same.
Issue:Whether the expiration of the probation period alone does not
automatically terminate probation.
Held:No. The present law on probation, P.D. 1990 which amends section 4 of
P.D. 968, clearly states that no application for probation shall entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
However in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable, P.D. 1990,
which went in force on January 15, 1985 can not be given retroactive effect
because it would be prejudicial to the accused.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer,
but not to exceed the period of probation like the period of incarceration, is
deemed the appropriate period for the probationer. In the instant case, a
review of the records compels a revocation of probation without the need of
further proceedings in the trial court which only is an exercise in futility. If we
render justice now, why should we allow the petitioner to further delay it.
Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible society. Precisely
he was granted probation in order to give him a chance to return to the
main stream, to give him hope- hope for self respect and a better life.
Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He thus
wrecked his chance, he has not reformed.
o Salgado vs. CA, (189 SCRA 304)

Facts: Salgado was charged with serious physical injuries. To suffer the
imprisonment for a period of 4 months and 20 days with the accessories
provide for by law and to indemnify the victim Francisco Lukban Jr. in the sum
of P126, 633.50 as actual or compensatory damages and P50, 000 for the
incapacity of Francisco Lukban in a monthly installment of P2, 000 during the
entire period of his probation. For the months of May, June, July, August,
September and October Salgado complied with the condition by paying in
checks. Lukban filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in his favor and was granted by the
trial court subsequently, he applied to the SC but it was referred to the CA.
CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision.
Contention of the Accused: The altering or modification of civil liability of
Salgado is unauthorized and not sanctioned by law.
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Contention of the State: Probation law provides only suspension of sentence

imposed on the convict that it has absolutely no beating on his civil liability
and that none of the condition listed relates to civil liability.
Issue:Whether a grant of probation carries with the extinction of civil liability.
Held:No. The condition of the pardon of indemnifying the victim on an
installment basis did not increase nor decrease the civil liability adjudged
against Salgado but merely provided for the manner of payment of the civil
liability during the period of probation. Although execution of sentence is
suspended it does not mean that the civil liability is extinguished. In the instant
case, the issue is not the survival or extinction of the civil liability of a
probationer but, whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition of
probation the manner in which a probationer may settle his civil liability
against the offended party during the period of probation. Counting from
April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the order granting probation which
under the law is also the date of its effectivity (Sec.11, P.D. 968), the probation
period must have lapsed by now. Hence, the order for petitioner to indemnify
the private respondent in the amount of P2000, 00 monthly during the period
of probation must have also lapsed. If such were the case, there would
therefore, be no more obstacle petitioner. However, the records are bereft of
allegations to this effect. The SC reversed the decision of the CA and trial
court.
o Francisco vs. CA, (April 6, 1995)

Facts: Pablo C. Francisco was charged and convicted for the 4 out of 5
information of oral defamation before the MeTC of Makati Branch 61, and
was sentenced to suffer 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months in each
crime committed on each date of each case as alleged in the 16
information. The accused Francisco filed an appeal to the RTC, where his
imprisonment was reduced to straight penalty of 8 months in each of the
information filed and the case was returned to the MeTC for the execution of
sentenced. Before he could be arrested he filed an application for probation
before the MeTC but was denied. The accused appealed the denial of his
application for probation to the CA but the same was denied. Hence he
appealed to the SC.
Contention of the State: The application for probation must be denied in light
of Sec.4 of PD 968 that probation cannot be granted once an appeal was
made by the accused. The accused when he appealed the decision of the
MeTC to the RTC had already loss his chance for probation.
Contention of the Accused: The appeal from MeTC to RTC was for the
purpose of lowering his penalty so that she will be able to qualify for
probation because the penalty imposed by MeTC when added altogether
exceeded the limit of 6 years imprisonment allowed by law for the purpose of
application for probation.
Issue:Whether the determination of the 6 years limit in a multiple prison term is
based on total penalty imposed or the maximum of the penalty imposed.
Held: The determination of the eligibility of the accused for the 6 years limit in
a multiple prison terms and should be based on the maximum term and not
the total term. It is enough that each of the prison term does not exceed 6
years. The number of offense is immaterial for as long as the penalties
imposed, when taken individually and separately, are within the
probationable period.
In the case at bar, the penalty imposed by the MeTC for the 16
information of oral defamation is 1 year and 1 day to a 1 year to 8 months
imprisonment in each case within the probationable period, the accused
contention that he is not qualified for probation under the MeTC decision is
devoid of merit because the basis is not the total term of imprisonment but
the maximum term.
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Under Sec.4, PD 968, the language of the law is clear that no

application fro probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. In the case at
bar, the accused by perfecting an appeal ipso facto relinquish his alternative
remedy of availing the Probation Law.
Since the accused has perfected an appeal, his application for
probation is denied.
o OCA vs. Librado, (260 SCRA 714)

Facts: Respondent Vicente P. Librado is deputy sheriff of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, in IliganCity. On September 19, 1994, he
was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 in an information filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 5, for selling and having in his
possession certain quantities of prohibited drugs known as metamphetamine
hydrochloride or ―shabu‖ and marijuana. He was subsequently found guilty
and sentenced to six (6) years of imprisonment.
Pursuant to its authority under the Resolution of the Court En Banc
dated March 12, 1981, the Office of the Court Administrator filed this
administrative complaint against him and on November 23, 1994, he was
suspended from office.
Contention of the Respondent Libradro: He admits that he had been
convicted of violation of R.A. No. 6425 and claims that he is now on
probation.
Contention of the State:The case involves a conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude as a ground for disciplinary action under the Civil Service
Law.Under the rules of the Civil Service Commission, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude is considered a grave offense punishable, upon first
commission, by dismissal. As this Court has held, it alone suffices as a ground
for the dismissal of a civil service employee.
Issue:Whether the respondent‘ claim is tenable.
Held:No. Drug-pushing, as a crime, has been variously condemned as ―an
especially vicious crime,‖ ―one of the most pernicious evils that have ever
crept into our society.‖ For those who become addicted to it ―not only slide
into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave
menace to the safety of law-abiding members of society,‖ while ―peddlers of
drugs are actually agents of destruction. They deserve no less than the
maximum penalty of death.
There is no doubt that drug-pushing is a crime which involves moral
turpitude and implies ―every thing which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals ―including ―acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man
and man.‖ Indeed nothing is more depraved than for anyone to be a
merchant of death by selling prohibited drugs.
The image of the judiciary is tarnished by conduct, which involves
moral turpitude. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law (P.D. No.
968, as amended) is to save valuable human material, it must not be
forgotten that unlike pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime of
which the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and
rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify his retention in the government
service. He may seek to reenter government service, but only after he has
shown that he is fit to serve once again. It cannot be repeated too often
that a public office is a public trust, which demands of those in its service the
highest degree of morality.
o Soriano vs. CA, (GR No. 123938, 1999)
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Facts: Soriano was convicted of the crime of Homicide, Serious Physical

