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Civil Law Review 2 (i) Causa debendi/ obligationes (Castan) – This is what makes the obligation demandable. This
NOTES
I. OBLIGATIONS
A. In General
1. Definition
Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.
Notes:
What is the definition of an obligation? It is best defined by Arias Ramos which reads as
follows, “an OBLIGATION is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the creditor)
may demand from another (called the debtor) the observance of a determinate conduct,
and, in case of breach, may obtain satisfaction from the assets of the latter”. This means
that where there is a right or power to demand, there is a correlative obligation or an
imposition upon a person of a definite conduct.
What are the elements of obligation? It has four definite elements as follows:
1. an active subject, who has the power to demand the prestation, known as the
oblige or creditor;
2. a passive subject, who is bound to perform the prestation, known as the obligor or
debtor;
a. These two, the active and passive subjects are considered as the personal
elements of an obligation.
b. They could be an individual person or juridical persons.
c. They must be determinable in some manner. Exceptions are the following
examples: (1) negotiable instrument payable to bearer, (2) promise of a
prize or a reward for anyone performing a certain act.
3. an object or the prestation;
a. This may pertain not to a thing but to a particular conduct of the debtor;
hence, a prestation which may consist in giving (prestation consists in the
delivery of a movable or immovable thing) or doing (all kinds of services)
or not doing (abstaining from some act, may include not to give)
something, e.g. it is not the thing which the vendor must deliver, but the
necessary conduct to produce the effects of the sale that is the object.
4. the efficient cause or the juridical tie (vinculum juris) between the two subjects by
reason of which the debtor is bound in favor of the creditor to perform the
prestation.
a. This pertains to the juridical or legal tie, which is the vinculum, that may
either be a relation established by the following:
i. Law (relation to give support)
ii. Bilateral acts (contracts giving rise to obligation)
iii. Unilateral acts (crimes and quasi-delict)
** All the above 4 elements are agreed upon by commentators as essential elements. The
following two are being debated.
is the proximate why of an obligation.
(ii) Form - This is controversial. This is acceptable only if form means some manifestation of
the intent of the parties.
What are the requisites of a prestation?
1. must be possible, physically and juridically;
2. must be determinable or at least determinable according to pre-established elements or
criteria; and
3. must have a possible equivalent in money (need not be for one of the parties because
it could be for the benefit of third persons; the criterion to determine whether the
obligation has a pecuniary value is not limited to the object or prestation thereof,
but extends to the sanction which corresponds to the juridical duty; this is
differentiated with creditor’s interest because the latter need not be economic or
patrimonial since it may be sentimental or ideal but the object of prestation must have
an economic value or in case of nonfulfillment, be susceptible of substitution in money
or something of patrimonial value)
How will you distinguish an obligation from natural obligations? Since the definition above
only refers to the civil obligation or those which give a right of action to compel their
performance, the same will not include the natural obligation, which are those which cannot be
enforced by court action but which are binding on the party who makes them, in conscience and
according to equity and natural justice. The differences between the two include the following:
1. Civil obligations derive their binding force from positive law while Natural
obligations derive their binding effect from equity and natural justice;
2. Civil obligations can be enforced by court action or the coercive power of public
authority while the fulfillment of Natural obligations cannot be compelled by court
action but depends exclusively from conscience.
According to Balane: Book IV starts w/ an inaccuracy. It gives the impression that obligations
& contracts are of the same status, w/c they are not. A contract is only one of the sources of
obligations. Book IV should have been simply titled "Obligations."
Etymology – two Latin words, ligare, meaning "to bind"
& ob w/c is a proposition used to intensify a verb.
Literally obligare means "to bind securely."
Hence, a better definition would be that, An obligation is a juridical relation (because there are
2 parties) whereby a person should engage or refrain fr. engaging in a certain activity for the
satisfaction of the private interests of another, who in case of non-fulfillment of such duty may
obtain from the patrimony of the former through proper judicial proceedings the very prestation
due or in default thereof, the economic equivalent (damages) that it represents. (Diaz Piero)
Characteristics of an Obligation:
1. It represents an exclusively private interest
2. It creates ties that are by nature transitory
3. It involves the power to make the juridical tie effective in case of non-fulfillment
through an economic equivalent obtained from the debtor's patrimony.
Essential Elements of an Obligation:
(1) Active Subject – This refers to the creditor or the obligee.
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 A creditor generally used in an obligation to give
 while obligee is used in an obligation to do
(2) Passive Subject – This refers to the debtor or the obligor.
 debtor is used in an obligation to give
 while obligor is used in an obligation to do
The first two elements must be determinate or determinable. The following are possible
combinations:
 Both parties are determined at the time of the execution of the obligation.
 one party is determined at the constitution of the obligation & the other to be
determined subsequently in accordance with a criteria that is previously
established.
 the subject is determined in accordance with his relation to a thing & therefore it
changes where the thing passes from one person to another. This is a property-
linked obligation.
(3) Object of the obligation - the conduct or activity that must be observed by the debtor, this is
always an activity or conduct, the prestation.
Requisites of an object:
 It must be licit.
 It must be possible.
 It must be determinate or determinable.
 It must have pecuniary value so that if not performed it is converted into damages.
(4) Vinculum juris- the legal tie, whereby upon default or refusal of the debtor to perform, the
creditor can go to court.
 When a person says "I promise to pay you when I like to," there is no
obligation here because there is no vinculum juris.
 Juridical tie, the efficient cause established by the various sources of
OBLIGATIONS
> by virtue of which the debtor is bound in favor of the creditor to perform
the prestation.
Efficient cause / vinculum  may either be relation established by:
1. Law (e.g. marital relation giving rise to OBLIGATION for support;
2. Bilateral acts (e.g. contracts give rise to the OBLIGATIONs stipulated
therein)
3. Unilateral acts (e.g. crimes and quasi-delicts)
** All the above 3/4 elements are agreed upon by commentators as essential elements. The
following two are being debated.
(i) Causa debendi/ obligationes (Castan) – This is what makes the obligation
demandable. This is the proximate why of an obligation.
(ii) Form - This is controversial. This is acceptable only if form means some
manifestation of the intent of the parties.
TOLENTINO:
OBLIGATION “to give”  prestation consists in the delivery of a movable or an immovable
thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for possession, or to return
to its owner; e.g. OBLIGATION to deliver the thing in a contract of sale, deposit, lease,
antichresis, pledge and donation.
OBLIGATION “to do”  including all kinds of work or services. E.g. contract of
employment or professional services.
OBLIGATION “not to do”  consists in abstaining from some act, e.g. duty not to create a
nuisance;
Requisites of a prestation:
1. it must be possible, physically and juridically
2. it must be determinate, or at least determinable; and
3. it must have a positive equivalent in money. (susceptible of pecuniary appreciation)
Positive Law – valid legal laws enacted by the legislative department;
Natural OBLIGATION – not sanctioned by any action but have a relative juridical
effect;
 do not grant the right of action to enforce their performance but after
voluntary fulfillment by their obligor, they authorize the retention of what
has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof (Article 1423);
2. KINDS OF OBLIGATIONS AS TO BASIS & ENFORCEABILITY
(a) NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
(Arts. 1423 – 1430  not exclusive enumeration; some others can be)
H. NATURAL OBLIGATIONS – ARTS. 1423-1430. 1155
Article 1423. Obligations are civil or natural. Civil obligations give a right of action to compel their
performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity & natural law, do not grant a
right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the
retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof. Some natural obligations are set forth in the
following articles.
Article 1424. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription, the obligor who
voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value of the service he has
rendered.
Article 1425. When without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, a third person pays a debt which
the obligor is not legally bound to pay because the action thereon has prescribed, but the debtor later volun-
tarily reimburses the third person, the obligor cannot recover what he has paid.
Article 1426. When a minor between 18 and 21 years of age who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parents or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or
price received, notwithstanding the fact that he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the
thing or price thus returned.
Note: When the ground for annulment is the incapacity of the plaintiff, he is not bound to make
restitution except to the extent that he was benefited. However, he has natural obligation to still
deliver, and he cannot thereby recover what he has delivered.
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Ratio: Because a minor at such age is deemed to have sufficient mental and moral development
to be aware of his debt of conscience. This is basically independent on the next provision on
Article 1427 below.
Illustrations:
1. A filed an action to compel B to fulfill the latter’s obligation to the former, will the action
prosper? Not necessarily because in natural obligations no court action can compel
performance because it is an action based on equity, conscience and natural justice. Natural
obligations are midway between civil obligations and the purely moral obligations. In order
that there may be a natural obligation, there must exist a juridical tie (vinculum juris) which
is not prohibited by law and which in itself could give a cause of action, but because of some
special circumstances is actually without such legal sanction or means of enforcing
compliance by invoking the intervention of the court.
Basis: Art. 1423 Obligations are civil or natural. Civil obligations give a right of action to
compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity
performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of
what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof. Some natural obligations are set
forth in the following articles.
Article 1427. When a minor between 18 and 21 years of age, who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment
of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed
it in good faith.
Note: It is not the voluntary payment that prevents recovery under this article, but the fact that
the obligee has consumed or spent the thing or money in GOOD FAITH. Although it is true that
the contract can be annulled, but until it is so annulled, it exists as a civil obligation.
General rule: Upon the annulment of the contract, the party who contracted with the minor must
return whatever he may have received under the contract.
Exception: If the payment was made although by the minor, but the thing or money paid was
consumed or spent in good faith (belief that the debtor has the capacity to deliver the object;
must exist at the time that the thing was consumed or money was spent; can be recovered still by
the debtor if the good faith, even if it existed at the time of the delivery, has ceased to exist at the
time of consumption or spending).
Is the thing here always have to be consummable? No, because although non-consummable, the
debtor cannot recover, if the think is no longer in the possession of the creditor who has acted in
good faith, either he has alienated it or it has been lost, without his fault.
Article 1428. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed, the defendant voluntarily performs
the obligation, he cannot demand the return of what he has delivered or the payment of the value of the
service he has rendered.
Article 1429. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent exceeding the value of
the property which he received by will or by the law of intestacy from the estate of the deceased, the payment
is valid & cannot be rescinded by the payer.
Article 1430. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in accordance with the formali-
ties required by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts of the deceased, pays a
legacy in compliance with a clause in the defective will, the payment is effective & irrevocable.
Note: This article includes ever licit obligation which is unenforceable because of the lack of
proper formalities.
Article 1960. If the borrower pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of this
Code concerning solutio indebiti, or natural obligations, shall be applied, as the case may be.
Article 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
Why would this Natural Obligation be allowed in our jurisdiction? Itr It is because equality,
morality and natural justice as the foundations of a positive law makes wisdom to this
obligation so as the so-called moral obligation.
