CONTRAVENING RULES OF COURT TO FISH FOR EVIDENCE

Harry S. Stonehill v. Jose W. Diokno

G.R. No. L-19550
June 19, 1967
Concepcion, C.J.

Doctrine: Pursuant to Sec. 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution (now Sec.2, Article III in the 1987 Constitution),
search warrants must be issued upon probable cause as determined by a judge, and must particularly
describe the objects to be seized.

Facts: Respondents-Prosecutors and Prosecutors-Judges issued 42 search warrants against the

petitioners and the corporations for which they serve as officers.

The search warrants authorized peace officers to search the persons as well as the office, warehouse,
and residence premises of the petitioners, and to seize all transaction records which may point that the
petitioners violated Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, the Internal Revenue Code, and the
Revised Penal Code.

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, and other
pertinent papers as well as cash money were seized from the offices and residences of the petitioners.

The petitioners were then subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to contend the
legality of the searches and seizures employed against them

Petitioners filed original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and injunction contending that the
issued search warrants failed to specify and/or describe the documents and things to be seized.
Petitioners argue that this makes the search warrants unconstitutional and in violation of the Rules of
Court, and therefore null and void.

In assailing the validity of the search warrants, petitioners argue that the seized objects must be deemed
inadmissible in court.

In their response, the respondents-prosecutors argued that (1) the search warrants were issued in
accordance with law and are therefore valid, (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, have been
effectively cured by consent from the petitioners, and (3) pursuant to the Moncado doctrine, effects
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners, without regard to any alleged illegality of the
searches and seizures used to obtain the same.

Issues
Were the search warrants issued against the petitioners and the corporations they work for valid?
May the seized articles be deemed admissible in court?
Ruling

No, the search warrants issued against the petitioners were not valid, and no, the properties seized from
their properties may not be admissible in court.

First, the Supreme Court ruled that it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found probable cause, for the same presupposes that there is competent proof that particular acts or
omissions were made in violation of the country’s criminal laws. Contrary to that presupposition, the
applications mentioned no particular acts or omissions and simply cast a wide net for “violations of the
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, the Internal Revenue Code, and the Revised Penal Code.”

Second, the warrants authorized seizure of all records of business transactions petitioners were involved
with, without specifying or describing the effects to be searched for and seized, as provided for by Sec.
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution (now Sec.2, Article III in the 1987 Constitution).

Since the search warrants were deemed invalid, the searches and seizures launched in the residences of
the petitioners are deemed illegal.

Still, in Moncado vs. People’s Court, it was ruled that property seized through an invalid search warrant
may still be admissible as evidence.

However, the Court took position that the Moncado doctrine must be abandoned.

The Court instead adopted the exclusionary rule existing in the United States, which provides for the
enforcement of constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

All these are true, though, only for the search warrants issued against the petitioners.

On the other hand, petitioners were found to have no standing/ cause of action to assail the warrants
issued against the corporation for the petitioners function as third parties who have personalities
distinctive from that of the corporation, and only the party whose rights have been impaired may
contest search warrants issued to them.

Thus, the Court held that the petitioners may only question the admissibility of the things seized from
their personal residences, but not that of the things seized from the premises of the corporation.

The petition is GRANTED. The search warrants are NULL and VOID, and property seized from the three
residences may not be admissible as evidence against petitioners.