Ninal V Badayog Arcaba V Tabancura FULL TEXT 2nd Exam

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2 EXAM |1
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity
of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage
to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are
"true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule
7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the
petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that
the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
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foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a
special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under
Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of
whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared
or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no
third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous
5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of
the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
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Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention,
he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. .
..
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved
to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court,
which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable.
Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity
is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that
was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed
at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
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Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make
the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties
so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
14
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in
an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
18
Art. 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years. . . .
Art. 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years. . ."
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20
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or
her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at anytime before the
death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery
of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the
force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the
marriage.
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A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage
is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that
marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together
as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not
to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge
be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting
aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano
and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on
the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
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For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both
were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge
cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their
separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that
they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple
and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for
a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in
lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged
on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage
was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract
to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was
not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together
as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father
of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him
to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a
judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the
subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal
to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time
he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to
relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of
the child.
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The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare
the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the
State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required
by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage
is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the
instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to
support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1)
declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring
the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown
by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses
that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that
he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted
as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action
for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the
instant action for support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a
collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity
of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence
and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the
parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his
marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to file their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy
of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically
brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual
encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare
null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v.
Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to
support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without
a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial
court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18
N D
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2 E X A M | 10
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the
daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the
Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear
from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted
their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five
years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
N D
the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of
the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that
petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s
house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner
became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal
otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-
1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"),
defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and
"E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated
16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both
challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which
declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried,
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa
had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was
introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being
his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she
could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal
from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him,
and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987
when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top
of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage
contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared
that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980,
but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief,
Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she
filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument.7
N D
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on
24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper.
[Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package
for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another
indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that
her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover"
that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as
his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12,
1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his
company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not
believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then.
This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written
instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as
a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified
that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily
affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the
Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil
Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four
years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action
to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further,
it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
N D
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage,
the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four
(4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage.
However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the
validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this
manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of
the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V.
Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s
argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to
the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article
76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the
man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an
Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog, 20 and reasoned
that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis
of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least
five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that
is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse
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to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground
to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review
before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006
be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and
subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT
FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar
from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage
after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa
surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue,
we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the
Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential
and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether
the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the
N D
fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years.
In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a
primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s
notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May
1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76
of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by
the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to
79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2)
marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification
of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
N D
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry
each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders
the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by
statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority,
and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language
of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language
of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy
to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s
testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986
after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when
Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception
to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such
findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect
the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant
merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
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should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to
the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does
not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose
and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The
marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is
a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent
and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite
for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage
license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage,
we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement
that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with
reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license
at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap
of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied
relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced
invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the
ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of
his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years
before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans
a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn
a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period
under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
N D
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
35
In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code,
thus:
"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of
at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source
of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement."
36
The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years desire to marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such
persons from legalizing their status," Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
N D
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the
Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be
declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed
and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a
portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the
NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1
by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C.
Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along
lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the
West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-
SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
N D
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por
el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que
es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y
Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50;
por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to
avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal
heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3)
lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II
(Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-
respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively,
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No.
94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under
the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the
first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were
adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between
petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect
to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved
accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally
divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
N D
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the
court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery
of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the
RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was
a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother
was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to
the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's
complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not
invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the
deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner
presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth
of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in
another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch
255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio
for lack of the requisite marriage license;
N D
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted
child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the
interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and
ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void,
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and
to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of
plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock
in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad
and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public
policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary
judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to
recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action
to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the
disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101
of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of
facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
N D
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied
to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos
on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's
own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the
annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation
in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding
the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is
to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be
proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench,
Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted.
While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the
Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing
the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the
number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have
overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity
and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly
threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a
marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be
taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it
must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party,
the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and
his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although
it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether
foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that
matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that
appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on
the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his
putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light
N D
of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name
and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct
a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca
De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in
denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the
nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of
this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of
substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the
Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on
the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues,
including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings
nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the
pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
N D
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench,
Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted.
x x x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments
have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence
to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on
the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions
for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for
legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the
case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion
exists between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence
before the judgment was rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and
intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence
to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during
the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication
or suppression of evidence.16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule
made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
N D
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and,
hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage.
They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are
the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life
play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed
by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the
right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule
never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under
the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although
the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines,
and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy
was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action
to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any
person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or
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injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be
the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in
the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children
have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to
the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando
was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage
on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring
supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs
are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and
child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

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(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a
brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001
and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the
estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo
II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the
other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New
Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds
to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent
upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the
ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the
marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because
the presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting
from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos,
the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a
need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36
N D
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation
that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights
arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of
respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the
appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the
guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery
of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its
finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and
the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo
Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its
calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos
faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal
suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked
petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the
advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was
"without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy,
because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this
case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions
the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met
Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of
Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known
of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a
person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a
marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with
Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her
the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and
one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
N D
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been
celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement
of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband
and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her
marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the
testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain
attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware
of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second
marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage
license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license,
because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges
that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without
completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the
instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent marriage. As
regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial
evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
N D
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she
should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the
previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if
the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1)
when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of
him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who
was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in
the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the credibility
of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with
bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC,
which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision
mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime
of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal
law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another
already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should
only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is
that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which
has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one
day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

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Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage
must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she
can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this
case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the
validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in
vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in
a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a
quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage
license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that
their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment
to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six
months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner
testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never
cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage
disliked him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she
first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four
years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not
show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the
two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five
years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of
Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that
they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner
seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite
knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no
less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing
individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
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consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath,
adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action appears
to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the
courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her
marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they
themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing
full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family
Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape
criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second
marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his
second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19
August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage.
In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly
illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court
cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner
for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36
(as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court
of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private
respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
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The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason."
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he
is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient
use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only
voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of
marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which
Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
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Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages
under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages?
In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented
to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage
to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for
divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when
the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going
to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that
it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which
are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen
years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage
which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In
N D
other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage
and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that
when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might
have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he
has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice
Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes
and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage
was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they
can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured.
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he
can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea
in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization"
N D
be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would
rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising
from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by
the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes
and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
N D
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather,
the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect,
the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed
as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed,
to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can
be of an infinite variety.
N D
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability
to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The
canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is
due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid
under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect,
but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these
duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
N D
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created
all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in
a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision
are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother
and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her
by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during
this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even
see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
N D
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves
her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of
medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr.,
for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and
he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection
which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with
the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
N D
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving
the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment
of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May
22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
N D
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that
no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts.
88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity
by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted
that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that
he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error
the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there
might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did.
At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and
he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign
of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
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As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same
bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to
court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty
of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and
fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through
proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not
posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it
is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation
in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil
Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts
have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many
judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the
context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to
be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after
a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on
his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king
to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order
to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior
of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
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5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied
by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives
of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the
instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug
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wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that

it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure
to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely
and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument
on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
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(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
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decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50,
51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor
children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage
was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for
their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of
them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of
Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
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"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing
unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would
see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and
was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the
military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged
from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were
already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on
her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought
refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong
to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected
presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY,
Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x
x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume
the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
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such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained
in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to
prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the
basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show
such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine
respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by
the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should
have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx xxx xxx

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2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
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presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead
to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed
as a taxi driver.1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided
under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for
its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
12
"Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or
a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
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(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by adoption."
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G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004 ANTI-SOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
DECISION
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of
his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows
before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20,
1967.2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on
September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother.
She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the
Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.
Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national
named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim
left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her
back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the
country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino
Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not
be found in the Philippines.7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner
and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed
up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by
her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in
handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L.
CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of
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psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of
complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions
of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of
the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that –
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.10
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that
the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent
adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
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Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of
psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify
as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at
its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 5517 of the Family
Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of
petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman
Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court.1âwphi1 We cannot deny the grief,
frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in
this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. 19 While we
sympathize with petitioner’s marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh
it may be.20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second
or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We
hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such,
an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally
liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas
lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to
get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his
brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing
him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
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prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL –
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic)
THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four
of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing
Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
reads as follows:
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Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated
between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given
to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7,
1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document
attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes
on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such
a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to
the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to
absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that
a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced
against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the
valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the
requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes
by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued
by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal
laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
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the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar
as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate
disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity
of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage
license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female
of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 3826 may
contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to
note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity
of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic
of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s
basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which
has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
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decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117
under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with
Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on
January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon.
Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated
November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before
Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union,
appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City
Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp.
15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
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Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage
to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo
was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages
to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since
Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that
petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her
marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her
previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that
Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s
1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said
decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the
CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity
of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR
THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO
ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
N D
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF
BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF
VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN
ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed
involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for
suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted
his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. x x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void
ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must
be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not
per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
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Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage."11
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article
25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run
from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant
or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains
self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence
that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to
support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already
married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court
correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous
marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the
latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only
from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as
opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove
with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again,
petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court
to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which
ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore,
correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8
years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared
by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which,
petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower
courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years,
N D
Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21,
2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other
respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the
decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage
contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived
in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November
16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and
their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy
of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because
Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on
November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the
parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to present her
evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary
evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into
the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
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It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of
the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the
needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly,
such behavior could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court
of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and
evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the
marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens.
But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent
sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all
efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support"
pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a
family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other
spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in
the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse
falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on
the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the
denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.

N D
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
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(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his
marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them
a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip
to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although,
as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had
she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that the case at
bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person;
it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity,
we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the
rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be
the fitting denouement.
N D
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth
and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude
on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and
void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored
his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold);
yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an
invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
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worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to
him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez
were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people
on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo
V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially
a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s
persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman.
They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs
of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s act
of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School
for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three
(3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal
Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company,
yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her
honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious.
Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed
with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s
whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31
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In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed
to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented
is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent
her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him
to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the
one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one
instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about
almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable
of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled
the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification
by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack
of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed
the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court
of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the
factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or
lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down
in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In
fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the
Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
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This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity,
still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree
of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of
their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was
not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind"
at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the
ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the
marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages
classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent
freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-
Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise
stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable
under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At
the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential
marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though
were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed
to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
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It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article
36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this
Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application,
by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee,
was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought,
and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed
the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing
a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same
time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need
though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of
canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family
Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon
law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the
Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic
Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic
Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have
been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred
in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the
trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
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But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and
the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While
it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate
to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as
a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for
nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
thereto.
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4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons
for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event,
the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of
these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from
his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications
from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the
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aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not
totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish
the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious
names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that
[are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over
again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think,
based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love
towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,
what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating
stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that
the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic
notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
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A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological.
That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is
carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having
an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also
the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to
lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs.
Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom
by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a
world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before
the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so
grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person
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unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she
had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere
to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting
fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would
be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not
allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential
as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in
question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s
consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the
marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes
in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage
option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in
terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-
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concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired
from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove
as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway
since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the
trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the
rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings
of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and
that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate
stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is
incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would
seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would
have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they
remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August
1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that
the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the
trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a
time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that
law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations.
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The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is
one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment
from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there
was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded
to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners
and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those
cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such
at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-
case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this
case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced
that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering
doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as
an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to
contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent
in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and
not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in
love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009
DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO J. NAJERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which
found petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts are as follows:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains.1
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in
the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the
Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.2 They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage
as shown by the following facts:
(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division of the
Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a
job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a
seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had
to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he
came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an
affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused,
he insulted her and uttered "unprintable words" against her. He would go out of the house and when he
arrived home, he was always drunk.
(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every year, he
quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On
July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon
her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained
physical injuries on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported
at the Bugallon Police Station.
(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother at
Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
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Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio
in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and
respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in
favor of petitioner of respondent’s share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family
Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by publication as
provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer3 wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and averred
that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed
that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed
for the award of ₱200,000.00 as moral damages, ₱45,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱1,000.00 as appearance fee for
every scheduled hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order4 terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide
equally their conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting
an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties.5 The initial hearing of the case was held on
November 23, 1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist
Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a government agency
in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage contract.6 At the time of
their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the
Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of ₱5,000.00. It was petitioner’s brother who helped
respondent find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was
employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of ₱1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went
home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with
petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked
marijuana and every time he went out of the house and returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record
in their barangay that respondent was involved in drugs.7
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house
on the lot.8
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioner’s sister. Respondent,
however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home at around midnight, petitioner asked
him about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead,
respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with
her and said that she was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be
bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she
N D
was able to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of her body. When
respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the
kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone out and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent
start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway,
she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan
and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a few hours, she went home.9
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about 300 meters
away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She found that
their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.10
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.11
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner
learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment from him.12
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondent’s parents were separated. Respondent’s
brothers were also separated from their respective wives.13
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.14
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She
confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of
family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated from Respondent’s father. This turn of
events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed
steep in a kind of a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated
feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and anger, he
turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder
as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najera’s psychological impairment as traced to his parents’
separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner
Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage
organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave
and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties’ marriage be annulled on grounds of
psychological incapacity on the part of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and
responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.15
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with
borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.16
N D
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received
a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner
without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police
blotter.17
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and
respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;
2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant,
and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint Manifestation/Motion dated April
27, 1998.18
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution19 dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.20
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
268 SCRA 198.
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo
Najera.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same set
of facts established by petitioner’s evidence submitted before the trial court and therefore the same
conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in Psychology.21
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent which
is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.

N D
Republic v. Court of Appeals23 laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, thus:
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
thereto.
and included in the text of the decision.1avvphi1
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
N D
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church --
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
Canon 1095.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."24 The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.25 In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."26 What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.27
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed
to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and
evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.28 Moreover, the trial court correctly found
that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may
be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates’ testimony:
Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality disorder. [D]id you
find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondent’s family] background, there was strong basis
that respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondent’s family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
N D
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly affected, is
this curable?
A The chances are nil.
Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?
A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline personality
disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.29
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence
or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without
justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation30 only and not for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004, twelve days before
the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to follow
Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as canonically invalid
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church – while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other – shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
N D
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered
the Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before
this Court and correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court
only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right
to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty
required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of
due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that
as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second,
he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice;
Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of
bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was
aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into
marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife
and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and
decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered
the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la
Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in
particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the
petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and
friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter’s
testimonies, this Court is without any clue.1avvphi1
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as [canonically] invalid
should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered
must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We
have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
N D
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court
(Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse
or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.31
Santos v. Santos32 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted
the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is
similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but
the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent
portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be
heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty
required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due
discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and
decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological
incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February
23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June
9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April
30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does
not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient
to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the
trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the
evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that
his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found
that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed
to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to
clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate
tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file
comment8but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court
directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it
complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province
of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties
to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or
when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case.
N D
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However,
the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that
there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to
perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent
and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during
their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time,
petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own
reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner
started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations.
Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her
suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality
disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement
that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that
respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root
cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there
was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed
problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate
that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse
integral element" in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that
respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions
must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of
the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled,
the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
N D
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his
family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his
wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy
however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage
and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with,
although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied
so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with
legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and
the like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying
the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Court’s ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition."2
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are
the (a) Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four
(4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31,
Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed
as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City.5 He
courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed
to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.7
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon.8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they
resided at her parents’ house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they were able to build a house of their
own.9 For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children because he shouldered
his sister’s schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the income from her
"Botica" and store.11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the
morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their
children’s well-being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family
who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with
his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing
the rooftop.15
N D
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her sisters supported them
throughout their two-year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines.
Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt. She then
realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.16 At other times,
he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge.
She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the
last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo
lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after
her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.17
As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent time in her
store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get
married. However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon
his mother’s signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa.20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged
profligacy.21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their
store, establish their gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her signature in one
mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and
Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee.22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosa’s attitude after her return from the United States. She
became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the family’s businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was
steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their relationship was
blissful.24
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas. When they were there,
their children’s tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his part, he was
granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines.25
He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law
practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though
that there were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income.26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in
1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his
birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated when she denied his request for
engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area.28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office.
She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that:
(a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their
house;29 (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell
out his limited salary;30 and (c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that the relationship
between the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the
celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought
the declaration of nullity of their marriage.33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

N D
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised
on the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court
rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank documents, immorality, and
abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHSon
the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and
for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family,
the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondent’s record as an
attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of
the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects or idiosyncracies
"were sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record – first, the income which supported their children
came from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly from Rosa’s industry; second, Justo
gave his share of the support to his children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from
the conjugal property; third, he was booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election
and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law
and morality, Justo’s alleged infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa’s inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case,
being in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her allegation that
Justo is psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present case.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the
instant complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Court’s pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court
of Appeals. She states that she could have presented an expert to prove the root cause of Justo’s psychological
incapacity had she been required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be annulled on the bases
of the Court’s conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for
reception of expert testimony in the interest of due process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter completely foreign and removed"
from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing
was conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and documents.
The parties’ opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of Justo’s
alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.

N D
Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has
no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that
they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The pertinent portion of
the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume Justo’s alleged infidelity, failure
to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best indicators that
he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare
the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest
that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person.
While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show
‘incurability’, such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts
show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic
obligations of marriage in the future.36
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosa’s motion for reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment case appellant filed
against her husband, namely, appellee’s falsification of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, these
facts, by themselves, do not conclusively establish appellee’s psychological incapacity as contemplated under
Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as far as to presume the existence of such seeming
depravities in appellee’s character in our earlier judgment. However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the
existence of such eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee
to discern and perform the rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article 36.37
Clearly, Rosa’s insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the present case is
unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the existence" of Justo’s depravities, however,
even doing so could not bring about her (Rosa’s) desired result. As Rosa’s prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is
for this Court to annul her marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333.38 Obviously, she is of the impression
that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of
law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern
the third and vice versa.39 The Court’s exposition in In re Almacen40 is instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
N D
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice
versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be
conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness
as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a
husband. In the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers
of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of
psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-
existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the
innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are
not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected
from a lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the Guidelines
set forth therein states:
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it held in Republic
v. Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of
expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
N D
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity
or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said incapacity. The Court
further held that the New Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated
November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court
of Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to this Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should
not have retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted
that the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the trial court for further
proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to remand Pesca51 on the premise that
the Santosand Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:
The ‘doctrine of stare decisis,’ ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim – ‘legis interpretado legis vim obtinet’ that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court
finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of ‘lex prospicit, non replicit.’
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint
and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then
concluded that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to remand it
to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of
Justo.
III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case

shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Court’s consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the State’s policy on marriage. Article XV of the
Constitution mandates that:
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SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the position that any
doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and renders a person incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the Family
Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x
x.
were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
thereto.
N D
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
Canon 1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main grounds in
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the
falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and abandonment of the
family. Both the courts below found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333
for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to support Rosa’s charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her
signature, and abandonment of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT’S SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant
Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in
the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following
results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the
same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and
the same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant. However,
an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures
of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the
sample signatures of respondent.
N D
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by
complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of
exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain
loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife’s signatures in the bank loan documents? The
purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using
his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three other
persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy
this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras
where respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after
his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their
house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching,
the mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of
her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the
records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the
evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4)
children. The early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even
persuading his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire several
properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their
children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their
relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between
them caused by the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the mayoralty
election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent
attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only
in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business
ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa
filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s "defects" are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be
annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of her many
paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological
incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage, thus:
x x x. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
N D
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations
of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wife’s inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he could fulfill
his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of
psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court declared that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And,
again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her
former husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily
establish a serious or grave psychological or mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of marriage;
and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting
relationship with his wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not
sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.59 As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual
infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates
with Rosa’s plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 165424. April 16, 2008.*
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, petitioner, vs. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Family Code; Marriages; Annulment; Psychological Incapacity; Immaturity hardly constituted sufficient cause for
declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.In this case, although petitioner was
able to establish his immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological report and as testified to by him and Dr. Dayan,
the same hardly constituted sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It had to be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not equate
to psychological incapacity.—In Republic v. CA and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), we ruled that the psychological
incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not equate to
psychological incapacity. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in petitioner’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations, had to
be shown. In this, petitioner failed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The report, and even the testimonies given by petitioner and his expert witness at the
trial, dismally failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged disorder was grave enough and incurable to bring about his
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.—The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that
he and respondent had difficulty getting along with each other as they constantly fought over petty things. However,
there was no showing of the gravity and incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner,
except for the mere statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report. The report, and even the
testimonies given by petitioner and his expert witness at the trial, dismally failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged
disorder was grave enough and incurable to bring about his disability to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Their not having lived together under one roof did not necessarily give rise to the
conclusion that one of them was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.—
Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. This,
however, fails to move us considering that there may be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, a
married couple might have to live separately though the marital bond between them remains. In fact, both parties
were college students when they got married and were obviously without the financial means to live on their own.
Thus, their not having lived together under one roof did not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of them
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the January 26, 2004
decision1 and September 24, 2004 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili3 were only 21 and 19 years of age,
respectively, when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. After the wedding, they continued to
live with their respective parents and never lived together but maintained the relationship nonetheless.
A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner stopped seeing respondent and went on dates with
other women. It was at this time that he started receiving prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he
was already a married man.
N D
Thereafter, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158 a petition for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage on the ground that he was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations
to respondent.4 He claimed that he thought that the wedding performed at the City Hall of Manila was a “joke” and
that the marriage certificate he signed was “fake.” He also pointed out that he and respondent never lived together
as husband and wife and never consummated the marriage.
The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and held that, taken in totality, the evidence for petitioner
failed to establish his psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The same was denied. Hence,
this petition.
The question before us is whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that petitioner
suffered from psychological incapacity which effectively prevented him from complying with his essential marital
obligations.
We deny the petition.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.5 He failed to discharge the burden.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and a psychological report written by Dr. Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph. D., a clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained therein.
According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a personality disorder characterized as “a mixed personality
disorder from self-defeating personality to dependent personality disorder brought about by a dysfunctional family
background.” Petitioner’s father was very abusive and domineering. Although petitioner and his siblings were
adequately supported by their father, a very wealthy man, they lacked affirmation. Because of this, petitioner grew
up without self-confidence and very immature. He never really understood what it meant to have a family, much less
to be a husband. According to Dr. Dayan, this was very much evident in petitioner’s impulsive decision to get married
despite having gone steady with respondent for only six months.
Moreover, she added that both petitioner and respondent were psychologically incapacitated to perform their
essential marital obligations as they never lived together as husband and wife. They also never consummated their
marriage. Furthermore, they constantly fought. Their separation was inevitable as they were both immature. Dr.
Dayan then abruptly concluded that petitioner’s psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.
In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological report and as
testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. It had to be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.6
In Republic v. CA and Molina,7 we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a
“refusal” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities does not equate to psychological incapacity.8 Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor, an adverse integral element in petitioner’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations,9 had to be shown. In this, petitioner failed.
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty getting along with each
other as they constantly fought over petty things.10 However, there was no showing of the gravity and incurability of
the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere statement or conclusion to that
effect in the psychological report. The report, and even the testimonies given by petitioner and his expert witness at
the trial, dismally failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged disorder was grave enough and incurable to bring about his
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
N D
Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. This, however,
fails to move us considering that there may be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, a married couple
might have to live separately though the marital bond between them remains.11 In fact, both parties were college
students when they got married and were obviously without the financial means to live on their own. Thus, their not
having lived together under one roof did not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of them was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. It is worth noting that petitioner himself
admitted that he and respondent continued the relationship after the marriage ceremony. It was only when they
started fighting constantly a year later that he decided to file a petition to have the marriage annulled. It appears that
petitioner just chose to give up on the marriage too soon and too easily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009 (Motion for Reconsideration)
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner,

vs.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioner’s petition
for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004
decision1 and September 24, 2004 resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null
and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a "joke." After the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later,
at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter,
he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon
making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and
self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that
petitioner’s personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.3
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence
presented failed to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CA’s decision and
resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought
to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented,
especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the
trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,4 this Court reiterated that courts should interpret
the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case
basis — guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of
church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden
of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the
parties.5
N D
In this case, the testimony6 of petitioner’s expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent
personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell this
court your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder from self-
defeating personality disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is brought about by [a]
dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage
with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the essential
obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive decision.
I don’t think he understood what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there was no
consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months
he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death,
and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave lack
of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I don’t think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of
the moment decision that they should get married xx xx I don’t think they truly considered themselves
married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and
respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated the marriage.
During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem
also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder7 as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually
lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments.
At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable
to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.1avvphil
In her psychological report,8 Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact
that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.9 Petitioner’s mother even
N D
had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his
marriage to respondent was for real.10
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner
typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude
encouraged other people to take advantage of him.11 This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be
dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots12 and, later, by respondent who was as domineering
as his father.13 When petitioner could no longer take respondent’s domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her
rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.14
Dr. Dayan traced petitioner’s personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:15
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lester’s family is dysfunctional. The father was very abusive, very
domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They might [have
been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact
family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having
self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what
[it] meant to have a real family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioner’s personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at
the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent.16
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had
a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality
disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.17 Particularly, personality disorders
are "long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles
of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems
for those who display them and for others."18
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively
renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and the
January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET
ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
13
Id., p. 8. Respondent was described as domineering, demanding and short-tempered.
16
Id., see pp. 9-10:
Q. Now, would you say that this psychological incapacity which you identified and described earlier, is it
beyond treatment?
A. Yes, sir.
N D
xx xx xx
Q. Now, based on your findings and what you said, would you say then that the psychological incapacity of
the petitioner was already apparent even before he got married?
A. Yes, sir.
N D
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological
incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free in form and devoid
of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January
19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowena’s close
friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996,
when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him
relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the
boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance
fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to
her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she,
20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed
to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one
point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home
and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that
they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he
would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid
him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents,
she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.10
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After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist
it in the scheduled hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the
following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He
finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married to and
separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in
relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is
now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the
business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed
to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself
to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until
1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself
from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have
not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives.
From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would
somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea
of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so
they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able
to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find
any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioner’s parents. When the
parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to
go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation,
respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted
irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would
call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the
extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her
how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought
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the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before
the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when
the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so
many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going
home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament
and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that
he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling.
Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home
of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live
with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner
that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life.
Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family.
When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to
stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have
a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The
break-up was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to
their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to
marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too
akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to
that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type
of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to
be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she
thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to
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have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the
realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows.
Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law.
In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken
marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening
their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive
so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since
childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a
big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.17 The
Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set
aside the trial court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner.
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted
the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the
OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 The CA later denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP
because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no
statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported
incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between
the parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:

