Crimpro Cases (Jurisdiction Venue)

I.
JURISDICTION: LAWS ON- IN GENERAL
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-sixth
day of July, nineteen hundred and ninety-three.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691]
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE “JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980”
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980”,
is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
“(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
“(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
“(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00);
“(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
“(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
“(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
“(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
“(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”

SEC. 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
“(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
“(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.”
SEC. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
“(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs
shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or
causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions;
“(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such
cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession; and
“(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.”
SEC 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or
land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of
which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of
the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts.”
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and
(8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned
jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00).
SEC. 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However,
by agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this
Act may be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the appropriate Regional
Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of
jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
SEC. 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA, JR.

(Sgd.) EDGARDO J. ANGARA
Speaker of the House
President of the Senate
of Representatives
This bill which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 167 and Senate Bill No. 1348 was finally passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on March 9, 1994 and March 7, 1994, respectively.
(Sgd.) CAMILO L. SABIO

(Sgd.) EDGARDO E. TUMANGAN
Secretary General
Secretary of the Senate
House of Representatives
Approved: 25 MARCH 1994
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
President of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand three.
Republic Act No. 9282 March 30 2004
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO
THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Court; Justices; Qualifications; Salary; Tenure. - There is hereby created a Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
which shall be of the same level as the Court of Appeals, possessing all the inherent powers of a Court of Justice,
and shall consist of a Presiding Justice and five (5) Associate Justices. The incumbent Presiding Judge and
Associate Judges shall continue in office and bear the new titles of Presiding Justice and Associate Justices. The
Presiding Justice and the most Senior Associate Justice shall serve as chairmen of the two (2) Divisions. The
additional three (3) Justices and succeeding members of the Court shall be appointed by the President upon
nomination by the Judicial and Bar Council. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and the
Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the date of their respective appointments, or when the
appointments of two (2) or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments
were issued by the President. They shall have the same qualifications, rank, category, salary, emoluments and other
privileges, be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirements and other benefits
as those provided for under existing laws for the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals.
"Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are increased,
such increases in salaries shall be deemed correspondingly extended to and enjoyed by the Presiding Justice and
Associate Justices of the CTA.
"The Presiding Justice and Associate Justices shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of
seventy (70), or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, unless sooner removed for the same
causes and in the same manner provided by law for members of the judiciary of equivalent rank."
Section 2. Section 2 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Sitting En Banc or Division; Quorum; Proceedings. - The CTA may sit en banc or in two (2) Divisions, each
Division consisting of three (3) Justices.
"Four (4) Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc and two (2) Justices for sessions of a Division:
Provided, That when the required quorum cannot be constituted due to any vacancy, disqualification, inhibition,
disability, or any other lawful cause, the Presiding Justice shall designate any Justice of other Divisions of the Court
to sit temporarily therein.
"The affirmative votes of four (4) members of the Court en banc or two (2) members of a Division, as the case may
be, shall be necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution."
"SEC. 3. Clerk of Court; Division Clerks of Court; Appointment; Qualification; Compensation. - The CTA shall have a
Clerk of Court and three (3) Division Clerks of Court who shall be appointed by the Supreme Court. No person shall
be appointed Clerk of Court or Division Clerk of Court unless he is duly authorized to practice law in the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court shall exercise the same powers and perform the same duties in
regard to all matters within the Court's jurisdiction, as are exercised and performed by the Clerk of Court and Division
Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals, in so far as the same may be applicable or analogous; and in the exercise of
those powers and the performance of those duties they shall be under the direction of the Court. The Clerk of Court
and the Division Clerks of Court shall have the same rank, privileges, salary, emoluments, retirement and other
benefits as those provided for the Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals, respectively.'
"SEC. 4. Other Subordinate Employees. - The Supreme Court shall appoint all officials and employees of the CTA, in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Supreme Court shall fix their salaries and prescribe their duties."
"SEC. 5. Disqualifications. - No Justice or other officer or employee of the CTA shall intervene, directly or indirectly, in
the management or control of any private enterprise which in any way may be affected by the functions of the Court.
Justices of the Court shall be disqualified from sitting in any case on the same grounds provided under Rule one
hundred thirty-seven of the Rules of Court for the disqualification of judicial officers. No person who has once served
in the Court in a permanent capacity, either as Presiding Justice or as Associate Justice thereof, shall be qualified to
practice as counsel before the Court for a period of one (1) year from his retirement or resignation."
"SEC. 6. Place of Office. - The CTA shall have its principal office in Metro Manila and shall hold hearings at such time
and place as it may, by order in writing, designate."
"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
"a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
"1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
"2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal
Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
"3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
"4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or
other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
"5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment
appeals;
"6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions
of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs
Code;
"7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and
the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and
countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said
duties.
"b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
"1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue
Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of
Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount o
taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where
there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filling of such civil action
separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
"2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
"a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided
by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
"b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
"c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
"1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees,
charges and penalties: Provided, however, That collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the
proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
"2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
"a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases
originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
"b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction."
"SEC. 10. Power to Administer Oaths; Issue Subpoena; Punish for Contempt. - The Court shall have the power to
administer oaths, receive evidence, summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum, subject in all respects to the
same restrictions and qualifications as applied in judicial proceedings of a similar nature. The Court shall, in
accordance with Rule seventy-one of the Rules of Court, have the power to punish for contempt for the same causes,
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."
"SEC. 11. Who May Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal. - Any party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or
inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the
Secretary of Trade and Industry or the Secretary of Agriculture or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals or the
Regional Trial Courts may file an appeal with the CTA within thirty (30) days after the receipt of such decision or ruling
or after the expiration of the period fixed by law for action as referred to in Section 7(a)(2) herein.
"Appeal shall be made by filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CTA within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision or ruling or in
the case of inaction as herein provided, from the expiration of the period fixed by law to act thereon. A Division of the
CTA shall hear the appeal: Provided, however, That with respect to decisions or rulings of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals and the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction appeal shall be made by
filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to that provided for under rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with the CTA, which shall hear the case en banc.
"All other cases involving rulings, orders or decisions filed with the CTA as provided for in Section 7 shall be raffled to
its Divisions. A party adversely affected by a ruling, order or decision of a Division of the CTA may file a motion for
reconsideration of new trial before the same Division of the CTA within fifteens (15) days from notice thereof: Provide,
however, That in criminal cases, the general rule applicable in regular Courts on matters of prosecution and appeal
shall likewise apply.
"No appeal taken to the CTA from the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of
Customs or the Regional Trial Court, provincial, city or municipal treasurer or the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary
of Trade and Industry and Secretary of Agriculture, as the case may be shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint,
and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by existing law: Provided,
however, That when in the opinion of the Court the collection by the aforementioned government agencies may
jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court any stage of the proceeding may suspend
the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more
than double the amount with the Court.
"In criminal and collection cases covered respectively by Section 7(b) and (c) of this Act, the Government may directly
file the said cases with the CTA covering amounts within its exclusive and original jurisdiction."
"SEC. 13. Decision, Maximum Period for Termination of Cases. - Cases brought before the Court shall be decided in
accordance with Section 15, paragraph (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the 1987 Constitution. Decisions of
the Court shall be in writing, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based, and signed
by the Justices concurring therein. The Court shall provide for the publication of its decision in the Official Gazette in
such form and manner as may best be adopted for public information and use.
"The Justices of the Court shall each certify on their applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by
them for payment, or upon the payrolls under which their salaries are paid, that all proceedings, petitions and motions
which have been submitted to the Court for determination or decision for a period required by the law or the
Constitution, as the case may be, have been determined or decided by the Court on or before the date of making the
certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no salary shall be paid without such certificate."
Section 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows:
"SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. - No civil proceeding involving matter arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained,
except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
"A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may
file a petition for review with the CTA en banc."
"SEC. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA en banc may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure."
Section 13. Distraint of Personal Property and/or Levy on Real Property. - Upon the issuance of any ruling, order or
decision by the CTA favorable to the national government, the CTA shall issue an order authorizing the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, through the Commissioner to seize and distraint any goods, chattels, or effects, and the personal
property, including stocks and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts, and interests in and rights to personal
property and/or levy the real property of such persons in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge together with
any increment thereto incident to delinquency. This remedy shall not be exclusive and shall not preclude the Court
from availing of other means under the Rules of Court.
Section 14. Retention of Personnel; Security of Tenure; Upgrading of Positions and Salaries. - All existing permanent
personnel of the CTA shall not be adversely affected by this Act. They shall continue in office and shall not be
removed or separated from the service except for cause as provided for by existing laws. Further, the present
positions and salaries of personnel shall be upgraded to the level of their counterparts in the Court of Appeals.
Section 15. Transitory Provisions. - In consonance with the above provision, the incumbent Presiding Judge and
Associate Judges shall comprise a Division pending the constitution of the entire Court.
Section 16. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the
General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 17. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders, executive issuances or letter of instructions, or any part
thereof, inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are hereby deemed repealed, amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 18. Separability Clause. - If for any reason, any section or provision of this Act shall be declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts thereof not affected thereby shall remain valid.
Section 19. Effectivity Clause - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least (2)
Approved,
FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2712 and House Bill No. 6673 was finally passed by the Senate
and the House of Representatives on December 8, 2003 and February 2, 2004, respectively.
OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives
Approved: March 30 2004

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
B. JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
Tenth Congress
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand seven.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 8249 February 5, 1997
AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended
to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and Compensation. - A special court, of
the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court ofjustice, to be known as
the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be
appointed by the President."
Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. - The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the
Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided,
however, That cases originating from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas or
Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the greater convenience of the
accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case
originating from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical region: Provided, further, That for this
purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside
Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The
Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the courts or other government
offices where any of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject to
the orders of the Sandiganbayan."
Section 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is hereby deleted.
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and
other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the
rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and
municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in,
the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed
to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate
civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a
case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts
and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.
"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or
notice of the final order on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from
submission thereon.
"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case
decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision
shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court.
"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.
"Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as those
rendered by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the
Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court.
"In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an
appeal."
Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged
against the current fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for its
continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun
as of the approval hereof
Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or
invalid, such parts or portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2)
Approved:
(Sgd.) ERNESTO M. MACEDA (Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA, JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5323 and Senate Bill No. 844 was finally passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on January 28,1997 and January 29, 1997, respectively.
(Sgd.) LORENZO E. LEYNES, JR. (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives
Approved: February 5, 1997