What is the basis of natural obligation? It is from the nature of man and of things, as well as
from law and reason, there arises a natural law, which is immutable and independent of all
human regulations; as sometimes called as rational law.
What are the types of obligations?
In juridical science, four types of which include the following:
1. Moral obligation- duties of conscience completely outside of the field of law
2. Natural obligation- not sanctioned by any action but have relative juridical effect
3. Civil obligation- juridical obligations which apparently in conformity with positive
law but are contrary to juridical principles and susceptible of being annulled
4. Mixed obligation- have full juridical effect
However, jurisprudence makes only two classifications, as follows:
1. Natural obligation
2. Civil obligation
Requisites of Natural OBLIGATION:
1. there is a juridical tie between two persons (distinguishes it from moral obligation)
2. the tie is not given effect by law (distinguishes it from civil obligation)
 an OBLIGATION without a sanction, susceptible of voluntary
performance, but not through compulsion by legal means.
Voluntary fulfillment – may be understood as spontaneous, free from fraud or coercion or
it may be understood as meaning without knowledge or free from error;
-with knowledge that he cannot be compelled to pay OBLIGATION;
RATIO: “reputation” (clan)
-this is being distinguished from payment by mistake (solution indebiti) which
constitutes quasi-contract because payment by mistake is not voluntary and hence may
be recovered.
-payment here is voluntary when the debtor knew of the obligation to be a natural one.
Case: Ansay vs. National Development Company
Facts: On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The court a quo does not see
how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus because:(a) A bonus is an act of liberality
and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal;
(b) Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but that they had only ask
that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this
Court understands, it has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New
Civil Code.).
Issue: Whether the appellees have the legal obligation to give the claimed bonus despite the fact that the
same has been granted arising from a moral obligation or the natural obligation to do the same.
Held: No. Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil obligations
are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on
equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary
fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason
thereof".
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It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but only after there has been
voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot
order the performance.
At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine Education Co. vs. CIR and
the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees (NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48 Off. Gaz., 5278) —
xxx xxx xxx
From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It is so when it
is made a part of the wage or salary compensation.
And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National Labor Union, et al., 95 Phil.,
553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:
Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or compensation of an
employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on equitable consideration as when it was given in the
past, though withheld in succeeding two years from low salaried employees due to salary increases.
still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one, and hence the ruling applied
in said case cannot be considered in the present action.
states in duty to the plaintiff the amount of P1, 000, with an interest of 12 percent per year. This action
relates to the collection of this amount. The Court of First Instance of Laguna, which was filed this action,
condemn the defendant to pay the claimed amount of P1, 000 with legal interest of 12 percent per year from
the August 9, 1930 until fully pay.
Issue: Whether the obligation arising from the original contract of loan, being prescribed would still be
demandable from the only heir of the original debtor.
Held: Yes because the prescribed debt of the deceased mother of the debtor was held to be a sufficient
consideration to make valid and effective the promise of the son to pay the same. Although the action to
recover the original debt has prescribed and when the lawsuit was filed in this case, the question that arises
in this appeal is primarily whether, notwithstanding such prescription is from the action filed. However, this
action is based on the original obligation contracted by the mother of the defendant, who has prescribed,
but in which the defendant contracted on August 9, 1930 to assume the fulfillment of that obligation, as
prescribed. Being the only defendant of the primitive heir debtor entitled to succeed him in his inheritance,
that debt legally brought by his mother, but lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for him a
moral obligation, which is consideration enough to create and effective and enforceable his obligation
voluntarily contracted the August 9, 1930.

What are imperfect and perfect obligations? Perfect obligation is one where there is a CIVIL NATURAL
determination of the creditor, debtor and the nature and value of the obligation while OBLIGATIONS OBLIGATIONS
imperfect obligation has no determination of those above. Source of binding from equity and
What is its implication to natural obligation? Perfect obligation is natural obligation in a From positive law
force & effect natural justice
sense that all those elements have been determined and it is only the performance that is left cannot be compelled
to the will of the debtor. can be enforced by
by court action but
court action or the
Enforceability depends upon good
Natural OBLIGATION vs. Moral OBLIGATION: coercive power of
conscience of the
Natural Moral public authority
debtor
OBLIGATION OBLIGATION
Juridical tie Exists None When can you convert a natural obligation to civil one? This can made through; (1) novation:
Performance by legal fulfillment of act of pure (2) confirmation or ratification unless contrary to law, morals or public order.
debtor an OBLIGATION liberality which Can you guarantee a natural obligation? In principle, no. because the liability of the guarantor
springs from blood, presupposes that there must be a prior exhaustion of the property of the principal debtor, and
affection or that the guarantor after paying can recover from the principal debtor—and both of these cannot
benevolence be legally done when the obligation is natural. The legal consequence of having a guaranty for a
Basis of existence Within the domain entirely domain of natural obligation is to convert the same to a civil obligation because that guaranty will now be
of OBLIGATION of law morals subject to some coercive remedies to be enforced against it.
Enforceability The juridical tie moral duty is
itself produces inexistent in the Illicit OBLIGATIONS  OBLIGATIONS which are contrary to morals and good customs do
certain civil juridical point of not constitute natural OBLIGATIONS, whatever is paid under such OBLIGATIONS can be
effects; True view recovered, without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 1411 and 1412, but Article 1414 may
OBLIGATION apply.
but for certain
causes cannot be Illustrations:
enforced by law 1. Differentiate civil obligation from natural obligation: In civil
action, the obligation can be enforced by court action; natural
Examples of natural OBLIGATIONS: obligations cannot be enforced by court action. Civil obligations are
 Support of a natural child based on positive law and natural obligations are based on equity.
 Indemnification of a woman seduced
 Support of relatives, by consanguinity or affinity 2. Example: The debt is 10M, the value of the estate 3M, the
natural obligation is? To pay 7M. The basis of 7M? Under the law,
Case: Villaroel vs. Estrada the heir is liable to the extent of the value which they actually received
Facts: On May 9, 1912, Alexandra F. Callao, mother of defendant John F. Villarroel, obtained from the
from the decedent, therefore, if they received 3M, they will only be liable
spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina a loan of P1, 000 payable after seven years. Alexandra died,
leaving as the only heir to the defendant. Spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina died too, leaving as the for 3M, the 7M will be a natural obligation.
only heir to the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada. On August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document which
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3. Example: Dated feb.1, 1994, I promise to pay X the amount of
1M, signed by Y. To this day, not a single centavo has been
paid. What kind of obligation is the promissory note? It may be
considered as a civil obligation when X demanded in writing the
payment from Y before the action prescribes because written demand
will toll the running of prescription of the obligation. However, if there
was no demand, since the obligation is a pure obligation, therefore,
demandable at once, the prescriptive period begins to run on feb.2,
1994, 10 years has already lapsed, the action already prescribed, the
obligation becomes a natural obligation. Is this promissory note a
pure obligation? Yes. Why? Because there is no period stated in the
promissory note. Because no period is stated in the promissory
note, it is a pure obligation? By express provision of the law, just
because the parties failed to state the period in the promissory note,
does not necessarily mean that it pertains to a pure obligation,
because from the circumstances it can be inferred that the parties shall
fix the period, if this is promissory note is a contract of loan it is
possible that there is a period. What possible contract may the
promissory note be that indeed this may pertain to a pure
obligation? A contract of sale. Now having said that, if this
promissory note pertains to an obligation with a period,
therefore today the obligation in this promissory note, if no
demand was made, a natural obligation? Not necessarily, the
period of prescription shall be counted from the due date where the
obligation must be paid. Because if this is with a period, and the
agreement is that the obligation should be paid after five years, today
this is still a civil obligation, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run from the time the cause of action accrues.
4. IN RELATION TO THE EXAMPLE OF THE HEIR WHO PAID THE
DEBT OF THE FATHER: X died, his heirs are ABC, ABC paid to Y
10M five days after X’s death, after 6 months thereafter the
heirs are trying to recover claiming that the estate is only 3M,
can the heirs recover the value from Y? They cannot recover if the
payment is voluntary. In natural obligation, if the payer voluntarily
paid, the creditor has the right to retain what has been paid. The
question here is that whether or not the payment is voluntary?
Incidentally, in natural obligation if the payer paid without
fraud, threat, or any vitiation being employed upon the heirs,
the payment is voluntary payment, correct? Not necessarily.
When will there be payment without vitiation, yet the payment
is not voluntary? What constitutes voluntary payment in
natural obligation? The payer knew that he is not compelled to pay
but the payer paid, it is a voluntary payment. The more reasonable
question here is that is there such a person who is crazy
enough to pay even if he has no obligation to pay? Yes, why
would he do that? Conscience. Precisely because the obligation is
based on justice (but this is not possible here in the Philippines). The
more reasonable answer is reputation. But under the facts the
payment is voluntary? Not really, because when they paid it was
only 5 days after the death of X, by that time normally, they do not
know the estate of the decedent.
5. Obligation is defined under Art. 1156 as an obligation to give, to
do, or not to do. Is it correct to say that the definition is not
accurate; there must be another prestation which is not to give?
No, the prestation not to give is included in not to do. Obviously in this
definition, there are only three obligations as to prestations,
which are? 1. Obligation to give; 2. Obligation to do; and 3. Obligation
not to do. Briefly, this definition is criticized because it is
incomplete, why is it incomplete? It pertains only to the part of the
debtor. To the critics, obligation is a concept that would include both the
debt side and the credit side. And you agree to that? Yes sir. The
credit side and the debt side are two aspects of an obligation,
do you agree to that? Yes. So a credit is an obligation? No, they
are actually opposite of each other. The difference is that a person who
has a right can compel the other; he cannot be compelled to perform his
right. Thus, in Philippine law, rights and obligations are different matters.
An obligation therefore may not be waived but a right may be
exercised or not.
6. What are obligations without agreement, and 5 situations giving
rise to this obligation? These are obligations arising from all other
sources besides contract. Thus, in answering the second question, you
must cite examples: 1. Payment of damages to the person who was
injured by negligence xxx. This is because agreement is required only in
contracts, it is not required in all other obligations, is only an essential
element of a contract.
7. Therefore considered as essential elements of obligations are?
1. Active subject (creditor or obligee); 2. Passive Subject (debtor or
obligor); 3. Juridical tie; and 4. Prestation. Therefore, in a contract of
lease, who is active subject and who is the passive subject? The
obligation is a reciprocal contract, hence, the passive subject is the
lessor in the aspect of delivering the property leased to the lessor, and
the active subject is the lessee in the aspect of demanding for the
delivery of the thing leased. In a contract of sale, who is the
passive subject? It depends, the contract of sale is a bilateral contract,
hence as to payment the buyer is the passive subject and the vendor is
the active subject, while as to the delivery of the thing sold, the buyer is
the active subject while the vendor is the passive subject. Contract
resulting to a reciprocal obligation is called? A bilateral contract.