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Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985
of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would
have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages
on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:

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‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring
the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering
an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University,
as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was
informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack
of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the
foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have
found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express
it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may
be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
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The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even
comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really
existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a
valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter
into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code—and classified the same
as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
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A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least
not ignorant’ of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced
two distinct but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and,
therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after
the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed as to
allow some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the second and
third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume
the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal,
example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive
law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different
locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them.
This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the
psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals
with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object.
The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an
object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the
positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent,
but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to
marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity
different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which
arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.
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The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there
sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal
system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still
capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of
a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality].
However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that
a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume
those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis,
the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent,
rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church
courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is
prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the
intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion
that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this
is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain
cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage
is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object
of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more
correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an
object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled
mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and
the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the
meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing
a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent,
experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of
view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is
possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free
decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani
concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of
consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person
in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral
impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as
moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent
that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
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3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of
initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-
centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone
how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony.
Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of
contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good
and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general
strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed
to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on the level
of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his
"constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is
determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision.
And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential
obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was
in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium
in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility
as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and
experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage
of in order to achieve one’s ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to
the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses
and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the
incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal
relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include
affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third
paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual
relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a
grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual
faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to
fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent,
as in the defect of the object of consent.
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3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of
the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is
something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then
affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable
in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which
impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one’s consciousness would not seem to
qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom,
however remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution. It would
seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of
freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party
to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court’s judgment of annulment in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the
Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.
Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
thereto.
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obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence
nation.
Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another
three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains
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in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too
much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions
for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should rather be alarmed by
the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First
and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant,
and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
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parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important
in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but
to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's
body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses
to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength
of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse
is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
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The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that
at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's
failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise
cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos
v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to
suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in
the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not
dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the findings
that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner,
and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health
discusses personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality
disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way
in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an
awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties
in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality
disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead
to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus,
some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived
from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-
aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and
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emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought
to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However, later researchers have
found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and
borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal
fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity
and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for
many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear
to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for other
specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack
self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments. At
times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable
to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations
imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either
through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
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Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are prominent
in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to
a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described
immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.
1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others being borderline,
histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive
the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-
hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to
blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and
the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,

vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its
assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23,
Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was
already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second child was born, the
couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical
board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in
1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff,10 while Carmen
worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.11
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977;
Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and
Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only
two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and
gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would
go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and
insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin
used his gun and shot the gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was
affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be
unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to
acknowledge the same.16
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family and would even
get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend
his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed
home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19
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Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two or three times a week and
would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would
pawn his wife’s own jewelry to finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their
family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling
debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble,
an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.23
In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice
and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money
to pay the same; and
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial
support to his family.24
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as
his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble
only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself
who would collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means
whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on
unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while
Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28
During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits and violent behavior was
corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’ children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated
that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview,
however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during
Benjamin’s deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa.
After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking,
compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality
disorder.32
To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the
Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness. 33 Dr. Obra evaluated
Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation
report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s)
interview with Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong
with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track
record as anesthesiologist.35
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of
his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-
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curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality
defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and
defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.37
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court’s
ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin
was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40and in Rep.
of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied
to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she
had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as
it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having
been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the
prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA
to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus,
on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s
decision.47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its December 13,
2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50necessary
for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil
Code.51
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This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by
the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical development of
this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The
doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved,
early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where
courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual
principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to
Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed
but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy
considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal
conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is
this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed
its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving
the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents.
Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare
decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory
stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to
apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in
constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal
and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is
a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided."
In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial
interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by
this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should
be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for
Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2)
it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare
decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the
hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis
are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions
in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's
"separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on
public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal."
Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the
chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis
rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original
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ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that
should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in
the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting,
age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to
be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3)
determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of
an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be
applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also
raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It
is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have
to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of
the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all
fours" with another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the
expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine
the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions,
while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At
best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given
case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.59The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the
parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of
Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
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Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein,
cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach
thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for
the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these
experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in
the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then such
expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition
for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court’s and the appellate court’s rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she is about to assume.621avvphi1.zw+
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and
gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on
the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the
marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these
experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a
personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover,
there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s
deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report
furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s)
personal interview with Benjamin’s brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts
against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love,
respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to
declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003
Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009
MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,1 and its Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they
got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City. At the time of their marriage, petitioner
was 23 years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no children.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.
Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him. Because of this,
the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there was collusion between the
parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between the
parties.
On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and
submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on the State’s behalf under the supervision
and control of the Solicitor General.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally
immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential
responsibilities and duties of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial
assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and it
was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even bought him a
newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have an age limit and that he had no
clothes to wear to job interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave
him money. Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed.
However, some weeks after, petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents
when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and the money
he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother. When she confronted him about the matter,
Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job so that petitioner would stop nagging
him about applying for a job. He also told her that his parents can support their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo
was so dependent on his mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of
his mother.
Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent
towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and petitioner never
enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be
enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when
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petitioner requested that they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo
did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.
During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993, Ramos,
the niece of Rodolfo’s father, was living with Rodolfo’s family. She corroborated petitioner’s testimony that Rodolfo
was indeed not gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his
mother. This witness also confirmed that it was respondent’s mother who was paying the rentals for the room where
the couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mother’s house in business attire.
She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that
respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner
for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent, very responsible, focused and has
direction and ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that
based on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary
way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make
his own decisions and dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was
a cross-identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondent’s father
was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life but
manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe
because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable
because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.
Based on petitioner’s evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his
commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he
has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of
the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the
wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and
cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect,
support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital
obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of respondent’s
severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared
null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make proper entries into the
records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.
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Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.3
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision4 to correct the first name of Rodolfo which was erroneously
typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based
solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based on an examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was
no showing that the alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were
grave, permanent and incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the
psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder existed prior to the marriage and was
grave and incurable. In setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondent’s alleged irresponsibility and over-dependence on his
mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellee’s failure to prove that respondent’s supposed psychological malady existed
even before the marriage. Records however show that the parties were living in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage and were living on their own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his mother for financial
support may be brought about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the family coffers,
considering that it was his wife who is working for the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that respondent does
not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have one. However this is not at all a
manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he has a full grasp of reality and
completely understands the implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed. The only problem besetting
the union is respondent’s alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven in
this case to be psychological-rooted.
The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional immaturity which by themselves,
do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events,
petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case
of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so
immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356
SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13,
2007).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-
appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains VALID.5 (emphasis ours)
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate
to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
N D
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly ruled that the "totality
of evidence presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouse’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code and settled jurisprudence.
We grant the petition.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.6 Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric
and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.7
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 stringent guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
thereto.
N D
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. 9 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.11 It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."12 The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.13
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina,
there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.15 With the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the
interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant
the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.
The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal examination of
Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctor’s reliance on petitioner’s version of events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held
that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon
which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.18 Significantly, petitioner’s narration of facts was
corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court
to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or
lack thereof.19 Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witness.20
Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision.
N D
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas
from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment; that from the choice of the family
abode to the couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couple’s inadequate sexual relations
and Rodolfo’s refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his
mother.1avvphi1
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical causes
by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field of psychology in general and psychological
incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the psychodynamics of the
case of petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:
Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the eldest, she is expected to be
the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and physically punished, in order to tow the
line. But on the other hand, she developed growing resentments towards her father and promised herself that with
the first opportunity, she’ll get out of the family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 ½ months after they
met, without really knowing anything about him. Her obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at that
time and she did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in marriage. During their 4 years marital
relationship, she came to realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in terms of
loving, caring, protection, financial support and sex.
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be weak, and his two elder
brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his mother’s needs, became an easy prey,
easily engulfed into her system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a prolonged and abnormal dependence
to his mother. The mother, being the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the reversal of
roles became confusing that led to ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all the boys were
hooked up to his complexities, producing so much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically,
Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying
the mother’s love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his
continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him
psychologically.
Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner,
that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible and is psychologically capacitated to perform
the duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems she has difficulty in handling her
considerable anxiety, at present. There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with a parent of the
opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation crippled his psychological functioning
related to sex, self confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to marriage, but became
manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable
in nature, because it started early in his life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure.
It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustment.21
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of
which we quote below:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your psychological evaluation?
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A: I’ve found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very responsible,
focused, she has direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she wanted, ma’am, and therefore,
I concluded that she is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage,
ma’am.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological evaluation with regards to the
respondent?
A: Based on my interview, I’ve found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric classification as Dependent
Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings, ma’am.
Q: In layman’s language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you mean by Dependent
Personality Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to ordinary way of life are
ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt with himself and inability to
make his own decision, quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his mother, ma’am.
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta?
A: Very much, ma’am.
Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a husband and as
a father, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this psychological problem?
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the mother who is the dominant
figure in the family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family while the father was a seaman
and always out of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive and
passive to the authority of the wife, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind of psychological problem
manifested?
A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his early stages in life, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent in
this case, before the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with the…that the manifestation came too
late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no stresses, no
demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished college degree of Computer
N D
Science, there is no demand on himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the
decision for him, ma’am.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is expected of a married person,
ma’am.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so deeply ingrained into his
personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological problem as far as the marriage
relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?
A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard expectation is, the
husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the sexual duties of a
husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their marriage, they had only according to the wife, experienced
once sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact that because husband was so closely attached
to the mother, it is a result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the mother’s love when
they will be having heterosexual relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to distinguish
between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship will not be satisfactory according to
expectation, ma’am.22
In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."23
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce
here for emphasis:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his
commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he
has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of
the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the
wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and
cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect,
support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital
obligations.
N D
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of respondent’s
severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the first
few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfo’s
irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these
manifestations of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted
in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.
Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The Court is wary of the CA’s bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CA’s reasoning
that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to his embarrassment for failing
to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his "responsible" realization that he
should not have a child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support
these views. Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial
court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted
by evidence.
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be
attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he
was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his
abnormal behavior.
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality disorder and how one
afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital obligations, to wit:
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.24
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means
an exact science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in
their symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts,
as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring
the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his
own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations
to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself,
much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters
that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his
spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.
N D
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was
supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when
it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply them to situations and people
in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only
developments in science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional
gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material
support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an "autonomous" social
institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family.
In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual
love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.
This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial
to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code is proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015 (Motion for Reconsideration)
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of
legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality
and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were
not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result.
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that
could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent
during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that
respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but
it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of
NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
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remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state
that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around
when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care
of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both
failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to
Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s
Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually
assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court
did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its
December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what
constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three
expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated
to perform their respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the
party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its
meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the
Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision
Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less
specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application."4 Illustrative of the "less
specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of
psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of
ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have
rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently
of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
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observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code, as follows:
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
thereto.
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"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church —
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
nation.
Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code
must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted
version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according
to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of
experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-
depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity
should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other
evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial
court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain
itself from substituting its own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial
court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard
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marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the
State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity
of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and
solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position
to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position and role of the trial
judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should
be accorded due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a
psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the petitioner’s version
of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of
the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological
incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached
by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews
of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such
circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the
issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine the
issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se
invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for
one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important
is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result
from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an
aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological
incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay
that would justify their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and
technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric
evaluation had been based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion
should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.
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Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the
expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and dependent
tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr.
Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes
to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but she may not be that
demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance
to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can
be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person.
At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an
enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.
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But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly
demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on the
respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to
wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are several scores wherein
Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as
acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that
the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates
relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less, could
you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is self-centered or
narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her fatherdied in a
vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume the
breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against
the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena
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Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena
Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother because
she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her
background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script,
the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a
tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was
not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of
fourteen already expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of
Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still insearch of this.
In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention,
this need for love on other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?
A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather
in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the
reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value
of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and
Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert
testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by
canonical thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity
adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility with
regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you
read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility
with regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested running
through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was dysfunctional and
then her being a model in her early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of
prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became
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an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had
embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the relationship of
the respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher children.
She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating with friends. They were the
priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody takes for granted.
The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated to the marriage
withher. It’s the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the
myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her
own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
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Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism afflicting
respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious obligations which she
has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at the time
or marriage or even thereafter?
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A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the
marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you show
that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her and she
was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the top priority in her
life. It’s her lifestyle.
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Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting such
fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?
A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background situation. Say,
almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in her
job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her position in the
family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the
pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect.
The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties’ psychological
incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that
would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon
a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and
findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice.
The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important
in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked togive professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but
to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's
body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses
to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented'
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since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse
is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
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The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that
at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's
failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise
cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos
v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in
Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
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Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another
three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains
in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much
regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions
for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by
the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial
to a stillborn marriage.
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aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

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Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that
could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or
absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the
duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties
and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong
sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life,
particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37–
the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been
hooked on playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity or practice which
your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get there by lunch
then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect
of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing
her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current
psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article
220 of the Family Code, to wit:
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Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of such children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated
children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example,
and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with
the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental
to their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that
both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the
respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from
The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper of the
petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they were together, that
they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she
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is also dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds
of problems that she had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr.
Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really thinking of
marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that time he was
not also a monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his younger
years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to you that the
thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions
is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that
he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?
A : Sir, it’s difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to
perform his duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to
Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and that
the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as
the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in
her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless
of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both
of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already accepted and
come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond
repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own
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children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them
and their children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her
erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for
all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.1âwphi1 It is not, in effect,
directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain
illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is
denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and
towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity
to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court
should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not preclude
striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions
for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently,
this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and
the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While
it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate
to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed,
Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with
the essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage
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between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 209180

vs.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II and OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209253
OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Petitioner,