(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173990 October 27, 2009
EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, and EDWARD
RANADA,Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the 25 November 2005
Decision1 and the 11 July 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modifications the Decision
and Resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 8, finding petitioner, Captain Edgardo V.
Estarija (Estarija), then Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority, Davao City, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3, paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
On 7 August 1998, an Information was filed before the RTC of Davao City against Estarija for violating Section 3,
paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about August 6, 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, EDGARDO ESTARIJA, a public officer, being then the Harbor Master of the Philippine
Ports Authority at Sasa, Davao City, while in the performance of his official function as such, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously request and consequently receive the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(₱5,000.00) from Davao Pilot Association in consideration of accused’s issuance of berthing permits.3
Upon his arraignment on 26 August 1998, Estarija, assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On 15 March 2000, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Estarija of the crime charged and imposing upon him a
straight penalty of seven years. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
For the foregoing, this Court finds accused Capt. Edgardo Estarija GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Par.
B, Sec. 3 of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of SEVEN (7) YEARS.5
Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.
On 10 August 2000, Estarija filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Estarija. The Court of Appeals, however, modified the
penalty to an indeterminate sentence ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 9 years, with the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court x x x hereby AFFIRMS the finding of guilt of the accused-appellant but ORDERS the
modification of the sentence imposed upon the accused-appellant. Conformably, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an Indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years and One (1) Month to Nine (9) Years of imprisonment, with the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.6
Hence, the instant petition.
In the main, the issue for resolution is whether or not error attended the RTC’s findings, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that Estarija is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3, paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019.
Quite apart from the foregoing issue raised by Estarija, the question that comes to the fore, as made evident by the
proceedings below, is whether or not Estarija correctly filed his appeal with the Court of Appeals; or put differently,
whether the Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over the RTC decision convicting Estarija of the charge.
Although not assigned as an error, said issue can be entertained by the Court, since, in a criminal proceeding, an
appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the
appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not.7
Republic Act No. 8249 entitled, "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes," which
further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on 23 February 1997. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of
Republic Act No. 8249 reads:
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.1avvphi1
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is manifest from the above provision that the decisions of the Regional Trial Court -- convicting an accused who
occupies a position lower than that with salary grade 27 or those not otherwise covered by the enumeration of certain
public officers in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 -- are to be
appealed exclusively to the Sandiganbayan.
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The
party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right
to appeal is lost.1avvphi1
Having failed to comply with the requirements set forth in the rules, Estarija’s appeal should have been dismissed by
the Court of Appeals.
In the instant case, instead of appealing his conviction to the Sandiganbayan, Estarija erroneously filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, in utter disregard of paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249. The Court of
Appeals did not notice this conspicuous misstep, since it entertained the appeal. This fatal flaw committed by Estarija
did not toll the running of the period for him to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Because of Estarija’s failure
to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan within the period granted therefor, the Decision of the RTC convicting him
of violating Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 has thus become final and executory.
Inasmuch as the decision of the RTC has long been final and executory, it can no longer be altered or
modified.8Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable.9 The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether or not made by the highest court
of the land. The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law.
The RTC imposed upon Estarija the straight penalty of seven (7) years. This is erroneous. The penalty for violation of
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than
fifteen years, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is
punished by a special law, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum
prescribed by the same. Thus, the correct penalty should have been imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) month, as minimum, to nine (9) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office. However,
since the decision of the RTC has long become final and executory, this Court cannot modify the same.10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 8, dated 15 March 2000, finding Edgardo V. Estarija GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING*
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD**
Associate Justice
ATT E STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 764, dated 21 October 2009, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing to replace Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, who is on official
leave.
** Per Special Order No. 753, dated 12 October 2009, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno designating
Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad to replace Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., who is on official leave.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Ramon R.
Garcia, concurring. Rollo, pp. 41-52.
2 Rollo, pp. 54-55.
3 Records, p. 1.
4 Id. at 34.
5 Id. at 228-229.
6 Rollo, p. 51.
7 Ungsod v. People, G.R. No. 158904, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 282, 297.
8 Eastland Construction and Development Corporation v. Mortel, G.R. No. 165648, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 203,
216.
9 Id.
10 Id.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution2of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent
to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a
disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental
Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash
advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a
demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two
hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation
report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent
Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on
September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds
against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas'
Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating
Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a
high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the
offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of
SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (₱71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by
reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with
deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of ₱71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a
MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating
that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an
incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected
balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers
were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a
position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the
cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not in
a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said
court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249.
According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to
the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT
NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION
2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's
appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)
(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first,
enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the
rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a
public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but
his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a
decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution
or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished
by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.1avvphi1
In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to
(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their
commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case
of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance of his official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had
thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan,
et al.,12 thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took
effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission
of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was
on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or
employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was
instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No.
1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated
by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other
city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army
and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section
4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the
public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only
because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are
committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would
fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606
as amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is
a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is
included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is
not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the
principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation
of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant
case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g),
since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that
accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could
exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then she is not
covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.1avvphi1
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the
Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a)
to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the
said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses
or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section
in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section
4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in
relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are
committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense
charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the
accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive
to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is
held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17Thus, in the case of Lacson v.
Executive Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court
ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and
that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant’s attack
to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant
might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante
for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her
office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the
application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there
would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently
exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the
said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said
offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused’s
office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x."
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element
of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x20
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the
public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same
section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical
or special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers  who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers  to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO**
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATT E STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No.
679 dated August 3, 2009.
** Per Special Order No. 678 dated August 3, 2009.
1 Dated April 20, 2005, rollo, pp. 30-58.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi (now retired), with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and
Norberto Y. Geraldez, concurring, rollo, pp. 59-75.
3 Sandiganbayan rollo, pp. 1-3.
4 Id. at 34-35.
5 Id. at 45-48.
6 Id. at 54-70.
7 G..R. No. 143047, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 388.
8 Rollo, pp. 96-102.
9 Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-38204, September 24, 1991, 201 SCRA 632.
10 Rollo, pp. 106-110.
11 G.R. Nos. 146646-49, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 236, 242, citing People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613 (1960).
12 G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 224.
13 Id. at 238-239, citing Presidential Decree No. 1486
14 Id., citing Section 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty
higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent
with the regular courts.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees.
Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall, at all times, be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action
shall be recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where
the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may
no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed
and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in cases within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is first
filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the
regular courts of competent jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the
armed forces in the active service.
15 Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122641, January 20, 1997, 266 SCRA 379.
16 Supra note 7.
17 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan 468 Phil. 374, 387 (2004), citing People v. Montejo, supra note 11, at 622.
18 G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298, 318.
19 393 Phil. 143, 157-158 (2000).
20 Cunanan v. Arceo, G.R. No. 116615, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 88, 96.
21 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 287 (2004), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 430, 448 (1996).
22 Id., citing PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., 213 SCRA 16, 26 (1992).
23 Id., citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 347-348.
C. JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES

G.R. No. 156747 - ALLEN A. MACASAET, ET AL. v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 156747 : February 23, 2005]
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, Petitioners, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision1 dated 22 March
2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled, "People of the Philippines
v. Alfie Lorenzo, et al."
The factual antecedents are as follows:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist,
publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper "Abante" were charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court, reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and
JORDAN CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN
MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of "Abante" a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a.
TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and maliciously write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and circulated in
the aforesaid newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996 an article which reads as follows:
"Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na
baluktot at binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto
Natividad siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong 'yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie 'yan
dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya ng
T-shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang
ang rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa
niya ang kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang
pagkain ko sa kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong 'yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng
utang na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang
klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare!
Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga
si Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda hangga't hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga
inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming
binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate
na hate ka nga ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng
pinagsasabi mo para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie," ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers.
Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya
kuno Liberty Boys!"
thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance and
causing in view of their publication, discredit and contempt upon the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD
a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice.2
In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, set the
arraignment of the petitioners on 27 August 1997.3
On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings
dated 21 August 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the adverse Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite this motion, the scheduled arraignment of petitioners pushed
through on 27 August 1997. During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo and Quijano, Jr., together with their co-accused Parajes
and Castillo, refused to enter any plea and so the trial court ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered into the records on their
behalf.4 As for petitioner Macasaet, his arraignment was rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his failure to attend the
previously calendared arraignment.
On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private
respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense'5 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997.6 Petitioners argued therein that the trial court committed grave error when it
denied the petitioners' Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled
arraignment on 27 August 1997. According to petitioners and their co-accused, by the trial judge's denial of their Urgent Motion
to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of
Justice. Moreover, banking on the case of Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,7 the petitioners and their fellow accused contended
that since they had already manifested their intention to file a Petition for Review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of
Quezon City before the DOJ, it was premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally,
petitioners and their co-accused claimed that regardless of the outcome of their Petition for Review before the DOJ, the
withdrawal of their "not guilty" pleas is in order as they planned to move for the quashal of the information against them.
In an Order dated 26 September 1997,8 Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that "with the filing of the 'Motion to Dismiss,' the court
considers the accused to have abandoned their 'Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea' and sees no further need to act
on the same."
In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 23 September 1997,9 the public prosecutor argued that the RTC, Quezon City,
had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, private respondent (private complainant
below) was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St., Paliparan,
Sto. NiÃ±o, Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11 October 1996 filed during the preliminary
investigation of the case.
For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to the affidavit
purportedly executed by private respondent as it is "axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is limited to a
consideration of the information as filed with the court, and no other." Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed by private
respondent and the information filed before the court state that private respondent's residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of
the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or
information.10
On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow accused filed a Supplemental Reply11 attaching thereto certifications issued by
Jimmy Ong and Pablito C. Antonio, barangay captains of Barangay Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto. NiÃ±o, Marikina
City, respectively. The pertinent portion of the barangay certification12 issued by Barangay Captain Ong states:
This is to certify that this office has no record on file nor with the list of registered voters of this barangay regarding a certain
person by the name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.
This further certifies that our BSDO's (have) been looking for said person seeking information regarding his whereabouts but to
no avail.
On the other hand, the certification13 issued by Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part:
This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal age, single/married/separate/widow/widower, a resident of Karen Street,
Sto. NiÃ±o, Marikina City is a bonafide member of this barangay.
..
This is being issued upon request of the above-named person for "IDENTIFICATION."
During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial court received and marked in evidence the two barangay certifications. Also
marked for evidence were page 4 of the information stating the address of private respondent to be in Marikina City and the
editorial box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm.
301/305, 3/F BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts., Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was then given five (5)
days within which to submit its comment to the evidence submitted by the petitioners and their fellow accused.
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,14 private respondent contended that the certification issued by the barangay captain of
Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of the apartment unit he was renting in Sikatuna Village, Quezon
City; that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms to boarders in order to avoid payment of local
taxes; and that there is no showing that a census was conducted among the residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he
resided therein.
As regards the certification issued by the barangay chairman of Sto. NiÃ±o, Marikina City, private respondent argued that it is of
judicial notice that barangay and city records are not regularly updated to reflect the transfer of residence of their constituents and
that a perusal of said certification reveals that the barangay captain did not personally know him (private respondent). Finally,
private respondent claimed that his receipt of the copy of petitioners' Appeal to the DOJ, which was sent to his alleged address in
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, proved that he did, in fact, reside at said place.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction.15 The court a quo noted
that although the information alleged the venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence submitted
for its consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly indicated that the purported libelous article was
printed and first published in the City of Manila. In addition, the trial court relied on the following matters to support its
conclusion that, indeed, jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the address of private
respondent appeared to be the one in Marikina City although right below it was a handwritten notation stating "131 Sct. Lozano
St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC"; b) the two barangay certifications submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for
Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit-Complaint attached to the information wherein the given address of private respondent
was Marikina City.
On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration16 insisting that at the time the alleged libelous
article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of
Marikina City at the time of publication of the claimed defamatory article because he understood the term "address" to mean the
place where he originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon
City as his actual residence at the time of publication of the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante.
On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration to which he attached an affidavit
executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, where
private respondent supposedly lived from July 1996 until May 1997. She also stated in her affidavit that she was not aware of any
inquiry conducted by the barangay officials of Barangay Malaya regarding the residency of private respondent in their locality.
Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the trial court denied private respondent's motion for reconsideration, ruling thus:
[Del Rosario's] affidavit appears to have been executed only on 19 January 1998 to which fact the court can only chuckle and
observe that evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a curative evidence, the weight and sufficiency of which is highly
suspect.17
Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo.18 In the Decision now assailed
before us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's conclusion and ordered the remand of the case to the court
a quo for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon
City, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the case filed against herein accused-appellees on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered remanding the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings.19
The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled that the "residence of a person must be his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or abode" and for the purpose of determining venue, actual residence is a person's
place of abode and not necessarily his legal residence or domicile.20 In this case, the defect appearing on the original complaint
wherein the residence of private respondent was indicated to be Marikina City was subsequently cured by his supplemental-
affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover, as the amendment was made during the
preliminary investigation phase of this case, the same could be done as a matter of right pursuant to the Revised Rules of
Court.21
As for the barangay certifications issued by the barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto. NiÃ±o, the Court of
Appeals ruled that they had no probative value ratiocinating in the following manner:
. . . With respect to the requirement of residence in the place where one is to vote, residence can mean either domicile or
temporary residence (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer, 3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of Quezon City
can be a voter of Marikina if the latter is his domicile. Conversely, a person domiciled in Marikina can vote in Quezon City if he
resides in the latter. It is just a matter of choice on the part of the voter. Thus, logic does not support the supposition that one who
is not a registered voter of a place is also not a resident theref. Furthermore, the right to vote has the corollary right of not
exercising it. Therefore, one need not even be a registered voter at all. The same principle applies to the certification issued by the
barangay in Marikina.22
The appellate court likewise gave weight to the affidavit executed by Del Rosario and observed that petitioners failed to
controvert the same.
The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
promulgated on 6 January 2003.23
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B.
DEL ROSARIO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDAD'S PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A
CRIMINAL CASE.24
Petitioners insist that the evidence presented before the trial court irrefutably established the fact that private respondent was not a
resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous publication saw print. According to them, the information dated 10 July
1997 filed before the RTC of Quezon City indicated private respondent's address to be in Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. NiÃ±o,
Marikina City. Further supporting this claim were the affidavit-complaint25 and the memorandum for preliminary
investigation26 where references were explicitly made to said address. Thus, petitioners are of the view that the Court of Appeals
erred in relying on the supplemental affidavit executed by private respondent claiming that its execution amounted to nothing
more than a mere afterthought.
In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it took into account the affidavit executed by Del Rosario. They
insist that its belated submission before the trial court and the prosecution's failure to present the affiant to testify as regards the
veracity of her statements undermined the evidentiary value of her affidavit. More, as the affidavit was not formally offered as
evidence, it was only proper that the trial court disregarded the same in dismissing the case.
Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent did not have the requisite personality to appeal from the decision of the trial
court as it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is authorized by law to institute appeal of criminal cases. Thus,
the Court of Appeals made a mistake in holding that -
'While it is true that only the OSG can file an appeal representing the government in a criminal proceeding, the private
complainant nevertheless may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case. The case at bar was dismissed due to the alleged
improper laying of venue resulting in the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and not based on the merits of the case. It
cannot therefore be argued that private complainant's appeal pertains to the merits of the criminal case as what happened in
accused-appellees' cited case in the motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay v. Court of Appeals(GR No. 112995, July 30, 1998).
Needless to say, the private complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case which he had the right to
protect. In the interest of justice and fair play, therefore, the Brief filed by private complainant in the present case should be
treated as pertaining only to the civil aspect of the case.27
In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003,28 private respondent reiterated his position that the RTC of Quezon City had
jurisdiction over this libel case. According to him, the affidavit executed by Del Rosario, the alleged owner of the house he leased
in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, established, beyond doubt, that he resided in said place during the time the claimed defamatory
article appeared on the pages of Abante. In addition, he draws attention to the fact that petitioners and their co-accused furnished
him a copy of the Petition for Review , filed before the DOJ, at the aforementioned address in Quezon City.
Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private respondent maintains that the prosecution exerted efforts to present the affiant before
the trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of town when she was supposed to be presented and so the public and the
private prosecutors decided to submit for resolution their motion for reconsideration sans the affiant's testimony. Citing the case
of Joseph Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,29 private respondent avers that this Court had previously admitted the
affidavits of witnesses who were not presented during the trial phase of a case.
As regards the petitioners' contention that he (private respondent) did not have the personality to bring this case to the appellate
level, private respondent contends that the proper party to file the Notice of Appeal before the trial court is the public prosecutor
as what happened in this case.
On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07 July 200330 wherein it prayed for the dismissal of this petition based on the
following: First, as the petition is concerned with the determination of the residence of private respondent at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should be unavailing to the petitioners because this remedy only deals with
questions of law.
Second, venue was properly laid in this case as private respondent's residency in Quezon City during the time material to this
case was sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the errors appearing in the memorandum for preliminary investigation and
in the affidavit complaint with regard to private respondent's residence were corrected through the supplemental affidavit private
respondent executed during the preliminary investigation before the Quezon City prosecutor's office.
Third, the OSG takes the view that the public prosecutor was the proper party to file the notice of appeal before the trial court
since its (OSG's) office is only "authorized to bring or defend actions on appeal on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Honorable Court of the Court of Appeals.
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same.
Jurisdiction has been defined as "the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a case the cognizance of which belongs
to them exclusively"31 and it constitutes the basic foundation of judicial proceedings.32 The term derives its origin from two
Latin words - "jus" meaning law and the other, "dicere" meaning to declare.33 The term has also been variably explained to be
"the power of a court to hear and determine a cause of action presented to it, the power of a court to adjudicate the kind of case
before it, the power of a court to adjudicate a case when the proper parties are before it, and the power of a court to make the
particular decision it is asked to render."34
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional.Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
Thus, the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.35 In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,36 this Court had the occasion to expound on
this principle, thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.37
The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of
said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the
libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published.
In Agbayani v. Sayo,38 we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.39
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he
could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually
resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly
insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating "Quezon City" at the beginning of the
information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC
Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the
time the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the court's jurisdiction, Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and
the absence of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective.
Sadly for private respondent, the information filed before the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city
prosecutor's failure to properly lay the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court
of the power to take cognizance of this case.
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in
the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information
should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a
private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation
was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to
where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.40
Anent private respondent and OSG's contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of
this libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be without merit. It is jurisprudentially settled that
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.41 In resolving a
motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained in the complaint or information should
be taken as they are.42 The exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion
to quash43 such as when the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of
the accused.44 In these instances, it is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the
motion to dismiss. As the present case obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly
dismissed this action.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise put premium on the affidavit executed by Del Rosario which was attached
to private respondent's supplemental motion for reconsideration. According to the appellate court, said document "supports
private (respondent's) claim that indeed, he was a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous article was
published."45 The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof, states:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations contained in the principal
pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the latter. Further, the
admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that parties may impose upon the court for we have consistently held that
its admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion of the court.46
Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a supplemental pleading should
deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the date of the pleading it seeks to supplement. A reading of
the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent discloses no additional or new matters which transpired
after he filed his original motion for reconsideration. The fact that he attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor fails to
persuade us into giving to said supplemental motion the same evidentiary value as did the Court of Appeals. For one, private
respondent did not even bother to explain the reason behind the belated submission of Del Rosario's affidavit nor did he claim
that he exerted earnest efforts to file it much earlier in the proceedings.
He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice of
appeal before the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file said notice in its capacity as the "sole
representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases."47
Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to "represent the government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the
appellate courts.48
The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals commence?
Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that "(i)n appeals by notice of
appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties."49 When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial court's jurisdiction over the case does not cease as
a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him.50 As explained by our former colleague,
Justice Florenz Regalado'
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus
perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for
those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the
expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.51
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors before
the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to
perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these two
incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case
on behalf of the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court
of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24 November 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. PestaÃ±o, with Associate Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a member of this
Court) and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurring.
7 G.R. No. 113930, 05 March 1996, 254 SCRA 307.