The question here is, how come the debtor is considered as the
passive subject? He can be compelled to perform the obligation. He is
the one to be compelled therefore passive? Under Philippine law,
the creditor is the active subject, because if the creditor does not
demand for the performance of the obligation there will be no
compulsion because if there is no demand, there will be no delay. The
debtor is actually favored by law for instance: 1. In an obligation to pay a
sum of money without a stipulation as to the place of payment, the
place of payment will be where? The place of domicile of debtor.
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8. Mentioned as one of the essential requisites is the prestation,
also known as what? The object. Therefore it pertains to a
thing? No. Because? The object pertains to conduct.
9. Another essential requisite is the juridical tie, also known as,
ad vinculum juris or legal tie or efficient cause. When would
there be a juridical tie, what is its purpose? It binds the party to
the obligation; there is a juridical tie when one of the sources of
obligation is present. These sources of obligations, anyone of them
binds the parties. Like for instance, law, it is the law that will bind the
parties. What obligation has no juridical tie? Moral obligations.
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS
What is “prescription of actions” means? It is also known as the limitation of actions which
refers to the time within which an action may be brought, or some act done, to preserve a
right.
What are “Statutes of Limitation”? These are the acts limiting the time within which actions
shall be brought. They do not confer any right of action but are enacted to restrict the period
within which the right might be asserted. They can be available as defenses but not matters of
substantive right. The purpose is to protect the diligent and vigilant not those who sleep on
their rights. They are statutes of repose, the object of which is to suppress fraudulent and stale
claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their
representatives when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost or the facts have become
obscure from the lapse of time or the defect memory or death or removal of witnesses. These
contemplate civil actions not criminal actions.
What is the difference between laches and prescription? Laches is concerned with the effect of
delay while prescription is concerned with the fact of delay. Laches is principally the question
of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced while prescription is a matter of time. Laches
applies to equity while prescription is statutory/law.
Article 1139. Actions prescribed by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.
Note: For example, in computing the prescriptive period if it is a leap year, February 28 and
29 are two separate days.
What is the effect of lapse of time? It has the effect of extinguishing the action. However, this
to be availed of as a defense should be pleaded in the answer. The right of prescription
however can be waived or renounced. It is deemed waived if not timely raised or pleaded
before or during trial. Exception if it is apparent in the pleading itself.
Case: Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Patricio Confessor
Facts: On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural
loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in
the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they
bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. As the
obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period,
Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory
note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before
June 15, 1961. Said spouses not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the DBP filed a
complaint dated September 11, 1970 in the City Court of Iloilo City against the spouses for the payment of
the loan.
Issue: Whether the validity of a promissory note which was executed in consideration of a previous
promissory note, the enforcement of which is barred by prescription may still be demandable.
Held: Yes. The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 1112 of Civil Code provides:
Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but not
the right to prescribe in the future.
Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which
imply the abandonment of the right acquired.
There is no doubt that prescription has set in as to the first promissory note of February 10, 1940. However,
when respondent Confesor executed the second promissory note on April 11, 1961 whereby he
promised to pay the amount covered by the previous promissory note on or before June 15, 1961, and
upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage, said respondent thereby effectively
and expressly renounced and waived his right to the prescription of the action covering the first
promissory note.
This Court had ruled in a similar case that –
... when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract
recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable ... .
Thus, it has been held —
Where, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and promises to pay it after the same has
prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby waives the benefit of prescription.
This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the
debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first
promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt.
A new express promise to pay a debt barred ... will take the case from the operation of the statute of
limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does
not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wit a
– pre-existing debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new the new promise; upon this sufficient
consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action.
... It is this new promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an acknowledgement as a legal
implication, which is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to the remedy
(which by lapse of time had become extinct) and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his original
contract.
Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such
administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. 5No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor
signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal
partnership is liable for this obligation.
Article 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe 8 years from the time the possession thereof is
lost, unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to Article
1132 and without prejudice to Articles 559, 1505 and 1133.
Article 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four years in good
faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribed through uninterrupted possession for 8 years, without
need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of which he has been illegally
deprived, as well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or market, or from a merchant’s
store, the provisions of Article 559 and 1505 shall be observed.
Article 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years. This provision is without prejudice to
what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
Note: While an action for reformation of instrument, such as a contract of sale with pacto de
retro alleged to be merely an equitable mortgage, is an action based upon a written contract
which must be brought within 10 years form the time the right of action accrues (Article 1144),
where however, the accrual of such right could not be established it is more logical to apply this
provision, Article 1141 because in reality the action seeks to reassert one’s title of ownership
over the real property, not to recover the same.
Article 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after 10 years.
Amen | Compiled Notes
Note: The fact that the mortgage is registered does not make its action to foreclose
imprescriptible.
Article 1143. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this Code, are not extinguished
by prescription:
1. To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;
2. To bring action to abate a public or private nuisance.
Note: Also included in the list is that provided for in Article 494 of the Civil Code which
allows no prescription to run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against co-owners or co-heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognize the co-ownership because the possession of
each of the co-owner or co-heir is in the nature of a subsisting trust and considered to be in
the name of the other.
Exception: It will prescribe if the co-owner or co-heir has possessed the property as exclusive
owner for a period sufficient to acquire the property by prescription.
Other imprescriptible actions:
1. Action by the government or a governmental entity;
2. Action for mandamus;
3. Action to enforce an express trust as long as the trustee does not repudiate the trust;
4. Action to quiet title of the property in one’s possession;
5. Action or defense to declare a contract or judgment void ab initio;
6. Action of the registered owner to recover his land.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues:
1. Upon a written contract;
2. Upon an obligation created by law; and
3. Upon a judgment.
Note: Remember that the action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes
in 10 years from the issuance of the title. But is fraud has been committed, and this is the basis
of action, not implied trust, the action will be barred after four years from the discovery of the
fraudulent act.
Article 1145. The following actions must be commenced within 6 years:
1. Upon an oral contract;
2. Upon a quasi-contract.
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within 4 years:
1. Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
2. Upon a tort or quasi-delict.
*An action based on fraud.
Note: Example of injury to the rights of the plaintiff is when there is an unjustified separation
from employment. Example of actions of tort or quasi-delict is; where real property belongs in
ownership to D and over which he was and has always been in possession but by mistake of
the cadastral clerk came to be titled in 1935 in the name of L, who had never claimed it and
knew all along that he was not the owner but only had a paper title thereto, never bothered to
disturb the possession of D until 1948 when he sought to do so, thereafter filing his
reinvindicatory action to recover the land from D in 1949, the counterclaim for reconveyance
contained in the answer of D has been filed within the period to recover on a quasi-delict.
Article 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
1. For forcible entry and detainer;
2. For defamation.
Article 1148. The limitations of actions mentioned in Articles 1140 to 1142 and 1144 and 1147 are without
prejudice to those specified in other parts of this Code, in the Code of Commerce, and in special laws.
Article 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought
within 5 years from the time the right of action accrues.
Note: The right to collect taxes is imprescriptible.
Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.
Note: It is to be computed from the day on which the corresponding action could have been
instituted. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determined the starting point for
the computation of the period. The period should not be made to retroact to the date of
execution of contract.
The commencement of cause of actions:
1. Closing of windows- the period of prescription for the action to close must be counted
from the day they were opened.
2. Obligation to pay upon receipt of an inheritance by the debtor- from the date of such
receipt because when the obligation is subject to a suspensive condition, prescription
begins to run from the happening of the condition.
3. Obligation without maturity date or note payable on demand- from the date of the note
or obligation NOT from demand.
4. Unpaid balance of a subscription to shares of a corporation- from the date of call or
demand.
5. Payment of money within a year but with privilege of extension- from the end of the
first year.
6. Action based on fraud- from the discovery of fraud.
7. Quasi-delict- from the day the quasi-delict accrued or was committed.
8. Action for partition and reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust- from the
date of issuance of the original certificate of title because registration is notice to the
world.
9. Period to claim inheritance- until a 3rd person claims a right under such instrument.
10. To set aside simulated written deed of pacto de retro sale- when the alleged vendees
made known their intention by overt acts not to abide by the true agreement NOT from
the date of execution of contract.
Article 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the enforcement of
obligations to pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or of the
interest.
Note: This is applicable only when the principal debt is already due. But where there exist a past
due mortgage which was recognized by payments of interest, prescription ran only from the past
payment of interest.
Article 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a
judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.
Amen | Compiled Notes
Note: Judgment will only become final upon the expiration of the period for appeal in the trial 1. A promise to pay a debt.
court. But in the SC or CA, the true judgment is that entered by the Clerk of that Court 2. Listing of mortgage indebtedness by the debtor in his schedule of liabilities filed in
pursuant to the dispositive portion of its decision. The period is 10 years from such entry or insolvency proceedings.
period under Article 1144. 3. Statement by one of the maker of a PN that he supposed he would have to pay it, if the
amount could not be gotten out of the estate of other drawer.
Article 1153. The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs from the day the persons 4. Notation in the handwriting of the maker to the effect that such note was renewed.
who should render the same cease in their functions. The period for the action arising from the result of * Can be made even by a legal representative.
the accounting runs from the date when said result was recognized by agreement of the interested Instances that there is no acknowledgment of debt
parties.
1. Mere offer to compromise a suit upon a supposed debt.
Note: The period of prescription begins to run in an action to compel an accounting by a joint 2. Debtor acknowledging receipt of a statement of account but declines to recognize the
account partner, from the date of the retirement of the members. For accounts, the following correctness of the account being exorbitant.
rules apply: 3. Acknowledgment of the obligation after it has already prescribed. There must be a
1. For mutual current accounts, it begins to run on the date of the last item, no matter new and positive promise to pay in order to nullify prescription.
how far back the account commenced. 4. Part payment of debt.
2. For simple current open accounts, it begins to run from the date of each particular 5. The death of the debtor.
item. 6. The transfer of right to another.
3. Current account guaranteed by mortgage executed in a public instrument, it begins 7. The institution of criminal action cannot have the effect of interruption the institution
to run from the date of the last payment. of civil action based on quasi-delict.
4. When the accounting has been made between the parties in their current account 8. Order to stay execution of judgment.
dealings, the right of action, and prescription begins to run on the date when the last 9. Confinement in jail.
balance of prescription was struck and NOT when the business relations terminated.