Injuries and Damage to Property through reckless imprudence. He filed for
probation which was granted. Trial court ordered Soriano also to pay
indemnities to the heirs of his victims. Trial court sent an order to Soriano to
pay with no avail. Soriano was cited for contempt which revoked his
probation and is penalized to serve the maximum penalty of his original
crime.
Contention of the Accused: He was unemployed, dependent on his parents
for support of his family, and incapable of figuring out any feasible program
of payment.
Contention of the State: Soriano was able to spend for 2 lawyers to represent
him.
Issue:Whetherinability to comply with a court order is a ground for denial of
probation.
Held:The decision is in favor of the accused. Judge committed grave abuse
in discretion in citing Soriano for contempt. There was no hearing for Soriano
to explain why he should not be in contempt. Soriano was barred to adduce
evidence that could clarify matters. Soriano‘s claim that he had no
knowledge regarding the order should have been given a chance to be
supported by evidence. Revocation of probation is lifted.
Civil Liability Arising from Criminal Liability
I. General Rule:
A. RPC Article 100.Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
 De Guzman vs People. October 8, 2003

Facts: Ma. Lourdes De Guzman has been convicted of theft and ordered to pay 4
640 000. Her conviction was affirmed by the CA but on further appeal to the SC, De
Guzman died before her case was decided.
Issue: Does the death of an accused while his case is on appeal also extinguish his
civil liability?
Ruling: Yes. Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand
as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Pursuant to RPC,
Art 89 1: How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally
extinguished;
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
it is incumbent upon the Court to dismiss the instant petition for review. Needless
to state, the civil liability attendant to the crime which includes the restitution of
personal or real property is also extinguished.
*Death of accused pending appeal extinguishes criminal and civil liabitliy.
 Sapiera vs CA, 314 SCRA 370, Sep 14, 1999
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Facts: Remedios Sapiera was charged with estafa. She was acquitted of the crime
but the trial court did not rule on whether her civil liability amounting to 335 000 was
extinguished. On appeal, the CA ruled that she is civilly liable.
Contention of Accused: Acquittal from a crime carries with it automatic extinction

of Civil Liability.
Issue: Does acquittal extinguish civil liability?
Ruling: No. Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
specifically provides: "Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that
the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the
civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted.
 Maximo vs Gerochi, 144 SCRA 326, Sep 24, 1986

Facts: Conchita Panghilason has been charged of estafa for using dishonored
checks as payment for the rice she bought from Lidelia Maximo. Panghilason upon
trial, admitted her obligations. Judge Nicolas Gerochi Jr. rendered a judgment
acquitting Panghilason from the crime charged and further stated that any
obligation arising from the acts complained is civil in nature. Maximo filed a motion
for reconsideration in so far as the civil obligation of the accused is concerned
asking for the payment of said obligations by the accused. Judge Gerochi denied
said motion.
Contention of Judge Gerochi: As the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, it follows that any obligation becomes civil in
nature and governed by civil laws.
Issue: In case of acquittal, is the civil liability arising from the acts complained of
extinguished?
Ruling: No. If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil
liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment.
The prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v.
Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on
reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the
same case without need for a separate civil action.
 People vs Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067, Aug 31, 1962

Facts: Miranda has been charged with estafa. The CFI acquitted him on the ground
that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt but still found him civilly
liable as there is evidence showing that accused has received 2000 pesos as loan
from one of the offended party in a prior arrangement. Miranda now assails the part
of the decision finding him civilly liable.
Contention of Accused: The civil obligation is a necessary consequence of the

criminal action. Acquittal from the criminal action necessarily deems it improper to
impose any civil liability arising from it.
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Issue: If the information in the complaint is inconsistent with the act complained of,
does acquittal extinguish civil liability?
Ruling: *NO but the right to institute a separate civic action is reserved to the
offended party.
The trial court found as a fact that the sum of P1,200.00 ordered to be paid in the
judgment of acquittal was received by the defendant-appellant as loan. This finding
is inconsistent with the existence of the criminal act charged in the information. The
liability of the defendant for the return of the amount so received arises from a civil
contract, not from a criminal act, and may not be enforced in the criminal case.
In the present case, instead of a loan, the appellant retained the money because
of an arrangement with Mr. Mojica, heretofore mentioned.
 People vs Ursua, 60 Phil 252, Aug 1, 1934

Facts: On June 8, 1933, the CFI of Camarines Sur found Ursua guilty of homicide
through reckless imprudence but no pronouncement as to the civil liability was
made. Ursua appealed his case on June 13, 1983. On June 18, 1933, the prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that no pronouncement as to the
civil liability has been made. The CFI denied the motion on the ground that it is of
the belief that since the accused appealed the case, the CFI has lost its jurisdiction
to pass upon the matter of the civil liability.
Issue: Does a court lose jurisdiction over the civil aspect if the accused files his
appeal first before the prosecution files a motion to attach civil liability?
Ruling: No. The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution
and to appeal for purposes of the civil liability of the accused (section 107, General
Orders, No. 58), necessarily implies that such right is protected in the same manner
as the right of the accused to his defense. If the accused has the right within fifteen
days to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the offended party should have
the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is
prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be made dependent on that of the
accused. If upon appeal by the accused the court altogether loses its jurisdiction
over the cause, the offended party would be deprived of his right to appeal,
although fifteen days have not yet elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the
accused files his appeal before the expiration of said period.
*The offended party/prosecution may file an appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal
case, 15 days from the promulgation of decision by a lower court.
 Quinto vs Andres, G.R. No. 155791; March 16, 2005