20 Rollo, p. 58; citing Jose Baritua v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100748, 03 February 1997, 267 SCRA 331.
21 Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended,
in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused."
31 United States v. Pagdayuman, et al., No. 2008, 11 November 1905, 5 Phil. 265.
32 People v. Mariano, et al., G.R. No. L-40527, 30 June 1976, 71 SCRA 600.
35 Lopez, et al. v. The City Judge, et al., G.R. No. L-25795, 29 October 1966, 18 SCRA 616.
36 G.R. No. 119000, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 367.
38 G.R. No. L-47880, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 699.
42 People v. Alagao, et al., G.R. No. L-20721, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 879.
43 People v. Cadabis, G.R. No. L-7713, 31 October 1955, 97 Phil. 829.
44 Ibid.; See People v. Alagao, et al., supra, note 42 at 883 and Lopez, et al. v. The City Judge, supra, note 35 at 621.
46 British Traders' Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-20501, 30 April 1965, 13 SCRA 719;
reiterated in Caoili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128325, 14 September 1999, 314 SCRA 345.
48 Urbano v. Chavez, G.R. No. 87977, 19 March 1990, 183 SCRA 347; emphasis supplied.
50 Rule 41, Section 9, par. 1, Revised Rules of Court.
51 I Florenz Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 508 (6th Revised Edition); emphasis supplied.
G.R. No. 145498 January 17, 2005