What is the effect of acknowledgment? It will renew the obligation of the debtor and interrupts
Article 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing his the prescription and make it run only from such acknowledgment. Example, if the decedent
right is not reckoned against him. makes a will but invalid as to its form but in there he acknowledge the debt in favor of A, the
prescription runs against the claim from the date of the making of invalid will and NOT from the
Note: There is only interruption of the running of prescription when the courts cannot be kept date of death.
open and are not within the reach of the people. The Statute of Limitations does not operate
against the Government. An example of interruption is the destruction of records of the case. (b) CIVIL OBLIGATIONS:

Article 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted (1) when they are filed before the court, (2) Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
when there is written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and (3) when there is any written (1) Law; (OBLIGATIONS ex lege)
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. (2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
Note: For the first interruption, it lasts during the pendency of the action and runs anew after (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
the dismissal of the first action to revive judgment. When interruption of action is legally (5) Quasi-delicts.
commenced? It is from the time the complaint is docketed in Court. How about if the
prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand? The full period for the prescription must be SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS:
reckoned from the cessation of the interruption.
1. LAW:
Article 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined
When there is no suspension in filing of action in court?
in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law
1. When the plaintiff desist which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
2. Amendment of the complaint with new or different cause of action  an agreement is not necessary in order that a party may demand from
3. New or additional defendants another the fulfillment of an OBLIGATION arising from the application
of a law in the circumstances;
For the second interruption, it is so because since the extinctive prescription is based on
presumed abandonment of a right, it is obvious that the running of the period should be Balane: Law as a source of obligation – It is my opinion that there is an overlap in the
interrupted when a demand is made by the creditor upon the debtor before the lapse of the enumeration because all obligations arise from law. Law is the only source of obligation, in the
period fixed by law, with the burden of proof on the former. It must also be written. ultimate sense. But, as a proximate source, there are five sources of obligations. Law is both the
ultimate & a proximate source of obligations.
For the third interruption, it is so if the acknowledgment is in writing. Does it always have to
be express? Not so because it can be implied therein, provided it is written and must apply to a Sources of Obligations according to Sanchez Roman.
particular or specific debt. Examples are the following: Law & Acts. The latter are further classified, as follows:
Amen | Compiled Notes
(1) licit acts created by concurrence of wills (contracts);
(2) licit acts either voluntary or involuntary without concurrence of wills (quasi-contract);
(3) illicit acts of civil character which are not punishable, voluntary or involuntary (torts & all
damages arising from delay);
(4) illicit acts which are voluntary & are punishable by law (crimes)
Baviera: When the source of the obligation is Law, there is no need for an act or omission for the
obligation to arise.
CASE: Sagrada Orden De Predicadores Del Santismo Rosario De Filipinas vs. National Coconut
Corporation, June 30, 1952, J. Labrador.
Facts: Plaintiff owned disputed property in Pandacan, Manila which was acquired during the Japanese
occupation by Taiwan Tekkosho with TCT. When the Philippines was ceded to USA, the same was entrusted
to Alien Property Custodian, APC by the US government. APC took possession, control and custody under
the Trading with the Enemy Act. APC allowed Copra Export Management Co. to occupy the property for a
fee. RP (Republic of the Philippines) later made representation with APC to use the same property with
warehouse which was repaired by NACOCO (National Coconut Corp.) and was leased to Dioscoro Sarile.
The latter failed to pay rentals on the property. In an action to recover possession of the property, the court
nullified the sale to Taiwan Tekkosho and cancelled its TCT and ordered reversion of title to plaintiff, and
right of recovery from NACOCO of rentals to the property.
ISSUE: WON NACOCO is liable to pay back rentals?
HELD: If defendant-appellant is liable at all, its obligations must arise from any of the 4 sources of
obligations, namely, law, contract or quasi contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Old Civil Code.) To
determine such, the following must be understood:
As to crimes: Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered into the premises &
occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control & administration thereof, the Alien
Property Administration (APA).
As to Quasi-Delict: Neither was there any negligence on its part.
As to Contract: There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the APA & Taiwan Tekkosho,
which had secured the possession of the property from the plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress, such that
the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed
illegality of the occupation of the property by said Tekkosho.
The APA had the control & administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy
holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express provision of law.
Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but a trustee of the US Govt., in its
own right, to the exclusion of, & against the claim or title of, the enemy owner. From Aug. 1946, when def.-
appellant took possession, to the date of the judgment on 2/28/48, the APA had the absolute control of the
property as trustee of the US Govt., with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it were the
absolute owner.
Therefore, even if defendant were liable to the APA for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the
plaintiff the old owner, but the US Govt.
Balane: Is the enumeration in Article 1157 exclusive or merely illustrative?
Doctrine: The sense that the case of Sagrada Orden tells us is that the enumeration is
exclusive.
In resolving the issue of whether the defendant should be liable to pay rentals, the SC used the
process of exclusion. For there to be an obligation to pay rentals, that obligation must arise from
any of the five (5) sources of obligations. If it does not, then there is no obligation. The clear
implication of this ruling is that, these five (5) are the only sources of obligations.
The problem with Article 1157 is that it might not cover all situations. For example: Carale uses
Dove as his soap. He then hears an advertisement from Proctor & Gamble that it is offering a
nice tumbler for those who can collect 30 wrappers of Tide before Feb. 29, 1996. So, Carale
stopped using Dove & started using Tide. He was able to consume all 30 wrappers on Feb. 29,
1996. He then went to Proctor & Gamble (P & G) to exchange the 30 Tide wrappers for a
tumbler. But P & G told Carale that their tumblers run out of stock. Carale contracted a skin
allergy as a result of using Tide in taking a bath. The question is: Does P & G have any obligation
to Carale. If we look at Article 1157, this situation does not fall in any of the five sources. So, we
know have a problem. The German Civil Code (BGB) covers this situation. The BGB has a sixth
source of obligation, the Auslobung, which means a unilateral offer.
2. CONTRACTS:
Article 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Negotiation of contract is initiated by an OFFER;
Autonomy of Contract  supposing the contract is valid and enforceable, the terms of contract
not contrary to law, morals, GC, PP or PO, the stipulations therewith should be given effect.
(One of fundamental principles of contracts)
Balane: There are two parts in Article 1159.
 Obligations derived from contract has the force of law between the contracting
parties (jus civili )
 There must be compliance in good faith (jus gentium.)
CASE: People’s Car Inc. vs. Commando Security Service Agency, May 22, 1973, J. Teehankee.
Facts: On April 5, 1970, Commando Security Service Agency’s security guard on duty at the premises of
People’s Car Inc., without authority, consent, approval, knowledge or orders from People’s Car and/or
Commando Security brought out from the compound a car belonging to a customer and drove said car for a
place or places unknown, abandoning his post as such security guard, and while so driving, lost control of said
car, causing the same to fall into a ditch. The customer, Joseph Luy had to rent another car. People’s Car
incurred actual damages of P8, 489.10. People’s Car sued Commando Security for reimbursement.
Issue: WON Commando security is liable to damages in accordance with provisions of contract
Held: YES. Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer's car, which had
been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making good such damages and
relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had
been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's security guard in breach of their
contract. As ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, "obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith."
Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court's view, that "under the Guard Service
Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant" — since the customer could not hold defendant
to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant. Such an approach of telling the
adverse party to go to court, notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical deficiency among
others, could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiff's business, in the same way that defendant's baseless
attempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot be expected to have brought it
more business. Worse, the administration of justice is prejudiced, since the court dockets are unduly
burdened with unnecessary litigation.
Paragraph 4 of the contract, which limits defendant's liability for the amount of loss or damage to any
property of plaintiff to "P1,000.00 per guard post," is by its own terms applicable only for loss or damage
'through the negligence of its guards ... during the watch hours" provided that the same is duly reported by
plaintiff within 24 hours of the occurrence and the guard's negligence is verified after proper investigation
with the attendance of both contracting parties. Said paragraph is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulated
facts of record, which involve neither property of plaintiff that has been lost or damaged at its premises nor
mere negligence of defendant's security guard on duty.
Here, instead of defendant, through its assigned security guards, complying with its contractual undertaking
'to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft, robbery, vandalism and all other
unlawful acts of any person or persons," defendant's own guard on duty unlawfully and wrongfully drove
Amen | Compiled Notes
out of plaintiffs premises a customer's car, lost control of it on the highway causing it to fall into a ditch,
thereby directly causing plaintiff to incur actual damages in the total amount of P8,489.10.
Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus incurred,
since under paragraph 5 of their contract it "assumed the responsibility for the proper performance by
the guards employed of their duties and (contracted to) be solely responsible for the acts done during
their watch hours" and "specifically released (plaintiff) from any and all liabilities ... to the third
parties arising from the acts or omissions done by the guards during their tour of duty." As plaintiff had
duly discharged its liability to the third party, its customer, Joseph Luy, for the undisputed damages of
P8,489.10 caused said customer, due to the wanton and unlawful act of defendant's guard, defendant in
turn was clearly liable under the terms of paragraph 5 of their contract to indemnify plaintiff in the same
amount.
Case: Joseph Saludaga vs. far Eastern University and Edilberto De Jesus (President of FEU), April 30,
2008, J. Ynares-Santiago.
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University
when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on
August 18, 1996. Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was
accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.
Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and Management
Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its
premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Galaxy’s President), to indemnify them for whatever would be
adjudged in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of student-school contract for a
safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning.
Issue: Whether or not FEU could be held liable.
Held: YES. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with.
For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice
to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Respondent FEU failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a
safe learning environment for their students. It failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and
confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the
Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test
results, 201 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on
the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the
guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To
do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its
students.
Respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages.
FEU cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are not
the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents
Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly
envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be
construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. It had no hand in
selecting thesecurity guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be
demanded from the said client
FALLO
“For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified security guard,
which resulted to the latters breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to
respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for being grossly
negligent in directing the affairs of the security agency.”
Case: Faustino Cruz vs. J.M. Tuason & Company, Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., April 29, 1977, J.
Barredo.
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant's complaint below shows that he alleged two separate causes of action, namely:
(1) that upon request of the Deudors (the family of Telesforo Deudor who laid claim on the land in question
on the strength of an "informacion posesoria") plaintiff made permanent improvements valued at P30,400.00
on said land having an area of more or less 20 quinones and for which he also incurred expenses in the
amount of P7,781.74, and since defendants-appellees are being benefited by said improvements, he is
entitled to reimbursement from them of said amounts and
(2) that in 1952, defendants availed of plaintiff's services as an intermediary with the Deudors to work for
the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. Q-135, then pending also in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, and involving 50 quinones of land, of Which the 20 quinones aforementioned form part, and
notwithstanding his having performed his services, as in fact, a compromise agreement entered into on
March 16, 1963 between the Deudors and the defendants was approved by the court, the latter have refused
to convey to him the 3,000 square meters of land occupied by him, (a part of the 20 quinones above)
which said defendants had promised to do "within ten years from and after date of signing of the
compromise agreement", as consideration for his services.