Facts: The accused invited Wilson Quinto, 11 years old to go fishing inside a
drainage culvert and later surfaced carrying Wilson‘s dead body. A case for
homicide has been filed against the accused. The accused filed a demurer to
evidence which was granted by the trial court. The court also held that it could not
hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant
evidence to prove their liability for Wilson's death. Wilson‘s mother, Melba appealed
the trial court‘s decision but such was affirmed by the CA.
Contention trial court and CA: The acquittal in this case is not merely based on
reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not
commit the criminal acts complained of.
Issue: In case of acquittal where the act constituting a criminal offense has not been
duly proven,is civil liability extinguished?
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Ruling: Yes. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or
omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.
 Chua vs CA, 443 SCRA 142, Nov 19, 2004

Facts: Lydia Hao filed with the city prosecutor 4 counts of falsification of public
documents against Francis Chua. The case was initially handled by the city
prosecutor until private prosecutors intervened in the case. Chua filed a motion
asking that said private prosecutors be excluded from the case and such was
granted. However, Hao filed a certiorari asking for the private prosecutors to be
allowed to intervene and such was granted. Chua moved for a reconsideration of
the order allowing private prosecutors to intervene.
Contention of Chua: Where from the nature of the offense or where the law defining
and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended
party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Issue: Are private prosecutors allowed to intervene when a case has been initially
filed and handled by a public prosecutor?
Ruling: Yes in relation to the civil liability. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising
from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly
liable.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel
in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that, [w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to
institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the
offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial
of the criminal action.
 Philippine Rabbit v. People 427 SCRA 526, April 14, 2004

Facts: A driver of the Phil. Rabbit Bus line has been found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries, and damage to
property and was ordered to pay damages. The accused appealed but while
pending appeal, he jumped bail. The CA upon discovering that said employee
jumped bail, dismissed the appeal. The company being subsidiarily liable, now
assails the judgment rendering it civilly liable.
Issue: If during the pendency of an appeal an employee has jumped bail, is the
employer now civilly laible?
Ruling: Yes. Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate
court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if
the accused jumps bail.The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
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This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when
they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are
deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
B. Civil Code
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
1) Freedom of religion;
2) Freedom of speech;
3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
5) Freedom of suffrage;
6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
9) The right to be secure in one‘s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances;
14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one‘s self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
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immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person

confessing becomes a State witness;
18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not
been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant‘s act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
II. SPECIFIC RULES
Article 101.Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision
4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age,
or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control,
unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority,
legal guardianship, or control or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or
minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution,
in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit
which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which
each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately,
or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the
inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused
with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the
manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no
such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of
their property exempt from execution.
A. Insanity, Imbecility and those Over 9 and Under 15 Years of Age: RPC Art 101 first rule
Civil liability of persons exempt from criminal liability
1. Persons who have legal authority of the imbecile, insane or minor are primarily
liable.
2. Civil liability of minor who acts with discernment devolve upon the parents.
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3. In the case of state of necessity, the ones benefited shall proportionately

shoulder the civil liability.
4. In cases falling under subversions 5 and 6 of art 12, the persons who used
violence or caused fear shall be primarily and secondarily liable. If there be no
such persons, the person doing the act shall be liable.
*Persons having legal authority of the imbecile, insane or minor are liable only if they are
negligent or with fault.
*The insane, imbecile or minor shall respond with their own property not exempt from
execution if there is no fault or negligence on the persons having legal authority over
such persons or those having legal authority are insolvent
B. State of Necessity: RPC Art 101 second rule

- paragraph 4 of Art. 11; there is civil liability but the civil liability is borne upon the one
who benefited by the act which causes damage to another.
-proportional level of benefit
C. Irresistible Force, Uncontrollable Fear of Greater or Equal Injury: RPC Art 101 third rule
- The persons using violence or causing the fear are primarily liable.
- If there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable secondarily
D. Innkeepers and Similar Persons,
Article 102.Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of

establishments. - In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or
theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself,
or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Elements under paragraph 1:

1 That the innkeeper, tavernkeeper, proprietor of establishment or his employee
committed a violation of municipal ordinance or some general or special police
regulation.
2. That a crime is committed in such inn, tavern, or establishment.
3. That the person criminally liable is insolvent.
Elements under paragraph 2:

1. The guests notified in advance the innkeeper or the person representing him of
the deposit of their goods within the inn of the house.
2. The guests followed the directions of the innkeeper or his representative with
respect to the care and vigilance over such goods.
3. Such goods of the guests lodging therein were taken by robbery with force upon
things or theft committed within the inn or house.
It is not necessary that the effects be actually delivered to the innkeeper; it is

enough that they were within the inn.
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E. Subsidiary Liability of Other Persons, RPC Art. 103
Article 103.Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants,
pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
1. Carpio vs Doroja, 180 SCRA 1, Dec. 5 1989

Facts: Edwin Ramirez pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting to less serious
physical injuries after he bumped Dionisio Carpio while driving a jeepney owned
and operated by Eduardo Toribio. Ramirez is unable to pay any of the damages
claimed by Carpio so Carpio claimed for Toribio‘s subsidiary liability but such was
denied by Judge Sergio Doroja.
Contention of Doroja: A separate action to impose civil liability is needed as the

nature of the accident falls under ―culpa-contractual‖ and the dispositive portion of
the decision did not include any subsidiary liability of Toribio.
Contention of Carpio: It is implied that the subsidiary liability of the employer may be
enforced in the same proceeding and no separate action is necessary even if the
employer was not mentioned as a party in the criminal proceeding.
Issue: Is a separate action necessary for enforcement of an employer’s subsidiary

liability?
Ruling: No, Doroja is mistaken. A separate and independent action is unnecessary as
an employer’s liability is clear and implied from the decision otherwise it would
prolong the agony of the victim.
The present case is an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art.
103 of the RPC and not an action arising from culpa-contractual or culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil
liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is
engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao,
117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction
and upon proof of the latter's insolvency
2. Clemente vs Foreign Missions. 38 OG 1954

Facts: A nurse from a missionary hospital run by Foreign missions has been found
guilty of negligence. Unable to pay to liabilities, she asks for the subsidiary liability of
the hosital. The hospital contends that it is not engaged in industry as a means of
livelihood or for profit, hence it is not subsidiarily liable.
Issue: Are hospitals engaged in industry?
Ruling: No, therefore they are not subsidiarily liable for the negligent acts of nurses.
Nurses in treating a patient, are not acting as servants of the hospitals because they
are employed to carry out the orders of physicians, to whose authority they are
subject.
*What is industry then?