vs.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions1 for review on certiorari assailing the Decision2 dated March 21, 2013 and
the Resolution3 dated September 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94337, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated November 5, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 225 (RTC Branch 225) in
Civil Case No. Q-98-34627 declaring the marriage of Reghis M. Romero II (Reghis) and Olivia Lagman Romero (Olivia)
null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code), as amended.
The Facts
Reghis and Olivia were married6 on May 11, 1972 at the Mary the Queen Parish in San Juan City and were blessed with
two (2) children, namely, Michael and Nathaniel, born in 1973 and 1975,7 respectively. The couple first met in Baguio
City in 1971 when Reghis helped Olivia and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Since then, Reghis
developed a closeness with Olivia’s family, especially with the latter’s parents who tried to play matchmakers for
Reghis and Olivia. In the desire to please Olivia’s parents, Reghis courted Olivia and, eventually, they became
sweethearts.8
Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of his siblings
and parents. Thus, less than a year into their relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt that her
demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals. Olivia, however, refused to end
their relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latter’s dormitory overnight. Reghis declined and, instead,
made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female dormitory. The next day, Reghis brought
Olivia home and while nothing happened between them the previous night, Olivia’s parents believed that they had
eloped and planned for them to get married. Reghis initially objected to the planned marriage as he was unemployed
and still unprepared. However, Olivia’s parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support
them until they are financially able. As Olivia’s parents had treated him with nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed.9
The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis could
not forgive Olivia for dragging him into marriage and resented her condescending attitude towards him. They became
even more estranged when Reghis secured a job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career and
focused on supporting his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little time with his family, causing Olivia to
complain that Reghis failed to be a real husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways.10
On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage11 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
94,12 docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-34627, citing his psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations.13 In support of his petition, Reghis testified that he married Olivia not out of love but out of the desire to
please the latter’s parents who were kind and accommodating to him. Reghis further maintained that he was not
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prepared to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time, as his mind was geared towards finishing his
studies and finding employment to support his parents and siblings.14 He also added that Olivia is in a relationship with
a certain Eddie Garcia (Mr. Garcia) but he (Reghis) has no ill-feelings towards Mr. Garcia, as he and Olivia have been
separated for a long time.15
Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio (Dr. Basilio), a clinical psychologist, who submitted a Psychological
Evaluation Report16 dated April 28, 1998 and testified that Reghis suffered from Obsessive Compulsive Personality
Disorder (OCPD).17 According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis’ behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for whatever
endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as those pertaining
to his roles as father and husband. Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis’ OCPD was the root of the couple’s disagreements
and that the same is incurable, explaining too that Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest from his
mind at the time and, as such, felt cheated into marriage.18
For her part,19 Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations
before, at the time, and after the celebration of their marriage. She also averred that the petition is barred by res
judicata inasmuch as Reghis had previously filed petitions for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage on the
ground the she is allegedly psychologically incapacitated, but said petitions were dismissed.20 Olivia, however, was
unable to present evidence due to the absence of her counsel which was considered by the RTC as waiver of her right
to present evidence.21
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the
petition.22
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision23 dated November 5, 2008, the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and
Olivia null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.24 It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr.
Basilio, holding that Reghis suffered from a disorder that rendered him unable to perform the obligations of love,
respect and fidelity towards Olivia as it gave him a strong obsession to succeed in his career, to the exclusion of his
responsibilities as a father and husband. It also concurred with Dr. Basilio’s observation that Reghis is still deeply
attached to his parents and siblings such that he pursues his business ventures for their benefit. Likewise, it agreed
that Reghis’ behavioral disorder existed even before his marriage or even his adolescent years and that the same is
incurable.25
Anent the issue of res judicata, the RTC remarked that there is no identity of causes of action between the petitions
previously filed, which ascribed psychological incapacity on Olivia’s part, and the present case which is brought on the
ground of Reghis’ own psychological incapacity.26
The Republic and Olivia moved for reconsideration,27 which was, however, denied by the RTC in a Resolution28dated
July 3, 2009. Undaunted, both appealed29 to the CA.30
The CA Ruling
In a Decision31 dated March 21, 2013, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC, holding that the OCPD from which
Reghis suffered made him yearn for professional advancement and rendered him obligated to support his parents and
siblings, at the expense of his marital and filial duties. It ruled that Reghis’ condition amounts to psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code as it is permanent in nature and incurable. It
observed that Reghis’ OCPD started early in his psychological development and is now so deeply ingrained in his
structure and, thus, incurable because people who suffer from it are of the belief that nothing is wrong with them. It
further concluded that Reghis’ condition is severe considering that it interrupted and interfered with his normal
functioning and rendered him unable to assume the essential marital obligations.
The Republic’s and Olivia’s respective motions for reconsideration32 were denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated
September 12, 2013.
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The Proceedings Before the Court
On November 19, 2013, the Republic filed a petition for review on certiorari34 before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
209180, where it maintained that Reghis has not established that his alleged psychological incapacity is grave, has
juridical antecedence, and is incurable. It averred that the psychological report prepared and submitted by Dr. Basilio
has no factual basis to support the conclusions found therein as she failed to describe in detail the "pattern of
behavior" showing that Reghis indeed suffered from OCPD. The Republic also claimed that the methodology employed
in evaluating Reghis’ condition is not comprehensive enough35 and that based on Reghis’ own testimony, he was able
to perform his marital obligations as he lived together with Olivia for years and attended to his duties to their
children.36 It pointed out that Reghis’ condition was not shown to have existed before their marriage and that the
same is incurable.37
On November 13, 2013, a separate petition for review on certiorari,38 docketed as G.R. No. 209253 was filed by Olivia.
Like the Republic, she pointed out that Reghis himself admitted knowing his marital obligations as husband to Olivia
and father to their children.39 Olivia added that if Reghis indeed felt that he was being forced into the marriage, he
could have simply abandoned her then or refused to take his vows on their wedding day.40
In a Resolution41 dated February 17, 2014, the Court consolidated the present petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The lone issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s declaration of nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petitions.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution, and
marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.42 Thus, it has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a
ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.43 It must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.44
Verily, all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality
disorders and there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases.45 Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological
incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.46
In Republic v. CA,47 the Court laid down definitive guidelines on the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code. Among others, it clarified that the illness must be grave enough to bring about the incapacity or inability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage such that "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.48
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not
concur.1âwphi1As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to comply with his
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marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part.
Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both
of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take
care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them.49 That
he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is
psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Albios,50 the Court held
that:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life
that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy
and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the OCPD which Reghis allegedly suffered from was not shown to have juridical antecedence. Other than
Dr. Basilio’s conclusion that Reghis’ "behavioral disorder x x x existed even prior to the marriage or even during his
adolescent years,"52 no specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years were shown which would explain his
behavior during his marriage with Olivia. Simply put, Dr. Basilio’s medical report did not establish that Reghis’
incapacity existed long before he entered into marriage.
In like manner, Dr. Basilio simply concluded that Reghis’ disorder is incurable but failed to explain how she came to
such conclusion. Based on the appreciation of the RTC, Dr. Basilio did not discuss the concept of OCPD, its classification,
cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order
to create a necessary inference that Reghis’ condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. To the Court’s mind,
this is a glaring deficiency that should have prompted the RTC and the CA to be more circumspect and critical in the
assessment and appreciation of Dr. Basilio’s testimony.
Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be
deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital tie.53 After all, marriage is an inviolable institution
protected by the State. Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of
evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of
the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.54
The Court is not unaware of the rule that factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this
Court. However, this principle does not apply when such findings go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the
admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,55 such as in the case at bar.
The Court can only commiserate with the parties’ plight as their marriage may have failed. It must be reiterated,
however, that the remedy is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.56Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;57 rather, it must be limited to cases where there is a downright
incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 58 Thus, absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity
within the context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie. 59
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated September
12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94337 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
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petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, as amended,
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 203284
NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B. MATUDAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the January 31, 2012 Decision2 and August 23, 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA·G.R. CV No. 95392 and the Motion for
Reconsideration,4 thus affirming the December 18, 2009 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were married in Laoang,
Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children.
In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with her; she had not been
seen nor heard from again.
Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,6docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94. Petitioner alleged that
before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations
as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected and failed to provide petitioner and her children with the
necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so after leaving for work abroad; that
based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), Marilyn's psychological
incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; that petitioner's consent to the marriage was obtained by Marilyn
through misrepresentation as she concealed her condition from him; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a lasting and
pennanent commitment like marriage"7 as she "never (gave) him and their children financial and emotional support x
x x and for being selfish through their six (6) years of cohabitation;"8 that Marilyn became "so despicably irresponsible
as she has not shown love and care upon her husband, x x x and that she cannot properly and morally take on the
responsibility of a loving and caring wife x x x."9
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the Petition.
The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there is no collusion between the parties,
proceedings were conducted in due course. However, trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence.
Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter Maricel B. Matudan (Maricel), and Dr. Tayag, the following
documents were submitted in evidence:
1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit10 (Exhibit "A") which was adopted as his testimony on direct examination;
2. The Judicial Aftidavit11 of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination;
3. The Sworn Affidavit12 of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was considered part of her testimony on direct examination;
4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the Psychological Condition of NICOLAS T. MATUDAN, the
petitioner for Nullity of Marriage against respondent MARILYN BORJA-MATUDAN''13(Exhibit "C"); and
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5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage contract/certificate and respective birth certificates of his
children, and a Letter/Notice, with Registry Return Receipt, sent by Dr. Tayag to Marilyn requesting
evaluation/interview relative to petitioner's desire to file a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage (Exhibits
"E" to "G").
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision14 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground
that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity. It held, thus:
Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist Nedy L. Tayag testified. Petitioner offered in evidence
Exhibits "A" to ''G" which were admitted by the Court.
The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.
From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner, the Court gathered the following:
Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976 x x x. They begot four (4) children x x x. Petitioner and
respondent lived together with their children. On June 25, 1985, petitioner asked respondent [sic] for permission to
work and left the conjugal dwelling. Since then she was never heard of [sic]. Respondent never communicated with
the petitioner and her children. Petitioner inquired from the relatives of the respondent but they did not tell him her
whereabouts.
In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony, petitioner claimed that respondent failed to perform her
duties as a wife to him. Respondent never gave petitioner and their children financial and emotional support, love and
care during their cohabitation. She was irresponsible, immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner
and their children. She was self-centered, had no remorse and involved herself in activities defying social and moral
ethics.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the respondent had a happy married life and they never had a
fight. The only reason why he filed this case was because respondent abandoned him and their children.
Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when respondent left them. She corroborated the testimony of the
petitioner that since respondent left the conjugal dwelling she never provided financial support to the family and never
communicated with them.
Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the Psychological Condition of Nicolas Matudan' which she
prepared (Exhibit "C''). She subjected petitioner to psychological test and interview. She likewise interviewed Maricel
Matudan. She came up with the findings that petitioner is suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and
respondent has Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The features of petitioner's disorder are the
following: negativistic attitude, passive resistance, lacks the ability to assert his opinions and has great difficulty
expressing his feelings.
The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed to his being an abandoned child. At a young age, his
parents separated and he was left in the custody of his paternal grandmother. He lacked a support system and felt
rejected. He developed a strong need for nurturance, love and attention and that he would do anything to attain such.
As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows: Preoccupation with pursuing matters that would
make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions;
lacks empathy; wants to have a good life.
Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial environment. She came from an impoverished family.
Her parents were more pre-occupied with finding ways to make ends meet to such extent that they failed to give
adequate attention and emotional support to their children.
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Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of the parties are grave and characterized by juridical
antecedence as the same already existed before they got married, their disorders having been in existence since their
childhood years are permanent and severe.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:
'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapicity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.'
Article 68 of the same Code provides:
'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.'
In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January 4, 1995, G.R. No. 112019, the Honorable Supreme Court
held:
'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family Code cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso
a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila x x x, who opines
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must be serious, grave and 'so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.' x x x.
In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.'
It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner is the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent.
During the pre-trial, the sole issue raised is whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The alleged personality disorder of the petitioner is clearly not
an issue in this case.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner has not
established the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Again, it must be emphasized that this
petition was filed on the ground of the psychological incapacity of respondent and not the petitioner.
Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits. The salient features of
her disorder were enumerated by Nedy Tayag in her report as follows: pre-occupation with pursuing matters that
would make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband's
opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a good life. Her personality disorder is considered permanent, grave and
incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial environment during her early developmental years.
In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of the petitioner as to the physical manifestation of the
psychological incapacity is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, petitioner's testimony particularly his affidavit which
was considered as his direct examination contained only general statements on the supposed manifestations of
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respondent's incapacity. Respondent was described therein as irresponsible, immature, self -centered, lacks remorse,
got involved with activities defying social and moral ethics. Petitioner however miserably failed to expound on these
allegations. In fact during his cross-examination, he even contradicted the allegations in his petition and affidavit. He
clearly stated that he had a happy marital relationship with the respondent and never had a fight with her (TSN,
December 5, 2008, page 8).
Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that this the [sic] only reason why he wants
their marriage dissolved (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 9). Abandonment of spouse however is not psychological
incapacity. It is only a ground for legal separation.
Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui generis, the allegations therein must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence that would warrant the dissolution of the marriage bond. Absent such proof, the Court will uphold
the validity of the marriage for 'the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bond.' (Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006).
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner moved to reconsider, 16 but in a May 12, 2010 Order,17 the RTC held its ground reiterating its
pronouncement that petitioner failed to demonstrate Marilyn's psychological incapacity, and that the petition is
anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the marriage and family, which by itself is not equivalent to
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 95392. However, in its assailed January 31, 2012
Decision, the CA instead affirmed the RTC judgment, declaring thus:
Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have denied the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Marilyn x x x. He maintains that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the trial court, he was able to establish by
the quantum of evidence required, the claimed psychological incapacity of his wife.
The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.
Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological incapacity his wife, petitioner-appellant revealed during his
cross examination that it was actually his wife's act of abandoning the family that led him to seek the nullification of
their marriage. In fact, during his cross-examination, he readily admitted that they were happily married and that they
never engaged in bickering with each other.
xxxx
Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]? Were there moments that you were happy with your wife?
A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.
COURT
And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?
FISCAL
N D
I would presume that you had a happy married life, how come your wife just left you like that? Do you have any idea
why your wife just left you like that?
A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.
Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?
A: None, ma'am.
xxxx
COURT
All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this case for the declaration of nullity of marriage because of
the psychological incapacity of your wife, what do you mean by that?
WITNESS
'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya sinasabi kung saan siya hahanapin.' She did not inform us of
her whereabouts.
COURT
Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her dissolved?
WITNESS
Yes, your honor.
As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a spouse, by itself, however, does not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that such abandonment is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes the spouse concerned completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.
Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following definitive guidelines were laid down in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff: Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage,
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
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marriage.
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos v. Court of Appeals that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. These requisites must
be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nu1lity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be
confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Using the above standards, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient to prove that the
respondent-appellee is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of her as a wife.
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical psychologist cannot be relied
upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of
the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the petitioner,
and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2)
years of age at the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel
would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have been there when the
spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between her parents until long
after her birth. On the other hand; as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly
be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as credible.
The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita Suazo, et al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony
and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the
psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions
from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e.,
that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelita's psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive
with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis
for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
N D
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological condition of the respondent-
appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn
suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as manifestations
of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the
respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature.
xxxx
Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well as her statements in the Sworn Affidavit are no different.
When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn, Dr. Tayag simply replied:
Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from a personality disorder characterized by Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with Anti-Social Trait. Will you please tell to the Court what do you mean by that personality
disorder?
A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a narcissistic [sic], this is a person whose preoccupation are all
toward his own self satisfaction both materially or emotionally at the expense of somebody. They have what you called
[sic] strong sense of entitlement thinking that she can get away whatever [sic] she wants to in pursuit of her own
satisfaction at the expense of somebody. And this is what happened to the respondent. She gave more consideration
to her own satisfaction material wise at the expense of social embarrassment of the children because of what
happened to her.
On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:
7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of personality disorder that rooted [sic] the downfall of their
marriage. As based on the DSM-IV, respondent's behavioral disposition fits with individuals with NARCISSISTIC
PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-social traits, as characterized by her disregard for and violation of the rights of
others as well as her failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are clearly immoral and socially despised. Such is also depicted through his [sic] deceitfulness, as
indicated by repeated lying and conning methods she used upon others in order to achieve personal profit or pleasure.
In addition, her consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by her repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or
honor financial obligations and her lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated, or stolen from another. x x x. And such condition is considered to [sic] grave, severe, long lasting and
incurable by any treatment available.
Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social
traits, in the absence of any showing that the same actually incapacitated her from fulfilling her essential marital
obligations, such disorder cannot be a valid basis for declaring Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. To be sure, jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological
illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under Article 36. '[T]he meaning of
'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.'
All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in rendering its assailed Decision:
N D
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 23, 2012 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence,
the instant Petition.
In a November 19, 2014 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.
Issue
Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the case, insisting that he was able to prove Marilyn's
psychological incapacity.1âwphi1
Petitioner's Arguments
In his Petition and Reply,20 petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's findings, he was able to prove Marilyn's
psychological incapacity which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which existed even before their marriage, and continued to subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave,
serious, incurable, and permanent as to render her incapable of assuming her marriage obligations; that the
nullification of his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the institutions of marriage and family, but will actually
protect the sanctity thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with psychological disorders that prevent
them from assuming marital obligations from remaining in the sacred bond;21 that the issue of whether psychological
incapacity exists as a ground to nullify one's marriage is a legal question; and that the totality of his evidence and
Marilyn's failure to refute the same despite due notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent's Arguments
In its Comment22 praying for denial, the Republic argues that the Petition calls for an evaluation of facts, thus violating
the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should be confined to legal questions. Citing Perez-Ferraris v.
Ferraris,23which decrees as follows-
Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province
supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties
to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or
when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case. (Citations omitted)
the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed instead.
The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness, indifference, and
abandonment of the family do not automatically justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders - existing at the time of the marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the marital bond he/she is about to assume; that petitioner failed to show how each of Marilyn's
claimed negative traits affected her ability to perform her essential marital obligations; that the supposed
psychological evaluation of Marilyn was in fact based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased information supplied
by petitioner and Maricel - which renders the same unreliable and without credibility; that petitioner's real reason for
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seeking nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family; and that all in all, petitioner failed to prove the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals24taught us that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved."25 In this connection, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant
to Republic v. Court of Appeals,26or the Molina case.
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases
grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making
it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 27
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that the totality
of petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn was psychologically unfit to enter marriage - in short,
while petitioner professed psychological incapacity, he could not establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability.
The Court agrees.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of
his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition
both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on
petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.
Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition."28 "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage."29 Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial,
however, fail to show gravity and juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and
was involved in "activities defying social and moral ethics,"30 and that she was, among others, irrational, irresponsible,
immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these allegations,
particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This is compounded by the fact
that petitioner contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had a
fight, which is why they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 was Marilyn's
complete abandonment of the marriage and family when she left to work abroad.
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less
than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 31
If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish
the degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.
N D
On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old when Marilyn left the family. Growing
up, she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment - such as the lack of emotional and financial support; but
she could not have any idea of her mother's claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and gravity
thereof.
Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition were not based on actual
tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact
gave more significance and importance to petitioner's other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for
the deficiency in the expert opinion which resulted from its being based solely on petitioner's one-sided account. But
since these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well. In
one decided case with a similar factual backdrop and involving the very same expert witness, this Court held:
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006.
The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary
Grace's departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to
comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to
present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former's
condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn's testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the
other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn's statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both
referred to MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the
antecedence of Mary Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married, they
saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-] educated person" in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court finds the same as unfounded. Rumbaua provides
some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:
We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on
the information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and
conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent
to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who 'believes that the world revolves around him'; and
who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that
a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the
respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be
grave and incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and
portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.32
N D
Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should be given due respect and finality. This Court is not
a trier of facts.
The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x.33
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve the other issues raised. They have become irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision and August 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95392 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 214064
MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS, Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the
Decision1and Resolution,2 dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
ruled against the dissolution and nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts of the case follow:
As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually,
became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former
girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents,
they reconciled. They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children born
in 1992 and in 2001.3
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe that the same was made
in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives and friends saw
him with different women. One time, she has just arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family. But to
her consternation, she caught him in a compromising act with another woman. He did not bother to explain or
apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with
him.5Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting
their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological
disorder.6
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report,7 concluded that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. A portion of the report reads:
x x xx
The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an early onset, with an enduring pattern and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. His poor parental and family molding (particularly
lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a defective superego and he proved to be selfish, immature and
negligent person and followed a pattern of gross irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings of his partner/wife
disregarding the marriage contract and the commitment he agreed on during the wedding. In other words, the root
cause of respondent's flawed personality pattern can be in childhood milieu. Respondent's familial constellation,
unreliable parenting style from significant figures around him, and unfavorable childhood experiences have greatly
affected his perceptions of himself and his environment in general. The respondent did not grow up mature enough
to cope with his obligations and responsibilities as married man and father.
It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the normative and ordinary duties of marriage and family,
shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary circumstances. He just cannot perform his duties and obligations
as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his own self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and denigrate the
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petitioner for his own pleasures and satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to assume his marital duties
and responsibilities to his wife. He failed to render mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).
Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no psychological insight that he has a character problem.
He would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around him. People suffering from this personality disorder
are unmotivated to treatment and impervious to recovery. There are no medications and laboratory examinations to
be taken for maladaptive behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder).
Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and pervasive affecting many aspects of his life, such as social
functioning and close relationships.1âwphi1 Apparently, he has failed to develop appropriate adjustment methods.
He lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration that caused him the failure to understand the very nature of
that sharing of life that is directed toward the solidarity and formation of family.
x x x x8
In a Decision9 dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case No. 4853-11 declared the marriage between Mirasol and
Felipe null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares the marriage contract by the petitioner MIRASOL CASTILLO
to the respondent FELIPE IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani, Pangasinan to be NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter this
judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue the corresponding Entry of Judgment.
Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani, Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also mandated to cause the
registration of the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT in their respective Book of Marriages.
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the petitioner, the respondent, the Solicitor General, 3rd Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar General with copies hereof.
Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the DECREE OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.10
On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion
for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order11 dated April 3, 2012.
On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of
performing marital obligations due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.12 A pertinent portion of the decision reads:
x x xx
Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe became unfaithful as a result of unknown factors that
happened during the marriage and not because of his family background. His tendency to womanize was not shown
to be due to causes of a psychological nature that are grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, it was only after thirteen
(13) years of marriage that he started to engage in extra-marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, she said that
after they got married, their relationship as husband and wife went smoothly and that she was of the belief that she
had a marriage made in heaven.
In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered
him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is
suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. Since
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that situation does not obtain in the case, Mirasol's claim of psychological incapacity must fail. Psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it
is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Felipe, We cannot but rule in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 20, 2012 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol elevated the case before this Court raising the issue, thus:
[Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering from grave psychological condition that rendered him
incognitive of his marital covenants under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the
RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court rules in the negative.
Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. The conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses are
entitled to great respect because of its opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Since the court a
quo accepted the veracity of the petitioner's premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of Felipe's
psychological incapacity drawn from the expert witness. She claims that Montefalcon was correct in interviewing her
for it was submitted that it was only her who knew best whether her husband was complying with his marital
obligations. Moreover, the OSG admits that personal examination of the respondent by the clinical psychologist is not
an indispensable requisite for a finding of psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to establish from the totality of evidence the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The conclusions of the clinical
psychologist that he was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was present at the inception of the
marriage were not supported by evidence. At most, the psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his marital
obligations.14 Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of the facts from which she based her findings and was
working on pure assumptions and secondhand information related to her by one side.15
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.16 Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.17
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,18 this Court laid down the more definitive guidelines in the
disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
x x xx
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x
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complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x
sex. x x x
marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
state. x x x
xxx19
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of each case and not on
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to
the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The
trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert
opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.22
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity, however, did
not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments
not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
their proceedings.23
Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the records, this Court rules that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.
Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is encumbered with a personality disorder classified as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality structure that rendered him incapacitated to
perform his marital duties and obligations. In her direct testimony, she stated:
ATTY. BAYAUA:
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Question: Were you able to interview and conduct examination on the respondent?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that supported your findings that the husband of Mirasol is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage?
Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and also from my interview of the couple's common friend who
validated all information given to me by the petitioner.
Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview the respondent?
Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the same psychological evaluation I administered with the
petitioner but he did not respond to my invitation.
Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to gather from your interview of the friend of the couple?
Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to me by the petitioner during the interview.
x x xx
Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at what point in time in the life of the respondent did he
acquire this disorder that you mentioned?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even at the time of celebration of their marriage, although
the incapacity became manifest only after their marriage. His disorder seemed to have started during the early years
of his life.
Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely source of the disorder of the respondent?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent seemed to have developed during the early years of his life due to his poor
parental and family [molding] particularly lack of parental guidance. [His] parents separated when he was still young
and when [his] mother had another affair and lived with her common-law husband. Respondent's familial constellation
and [unfavorable] childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his environment.
Respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and responsibilities as a married man and
father.
x x x24
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the RTC's
decision would reveal that there was no assessment of the veracity of such allegations, the credibility of the witnesses,
and the weight of the pieces of evidence presented. Also, there were no factual findings which can serve as bases for
its conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.25 The probative force of the testimony
of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render
to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her
conclusion is founded.26
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she evaluated respondent's psychological condition
indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which
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brought about his personality disorder as painted in the evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful
knowledge of petitioner. There was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's upbringing interviewed
by the psychologist or presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's common friend, agreed with
petitioner's claims in the interview with the psychologist, confirmed the information given by petitioner, and alleged
that she knew Felipe as "chick boy" or ''playboy."27 She did not testify before the court a quo.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to establish Felipe's psychological condition and its
associations in his early life. Montefalcon's testimony and psychological evaluation report do not provide evidentiary
support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's one-sided assertion. The said report falls short of the required proof
for the Court to rely on the same as basis to declare petitioner's marriage to respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him psychologically incapacitated is not required,
the root cause thereof must still be "medically or clinically identified," and adequately established by evidence. 28 We
cannot take the conclusion that Felipe harbors a personality disorder existing prior to his marriage which purportedly
incapacitated him with the essential marital obligations as credible proof of juridical antecedence. The manner by
which such conclusion was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required
in determining psychological incapacity. The lack of corroborative witness and evidence regarding Felipe's upbringing
and family history renders Montefalcon's opinion on the root cause of his psychological incapacity conjectural or
speculative.
Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue are considered since the judge had found them to be
credible enough, this Court cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Felipe's pre-marital
history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case because we only have petitioner's words to rely on. To
make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her judicial affidavit, to wit:
x x xx
Question: You said Madam Witness that after several months you and respondent became sweethearts, what
happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got dismayed when respondent was also maintaining another
woman who was his former girlfriend.
Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you told him about his relation with his former girlfriend?
Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir. This turned our relationship sour and it led to being stormy.
Question: You said Madam Witness that you and respondent's relationship became sour and stormy, what happened
next, if any?
Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have been ended had it not been with the timely intervention of
our parents. Respondent and I reconciled.
x x xx
Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got married with the respondent as evidenced in fact by a Marriage
Certificate. What happened next after the marriage?
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Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and wife went on smoothly. I was of the belief that my
marriage was made in heaven and that respondent had already reformed his ways and had completely deviated from
his relationship with his ex-girlfriend;
x x x30
Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent change or become responsible considering that he is
already a father?
Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would already change the ways of respondent. The birth of our
first child did not actually help improve respondent's ways because respondent is really a man who is not contented
with one woman even before we got married;
xxx31
Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent is back to his old habit where he has been seen having
relationship with a different woman. This was also seen by our relatives and friends of respondent.
x xx32
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.33 In order for sexual infidelity to
constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.34 It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.35
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to
prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable. We are not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations
are not evidence.36 Based on the records, this Court finds that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude
that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated with psychological incapacity as contemplated by law.
We reiterate that there was no other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other
witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their
relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious
evidentiary value.
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA against the dissolution and nullity of the
parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence presented. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.37
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mirasol Castillo. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM the assailed Decision and Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014, respectively, of the Court
of Appeals.
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SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 222541
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner

vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 29, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed the
Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891
declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as amended.6
The Facts
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party in
Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very soon, they became romantically involved.8
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly
provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on
December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named
Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the
Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.9
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since,
only returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she was able to acquire a house and
lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.10
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. In
support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his
duties as husband and father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder
a few days before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation expenses
of his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to leave
Jose's parents' house where they were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle of the
night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to perform.
Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she
discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw
mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang dito."12 Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa
mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught
Jose and the other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse
any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart.13
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in their
marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.14
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley15 and her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which corroborated
her allegations, as well as the testimony17 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the Psychological
Report18 (Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview
with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a) his
lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to
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his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his marital commitments;
and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.19
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of
his marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had provided for his family's financial and emotional
needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that although they
occasionally had misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their first major
argument was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to communicate through mail
during her stay overseas; and that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her family the
financial aid that they need so long as she would not sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-
marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son.20 Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos
to support his allegations.21
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes with
his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his actions,
notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against him.23
Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek employment, squandering of their money on vices,
violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent psychological condition that incapacitates him
to perform his marital obligations required by Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be considered as grounds for legal separation
under Article 5525 of the same code.26
The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC,28 holding that the totality of the evidence
Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek
employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper and alleged propensity for violence were
not so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code; at best, they showed that Jose was irresponsible,
insensitive, or emotionally immature which nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that the law
requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating
nature, and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the relation
between Jose's "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition," on one hand, and grave and permanent
psychological malady, on the other. Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only offered
a general evaluation on the supposed root cause of Jose's personality disorder.30
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution32 dated December 1, 2015;
hence, this petition.
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.

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The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution,33 and marriage as
the foundation of the family.34 Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage
under Article 3635 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.36 It should
refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as
provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code, among others,38 include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support.39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.40
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c)
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.42 The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
in Republic v. Molina43 (Molina) whose salient points are footnoted below,44 that incorporated the basic requirements
the Court established in Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be
dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.45 The evidence need
not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the
spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at
or about the time of the marriage.46 In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its application calls
for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.47 To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid
down: gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could
not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely
due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.49 In Taring v. Taring,50 the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal,
or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of
the Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did not consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning
spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v. Encelan,53 Republic v. De Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to name a few,
and thus dismissed their petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity
amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking
sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as
a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4)
engaged in an extra-marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions.
Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other
hand, simply summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to conclude
that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply embedded within his adaptive
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systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore
x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form of intervention."56
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as
grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for establishing
psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers
from, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder
or how and to what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that
Jose's condition has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report
specify the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand
and comply with his marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived
childhood" and "poor home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity
without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior
or habits during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that
could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was already existing
at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established parameters do not require that the expert witness personally
examine the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are
presented sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters.57 Considering that her Report was based solely on
Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved the application of a more rigid
and stringent standards which the RTC failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification
of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other
failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.58 There must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be
linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.59
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is
not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context
of Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 1, 2015
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 188400
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner

vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital
obligations.
This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision2 and Resolution3 dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA- G.R. CV. No. 76243,
which reversed the Decision4 dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q- 99-37829.
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they were students at the
University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts.5
After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's Office.6Meanwhile,
Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found continued employment at his family's printing press
business.7
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to
jealousy.8 She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who
excelled in their studies and careers.9
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria Katharyn,
who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on April 6, 1986.10
Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria
Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk her.11 Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he
once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of
being Maria Teresa's lover.12
In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day.13 At
times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just so they could have sex.14During
sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or poke her with things.15 Rodolfo also suggested that they
invite a third person with them while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's
presence.16 Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated.17 Whenever Maria Teresa
refused Rodolfo's advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel.18
Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person she thought could help her
and Rodolfo.19 Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused
and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".20
Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. 21 In the
heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow,
left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that,
and she supported their children by herself.22
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On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage23 before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a responsive pleading.24 Maria Teresa moved
for the revival of the Petition.25 The trial court granted the motion and referred the case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for collusion investigation.26 Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and
recommended the trial of the case on the merits.27
Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference.28 The pre-trial conference was declared
closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her evidence.29
Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert
witness.30 Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her
family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests.31 Dr. Lopez
also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.32
After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering from
any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or functional impairment.33 Although Dr. Lopez found
that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality, he opined that this was not severe enough to constitute
psychological incapacity.34
Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered mail.35 After two (2) months, Rodolfo
contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez
explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the story, but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala
kayong pakialam sa akin."36
Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like
reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends
and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his
emotional coldness and severe immaturity."37
Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than
the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.38 Dr. Lopez explained that
Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic parental model.39 Rodolfo's family
background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic
contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's.40 Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's
disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia.41
Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to perform
his marital obligations.42
Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive leading.43 He likewise did not appear during the
pre-trial conference.44 He was given a specific date to present evidence but he still failed to appear.45 he trial court
eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.46
On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's
formal offer of evidence.47 The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification.48 The Office
of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for
decision without the certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General.49
On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision50 granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his findings as they were
based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court held that the marriage between Maria Teresa
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and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because "[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave, serious and
incurable."51 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE,
JR. null and void on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Their conjugal partnership (sic) property relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of properties acquired
by the parties, no pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;
(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la Fuente shall remain legitimate. They shall
remain in the custody of the petitioner.
(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence presented as to the capability of the respondent
to give support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;
(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Mandaluyong City where the
marriage was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration.53 The Office of the Solicitor
General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of
stenographic notes.54 It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it
was handling.55
On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, with the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is
hereby deemed moot and academic.
This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case was filed on June 3, 1999
and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the case.56
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.57 It argued that the trial court erred a)
in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General,58 and b) in giving
credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based
on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case.59
The Court of Appeals granted60 the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay, thus, the trial court should
not have given it weight.61 The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's finding that Rodolfo's behavior
descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.62
In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission that she married Rodolfo with the belief
that he would change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5) years before getting married, showed that they
were in good terms during the early part of their marriage. It also negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological defect
existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage.63 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)
Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration65 but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution66 dated May
25, 2009.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.67
Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on whether expert opinion
was needed to prove psychological incapacity.68 Petitioner further argued that for as long as the trial court had basis
in concluding that psychological incapacity existed, such conclusion should be upheld.69
Rodolfo filed a Comment70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that
there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."71
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,72 agreed that a physician was not required to declare a person
psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented must be able to adequately prove the
presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to
sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged psychological incapacity.73
The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological report stated that his assessment was
based on interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties' common friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not
name the two (2) common friends in the report.74 Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed
petitioner and Rodolfo's best friend, not two (2) friends as indicated in his report.75 The Office of the Solicitor General
insisted that the finding of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should be dismissed as hearsay as it was based solely on
information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez.76
The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
The Petition is granted.
The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals77 was the first case that attempted to lay down the standards for
determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos declared that "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."78 Furthermore, the
incapacity "should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]"79
Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,80 provided the guidelines to be followed when
interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
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complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
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equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant
the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that
respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.
The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no
chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition. The
Court of Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag,82 where this Court held that "the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts."83 The Court of Appeals then ruled that
"[o]bviously, this requirement is not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies on the
alleged psychological incapacity of one party."84
The Court of Appeals is mistaken.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85 states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as
hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition,
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage
is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."86
Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to
be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented establishes the party's
psychological condition.88
Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological
incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts
of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial
court found:
Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s] personality by taking into consideration the
psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the different behaviors he manifested during
the time that he and petitioner were living together. According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he
found the respondent to be suffering from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging
behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust
of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and
his emotional coldness and severe immaturity. He also testified that this kind of disorder is actually one of the severe
forms of personality disorder even more severe than the other personality disorders like the borderline and narcissistic
personality disorders.
As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a pathogenic parental model. As he
investigated the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his father was a psychiatric patient
such that the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic contamination which is called double insanity. This,
according to Dr. Lopez is usually developed among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even
couples who are close to one another; that people close to one another get psychically contaminated; that surprisingly,
the symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The said disorder started during
respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years.
He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe paranoia of the
patient; that patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that there is something wrong with
them and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather
than cooperate with them.
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Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner.1âwphi1 He recommends that the marriage be
annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must give due regard to
expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.90
The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from
a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological disorder probably started during his late
childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform his marital obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.
The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner
attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would often follow her to
make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him.91 She believed that he would change after they got
married;92 however, this did not happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these
caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.93
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He
vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and
that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly
refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to
respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused
to be examined by Dr. Lopez.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but
the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of
him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to
intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only inflicted nonphysical forms of
mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to
his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun
at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner
through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic
deprivation.94 Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been
recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
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or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family
and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that
petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent
truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe
that respondent's mental illness is incurable.
In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the
pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin:95
Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks
of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to children,
property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of
society.1âwphi1 The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.
Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological incapacity should not only
be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the inability to comply with essential marital
obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96
Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket application of
the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions."97 Ironically, the ultimate effect of such stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the
perversion of the family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente and
Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August
29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
August 14, 2002 of Branch 107, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 217993
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III,, Petitioner,

vs.
NORA REYES BAKUNAWA,, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, JR, J.:
For resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Manuel R. Bakunawa III (Manuel) challenging
the Decision2 dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution3 dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 98579, which upheld the validity of his marriage to Nora Reyes Bakunawa (Nora).
The Facts
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were students and became sweethearts.
When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel got married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo,
Quezon City.4
Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived with Manuel's parents. While
Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father in the family's construction business.
Manuel was assigned to provincial projects and came home only during weekends. This setup continued even as Nora
gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel (Moncho). However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial
assignments, he chose to spend his limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented this
and they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel depended on his father and on Nora for their
family's needs.5
In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this period th.at Manuel first observed
Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus,
Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.6
On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in their relationship. Manuel spent
most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came
home. He eventually left Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves
separated.7
In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. After Manuel spent a few nights with
them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third child.8
On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City,9 on the ground that he and Nora are psychologica11y incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive
Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas
diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and passive
resistance in her relationship with Manuel. Her findings were based on her interview with Manuel and the parties'
eldest son, Moncho, because Nora did not participate in the psychological assessment.10
Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-law wife and has a son with her, whereas,
Nora lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City. Their house and lot was already foreclosed following Nora's failure
to pay a loan secured by a mortgage on the said property.11
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Ruling of the RTC
The R TC granted the petition in its Decision12 dated March 28, 2011. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage

between MANUEL R. BAKUNAWAIII and NORAREYESBAKUNAWA null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Office of the City Civil Registrar of Quezon City is hereby ordered to make entries into the records of the
respective parties pursuant to the judgment of the Court.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished upon the Office of Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, the Office of the Civil Registrars of Quezon City, and the National Statistics Office, as well as the parties
and counsel.
SO ORDERED.13
Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter alia that the RTC erred in finding that the testimony of the
psychiatrist is sufficient to prove the parties' psychological incapacity.
Ruling of the CA
The CA, in its Decision14 dated March 27, 2014, granted Nora's appeal and reversed the RTC decision. The decretal
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal filed by [Nora] is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 28, 2011
of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case No. Q-08-62822 is REVERSED and SETASIDE.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA denied Manuel's motion for reconsideration16 through a Resolution17 dated April 22, 2015.
Manuel filed the present petition raising the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF °THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES DESPITE MORE
THAN CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES TO PERFORM THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; and
II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION DATED MARCH 27, 2014 DESPITE MORE
THAN COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE REVERSAL THEREOF.18
Ruling of the Court
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr.
Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive
Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code,19 is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did
not err in not according probative value to her psychological evaluation report and testimony.
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In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,20 the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be proven by independent means,
no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,
independently of a psychologist's examination and report."21 In Toring v. Toring, et al.,22 the Court stated that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or
about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present
at the time of marriage.23
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation
was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents
in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.
The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on Manuel despite having had the
opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician,24 much less be subjected to psychological
tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have been established by means of
psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality.25
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree26 of the National Tribunal of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of
Manuel and Nora, the Court accords the same with great respect but does not consider the same as controlling and
decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.27
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April
22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 210766
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON, Petitioner

vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
its January 6, 2014 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and set aside the November 12, 2010
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.
Factual Antecedents
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition5 for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines6 (Family Code). This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were married before the
Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four children, all of
whom are now of legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest,
unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually,"7 and a
compulsive gambler; that respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that respondent
was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him
completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or
assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole
breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro Psych Facility, 8 a
rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological
Gambling as manifested by:
a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing
and pawning jewelries and appliances[;]
b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired effect[;]
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his] involvement with gambling[;]
d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife, issuing bouncing checks in order to finance
his gambling[;]
e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his children, lost a good career in banking
because of gambling[;]
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to relieve a desperate fmancial situation
caused by gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a young boy, it would be difficult to
say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are] etiologically related to the general medical
condition that occurred in his childhood.
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Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations
of our culture as manifested in the following areas:
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people, and events[;]
b. his emotional response[;]
c. his poor impulse control[;]
Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social, occupational and interpersonal
relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for several years, and can be traced back [to] his adolescence
since he started gambling while in high school. He is therefore diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.
All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital obligations.9
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a "dysfunctional"
childhood;10that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his parents as the youngest child for some time;
but that these parental love, care and protection were, however, transferred to his youngest brother who was born
when respondent was almost five years old; and that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from
which he never recovered.
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was already betting on jai alai. She
also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality disorders, but that she did not attain her goal.
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to govern their
prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no conjugal assets or debts.
On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer.11
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the instant case because petitioner's
allegations are not supported by facts.
Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support or assistance to petitioner
and their family; that the family home where petitioner and their children are living was in fact his own capital
property; that his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to the most grave or serious cases of
personality disorders that would satisfy the standards required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that
petitioner's complaint is nothing more than a complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to
get out of it; that contrary to petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree in business
administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was money problem, and not his alleged personality disorder, that
is the wall that divided him and petitioner.
Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions of the psychiatrist to the effect that
he is suffering from pathological gambling and personality disorder; that petitioner's allegation that he came from a
distraught family and that he suffered emotional devastation is vague, and bereft of particular details, and even
slanderous; and that assuming that he had not acted the way petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions
and behavior are not psychological illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin to
hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders that
were present at the time of his marriage with petitioner.
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the land where their
family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner
also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and
N D
petitioner also have investments in shares of stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these
are conjugal assets because they came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.
Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition, petitioner had caused him to be admitted
into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of his confinement and treatment in this psychiatric
facility, he has incurred medical expenses and professional medical fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages
all their finances and conjugal assets it stands to reason that he should be awarded '"spousal support."
On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order.12
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio.
On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which included a photocopy of the marriage
contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son Jose’s Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy
of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008; Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a
photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children:, and
a notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for tJ1e period November 1999 to March 31,
2008" executed by petitioner and described as a detailed summary of expenses paid for with the proceeds of
respondent's share in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes Village.13
Respondent filed his Comment thereon.14
On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits.15
On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss16 "on the ground that the totality of evidence presented by
petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x to comply with the essential martial obligations x x
x".17 Petitioner filed her Opposition18 thereto, and respondent tendered his Comment thereon.19
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat on its March 29, 2010 Order.20
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his client was waiving the right to
present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also moved that the Petition at bar be submitted for decision
on the basis of the evidence already on the record. The RTC thus declared the case submitted for decision.21
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered[:]
1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA CONCEPCION v. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N.
SINGSON and BENJAMIN L SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in Mandaluyong City or any other marriage between
them on the ground of psychological' incapacity of the respondent.
2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics Office to cancel the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in the Registry of Marriage.
There are no other issues in this case.

N D
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars ofMandaluyong City and Parañaque City, the Office of
the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General (National Statistics Office) and the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Parañaque City.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the family Code
are present in the instant case because the totality of evidence showed that respondent is suffering from a
psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical antecedence.
The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio convincingly showed that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations; that respondent's inability to
perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological
abnormality arising from a pathological and utterly irresistible urge to gamble.
The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that respondent is suffering from Personality Disorder
known as Pathological Gambling."23 It ruled that it has been shown that this personality disorder was present at the
time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only later; that because of this personality disorder respondent
had already jeopardized his relationship with his family; and that respondent's psychological disorder hinders the
performance of his obligations as a husband and as a father.
Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses was donated in favor of the parties' children
as evidenced by TCT No.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.
But in its older dated January 6, 2011,24 the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. It reiterated that the
expert witness had adequately established that respondent is suffering from "Pathological Gambling Personality
Disorder'' which is grave, permanent, and has juridical antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal25 which was given due course by the RTC in its order26 dated February 28, 2011.
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November 2010 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the marriage between Maria Concepcion N. Singson and
Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.27
The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations, which in this case, was not at all proven to be grave or serious,
much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing at the time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution
and nullity, in obedience to the mandate of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case, petitioner failed
to discharge the burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a serious or grave psychological disorder that
completely disables or incapacitates him from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital
union.
According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did not go along with the RTC, which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
N D
due to a personality disorder known as pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that
respondent's pathological gambling was grave or serious, the evidence in fact showed that the latter was truly capable
of carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, had provided money for the family from
the sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the land on which the family home was built, and he also lives
in the family home with petitioner and their children.
On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that respondent's alleged pathological gambling arose after the
marriage; that in fact petitioner admitted that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got
married; that petitioner moreover acknowledged that respondent was a kind and a caring person when he was
courting her; that petitioner likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all four
instances when she gave birth to their four children.
In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological gambling was not proven to be incurable or
permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment since 2003 and has been responding to the treatment.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 of the CA's Decision. But her motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution of
January 6, 2014.29
Issue
Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –
[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [RTC].30
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in asking for the reinstatement of the RTC
Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition,31 Reply,32 and Memorandum33 that respondent's psychological incapacity
had been duly proved in court, including its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.
First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual love, respect, and support;
that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by the testimonies of petitioner end her son Jose both of
whom demonstrated that respondent’s psychological incapacity is grave or serious rendering him incapable to
perform the essential marital obligations; that for his pan, respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is
capable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage for the reason that everything that the family had
saved and built had been squandered by respondent; and that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation facility
is itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such psychological incapacity, which included pathological
gambling, can be traced back when respondents was already betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not
known to his family; that the Clinical Summary was based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by
respondent’s sister, and by respondent himself; that such juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor
overthrown by countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be traced back to respondent’s flawed
relationship with his parents which developed into a psychological disorder that existed before the marriage.
Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders are generally
incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically; that in this case the Clinical Summary; had
pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is only at the surface level; and that in point of
fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality disorders are incurable.
Respondent’s Arguments
N D
In his Comment34 and Memorandum,35 respondent counters that the assailed CA Decision should be affirmed. He
argues that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same grounds raised by petitioner before the RTC and the CA;
that petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly that he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.
Our Ruling
The Petition will not succeed.
It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory
laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage
and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner.36 "The policy of the
Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties."37
Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life" and as "the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution."
In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing out pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code, which provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings interpreting and construing the
quoted Article, to wit:
than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court
first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known
as the Molina guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.38
In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations because she failed to establish that such
incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting findings between the trial court
and the appellate court.39 We thus did peruse and review the records, and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found
that respondent has the capability and ability to perform his duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather
general statement that respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic
obligations as a husband and a father.
N D
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was
grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the
family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family
home with petitioner-appellee and their children."40
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was working at a certain
point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were
both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and
respondent met at the bank where petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit
investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage.42
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized summary dated
February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his
parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating
that this amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under
oath that the items for their family budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association dues, and
for electric bills came from this money.
And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which the family home was
built, thus -
[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?
A: No.
Q: He does not [own] any real property?
A: No.
Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal which has been transferred
with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-numbered as S-25470, which is in the name of [respondent],
Filipino, of legal age, single.
xxxx
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Who owned this property?
A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson.
Q: Where is this property located?
A: It is located in United Paranaque.
Q: Where in United Paranaque?
A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.
Q: Are you staying in that property?
A: We are staying in that property.

N D
xxxx
[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner]
Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who owns it?
A: It was donated to the children.
xxxx
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner?
A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.
Q: Who owns it now?
A: The children because it was donated [to them].43
What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since their marriage on
July 6,1974 (and in the company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the time that respondent was under
treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any instance when respondent failed to live with them.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent likewise brought her to
the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their children.44
By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at the rehabilitation
center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep
a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. It is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely
the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will."45 "[I]t is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to
be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness."46
Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for gospel truth in regard to
the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his marital obligations. That much is clear from
the following testimony –
[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]
Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin Singson?
A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first admission and again [in] 2006, [S]ir.
Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?
A: Yes, [S]ir.
Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?

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A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and subsequently because of [behavioral] problem,
[S]ir.
xxxx
Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?
A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of 2006, he knocked on the doors of the
maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his car in the garage and drove out bumping the car
parked right across the garage and he [also kept] takfr1g things out from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean
[these], he [would] immediately take them out again. So, he was brought to the facility in October because of his
uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir.
xxxx
Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, Benjamin Singson, Madam witness?
A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his stay, I found that [respondent] is suffering
from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the
behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006. Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is suffering
from a personality disorder, [S]ir.
Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with [regard] to [respondent's dealings] with other
people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?
A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.
COURT: Go ahead.
A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his problems which [makes] his personal[,] family[,]
and social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was pre-occupied with gambling, thinking of ways to get
money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with
increasing amounts of money in order achieve his desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.
COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]
Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?
A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the psychological testing, [S]ir.
Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we would like to request [from] this Honorable
Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert witness, you concluded that the respondent is suffering
from personality disorder?
A: Yes,[S]ir.
Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?

N D
A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has distracted his ability to perform his functions as
a married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a person who is supposed to be employed productively,
[S]ir.47
Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly negative traits are
nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness."48
We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of the trial court and appellate court,49 we
take recourse to the records to assist us in evaluating the perspective postures taken by the parties.
Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations x x x." 50 "A cause
has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity."51
Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or premises for this particular
finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity, thus:
Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to perform his marital obligations
was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are caused by psychological abnormality. Such psychological
incapacity of the respondent has been shown as already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became
manifest only after the solemnization. x x x.52
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the root
cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or a
definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral
changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006."53 Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but
another psychologist who conducted the tests.54 And this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than
that, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly betting on jai
alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness having personal knowledge of that fact was
called to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in
connection therewith, the latter did testify in court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court
assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution
that marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State."55
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could be attributed to
the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced
to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was
"distraught" and that respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These
are very serious charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all
adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged
inability to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological incapacity existed
before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held that the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an
Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected
to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth."56
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and trustworthy evidence
to establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and that the same antedated their marriage.57 If
anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by
respondent before they got married and that respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her.58
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Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove that respondents alleged
psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or permanent.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are generally
incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court.59
"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie."60 This is the situation here.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 218630
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite,
Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code
and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they entered
into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both their parents were very strict and conservative.
Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried how it would affect his image and how his parents would
take the situation.3 Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000.4
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon,
they were fighting so much that they went their separate ways most of the time and Katrina found herself wandering
the streets of Hong Kong alone.5
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora
Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000.6 Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he knew
nothing about children and how to run a family.7 Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and
drinking sprees.8 Katrina noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very
high degree of immaturity.9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy
between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz.10
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions-from the manner by which she took
care of Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments, often in front
of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her youngest brother who was then committed in a
substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not
stop.11
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents' home and never to come back.
They have been separated in fact since then.12
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is
unique in some way.13
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated within his
psyche;14 and that it was present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset was in
early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity,
respect, mutual help, and support to his wife.15
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C.
Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
surname of her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to avoid the misconception that she is still the
legal wifo of respondent. Custody over the couple's· minor child is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable visitation
rights accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday and Sunday, or as the parties may agree among themselves.
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the National Statistics Office and the Local Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn, shall endorse a copy of the same to the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong
City, ·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or cancellation of the parties' marriage can be effected
in its registry. Furnish, likewise, the parties and counsel.
SO ORDERED.16
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in
Civil Case No. 4903-11dated8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad of cases declaring that psychological
assessment based solely on the information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad of cases declaring that psychological
assessment based solely on the information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of each and every case for the nullity is different
from the other and must be appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points out that the psychological report of Dr.
Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable tests18 to come up with his findings. In any case, the
decision must be based not solely on the expert opinions but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have found to have been sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological
incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the findings of both the
RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting
the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the negative.
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.19
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals20has set out the guidelines that has been the core of
discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We
have decided:
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resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. xxx
obligations of marriage. xxx
their children. xxx
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxx
be, to the petition. xxx21
Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated
to discharge the duties expected of a husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of their proceedings.22 Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's
statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor
was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan23is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied
upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of
the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the petitioner,
and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2)
years of age at the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel
would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have been there when the
spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between her parents until long
after her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly
be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as credible.
The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelita Suazo, el al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony
and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the
psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions
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from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above i.e.,
that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive
with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis
for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological condition of the respondent-
appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn
suffers from. Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as manifestations
of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the
respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature. (Emphasis Ours)
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive
of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the psychological condition of
Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make
conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side,
as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness
of the content of such evidence.24
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically
incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said
to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the
law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.25 It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should
be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.26
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality
of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab
initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations
are not evidence.27 Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to
substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-
serving and had no serious evidentiary value.28
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WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the
Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 4903-
11 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 209031
ABIGAEL AN EPINA-DAN, Petitioner