BENJAMIN LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner is now before us on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 30, 1999, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 79, Quezon City (RTC) convicting him of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-50094;
and the Resolution2 dated October 11, 2000, denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On October 4, 1993, an Information was filed against petitioner Dr. Benjamin F. Lee and a certain Cesar Al. Bautista,
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, which reads:
That on or about the 24th day of July 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with, and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or
draw and issue to Rogelio G. Bergado to apply on account or for value United Coconut Planters Bank Check No.
168341 dated July 24, 1993 payable to the order of Rogelio G. Bergado in the amount of ₱980,000.00, Philippine
Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Rogelio G. Bergado the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Petitioner pleaded not guilty in his arraignment on February 1, 1995.4 Presiding Judge Godofredo L. Legaspi noted in
the assailed judgment that trial proceeded insofar only as petitioner is concerned, "since accused Cesar Bautista is
presently detained at Municipal Jail at Calapan, Mindoro where he has a pending case before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC), Calapan, Mindoro and despite several notices to the jail warden of Calapan, Mindoro, the latter failed to
bring the person of said accused to this Court for arraignment."5
For the prosecution, private complainant Rogelio Bergado testified that: on July 19, 1992, he loaned Unlad
Commercial Enterprises (Unlad for brevity), through its agent Norma Ilagan, the amount of ₱500,000.00 with an
interest of 4% a month; on September 10, 1992, he loaned another ₱400,000.00 through Ilagan for the same interest
rate; in exchange, he received a total of twenty-six checks, four of which were dishonored for the reason "drawn
against insufficient funds"; he went to Calapan, Mindoro and talked to Bautista and the latter replaced the dishonored
checks with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. ARA 168341, signed by Bautista and herein petitioner
dated July 24, 1993, in the amount of ₱980,000.00 representing the total amount loaned plus interests; when
Bergado deposited the check at UCPB, the same was dishonored due to "account closed"; through his lawyer, he
sent demand letters to Bautista and petitioner, who, despite having received the same still failed and refused to make
any payment. Upon cross-examination, Bergado admitted that he did not see or meet petitioner prior to July 24, 1993
nor did he go to Calapan, Mindoro to check the existence of Unlad prior to lending it the amount of ₱900,000.00.6
The prosecution also presented Zenaida7 Katigbak, Branch Operations Officer of UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon
City, who testified that Bautista and petitioner are the authorized signatories of Current Account No. 130-000406-2,
against which the check subject of the present criminal case was issued; and that the account was opened on August
22, 1988 and closed on January 31, 1992 due to mishandling of the account, i.e., a check was previously issued
against it without sufficient funds.8
The prosecution presented UCPB Check No. ARA 168341,9 UCPB Check Return Slip dated August 5, 1993 stating
that Check No. ARA 168341 was returned unpaid due to "account closed";10 a demand letter addressed to petitioner
dated August 9, 1993;11 registry return slip;12 a copy of the complaint affidavit of private complainant;13signature
card of the current account of petitioner and Bautista at UCPB;14 and the bank statement of the current account of
petitioner and Bautista dated January 31, 1992 reflecting that said account has been closed on said date.15
For the defense, petitioner testified that: it is Bautista who is the sole owner of Unlad; he knew Bautista and became
his "compadre" because of Bautista’s wife who was his employee; he does not know anything about the check issued
by Bautista in favor of Bergado nor did he receive any amount from Bergado or any other person; he agreed to open
an account with Bautista in 1988 because Bautista promised to give him 5% interest from the proceeds of loans that
will be made in favor of other people from said account; before July of 1989, Bautista also asked him to sign several
checks in exchange for 2.5% interest a month from the proceeds of loan to be made in favor of other people; after
July 1989, he terminated his accommodation arrangement with Bautista after learning that Bautista was also giving
5% interest to other investors without any accommodation agreement; he asked for the checks he previously signed
but Bautista refused to return them saying that he did not have them anymore; and inspite of these, he continued
investing in Bautista’s business in the amount of more than ₱500,000.00.16
On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that he signed several checks in blank on different occasions; that he was
the one who asked and insisted that Bautista execute Exhs. "1" and "2", affidavits of Bautista stating that Unlad shall
be Bautista’s sole responsibility; and that despite having severed his relationship with Bautista in July of 1989, he did
not inform UCPB Araneta, Quezon City branch of such fact and he continued investing in Unlad, from July 1989 to
April 1994.17
To bolster his claim, petitioner presented: an affidavit executed by Bautista dated May 31, 1993 stating that Bautista
is the sole proprietor of Unlad and that any business transaction entered into by Unlad shall be Bautista’s personal
responsibility;18 an affidavit executed by Bautista on June 4, 1990, stating that petitioner is no longer connected with
Unlad and that petitioner should not be held liable regarding any transaction entered into by Unlad after July 1989
since petitioner is no longer a signatory;19 a business permit issued by the Municipality of Calapan certifying that
Bautista has been granted a permit to operate a "general merchandise";20 a certification from the Department of
Trade and Industry, Oriental Mindoro Provincial Office stating that Unlad is registered in the name of Cesar Bautista
and/or Placer Bautista;21 orders of attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro on the
properties of Bautista and petitioner;22 and checks issued by Bautista in favor of petitioner and his wife Amelia
Lee.23
On July 22, 1997, the RTC promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this case finding accused Benjamin Lee guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and accordingly sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of one (1)
year of prision correccional, and to pay the offended party ₱980,000.00 and to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and non-payment of the fine by the accused.
SO ORDERED.24
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial court’s judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision is hereby MODIFIED by imposing a penalty of one (1) year and for the accused to pay
the private party the sum of Nine Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱980,000.00) as civil indemnity.
With cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on October 11, 2000.
Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING PETITIONER’S
DEFENSE THAT HE HAD ALREADY SEVERED, SINCE JULY 1989, HIS ACCOMODATION ARRANGEMENT WITH
HIS CO-ACCUSED BAUTISTA WHO WAS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE TRANSACTIONS ENTERED
INTO BY UNLAD COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND THEREFORE PETITIONER HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
SUFFICIENCY OR INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS OF UNLAD’S BANK ACCOUNT.
2. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED IN (A) WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE
SUBJECT CHECK, UCPB CHECK NO. ARA 168341, WAS NOT ISSUED BY PETITIONER TO PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT ON ACCOUNT OR FOR VALUE.
3. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT AT THE TIME
THE SUBJECT CHECK WAS ISSUED BY BAUTISTA IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, THE LATTER WAS
ALREADY AWARE THAT THE RESPECTIVE ESTATES OF THE ACCUSED WERE ALREADY ATTACHED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALAPAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO.
4. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF FACT AND LAW IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
5. THE COURT A QUO AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN THEY
FAILED TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22 AGAINST THE ACCUSED FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.26
In support of his first assigned error, petitioner claims that: he had no actual knowledge of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the funds handled by his co-accused Bautista; while it is true that he opened a joint account with
Bautista at UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City and that he signed several UCPB checks in blank to accommodate
Bautista, he already severed his accommodation arrangement with Bautista as early as July of 1989; this is
evidenced by the affidavits executed by Bautista dated June 4, 1990 and May 31, 1993 which the court a quoignored;
the Court of Appeals erroneously held that the affidavits of Bautista are "self-serving" since there was no showing that
Bautista was lying when he made the statements therein; also, the declarant in this case is Bautista and not
petitioner, thus the principle of self-serving statements cannot apply; the affidavits of Bautista are declarations against
the interest of the person making it, which are admissible notwithstanding their hearsay character, since such
declarations are relevant to the case and the declarant is not available as a witness despite efforts of petitioner to
present Bautista in court; the true test of the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem
motam as in this case but whether the declaration was uttered under circumstances justifying the conclusion that
there was no probable motive to falsify; also, the affidavits of Bautista, having been acknowledged before a notary
public, should be given evidentiary weight.27
Petitioner also points out that in Lao vs. Court of Appeals 28 the Court held that if knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds is proven to be actually absent or non-existent, the accused should not be held liable for the offense defined
under Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22; in said case, petitioner was acquitted, even though she was still connected with the
corporation at the time of the issuance of the check, since she was not expected or obliged to possess under the
organizational structure of the corporation, knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; and that in the case at bar, the
court a quo affirmed the conviction of petitioner even though it was established that he had ceased to be connected
with co-accused Bautista’s business for more than three years prior to the issuance of the subject check and even
though it was clear from the testimony of private complainant himself that he had dealt with Bautista and Ilagan
only.29
Anent the second and third assigned errors, petitioner argues that: in the case at bar, there was neither a pre-existing
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private
complainant on July 24, 1993 since petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July of 1989;
when Bautista issued the subject check to Bergado on July 24, 1993, Bautista had no more authority to use
petitioner’s pre-signed checks thus there was no consideration to speak of; petitioner was deceived by Bautista into
believing that all the pre-signed checks were already used or issued as of 1989; the court a quo should not have
presumed that when petitioner signed the checks and handed the same to Bautista, petitioner had knowledge that
their account had no funds; in all criminal cases, suspicion, no matter how strong cannot sway judgment; even
assuming that petitioner had issued the subject check when he signed the same sometime before July 1989 and that
he had an undertaking to whoever would be the payee, still petitioner should be exempted from criminal liability since
petitioner could not comply with the said undertaking due to an insuperable cause, i.e., as early as June 18, 1993, all
the properties of petitioner had already been attached/garnished by the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro.30
Petitioner further argues that: private complainant is not a holder in due course because he knew that the account of
Bautista and petitioner with UCPB Araneta branch had been closed at the time that he deposited UCPB Check No.
ARA 168341 on August 5, 1993; Check No. ARA 374058 in the amount of ₱500,000.00, which bounced earlier, was
drawn from the same UCPB account of Bautista and petitioner which had already been closed by the UCPB on
January 31, 1992;31 private complainant also had knowledge that the respective estates of both accused were
already attached by the RTC at the time the subject check was given to him by Bautista since the first order of
attachment was issued on June 18, 1993 and was recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on the
same date; applying the principle that registration of instrument is notice to the world, Bergado is presumed to know
the various orders of attachment/garnishment issued by the court.32
As to his fourth assigned error, petitioner argues that: the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; the prosecution failed to rebut the allegation of petitioner that he was not anymore connected with the
business of Bautista and therefore he had no knowledge of the insufficiency of the funds handled by Bautista; and the
prosecution and the trial court relied solely on the authenticity of petitioner’s signature on the subject check which fact
is not enough to convict petitioner of the offense charged.33
Finally, anent his fifth assigned error, petitioner claims that the Regional Trial Court which tried and convicted
petitioner had no jurisdiction over violations of B.P. Blg. 22 considering that the penalty therefor is imprisonment of
thirty days to one year and/or a fine not less than, and not more than double, the amount, but not to exceed
₱200,000.00; and that at the time the Information was filed on October 4, 1993, violations of B.P. Blg. 22 fell under
the jurisdiction of the MTC in view of Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 which provides that the MTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than four years and two months or a fine of
not more than ₱4,000.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kin, nature, value
or amount thereof.34
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that: the mere fact that petitioner was a signatory to the check makes
him solidarily liable with his co-signatory; if it is true that petitioner severed his accommodation arrangement with
Bautista as early as July of 1989, he should have informed the UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City branch that any
check that would be issued bearing his signature and that of Bautista and drawn against their joint account after July
of 1989 should no longer be honored; the affidavit of Bautista to the effect that petitioner should not be held
answerable for any liability of Unlad after July 1989 is not admissible as Bautista was not presented in court nor the
prosecution afforded any opportunity to test the veracity of his allegations; having failed to convincingly establish that
petitioner has severed his accommodation arrangement with his co-accused Bautista, the presumption stands that he
was aware that they no longer had sufficient funds at the time the check was issued; the presumption also stands that
the check was issued on account or for value; petitioner also cannot claim that private complainant was aware that
petitioner and Bautista’s joint account was already closed at the time the subject check was issued and delivered to
complainant since there is nothing on record to show that the reason for the non-payment of the checks earlier issued
to complainant was due to "account closed"; Bergado claims that the earlier checks were dishonored due to lack of
sufficient funds; there is also no merit to the argument of petitioner that private complainant was already aware that
petitioner together with Bautista could no longer make good the subject check in view of the various writs of
attachment issued by the court against their properties, which writs of attachment were duly recorded with the
Register of Deeds; the registration of the various writs of attachment affected only the real properties of petitioner and
such registration served as warning to those who may have or intend to have dealings affecting such lands covered
by the attachments; with regard to the attachment of their bank accounts, there was no showing that private
complainant was aware of the same; there is also no merit to the claim of petitioner that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution was able to establish that petitioner, together with Bautista, issued the
subject check to the complainant in payment of the money loaned by the latter to Unlad; the check bounced for the
reason "account closed" and despite demand to make good the check, petitioner and his co-accused failed and
refused to pay the complainant; and there is no merit to the claim of petitioner that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the present case following Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 where it is provided that in order that the offense under the
jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the imposable
penalty must not exceed four years and two months or a fine of not more than ₱4,000.00 or both such fine and
imprisonment; in the case at bar, the imposable fine is way beyond the limit of ₱4,000.00 as the amount of the check
is ₱980,000.00 thus the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.35
Simply stated, the issues that need to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether the RTC, which tried and convicted
petitioner, has jurisdiction over the case; (2) whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of funds handled by his co-accused; (3) whether the check was issued on account or for value; (4)
whether the private complainant, at the time of issuance, had knowledge that the check had no sufficient funds; and
(5) whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First issue. Whether the RTC, which tried and convicted petitioner, had jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner claims that the RTC which tried and convicted him had no jurisdiction over violations of B.P. Blg. 22 since
such jurisdiction is vested on the MTC in view of Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129.
We do not agree.
As clearly provided by Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, to wit:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases.---Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
.....
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, OR, a fine of not more than four thousand pesos or both such fine and imprisonment.
The Information in this case was filed on October 4, 1993.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7691 took effect and amended Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 to read as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. --- Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
.....
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the Information in the present case was filed prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 7691, the old rule governs and
therefore, considering that the imposable penalty for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 per Section 1, thereof is imprisonment of
not less than thirty days but not more than one year OR by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment; and inasmuch
as the fine imposable in the present case is more than ₱4,000.00 as the subject amount of the check is ₱980,000.00,
it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the present case. As we held in People vs. Velasco :36
…as a general rule…the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where
a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending
prior to the enactment of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached
the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive
application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity…At the time the
case against the appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court
had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
.....
…In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law
then in force (R.A. No. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the
commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction
of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.37
Second issue. Whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
We have held that knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, thus the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the time
of the issuance and on the check’s presentment for payment if he fails to pay the amount of the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor.38
Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds
or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.
As a rule, the prosecution has a duty to prove all the elements of the crime, including the acts that give rise to
the prima facie presumption. Petitioner, on the other hand, has a right to rebut such presumption. Thus, if such
knowledge of insufficiency of funds is proven to be actually absent or inexistent, the accused should not be held liable
for the offense defined under the first paragraph of Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22,39 thus:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit or to cover the
full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
....
In the present case, the prosecution has established the prima facie presumption of knowledge of petitioner of
insufficient funds through the demand letter sent to petitioner, Exhibit "C"40 which was duly received by petitioner as
shown by the registry return receipt, Exhibit "D".41
Petitioner tried to rebut the prima facie presumption by insisting that he is not an owner of Unlad and he has already
severed his accommodation arrangement with Bautista as early as 1989. He argues that the affidavits of Bautista
exonerating him from any responsibility as well as the private complainant’s own testimony that he never dealt with
petitioner, should be given weight.
We are not persuaded.
It is a hornbook doctrine that unless the affiant himself takes the witness stand to affirm the averments in his
affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay.42 The trial court
and the Court of Appeals were correct in considering the same as hearsay evidence and in not giving probative
weight to such affidavits.
Moreover, petitioner had admitted that he continued investing in Unlad until April 1994. Hence, he now cannot claim
that he has completely severed his ties with Bautista as of 1989. With nothing but his bare assertions, which are
ambiguous at best, petitioner has failed to rebut the prima facie presumption laid down by the statute and established
by the prosecution.
Petitioner’s insistence that since he is not an owner of Unlad, he could not have had any knowledge as to the
insufficiency of funds is devoid of merit. As clarified in Lao vs. Court of Appeals,43 the very case petitioner is invoking,
the doctrine that a mere employee tasked to sign checks in blanks may not be deemed to have knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds applies only to corporate checks and not to personal checks.44 In this case, what is involved is
a personal and not a corporate check.
Worth mentioning also is the fact that in the Lao case, the notice of dishonor was never personally received by
petitioner, thus the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds never arose. Here, as correctly
found by the RTC, petitioner was duly notified of the dishonor of the subject check as shown by Exh. "C,"45 a letter,
specifically mentioning that the subject check was dishonored for reason "Account Closed," with the corresponding
registry return receipt showing that petitioner received the notice on August 16, 1993 which petitioner did not
impugn.46
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration.47 Valuable consideration, in turn, may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or
indorser.48
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in
exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable
consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation
incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24,
1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit
since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or
Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.49
Fourth issue. Whether the private complainant, at the time of issuance, had knowledge that the checks had no
sufficient funds.
We have held that knowledge of the payee that the drawer did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank at the
time the check was issued is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22.50This
is because the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance
thereof are inconsequential.51
In Yu Oh vs. Court of Appeals 52 the Court held that there is no violation of B.P. Blg. 22, if complainant was actually
told by the drawer that he has no sufficient funds in the bank.53 In the present case, since there is no evidence that a
categorical statement was given to private complainant when the subject check was issued to him, the above ruling
cannot apply.
Fifth issue. Whether the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner maintains that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since the prosecution
failed to rebut his allegation that he was not anymore connected with the business of Bautista and the trial court relied
solely on the authenticity of petitioner’s signature on the subject check to convict him of the offense charged. We are
not convinced.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty. Suffice it to say the law requires only moral
certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in a prejudiced mind.54
After reviewing the entire records of this case, we find that there is no reason to depart from the trial court’s judgment
of conviction. The weight and quantum of evidence needed to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt
were met and established by the prosecution and correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
However, in view of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No.
13-2001, establishing a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22; and the
recommendation of the Solicitor General in its Comment that the policy laid down in Vaca vs. Court of
Appeals ,55and Lim vs. People,56 of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness, be considered in favor of petitioner who is not shown to be a habitual
delinquent or a recidivist,57 we find that the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals should be modified by deleting
the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine of ₱200,000.00.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be
found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not.58 Considering that the civil aspect of the case
is deemed instituted with the criminal case and considering that the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to
award, in their respective judgments, the interest on the amount due to private complainant, it is incumbent upon us
to correct the patent error of the lower courts. Private complainant is entitled to a 12% legal interest per annum from
the date of finality of judgment.59
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: The sentence
of imprisonment is deleted. Instead, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00, subject to subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code; and petitioner is ordered to pay
the private complainant the amount of ₱980,000.00 with 12% legal interest per annum from the date of finality of
herein judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., and concurred in by Justices Jainal D. Rasul and Ruben T. Reyes; Rollo, pp.
49-57.
2 Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Mariano M. Umali (now
retired).
7 Spelled as "Zayda" in the TSN, May 24, 1995, but "Zenaida" in the RTC decision, Rollo, p. 63.
42 People vs. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401 , October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 1, 8; People vs. Rendoque , January 20,
2000, 322 SCRA 622, 635.
47 Ty vs. People, G.R. No. 149275 , September 27, 2004.
50 Ty vs. People, supra; Rigor vs. People, G.R. No. 144887 , November 17, 2004.
51 Rigor vs. People, supra.
52 G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003, 403 SCRA 300.
53 Id., p. 316, citing Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals , January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA
73, 79.
54 People vs. Esquila, G.R. No. 116727 , February 27, 1996, 254 SCRA 140, 147.
55 November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 656.
56 G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, 340 SCRA 497.
57 Rollo, p. 159.
58 People vs. Laguerta , October 30, 2000, 344 SCRA 453, 458; People vs. Balacano , July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA
615, 629-630.