-An industry is an enterprise conducted as means of livelihood or profit.
- Any dep‘t or branch of art, occupation, or business especially one which employs
so much labor and capital and is a distinct branch of trade.
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3. Sleinmetz vs Valdez, 79 Phil 92

In this case, it has been held that when an employer‘s property is used for private
purposes and not industry, then he is not subsidiarily liable.
F. What Civil Liability Includes:
1. RPC Art. 104 - 108
Article 104.What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in articles 100,
101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Article 105.Restitution. - How made. - The restitution of the thing itself must be made
whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as
determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third
person who has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the
proper person, who may be liable to him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the
third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for
its recovery.
Article 106.Reparation. - How made. - The court shall determine the amount of
damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its
special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made
accordingly.
Article 107.Indemnification - What is included. - Indemnification for consequential

damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered
by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Article 108.Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification

for consequential damages and action to demand the same - Upon whom it devolves.
- The obligation to make restoration or reparation for damages and indemnification for
consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to

the heirs of the person injured.
- If victim dies, the action to demand restitution, reparation and indemnification

descends to the heirs.
- If the accused dies after final judgment, the obligation devolves upon the heirs.
Formula in determining loss of earning capacity
Net earning capacity = x
X= Life Expectancy(LE) x gross annual income – living expenses (50% of gross annual
income)
LE = 2/3 x (80 – aged of deceased)
 There must be unbiased proof of the deceased average income
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 Rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a

claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.
Loss of earning capacity must always be supported by documentary evidences,

except:
1. Self employed and earning less than min wage
2. Employed as a daily wage worker earning less the min wage,
* Even if a daily wage worker is earning less than minimum wage, if he is not
employed full time or he is just seasonally employed
Moral damages
- Automatically granted in:
1. Rape
2. Death
3. Detention
- Never punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich the claimant at the
expense of the defendant.
- Can be awarded without proof if it‘s obvious that physical suffering is present.
- Expenses relating to the 40th day and death anniversary cannot be considered
actual expenses because of lapse of time.
- Actual damages must be supported by receipts. An exception is for members of
indegenous community or Indegenous Persons (Mangyan, Ita, Igorot, etc.)
The heirs of the person liable has no obligation if restoration is not possible and the
deceased left no property.
Other kinds of damages: temperate and nominal damages may be awarded if the
court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered by its amount cannot be proved with
certainty.
Attorney‘s fees- allowed to be recovered when:

a. It is in the concept of actual or compensatory damage
b. if the defendant‘s acts or ommission compelled plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect their rights.
In cases of complex crimes where rape and death are present, the indemnity is 100
000 pesos while the moral damage is 50 000.
3. Jamelo vs Serafino, 44 SCRA 464

Facts: Anita Jamelo‘s son, Artemio is a truck driver of Federico Serfino. On one
ocasson, another truck driver of Serfino, Antonio Regoles bumped the truck Artemio
was riding resulting to his death. Anita filed a civil case for damages against
Regoles, which she won. Regoles turned out to be insolvent so Anita went after
Serfino‘s subsidiary liability.
Contention of Serfino: There is no judgment of conviction so there is no subsidiary

liability. A civil complaint commenced but there was no criminal action filed against
his driver he was not named as a party in said civil case.
Contention of Jamelo: There is an automatic liability of the employer. Conviction of

the employee is not a legal requisite.
Issue: Is conviction of an employee by final judgment a requisite to claim damages

under Art. 103 of RPC?
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Ruling: Yes. There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant-employer

under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Codewhere his employee has not been
previously criminally convicted. It is clear then that there having been no criminal
conviction of the employee wherein his civil liability was determined and fixed, no
subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code can be claimed
against defendant-employer.
The judgment in the civil action won by Jamelo is enforceable solelyand exclusively
against the only defendant therein, the erring driver, Regoles.
4. People vs Torres, 366 SCRA 408, Oct 2, 2001

Facts: Amorsolo Torres pleaded guilty to 1 count of rape and 1 count of acts of
lasciviousness. The case for rape which, is punishable by death was elevated to the
SC upon automatic review along with the case for acts of lasciviousness. No
separate appeal has been made for the case of acts of lasciviousness when it
should not have been included in the automatic review. The case for acts therefore
has been dismissed for being in the wrong forum. The question now arises on
whether the civil liability still exists for acts of lasciviousness.
Issue: When a case on appeal has been dismissed for being in the wrong forum, is
the civil liability also lost?
Ruling: No. The case for acts of lasciviousness has not risen out of the same
occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion as that of the
crime of rape. What has been dismissed is only the appeal and the conviction of the
accused therein by the a quo stands.
5. People vs Panado
Facts: The accused, all surnamed Panados were found guilty of killing Danilo del
Rosario. They were ordered to pay the victim‘s heirs 50 000 for actual and
compensatory damages. The claim for damages has been based on Danilo‘s
widow‘s testimony.
Contention of Accused: The amount of 50 000 as civil liability is too much as it is

based on claims of the widow that the heirs incurred burial and funeral expenses.
Issue: Is it necessary to prove claims for moral, actual and compensatory damages
in cases of death?
Ruling: Yes for actual damages. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code explicitly requires that,
except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled only to such pecuniary
loss as he has duly proved. In the instant case, aside from the assertion of the widow
that he spent P9,000.00 for the coffin of the deceased, no documentary evidence
was presented to prove that burial or funeral expenses were actually incurred.
However, from her own testimony she claimed that the receipt for the purchase of
the coffin was delivered to the Social Security System (SSS) to support her claim for
reimbursement. In fact, according to her, she was expecting to be reimbursed
P12,000.00 for her funeral expenses. The amount should more than make up for the
P9,000.00 she allegedly spent for the coffin of her husband. With regard to her other
funeral expenses, the widow failed to prove them with competent evidence.
Nonetheless, the heirs are entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of
the deceased Danilo del Rosario. The absence of documentary evidence to
support such claim does not preclude its recovery. The testimony of the victim‘s wife,
Hilda del Rosario, as to the earning capacity of her husband during his lifetime
sufficiently cures this deficiency.
Danilo del Rosario was thirty-seven (37) years old at the time of his death. His
average income as fishpond caretaker was P3,000.00 a month. Hence, in
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accordance with the American Expectancy Table, the loss of earning capacity
must be computed as follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus age of the deceased).
Since Danilo was 37 years of age at the time of his death, then his life expectancy
was 28.66 years. Thus - chanrobles virtual law library
Net Earning = Life x Gross - Reasonable &
Capacity (x) Expectancy Annual Necessary chanrobles virtual law library
Income Living Expenses chanrobles virtual law library
(x) = 2(80-37) x (P36,000 - P18,000)
3
(x) = 28.66 x P18,000 (x) = P 514,800.00
On the award of moral damages, this Court is convinced that the prosecution has
amply demonstrated that the heirs suffered mental anguish to justify this award.
Current jurisprudence has set moral damages at P50,000.00. Nonetheless, we deem
it proper to rethink our policy on moral damages.
Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only
when the heirs of the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as
borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims
family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved
one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal
killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives
them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the
gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral
damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the
heirs' emotional suffering. Verily, Hilda and her son Louie Gee would forever carry
the emotional wounds of the vicious killing of a husband and a father. With or
without proof, this fact can never be denied; since it is undisputed, it must be
considered proved
6. People vs Caniezo, 354 SCRA 335, March 13, 2001