vs
MARCO DAN, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the December 14, 2012 Decision2 and August 29, 2013
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA-G.R. CV No.95112 and herein petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration,4 respectively, thus affirming the January 4, 2010 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Piñas City, Branch 254, in Civil Case No. LP07-0155.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan - an Italian national - met "in a chatroom [o]n the
internet"6 sometime in May, 2005. They soon became "chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew
them emotionally closer to each other"7 even though petitioner was in the Philippines while respondent lived in Italy.
In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year, he flew in from Italy and tied the knot with
petitioner on January 23, 2006.
Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner followed thereafter, or on February 23, 2006. The
couple lived together in Italy.
On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the country.
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition8 for declaration of nullity of her marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. LP-07-0155with the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 254. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic
of the Philippines opposed the petition.
On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed
to adequately prove respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. It held, thus:
Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit x x x petitioner stated that sometime in May 2005, she chanced upon the
respondent, an Italian, in the internet xxx and they became regular chatmates. x x x In their exchanges of chat
messages and letters, she found respondent to be sweet, kind and jolly. He made her feel that he really cared for her.
He was romantic. X X X [A]lthough at times, respondent was impatient and easily got irritated, X X X.
xxxx
On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines and x x x they got married on 23 January 2006 X X X. During
their honeymoon, petitioner noticed that the respondent was not circumcised, x x x [R]espondent (also) asked her
where to find marijuana since he had to sniff some. This made petitioner angry and she quarrelled with him.
Respondent apologized later.
On 29 January 2006, X X X respondent flew back to Italy and on 26 February 2006, xxx petitioner left to join respondent
in Italy. Xxx After a few days, respondent started displaying traits, character and attitude different from that of Marco
whom she had known thru the internet. He was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He depended on his
mother to do or to decide things for him. It was even his mother who decided where they lived and how the house
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should be arranged. When they transferred to a separate house. it was respondent's mother who managed the
household.
Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing video games was always the first thing he
does when he wakes up and the last thing he does before retiring. During rest days, he would play video games the
whole day. There was never a quality time he spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible husband would spend
with his wife.
Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing video games was always the first thing he
does when he wakes up and the last thing he does before retiring. During rest days, he would play video games the
whole day. There was never a quality time he spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible husband would spend
with his wife.
Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the household chores. He also has extremely
poor hygiene. He seldom takes a bath and brushes his teeth. For him to be able to take a bath, petitioner would literally
push him to the bathroom or hand him his toothbrush with toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to put deodorant
on his underarms for he would not do it himself. He refused circumcision.
Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house while using marijuana. When confronted, he get mad and
pushed her [hard] and hit her in the arm, [and told] her to go back to the Philippines. X X X
In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another house. Living in a separate house from his mother did not improve
their marital relationship. His addiction to video games worsened. They seldom talk to each other as he did not want
to be disturbed while playing games. His addiction to drugs likewise worsened. He would often invite his friends to
their house for pot sessions, X X X to her extreme fright and discomfort.
xxxx
On 18 April 2007. she flew back to the Philippines. XXX Since then, there was no communication between them. XX x
Petitioner took this as lack of interest on his part to save their marriage, reason why she decided to file this petition
(TSN, August 11, 2008, pp. 6-10).
xxxx
She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her moncy for food. He spent most of his income for video games.
If they ran out of food, it was her mother-in-law who supported them.
xxxx
Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical psychologist, who testified x x x in her direct-examination that petitioner
xxx was subjected to a series of psychological tests, written and oral form. She likewise subjected the mother of the
petitioner to clarificatory analysis x x x.
In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of major psychological incapacity of the petitioner, while respondent
is suffering from a xxx Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his parasitic attitude,
allowing other people to be the handler of his own personal sustenance, even hygienic wise, which somehow distorted
the notion on how to handle marital obligations in terms of mutual understanding, communication and emotional
intent. She was able to arrive at these findings on respondent although he did not submit himself for the same
psychological tests, through the clinical assessments and information supplied by the petitioner, and the description
of the petitioner's mother regarding how she perceived the respondent.
On cross-examination, x x x she described respondent x x x as "Mama's Boy", which attitude can be narcissistic because
of his attachment to the mother. He can do whatever he wants because the mother will always be at his back. She
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likewise stated that the respondent is an unhygienic person and the reason why he opted to lure herein petitioner to
be his wife was because he wanted her to be an extension of his maternal needs to sustain his own desire.
On clarificatory questions of the Court x x x Ms. Tayag testified that she was able to describe the respondent xxx
because of the description made by the petitioner and her mother. She however, admitted that as disclosed to her by
the petitioner, she (petitioner) was not able to have a bonding or to know well the respondent because more often
than not the respondent was always in the company of the mother that a pathological symbiotic relationship
developed between the mother and son.
Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA, the mother of herein petitioner. Her Judicial Affidavit x x x was
adopted as her direct-testimony, which was entirely in corroboration of the testimony of petitioner Abigael An Espina-
Dan.
On cross-examiration x x x. She testified that respondent had not assumed his responsibilities as a married man, his
dependency on drugs, his dependency on his mother with regard to their finances were just toid by her daughter,
petitioner herein, during their conversations in the internet and therefore she has no personal knowledge to what
happened to her daughter, petitioner herein.
xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code x x x provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration of marriage, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
The Supreme Court in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, (240 SCRA 20, 24) declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (6) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage, and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the instant case, the clinical psychologist found respondent to be suffering from x x x Dependent Personality
Disorder with underlying Antisocial traits, x x x which x x x is 'grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any
treatment'. x x x
XXXX
The clinical psychologist['s] findings and conclusion were derived from her interviews of petitioner and her mother.
However, from petitioner's Judicial Affidavit xxx, it was gathered that respondent's failure to establish a common life
with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. How she arrived at the
conclusion that respondent was totally dependent (on] his mother, his propensity [with] illegal substance, his
instability to maintain even his personal hygiene, and his neglect to assume his responsibilities as a husband, Nedy
Tayag failed to explain. It bears recalling that petitioner and respondent were chatmates in 2005 and contracted
marriage in 2006 when respondent was already 35 years old, far removed from adolescent years.
Noteworthy is petitioner's admission that she and respondent met in a chat room in the internet. Respondent was
very sweet, kind and jolly. He was romantic. He made her feel that he cared even if they were apart. He remembered
important occasions and he would always send her sweet messages and funny jokes x x x which revealed the
harmonious relationship of the couple before their marriage. From this, it can be inferred how responsible respondent
was to faithfully comply with his obligations as a boyfriend. During marriage, respondent was working and giving her
money though not enough as she said (TSN, August 11, 2008, p. 15). With this premise, it is therefore safe to conclude
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that no matter how hard respondent would try to show his best, to show his capability as husband to petitioner, she
would always find reason to say otherwise.
As to her allegation that respondent was unhygienic; x x x it was admitted by no less than the psychologist, Nedy Tayag
that in a country like Italy wherein the weather is different from the Philippines, the people there do not bathe
regularly x x x. With respect to circumcision, we all know that circumcision is not common in European countries. You
cannot compel respondent to undergo circumcision since it is against their culture. However, respondent expressed
his willingness to be circumcised, but later on, changed his mind.
As to her allegation that respondent was a drug dependent, petitioner never showed that she exerted effort to seek
medical help for her husband. Undeniably, drug addiction is curable and therefore it can hardly be considered as a
manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
With regard to the dependency of respondent to his mother, it was not well established by the petitioner. X X X What
is clear was that respondent's mother was all out in helping them since the salary of the respondent was not sufficient
to sustain their needs.
All told, the Court cannot see how the personality disorder of respondent would render him unaware of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by him, At the most, the psychological
evaluation of the parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, considering also their culture
differences, which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Along this line, the aforesaid psychological
evaluation made by Ms. Tayag is unfortunately one sided (and) based only on the narrations made by petitioner who
had known respondent only for a short period of time and too general to notice these specific facts thereby failing to
serve its purpose in aiding the Court in arriving at a just resolution of this case.
In sum, inasmuch as the evidence adduced by petitioner in support of her petition is miserably wanting in force to
convince this Court that her marriage with respondent comes and qualifies under the provision of Article 36 of the
Family Code and hence unable to discharge completely her burden of overcoming the legal presumption of validity
and the continuance of her marriage with respondent, declaration of nullity of same marriage is not in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DENIED, for lack of
merit and accordingly, the same petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.9
Petitioner moved to reconsider,10 but in an April 28, 2010 Order,11 the RTC held its ground.
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 95112. In its assailed December 14, 2012 Decision,
however, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, declaring thus:
x x x There is no ground to declare the marriage xxx null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus, the court a quo correctly denied the petition for annulment of marriage x x x.
XXXX
In Toring v. Toring, the Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage.
The psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
the marriage.
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It further expounded on Article 36 x x x in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina and laid down definitive guidelines
in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:
xxxx
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus
confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. Insofar as the present factual situation is concerned, what
should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of
Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in
the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she
contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the
marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 xxx does not really dissolve a marriage: it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction - already then existing - was so
grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.
In the present case, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient to prove respondent-
appellee was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Petitioner-appellant's depiction of
respondent-appellee as irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to
drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage, are not
enough. These traits do not equate to an inability to perform marital obligations due to a psychological illness present
at the time the marriage was solemnized. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal," or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. It is not enough the respondent-appellee, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the respordent's
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations - must
be shown.
Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of the spouse, is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity x x x, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. It is essential that the spouse must be shown to be incapable of performing
marital obligations, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Respondent-appellee's condition or personality disorder has not been shown to be a malady rooted on some
incapacitating psychological condition.
It will be noted [that] Ms. Tayag did not administer psychological tests on respondent-appellee. The conclusion in the
psychological report of Ms. Tayag that respondent-appellee was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder, with
underlying Anti-Social traits, was based merely on information supplied by petitioner-appellant and Violeta (mother
of the petitioner-appellant).
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. The court must evaluate
the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of
standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe, and incurable.
Thus, We cannot credit Ms. Tayag's findings as conclusive, as she did not conduct an actual psychological examination
on respondent-appellee. The information relied upon by Ms. Tayag could not have secured a complete personality
profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of respondent-appellee's
psychological condition. The methodology employed (i.e., gathering information regarding respondent-appellee from
petitioner-appellant and Violeta, without interviewing respondent-appelles himself), simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder.
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Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, and to establish the
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The psychological report, was based entirely on
petitioner-appellant's assumed knowledge of respondent-appellee's family background and upbringing, Ms. Tayag was
not able to establish with certainty that respondert-appellee's alleged psychological incapacity was grave enough to
bring about the inability of the respondent-appellee to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same
was medically permanent or incurable. Also, it did not fully explain the details of respondent-appellee's alleged
disorder and its root cause; how Ms. Tayag came to the conclusion that respondent-appeliee's condition was incurable;
and how it related to the essential marital obligations that respondent-appellee failed to assume.
in this case, the only proof which bears on the claim that respondent-appellee is psychologically incapacitated, is his
allegedly being irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs,
lazy, had poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is worthy to
emphasize that Article 36 X X X contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.
This Court finds the totality of evidence presented by petitioner-appellant failed to establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband x x x. Therefore, there is no basis to declare their marriage null and void x x x.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at
the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. "The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City dated 4
January 2010, in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 29, 2013 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence,
the instant Petition.
Issue
Petitioner mainly contends that –
THE TOTALITY OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND
SATISFIED THE STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA AND OTHER PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE IN POINT.13
Petitioner argues that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was clinically identified, sufficiently
alleged in the petition, and proved by adequate evidence; that respondent's psychological incapacity was shown to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and that the same is medically permanent, incurable, and grave
enough as to bring about the inability of respondent to assume his obligations in marriage, and that as a consequence,
respondent is incapable of fulfilling his duties as a husband under the obligation to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support to her.
Petitioner adds that her allegations in the petition for declaration of nullity are specifically linked to medical and clinical
causes as diagnosed by Dr. Tayag, which diagnosis is contained in the latter's report which forms part of the evidence
in the case; that such diagnosis is backed by scientific tests and expert determination, which sufficiently prove
respondent's psychological incapacity; that Dr. Tayag has adequately determined that respondent's condition is grave,
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incurable, and existed prior to and at the time of his marriage to petitioner; that respondent has been suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait which deterred him from appropriately discharging
his duties and responsibilities as a married man; that despite considerable efforts exerted by petitioner, respondent
remained true to his propensities and even defiant, to the point of exhibiting violence; that no amount of therapy - no
matter how intensive - can possibly change respondent, but rather he would always be in denial of his own condition
and resist any form of treatment; and that respondent's condition is deep-rooted and stems from his formative years
- a product of faulty child-rearing practices and unhealthy familial constellation that altered his emotional and moral
development.
Finally, petitioner argues that it is not necessary that personal examination of respondent be conducted in order that
he may be diagnosed or declared as psychologically incapacitated. She cites the cases of Marcos v. Marcos 14 and
Antonio v. Reyes,15 as well as the case of Suazo v. Suazo,16 in which latter case it was held that a personal examination
of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is not necessarily mandatory, bụt merely desirable, as it may
not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the partics. She suggests instead
that pursuant to the ruling in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te,17 "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
presumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts"18 and that courts "should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines x x x."19
The State's Arguments
In its Comment20 praying for denial, the State calls for affirmance of the CA dispositions, arguing that no new issues
that merit reversal have been raised in the Petition. It contends that petitioner failed to prove the elements of gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability; that quite the contrary, petitioner even admitted that incipiently, respondent
was romantic, funny, responsible, working, and giving money to her; that petitioner's allegations of video game and
drug addiction are uncorroborated, and her failure to seek medical treatment therefor in behalf of her husband must
be considered against her, that such addictions are curable and could not be the basis for a declaration of psychological
incapacity; that respondent's irresponsibility, immaturity, and over-dependence on his mother do not automatically
justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders - existing at the
time of the marriage -- clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage, and depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond one is about to
assume; that the psychological evaluation of respondent was based on one-sided information supplied by petitioner
and her mother - which renders the same of doubtful credibility; and that while personal examination of respondent
is indeed not mandatory, there are instances where it is required - such as in this case, where the information supplied
to the psychologist unilaterally comes from the side of the petitioner, which renders such information biased and
partial as would materially affect the psychologist's assessment.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the petition.
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155 on the ground that petitioner's
evidence failed to sufficiently prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at the time.
They held that while petitioner alleged such condition, she was unable to establish its existence, gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability based solely on her testimony, which is insufficient, self-serving, unreliable, and
uncorroborated, as she did not know respondent very well enough - having been with him only for a short period of
time; Dr. Tayag's psychological report - which is practically onesided for the latter's failure to include respondent in
the study; and the account of petitioner's mother, which is deemed biased and thus of doubtful credibility.
The Court agrees.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of
hermother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition of both
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petitioner and respondent. The deterınination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely on
petitioner's account and that of her mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the
proceedings.
This is insufficient.
At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their marriage, respondent was working
and giving money to her; that respondent was romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and
respondent enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for
marriage. As correctly observed by the trial and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of
irreconcilable differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture and upbringing, and the very short
period that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed addiction to video games
and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and
petitioner has not shown that she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render
support and aid to respondent.
"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition.21 "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage"22 such that "[i]f the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to."23
than a mental -- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
in Article 38 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.24
With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the weight of proving psychological
incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert findings. However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or
interviews conducted on respondent himself - but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do as well.
x x x Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or
psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on
the information fed to her by only one side --- the petitioner -- whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent
to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who believes that the world revolves around him'; and
who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner) extended towards him.'. . .
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report -- i.e., that the
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respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be
grave and incurable’- is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and
Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts - identical in most respects -are entitled to respect and
finality.1âwphi1 The same being correct, this Court finds no need to disturb them.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x.26
To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, "The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage, and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved."27 Finally, the burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner.
X X X Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 28
With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage was correctly
dismissed by the courts below.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision and August 29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.95112 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 210518

vs
MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER and MICHELLE K. MERCADO- JAVIER, Respondents
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision2 dated July 10, 2013, and Resolution3 dated November 28, 2013, rendered in relation
to CA-G.R. CV No. 98015. In these assailed issuances, the CA reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of
Pasig City, which dismissed the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent Martin Nikolai Z.
Javier (Martin) against respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier (Michelle) under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Factual Antecedents
Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002.4
On November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Joint Custody of Common
Minor Child under Article 36 of the Family Code.5 Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.6 He thus prayed for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage, and for the joint custody of their minor child, Amanda M. Javier.7
In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his own behalf,8 and presented the psychological
findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos (Dr. Adamos) (i.e., Psychological Evaluation Report on Martin and Psychological
Impression Report on Michelle). 9
In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos diagnosed her with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. 10 Likewise, Dr. Adamos concluded in the Psychological Evaluation Report that Martin suffered from the same
disorder. 11 Their disorder was considered grave and incurable, and rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Adamos further testified before the RTC to provide his expert
opinion, and stated that with respect to the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, the informants were Martin
and the respondents' common friend, Jose Vicente Luis Serra (Jose Vicente ). 12 He was unable to evaluate Michelle
because she did not respond to Dr. Adamos' earlier request to come in for psychological evaluation. 13
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision14 dated March 10, 2011, the RTC dismissed the petition for failure to establish a sufficient basis for the
declaration of nullity of the respondents' marriage. The relevant portions of the RTC's decision reads:
Upon the other hand, though Dr. Adamos diagnosed [Martin] to be afflicted with a narcissistic personality disorder,
which rendered him incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations of observing love, trust and respect.
[Martin's] testimony is found by the Court to be not supportive of such finding and vice-versa. In fact, on the basis of
[Martin's] declarations, the Court came up with an impression that [Martin] is a man gifted with a lot of patience; that
he was righteous, that he laudably performed his role as husband and father, and that in spite of [Michelle's] alleged
wrongdoings, he still exerted his best efforts to save their marriage.
Thus, as to [Michelle's] alleged psychological incapacity, the Court finds [Martin's] testimony to be self-serving and Dr.
Adamos' findings to be without sufficient basis.
Taking all the foregoing into consideration, the Court finds no sufficient basis for granting the relief prayed for in the
petition.
N D
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Martin moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's decision on May 18, 2011. 16 Finding the arguments in the motion
unmeritorious, the RTC denied the motion in its Order17 dated September 7, 2011:
In the case at bar, the Court found no sufficient basis for making a finding that either petitioner or respondent or both
were afflicted with a psychological disorder within the contemplation of existing law and jurisprudence. Such being
the case, there was no need to resort to Dr. Adamos' findings.
Having said this, the Court finds no compelling reason to set aside its March 10, 2011 Decision.
Wherefore, premises considered, the pending Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.18
Unsatisfied with the RTC's ruling, Martin appealed the denial of his petition to the CA. 19 In his Appellant's Brief, Martin
submitted that it is not necessary for the psychologist to personally examine the incapacitated spouse, or Michelle in
this case, before the court may rule on the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.20 He also argued that, at the
very least, there was sufficient evidence to support his own diagnosis of psychological incapacity.21Martin thus claimed
that the RTC committed a reversible error in dismissing his petition.
The Republic filed its own brief opposing the appeal of Martin. Arguing that there was no basis for Dr. Adamos' findings
as to Michelle's psychological incapacity, the Republic asserts that there was no independent proof to establish this
claim. Furthermore, the Republic argued that Martin supported his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
self-serving testimonies and hearsay evidence.22
Ruling of the CA
On review, Martin's appeal was granted. In its Decision23 dated July 10, 2013, the CA held that:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 10, 2011 and the Resolution dated
September 07, 2011, respectively, issued by the [RTC] of Pasig City, Branch 261, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the marriage between [Martin] and [Michelle] is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.24
The CA found that there was sufficient evidence to support Martin's claim that he is psychologically incapacitated. The
CA also negated the RTC's ruling by referring to Martin's own testimony, in which he narrated his tendency to impose
his own unrealistic standards on Michelle.25 In its challenged decision, the CA likewise ruled that Michelle's diagnosis
was adequately supported by the narrations of Martin and Jose Vicente.26
Aggrieved, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration from the CA's Decision dated July 10, 2013.27 The CA denied
the motion in its Resolution28 dated November 28, 2013 for being a mere rehash of its earlier arguments.
The Republic is now before this Court, arguing that there was no basis for the CA's ruling granting the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It argues that the testimony of Martin was self-serving, especially in relation to Dr.
Adamos' diagnosis that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code. According to the Republic, there were no other witnesses that were presented in court, who
could have testified on Michelle's behavior.29
Ruling of the Court

N D
The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The totality of evidence supports the finding that Martin
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability, which the Court discussed in Santos v. CA, et al. 30 as follows:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved. 31
The Court later clarified in Marcos v. Marcos32that for purposes of establishing the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, it is not required that a physician conduct an actual medical examination of the person concerned. It is enough
that the totality of evidence is strong enough to sustain the finding of psychological incapacity. In such case, however,
the petitioner bears a greater burden in proving the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the other
spouse's psychological incapacity.33
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v. Molina,34 these guidelines are not meant to
straightjacket all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits of each case are determined on a case-to-
case basis, as no case is on all fours with another.35
Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of evidence to support his petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. He testified as to his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, Michelle. In particular,
he stated that Michelle was confrontational even before their marriage.36 He alleged that Michelle always challenged
his opinions on what he thinks is proper, which he insisted on because he witnessed the abuse that his mother went
through with his biological father. 37 He also thought that Michelle was highly impressionable and easily influenced by
friends, as a result of which, Martin alleged that Michelle acted recklessly and without consideration of his feelings. 38
The psychological findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the trial court to corroborate his claim. According to
Dr. Adamos, Michelle suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a result of childhood trauma and defective
child-rearing practices.39 This disorder was supposedly aggravated by her marriage with Martin, who she constantly
lied to. It was also alleged in the Psychological Impression Report that Michelle openly had extra-marital affairs.40
The basis of Dr. Adamos' findings on the psychological incapacity of Michelle was the information provided by Martin
and Jose Vicente.1âwphi1 Jose Vicente was a close friend of the respondents, having introduced them to each other
before their marriage.41 Jose Vicente was also allegedly a regular confidant of Michelle.42
While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or evaluated for purposes of the psychological report, the
trial court was incorrect in ruling that Dr. Adamos' findings were based solely on the interview with Martin.43 Even if
that were the case, the findings of the psychologist are not immediately invalidated for this reason alone. Because a
marriage necessarily involves only two persons, the spouse who witnessed the other spouse's behavior may "validly
relay" the pattern of behavior to the psychologist. 44
This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings that Michelle was psychologically
incapacitated. We cannot absolutely rely on the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle. There were no other
independent evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged psychological
incapacity. While this Court cannot discount their first-hand observations, it is highly unlikely that they were able to
paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood history. The records do not show that Michelle
and Jose Vicente were childhood friends, while Martin, on the other hand, was introduced to Michelle during their
adulthood. Either Martin or Jose Vicente, as third persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have known about
her childhood, how she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her family.45 Without a credible source of her
supposed childhood trauma, Dr. Adamos was not equipped with enough information from which he may reasonably
conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and persistent disorder that is grave and incurable.
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The Court's explanation in Rumbaua v. Rumbaua46judiciously discussed the dangers of relying on the narrations of a
petitioner-spouse to the psychologist, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on
the information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not
actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's
probes.
xxxx
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report - i.e., that the
respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be
grave and incurable" - is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.47 (Citations omitted and emphasis Ours)
It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also subjected to several psychological tests, as a result of
which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed him with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.48 Additionally, the diagnosis was based on Dr.
Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who underwent several-or to be accurate, more than 10-counselling sessions
with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to 2009.49 These facts were uncontroverted by the Republic.
In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose self[-]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas
of preference towards ideal love and ideal marriage."50 Dr. Adamos also found that Martin lacked empathy, leading
him to disregard and ignore the feelings of Michelle.51
As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with tendencies toward sadism. 52 Dr. Adamos
concluded from the tests administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic experiences he
experienced during his childhood, having grown up around a violent father who was abusive of his mother.53 This
adversely affected Martin in such a manner that he formed unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, and
proposed unconventional sexual practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals, Martin would not only
quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her. 54 Other manifestations include excessive love for himself,
self-entitlement, immaturity, and self-centeredness.55
These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part
of Martin. As such, insofar as the psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a reversible
error in declaring the marriage of the respondents null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the factual circumstances obtaining in this specific case warrant the
declaration that Martin is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his
marriage to Michelle. This is neither a relaxation nor abandonment of previous doctrines relating to Article 36 of the
Family Code. The guidelines in Molina still apply to all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage inasmuch as this
Court does not lose sight of the constitutional protection to the institution of marriage.
N D
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the
psychological incapacity of respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier is concerned. The Decision dated July 10, 2013 and
Resolution dated November 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98015 are MODIFIED to the extent
that the marriage of the respondents on February 8, 2002 is declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) asking the Court to reverse and set
aside the April 25, 2017 Decision1 and January 11, 2018 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
105873, which affirmed the May 8, 2015 Decision3 and September 16, 2015 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan
City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34 (RTC) declaring the marriage of Liberato P. Mola Cruz (respondent) and Liezl S. Conag
(Liezl) void ab initio.
The Antecedents
Respondent and Liezl were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. Their dating relationship began when Liezl's
sister gave Liezl's mobile phone number to respondent so they could become textmates. In the course of their
relationship, Liezl left for Japan to work as an entertainer for six (6) months. The couple got married after Liezl
returned home. They lived for some time in Manila where respondent worked, but later moved to Japan where Liezl
again secured a contract as an entertainer and respondent found work as a construction worker. It was while living
in Japan when respondent noticed changes in Liezl. She began going out of the house without respondent's
permission and started giving respondent the cold treatment. Liezl also started getting angry at respondent for no
reason. The couple later returned to the Philippines after Liezl was released from detention due to overstaying in
Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed to respondent her romantic affair with a Japanese man. Despite the
confession, Liezl did not end the illicit relationship, which caused respondent such stress that he was hospitalized.
Respondent expressed her willingness to forgive Liezl but she chose to walk away from their marriage.
The couple reconciled after respondent made efforts to woo Liezl back. One day, however, respondent found Liezl's
Japanese lover in their house. To respondent's surprise, Liezl introduced him to her lover as her elder brother.
Respondent went along with the charade, and allowed Liezl to share her bed with her lover as she threatened to
leave their home. Liezl went on with her partying ways, and continued working in a Manila nightclub despite
respondent's offer for her to start a business.
Despite the concessions given her, Liezl left respondent a second time. Respondent tried to move on and left for
Singapore to work in 2008. Though abroad, he continued to woo his wife back, but found out that Liezl already
cohabited with her lover.
Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
public prosecutor assigned to the case reported, submitted a written report to the RTC, stating, among others, that
the filing of the petition was not a result of collusion between the spouses.5Thereafter, pre-trial was held and trial on
the merits ensured.
The RTC's Decision
The RTC granted respondent's petition, and declared respondent and Liezl's marriage void ab initio and their
property regime dissolved.
The RTC relied on the psychological report and testimony of expert witness, Dr. Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) a clinical
psychologist. Based on the evaluation and assessment procedure she followed, Dr. Tudla found that Liezl was
afflicted by histrionic personality disorder, a pervasive pattern of behavior characterized by excessive emotionality
and attention seeking. A histrionic so afflicted tends to be perceived by others as selfish, egotistical and unreliable;
seeking immediate gratification; over-reactive to even minor provocations; suggestible; and lacking in analytical
ability.
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Dr. Tudla presented the following indicators of Liezl's disorder: going out without her husband's knowledge or
permission; coldly treating her husband, verbally and sexually; quick anger at the slightest provocation or for no
reason; arrest in Japan due to overstaying; admission to an affair; insensitivity towards her husband's feelings, as
shown by introducing her husband as her brother to her Japanese lover; threats of leaving if her ideas are not agreed
to; unabashed declaration of having no feelings for her husband; maintaining a night life with friends; and choosing
to work in a nightclub instead of engaging in a decent job.
Dr. Tudla found that Liezl's psychological incapacity existed prior to the marriage because she grew up irritable, hard-
headed and more fond of friends than family. She despised advice or suggestion from her elders, and would rebel
when her demands were not met. This personality aberration was determined by Dr. Tudla as rooted on Liezl's poor
upbringing - Liezl's father resorted to corporal punishment to instill discipline, while her mother tolerated her whims.
Liezl also tended to skip house and spend nights with her friends to avoid her father's spanking. According to Dr.
Tudla, the irregular treatment she received from her parents led to Liezl acquiring unsuitable behavioral patterns.
Aside from the existence of Liezl's psychological incapacity prior to the marriage, Dr. Tudla found her incapacity too
grave that it seriously impaired her relationship with her husband, and caused her failure to discharge the basic
obligations of marriage which resulted in its breakdown. Her incapacity was also found incurable because it was
deeply ingrained in her personality. Further, Dr. Tudla found Liezl unconscious of her personality disorder and, when
confronted, would deny it to avoid criticism. The disorder was also permanent as it started during her adolescence
and continued until adulthood. Treatment was also deemed ineffective as lack of any indication that behavioural or
medical therapy would play a significant role, considering Liezl's unawareness of her disorder. Only the people
around her noticed her maladaptive behavior.
The RTC found that Liezl was largely responsible for the failure of her marriage. Her moral bankruptcy, coupled with
respondent's weakness in character inconsistent with what is expected of the head of a family, left the marital union
bereft of any mutual respect. According to the RTC, the marriage was wrong from the very beginning.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and argued that Dr. Tudla's findings were based on hearsay because she
lacked personal knowledge of the facts on which her evaluation was anchored; and that the hopelessness of the
parties' reconciliation should not mean that their marriage should be declared void ab initio.
In its Order,6 the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals' Decision
On appeal, petitioner raised the sole issue of whether respondent was able to prove Liezl's psychological incapacity
to perform her marital obligations. It claimed that respondent failed to do so, and that witness Dr. Tudla only made a
sweeping statement that Liezl's condition was grave and permanent. Petitioner questioned Dr. Tudla's report as it
lacked details regarding Liezl's condition and how Liezl was unable to comply with her marital obligations. Petitioner
contended that the change in Liezl's behavior was only caused by her illicit relationship and not because of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner asserted that sexual infidelity, indulgence and abandonment can only be grounds
for legal separation as they do not constitute psychological incapacity.
In its decision, the CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC's decision. It reasoned that:
What matters in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether the totality
of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In the task of ascertaining the
presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis of experts.
In the present case, the Psychological Evaluation Report prepared by petitioner's witness Pacita P. Tudla. Ph.D
concluded [that] respondent is suffering from histrionic personality disorder. From interviews of said psychologist
with petitioner, respondent and her sister, it was revealed how her psychological disorder resulted in the failure of
their marriage. At the time the parties were living in Japan, respondent had an affair with a Japanese national which
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she admitted to petitioner. Furthermore, her attitude towards her husband had changed ever since she met her
Japanese lover, giving him the cold treatment and getting angry at him at the slightest provocation. She likewise
refused to have sexual intercourse with petitioner. Respondent preferred to work at a nightclub over a decent
business offered to her by petitioner. Worst, she let her Japanese boyfriend visit the conjugal home she shared with
petitioner and introduced the latter as her older brother to her lover. Petitioner was forced to keep silent because
she threatened to leave him. And ultimately, Liezl left Liberato and cohabited with her Japanese boyfriend.
According to Ms. Tudla, respondent's psychological incapacity has antecedence since it already existed long before
she married petitioner. Growing up, Liezl was irritable, hard-headed and was fond of her group of friends. She did
not know how to accept advice and suggestion from elders.
Respondent's psychological incapacity is considered by the expert witness to be grave, permanent and incurable.
Liezl's histrionic personality disorder seriously impaired the quality of her relationship with her husband and caused
her failure to discharge the basic obligations of marriage - love, respect, concern, support and fidelity to her
husband. Further, she is unconscious of her personality disorder and if confronted about it, she would deny it in her
attempt to protect herself from criticisms.
Ms. Tudla said in her report that Liezl's psychological incapacity is permanent because it started in the adolescent
stage of her life and continued to manifest as she grew up into adulthood. Thus, it is already ingrained in her
personality make-up and no treatment will be effective.7
The CA described Liezl's acts of allowing her lover to stay in the conjugal home and introducing her husband as her
brother as extreme perversion and depravity. It then concluded that, in dissolving marital bonds on account of
psychological incapacity, the court is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
The Present Appeal
Petitioner now questions whether the totality of the evidence adduced by respondent proves Liezl's psychological
incapacity, thus warranting the declaration of their marriage as null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Using the guidelines set forth in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina (Molina),8 petitioner argues that
the CA erred in affirming the RTC's findings because there was no sufficient evidence to prove that Liezl is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. Dr. Tudla's assessment, based only on the
information given by respondent, Liezl and her sister, must be weighed strictly and with due care. Petitioner avers
that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the couple to obtain a conclusive diagnosis of
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable. Information retrieved from Liezl's interview does not
necessarily enhance Dr. Tudla's conclusion because the details Liezl conveyed were wanting. There is also no
independent collateral informants, which made Dr. Tudla's evaluation fallible. Therefore, Dr. Tudla's findings should
not be accepted without question.
For petitioner, Liezl's purported actuations were not proven to have existed prior to the marriage; nor was it alleged
in respondent's petition that she showed abnormal and peculiar character and behavior prior to the celebration of
the marriage that would support a conclusion that she is suffering from any psychological incapacity. Petitioner
argues that the CA observed nothing peculiar about the spouses that would insinuate that they are suffering from
psychological incapacity, and that the finding that Liezl was suffering from a psychological disorder was merely based
on incidents that occurred after the celebration of the marriage. Petitioner, thus, avers that Liezl's incapacity is
merely conjectural since there was no mention or proof that her incapacity manifested, or at least was hinted at,
before the celebration of the marriage.
Petitioner also claims that the CA failed to detail how Liezl's disorder could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted
in her childhood and incurable. There should be a causal connection between the failure of the marriage and the
psychological disorder. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty", a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Petitioner maintains that sexual infidelity and abandonment are only
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grounds for legal separation and not for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The change in the spouses' feelings
toward each other could hardly be described as a psychological illness.
Issue
Whether Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations was sufficiently established by the
totality of evidence presented by respondent.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,9 the Court explained psychological incapacity as follows:

"[P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. x x x.10
Further, "x x x psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them x x x."11
Jurisprudence consistently adhered to the guidelines in appreciating psychological incapacity cases set in Molina. We
quote the fairly recent iteration of the guidelines in Republic v. Pangasinan12 for reference:
x x x [P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Thereafter, in Molina, the Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity
cases, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by expe1ts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential obligations, as the case may be, in
marriage must be rooted on a medically or clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown to have
existed at the time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof may only be evident after marriage. x x x.13
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In addition, the Court is mindful that the Molina guidelines should no longer be viewed as a stringent code which all
nullity cases on the ground of psychological incapacity should meet with exactitude, in consonance with the Family
Code's ideal to appreciate allegations of psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis and "to allow some
resiliency in its application" as legally designed.14Ngo Te v. Yu-Te15predicated, thus:
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.16
In the case at hand, petitioner is again assailing the CA's affirmance of the RTC's conclusion that Liezl is
psychologically incapacitated to carry out her marital obligations to respondent (1) by attacking the reliability of
expert witness Dr. Tudla's medical conclusions on the ground that they were based only on interviews of Liezl and
her sister; (2) by claiming that Liezl's actions manifesting her disorder occurred after the celebration of the marriage;
and (3) because the CA failed to detail why it found Liezl's disorder grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and
incurable. These issues were resolved by the CA by affirming the factual findings earlier made by the RTC as regards
the histrionic personality disorder suffered by Liezl, all of which were deemed binding to the Court. The Court is so
bound "x x x owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the
Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts."17 A sharper pronouncement on the respect accorded to the
trial court's factual findings in the realm of psychological incapacity was made in Kalaw v. Fernandez (Kalaw):18
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party's psychological incapacity
should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other
evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the findings of the trial
court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain
itself from substituting its own judgment. It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial
court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard
marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for
the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.19
The CA decision itself recognized and Our own review of Dr. Tudla's psychological report confirms, contrary to
petitioner's allegation, that Dr. Tudla personally interviewed both spouses regarding their personal and familial
circumstances before and after the celebration of their marriage. Information gathered from the spouses was then
verified by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa Conag, Liez's youngest sister,20a close relation privy to Liezl's personal history
before and after she got married. Dr. Tudla then based her psychological evaluation and conclusions on all the
information she gathered. Her findings were, thus, properly anchored on a holistic psychological evaluation of the
parties as individuals and as a married couple under a factual milieu verified with an independent informant. The
courts a quo properly accorded credence to the report and utilized it as an aid in determining whether Liezl is indeed
psychologically incapacitated to meet essential marital functions. Clearly, petitioner has no basis to assail Dr. Tudla's
psychological findings as wanting evidentiary support.
Even the failure of an expert to conduct personal examination of the couple will not perforce result to the expert's
opinion becoming unreliable, as petitioner advances. In Kalaw, a case also involving a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage wherein the expert witnesses declared the respondent spouse therein as suffering from
narcissistic personality disorder without personally examining the latter albeit with the support of the medical
findings of the respondent spouse's own clinical psychologist. In said case, the Court had the occasion to re-
emphasize that such lack of personal examination does not per seinvalidate the experts' findings of psychological
incapacity. Citing Marcos v. Marcos,21 the Court emphasized the importance of the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity and the inessentiality of a physician's personal
examination to have a party declared psychologically incapacitated. Kalaw expounded on the point, as follows:
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible
and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation. Indeed, an expert
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opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative
value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert's findings under such circumstances
would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is so, considering that any ruling
that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if
it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties' upbringing and psychodynamics.22
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that both the CA and the RTC did not err in finding
that the totality of evidence presented by respondent in support of his petition, sufficiently established the link
between Liezl's actions showing her psychological incapacity to understand and perform her marital obligations and
her histrionic personality disorder. The Court respects the RTC's appreciation of respondent's testimony during trial
on what transpired before and during the marriage, considering that "[t]he totality of the behavior of one spouse
during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."23 In addition, Dr.
Tudla was able to collect and verify largely the same facts in the course of her psychological evaluation of both
spouses and her interview of Liezl's sister. Dr. Tudla's report gave a description of histrionic personality disorder, and
correlated the characteristics of this disorder with Liezl's behavior from her formative years through he course of her
marriage to petitioner. Indubitably, Dr. Tudla's report and testimony enjoy such probative force emanating from the
assistance her opinion gave to the courts to show the facts upon which her psychological conclusion was based.24
The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that occurred after the marriage was celebrated does
not mean, as ,petitioner argues, that there is no psychological incapacity to speak of. As held in Republic v.
Pangasinan,25 psychological incapacity may manifest itself after the celebration of the marriage even if it already
exists at the time of the marriage. More importantly, Art. 36 of the Family Code is explicit - a marriage contracted by
a psychologically incapacitated party is also treated as void even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after the
marriage was celebrated.26
Also, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the CA did expound on the reasons why it found Liezl's disorder grave,
deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable.
To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must
sufficiently prove that the respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to
the time of the marriage.27 The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.28 "There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to the
marriage which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity."29
The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the cause of her inability to discharge her marital
obligations to love, respect and give concern, support and fidelity to her husband. The CA also narrated how the
disorder was evidenced by Liezl's actions after the marriage was celebrated, starting from when she and petitioner
lived together in Japan. The gravity of her disorder is shown by appreciating the totality of her actions after she got
married. Liezl was unable to accommodate the fact that she was already married into the way she wanted to live her
life, and essentially treated petitioner as a manipulable inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to accede to
her desires. It is clear that Liezl is truly incognitive of her marital responsibilities.
The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It
fully appreciated Liezl's psychological evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness of her disorder. Together with its
rootedness in Liezl's personality since her teens, the CA came to agree with the expert findings that any medical or
behavioral treatment of her disorder would prove ineffective.
Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and abandonment are only grounds for legal
separation and cannot be used as basis to hold a marriage void ab initio. According to petitioner, Liezl cheated on
and abandoned her husband because of her illicit affair and not because she is psychologically incapacitated.
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It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal separation. It may be noted, however, that the
courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of her histrionic personality
disorder. A person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate
gratification.30 These traits were especially reflected in Liezl's highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend
to stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and introducing her husband as her
elder brother, all done under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of
the marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married person who reasonably understand the principle and
responsibilities of marriage.
The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's marriage as void ab initio, even as it is clear from the records
how much petitioner must love his wife to endure the pain and humiliation she callously caused him in the hope that
their relationship could still work out. Clearly, Liezl does not recognize the marital responsibilities that came when
she married petitioner. The severance of their marital vinculumwill better protect the state's interest to preserve the
sanctity of marriage and family, the importance of which seems utterly lost on respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2017 Decision and January 11, 2018 Resolution of the Court of
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower
court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation
of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The
petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on
November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with
Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage
only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she
has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month
annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and
completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without
her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as
her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration
of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties;
their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and
exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being
void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that
private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman
is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second
marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman
is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially
declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme
Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
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And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the
Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his
possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the
absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the
motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground
that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there
being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant
case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the
separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first
marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration
of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation
of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion
to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the
trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether
the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal
properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being
unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the
petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should
therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage,
not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties
acquired during coverture.
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There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous
marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier
ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to
observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to
dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment
is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus,
in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower
court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court
stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need
for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage
was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In
granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the
death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that
there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable
marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
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The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his
marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the
provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out
that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment
of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative.
Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice
Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of
a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy
added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the
other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity"
can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are
referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral
attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment
declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is
void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to
avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought
on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to
raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added
that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage
because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a
void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the
provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on
the basis of final judgment . . .
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Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of
Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said
subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the
provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or
her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity
of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning
down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a
second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter
remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can
be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory,
will warrant dismissal of the same.
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed,
the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need
for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it
finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
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remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other
instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the
erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the
latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who
has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only
legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as
"a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the
nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect —
and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through
the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily
verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of
the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a
marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and
annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite
restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable
her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from
the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage."
Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the
basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead
of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests
that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have
been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court
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but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out
that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with
private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor
of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage
or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of
the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one
of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason
that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction
to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no
reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street,
Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in
Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not
bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his
children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for
him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing
in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his
arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of
the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro
who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges
that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the
same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent
went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a
marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a
single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto
can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
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Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14
SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage
license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was
given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time.
His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral
and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality
of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial
duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 189607
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the
Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the ground that
respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand, that
respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for
this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially
reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979,
respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, 4 praying that his
marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological
incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as
they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista
was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision
dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was
insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his
Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of
the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the
time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied
respondent's demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage between RENATO
A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San
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Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of
the Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979,
makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument
that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The
RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said
that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of
nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were concerned. 15 His motion,
however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and
Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity
of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in
1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the
law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that
the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA
Resolution22dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in
toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the
Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of
its celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The
children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court
must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles
80,2681,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second
paragraph),30 8531and 86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is
nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by
legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
34 35 36
of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express
provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37
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In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second marriage was
contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death
of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second
marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from
its performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat (
1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered
bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this
requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the
nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter
of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing
more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity
and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the
courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily
verifiable through records accessible to everyone.40(Emphases supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree
of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the
children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue
to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second
marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife
whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held
that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At
that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to
do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment
of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
N D
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that
the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of
the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only
serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and
Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The
petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be
declared null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
"well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker
lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San
Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married
Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San
Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract
as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission
to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool,
England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that
he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack
of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information
even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to
the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet
Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December
1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that
Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to
dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia)
failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England.
She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
N D
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares
as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to
form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the following
allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded
belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a proper
case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his
wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded,7 the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code
merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered
to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code.9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
N D
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had complied
with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that
case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief
that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the
whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he
fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife,
who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her
whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the
only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead
of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to
London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the
whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to
London to look for her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed
efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between London
and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one — place in England,
the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they
leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends
and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does
not appear to be fatal. 16
N D
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and
Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers
apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow
bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a
reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The
same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of
her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals
ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence
cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before,
there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely
tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not
that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his
employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from
January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place
of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a
well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It
is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave
the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that
respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
N D
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State bas
the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and
no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or
given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Costs against respondent.
N D
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of
P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on 13
January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and
Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court
declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the
Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir
of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly
bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator,
without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of
the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been
dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought
priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent
Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein
petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos. 1
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, formulating that —
1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the instant case despite the fact that
the controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse.
3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio.
4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be granted solely in favor of
oppositor-appellant. 2
N D
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed
decision, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one
entered declaring as follows:
(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong
to the conjugal partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the
value of the land to Teodorico's estate as of the time of the taking;
(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of her husband's
estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the other half;
(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E. Calisterio to act as
administrator of Teodorico's estate, and if so found competent and willing, that she be appointed as
such; otherwise, to determine who among the deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to
become the administrator of the estate. 3
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, prompting her to
interpose the present appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision
of the trial court is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. 4
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in
force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the
Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and
void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from
the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held
valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good
faith. 6 Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of
N D
the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. 7 The Court does not find
these circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary8 as long as the prescribed period of absence
is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83,
to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be,
in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated
in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41 9 , in relation to Article 40, 10 of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been
absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code,
should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James
Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another property
regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
property should rightly be divided in two equal portions — one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other
portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
estate 11 of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the
other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and
aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or
sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are
incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of
its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only
as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled,
along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of
the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877,
affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of
bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know
the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano
Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a
friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went
to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s
resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring
her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by
them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996
before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their marriage
contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to
build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce
and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo,
he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped
giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when
they exchanged their own vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations
Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña,
but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed
that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was
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"single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did
not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide
unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid
because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of ₱200,000.00 by
way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the
ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known
that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he
married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the
time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted.
He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally
liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of
his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account
Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance on the Court’s
ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended
Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as
provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto
should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State
and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought
the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of
the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of
the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant,
there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court
cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect,
as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.17
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Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE
CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00
AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since
1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the
first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still
alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on
legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction
of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to
prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or
whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by
operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that
he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule
therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require
that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further
asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or
second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was already
married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an
illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioner’s conviction is
in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
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El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el anterior, será castigado con la
pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by
law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were
of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence
of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification
for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been
legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. 22 It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the
second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of
a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the
existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not
matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully
dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v.
Tan,27 under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are three
(3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the
felony of the act.28 He explained that:
… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all
codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime.
There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this
be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in
the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since
he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime
of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is
included in the word "voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from
which another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that
every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary,
and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was
not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
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The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he
was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married
the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on
the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present,
as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged
and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is
a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the
marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order,
comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage,
the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may
well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of
the presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as
proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first
spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second
marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of
the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof,
but by the subjective condition of individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to
permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate
judicial cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years.
If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
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Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of
for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of
the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil
Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage,
he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court
in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated
in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second
marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law
and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and
comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee.
For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse
to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
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subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the
person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have
such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead
because he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of
the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit
to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous
and meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer
to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are
authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its
rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349 or "before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and
should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not
been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court
proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.53 A second marriage
is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.54 Former
Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or
judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy.
He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice
Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she
contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period,
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive
death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce
evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the
good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse must first
ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she
marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a
second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to
protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because
with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now
clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
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clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring
an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With
the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases
where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which
could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.60 Before such declaration, it was held that
the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were
contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however,
appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of
the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate
court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In
any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to
prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219
of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled
that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil
de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o
concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente,
base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers
that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.65 An award
for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of
the Civil Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219,
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
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(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article
in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has
suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any
reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing
analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation,
etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may
be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to
the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his
due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21
provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
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number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil
Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that
he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made
the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even
stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties
as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly
abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were
married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being
a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned
out was not her lawful husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the
private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain
any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and
mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper &
James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent,
recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p.
38. Here the defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound
to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff
became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra;
Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev.
517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant’s bigamous marriage to her and the attendant
publicity she not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific
headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s reasonable
allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298
(App. Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family
as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming
moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right
of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such
act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the
court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff
was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she
had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the
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action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her
being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume
and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to
be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by
herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part,
were but one of the incidental results of the defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in
other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash.
626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411.
Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was
conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant’s misrepresentation, and
that she does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal
on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of ₱200,000.00 for moral damages to
be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), and ALAN B. ALEGRO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27,
for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
In an Order1 dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that
a copy of the said order be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper
of general circulation in the Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the court’s bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next scheduled hearing. The
court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and
Alan, through counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all the foregoing
jurisdictional requirements.2
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to
Dismiss3 the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.4
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.5He
testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of
their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her
parents.6 Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house,
but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.7 Alan thought that Lea merely went to her
parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar.8 However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of Lea’s parents to see if she
was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of Lea’s friend, Janeth Bautista,
at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janette’s brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for
Manila.9 When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been
to their house but that she left without notice.10 Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised
to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.11
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town
fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.12 However, Lea did not show up.
Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying.
When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her.13 He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts
despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look
for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.14
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.15 The police authorities issued an
Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.16 Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
on July 9, 2001.17
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on February 14, 1995, at 2:00
p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea
had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since.18 Lea’s father, who was his compadre and the owner
of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know where Lea was.19
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After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence
in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner’s absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared
PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioner’s subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.20
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming
the decision of the RTC.21 The CA cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.22
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s decision alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to
prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.23 It averred that the respondent failed to exercise
reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Lea’s father told him on February
14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported
his wife’s disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate
Lea. Finally, the petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41
of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages x x x
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of
the x x x summary nature of its proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation
of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife
is already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration
of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals.24
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.25
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does
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not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme
se funde en motivos racionales."26
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so
far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,27 competence evidence
on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not
the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.28
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that the absent
spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,29 the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they
find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that "men readily
believe what they wish to be true."
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even
failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about
Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of
his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left
without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her for coming home late and
for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for her to go home to her parents if she
enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she
communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement
she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to
make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have
enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts
considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only
an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he
filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
73749 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27,
is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent’s petition.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28, 20043 reversing the
Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No.
4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon
a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and
purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted
marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner
thereof effective July 1994, died.11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits13 which was also granted by the SSS on
April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the
SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages
in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are
still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents
submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13,
199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as
1958; and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon
and respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz,"
filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death,17 he further attesting in a sworn
statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the SSS.20
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Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of
payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to
her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that
she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year
guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the
amount erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in declaring the
first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did not become final.
The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the
deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita
Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of reappearance to terminate the second
marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to
speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,22 advised respondent that as Cecilia and
Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension
for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it
was contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order
declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of
the order. It thus requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly
pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October
12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release of
her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous
or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her
as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the
discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not deprived of her right to file
a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her entitlement to
monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000
representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings "forcibly and coercively
prevented her from spending any amount during Bailon’s wake."28
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After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their respective Position Papers, one
Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of
Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not
true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents’ residence in
Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even
after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she
was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse
and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death
benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the
funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the demise
of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as
amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that
the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th
Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented in bad faith. This Commission
accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice
(a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud
upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased member the right to marry
anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955
to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto.
x x x as determined through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not
Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased
member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the latter’s death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of
Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she received from the SSS for the period
from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
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Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente
Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS as funeral
benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for
review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the
SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now
RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more importantly, whether or not the
respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latter’s
decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first
marriage subsisting and the second marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that
"the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the second marriage contracted by a
person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second
marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for
annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly
declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of
the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular courts under the
pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members. Notwithstanding its opinion as to the
soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any
judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC to
be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair play and thus its findings are of
doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present evidence for and her
behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer
practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz
and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate
because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS has now the authority
to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and void.36(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration37 which were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:
I
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THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting
marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to whom, between Alice and
respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 540 of the Social Security Law; and in declaring
that the SSS did not give respondent due process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no moment to the present
controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior
and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits."41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no
doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law
as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and
subsequently disregarded the same, making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage
on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not give
the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the
beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles
390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of
the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed
valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the
party assailing the second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years45 when Bailon sought the
declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of
remarriage.46
N D
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second
marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage
had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended
when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime
or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the
first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a
case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence
of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of
the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such
fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code
does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration
of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court
action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not
terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former
spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or
she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration
but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid
marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable or
voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for annulment.52(Underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of
the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven
consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished
as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring
that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must
be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of
the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
N D
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either,
in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death
of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to
the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009
ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdez’s petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to the
spouses’ only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was
unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their
child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents’ home in Bancay
1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay
1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that
effect.1 That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn’t hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts
or even if he was alive or not.2
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.3 Subsequently, however,
Virgilio’s application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied
because petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was subsisting.4 Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before
the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision5 on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that
Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It said
that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent
and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract
a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioner’s own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual
agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioner’s daughter testified that her mother prevented her from looking for
her father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been
only 61 years old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and
spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioner’s testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no
evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the
Family Code since petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took
effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the
stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where
Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not
expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights
petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.7
N D
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,8 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the Court set aside the
assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement
of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner
could not be expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to
Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already
acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under
the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofio’s death, the OSG posits, could not be affected by the
obligations created under the Family Code.9
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code.10 Title XIV
of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of
the Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights.11
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that we are denying the
Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a
decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the
controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.12
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove a "well-
founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20,
1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
N D
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years.
If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.13
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of
the settlement of the absentee’s estate.
In re Szatraw14 is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national in 1937. They lived
together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends,
left the conjugal abode with their child and never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her
husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen
there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since
the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her child,
she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed
property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner.
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead
after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may
arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and
submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption
of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no
right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a
prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v.
Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but
merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is
any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted
because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But
this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court
has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status
of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once
such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established,
by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a
party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few
rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively
dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
N D
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact
finally determined.1avvphi1 If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard
from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which
an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition
for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.15
In Lukban v. Republic,16 petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10,
1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after
that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile.
Believing her husband was already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a
petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal
impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic17 are similar
to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gue’s husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai,
China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as
to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for
a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's
husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law.18
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law19and
no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the
seventh year of absence,20 Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to
marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner
could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time
of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family
Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will,
ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a
situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death can be
granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that
petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said
marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul
the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead
has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial
court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September
17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an
apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year,
they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business.4chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a
domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work
abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two
months after and was never heard from again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon
City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and
friends, but no one gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer
avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo,
despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon
City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a
result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper
abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that
she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It
was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his
petition.24chanrobleslaw
N D
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a
sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when
the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-
founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance
if she did not disappear in the first place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the
declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a
sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive
death.34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it
cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to
terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to
Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate remedy.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become
final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic
fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or
could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a
parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made
false allegations in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12
years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general
circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's
petition to declare her presumptively dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were
false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General
N D
and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of
Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from
the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in
October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud,
and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated
on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and
conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-
founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a
second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead
spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the
subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to
the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by
reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage
or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or
judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent
marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance
(1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet
rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
N D
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises
that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed
valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing
the validity of the second marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage
in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second marriage
and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be
considered valid when the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive
death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are
generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to
declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of
another marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and
when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under
Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to
apply.59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage
does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law.
This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to
prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage."60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage
but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until
terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the
children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
N D
legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for
bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the
subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent
for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the
outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would
not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 210929 July 29, 2015