Issue: Whether or not Faustino Cruz can claim reimbursement for the expenses and services rendered.
Held: NO. We hold that the allegations in his complaint do not sufficiently Appellants' reliance on Article
2142 of Civil Code is misplaced. Said article provides:
Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end
that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
From the very language of this provision, it is obvious that a presumed qauasi-contract cannot emerge as
against one party when the subject mater thereof is already covered by an existing contract with another
party. Predicated on the principle that no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another, Article 2124 creates the legal fiction of a quasi-contract precisely because of the absence of any
actual agreement between the parties concerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims having enriched
somebody has done so pursuant to a contract with a third party, his cause of action should be against the
latter, who in turn may, if there is any ground therefor, seek relief against the party benefited. It is essential
that the act by which the defendant is benefited must have been voluntary and unilateral on the part of the
plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts it, "The act is voluntary because the actor in quasi-contracts is
not bound by any pre-existing obligation to act. It is unilateral, because it arises from the sole will of the
actor who is not previously bound by any reciprocal or bilateral agreement. The reason why the law
creates a juridical relations and imposes certain obligation is to prevent a situation where a person is able
to benefit or take advantage of such lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts at the expense of said actor."
(Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Law, Vol. VI, p. 748, 1969 ed.) In the case at bar, since appellant has a clearer
and more direct recourse against the Deudors with whom he had entered into an agreement regarding
the improvements and expenditures made by him on the land of appellees it Cannot be said, in the
sense contemplated in Article 2142, that appellees have been enriched at the expense of appellant.
Case: Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Engracio Orense, December 4, 1914, J. Torres.
Facts: Engracio Orense is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Albay. On February 14, 1907, Jose Duran,
Orense’s nephew, with the latter’s knowledge and consent, sold and conveyed to Hermanos’ company for
P1,500 the aforementioned land with the reservation of the former the right to repurchase it for the same price
within a period of 4 years. But the same land was not repurchased by Jose Duran, being insolvent, which
correspondingly caused damage to the firm of Hermanos. Despite repeated demand upon Jose Duran, the latter
never vacated nor transferred ownership to Hermanos’s firm, the said land. His refusal was based on the
allegations that he had been and was then the owner of the said property, which was registered in his
name in the property registry; that he had not executed any written power of attorney to Jose Duran, nor
had he given the latter any verbal authorization to sell the said property to the plaintiff firm in his name;
and that, prior to the execution of the deed of sale, the defendant performed no act such as might have
induced the plaintiff to believe that Jose Duran was empowered and authorized by the defendant to effect
the said sale.
The plaintiff firm, therefore, charged Jose Duran, in the Court of First Instance of the said province, with
estafa, for having represented himself in the said deed of sale to be the absolute owner of the aforesaid land
and improvements, whereas in reality they did not belong to him, but to the defendant Orense. However, at
the trial of the case Engracio Orense, called as a witness, being interrogated by the fiscal as to whether he
and consented to Duran's selling the said property under right of redemption to the firm of Gutierrez
Hermanos, replied that he had. In view of this statement by the defendant, the court acquitted Jose Duran
of the charge of estafa.
As a result of the acquittal of Jose Duran, based on the explicit testimony of his uncle, Engacio Orense, the
owner of the property, to the effect that he had consented to his nephew Duran's selling the property
under right of repurchase to Gutierrez Hermanos, counsel for this firm filed a complainant praying,
Amen | Compiled Notes
among other remedies, that the defendant Orense be compelled to execute a deed for the transfer and
conveyance to the plaintiff company of all the right, title and interest with Orense had in the property sold,
and to pay to the same the rental of the property due from February 14, 1911.
Issue: Whether or not Orense can be compelled to deliver the property to Hermanos as premised above.
Held: YES. It having been proven at the trial that he gave his consent to the said sale, it follows that the
defendant conferred verbal, or at least implied, power of agency upon his nephew Duran, who accepted it
in the same way by selling the said property. The principal must therefore fulfill all the obligations
contracted by the agent, who acted within the scope of his authority. (Civil Code, arts. 1709, 1710 and
1727.)
Even should it be held that the said consent was granted subsequently to the sale, it is unquestionable
that the defendant, the owner of the property, approved the action of his nephew, who in this case acted
as the manager of his uncle's business, and Orense'r ratification produced the effect of an express
authorization to make the said sale. (Civil Code, arts. 1888 and 1892.)
Article 1259 of the Civil Code prescribes: "No one can contract in the name of another without being
authorized by him or without his legal representation according to law.
A contract executed in the name of another by one who has neither his authorization nor legal
representation shall be void, unless it should be ratified by the person in whose name it was
executed before being revoked by the other contracting party.
The sworn statement made by the defendant, Orense, while testifying as a witness at the trial of
Duran for estafa, virtually confirms and ratifies the sale of his property effected by his nephew,
Duran, and, pursuant to article 1313 of the Civil Code, remedies all defects which the contract may
have contained from the moment of its execution.
The sale of the said property made by Duran to Gutierrez Hermanos was indeed null and void in the
beginning, but afterwards became perfectly valid and cured of the defect of nullity it bore at its execution
by the confirmation solemnly made by the said owner upon his stating under oath to the judge that he
himself consented to his nephew Jose Duran's making the said sale. Moreover, pursuant to article 1309 of
the Code, the right of action for nullification that could have been brought became legally extinguished
from the moment the contract was validly confirmed and ratified, and, in the present case, it is
unquestionable that the defendant did confirm the said contract of sale and consent to its execution.
If the defendant Orense acknowledged and admitted under oath that he had consented to Jose Duran's
selling the property in litigation to Gutierrez Hermanos, it is not just nor is it permissible for him
afterward to deny that admission, to the prejudice of the purchaser, who gave P1,500 for the said
property.
The contract of sale of the said property contained in the notarial instrument of February 14, 1907, is
alleged to be invalid, null and void under the provisions of paragraph 5 of section 335 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, because the authority which Orense may have given to Duran to make the said contract
of sale is not shown to have been in writing and signed by Orense, but the record discloses
satisfactory and conclusive proof that the defendant Orense gave his consent to the contract of sale
executed in a public instrument by his nephew Jose Duran. Such consent was proven in a criminal
action by the sworn testimony of the principal and presented in this civil suit by other sworn testimony of
the same principal and by other evidence to which the defendant made no objection. Therefore the
principal is bound to abide by the consequences of his agency as though it had actually been given in
writing (Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil. Rep., 387; Gallemit vs. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. Rep., 241;
Kuenzle & Streiff vs. Jiongco, 22 Phil. Rep., 110.)
The repeated and successive statements made by the defendant Orense in two actions, wherein he
affirmed that he had given his consent to the sale of his property, meet the requirements of the law
and legally excuse the lack of written authority, and, as they are a full ratification of the acts
executed by his nephew Jose Duran, they produce the effects of an express power of agency.
3. QUASI-CONTRACTS:
Article 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book.
QUASI-CONTRACT is a juridical relation which arises from certain unlawful, voluntary and
unilateral acts to the end that no one may be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.
The act must be:
(1) Lawful – thus different from delict which is unlawful;
(2) Voluntary – thus different from quasi-delict which is based on fault or
negligence or lack of foresight;
(3) Unilateral – thus different from contract, in which parties agree.
e.g. in Negotiorum Gestio:
 Benefits Conferred Voluntarily
 For preservation of Property or Business
EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
(OBLIGATIONS without an agreement / based in IMPLIED CONSENT)
Q: HOW MANY?
A: In NCC, 2, nominate and “some” innominate Quasi Contract.
a. Quasi-contracts
Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of
quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.
Article 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-
contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article.
b. Negotiorum Gestio
Article 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or
property of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the
termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if
the owner is in a position to do so.
This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances: ELEMENTS –
(1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;
(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.
In the first case, the provisions of articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404 regarding
unauthorized contracts shall govern.
In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable.
 NEGOTIORUM GESTIO – juridical relation which arises whenever a person
voluntarily takes charge of an agency or management of the business or property of
another without any power or authority from the latter.
Illustration:
1. Scenario: Lumubog na barko, what if this one of the missing persons landed on a remote island and only
one resident is present there or only one family is living there in the island. Anyway this resident found the
dead body of the missing person, and he found it necessary to bury the dead and he spent a sum of money of
400php. At any rate this resident, met the aunt of the decease, and demanded reimbursement for the burial, is
the resident’s demand valid? Well if you read the provisions of the quasi-contract, there is an obligation to
reimburse the person. In other words, you have the obligation to reimburse. But back to the question, is there
a valid demand? NO. if you know, because the law on quasi-contract would tell you that he has the right to
seek reimbursement from anyone who is oblige to give support and an aunt Is not oblige under the law to
give support. There’s no civil obligation to give support.
Case: Rustico Adille vs. CA, Asejo’s, January 29, 1988, J. Sarmiento.
Amen | Compiled Notes
Facts: Feliza Azul owns a parcel of land. She married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille
with whom she had as an only child, herein defendant Rustico Adille; in her second marriage with one Procopio Asejo,
her children were herein plaintiffs. Sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd
persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942 without being able to redeem and after her death, but
during the period of redemption, herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of
extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence that
he was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that OCT. No. 21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his
name, that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein
plaintiffs (The Asejo siblings), filed present case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee
on an implied trust when he redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria
Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that.
Issue: Whether or not Adille can acquire exclusive ownership over the land.
Held: NO. It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so
either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under
Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and
must act as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The
evidence, of course, points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive
ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to
have assume the mere management of the property abandoned by his co-heirs, the situation Article
2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be
the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Private respondents, his
co-heirs.
c. Solutio indebiti
Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly
delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
 SOLUTIO INDEBITI – juridical relation which arise whenever person unduly
delivers a thing through or by mistake of another who has no right to demand it.
Case: Dometila Andres, doing business under the name and style “IRENE’S WEARING APPAREL” vs.
Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, CA, September 15, 1989, J. Cortes.
Facts: Petitioner, using the business name "Irene's Wearing Apparel," was engaged in the manufacture of ladies
garments, children's wear, men's apparel and linens for local and foreign buyers. Among its foreign buyers was Facets
Funwear, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as FACETS) of the United States. In the course of the business transaction between
the two, FACETS from time to time remitted certain amounts of money to petitioner in payment for the items it had
purchased. Sometime in August 1980, FACETS instructed the First National State Bank of New Jersey, Newark, New
Jersey, U.S.A. (hereinafter referred to as FNSB) to transfer $10,000.00 to petitioner via Philippine National Bank, Sta.
Cruz Branch, Manila (hereinafter referred to as PNB).