Facts: Caniezo was found guilty of rape. He was ordered to pay the victim 50 000 for
moral damages and the costs. No award for indemnity has been pronounced.
Contention of State: The victim must be indemnified.
Issue: In rape cases,may civil indemnity be awarded even if the judgment has no
pronouncement as to the civil liability?
Ruling: Yes. Civil indemnity must be mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.
Exemplary damages may also be awarded as part of the civil liability when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as provided by
Art. 2230 of the Civil Code. Hence, in addition to the moral damages amounting to
P50,000.00, the victim should also be awarded civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00.
7. People vs Galvez, 355 SCRA 246, March 26, 2001

Facts: Manuel Galvez stabbed Romen Castro at his back. Galvez was convicted
before the RTC of Caloocoan city for murder and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Castro the sum of 50 00.00 plus actual
damages of 30 000 as well as moral and exemplary damages of 30 000 each.
Contention of State: The victim‘s testified that they incurred 30 000.00 pesos as
actual damages for his brother‘s wake and funeral. The trial court failed to award
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indemnification of consequential damage considering the victim was a

construction worker earning a daily wage of 150.00 at the time of his death.
Issue: Is it necessary to increase the 30 000.00 pesos award for moral and exemplary
damages and to include consequential damages?
Ruling: Yes. The trial court‘s award of P50 000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the
victim Romen Castro is in accord with our current rulings.
The award for exemplary damages should be deleted. Exemplary damages are not
awarded in the case at bar because the crime was committed without one or more
aggravating circumstances. As regards moral damages, the same should be
increased to P50 000 pursuant to recent rulings.
On the other hand, the trial court failed to award indemnification for consequential
damages which includes payment for loss of earning capacity.
In determining the loss for earning capacity the following formula is provided:
2 x [80-21 (age of the victim at time of death)] = 39.33
3
P150 (daily wage) x 261 (number of working days in a year) = P39,150.00
(gross annual salary)
39,150.00 x .50 (allocation for living expenses) = P19,575.00
39.33 x P19,575.00 = P769,884.75 (loss of earning capacity)
Hence, aside from the damages awarded by the trial court, accused-appellant
should pay the legal heirs of the victim the amount of P769,884.75 representing
unearned income of the victim.
9. People vs Pajotal, 386 SCRA 674, Nov 14, 2001

Facts: Pajotal was convicted of Robbery with Homicide for taking away P15 000
from the victim before killing him. He was sentenced to pay the heirs of the victim
the sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of life of the victim, the
sum of P26,000.00 as actual damages and P500,000.00 as lost earnings. No
documentary evidence was shown to support the award for loss of earning
capacity. No compensation for the sum of money taken away during the crime was
also pronounced.
Issues: Is there a need to present proof for claims on loss of earning capacity? Is
there a need to award a compensation for the value of thing destroyed, stolen, or
seized by an accused during the commission of a crime?
Ruling: Yes. The civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial
court is sustained, the same being in line with current case law. The award of
P26,000.00 as actual damages is also sustained as the amount duly proved and
supported by receipts presented during the course of the trial. However, the trial
court should have ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P15,000.00, representing the amount the victim was carrying at the
time of the crime and taken by accused-appellant and his co-accused. It was
never established by any admissible evidence that any portion of this amount had
been recovered.
But the award for loss of earning capacity should be disallowed. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages
for lossof earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence,
provided that there is testimony either that the victim was self-employed earning
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less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is
available; or that the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws. In the case at bar, the testimony of
Lea Espina, Winefred Espina's widow, was the sole basis for the award of damages
for loss of earning capacity. As it is not supported by other documentary evidence,
her bare testimony cannot be made the basis for an award of damages for loss of
earning capacity. Nor do the exceptions apply so as to justify an award of damages
for loss of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence. The
victim was not employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage at the time of his death. He was in fact, as claimed by his widow, earning
substantially more than the minimum wage. For these reasons, damages for loss of
earnings cannot be awarded in the absence of evidence sufficiently showing his
income.
The trial court should have awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
pursuant to Art. 2219 par. (1) in relation to Art. 2006 par. (3) of the Civil Code. This is in
consonance with our recent rulings.
G. Persons Civilly Liable.