59 Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation vs. Court of Appeal , January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 73, 79.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution2of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent
to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a
disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental
Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash
advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a
demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two
hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation
report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent
Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on
September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds
against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas'
Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating
Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a
high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the
offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of
SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (₱71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by
reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with
deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of ₱71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a
MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating
that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an
incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected
balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers
were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a
position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the
cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not in
a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said
court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249.
According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to
the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT
NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION
2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's
appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)
(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first,
enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the
rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a
public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but
his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a
decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution
or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished
by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.1avvphi1
In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to
(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their
commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case
of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance of his official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had
thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan,
et al.,12 thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took
effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission
of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was
on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or
employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was
instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No.
1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated
by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other
city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army
and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section
4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the
public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only
because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are
committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would
fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606
as amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is
a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is
included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is
not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the
principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation
of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant
case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g),
since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that
accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could
exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then she is not
covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.1avvphi1
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the
Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a)
to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the
said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses
or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section
in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section
4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in
relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are
committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense
charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the
accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive
to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is
held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17Thus, in the case of Lacson v.
Executive Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court
ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and
that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant’s attack
to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant
might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante
for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her
office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the
application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there
would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently
exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the
said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said
offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused’s
office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x."
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element
of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x20
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the
public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same
section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical
or special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers  who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers  to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No.
679 dated August 3, 2009.
** Per Special Order No. 678 dated August 3, 2009.
1 Dated April 20, 2005, rollo, pp. 30-58.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi (now retired), with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and
Norberto Y. Geraldez, concurring, rollo, pp. 59-75.
3 Sandiganbayan rollo, pp. 1-3.
4 Id. at 34-35.
5 Id. at 45-48.
6 Id. at 54-70.
7 G..R. No. 143047, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 388.
8 Rollo, pp. 96-102.
9 Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-38204, September 24, 1991, 201 SCRA 632.
10 Rollo, pp. 106-110.
11 G.R. Nos. 146646-49, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 236, 242, citing People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613 (1960).
12 G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 224.
13 Id. at 238-239, citing Presidential Decree No. 1486
14 Id., citing Section 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty
higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent
with the regular courts.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees.
Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall, at all times, be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action
shall be recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where
the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may
no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed
and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in cases within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is first
filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the
regular courts of competent jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the
armed forces in the active service.
15 Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122641, January 20, 1997, 266 SCRA 379.
16 Supra note 7.
17 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan 468 Phil. 374, 387 (2004), citing People v. Montejo, supra note 11, at 622.
18 G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298, 318.
19 393 Phil. 143, 157-158 (2000).
20 Cunanan v. Arceo, G.R. No. 116615, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 88, 96.
21 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 287 (2004), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 430, 448 (1996).
22 Id., citing PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., 213 SCRA 16, 26 (1992).
23 Id., citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 347-348.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182792 August 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PEPITO NEVERIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the November 23, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01374 entitled People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio, which held accused-appellant Pepito Neverio guilty of two
counts of rape. The CA Decision affirmed the September 30, 2004 Decision2 in Criminal Cases Nos. P-3182 and P-
3183 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 in Pili, Camarines Sur.
The Facts
AAA3 is a mentally deficient lass, who resides with her family in Barangay Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur. Because of
her mental condition, she was not able to go to school for most part of her life. Nonetheless, she learned to cook for
the family and clean their house.4
In the morning of June 29, 2001, AAA, then 20 years old, was alone in their home cooking. Her father was farming,
while her mother was at the poblacion5 of Pili. Her siblings, too, were somewhere else––somewhere in school and
others were tending a neighborhood store away from their residence.6
Suddenly, Pepito, AAA’s cousin, entered the kitchen by lifting the bamboo barrier with a bolo. Pepito then poked a fan
knife to AAA’s neck, placed the bolo on the table, and dragged AAA to her brother’s room. He pushed AAA on the bed
and went on top of her. Still poking the knife against AAA’s neck, he removed her shorts and panty; then he also
removed his pants. He then began to insert his penis inside AAA’s vagina. AAA shouted in pain, but Pepito covered
her mouth and continued removing and inserting his penis inside her vagina. When Pepito was done, he put on his
pants and threatened to kill AAA should she share with anyone what had happened. Fearing for her life, AAA kept
mum about the incident.7
On July 27, 2001, Pepito committed the same abuse against AAA. At around five o’clock in the afternoon, while AAA
was alone in their home, Pepito again entered AAA’s house through the kitchen. He poked his knife against AAA’s
neck, dragged her to the nearby room, and pushed her on the bed. AAA fought back but did not succeed in getting
out of the room. Pepito then brought AAA back to the bed. Still pointing the knife against AAA, Pepito removed her
lower garments, and thereafter removed his shorts and brief. He then proceeded to insert his penis inside AAA’s
vagina. Satiated, he stood up and got dressed. Before he left, he again warned AAA not to tell anyone what had
happened; otherwise, he would kill her.8
On August 1, 2001, AAA’s mother arrived from Naga City. She saw AAA crying under the bamboo grove. She asked
why AAA was crying and AAA finally revealed what Pepito had done to her. She then sought the assistance of law
enforcement authorities in investigating and in filing the appropriate charge against Pepito.91avvphi1
On August 28, 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation medico-legal expert Jane Perpetua-Fajardo conducted a
physical examination on AAA. She noted that her hymen had one healed laceration. She further stated that AAA’s
injury was probably caused by sexual intercourse and that the healed laceration was compatible with the time that the
alleged incidents of rape happened.10
On October 17, 2001, two Informations were filed against Pepito. Except for the date and time of the commission of
the crime, both Informations contained the same allegations, thus:
That on or about 10:00 A.M. on June 29, 2001 in Barangay Sagurong, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs and
grave abuse of confidence being a cousin of the private complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of force and intimidation succeed in having carnal knowledge, with [AAA], a 20 years old
mental retardate against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be
awarded by the Honorable Court.11
The other information averred the commission of the crime of rape against AAA on July 27, 2001 at 5:00 p.m.12
During trial, Pepito did not present any evidence but instead filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court. On
February 24, 2004, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence. Despite the said denial, the defense still chose
not to present any evidence. Thereafter, instead of filing a memorandum, the defense adopted its Demurrer to
Evidence as its memorandum.13
On September 30, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in Crim. Cases No. P-3182 and P-
3183, finding the accused, Pepito Neverio, a.k.a. "Totoy", GUILTY in both cases, of the crime of rape, defined and
penalized under Art. 266-A, R.A. 8353, and accordingly sentences him [to suffer] the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA for each RAPE, to indemnify the offended party, [AAA], the sum of [PhP] 50,000.00 as indemnity for each
rape, plus the sum of [PhP] 50,000.00 for each rape, as moral damages, and to pay the costs, with all the
accessories of the penalty; he is credited in full for his preventive detention had he agreed to abide with the rules for
convicted prisoners, otherwise, for 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.14
The case was appealed to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
Aware that Pepito did not present any evidence to support his cause, the CA, in its November 23, 2007 Decision,
carefully reviewed the evidence of the prosecution. It re-assessed the testimony of AAA and was convinced of its
credibility. It found that despite AAA’s mental retardation, her testimony was "direct, natural and unvarnished."15 It
noted further that the physical evidence fully supports the allegations of AAA.
Finding that the prosecution successfully proved its charges against Pepito, the CA affirmed the September 30, 2004
Decision of the RTC.
Hence, we have this appeal.
The Issues
In a Resolution dated July 30, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired.
On September 30, 2008, Pepito, through counsel, signified that he was no longer filing a supplemental brief. Thus,
the following issues raised in Pepito’s Brief dated August 30, 2006 are now deemed adopted in this present appeal:
I.
The Court a quo, gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape.
II.
The Court a quo, gravely erred in failing to appreciate the arguments of the defense in the Motion to
Dismiss with Demurrer to Evidence.16
The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.
In his Brief, Pepito argues that the prosecution failed to prove two elements of the crime as alleged in the
Information––AAA’s mental retardation and the use of force and intimidation in committing the sexual act. He claims
that medical findings confirming AAA’s mental retardation should have been presented; however, none was given in
this case. Also, he maintains that it was incredible for him to have managed to hold a knife against AAA with one
hand, while at the same time undressing and later having sex with her with only one hand free. We, however, hold
that his arguments deserve scant consideration.
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, if the victim is demented, the element of force becomes
immaterial and absence of consent is presumed. Thus, only sexual intercourse must be proved in order to convict an
accused. For this reason, if the mental age of a woman above 12 years old is that of a child below 12 years old, even
if she voluntarily submits herself to the bestial desires of the accused, or even if the circumstances of force or
intimidation are absent, the accused would still be liable for rape.17 If the victim, however, is above 12 years old and
has normal psychological faculty at the time of the crime, sexual intercourse and the attendant circumstance of force,
violence, intimidation, or threat must be proved.
In this case, the Information alleged that AAA is mentally retarded. It, however, contained also an allegation that
sexual intercourse was committed against AAA through force and intimidation and without her consent. The trial court
convicted Pepito after finding that sexual congress through force and intimidation had been sufficiently established. It
did not consider the mental condition of AAA because it was no longer necessary. As correctly ruled by the CA, AAA’s
mental retardation was inconsequential because the conviction of the accused was based on the use of force and
intimidation. The CA held:
In reality, the absence of competent evidence on the victim’s mental retardation is inconsequential because it did not
negate the finding of guilt. Contrary to the accused’s argument, her mental retardation had no bearing on the
worthiness of the evidence of rape. We find to be correct the [Office of the Solicitor General]’s submission that the
mental retardation was a "non-issue," for the conviction of the accused was based on the use of force and
intimidation. Indeed, threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to coerce the victim and constitutes an element of
rape.18
We also affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA that the sexual molestation was committed through force and
intimidation. The fact of sexual congress was established by the testimony of AAA and corroborated by the medico-
legal findings of lacerations on her hymen. When the victim’s straightforward testimony is consistent with the physical
finding of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.19
As to the attendant circumstance of force, this was likewise sufficiently established. Force or intimidation necessary in
rape is relative, for it largely depends on the circumstances of the rape as well as the size, age, strength, and relation
of the parties.20 Notably, however, the act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force or at least
intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring a woman to submission. 21 And the victim
does not even need to prove resistance.22 To appreciate force or intimidation, it is enough to show that such force or
intimidation was sufficient to consummate the bestial desires of the malefactor against the victim. Such was
determined in this case.
In Pepito’s Motion to Dismiss with Demurrer to Evidence, he faults AAA for her failure to state the place where the
alleged crime happened. He maintains that the identification of the place where the crime was committed was
necessary for vesting the court with jurisdiction over the case. This argument is without merit.
For the court to acquire jurisdiction over a criminal case, the offense or any of its essential elements should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.[23] This territorial jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint or information.[24] In this case, the October 17, 2001 Informations clearly indicated
that the acts of rape were committed in Barangay Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur. During trial, prosecution evidence
showed that the molestations happened in AAA’s house. And as testified by AAA’s mother, their house was situated in
Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur. Thus, AAA’s inability to state her address in her testimony was trivial. Understandably,
this failure was due only to her mental deficiency.
As to the damages, we find that an award of exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 is warranted, following
People v. Sia.25 Exemplary damages are awarded when the crime is attended by an aggravating circumstance;26 or
as in this case, as a public example,27 in order to protect hapless individuals from molestation.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the CA’s November 23, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01374 with
MODIFICATION. As modified, the dispositive portion of the affirmed September 30, 2004 RTC Decision shall read:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in Crim. Case Nos. P-3182 and P-
3183, finding the accused, Pepito Neverio, a.k.a. "Totoy," GUILTY in both cases, of the crime of rape, defined and
penalized under Art. 266-A, RA 8353, and accordingly sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA for each RAPE. He is likewise ordered to pay the offended party, for each rape, the sum of PhP 50,000
as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs, with all
the accessories of the penalty; he is credited in full for his preventive detention had he agreed to abide with the rules
for convicted prisoners, otherwise, for 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA** CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES***
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* As per Special Order No. 678 dated August 3, 2009.
** Additional member as per August 17, 2009 raffle.
*** Additional member as per Special Order No. 679 dated August 3, 2009.
1 Rollo, pp. 3-21. Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos and Arturo G. Tayag.
2 CA rollo, pp. 21-22. Penned by Judge Nilo Malanyaon.
3 Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004" and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, together with that of her immediate family members,
is withheld and fictitious initials instead are used to represent her, to protect her privacy.
4 Rollo, p. 5.
5 Literally "town" in Spanish. Poblacion is commonly used for the central barangay or barangays of a Philippine city
or municipality. Common features of the poblacion include a town plaza, church, market, school, and town hall. It is
sometimes shortened to "pob."
6 Rollo, p. 5.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 5-6.
9 Id. at 6.
10 Id.
11 CA rollo, p. 9.
12 Id. at 11.
13 Id. at 51.
14 Id. at 22.
15 Rollo, p. 17.
16 CA rollo, p. 51.
17 People v. Lopez, G.R. Nos. 135671-72, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 469, 476.
18 Rollo, p. 19.
19 People v. Malibiran, G.R. No. 173471, March 17, 2009; People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, February 13, 2006,
482 SCRA 435, 448.
20 People v. Murillo, G.R. Nos. 128851-56, February 19, 2001, 352 SCRA 105, 118.
21 People v. Galido, G.R. Nos. 148689-92, March 30, 2004, 425 SCRA 502, 515; People v. Baylen, G.R. No. 135242,
April 19, 2002, 381 SCRA 395, 404; People v. Dela Peña, G.R. No. 128372, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 186, 194.
22 People v. David, G.R. Nos. 121731-33, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 666, 681; People v. Moreno, G.R. No.
140033, January 25, 2002, 374 SCRA 667.
23 People v. Macasaet, G.R. No. 156747, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 255, 271; citing Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119000, July 28, 1997, 276 SCRA 367.
24 Fullero v. People, G.R. No. 170583, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 97, 123.
25 G.R. No. 174059, February 27, 2009.
26 Civil Code, Art. 2230.
27 People v. Tabio, G.R. No. 179477, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 156, 169.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 73875 May 18, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSELITO AGBULOS alias LITO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rolando S. Bala for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Upon complaint filed by Angelita P. Bangit, accused-appellant Joselito Agbulos was charged with the offense of
forcible abduction with rape. On January 23, 1981, Agbulos arraigned and pleaded not guilty.1
On April 25, 1984, the prosecution rested its case. On August 13, 1984, a warrant for the arrest of Agbulos was
issued for his failure to appear at the scheduled hearing. On September 24, 1984, the order of arrest was recalled
and set aside because notice had been sent to the wrong bonding company. Hearing was reset on November 5,
1984, and the accused was notified at his home address.2
On November 5, 1984, the accused failed to appear and his arrest was again ordered.3 The bonding company was
given 30 days to produce the person of the accused and show cause why judgment should not be rendered against
its undertaking.
On December 18, 1984, the trial court issued an order reading as follows:
Upon motion of the Fiscal, it appearing that the bonding company of the herein accused failed to produce the person
of the latter within the specified period, let judgment issue against the full amount of his bond.
Upon motion of the defense counsel, over the vigorous objection of the Fiscal, the continuation of the trial of this case
today for presentation of evidence for the defense is hereby cancelled and reset to January 30, 1985, at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning.
It is understood that should the accused still fail to appear and present evidence at the next setting, it shall be
deemed that he has waived his right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for decision
based on the evidence on record.
As requested by the defense counsel, let an Order of Arrest issue against the herein accused at his address at 119
Dionisio St., Doña Adela Subdivision, Cabanatuan City, to be coursed through the INP Station at Cabanatuan City.
SO ORDERED.
On January 30, 1985, the accused still failed to appear.4 His counsel manifested in court that he was adopting the
prosecution witness Ernesto Tamayo as evidence for the accused. Thereafter, the defense rested its case.
On July 11, 1985, judgment was rendered against the bonding company for failure to produce the accused and to
explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be forfeited.
On June 15, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused Joselito Agbulos guilty of forcible abduction
with rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim
Angelita Bangit in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.5
On August 16, 1985, the counsel for the accused filed a notice of appeal.
The trial in absentia was perfectly valid, having been held in accordance with Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, which has been reproduced verbatim in Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution,
providing in part as follows:
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed not withstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely
deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old case of People v.
Avanceña6 required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as
the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not
waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the
authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he has not been recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by the Bill of Rights, which now allows trial in absentia. Now
the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided
only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
Under the old doctrine, trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified
thereof. Under the present rule, the fugitive is deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has
escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal
justification.
In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately
absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to his
disadvantage as he will be unable to attend his trial, which will continue even in his absence and most likely result in
his conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will identify the accused.7 The defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right
and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial.
He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear
unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
By the same token, the accused has forfeited the right to appeal. The record shows that after arraignment and during
the trial, Agbulos jumped bail and has not been apprehended to date. The last time he appeared in court was on April
25, 1984, when the prosecution rested its case. The rest of the trial was held in absentia, resulting in the judgment of
conviction.
Rule 124, Section 8, of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may, "upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." We have held that once an accused escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he
surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.8
In the case at bar, the appellant has remained at large even as he hopes that his appeal will succeed and he can then
appear before the Court to claim his victory. He hopes in vain.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for issuance of
the mittimus.
SO ORDERED.
Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Records, p. 62.
2 Ibid., pp. 366, 389, 387.
3 Id., p. 397.
4 Id., p. 408.
5 Decision rendered by Judge Pablo S. Villanueva of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.
6 32 O.G. 713.
7 Aquino v. Mil. Commission No. 2; 63 SCRA 546; People v. The Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269.
8 People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 101387 March 11, 1998

SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may
already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled
by mandamus to issue such decree?
The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamus 1 under Rule 65 which asks
this Court to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in
Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision
disposing thus: 3
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and
Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares,
confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano
[sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave.,
Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order 4 dated March 15, 1991
requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners
filed this action for mandamus. 5
Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of
the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said decree: 6
In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to
the above-noted case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372,
a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was
filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a
portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per
plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex "A" hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and
1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex
"B" hereof, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of
Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority,
a copy is Annex "C" hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "D"
hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of land described
therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "E" hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355,
or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical description of the parcel of
land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of
the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. — 7237, is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as
Annex "F" hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title
issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are [sic] incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision
dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the
integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et al.,); . . . .
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995, 7 for an
early resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which
ordered: 8
. . . Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda
Laburada herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since
19 May 1993 (the date of respondent's Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot subject of LRC Case No. N-
11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City,
might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to which was
attached a letter, dated November 27, 1997, of Feline M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree
Division, which states: 9
With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992
addressed to Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a
portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of
Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per verification
of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the
petitioners pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the
duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens
registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio
Migriño, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue: 10
Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC
Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA "unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of
an act which the laws specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office . . . ." They cite four reasons why the writ
should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a "clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA
has the imperative duty to perform" because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the "jurisdictional
requirement of notices and publication should be complied with." 11 Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an
opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA
to "take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595."
Rather, it is the "sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper action
whatever claim they may have against the property subject of petitioners' application for registration." Third,
petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of "the failure of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No.
6595" notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles. 12 Fourth, the State "consented to its
being sued" in this case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case "as
final and make provision for its satisfaction." 13
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trial court is not
valid, considering that "[the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for the same land is null and void." 14On the
question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos
vs. Rodriguez 15 which held: 16
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may be
ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict
adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration
over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was
spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the
Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, "(t)he very purpose of
the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for
registration." The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to
be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and
incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We
have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one
year after the entry of the final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals: 17
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously
maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They
anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment
has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for
the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in
relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the
decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent
Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October
1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1)
year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year
has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or
nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose,
and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 18 this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have
in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as
administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called
upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and
conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were
personally notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance
of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:
Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or
adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom
it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the
right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to
file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or
certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the
decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of
appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to
the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever
the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act
No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and
November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register — Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 — is a
portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the
other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's
refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the trial
court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the
name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and
void, 19 since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. 20 Thus, if it is proven
that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of
a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21
As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it
follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the
same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the
case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this Court,
through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of
respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate
ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as
land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in
favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the
same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the
land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court
has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same
title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in
the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the
latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no
right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system
which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of
the people in the efficacy of the registration law.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which
may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: 22
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be done
before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions,
especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to
another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227,
234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon
the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires trained technical
men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered
registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be
entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General
Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the
administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that
said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court
and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one(De los Reyes vs. De
Villa, supra). . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act
involving the exercise of discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners'
legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete.24 Under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a
matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be
disregarded. 25 But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this
case, mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be
enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties. 26 As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable
by mandamus. 27 The court has to decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding of the law. 28
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid
multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to
determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report
thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the said court shall act
with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The
Land Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with
finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After
receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to
settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein
discussed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 This case was filed prior to the issuance of Revised Administrative Circular 1-95 which directs that actions
against quasi-judicial bodies in general should be filed in the Court of Appeals.
2 Per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila (now Pasig City), Branch LXVIII.
3 Rollo, p. 5.
4 Rollo, p. 6.
5 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 25, 1997, upon this Court's receipt of the public
respondent's reply in compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 10, 1996.
6 Rollo, pp. 48-49.
7 Rollo, pp. 83-84.
8 Rollo, p. 85; original text in upper case.
9 Rollo, p. 113.
10 Rollo, p. 70; petitioners' memorandum, p. 2.
12 Rollo, p 72; petitioners' memorandum, p. 4.
14 Rollo, p. 63; the LRA's rejoinder, p. 2; citing Rojas, et al., vs. City of Tagaytay and Hon. Jimenez, 106 Phil. 512,
November 24, 1959; Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154, September 29, 1961.
15 244 SCRA 418, 423-424, May 29, 1995, per Romero, J.
16 Rollo, p. 165; the LRA's reply, p. 5.
17 168 SCRA 503, December 15, 1988, per Padilla, J.; citing Section 32, PD 1529; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil 113;
Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil 256; Afalla and Pinanoc vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil 622; Roman Catholic Bishops of Cebu vs.
Phil. Railway Co., 49 Phil. 540; De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil. 227; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558,
June 22, 1922; Director of Lands vs. Busuego, 12 SCRA 678.
18 Supra, at 422.
19 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 783, November 17,
1992, citing Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558, June 22, 1922.
20 PD 1529 provides:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
21 Supra, at pp. 159-160, per Labrador, J; citing Pamintuan vs. Agustin, supra; Timbol vs. Diaz, 44 Phil. 587, 590,
march 5, 1923; Perez vs. Bolbon, 50 Phil 791, 795, September 30, 1927; Singian vs. Manila Railroad Co., 60 Phil
192, 203, June 19, 1934; Addison vs. Payatas Estate Improvement Co., 60 Phil 673, September 27, 1934; Sideco, et
al. vs. Aznar, 92 Phil 952, April 24, 1953.
22 85 Phil. 256, 260-261, December 29, 1949, per Tuason, J.
23 Go vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 564, 567, January 29, 1996.
24 Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99, July 17, 1996, University of San Agustin, Inc. vs. CA, 230 SCRA 761,
March 7, 1994; Tamano vs. Manglapus, 214 SCRA 567, October 13, 1992; Marcelo vs. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439,
July 7, 1986; Samson vs. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198, July 20, 1936.
25 Pelileo vs. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272, December 29, 1949.
26 Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280, 284, April 25, 1991; Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
91 Phil 608, July 11, 1952.
27 Go vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
28 Lupisan vs. Alfonso and Arguieta, 78 Phil 842, July 31, 1947.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172357 March 19, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
MARCELO BUSTAMANTE y ZAPANTA, NEIL BALUYOT y TABISORA, RICHARD DELOS TRINO y SARCILLA,
HERMINIO JOSE y MONSON, EDWIN SORIANO y DELA CRUZ and ELMER SALVADOR y JAVALE, Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The police authorities are the ones tasked to promote and maintain peace and order in our country. Thus, it becomes
doubly deplorable when they themselves commit the criminal act. In this case, appellants insist on their innocence;
they deny that they killed the victim Romeleo Quintos on June 1, 1997 inside the detention cell of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA). But we are not persuaded. We took a second hard look at the evidence presented and
we hold that both the trial court and the appellate court correctly found that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellants are guilty of murder.
This is an appeal from the July 19, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665
which affirmed in toto the March 17, 2000 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109,
finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Also assailed is the March 6, 2006
Resolution3 of the CA denying the separate motions for reconsideration filed by the appellants.
Factual Antecedents
On May 22, 1998, two Informations were filed against the herein appellants, together with Carlito Lingat and Mutalib
Abdulajid, charging them with the crimes of Murder and Arbitrary Detention. The Informations read:
Crim. Case No. 98-0547 (for Murder):
The undersigned Ombudsman Investigator, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, hereby accuses NEIL
BALUYOT, RICHARD DELOS TRINO, HERMINIO JOSE, EDWIN SORIANO, MARCELO BUSTAMANTE, CARLITO
LINGAT, MUTALIB ABDULAJID, AND ELMER SALVADOR of the crime of MURDER defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That in the early morning of June 01, 1997, between 2:00 to 3:00 o’clock [in the morning], or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused NEIL
BALUYOT, RICHARD DELOS TRINO, HERMINIO JOSE, EDWIN SORIANO, MARCELO BUSTAMANTE, and
CARLITO LINGAT, all public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Force, assigned
[at] the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), and accused ELMER SALVADOR and MUTALIB ABDULAJID,
security guards, also assigned at the NAIA, conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill and
taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie a plastic nylon
cord around the neck of one Romeleo A. Quintos, and hang him at the end portion of the detention cell, which caused
the instantaneous death of said Romeleo A. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 98-0548 (for Arbitrary Detention)
The undersigned Ombudsman Investigator, Office of the Ombudsman for the Military, hereby accuses EDWIN D.
SORIANO, MARCELO Z. BUSTAMANTE, HERMINIO M. JOSE, CARLITO D. LINGAT and NEIL T. BALUYOT of the
crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, committed
as follows:
That on or about June 01, 1997, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, all public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police Force
assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, conspiring and confederating with each other, committing the
offense in relation to their office, and without any legal ground, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
detain and restrain Romeleo A. Quintos of his personal liberty, without his consent and against his will since midnight
of May 31, 1997 until around 3:15 a.m. of June 01, 1997 when said Romeleo A. Quintos was found dead inside the
detention cell.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Neil Baluyot (Baluyot), Richard Delos Trino (Delos Trino), Herminio Jose (Jose), Edwin Soriano (Soriano), Marcelo
Bustamante (Bustamante), Carlito Lingat (Lingat) and Elmer Salvador (Salvador), were arraigned on July 14, 1998
where they all entered a plea of not guilty.6 Mutalib Abdulajid (Abdulajid) remains at large.
The records show that at around midnight of May 31, 1997, Romeleo Quintos (Romeleo) and his friend, Ancirell Sales
(Ancirell), went to the NAIA to fetch Rolando Quintos (Rolando), brother of Romeleo, who was arriving from the
United States. At the arrival extension area of the NAIA, Ancirell alighted from the car driven by Romeleo to check
whether Rolando had already arrived. Upon his return, he was surprised to see Romeleo arguing with a man in
uniform later identified as Soriano who arrested Romeleo for expired license.
Romeleo vehemently denied the charge causing a heated altercation. Outraged, Romeleo challenged Soriano to a
gun duel. Thinking that Romeleo was a military man, Soriano called for reinforcement. In a few minutes, Lingat and
Bustamante arrived followed by Jose. They asked Romeleo to hand over his license but the request went unheeded.
Thus, Jose seized the ignition key of the vehicle and ordered Romeleo to alight from the vehicle but the latter refused.
Thereupon, Soriano, Lingat, Bustamante and Jose pulled Romeleo out of the vehicle and brought him to the
Intelligence and Investigation Division of the NAIA (IID-NAIA) supposedly for questioning. At the IID-NAIA, it was
decided that Romeleo be brought to the Pasay General Hospital for examination where he was found positive for
alcoholic breath. Thereafter, Romeleo was brought back to the IID-NAIA for further investigation.
Romeleo was shoved into a cell already occupied by prosecution witness Noel Gabornes (Gabornes), who had
earlier been arrested for being an unauthorized porter. Professing his innocence, Romeleo cursed and shouted at
Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose, Soriano, Bustamante, Lingat, Salvador and Abdulajid to release him as he was only at the
airport to fetch his brother. Jose ordered him to stop but Romeleo persisted. Infuriated, Jose entered the cell and
kicked the victim hard on the stomach. Salvador also entered the cell followed by Baluyot while Delos Trino stayed
near the door. Romeleo was still reeling from the blow delivered by Jose when Baluyot boxed him in the abdomen.
Salvador also punched him at the solar plexus causing the victim to writhe in pain at a corner of the cubicle. To avoid
being hit, Gabornes went outside the cell.
Gasping for breath, Romeleo sought succor from Gabornes but the latter declined, afraid to get involved. After a
while, Gabornes asked Jose if he could go home but the latter did not answer. Instead, Jose directed Salvador to
transfer Gabornes to an adjacent cell. Thereafter, Gabornes overheard Jose saying "tapusin na natin ito". Intrigued,
Gabornes peered through the iron grill to see what was happening. From his vantage point, he saw Baluyot handing
a piece of grayish plastic cord to Salvador. Thereafter, he heard Romeleo coughing and gasping for breath as if he
was being strangled. Peering closely, the witness saw Salvador and Abdulajid twisting the cord with a piece of wood,
"garrote" style. Romeleo’s hand could be seen trying to reach for the piece of wood in a backward angle in a vain
effort to stop the twisting. After a couple of minutes, Gabornes saw a body being carried out of the cell. Delos Trino
then approached Gabornes and said: "Kung anong nakita mo, nakita mo lang. Kung anong narinig mo, narinig mo
lang. Sana huwag mo ng ikalat ito." Fearing for his life, Gabornes promised not to tell anybody about the incident.
Thereafter, he was released.
At about that time, the victim’s brother, Rolando, had already arrived from the United States. Informed by Ancirell of
the detention of his brother Romeleo, Rolando set out for home to deposit his luggage but immediately went back to
the airport with Ancirell and a cousin, Rabadon Gavino (Gavino), to check on Romeleo. At around 3:00 a.m. of the
same day, they arrived at the IID-NAIA office and were met in the hallway by Bustamante who told them that
Romeleo was in the detention cell. Asking for directions, the group was ushered towards a dark cell. When the lights
were turned on, they were horrified to see the lifeless body of Romeleo hanging with a cord around his neck with the
other end tied around the iron grills of the cell window.
Rolando, Ancirell and Gavino, along with Soriano and Lingat, immediately brought the victim to the San Juan De Dios
Hospital aboard a police car. Rolando and his companions carried the victim to the emergency room. Soriano and
Lingat remained in the vehicle but returned to the NAIA after a while. Romeleo was declared dead on arrival by the
attending physician. Gabornes later learned of the victim’s identity through the newspapers.
Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose, Soriano, Bustamante, and Lingat, were all members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) assigned with the IID-NAIA, while Salvador and Abdulajid were security guards of the Lanting Security Agency
assigned at NAIA.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court promulgated its Decision dated March 17, 2000, the decretal portion reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, Richard delos Trino y Sarcilla,
Herminio Jose y Mozon, Edwin Soriano y dela Cruz, Marcelo Bustamante y Zapanta, Carlito Lingat y Salvador, Elmer
Salvador y Javale, and Mutalib Abdulajid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 98-0457.
It appearing on evidence that the accused voluntarily surrendered at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
as evidenced by Exh. 21, the Court credits them with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and hereby
sentences each of them to RECLUSION PERPETUA and for each accused to pay the heirs of the victim indemnity in
the amount of ₱50,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 98-0548 for Arbitrary Detention, it appearing from the evidence that the victim Romeleo Quintos
was detained at the IID for three (3) hours and fifteen (15) minutes, the same is punished or penalized under Art. 124,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code which is herein below reproduced:
ART. 124. Arbitrary Detention. – Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its minimum period if the detention
has not exceeded three days;
xxxx
hence the case is not within the jurisdiction of this Court.
The OIC of this Court is hereby ordered to transmit the records of Criminal Case No. 98-0548 for Arbitrary detention
to the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The Petition for Bail filed by all the accused is hereby considered moot and academic.
Let an Alias Warrant of arrest be issued in so far as accused Mutalib Abdulajid is concerned who remains at large.
SO ORDERED.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in a Decision dated July 19, 2005, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, appellants filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. In the meantime, Lingat died. On March 6,
2006, the CA denied the motions for reconsideration.9
All the appellants, except Bustamante, filed notices of appeal. Bustamante filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Admit
Second Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution11 dated April 28, 2006.
Thereafter, Bustamante filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari but the same was treated as an appeal in the
Resolution12 dated January 15, 2007.
Issues
The issues raised are: (1) whether the uncorroborated testimony of the lone eyewitness, Gabornes, is sufficient to
produce a judgment of conviction; (2) whether conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) whether
appellants should be held liable only for homicide, and not for murder.
Our Ruling
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense, we are unable to
consider the appellants’ appeal with favor.
The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough to warrant conviction.
We find that the CA did not err in affirming the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellants of murder based on
the testimony of Gabornes, the lone eyewitness. It is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if
credible, is enough to warrant conviction. Both the trial court and the CA found Gabornes to be credible and whose
testimony is entitled to full faith. We find no cogent reason to depart from said findings.
As borne out by the records, Gabornes positively identified and categorically pointed to appellants as the ones who
conspired with one another to kill Romeleo on June 1, 1997. He narrated the incident in a clear and convincing
manner. He testified on the degree of participation of each of the accused with regard to the killing of Romeleo inside
the IID-NAIA detention cell in such a manner that only an unbiased eyewitness could narrate. Gabornes was not
shown to have had any ill motives to testify falsely against the appellants. As correctly observed by both the trial court
and the CA, the fact that Gabornes was previously arrested for being an unauthorized porter is not enough reason for
him to falsely accuse appellants of a very grave offense.
We also hold that the CA correctly disregarded the affidavit of recantation of Gabornes dated February 21, 2005. In
the said affidavit, Gabornes denied that he was inside the detention cell of the NAIA on June 1, 1997. Instead, he
claimed that he was under the fly-over near the NAIA playing a card game. Consequently, he averred that there is no
truth to his testimony given before the trial court pointing to the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. We are
not persuaded.
Our ruling in People v. Ballabare13 is instructive:
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties simply because
an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any recantation
must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-examine
the recanting witness. x x x
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction,
this circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can
easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, when
confronted with a situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original
testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence
through a comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. x x
x 14
As we have already discussed, Gabornes’ testimony given before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the
trial court was replete with details that only a person who witnessed such gruesome crime could narrate. Even during
cross-examination, he remained steadfast in his account that the appellants were the ones who killed Romeleo. Also,
both the trial court and the appellate court had several opportunities of taking a hard look at the records of the case
considering the motions for reconsideration filed by the appellants. Both the CA and the RTC found beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellants were indeed the authors of the crime.
The prosecution satisfactorily established that appellants conspired with each other in killing Romeleo.
We are not persuaded by the contention of the appellants that there was no conspiracy considering that they were in
different areas of the NAIA premises when the crime took place. As correctly held by the CA:
At bar, appellants claimed that they were either at the NAIA parking lot or were at the adjacent IID-NAIA office when
the crime took place. These places, however, are but a short distance away from the scene of the crime and one
could travel to and from these points in a little over a few seconds or minutes of leisure walking, as readily admitted
by appellants in their own version of the event. Verily, the possibility of appellants to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission, is thus not farfetched.15
Besides, it is not required for conspiracy to exist that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution. Direct proof of such agreement is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest.16
This community of design is present among the appellants as deduced from their individual acts. The RTC observed
thus:
The act of the accused Elmer Salvador, Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, and Richard Delos Trino y Sarcilla of boxing the
victim on the stomach and the act of accused Herminio Jose who said ‘tapusin na natin ito’ together with the act of
accused Neil Baluyot of handing a ‘tale’ or cord to Elmer Salvador who thereafter twisted the cord which was around
the neck of the victim with a piece of wood with the help of accused Mutalib Abdulajid who up to the present remained
at large, all acts of which were done in the presence of all the accused namely: Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, Richard
Delos Trino y Sarcilla, Herminio Jose y Mozon, Edwin Soriano y dela Cruz, Marcelo Bustamante y Zapanta, Carlito
Lingat y Damaso and Elmer Salvador (including the accused who is at large) clearly show that all accused conspired,
confederated and helped one another in murdering the victim with abuse of superior strength by strangling and
hanging the victim Romeleo Quintos causing him to die of asphyxia. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
xxxx
Likewise, the act of accused Carlito Lingat y Damaso and Edwin Soriano y Dela Cruz of not coming to the hospital to
give the medical clerk the name and circumstances of the victim including the facts surrounding the victim’s death is
very suspicious indeed and is contrary to the SOP of officers who bring victims to the hospital. Also the failure of all
the accused to immediately report to the police investigator of Pasay City is quite unusual. In the same manner the
acts of accused Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, Herminio Jose y Mozon and Richard Delos Trino y Sarcilla of leaving the IID
office and cell which is the scene of the crime and then going to Biňan and to Atty. Augusto Jimenez is quite unusual for persons
who professed innocence.17
Moreover, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but may be proven
through the series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of their common unlawful purpose. For
collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of
them acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to kill the victim.18
The CA correctly observed that:
A fortiori, appellants should be held liable for the death of Romeleo Quintos. Their sequential attack, one after
another, revealed their unlawful intent to kill the victim. Herminio Jose’s utterances of "tapusin na natin ito" only
strengthens the link that binds the acts of the appellants in their coordinated effort to kill Romeleo. x x x19
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
There is likewise no merit to appellants’ contention that they should only be held liable for homicide, and not for
murder, because the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not specifically alleged in the
Information.
Contrary to the assertion of the appellants, the Information specifically alleged that the appellants were –
x x x conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie a plastic nylon cord around the neck of one Romeleo A.
Quintos, and hang him at the end portion of the detention cell, which caused the instantaneous death of said
Romeleo A. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
It has been satisfactorily established that Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose, Soriano, Bustamante, and Lingat, were all
members of the PNP assigned with the IID-NAIA, while Salvador and Mutalib were security guards of the Lanting
Security Agency assigned at NAIA. The eight of them acted in concert and definitely took advantage of their superior
strength in subduing and killing their lone victim who was unarmed. Thus, all the appellants must be held liable for the
crime of murder.
All told, appellants miserably failed to show convincing reasons to overturn the Decision of both the trial court and the
CA. In this case, the CA ascertained the factual findings of the trial court to be supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt which led to the conclusion that appellants acted in unison in killing Romeleo. It is worthy to stress that findings
of fact of the CA, especially if they affirm factual findings of the trial court, will not be disturbed by this Court, unless
these findings are not supported by evidence.20
The liabilities of Carlito Lingat and Mutalib Abdulajid
It has not escaped our notice that Abdulajid was not arraigned and remains at large up to this time. However, in the
Decision of the trial court which was affirmed by the CA, Abdulajid was likewise found guilty as charged. This is
erroneous considering that without his having been arraigned, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person.
As regards Lingat, his death pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguished his criminal and civil
liabilities.21 Moreover, the death of Lingat would result in the dismissal of the criminal case against him.22
Damages
We note that both the trial court and the CA awarded the heirs of the victim only the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,23 we also award the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
Further, we also award the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Angeles24 where we held that "under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal
cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, (in this case, abuse of superior
strength). This is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The imposition
of exemplary damages is also justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example for the public
good." In addition, and in lieu of actual damages, we also award temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00.25
Likewise, we note that both the trial court and the CA overlooked the fact that during the testimony of Clementina
Quintos, the mother of the victim, sufficient evidence was presented to show that the victim before his untimely death,
was gainfully employed in a private company with a monthly salary of ₱15,000.00.
Fiscal Barrera:
Q – Would you describe Romeleo Quintos prior to his death?
A – He was gainfully employed. He is an executive at IPC (International product Corporation), Makati as operation
officer.
xxxx
Q – How much was your son Romeleo Quintos receiving as operation officer at IPC?
A – ₱15,000.00, sir, monthly.
Q – Do you have any evidence to show that he earn Five Thousand pesos [sic] (₱15,000.00) a month as project
engineer?
A – Yes, sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
May I request that the Certification dated January 22, 1999 issued by IPC be marked as Exh. "EEE"; the name
appearing thereat that Romeleo Quintos has been an employee of IPC from January 8, 1997 up to June 1, 1997 with
the position of operation officer with monthly salary of ₱15,000.00 x x x be marked as Exh. "EEE-1" and the signature
of a person who issued the certification be marked as Exh. "EEE-2".26
The formula27 for unearned income is as follows:
Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income (GAI) less Living Expenses (50% GAI)]
Where Life Expectancy= 2/3 x (80 – age of the deceased)
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. That amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least Three Thousand
Pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter, such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the accused, had no earning capacity at the time
of his death;
xxxx
Hence, the testimony of the victim’s mother that Romeleo was earning ₱15,000.00 per month is sufficient basis for an
award of damages for loss of earning capacity.1avvphi1
It is well settled that the factors that should be taken into account in determining the compensable amount of lost
earnings are: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; (2) the rate of loss sustained
by the heirs of the deceased.
The unearned income of Romeleo is computed as follows:
Unearned Income = 2/3 (80 – 3028) [(₱15,000.00 x 12) – ½ (₱15,000.00 x 12)]