Acting on said instruction, FNSB instructed private respondent Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corporation to effect
the above- mentioned transfer through its facilities and to charge the amount to the account of FNSB with private
respondent. Although private respondent was able to send a telex to PNB to pay petitioner $10,000.00 through the
Pilipinas Bank, where petitioner had an account, the payment was not effected immediately because the payee designated
in the telex was only "Wearing Apparel." Upon query by PNB, private respondent sent PNB another telex dated August
27, 1980 stating that the payment was to be made to "Irene's Wearing Apparel." On August 28, 1980, petitioner received
the remittance of $10,000.00 through Demand Draft No. 225654 of the PNB.
Meanwhile, on August 25, 1980, after learning about the delay in the remittance of the money to petitioner, FACETS
informed FNSB about the situation. On September 8, 1980, unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance,
FACETS informed private respondent about the delay and at the same time amended its instruction by asking it to effect
the payment through the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB) instead of PNB.
Accordingly, private respondent, which was also unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance of
$10,000.00 from PNB instructed the PCIB to pay $10,000.00 to petitioner. Hence, on September 11, 1980, petitioner
received a second $10,000.00 remittance.
Private respondent asked petitioner for the return of the second remittance of $10,000.00 but the latter refused to pay.
Issue: Whether or not Mantrust can recover the second remittance worth $10,000.
Held: YES. The contract of petitioner, as regards the sale of garments and other textile products, was with FACETS. It
was the latter and not private respondent which was indebted to petitioner. On the other hand, the contract for the
transmittal of dollars from the United States to petitioner was entered into by private respondent with FNSB. Petitioner,
although named as the payee was not privy to the contract of remittance of dollars. Neither was private respondent a party
to the contract of sale between petitioner and FACETS. There being no contractual relation between them, petitioner has
no right to apply the second $10,000.00 remittance delivered by mistake by private respondent to the outstanding account of
FACETS.
Art. 2154. If something received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the
obligation to return it arises.
This provision is taken from Art. 1895 of the Spanish Civil Code which provided that:
Art. 1895. If a thing is received when there was no right to claim it and which, through an error, has been unduly delivered,
an obligation to restore it arises.
In Velez v. Balzarza, 73 Phil. 630 (1942), the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo explained the nature of this article
thus:
Article 1895 [now Article 2154] of the Civil Code abovequoted, is therefore applicable. This legal provision, which
determines the quasi-contract of solution indebiti, is one of the concrete manifestations of the ancient principle that no one
shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. In the Roman Law Digest the maxim was formulated thus: "Jure
naturae acquum est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem." And the Partidas declared: "Ninguno
non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Such axiom has grown through the centuries in legislation, in the
science of law and in court decisions. The lawmaker has found it one of the helpful guides in framing statutes and codes.
Thus, it is unfolded in many articles scattered in the Spanish Civil Code. (See for example, articles, 360, 361, 464, 647, 648,
797, 1158, 1163, 1295, 1303, 1304, 1893 and 1895, Civil Code.) This time-honored aphorism has also been adopted by
jurists in their study of the conflict of rights. It has been accepted by the courts, which have not hesitated to apply it when
the exigencies of right and equity demanded its assertion. It is a part of that affluent reservoir of justice upon which judicial
discretion draws whenever the statutory laws are inadequate because they do not speak or do so with a confused voice. [at p.
632.]
For this article to apply the following requisites must concur: "(1) that he who paid was not under obligation to do so; and,
(2) that payment was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact" [City of Cebu v. Piccio, 110 Phil. 558, 563 (1960)].
It is undisputed that private respondent delivered the second $10,000.00 remittance. However, petitioner contends that the
doctrine of solutio indebiti, does not apply because its requisites are absent.
First, it is argued that petitioner had the right to demand and therefore to retain the second $10,000.00 remittance. It is
alleged that even after the two $10,000.00 remittances are credited to petitioner's receivables from FACETS, the latter
allegedly still had a balance of $49,324.00. Hence, it is argued that the last $10,000.00 remittance being in payment of a
pre-existing debt, petitioner was not thereby unjustly enriched.
Petitioner invokes the equitable principle that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third
person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the loss.
The rule is that principles of equity cannot be applied if there is a provision of law specifically applicable to a case. ... The
common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law
imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied
in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law
principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction. [at p. 135.]
Having shown that Art. 2154 of the Civil Code, which embodies the doctrine of solutio indebiti, applies in the case at bar,
the Court must reject the common law principle invoked by petitioner.
Case: Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. City of Manila and Marcelo Sarmiento, as City Treasurer, April 30,
1963, J. Paredes.
Facts: Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling all kinds of furniture
at its factory in Manila. Pursuant to Ordinance No. 3364, Manila assessed from Puyat retail dealer’s tax which
the latter paid without protest in the erroneous belief that it was liable therefore. Puyat subsequently found that it
was exempt from said taxes as provided under Ordinance No. 3816, Puyat claimed for refund.
Issue: Whether the taxes paid without protest are refundable.
Held: YES. Appellants do not dispute the fact that appellee-companyis exempted from the payment of the
tax in question.This is manifest from the reply of appellant City Treasurer stating that sales of manufactured
products at the factory site are not taxable either under the Wholesalers Ordinance or under the Retailers'
Ordinance. With this admission, it would seem clear that the taxes collected from appellee were paid, thru an
error or mistake, which places said act of payment within the pale of the new Civil Code provision on
solutio indebiti. The appellant City of Manila, at the very start, notwithstanding the Ordinance imposing the
Retailer's Tax, had no right to demand payment thereof..
"If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligationto retun it arises" (Art. 2154, NCC)..
Amen | Compiled Notes
Appelle categorically stated that the payment was not voluntarily made, (a fact found also by the
lower court),but on the erronoues belief, that they were due. Under this circumstance, the amount
paid, even without protest is recoverable. "If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due, he
may recover if he proves that it was not due" (Art. 2156, NCC). Appellee had duly proved that taxes
were not lawfully due. There is, therefore, no doubt that the provisions of solutio indebtiti, the new Civil
Code, apply to the admitted facts of the case.
With all, appellant quoted Manresa as saying: "x x x De la misma opinion son el Sr. Sanchez Roman y el
Sr. Galcon, et cual afirma que si la paga se hizo por error de derecho, ni existe el cuasi-contrato ni esta
obligado a la restitucion el que cobro, aunque no se debiera lo que se pago" (Manresa, Tomo 12, paginas
611-612). This opinion, however, has already lost its persuasiveness, in view of the provisions of the Civil
Code, recognizing "error de derecho" as a basis for the quasi-contract, of solutio indebiti. .
"Payment by reason of a mistake in the contruction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of
law may come within the scope of the preceding article" (Art. 21555)..
There is no gainsaying the fact that the payments made by appellee was due to a mistake in the
construction of a doubtful question of law.
4. ACTS OR OMISSIONS PUNISHED BY LAW (DELICT or CRIMES  but not
Felony which is limited only to those punished under RPC)
Article 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at
his cost. This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the
obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.
Balane: Crime as a source of obligation – There are many crimes from which, civil liability
arises in their commission, in addition to the criminal penalty attached to them. This underlines
the two aspects in a crime: one, as an offense against the state, & two as an offense against
the victim. It is in the latter case that civil liability is recoverable.
 As far as crime is concerned, civil law is not concerned with the penal liability but
only with the civil liability.
Performance at debtor’s cost  non-compliance with OBLIGATION to do, creditor may do
it himself or get a 3rd person at the expense of the debtor;
 when OBLIGATION to do can only be performed by debtor he cannot compelled to
do so by force, the only remedy is damages;
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
TITLE V - Civil Liability, RPC: CHAPTER ONE - Persons Civilly Liable for Felonies
Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
[CHAPTER 2, RPC: What Civil Liability Includes]
Article 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in articles 100,
101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Baviera: Requisites of enforcing the subsidiary obligation of the employer under the RPC:
-criminal case was filed against the employee
-the act or negligence arose during or in connection with the performance of the latter’s
employment
-the employee is found guilty of criminal negligence
-a writ of execution has been returned unsatisfied, i.e. employee has been found to be insolvent.
There is no res judicata as regards the Employer as there is a difference in the Cause of Action.
Quasi-delict (QD) differs from an action based on delict on the following grounds:
QUASI DELICT DELICT
it is subsidiary (imputed) ER’s liability is primary in RPC
Diligence of good father of the family In RPC, such defense of GFF is not
may be set up by the ER as a defense available
A person while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable  Failure of the plaintiff to
reserve in the criminal case his right to file a separate civil action is not fatal to the civil action
after the acquittal of the accused.
 When the acquittal is based on ground that the guilt of the accused has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, plaintiff has the right to institute a civil action for damages
(culpa aquiliana).
Q: Is it possible that even if there is a contract between the parties, a quasi-delict can still be
committed by one against the other regarding the area covered by the contract?
A: Yes, according to the case of Araneta v. de Joya, 57 SCRA 59. The same act can give rise to
obligations arising from different sources. For example, Alinea is the owner of a bus co., the Alinea
Bus Co., Molina is a driver of one of the buses of Alinea Bus Co. Lagdameo rode the bus being
driven by Molina. As a result of the reckless driving of Molina, Lagdameo suffered injuries. In
this case, Lagdameo has a choice-- he can sue on either contract, quasi-delict or on crime. If he
decided to sue on the breach of the contract of carriage, all he has to prove is the (existence of the
contract) & that it was not performed. In this case, he can sue the common carrier but not the
driver because he has no contract with the driver. If he sues on quasi-delict, he can sue both the
common carrier & the driver. The defense of the driver would be diligence in driving (or
fortuitous event.) The defense of the common carrier would be diligence in the selection &
supervision of employees. If he sues under crime, he has to sue the driver. In case the driver is
convicted & has been sentenced to pay civil liability, the employer (Alinea Bus Co.) is subsidiarily
liable. If Molina is insolvent, Alinea Bus Co. will pay.
 Notice that the choice of cause of action will determine three things: the theory of the
plaintiff, the defense of the defendant & the question of whom to sue.
 Again, remember that in this case, the victim has a choice. Provided that he is consistent
with his theory & provided, further, that he cannot recover damages twice for the
same injury.
Baviera: The terms of the contract cannot be against mandatory & prohibitive laws. And if the
contract is valid, it shall have the force of law between the contracting parties.
5. QUASI-DELICTS: (culpa aquiliana / negligence / torts*)
[NCC, CHAPTER 2 - Quasi-delicts]
Amen | Compiled Notes
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (memorize!)
Article 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.
* Torts is seldom used by SC in this jurisdiction, it is broader term for actionable wrong which
may not be negligence, may be malicious tortuous act which is not anymore Quasi Delict.
 QUASI-DELICTS – the fault or negligence of a person who, by his act or omission
connected or not with, but independent from any contractual relation, causes damage
to another person;
 The omission to do something which ordinarily reasonable men guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or
doing something which prudent and reasonable men would not do.