1. RPC, Arts. 108-111
Article 108.Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification

for consequential damages and action to demand the same - Upon whom it devolves.
- The obligation to make restoration or reparation for damages and indemnification for
consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to

the heirs of the person injured.
Article 109.Share of each person civilly liable. - If there are two or more persons civilly
liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond.
Article 110.Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of

a felony - Preference in payment. - Notwithstanding the provisions of the next
preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their
respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas,
and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable.
The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next,
against that of the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories.
Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person
by whom payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others for
the amount of their respective shares.
Article 111.Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. - Any person who has
participated gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution
in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation.
2. Articles 2202, 2206, and 2230 New Civil Code
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained
of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant
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Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be
at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the
law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing
the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to
the offended party.
RELATED CASES
People vs Bangcado and Banisa , GR. No. 132330, Nov 28, 2000
Facts: SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO and PO3 CESAR BANISA are policemen convicted of 2
counts of murder and 2 counts of frustrated murder. The victim is an ―Igorot‖, member
of an Indigenous Persons and during his burial, no receipts were taken or brought for
very few use receipts as proof of payments in Indigenous Persons Community. The
question now arises on the claim for actual damages.
Issue: On occasions where a victim was a member of Indigenous Persons and he was
buried according to customs and traditions, is documentary evidence such as receipts
necessary to substantiate claims for damages?
Ruling. No. The general rule is that claims for actual damages should be supported by
actual receipts. However, it is undisputed that the victims are members of the
indigenous community and were buried according to their customs and traditions. The
relatives of the victims attested that they incurred expenses for the cañao, the
traditional gathering of Igorots. The Court is not unaware that the informal market
system still governs the economic transactions of indigenous communities. Thus,
receipts and other documents do not play a large role in their daily commercial
transactions. In this case, wherein it is clearly established that the claimants were
indeed members of indigenous communities, then the court should allow reasonable
claims for expenses incurred in relation to traditional burial practices.
People vs Manalo 396 SCRA 159, G.R. Nos. 144989-90. January 31, 2003
Facts: Manalo was convicted of rape. The trial court awarded P50 000.00 as indemnity
to the victim and ordered the accused to pay the cost. No award for moral damages
was pronounced.
Contention of State: In rape cases, moral damages should automatically be

awarded.
Issue: Is there a need to automatically award moral damages to victims of rape?
Ruling: Yes. The trial court should have further ordered him (accused) to pay P50,000 as
moral damages. Moral damages are automatically granted in a rape case without
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need of further proof other than the fact of its commission. It is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.
People vs Rubiso, 399 SCRA 267, G.R. No. 128871. March 18, 2003
In this case, the ruling in in People vs Panado has been reiterated.
Facts: Rubiso was found guilty of murder. He was ordered to pay 106 288.85 as actual
damages and to the legal heirs of the deceased the amount of 50 000.00 for his
wrongful death, 30 000.00 as moral damages, and 560 000.00 for loss of earning
capacity and costs.
Issue: Is there a need to increase the award for moral damages?
Ruling: Yes. We increase the trial courts award of moral damages from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence. The purpose of such award is not to enrich
the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for their wounded feelings. As borne out
by human nature and experience, a violent death, such as the one at bar, invariably
and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims
family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved
one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death not only steals
from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love,
affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice
has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering.
People vs Montemayor, 396 SCRA 159, Jan. 28, 2003

Facts: Silverio Montemayor has been found guilty of 5 counts of rape. He was ordered
to pay P50 000.00 in each case.
Issues: Is there a need to award civil indemnity in cases of rape? Are awards for civil
indemnities and moral damages one and the same?
Ruling. Yes and civil indemnity is separate and distinct from moral damages.
Civil indemnity must be awarded to complainant Aileen S. Alba. Civil indemnity, which
is mandatory in a finding of rape, is distinct from and should not be denominated as
moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
we grant civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in each case.
People vs Bantilan, GR 129286, Sep 14, 1999

Facts: Hermie Bantilan was found guilty of Rape with Homicide. The accused was
ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim, Jita Quinto, the sum of P14,000.00 as
reimbursement of actual expenses for the burial of the deceased; the sum of
P100,000.00 as indemnity for the rape and death of the said victim; and the costs. No
award for moral damages was pronounced.
Contention of Accused: The indemnity for Rape with Homicide being one crime must
be 50 000. Moral damages is unnecessary without proof of mental anguish and the likes.
Issues: In case of Rape with Homicide, is the civil indemnity of P100 000.00 too much? Is
it necessary to prove mental anguish and suffering before being awarded moral
damages?
Ruling: No. In line with the recent jurisprudence, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the
victim of rape with homicide is in the amount of P100,000.00 which is fully justified and
properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said special complex crime.
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The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is granted. Moral damages may be

additionally awarded to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding without the
need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof; the fact that they suffered the trauma of
mental, physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the
trial.
People vs Quisay, Gr. 106833, Dec 10, 1999

This is a reiteration of the ruling in relation to the award for civil indemnity and moral
damages in cases of rape with homicide.
Facts: Jaime Quisay was found guilty of rape with homicide and was ordered to pay
and indemnify the parents of the victim in the amount of 50 000 as damages.
The question on what is the proper amount for civil indemnity and moral damages
surfaces once more.
Ruling: The trial court awarded the heirs of the victim civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This
should be increased to P100,000.00 in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Payoti[45and People v. Robles, in which it was stated:
―With regard to the civil indemnity, the court hereby rules that the victim of rape with
homicide should be awarded the amount of P100,000.00. Prevailing judicial policy has
authorized the mandatory award of P50,000.00 in case of death, and P50,000.00 upon
the finding of the fact of rape. Also, under recent case law the indemnity for the victim
shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape committed is
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the applicable amendatory laws [R.R. No. 4111 and R.A. No. 7659]; Thus,
if homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the rape, indemnity in the
amount of P100,000.00 is fully justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness
of the said special complex crime.‖
An award of P50,000.00 for moral damages should likewise be made in favor of the heirs
of the victim in accordance with recent ruling of this Court
People vs Caraig, 400 SCRA 67, March 28, 2003

Facts; Caraig and Laomoc are charged with 3 counts of frustrated murder and 1 count
of frustrated murder. Laomoc was arrested, tried and found guilty before Caraig was
even arrested. Caraig was found gulty of the crime charged and ordered to pay the
heirs of Roberto Raagas (one of the victims) the sum of P140,000 for burial expenses
based on bank checks presented at Laomoc‘s trial.
Issues: In cases where the accused in one crime are tried separately and the evidence
supporting claims for damages has been presented in the trial of one of the accused
but not in the trial of another, is the latter also liable for the civil liabilities of the former?
Ruling: No. In awarding in favor of the heirs of Roberto Raagas the amount of P140, 000
for burial expenses, the trial court relied on Exhibits A and A-1, which are merely lists of
expenses written on a PCIBank check booklet. It based the award for burial expenses in
the amount of P19,900 in favor of the heirs of Melencio Castro Jr. on Exhibits C (receipt
issued by Memorial Homes), D(list of expenses), and D-1(Affidavit of Adjudication).
Notably, these exhibits were presented during the trial of the cases against Laomoc on
14 December 1988 and 1 February 1989 before appellant Caraig was arrested. They
were not among the documentary evidence offered in evidence during the trial of the
consolidated cases against Caraig. Hence, they cannot be considered as evidence
against him.
Besides, a list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been
issued as a matter of course in business transactions. Neither can the mere testimonies
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of the victims widows Ruth Agustin, Rhodora Raagas, and Merle Castro in the
consolidated cases against Caraig justify the awards for funeral or burial expenses. It is
necessary for a party seeking the award of actual damages to produce competent
proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award.Only substantiated and
proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection
with the death, wake, or burial of the victim will be recognized in court. Nonetheless, in
line with People v. Carillo, reiterated in People v.Bonifacio, we shall award nominal
damages in the amount of P10,000 for each group of heirs of the victims, since they
clearly incurred funeral expenses.
People vs Cabical, 403 SCRA 268,