= 2/3 (50) (₱180,000.00 – ₱90,000.00)
= 2/3 (50) (₱90,000.00)
= 9,000,000.00/3
= ₱ 3,000,000.00
WHEREFORE, the July 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665 is MODIFIED.
Appellants Neil Baluyot, Richard Delos Trino, Herminio Jose, Edwin Soriano, Marcelo Bustamante, and Elmer
Salvador, are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Romeleo Quintos the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
₱3,000,000.00 as lost income. In view of the death of Carlito Lingat pending appeal and prior to the finality of his
conviction, Criminal Case No. 98-0547 is DISMISSED and the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE insofar as Carlito
Lingat is concerned. Insofar as Mutalib Abdulajid is concerned, the March 17, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 in Criminal Case No. 98-0547 is NULLIFIED for failure of the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the appealed July 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00665 is likewise SET ASIDE insofar as Mutalib Abdulajid is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 CA rollo, pp. 786-803; penned by then Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Aurora Santiago Lagman.
2 Id. at 128-179; penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez.
3 Id. at 854-855.
4 Id. at 85-86.
5 Id. at 87.
6 Records, pp. 110-116.
7 CA rollo, pp. 178-179.
8 Id. at 802.
9 Id. at 854-855.
10 Id. at 858-867.
11 Id. at 871.
12 Rollo, p. 167.
13 332 Phil. 384 (1996).
14 Id. at 396-397.
15 CA rollo, p. 801
16 People v. Ricafranca, 380 Phil. 631, 642-643 (2000).
17 CA rollo, pp. 177-178.
18 People v. Magalang, G.R. No. 84274, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 571, 574.
19 CA rollo, p. 800.
20 Bañas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 144, 154 (2000).
21 People v. Abungan, 395 Phil. 456, 458 (2000).
22 Id. at 462.
23 People v. Badriago, G.R. 183566, May 8, 2009.
24 G.R. No. 177134, August 14, 2009.
25 People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 185841, August 4, 2009.
26 TSN, February 25, 1999, pp. 4-5.
27 People v. Jabiniao, Jr., G.R. No. 179499, 30 April 2008, 553 SCRA 769, 787.
28 Romeleo was 30 years old at the time of his death on June 1, 1997.
II. VENUE
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) – Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion
to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying
reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco
Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for thirteen (13)
counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia
Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI),
John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra,
Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees
of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator
of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly
owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies
(YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or
avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for
suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to
provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by
maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot6 under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-
group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone
logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to
October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be
published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published
on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is
that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga
Yuchengcos.
LET’S MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER.
Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott
ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I
mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga
ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x 9 (emphasis in the
original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused,
filed thirteen (13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition
and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together
with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of
attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing
the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and
caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and
defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the
next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex
"F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to
the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible
for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with
the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor’s Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of
Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the
withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was
non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash16the
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts
complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the
RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the
trial court’s jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in
Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the
Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended
parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address
in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and
first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,20 insisting that the Information sufficiently
conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban21 which held that the Information
need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it
pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that
even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is
jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of
form that may be cured by amendment.22
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration and
accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,24 the accusatory
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition
and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty,
virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family
particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to
public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati
City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati
City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the
public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the
accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party
accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to
be sufficient in form.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August
12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE
DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27
With the filing of Gimenez’s Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on
hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the
public respondent’s admission of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,29 as a rule, requires that recourse must
first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.30 A regard for judicial
hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed
in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however,
as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
factual but purely legal questions.32
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of
exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in
criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC –whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a
charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall
be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office
is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is
printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import
in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of
the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo35 which laid out the rules on
venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier
pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or
information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a
public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be
a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the
venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of
two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case
opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published
and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to
the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced
upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of
Appeals36 explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the
amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the
province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written,
printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the
preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction
where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja,
43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying
the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel
V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan
(Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the
criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by
means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill
which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-
28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of
the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or
intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended
party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for
the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was
printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business
offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order
to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website
on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit
Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with
"printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where
the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in
the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply
because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.1avvphi1
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive,
the Court’s pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private
person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant’s place
of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such
as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations
imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file
the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on
a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to quash the
Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12,
2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Issued by Presiding Judge Cesar Untalan; rollo, pp. 51-52.
2 Id. at 71-72.
3 President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising Agency, Inc. (PIAA), the advertising arm of the Yuchengco Group
of Companies (YGC), tasked with preserving the image and good name of the YGC as well as the name and
reputation of the Yuchengco Family.
4 A domestic corporation with offices in Binondo, Manila and belonging to the YGC engaged in the non-life insurance
protection business which includes fire, marine, motorcar, miscellaneous casualty and personal accident, and surety.
5 Rollo, pp. 269-293.
6 A blog is a type of website usually maintained by an individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of
events, or other material such as graphics or video. Entries are commonly displayed in reverse-chronological order
and many blogs provide commentary or news on a particular subject; videhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (visited:
March 24, 2010).
7 The term Groups refers to an Internet communication tool which is a hybrid between an electronic mailing list and a
threaded internet forum where messages can be posted and read by e-mail or on the Group homepage, like a web
forum. Members can choose whether to receive individual, daily digest or Special Delivery e-mails, or they can
choose to read Group posts on the Group’s web site. Groups can be created with public or member-only
access; vide http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahoo_Groups (visited: March 24, 2010).
8 Rollo, p. 274.
9 Id. at 352.
10 Signed by 1st Assistant City Prosecutor Romulo Nanola, id. at 98-108.
11 Criminal Case Nos. 06-873 – 885, id. at 467-503.
12 Id. at 119-121.
13 Issued by Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, id. at 110-118.
14 The Yuchengcos’ motion for reconsideration of the Justice Secretary’s aforesaid resolution has yet to be resolved.
15 The RTC granted the motion of the accused to post bail on recognizance by Order of May 31, 2006.
16 Rollo, pp. 122-155.
17 G.R. No. 156747, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 255.
18 Issued by Presiding Judge Cesar Untalan, rollo, pp. 156-163.
19 G. R. No. 164938, August 22, 2005, 467 SCRA 601.
20 Rollo, pp. 590-605.
21 G. R. No. 167474, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 164.
22 Rollo, pp. 610-624.
23 Id. at 179-180.
24 Id. at 181-183.
25 Id. at 184-206.
26 Vide Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Cancel Arraignment, id. at 53-70.
27 Id. at 17.
28 Id. at 216-268.
29 Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28 September 2007, 534 SCRA 338, 346.
30 Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 410.
31 Miaque v. Patag, G.R. Nos. 170609-13, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 394, 397 citing Chavez v. National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. 164527, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 285 citing People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 133250, 9
July 2002, 384 SCRA 152.
32 Chua v. Ang, G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 229, 239.
33 Macasaet v. People, supra note 17 at 271; Lopez, et al. v. The City Judge, et al., G.R. No. L-25795, October 29,
1966, 18 SCRA 616.
34 Vide Macasaet v. People, supra note 17 at 273-274.
35 G.R. No. L-47880, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 699.
36 G.R. No. 125813, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 279, 285-286.
37 Vide note 36 at 291-292.