 Liability on Quasi Delict is based on equity, man is responsible not only for acts
conscious and intentional acts but also for his lack of foresight, care and diligence
which may cause harm to another.
 ELEMENTS:
(1) A duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the injury of
which the latter complains;
(2) A failure to perform that duty, and
(3) An injury to the plaintiff through such failure.
 TEST OF NEGLIGENCE: Would a prudent man, in the position of the person on
who negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued?
 KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE:
(1) Culpa aquiliana, also known as culpa extra-contractual, or negligence as a
source of OBLIGATION, QUASI-DELICT;
 Governed by Arts. 2176-2194
 NO contractual relation at all
(2) Culpa contractual, or negligence in the performance of a contractual
OBLIGATION.
 Governed by Article 1179 (common carrier), & all on contracts
 PERSONS LIABLE: (IMPUTED/vicarious LIABILITY, 2180)
1. father / mother
2. guardians
3. owners/managers
4. employers
5. the State
6. teachers
 The responsibility shall cease if they can prove that they have observed diligence of
good father of the family to prevent damage;
REQUISITES OF LIABILITY (IMPUTED):
1. the fault of negligence of the defendant
2. the damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff
3. the relation of the fault or negligence and damage incurred by the plaintiff
Balane:
The Code Commission did not choose to use tort. This is because tort does not exactly have the
same meaning as quasi-delict. Tort [BROADER] covers intentional torts which in quasi-delict is
considered as civil liability arising from acts or omissions punishable by law. There are some QD
which are not covered by tort. Dean Bocobo suggested the ancient term culpa aquiliana. But this
did not merit the approval of the Code Commission.
A TORT is a civil wrong (an actionable wrong) consisting of a violation of a right or a breach
of duty for which the law grants a remedy in damages or other relief. The right is created by law
in favor of a person called a creditor to compel another called a debtor to observe duty or a
prestation either to render what is due him or to refrain from causing him injury.
Classes of Torts According to Manner of Commission
1. Intentional Torts
a. tortfeasor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or
b. tortfeasor believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it
c. ex. Article 26, 32 & 33 (CC)
2. Negligent Torts:
d. tortfeasor’s conduct merely creates a forseeable risk of harm which
may or may not occur
e. Article 2176 (CC)
3. Strict Liability Torts:
f. Ex. Article 2183 & 2187 (CC)
Q: If there is a contract between the parties, can there be a quasi-delict committed by one against
the other regarding the area covered by the contract?
A: If you look at Article 2176, you get the impression that if there is a contract between the parties,
they cannot be liable for quasi-delict on an area covered by the contract. The case of Cangco has
not really resolve this controversy.
Case: Jose Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., October 14, 1918, J. Fisher.
Facts: Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Co. He takes the train going home from work. That day he
alighted from the train while it was still slightly in motion. He landed on the elevated platform on top of some
sacks of watermelon which made him fall violently, rolled away from the platform under the moving train
where he badly crashed and lacerated his right arm. It happened at night between 7-8pm and the station was
poorly lit. Resulting from such incident, Cangco’s arm was amputated twice. The seriousness of his injury made
him file a case for damages against MRR Co. The latter then interposed the defense that the direct and
proximate cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait
until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting.
Issue: Whether or not the conduct of Cangco was characterized by imprudence so as to hold him liable because
of his contributory negligence.
Held: NO. can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in
piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall
as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from
the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That
is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that
Amen | Compiled Notes
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, [RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR], which can be
rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. (presumption juris tantum,
rebuttable). Imputed liability in NCC is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to
extra-contractual obligations, or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa
aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual
obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society
imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members
of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status.
The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract,
rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (contract of carriage). That
duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof
that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause
of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train
had come to a complete stop before alighting (Doctrine of comparative negligence, Rakes doctrine). If
the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence
and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence
in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable
care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and
condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which
may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries
on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
RULING: …that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact
that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight
from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has
kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have
suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to
perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
Balane: There are two important principles that we learn from this case:
The difference in concept between contract & quasi-delict is that in a contract, there is a
pre-existing juridical tie between the parties. Violation of the contract gives rise to
liability but not to the juridical tie. Juridical tie is not borne by a violation. In quasi-
delict, it is precisely the wrongful act which gives rise to the juridical tie. Liability &
juridical tie are simultaneous.
Contracts & quasi-delicts create two concentric circles with quasi-delict as the bigger circle.
CASE: Narciso Gutierrez vs. Bonifacio Gutierrez, et al., September 23, 1931, J. Malcolm.
FACTS: On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las
Piñas, Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by
Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was
owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the
father was not in the car, but the mother, together will several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven
in all, were accommodated therein. A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en
route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila. The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in
Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg which required medical attendance for a considerable period
of time, and which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed properly.
Issue: Whether or not Bonifacio’s father, not present during the incident could be held liable for damages to
Narciso.
HELD: The court found both drivers negligent. The owner of the truck was made liable for culpa contractual,
under the contract of carriage. The owner of the car was made liable under Article 2180, imputed liability for
culpa aquiliana. In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez family,
it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an
excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was
granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on
these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor
or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.
The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on
a different basis, namely, that of contract which, we think, has been sufficiently demonstrated by the
allegations of the complaint, not controverted, and the evidence. The reason for this conclusion reaches to
the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the
machine, and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. While these facts are not as clearly evidenced as
are those which convict the other defendant, we nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points emphasized by
the trial judge. In its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from
opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other, with the
inevitable result of a collision and an accident.
The defendants Velasco and Cortez further contend that there existed contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff, consisting principally of his keeping his foot outside the truck, which occasioned his injury. In
this connection, it is sufficient to state that, aside from the fact that the defense of contributory negligence
was not pleaded, the evidence bearing out this theory of the case is contradictory in the extreme and leads
us far afield into speculative matters.
FRAUD NEGLIGENCE
dolo Culpa
Nature of Act involves willfulness or mere want of care or
deliberate intent to diligence, not voluntary
cause damage or injury act or omission
to another
Gives rise to the act itself the want or care or
OBLIGATION diligence
 A single act may be a crime and a QD at the same time; (Article 100,
RPC)
 Injured party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of defendant; (must choose 1 Remedy)

[Note: There is a little mistake in Cangco. The SC said that the driver can be sued under culpa QUASI-DELICT CRIME
contractual. This is wrong. The driver cannot be sued as he has no privity of contract with the As to nature of Right private right public right
violated
passenger.]
Is a Wrong against the individual the State
Criminal Intent not needed Necessary
CASE DOCTRINE: Where there could still be Quasi Delict even when there is contract of Legal Basis for Broad penal law necessary
carriage.
Amen | Compiled Notes
liability
Liability for Damages every QD gives rise to there are crimes without civil
liability for damages liability
Form of Redress reparation for injury punishment/fine/imprisonment
suffered/indemnification/co
mpensation
Quantum of Evidence Preponderance Beyond reasonable doubt
Compromise can be compromised criminal liability can never be
compromised
REQUISITES FOR LIABILITY: (onus)
(1) Wrongful act or omission imputable to the defendant by reason of his fault or
negligence;
(2) Damage or injury proven by the person claiming recovery;
(3) A direct causal connection between the negligent act and the injury.
DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE  is that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the
result would not have occurred.
The exemplification by the Court in one case is simple and explicit; viz: "(T)he proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
Illustrations:
1. Sources of obligations: 1157: Are there other sources of
obligations aside from those provided by law? No. Art. 1157 is
exclusive based on the case of Sagrada.
2. Who may be considered privy to the contract? Heirs, successors
in interest.
3. There are certain facts which need not be proven, there is no need to
allege such facts because the law presumes the existence of a right
and presumes the existence of a fact, hence, it is not always true that
whoever alleges the fact must prove the existence of such fact.
4. Contracts: How would you know if there are obligations arising
from a contract? By considering the terms and conditions of contract,
by reading the terms and conditions of the contract, you will determine
whether or not there is an obligation arising from such contract.
Incidentally, does it mean that there is no stipulation, therefore
an agreement is not part of the contract? Not necessarily, an
obligation may arise even without a stipulation like warranty against
eviction. A limitation provided by law as to terms and
conditions? It must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy. But
before an obligation arises, what transpires? Negotiation.
Negotiation is initiated by what? Offer. During the negotiation,
the offeror withdrew the offer, will there be an obligation? Yes.
What source? It depends if there is bad faith, if there is negligence on
the part of the offeror in not communicating as soon as possible the
same is quasi-delict. If bad faith, Art. 19, 20, and 21 I which is law, but
the SC generally would consider the source of obligation as tort.
5. People’s car Case: Issue: Whether or not commando is liable for the
entire amount of damages instead of only 1,000.00
6. The owner of the house left the house for a short vacation, the
very night, they left, their house was burned, the neighbors
saved some of their appliances, what is the relationship?
Negotiorum gestio, do you agree? No, these appliances are not
managed; this will fall under quasi-delict because in negotiorum gestio
there must be abandonment or neglect of the property. Another reason
why this is not negotiorum gestio, this falls under the other quasi-
contracts. An obligation arising from quasi-contract, even if the
obligor was not unjustly enriched, or is it required that he must
be unjustly enriched if he will not perform an obligation under
quasi-contract? Despite 2142, is it possible that in a quasi-
contract there will be no unjust enrichment? Yes, read the
provisions on negotiorum gestio, expressly provided by law, even if the
owner is not enriched or unjustly enriched, if he has an obligation. It will
appear therefore that the principles behind quasi-contracts are
not really the principle of unjust enrichment. Thus, in other
countries, the principle behind this obligations is, like in the U.S.
law and quasi-contracts are considered to fall under one source
only implied contracts, from that alone the basis is consent
given by the obligor.
7. A bought a sack of rice from B, P625, A gave 1K to B, B gave the
sack of rice to A, B gave 475 to A, what relationship was
created? Solutio indebiti. What is the obligation? To return the
excess P100.
8. The quasi-contracts are provided for in article 2165-2175, is this
exclusive? No. it is not exclusive as provided for in article 2143.
9. Act or omission punishable by law? These are crimes or delicts. As
to this source, once a person in criminally liable, he is also civilly
liable? Not necessarily, because are crimes that does not make the
criminal civilly liable such as treason and rebellion. The kinds of civil
liability arising from this source? Restitution, reparation, and
indemnification. Every time there is this civil liability, all of these
are present? Not necessarily. Example: what will be lacking?