Facts: Rolito Cabital was found guilty for the murder of Reynaldo Fernando. The victim‘s
wife claimed that her husband earned a living from the buy and sell of pigs, cows and
carabaos, and farming. He allegedly earned an annual income of P124,290.00. The
claim for actual damages were unsupported by any receipts and the expenses for 40 th
day and The accused was ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of 50 000 as
civil indemnity; 100 000 as loss of earning capacity; 44 000 as actual damages and 20
000 for moral damages and to pay costs.
Issue: Are expenses for 4oth day and 1st year death anniversary included in actual
damages? Is testimonial evidence by the relative of a self-employed individual
sufficient to support claims for loss of income?
Ruling: Expenses for 40th day and 1st year death anniversary are not included in actual
damages. For loss of income, unbiased proof is required.
With regard the civil liability of the appellant, the award by the trial court of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity is in accord with recent jurisprudence. The widow of the victim is also
entitled to P50,000.00 as moral damages for the anguish she suffered for the sudden
death of her husband. As to the actual damages, it has been consistently ruled that the
party must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such
award. In People v. Judy Matore y Guevara, we held that a list of expenses cannot
replace receipts when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in
business transactions. Thus, in the case at bar, the transportation and hospitalization
expenses which were not supported by receipts cannot be included in the
computation. Moreover, the expenses relating to the 40 th day and first year death
anniversary of Fernando cannot be considered as actual expenses because of the
lapse of a considerable time from his death. The award of P44,000.00 granted by the
trial court is therefore reduced to P27,040.00.
The widow, Esperanza, also testified that she lost a source of income for her family due
to the death of her husband, who she claimed had an annual income of P124,290.00
from farming and from the business of buying and selling of cows, carabaos, and pigs.
Of the P124,290.00, P81,600 or P6,800.00 per month comes from the business of buying
and selling of animals, while P42,690.00 comes from farming. In People v. Panabang, we
laid down the rule that for lost income to be recovered there must be an unbiased proof
of the deceased’s average, not just gross, income. Although in general, testimonial
evidence is insufficient to substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity,
testimonies of the relatives on the income of the deceased have been allowed to
prosper when documentary evidence is unavailable, such as when the deceased is
self-employed and the amount claimed is reasonable. Esperanza stated that her late
husband used to sell 3 cows, 2 carabaos and 10 pigs per month. However, it is of
judicial notice that the buy and sell of animals is a seasonal business. There are certain
months of the year when business is good, such as during the fiesta and Christmas
seasons. In the same manner, there are times when business is bad. In the exercise of
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our discretion, we reduce the claim of Esperanza to a reasonable amount. We compute

the award for the loss of income of Fernando, as follows:
Net annual income = (Annual income) (necessary and incidental expenses computed
at 50% of the annual income)
Net annual income = P100,000.00 50,000.00

Net annual income = P 50,000.00
Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 age during the time of death)
Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 45)
Life expectancy = 23.33
Loss of earning capacity = (net annual income) x (life expectancy)
Loss of earning capacity = P50,000.00 x 23
Loss of earning capacity = P1,150,000.00
People vs Mallari, 404 SCRA 170 June 17, 2003

Facts: Rufino Mallari was convicted of murder and ordered to pay the victim‘s heir‘s 100
000 as compensatory damages; 75 000 as moral damages; 50 000 as exemplary
damages and costs. The victim‘s wife testified that at the time of his death, Joseph was
37 years old. He was a foreman in a construction firm with a daily income of P350 and
also a carpenter and mason with a daily income of P250. (*the victim therefore is not
regularly employed- umeextraextra lang)
Contention of Accused: In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award for moral
damages and exemplary damages must be reduced.
Issue: Is there a need to reduce the amount of moral damages and exemplary
damages when they exceed current jurisprudence?
Ruling: Yes. We sustain the court’s award of moral damages but at a reduced rate of
P50,000, consistent with recent jurisprudence. In cases of violent death, moral damages
is awarded even in the absence of proof because an untimely and violent death
invariably brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim‘s family. In
addition, the amount of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Joseph should be
awarded to his heirs.
The award of exemplary damages is proper in view of the qualifying aggravating

circumstance of use of a motor vehicle. However, the amount of P50,000 awarded by
the trial court should be reduced to P25,000 pursuant to current case law.
Finally, we note that the prosecution offered the testimony of the victim‘s widow on the
age and daily income of her husband, without supporting the same with documentary
evidence.
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may
be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence provided that there is
testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
victim‘s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
There is no showing that the victim was self-employed or employed as a daily-wage

worker with an average daily income of less than the minimum wage provided under
the labor laws in force at the time of his death. In the absence of such proof, the
exception cannot be applied to this case. Hence, no award for loss of earning
capacity can be granted in favor of the victim‘s heirs.
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*not regularly employed/ ―umeextra extra lang‖- does not fall within the exception of
not presenting documentary evidence to substantiate claims for loss of income.
People vs Bisda 406 SCRA 454