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I.

JURISDICTION: LAWS ON- IN GENERAL

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines

Second Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-sixth

day of July, nineteen hundred and ninety-three.

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691]

KNOWN AS THE “JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980”

is hereby amended to read as follows:

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

thousand pesos (P200,000.00);

any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”

territorial jurisdiction; and

exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.”

SEC. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

the same or different transactions;

issue of possession; and

assessed value of the adjacent lots.”

SEC 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

of the Regional Trial Courts.”

newspapers of general circulation.

(Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA, JR.

(Sgd.) CAMILO L. SABIO

(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

President of the Philippines

FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Approved: March 30 2004

B. JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

(Sgd.) ERNESTO M. MACEDA (Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA, JR.

(Sgd.) LORENZO E. LEYNES, JR. (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Approved: February 5, 1997

Republic of the Philippines

C. JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES

[G.R. NO. 156747 : February 23, 2005]

He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy.

7 G.R. No. 113930, 05 March 1996, 254 SCRA 307.

G.R. No. 145498 January 17, 2005

47 Ty vs. People, G.R. No. 149275 , September 27, 2004.

Republic of the Philippines

The Ruling of the Court

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 73875 May 18, 1993

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 101387 March 11, 1998

Republic of the Philippines

Unearned Income = 2/3 (80 – 3028) [(₱15,000.00 x 12) – ½ (₱15,000.00 x 12)]

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