Restitution is lacking in rape. When is restitution present? Theft. But
even in murder or homicide, restitution is not possible. If a
person committed an act punished by law and there is sufficient
evidence to prove such fact beyond reasonable doubt,
nonetheless, is it possible for him not to be committed? Yes, if the
law exempts him from liability, when there is an exempting
Amen | Compiled Notes
circumstance, such as minority, so if there is exempting
circumstance there is civil liability? Yes. Of those enumerated,
generally, is there civil liability? Yes, when will there be no civil
liability, and what will be the basis thereof? Quasi-delict, why
not delict? Because there is no conviction. If there is no conviction,
there is no civil liability under delict. In justifying circumstance, can
there be civil liability? As a rule no civil liability, except paragraph 4.
10. Torts, culpa acquiliana, culpa extra contractual, quasi delict:
Under 2176 is simply, Fault or Negligence, is there a
difference? Yes. Culpa extra contractual is a good name for
quasi delict? This is outside of the contract, if CEC, quasi delict? This
does not seem right, culpa extra contractual, outside of the contract,
outside of the contract there are how many sources of obligations,
four, necessarily quasi delict? No. Can there be negligence in the
performance of an obligation arising from law, Yes, can a gestor be
negligent, Yes, but is that negligence quasi delict? NO because it will
fall under quasi-contract. The use of the word torts is criticized
because? torts is not the same as quasi-delict, torts is a much broader
term that quasi delict, because torts include intentional, malicious,
while quasi-delict includes negligence only, is this correct? 2176 first
article in quasi-delict, it provides for fault or negligence, it did not
mention negligence only. The next article 2177, from this article, may
an act be the basis of liability under two sources of obligation, Yes. the
only obligation provided by law is? He cannot recover twice. So if
A was able to recover from one case, he will not have the right
to recover in any other case, correct? Yes The Supreme Court
held that he can recover the difference if the second award is greater
for instance in case 1 100K Case 2 150K, he has the right to recover
50K, but not 250K. Ultimately, the claim of the author that quasi
delict should be limited to negligent act, has not been supported by
the justices of the SC, the SC would always claim, that a single act may
be a basis of an action under delict, under quasi delict, may be even
under contract if there is a pre-existing contract, it is up to the
aggrieved party to choose his cause of action, however, if he chooses
one cause of action, he must comply to the requirements of the cause
of action, for example he chose delict, then he has to have the accused
convicted. But if contract, the law already presumes that there is
negligence in case of non performance. This recommendation that
quasi delict should be limited to negligent act has no basis
under the law, and has no application here in our country, the
best arguments to this issue is this, if the act is punished by
law, you should have the right to recover civil liability only be
ensuring that the accused will be convicted, otherwise, that
will encourage the people to commit crime, people will think
that it is okay to commit a crime because they can pay their
way out of it, however, in the situation where the husband is
killed the mother is the only one left with five kids, will you
fault them by accepting the damages? I think not.
11. A man buried a victim of princess of the stars, the relative of
the victim appeared the man demanded payment, from the
relative P300, can he demand from the relative payment for
burying the victim? The obligation created here is quasi delict,
however, the man cannot demand payment from the relative because
the persons who may be compelled is the persons who is liable to give
the victim support.
C. COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged to take care of it with the
proper diligence of a good father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation of the parties
requires another standard of care.
Article 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing from the time the obligation to
deliver it arises. However, he shall acquire no real right over it until the same has been
delivered to him.
Article 1165. When what is to be delivered is a determinate thing, the creditor, in addition to
the right granted him by article 1170, may compel the debtor to make the delivery.
If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he may ask that the obligation be complied with at
the expense of the debtor.
If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more persons who do
not have the same interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until he has
effected the delivery.
Article 1166. The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivering all its
accessions and accessories, even though they may not have been mentioned.
According to Balane:
Three types of obligations- (1) obligation to give; (2) obligation to do; & (3) obligation not to do.
I. Obligation to give
A. Specific thing
B. Generic thing
II. To do
III. Not to do (this includes all negative obligations like obligation not to give.)
Kinds of performance.--
1. specific performance - performance by the debtor himself (applies only to
OBLIGATION to give )
2. substitute performance - performance at the expense of the debtor
3. equivalent performance - grant of damages
Articles 1163 - 1166 cover obligation to give.
Three Accessory Obligations:
1. Article 1163- To take care of the thing with the diligence of a good father of a family
until actual delivery.
2. Article 1164- To deliver the fruits to the creditor (fruits produced after obligation to
deliver arises.)
3. Article 1166- To deliver accessions & accessories.
Amen | Compiled Notes
Balane:
 From the time the obligation arises, the creditor has a personal right against the
debtor as to the fruits. But he has no real right over them until actual delivery.
 Real right is a right which is enforceable against the whole world. He has only
the personal right against the debtor with regard to the undelivered fruits.
 This is because of the principle Non nudis pactis, sed traditione, dominia rerum
transferentur (It is not by mere agreement, but by delivery, is ownership
transferred.)
 Personal right arises from the time the obligation to deliver arises whereas the real
right does not arise until actual delivery.
Articles 1165 – 1167- Remedies Available to the Creditor (specific performance, substitute
performance, equivalent performance.)
A. In obligations to give
1. A determinate thing
a. Specific performance
b. Equivalent performance
2. A generic thing, all remedies are available
B. In an obligation to do, make a distinction:
In obligation to do, which is purely personal  only equivalent performance is available
In an obligation to do which is not personal:
a. substitute performance
b. equivalent performance
Note: In obligations to do, specific performance is not available.  The reason for this is
that specific performance will give rise to involuntary servitude.
C. Obligation not to do
1. substitute performance
2. equivalent performance.
 In all these cases, the creditor has the option of resolution or rescission under Article
1191. In addition, he can also claim damages.
Article 1244. The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one,
although the latter may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due.
In obligations to do or not to do, an act or forbearance cannot be substituted by another act or
forbearance against the obligee's will.
Article 1245. Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of
a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales.
Article 1246. When the obligation consists in the delivery of an indeterminate or generic thing,
whose quality and circumstances have not been stated, the creditor cannot demand a thing of
superior quality. Neither can the debtor deliver a thing of inferior quality. The purpose of the
obligation and other circumstances shall be taken into consideration.
Article 1460. A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated or physical segregated
from all others of the same class.
The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into, the
thing is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement
between the parties
Article 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other
products of animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the amount
of perpetual or life annuities or other similar income
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF OBLIGATIONS
OBJECT OF THE OBLIGATION:
1. to give  real OBLIGATION  determinate (specific) or indeterminate (generic)
2. to do 
3. not to do  personal OBLIGATION  positive (to do) or negative (not to do)
REAL OBLIGATION:
a. DETERMINATE OBLIGATION – particularly designated from a particular class;
PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION – to give (to deliver) a determinate thing;
ACCESSORY OBLIGATION – exists even when not expressly stipulated;
(1) Article 1163 – to take care of the thing with proper diligence of a good
father of the family;
(2) Article 1164 – to deliver the fruits;
(441)  natural / industrial / civil
 the OBLIGATION to deliver arises only if the creditor is
entitled;
(3) Article 1166 – delivery of the accessions and of the accessories (Art
440);
b. GENERIC THING  is one that is indicated only by its kinds, without being distinguished
from others of the same kind. (indeterminate)
 In an OBLIGATION to deliver a generic thing, the object is determinable; when
delivered it becomes determinate.
DELIMITED GENERIC  not totally generic nor specific; obligation to deliver one of
SEVERAL things; does not have designation nor physical segregation; Rule re Fortuitous
Events still apply.
DETERMINATION OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED:
(1) LAW  e.g. extra ordinary diligence required in Common carriers
(2) Stipulation of Parties
(3) Presumed: diligence of a Good father of the Family if none is specified/expressed by law
or agreement.
REAL RIGHT  is the power by a person over a specific thing, susceptible of being exercised
against the whole world.
PERSONAL RIGHT  belongs to a person who may demand from another, as a definite
passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation.
 From the moment the OBLIGATION to deliver a determinate thing arises, the
creditors earns a personal right over the thing and its fruits, but only delivery or
tradition transfers ownership that is a real right over the thing against the whole
world.
 For failure to deliver, the creditor’s remedy is not reivindicacion but specific
performance.
[CHAPTER 2: Right of Accession – GENERAL PROVISIONS]
Amen | Compiled Notes
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

Kinds of Fruits;
1) CIVIL – derived by virtue of juridical relation
2) Natural – spontaneous products of the soil and the young and other products of animals;
3) Industrial – produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor or by reason of
human labor.

Illustrations:
1. Which article is enshrined with the compliance of the obligation? Article 19 of the Civil Code.
2. How should an obligation be complied with? To answer, I would ask you after reading Article
19, to know what is the source of the obligation. Because if you know the source then you will
know how such obligation should be complied with. If the source of obligation is a contract,
then may be the party has already stipulated as to how the obligation should be complied with.
3. Obligation arising from law, the law itself will provide the manner of compliance of the
obligation. But in recent years, thus the common law specially on economic matters, is that
congress will just set the policies, and the IRR will have to be formulated by the executive
dept., and as a rule you should know the IRR. Even if we know the source of the obligation, we
may still not know on how to comply the obligation, because the parties did not stipulate or the
law did not provide, so how should we perform? Finally, the civil code will tell us on how to
comply in relation to the kind of obligation as to prestation. But most of the provision is on the
prestation to give so I will focus on that. In relation to this obligations, how should this
obligations be complied with, first you should know as to what kind of thing is to be delivered.
If it is a determinate thing or a generic thing.
4. Generic Thing: How should this obligation be complied with? There is a rule that should be
followed. What a debtor cannot compel the creditor to accept a thing that is inferior of quality.
A thing of such kind the debtor also cannot demand which is of superior quality. In other
words, the thing that is to be delivered to the creditor is not of inferior nor superior quality.
What should be delivered depends on the purpose of the constitution of the obligation.
5. Determinate Thing: if A has an obligation to deliver to B, KIA PRIDE 1996, but instead of
delivering that car, the creditor offered to deliver a brand new BMW, series 9 black convertible.
May the obligation be extinguished? Yes. If the creditor accepts the BMW. Why? Because
when the law said that the creditor cannot be compelled to accept but he may want to accept. In
fact if the creditor accepts, what is the mode of extinguishment? The mode of extinguishment
is Dacion En Pago, an act of thing was delivered by the debtor to the creditor in satisfaction of
his death.
6. Last question, why would anyone refuse to accept the BMW? Maybe there are gems in the old
car.
7. The accessory obligations, the debtor should preserve the thing. This obligation starts from
the constitution of the obligation until the delivery of the thing. Not all obligations have this
accessory the obligations. E.g. to deliver a generic thing.
8. As to the fruits of the thing. Who is entitled to the fruits of the thing accrued after the
constitution of the obligation? The Code provides: he will be entitled to the fruits of the thing
from the time the obligation to deliver arises. Art 1164