vs.
EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
Edna Orcelino-Villanueva (Edna) was a domestic helper based in Singapore. In 1993, she came home immediately after
she heard news from her children that her husband, Romeo L. Villanueva (Romeo), left their conjugal dwelling. She
came home, leaving her work, for the purpose of looking for her husband and taking care of her children. She had
limited resources for her search.
For 15 or 16 years, she endured the absence of her husband. Within those long years, whether in good times or bad,
she never heard from him. He did not discharge any of his duties as husband.
In ruling against her and concluding that she did not search hard enough for Romeo, the majority fails to appreciate
several crucial facts:
First, Edna turned away from her livelihood, her modest means of subsistence, just to search for Romeo.
Second, Edna did not only embark on a token search. She did not limit herself to her parents-in-law and to common
friends in Iligan City, the . place where she and Romeo were married. Edna went all the way to Romeo's birthplace,
which was Escalante, Negros Oriental. There, she inquired from Romeo's relatives as to his whereabouts.
Third, 15 or 16 years had passed since Edna was told that Romeo had gone missing when she filed her Petition to
declare Romeo presumptively dead. If Edna merely intended to use a petition for declaration of presumptive death as
a convenient means for circumventing laws that protect the institution of marriage, it is astounding that she would
await the inconvenience of 15 or 16 years.
Edna established a well-founded belief that her husband, Romeo, is already dead.
I vote to sustain the assailed October 18, 2013 Decision1 and January 8, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 03768-MIN, affirming the October 8, 2009 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon, declaring Romeo presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
I reiterate the position I articulated in my dissent to Republic of the Philippines v. Cantor.4 I maintain that a strict
standard should not be used in evaluating the efforts made by a spouse to ascertain the status and whereabouts of an
absent spouse. The marital obligations provided for by the Family Code require the continuing presence of each
spouse. A spouse is well to suppose that this shall be resolutely fulfilled by the other spouse. Failure to do so for the
period established by law gives rise to the presumption that the absent spouse is dead, thereby enabling the spouse
present to remarry.
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
N D
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
Article 41’s requirement of a "well-grounded belief" calls for an inquiry into a spouse’s state of mind.5 Otherwise
abstract, one’s state of mind can only be ascertained through overt acts. Article 41 requires this belief to be "well-
grounded." It therefore requires nothing more than for a spouse to have a "reasonable basis for holding to such
belief."6 Article 41 relies on a basic and plain test: rationality.7
What is rational in each case depends on context. Rationality is not determined by the blanket imposition of pre-
conceived standards. Rather, it is better determined by an appreciation of a person’s unique circumstances.8
Moreover, all that Article 41 calls to sustain is a presumption. By definition, there is no need for absolute certainty. A
presumption is, by nature, favorable to a party and dispenses with the burden of proving. Consequently, neither is
there a need for conduct that establishes such a high degree of cognizance that what is established is proof, and no
longer a presumption:
In declaring a person presumptively dead, a court is called upon to sustain a presumption, it is not called upon to
conclude on verity or to establish actuality. In so doing, a court infers despite an acknowledged uncertainty. Thus, to
insist on such demanding and extracting evidence to "show enough proof of a well-founded belief", is to insist on an
inordinate and intemperate standard.9
It is improper for the majority to insist upon the same "strict standard approach"10 that was relied on in Cantor and
conclude that Edna’s efforts "were not diligent and serious enough."11 The majority fails to appreciate several crucial
facts in this case that define the limits of her situation.
Edna’s lack of resources appears in the records. She only had the ability to present herself as witness.
Concededly, Edna could have engaged in other efforts—asking for the help of police officers, filing a formal missing-
person report, announcing Romeo’s absence in radio or television programs—as would show how painstakingly she
endeavored to search for Romeo. Insisting on Edna to have also made these efforts, however, is to insist that she act
in an ideal manner. It takes her away from her own reality and requires her to fulfill pre-conceived notions of what
satisfies notice. It fails to appreciate the merit of the lengths she actually went through to search for Romeo.
Unless Edna had the ability to gain access to radio or television programs with nationwide coverage or ensure that her
notices were posted in all precincts, then requiring this type of search would have been futile and economically
wasteful. If we are to lend truth to the concept of social justice, we have to make judgments based on her context. To
reiterate, she is one of the millions who had to go abroad to earn a more prosperous life for herself and her children.
She had to cut short her employment to come home and make an honest search for her husband. To require her to
squander more time and money to reach media and the police would have been economically expensive for her. The
law should be interpreted in the context of reality—and ours is different from Edna’s.
Edna was an abandoned wife whose husband was missing for 15 or 16 years. Her search for Romeo began more than
two decades ago in a province in Mindanao, far removed from this nation’s capital. She was an overseas Filipino
worker, a domestic helper, who was compelled to return to the Philippines to tend to a missing husband. Twenty-two
years ago, when she embarked on her search, she could not have been aided by the convenience of ready access to
communication networks. To go to her husband’s birthplace and inquire from his relatives, she could not have merely
boarded an hour-long flight; she must have endured hours, even days at sea. It is in light of these human realities that
Edna’s efforts must be appreciated.
This court must realize that insisting upon an ideal will never yield satisfactory results. A stringent evaluation of a
party’s efforts made out of context will always reveal means through which a spouse could have ‘done more’ or walked
the proverbial extra mile to ascertain his or her spouse’s whereabouts. A reason could always be conceived for
concluding that a spouse did not try ‘hard enough.’
N D
So, too, insisting on Edna’s perceived shortcomings unjustly puts the blame on her and undermines the shortcoming
that Romeo himself committed. All marital obligations recognized in the Family Code are predicated upon each
spouse’s presence. The primordial marital obligation is "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support."12 As I explained in my dissent in Cantor:
The opinions of a recognized authority in civil law, Arturo M. Tolentino, are particularly enlightening:
Meaning of "Absent" Spouse.– The provisions of this article are of American origin, and must be construed in the light
of American jurisprudence. An identical provision (except for the period) exists in the California civil code (section 61);
California jurisprudence should, therefore, prove enlightening. It has been held in that jurisdiction that, as respects
the validity of a husband’s subsequent marriage, a presumption as to the death of his first wife cannot be predicated
upon an absence resulting from his leaving or deserting her, as it is his duty to keep her advised as to his whereabouts.
The spouse who has been left or deserted is the one who is considered as the ‘spouse present’; such spouse is not
required to ascertain the whereabouts of the deserting spouse, and after the required number of years of absence of
the latter, the former may validly remarry.
Precisely, it is a deserting spouse’s failure to comply with what is reasonably expected of him/her and to fulfil the
responsibilities that are all but normal to a spouse which makes reasonable (i.e., well-grounded) the belief that should
he/she fail to manifest his/her presence within a statutorily determined reasonable period, he/she must have been
deceased. The law is of the confidence that spouses will in fact "live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support" such that it is not the business of the law to assume any other circumstance than
that a spouse is deceased in case he/she becomes absent.13
It is Romeo who has been absent. In so doing, he is rightly considered to be no longer in a position to perform his
marital obligations to Edna. Having been absent for the statutorily prescribed period despite his legal obligations as a
married spouse, Romeo should be rightly considered presumptively dead.
The majority burdened itself with ensuring that petitions for declaration of presumptive death are not used as
procedural shortcuts that undermine the institution of marriage. While this is a valid concern, the majority goes to
unnecessary lengths to discharge this burden. Article 41 of the Family Code concedes that there is a degree of risk in
presuming a spouse to be dead, as the absent spouse may, in fact, be alive and well. Thus, Article 41 provides that
declarations of presumptive death are "without prejudice to the reappearance of the absent spouse." The state is thus
not bereft of remedies.
Consistent with this, Article 42 of the Family Code provides for the automatic termination of the subsequent marriage
entered into by the present spouse should the absent spouse reappear: Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to
in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab nitio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence
of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of
the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such
fact is disputed. Moreover, in Santos v. Santos,14 we recognized that in cases where a declaration of presumptive death
was fraudulently obtained, the subsequent marriage shall not only be terminated, but all other effects of the
declaration nullified by a successful petition for annulment of judgment:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the
judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has
never been absent.
....
N D
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not
suffice.15
The majority is gripped with the apprehension that a petition for declaration of presumptive death may be availed of
as a dangerous expedient. Nothing, in this case, sustains fear. A misplaced anxiety is all that there is. As things stand,
Edna has shown facts that warrant a declaration that Romeo is presumptively dead. Proceeding from these merits,
this Petition must be denied.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03768-MIN,
affirming the October 8, 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, declaring
Romeo L. Villanueva presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, must be affirmed.
N D
G.R. No. 199194

vs.
JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge a trial court's
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 ofThe Family Code of the Philippines1 (Family Code).2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3assails the October 24, 2011 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP
No. 04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
Factual Antecedents
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S.7 Sareñogon (Netchie).8
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise
directed the publication of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and
Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition.9 Trial then followed.10
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991.11 They later became sweethearts and on
August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall.12 However, they lived together as husband and
wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper.13 For
three months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie.14 He likewise had no idea about her
whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left
Clarin, Misamis Occidental.16 He returned home after his contract expired.17 He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives
and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was.18 Because of these, he had to presume
that his wife Netchie was already dead.19 He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.20
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo Sande.21These
two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their
leaving the Philippines for separate destinations abroad.22 These two added that they had no information regarding
Netchie’s location.23
In its Decision24 dated January 31, 2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08, the RTC held that Jose had established by
preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code.25 The RTC
found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was
indeed already dead.26 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent presumptively dead
for purposes of remarriage of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.27
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

N D
On April 19, 2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC
to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari28 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no error at all in the RTC’s judgment
granting Jose’s Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in effect
that the Republic’s appeal sought to correct or review the RTC’s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not
translate into excess or lack of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion.30 The CA noted that the RTC
properly caused the publication of the Order setting the case for initial hearing.31 The CA essentially ruled that, "[a]
writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other
words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal."32 The CA then disposed of
the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.33
Issues
The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION BECAUSE:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC’S
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE
BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR DECISIONS ARE
NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.
II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A
"WELLFOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT’S ABSENT WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35
Petitioner’s Arguments
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy to
challenge an RTC’s immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive death.36
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or
generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead.37 It maintains that even as Jose avowedly averred that
he exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the relevant government
agencies like the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs,
the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration.38 It likewise points out that Jose did not present any disinterested person to corroborate his
allegations that the latter was indeed missing and could not be found.39 It also contends that Jose did not advert to
circumstances, events, occasions, or situations that would prove that he did in fact make a comprehensive search for
Netchie.40 The Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the propensity of some
erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the Family Code for the purpose of terminating their marriage.41
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie declared
presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of Article 41 of the Family Code.42
N D
Respondent’s Arguments
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic’s Petition because the latter’s petition is erected upon the
ground that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on record, or assigned to the evidence its due
worth, import or significance; and that such a ground does not avail in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose also contends that the Republic should have instead filed a motion for
reconsideration44 of the RTC’s Decision of January 31, 2011, reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in law. Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
granting his petition because it even dutifully complied with the publication requirement.45 He moreover argues that
to sustain the present petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads into judicial
territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial court’s factual findings are entitled to great weight and respect as these
were arrived after due deliberation.47
This Court’s Ruling
This Court finds the Republic’s petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question the RTC’s Decision
in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that the RTC’s Decision on a Petition for declaration of
presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no
jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment.49 Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision was to
institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for review under Rule 45.50
We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango:51
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings
under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the
rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in
this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same
title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
N D
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine
of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with
the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. x x x52 (Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied)
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon,
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court."53
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of appeal
under Rule 42 with the CA to question the RTC’s Decision declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda.55
Above all, this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal clear that the OSG properly availed of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the RTC’s Order therein declaring Jerry Cantor as presumptively dead.1âwphi1
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTC’s Decision.
The "well-founded belief" requisite

under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had
indeed been made to ascertain whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead
We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted Jose’s Petition.
Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already
dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

N D
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.58
(Underscoring supplied)
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended discussion), the
holding is that the –
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive,
failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil
Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon
the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief"
which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is
already dead.
xxxx
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate
the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).59 (Emphasis omitted;
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-founded belief" that Netchie was already dead upon the following
grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while he was still out of the country, but did not reach them as
they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he was not able to obtain
any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie’s relatives and friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated by
Jose’s older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together as
husband and wife only for one month and that after this, there had been no information as to Netchie’s whereabouts.
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that the present spouse (Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor)
merely conducted a "passive search" because she simply made unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from
neighbors and friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required
by law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made
inquiries especially the absent spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing
spouse’s purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the present spouse’s evidence
might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was
indeed dead.61 The rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous requirement has been marked out thus:
x x x [T]he Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied
the "strict standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural
shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. x x x
N D
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s policy to protect
and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation and since it is the state’s
policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. x x x
x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard required in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this
Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of
the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the
strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code." (Citations omitted)62
Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied with
the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief" standard. If anything, Jose’s
pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as
to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw
or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the
particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific
persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
04158-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent’s Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is
accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NILDA B. TAMPUS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 17, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated
September 2, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04588, which affirmed the Decision4 dated
July 29, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 54 (RTC) declaring respondent's spouse, Dante L.
Del Mundo, as presumptively dead.
The Facts
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L. Del Mundo (Dante) on November 29, 1975 in Cordova,
Cebu. The marriage ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B. Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu.5 Three days
thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent,
and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children.6
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante,. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. 7 Thus,
on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition8 to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of
remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she
firmly believes that he is already dead.9
Due to the absence of any oppositor, Nilda was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. She testified on the
allegations in her petition, affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and
neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not aware of his whereabouts. She averred that she intends to remarry and
move on with her life.10
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision11 dated July 29, 2009, the RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as presumptively dead for all
legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect of his reappearance. It found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling
sometime in 1975 and from then on, Nilda never heard from him again despite diligent efforts to locate him. In this
light, she believes that he had passed away especially since his last assignment was a combat mission. Moreover, the
RTC found that the absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to the presumption of death.12
Dissatisfied, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
filed a petition for certiorari13 before the CA assailing the RTC Decision.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 17, 2013, the CA denied the OSG's petition and affirmed the RTC Decision declaring Dante
as presumptively dead. The CA gave credence to the RTC's findings that Nilda had exerted efforts to find her
husband by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and neighbors, who likewise had no knowledge of his whereabouts.
Further, the lapse of thirty-three (33) years, coupled with the fact that Dante had been sent on a combat mission to
Jolo, Sulu, gave rise to Nilda's well-founded belief that her husband is already dead.15
Moreover, the CA opined that if Dante were still alive after many years, it would have been easy for him to
communicate with Nilda, taking into consideration the fact that Dante was only 25 years old when he left and,
therefore, would have been still physically able to get in touch with his wife. However, because neither Nilda nor his
N D
own family has heard from him for several years, it can be reasonably concluded that Dante is already dead.16
The OSG's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 2, 2014; hence, this petition.
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision declaring
Dante as presumptively dead.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit.
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that
the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.20
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the
Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially
asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.21
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of
any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice.22 The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse
the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon
a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead.23
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his
parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find
him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have
called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did
not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that
Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have
inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto.
To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest
efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of
diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could have corroborated
her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons were not even named. In Republic v.
Nolasco,24 it was held that the present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent
spouse's whereabouts was found insufficient as the names of said friends were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.25cralawred
N D
Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to support her
allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as established in
this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively and diligently searching for her husband,
which the Court cannot accept as constituting a "well-founded belief that her husband is dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.26
In fine, having fallen short of the stringent standard and degree of due diligence required by jurisprudence to
support her claim of a "well-founded belief that her husband Dante is already dead, the instant petition must be
granted.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 17, 2013 and the Resolution dated
September 2, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04588 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petition of respondent Nilda B. Tampus to have her husband, Dante L. Del Mundo, declared presumptively dead
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 210580

vs
LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
Nature of the Petition
Challenged before this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 131269 dated September 3, 2013 3 and December 6,
2013.4 The assailed Resolutions denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Likewise challenged is the Decision5 dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch
11, declaring Ludyson C. Catubag's (private respondent) spouse, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag (Shanaviv), as
presumptively dead.
The Antecedent Facts
Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each
other as husband and wife. Their union begot two (2) children named Mark Bryan A. Catubag and Rose Mae A. Catubag,
both of whom were born on May 18, 2000 and May 21, 2001, respectively.6
In 2001, in order to meet the needs of his family, private respondent took work overseas. Meanwhile, Shanaviv stayed
behind in the Philippines to tend to the needs of their children.7
On June 26, 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal, Cagayan. The marriage was solemnized by
Honorable Judge Tomas D. Lasam at the Office of the Municipal Judge, Rizal, Cagayan.8
Sometime in April 2006, private respondent and his family were able to acquire a housing unit located at Rio del
Grande Subdivision, Enrile Cagayan. Thereafter, private respondent returned overseas to continue his work. While
abroad, he maintained constant communication with his family.9
On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, private respondent was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house
and never returned. In the meantime, private respondent's relatives took care of the children. 10
Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of his children, private respondent took an emergency
vacation and flew back home. Private respondent looked for his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail. He then
proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and relatives, but they too could offer no
help. Private respondent travelled as far as Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and raised, but he still could not locate
her.11
Private respondent subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo Philippines, one of the more well-known radio
networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance. Moreover, private respondent searched
various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol, with no avail. 12
On May 4, 2012, after almost seven (7) years of waiting, private respondent filed with the RTC a petition to have his
wife declared presumptively dead. 13
N D
On May 23, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the Petition. The dispositive portion of the decision which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG is hereby adjudged PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD
only for the purpose that petitioner LUDYSON C. CATUBAG may contract a marriage subsequent to what he had with
SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG without prejudice to the reappearance of the latter.
SO ORDERED. 14
On August 5, 2013, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to
the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner's main contention is that
private respondent failed to establish a "well-founded belief' that his missing wife was already dead. 15
In its Resolution16 dated September 3, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition because no motion for reconsideration was
filed with the court a quo. The CA ruled that such defect was fatal and warranted the immediate dismissal of the
petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.17
On September 18, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its
Resolution 18 dated December 6, 2013. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Issues
The petitioner anchors its plea for the annulment of the assailed resolutions and the denial of private respondent's
petition to declare his wife presumptively dead on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT
PETITIONER DID NOT PREVIOUSLY FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR [CERTIORARI] ON THE GROUND
THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ATTACH THERETO COPIES OF ALL PERTINENT AND RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND
PLEADINGS.
III. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A WELLFOUNDED BELIEF THAT HIS WIFE IS PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.
IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE HIS INTENTION TO RE-MARRY. 19
In sum, the instant petition rests on the resolution of two issues: (1) whether or not petitioner's resort to a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the decision of the RTC declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper;
and (2) whether or not private respondent complied with the essential requisites of a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
Basic is the rule that the nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies available. Hence,
a party aggrieved by an action of a court must first correctly determine the nature of the order, resolution, or decision,
in order to properly assail it.20
N D
Since what is involved in the instant case is a petition for declaration of presumptive death, the relevant provisions of
law are Articles 41, 238, and 253 of the Family Code. These provisions explicitly provide that actions for presumptive
death are summary in nature. Article 41 provides:
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Article 238 in relation to Article 253, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW,
of the Family Code provides:
Article 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for
in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
xxxx
Article 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis Supplied)
Consequently, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal decisions in summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code because by express mandate of law, judgments rendered thereunder are immediately final and
executory.21 As explained by the Court in Republic of the Phils. vs. Bermudez-Lorino,22 citing Atty. Veloria vs. Comelec:23
[T]he right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by
express mandate of Article 24 7 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family
Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated
differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.24
Further, it is well settled in our laws and jurisprudence that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land. 25
While parties are precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal, in a petition for declaration
of presumptive death, they may challenge the decision of the court a quo through a petition for certiorari to question
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.26
In Republic vs. Sarenogon, Jr., 27 the Court outlined the legal remedies available in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death. If aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then filing with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 would be proper. Any subsequent decision by the CA may then be elevated to the
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. 28
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner's resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
challenge the RTC's Order declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper.
N D
Having determined the propriety of petitioner's mode of challenging the RTC's Order, the Court shall now proceed to
tackle the issue of whether or not private respondent has sufficiently complied with the essential requisites in a
petition for declaration of presumptive death.
Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code that
must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death to prosper: first, the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code.29 Second, the present spouse wishes to remarry.
Third, the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Fourth, the present spouse files for a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 30
In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse who has the burden of proving that all the
requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. In the instant case, since it is private respondent who asserts
the affirmative of the issue, then it is his duty to substantiate the same. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it and mere allegations will not suffice.31
Notably, the records reveal that private respondent has complied with the first, second, and fourth requisites. Thus,
what remains to be resolved is whether or not private respondent successfully discharged the burden of establishing
a well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
The Court in Cantor,32 pointed out that the term, "well-founded belief' has no exact definition under the law. In fact,
the Court notes that such belief depends on the circumstances of each particular case. As such, each petition must be
judged on a case-to-case basis. 33
This is not to say, however, that there is no guide in establishing the existence of a well-founded belief that an absent
spouse is already dead. In Republic vs. Orcelino-Villanueva,34 the Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided that such
belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Such diligence entails an active effort on the part
of the present spouse to locate the missing one. The mere absence of a spouse, devoid of any attempt by the present
spouse to locate the former, will not suffice. The Court expounded on the required diligence, to wit:
The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result
of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not
a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the
absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of
complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief' which can only be discharged upon a showing of
proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more
importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.35(Citations omitted)
Furthermore, jurisprudence is replete with cases which help determine whether belief of an absent spouses' death is
well-founded or not.1âwphi1 A perusal of the cases of Republic vs. Granada,36 Cantor,37 and Orcelino-
Villanueva38 reveal the circumstances which do not meet the Court's standards in establishing a "well-founded belief."
In Granada,39 the present spouse alleged that she exerted efforts in locating her absent spouse by inquiring from the
latter's relatives regarding his whereabouts. The Court ruled against the present spouse and stated that the mere act
of inquiring from relatives falls short of the diligence required by law. It pointed out that the present spouse did not
report to the police nor seek the aid of mass media. Even worse, the present spouse did not even bother to present
any of the absent spouses' relatives to corroborate her allegations.40
Similarly in Cantor,41 the present spouse alleged that she exerted "earnest efforts" in attempting to locate her missing
husband. She claimed that she made inquiries with their relatives, neighbors, and friends as to his whereabouts. She
even stated that she would take the time to look through the patient's directory whenever she would visit a hospital.42
N D
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled otherwise. It held that the present spouse engaged in a
mere "passive-search" Applying the "stringent-standards" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence, the Court
pointed out four acts of the present spouse which contradict the claim of a diligent and active search, 43 to wit:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the records that her hospital
visits and her consequent checking of the patients' directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for
him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.
While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed,
under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek
the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts
to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in
Nolasco, the present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse's whereabouts
is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent's claim that she conducted a diligent
search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims
that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband's whereabouts.44 (Citations omitted)
The foregoing conduct of the present spouse led the Court to conclude that her efforts in searching for her absent
spouse were insincere. Ultimately, the Courts considered these attempts insufficient to comply with the requirement
of conducting a reasonable, diligent, and active search.45
In Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court likewise ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that she had a well-founded
belief that her absent spouse was already dead. In said case, the present spouse began her "search" by returning home
from her work overseas to look for her missing husband. She then inquired from her in-laws and common friends as
to his whereabouts. The present spouse even went as far as Negros Oriental, where the absent spouse was born.
Additionally, the present spouse claimed that fifteen (15) years have already lapsed since her husband's
disappearance.46
In that case, the Court held that the factual circumstances were very similar to the two aforementioned cases. It further
held that it was erroneous for the lower courts to grant the petition for declaration of presumptive death. The Court
explained why the present spouse's allegations should not have been given credence, to wit:
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to
satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband's death.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without
any corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about the
whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from whom she learned the disappearance of her
husband. In fact, she was the lone witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give credence to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her
husband. 47 (Citations omitted)
Having laid out the foregoing jurisprudential guidelines in determining the existence of a "well-founded belief," the
Court now shifts focus to the specific circumstances surrounding the current case. In the case at bar, private
respondent first took a leave of absence from his work in the United Arab Emirates and returned to the Philippines to
search for Shanaviv. He then proceeded to inquire about his wife's whereabouts from their friends and relatives in
Cagayan and Bicol. Next, private respondent aired over Bombo Radyo Philippines, a known radio station, regarding
N D
the fact of disappearance of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various hospitals and funeral parlors in
Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities.48
Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court in Cantor,49 Granada,50 and Orcelino-Villanueva,51 the Court
finds that private respondent's efforts falls short of the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following
reasons:
First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife's whereabouts from both friends and relatives.
Further, he claims to have carried out such inquiries in the place where they lived and in the place where his wife was
born and raised. However, private respondent failed to present any of these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate
these "inquiries." Moreover, no explanation for such omission was given. As held in the previous cases, failure to
present any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to belie a claim of a diligent search.
Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned government agencies, namely, the local police
authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In Cantor, the Court reasoned that while a finding of well-
founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would still be prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid
of the authorities in searching for the missing spouse. Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the
present spouse cannot be said to have actively and diligently searched for the absentee spouse. 52
Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private respondent bases his "well-founded belief' on
bare assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the present spouse's bare assertions,
uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that
the absentee spouse is dead.
Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's efforts in searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv,
are merely passive. Private respondent could have easily convinced the Court otherwise by providing evidence which
corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or justification was given for these glaring omissions. Again, he
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by some other means than mere allegations.
Stripped of private respondent's mere allegations, only the act of broadcasting his wife's alleged disappearance
through a known radio station was corroborated.53 This act comes nowhere close to establishing a well-founded belief
that Shanaviv has already passed away. At most, it just reaffirms the unfortunate theory that she abandoned the
family.
To accept private respondent's bare allegations would be to apply a liberal approach in complying with the requisite
of establishing a well-founded belief that the missing spouse is dead. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),54the
Court cautioned against such a liberal approach. It opined that to do so would allow easy circumvention and
undermining of the Family Code. The Court stated:
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing
fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their
marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for
relief because of the x x x summary nature of its proceedings.
Stated otherwise, spouses may easily circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage by simply agreeing that one of
them leave the conjugal abode and never return again. Thus, there is a need for courts to exercise prudence in
evaluating petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse. A lenient approach in applying the
standards of diligence required in establishing a "well-founded belief' would defeat the State's policy in protecting and
strengthening the institution of marriage.55
On this basis, it is clear that private respondent failed to fulfill the requisite of establishing a well-founded belief that
the absentee spouse is dead. Thus, the RTC should have denied private respondent's petition for declaration of
presumptive death.
N D
In fine, having determined the propriety of petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari and private respondent's
failure to meet the stringent standard and degree of due diligence required by jurisprudence to support his claim of a
"well-founded belief' that his wife, Shanaviv, is already dead, it is proper for the Court to grant the petition.
Consequently, the other issues raised by the petitioner need not be discussed further.
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the Resolutions dated September 3, 2013 and December 6, 2013 rendered by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the petition of private
respondent Ludyson C. Catubag to have his wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag, declared presumptively dead is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 230751
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner

vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution3 dated March 20, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the petition
read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106 Molave street, Zone B.
San Miguel Tarlac City;
2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Araya, Pampanga since
August 24, 1967[;]
3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone
B. San Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to
again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already
declared missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her] beloved husband
[Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of
him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after more than
three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially with a
meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully
belong to her in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least declaration of
presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as
amended.
N D
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the
petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)_.
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the Philippines
(Republic).5
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:7
WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively
dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as
former military officer.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.8
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and setting aside
the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 15, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition
is DISMISSED.
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the Family Code (FC).
Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the presumption of death
established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by the RTC. The
RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person
is dead-which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an
independent action or proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized
suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.
RTC Erred I Declaring the

Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of
N D
Presumptive Death is Not Based on

Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's petition by declaring
Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC gave the impression that the petition for
the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is
wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted
the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for
the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death Wilfredo as a
prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated
that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended.10
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the
Civil Code11 as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of
for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading
and grossly improper.The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the
Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
N D
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under
the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is objectionable.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil
Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole
objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no
court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai
Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death13 is merely one of the evidence that-
while may be invoked in any action or proceeding-cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or
proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume that a person had
been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a
case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be
invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right ti be enforced
nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of particular fact, for the petition does not pray for the
declaration that the petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband os dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would be a prima
faciepresumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent
court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and
once such controversy is decided by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree
upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no
collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration
that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban v. Republic14 and Gue v.
Republic15 in disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and,
implicity, also those based on the Civil based on Article 391 of the Civil Code).
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the considerations why a
petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or a tribunal
to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
N D
2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to
declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents
no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to be enforces, no
wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code,
in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the same only confirms tha existence of
a prima facie or disputable presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to
be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.
4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would
be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already established by law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition that-like the one
filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition
for the declaration of presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave
abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.
II
Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is minded to make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception that a court
declaration is required in order to establish a person is presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits
as a military serviceman under pertinent laws.18 This misconception is what moved petitioner to file her misguided
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary
difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affair
Office (PVAO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may have been peddles
by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring
claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of presumptive death before processing the death
before processing the death benefits of missing serviceman.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines-culled from
relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims
of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to
first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can
make their own determination, on the basis of the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of
death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of
law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are
established.19 Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive
death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.20
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate
office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"21 which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for
such number of years and or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
N D
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and determine
their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in
order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the
claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.
4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the
presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an
appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43
of the Rules of the Court.1avvphi1 And finally, shold such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal
by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the foregoing
guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in the future.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March 20,
2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a
court of law that a person is presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul
the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead
has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial
court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September
17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an
apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year,
they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business.4chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a
domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work
abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two
months after and was never heard from again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon
City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and
friends, but no one gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer
avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo,
despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon
City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a
result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper
abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that
she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It
was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his
petition.24chanrobleslaw
N D
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a
sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when
the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-
founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance
if she did not disappear in the first place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the
declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a
sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive
death.34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it
cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to
terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to
Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate remedy.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become
final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic
fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or
could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a
parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made
false allegations in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12
years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general
circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's
petition to declare her presumptively dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were
false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General
N D
and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of
Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from
the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in
October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud,
and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated
on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and
conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-
founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a
second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead
spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the
subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to
the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by
reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage
or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or
judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent
marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance
(1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet
rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
N D
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises
that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed
valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing
the validity of the second marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage
in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second marriage
and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be
considered valid when the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive
death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are
generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to
declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of
another marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and
when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under
Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to
apply.59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage
does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law.
This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to
prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage."60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage
but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until
terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the
children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
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legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for
bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the
subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent
for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the
outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would
not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
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G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for
the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not
get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned
that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage;
that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born
prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but
reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned
errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
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The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and
(b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case,
are generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent which
supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after
a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same
marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this
annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his
defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already
pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided
ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case
disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x
Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet
secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore,
understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent
to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from
the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of
the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of
the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him
in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time,
it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper
way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon
appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor
the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was
pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the
appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst.
The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also
conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also
narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was
consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to undermining the
credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year
off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
N D
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no
controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the cross-
examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching
the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and
throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of
the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the
date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his argument
that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she
could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-
week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered
prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the
light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to
attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the
appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the
appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the
seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by
the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under
duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship
of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm
by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the temerity
to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a
hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the
absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate
the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result
of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity,
fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the
appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that
attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant
case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing
in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the
Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as
the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent
detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious
N D
anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent
should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for
moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No
other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal
to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is
clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he
is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon,
although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless,
before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the
plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for
the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be
awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.12 In the instant case, private respondent
failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with
private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true
intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for
annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254. The
CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989
at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2)
Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are
both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on
the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as
LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as
medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other
people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture
of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a
harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on
their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast
to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence
on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when
she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet
telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.9 She also found several pornographic homosexual
materials in his possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips.
The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took
her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia
testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-
time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded
that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the
marriage and appeared to be incurable.
N D
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however,
maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came
as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began when
he refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist
from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King
Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family
have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only
imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and
affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is
in her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of
her very jealous and possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to
avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual
preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his
masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at
Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious
relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband
and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He
denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,22 he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to
Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness.
However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the law null
and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share
thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right
afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry
of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
N D
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the registration of the
said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the
complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more
than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual
marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract
exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage,
the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or
Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man
cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will
surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus
jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment
of judgment with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no
jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in
toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil
Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment
of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court. But
the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal.
An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an
ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof.
"Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers
the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
N D
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in the Court's
exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.30This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it
carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available
or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified
the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should
not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally
construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are
strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of
time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.35 It has,
in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition
before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling
his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar
situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service
Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed
to have already served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered
reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
N D
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines
and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is
filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of
appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from
judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The
Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor
procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals
should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties
concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed
in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate
substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.41(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a
petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this
Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this
wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict
application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and
treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or
non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a
statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-
litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints
of technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the
case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His
counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal,
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she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for
annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of
Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain
exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so
require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of
petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's
grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by
a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However,
where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's
being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may
be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners
be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's
mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless
inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients,
of their day in court.49(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of
justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of
marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's
action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson
Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes
a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation
of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought
back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied
upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or
beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the
performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What
Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant
among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable
of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
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But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the
ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although
vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that
defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life
scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close
friends doubtedhis true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003).
After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not
do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to
sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend
to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more
premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced
to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff,
but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his
real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy
and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in
the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes
or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in
the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the
extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff
kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered
underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The
accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple
reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the
question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of
their children and family as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's
sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and
interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to
annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid
such fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent
of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent
to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation
of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list
of circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and
Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal
separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment," while
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in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed
after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested
that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The
Committee approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid
ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of
fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual
identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make the
marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife,
and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental
suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly
different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy
heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a
ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which
produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed
to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of
his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant
case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely
and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled
him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent
to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense,
or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was
pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the
appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst.
The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue
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influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's
homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In
a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the
same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld
valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They
remain the joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the trial
court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which
dismissed the petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the
petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They
had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On
January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40,
against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea
for support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the petitioner
was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together
with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements.
All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the
eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6
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The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent
vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The petitioner,
with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that the
petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in
his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner
at the address stated in the petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service
on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons
and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6,
1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was received by the herein
defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons. Service
was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.

Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to
Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said
date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no
objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified
in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition
and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order
of the court on July 16, 1996.12
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the
municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-
662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed
gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72
CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the
respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the
petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a
favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused the service
of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,
a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III
failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial
court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the
extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial
court’s finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of
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the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner
and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;
d. ₱100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and specific averment by
petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the present petition is
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic
fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new
trial, or petition for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an amended petition
in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new
trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no longer
available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition is the
only available remedy to her.16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondent’s marriage was
null and void for the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there
was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:
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1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in not admitting
the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or
final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of
jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise,
the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment
through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the
remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of her own.
The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in
the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto.
Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted
an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and
petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she received
the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s amended petition did not cure the fatal defect
in her original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial,
appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the
amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations
of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not
served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of
the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner,
notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or
appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject
of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration
of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed
any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
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In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments
therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the
petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed
that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to
give her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima
facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person
of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed
against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the
petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against
him unless he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the
summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be effected by
substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to find him and
personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This statement should be
made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted
service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a method
extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc.
No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 the petitioner’s son. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff
on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable
time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio
Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, where the
petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been
residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and the complaint and was
made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said summons and
complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing
on the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal
partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my father’s lot), my father came
to see me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow
me to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of marriage
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filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the
complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the
amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court. However,
we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records. The records show that for
the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein
to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection
to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of
the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section
3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State
in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State:
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,40regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the
Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not
mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the
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court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.43Whether or not a
marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only
one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her
marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13,
2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-
G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this
Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No.
88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch
96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines.
They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They
then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in courier
service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:
PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00
located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. ₱400,000.00
located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares ₱490,000.00
located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
3
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00
located at Sabang Baler, Aurora
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria ₱750,000.00
Aurora, Aurora
USA
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly
City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings $3,000
Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00
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Bank of America Checking Account $8,000

Bank of America Cash Deposit
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and
mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for
the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million. According
to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora
province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s
father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00,
which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall
renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.5 David
was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was
duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all
the couple’s properties in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the same.
She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease
and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in
favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties
be charged against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity which
can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be
included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A.
Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion sales
proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property
of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

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6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their
conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered
to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United States of America
remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce
decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving
the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled
and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph are hereby
given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their
share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the
first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with respondent
David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the said properties. Their share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them
annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall give
them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive legitimes, while
petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in
her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as
the needs of the children require and his financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses
are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two children.
The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall be deposited
with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which
shall only be made by them or by their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision,
with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within
the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them
individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and personalstatus are
those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their
marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’
marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation
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of the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the
children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute community of
property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant
to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual
presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties
did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the
provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot
beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove
abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for considering that she
already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the
Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that
under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint
Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s presumptive legitime, the appellate
court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision dated December 8,
2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby divided
equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her
minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted
to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the amount
of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the
Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler,
Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of
thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the
custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-
in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of
₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:

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Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California Judgment which
awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in
evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount
to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the
California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a
petition for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the
parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with
our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by:
(1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official
publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or
if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on certification where we held that
"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from
the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
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Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime
of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties
are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An
exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances
provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article
135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations
to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power;
and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guiltyor absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation
of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse
is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria
Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the
respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them worsened.
The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a
petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing
of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s
decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of
properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year
and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed
that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his
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own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who
represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.20Third and
more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute
community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis
supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the
following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency
of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in
accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall
be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No.
(2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case
to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s
Decision with respect to liquidation.
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We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties
of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine
properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes,
which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.1âwphi1 While both
claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not
entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the
absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the
U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor
cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required
under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred
to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum,
Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the respective
amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David
and Leticia should each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., and ELVIRA
GOZON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED GOZON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review,1 assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision2 and the 30 September
2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447.
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357.4 The property is situated in
Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a petition for legal separation
against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT
No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into
an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement) involving the property for the price of ₱18 million. Among the stipulations
in the Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredo’s exclusive
property and to annotate the Agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to
exclude the property from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis pendens pertaining
to the said case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to
comply with these stipulations. After paying the ₱5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price,
Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement was annotated on
TCT No. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision6 in the legal separation case, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation between petitioner and respondent.
Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon is entitled to live separately from respondent Alfredo Gozon without
dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED and
LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is
awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.
Furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their child Winifred R. Gozon as her needs arises.
SO ORDERED.7
As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.
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On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon
(Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-105088 in the
name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney9 executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the
property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for ₱18 million.10 IDRI paid Alfredo ₱18 million, representing full
payment for the property.11 Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued
TCT No. M-1097612 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order.
On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision,13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
1.1 The same is hereby made permanent by:
1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. and
Gil Tabije, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in their behalf from any attempt
of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of further alienating or disposing of the
subject property;
1.1.2. Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. from entering and fencing the
property;
1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. to
respect plaintiff’s possession of the property.
02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and defendant Alfredo Gozon is
hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-
half share in the conjugal property subject of this case.
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between defendants Alfredo Gozon and
Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant Winifred Gozon, through
defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby nullified and voided.
05. Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby ordered to deliver its Transfer Certificate of Title No.
M-10976 to the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
06. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel Certificate of Title Nos. 10508
"in the name of Winifred Gozon" and M-10976 "in the name of Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.," and to restore
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5357 "in the name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Robles" with the
Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993 fully annotated therein is hereby ordered.
07. Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of plaintiff over his
one-half undivided share in the subject property and to comply with all the requirements for registering such
deed.
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08. Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling price of her undivided
one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply with all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of this DECISION.
09. Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the balance of Four Million Pesos
(₱4,000,000.00) in his one-half undivided share in the property to be set off by the award of damages in
plaintiff’s favor.
10. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon the price they had agreed upon for
the sale of her one-half undivided share in the subject property.
11. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly
and severally, the following:
11.1 Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) as actual and compensatory damages;
11.2 One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
11.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
11.4 Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and
11.5 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as litigation expenses.
11.6 The above awards are subject to set off of plaintiff’s obligation in paragraph 9 hereof.
12. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.
jointly and severally the following:
12.1 Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000.00) which constitute the amount the former received from
the latter pursuant to their Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, with legal interest
therefrom;
12.2 One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
12.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
12.4 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as attorney’s fees.
13. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTC’s decision with modification. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 7 July 2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 3, 2001 of the RTC, Branch 74, Malabon is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
1. The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is declared null and
void for the following reasons:
a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee Elvira Gozon;
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b) Defendant Alfredo Gozon’s one-half (½) undivided share has been forfeited in favor of his daughter,
defendant Winifred Gozon, by virtue of the decision in the legal separation case rendered by the RTC,
Branch 16, Cavite;
2. Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant Siochi the amount of ₱5 Million which
the latter paid as earnest money in consideration for the sale of the subject land;
3. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant
Siochi jointly and severally, the following:
a) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
d) ₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
e) The awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby ordered deleted for lack of basis.
4. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay defendant-appellant IDRI jointly
and severally the following:
a) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of defendant Alfredo Gozon was awarded, is hereby
given the option whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject land.
The rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
SO ORDERED.15
Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario alleges that the Agreement
should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the
offer is withdrawn. Since Elvira’s conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct
Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of ₱9 million to Elvira.
On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Thus, IDRI prays that the Court should
uphold the validity of IDRI’s TCT No. M-10976 over the property.
We find the petitions without merit.
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
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In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in
fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court.
Without such consent or authority, the sale is void.16 The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the
entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.17Even
if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent
to the sale is still required by law for its validity.18 The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the
written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a
continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the
property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was
already withdrawn.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the
property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal
separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending
spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to Winifred.
The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the following provisions of the Family Code:
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be
severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of
Article 213 of this Code; and
The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of
law.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
effects:
xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(Emphasis supplied)
N D
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated
and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is
only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides
that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63,
No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time
of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in
favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the
conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by
the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel
a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property. The representative of
IDRI testified that he knew about the existence of the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 5357 and the legal separation
case filed before the Cavite RTC. Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision declaring the property
as conjugal.
Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was
highly irregular. Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,19 the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a)
upon order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration
of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of Alfredo.
There was no court order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira, the party who caused the
registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its cancellation.
Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo’s donation of
the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 12520 of the Family Code, a conjugal property
cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good
faith.1avvphi1
Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC for the reimbursement of the ₱18 million
paid by IDRI for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’
decision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozon’s one-half undivided share in favor of
Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to dispose of her undivided share
in the property; and
(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally
the Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the
property, with legal interest computed from the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
N D
G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,

vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA
QUIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where children are born and
molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened
when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their children.
Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating
to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner
seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order2 dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan
City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a
result of the decree of legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or
alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein
petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the
dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation
of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be
severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all
surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties,
namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
N D
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the
children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [₱]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses
of [₱]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b)
of the Rule on Legal Separation.6
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution7 which the trial court granted in its Order dated
December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the
immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED."8
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution9 which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums
stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine
Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we
command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner required
by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the judgment has been satisfied
in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.10
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the amount of ₱46,870.00,
representing the following payments:
(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's fees; and
(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation expenses.11
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the
RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order13 dated August 31, 2006, which held that
the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts."14 The Order further held that after determining the remainder of
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the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any
right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. 15 The
dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after
deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to
him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 on September 8, 2006.
Consequently, the RTC issued another Order18 dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the
petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject
of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article
102 of the Family Code.20
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,21 praying for the correction and reversal
of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,22 the trial court had changed its ruling again
and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside
to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND
WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING
THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977?
CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE
NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING
VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?23
Our Ruling
N D
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the
respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when
the Motion for Clarification was filed.24 Thus, we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was
filed on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension
of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration."26
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said,
"The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution."27 In other
words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's
decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-
day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and
executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for
reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an
order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the
trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July
7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the "net profits earned."
From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005.
For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at
the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s decision has become final and executory. A
judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected
within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to
review a case or modify a judgment that became final.28
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that
it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for
clarification. He said that "a void judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any
right nor any obligation."29 But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes
void?
"A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or over the parties or both."30 In other words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a
case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non
judice.31
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The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction
over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family
Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to
marital status and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together.32 The Rule on Legal
Separation33 provides that "the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner."34 In
the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to
the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition below.
Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that summons and a
copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the
herein petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001.35 Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has
rendered the questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio,
since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed,
even if the modification is meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.36 In fact,
we have ruled that for "[as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only
by appeal."37 Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the
petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to
do this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become immutable and
unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has
already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman who is not his
wife;38
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;39
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;40
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership;41
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;42
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession;43
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse;44
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and pursuant to Article
116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses,
is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved;45
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were living together;46
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;47
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated and the fact that
respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these properties;48
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(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article 121 of the Family
Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling ₱503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by these
properties;49
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate properties which
can satisfy his share for the support of the family;50
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);51
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally
between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime;52
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children;53 and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of ₱19,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00.54
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues
for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article
102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this
case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner
and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the
operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains.55 Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property,
or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when
the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the petitioner and of the
respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry."56 The husband and
wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.57
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already
the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other law."58
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Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal partnership violated
when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: "As earlier adverted to, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common by the spouses. If the
provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."59 In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations
between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the
Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife."60 Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a
vested right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no
provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,61we
define and explained "vested right" in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and
natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of
property.62(Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v.
The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63 we also explained:
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the
right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.64 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if there
is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.65 In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner
prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances
and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties.66 Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the
trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family
Code.67 Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not only in
the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the
Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
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Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits,
which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However,
if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries,
or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the
Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation
case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested
right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a
mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears
that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of
the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not
vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is
finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided
between the spouses or their respective heirs.69 (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the
applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.70 The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration
nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it has
become final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from
disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor
reversed by this Court.71
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case since the parties'
property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial
court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and
the products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of
effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision
under the Family Code, which defines "net profits" earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then
Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net profits" earned in the conjugal partnership
of gains the same with the computation of "net profits" earned in the absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations between the parties
and the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies
as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow
the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer
to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject
to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall
be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
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marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution."72 Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies
to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown,
the difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of
the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129
of the Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime and the conjugal
partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all
the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during
the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's
properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value
each one may have originally owned.73
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the
absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are
insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is
left of the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its
net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.74
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the market value of the properties
at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the properties, we subtract the
debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties
of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which
then results to the net profits.75
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article
102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate properties, thus, the
remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute community. And its market value at the time
of the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the "market value at dissolution."
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the properties which
remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations will be
subtracted from the "market value at dissolution."
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the absolute
community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner
and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the
resulting totality constitutes the "net profits."
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to each of
them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the "net profits." However, in the Decision dated
October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we
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use Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both
parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the
Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining "net profit." As earlier explained, the definition
of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal
partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal
Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, "the
husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage."76 From the foregoing provision, each of the couple
has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or
properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.77
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies
in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or
for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal
partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used
for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said
spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance
with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
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unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal properties
and their separate properties.78 In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate
properties when they married.79 Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.80
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned
in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership;81 and if the community is enriched at the expense
of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective
owners shall be made.82
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; while the
debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the
conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable.83
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned
to each of them.84 In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have
no separate properties,85 there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are
considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.86 However, since the trial court
found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus,
we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already
did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED.
Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years
ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire
to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with another case3 filed by
Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation
rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify
the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.8
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without
requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9
The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the parties and their lawyers to
initiate steps towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other means.
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the resolution of
October 11, 2000.10
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On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be
produced before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court.11
On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.12
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of her arguments that
have been resolved in the decision.
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that
Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have
her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were
illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed
that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies
controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country
Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and
Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23,
1999.16Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had
no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental
capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that
we could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not.
Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out
in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of
Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason
why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower
courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over
again.18 Although there are exceptions to the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her
position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We
agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.21
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and
board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
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Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.22
On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest
in peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by
the death of subject.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C.
TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A.
COMILLE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No.
4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its
subsequent resolution3 denying reconsideration.
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-
A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.4 After the death of Zosima on October 3,
1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with
waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco.5 On
June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds.6
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, 7 the latter's
cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the
store inside.9
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo
said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room,10 while Erlinda Tabancura,11another niece of
Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress.12 On the other hand, Cirila said she was a
mere helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any
case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.13
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.14 Cirila testified
that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she began working for the latter;
that he could still walk with her assistance at that time;15 and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became
bedridden.16 Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot near
the public streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her family with
food and lodging.18
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square
meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila
Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. 19 and later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a
market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.21
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and nieces
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and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter
vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under this
provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and
certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila Comille." The documents were (1) an application for a business
permit to operate as real estate lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature "Cirila Comille";22 (2)
a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate showing the signature "Cirila Comille" in
black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature "Cirila A. Comille" written in black ink.24 The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7;
Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A " to
the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs
within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As
already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia,
Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3) a pleading
in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the fact that
Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late Francisco
Comille is not correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of facts, and unduly
breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on
totally incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar
v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions, 1993
ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v.
Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.26
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances
of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
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The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises,
or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave
abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.27 It
appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the general rule should
apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual
intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and
wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together,
even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.29 In this jurisdiction,
this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties,30 a
conviction of concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one
roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated
that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications
that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents apparently signed by
Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an application for a business permit to operate as
a real estate lessor,33 a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate,34 and the death
certificate of Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise,
she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et
al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to
Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular
cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She
was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.36 It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco
and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's
common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is
void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2 EXAM |1

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

We answer in the affirmative.

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

REYES, R.T., J.:

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

THE RTC RULING

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11

In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

The applicability of People v. De Lara

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

The members voted as follows:

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

then a broader one followed:

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,