Facts: Alma Bisda and Generosa Basilan were convicted of kidnapping for ransom and
ordered to indemnify the parents of the victim the amount of P100 000 as moral
damages and to pay the costs.
Contention of State: Damages must also be awarded to the victim and not just her
parents.
Issue: In cases of kidnapping, must a child-victim also be awarded civil indemnity

and damages?
Ruling: The trial court awarded P100,000 moral damages to the spouses William and
Marymae Soriano, the parents of the victim. The trial court did not award any moral and
exemplary damages to the victim. The decision of the trial court has to be modified.
Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be
awarded to a victim of illegal arrest and detention. In this case, the appellants poked a
knife on the victim as they took her from the school. The appellants also tied her hands,
and placed scotch tape on her mouth. The hapless victim was so shocked when
operatives of the PAOCTF barged into the office of appellant Bisda, and took custody of
the victim that she cried profusely. The victim suffered trauma, mental, physical and
psychological ordeal. There is, thus, sufficient basis for an award of moral damages in
the amount of P300,000.Since there were demands for ransom, not to mention the use
by the appellants of a vehicle to transport the victim from the school to the Jollibee
Restaurant and to the office of appellant Bisda, the victim is entitled to exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.
People vs Bajar, 414 SCRA 494

Another reiteration of the ruling in Panado.
Facts: Alejandro Bajar was found guilty for killing his father-in-law. Bajar‘s wife and her
sisters did not allege any moral damage for they maintain that no amount of money
would compensate for the loss of their father. The trial court sentenced Alejandro to
suffer the penalty of death and to pay the heirs of the victim P30,000 as burial expenses;
P50,000 as death indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Issue: Is an award for moral damages necessary even if it is not alleged?
Ruling: Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only
when the heirs of the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as
borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily
brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently
human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from
the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection
and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been
done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence
of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering. Verily Hilda and her son
Louie Gee would forever carry the emotional wounds of the vicious killing of a husband
and a father. With or without proof, this fact can never be denied; since it is undisputed,
it must be considered proved
People vs Dogami
Facts: Alberto Dogami was found guilty of rape. No aggravating circumstance was
alleged in the information but during the trial, the circumstance of use of deadly
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weapon was proven. The trial court did not award any exemplary damage but the CA
awarded P50 000.00 as exemplary damages on appeal.
Issue: In cases where an aggravating circumstance is not alleged in the information yet
it is duly proven during trial, will there be an award for exemplary damages?
Ruling: Yes. During the trial, the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a
weapon (handgun) and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling were proven.
Nonetheless, these aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the
penalty because the same were not alleged in the Information. Sections 8[140] and
9[141] of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now provide that
aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information;
otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if proven during the
trial. Being favorable to the appellant, this rule, as amended, should be applied
retroactively to this case.
Although the aggravating circumstances in question cannot be appreciated for the

purpose of fixing a heavier penalty in this case, they can, however, be considered as
basis for an award of exemplary damages. Evidence proving these circumstances
forms part of the actual commission of the crime and justifies an award of exemplary
damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code even when the said aggravating
circumstances were not alleged in the information.
As discussed above and pursuant to People v. Catubig, an award of P25,000 as

exemplary damages is also proper.
H. EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY
1. RPC Arts. 112-113
Article 112.Extinction of civil liability. - Civil liability established in articles 100, 101, 102,
and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.
Article 113.Obligation to satisfy civil liability. - Except in case of extinction of his civil
liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be
obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of
liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty,
pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.
By Provisions of the Civil Code:

Civil liability is extinguished by:
1. Payment or performance
2. Loss of the thing due
3. Condonation or remission of the debt
4. Confusion or merger of the rights of the creditor and debtor
5. Compensation
6. Novation
Other causes:
1. Annulment
2. Recission
3. Fulfillment of resolutory condition
Obligations arising from a criminal act is not extinguished by a fortuitous event.
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Page 134 of 134

Criminal Law II: Penalties and Retroactivity

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UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PENALTIES

• Correction or Reformation as shown by the rules which regulates the

THEORIES JUSTIFYING PENALTIES

• Reformation - the object of punishment in criminal cases is to correct and

• Exemplarity - the criminal is punished to serve as an example to deter others

• No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a

IN RE: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI

EX POST FACTO DEFINED

Issue: Whether the death penalty be given retroactive effect

ARTICLE 21. (REVISED PENAL CODE)

Penal laws may be given a retroactive effect provided that:

Serious Physical Injuries, Theft, Robbery, Estafa, or Falsification, is guilty of any

ARTICLE 4 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

RULING: Yes. The subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a

Issue: Whether court rulings or changes in rules of court particularly on criminal

Issue: Whether the new rule should be given retroactive effect.

ISSUE: Whether the new rule should be given retroactive effect.

RULING: Yes. For aggravating circumstances to be appreciated, they must be alleged

Effects of Repeal of Penal Laws

RULING: Requisite of a double jeopardy (1) a valid complaint or information; (2)

F. ARTICLE 23. Pardon

NOTE: Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code states:

As regards to the private crimes of concubinage, adultery, seduction,

However, pardon by the offended party to be effective must be given before

 A pardon has no effect on the criminal aspect. Criminal liability is not

AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE,

"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between

In concubinage, adultery, seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness or CASAA:

What then constitutes implied pardon for adultery and concubinage?

Pardon given by parents, grandparents or guardian without the offended

CONTENTION OF COMPLAINANT: No pardon is given and he is unaware of wife‘s

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: he was pardoned by the victim.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Appellant argues that assuming he committed the

Preventive suspension is intended to enable the disciplining authority to

An example of deprivation of rights Par. 5 is loss of parental authority.

ART. 228. PARENTAL AUTHORITY TERMINATES PERMANENTLY:

(2) Upon the death of the child; or

(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

ART. 229. UNLESS SUBSEQUENTLY REVIVED BY A FINAL JUDGMENT, PARENTAL AUTHORITY

(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;

(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising

Penalties common to the three preceding classes:

Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

Classification of the Principal Penalties:

Death Penalty: Accessory Penalties if not executed (Article 40 of the RPC)

Crimes punishable by death under this Act:

o) Violation of certain provisions of the Dangerous Drug Act

RA 8177 (AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF

NOTE: Section 3. Implementing Rules. – The Secretary of Justice in

The death penalty shall not be imposed in the following instances:

Note: There is now an intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeals. It is no longer

Basis of the Death Penalty Law: Retribution

HARDEN VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

ISSUE: Whether or not the punishment is unjust or excessive.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MUNOZ

RULING: No. The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEDRO EMPANTE

ISSUE: Whether the presence of mitigating circumstances warrant the imposition of

RULING: NOTE: Section 11 of RA 7659 provides:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSEFINA ESPARAS

ISSUE: Whether automatic review is necessary in cases where an accused sentenced to

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LEO ECHEGARAY