1
ARTICLE 3, RPC
G.R. No. 210192
ROSALINDA S. KHITRI and FERNANDO S.
KHITRI, Petitioners,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari1filed by Rosalinda S. Khitri
(Rosalinda) and Fernando S. Khitri (Fernando)
(collectively, the petitioners) assailing the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered
on June 27, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33961,
which affirmed the Decision3 dated December 9,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Piñas City, Branch 253, in Criminal Case No. 00-
1023, convicting the petitioners of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Information indicting the petitioners reads:
That on or about the 25 January, 1991 and
sometime thereafter, in the City of Las Pi[fi]as,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [petitioners], conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, received in trust
from the said complainants the amount of
P400,000.00 to be used in the construction of a
factory building to be built on the one[-]half portion
of the [petitioners'] lot located at Monte Vista Park
Subd., Sto. Nino, Cainta, Rizal but [the petitioners]
once in possession of the said amount of money
and far from complying with their obligation, with
abuse of confidence and with intent to defraud
said complainants[,] did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to their own personal use
and benefits said amount of P400,000.00 and
despite repeated demands made by the
complainants[,] [the petitioners] failed and refused
and still fails [sic] and refuses [sic] to return the
said amount of P400,000.00 to the damage and
prejudice of the said complainants in the
aforementioned amount of P400,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (Italics ours)
Antecedents
Rosalinda is Fernando's mother. In their joint
Counter-Affidavit,5 they admitted that they
received the amount of Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000.00) from Spouses Hiroshi
(Hiroshi) and Belen (Belen) Fukami (collectively,
the private complainants). However, the
petitioners claimed that the money they received
was the private complainants' contribution in their
joint venture to construct and operate a garments
factory. The petitioners further alleged that they
had substantially complied with their obligation by
constructing a two-door studio-type apartment in
their lot in Cainta, Rizal, half of which was to be
devoted for the operation of the garments factory.
On March 28, 2001, the petitioners were arraigned
and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Since their
primary defense was in the nature of an affirmative
allegation, the R TC reversed the order of trial.6
In her testimony,7 Rosalinda stated that she
manufactures and exports ladies' lingerie and
wear. Hiroshi, on the other hand, is an exporter of
locally-manufactured women's wear to Japan.
They were introduced to each other in 1986 by
Hiroshi's agent, who used to source lingerie items
from Rosalinda. In 1989, Hiroshi proposed a
venture for them to jointly manufacture and export
women's wear to United States of America and
other countries. The venture required the
construction of a factory, with Hiroshi contributing
P400,000.00 therefor. Initially, Hiroshi wanted the
factory to be constructed in Cubao, Quezon City
beside Rosalinda's warehouse. However,
Rosalinda offered her lot in Monte Vista Park
Subdivision, Cainta, Rizal and Hiroshi acceded.
The parties' agreement was merely verbal. The
construction started in 1991. Half of the lot was
reserved for the factory, with the remaining half as
Rosalinda's residence. Rosalinda presented a
supposed plan for the factory
entitled "Construction of Two-Unit Studio-type
Apartments," prepared for "Rosalinda P. Subido."
On cross-examination, Rosalinda clarified that the
parties verbally agreed that one-half of the
building would be used as factory while the other
half would be her residence. However, there was
no approved plan for a two-storey factory but only
for two units of studio-type apartment. Hiroshi
signified his acceptance of the factory building as
constructed when he had caused the delivery and
installation of five sewing machines in the
apartment units albeit no government permit was
obtained to operate the factory. Two weeks after,
Hiroshi directed the machines to be pulled out for
needed repairs.8
In his testimony,9 Fernando stated that he is also
engaged in garments manufacturing since 1979.
He is the sole proprietor of Allure Garments and
owns an interest in Venus Fashion Apparel
Corporation. Rosalinda, on the other hand, solely
owns Nandy's Enterprises, another business
entity involved in garments manufacturing. Hiroshi
first purchased garments from him in 1988. Later,
Hiroshi proposed a joint venture to manufacture
garments and agreed to contribute money for a
factory to be constructed in their lot in Cubao.
Hiroshi eventually agreed to have the factory be
built instead in their lot in Cainta, Rizal.
In her testimony,10 Belen confirmed that she and
her husband Hiroshi used to source some
women's wear and lingerie items, which they
export to Japan, from the petitioners in their
Cubao factory from 1988 to 1992. Sometime in
1990, when the petitioners were running low on
capital, they approached the private complainants
to form a corporation to manufacture and export
women's clothes and lingerie. Initially, the private
complainants hesitated because the project
entailed a huge amount for the construction of a
two-storey factory. The private complainants at
first suggested to have the factory be built in the
petitioners' lot in Cubao. However, the Cubao area
is congested. Further, after visiting the petitioners'
lot in Cainta, and having been shown a sketch of
the two-storey factory to be constructed, they
agreed to build thereat. The factory was intended
to occupy one-half of the lot, while the other half
thereof would be reserved for the petitioners'
residence. The private complainants gave their
P400,000.00 contribution to the petitioners and
this amount was used to open a Boston Bank joint
account in Belen and Rosalinda's names. The
private complainants were eventually shocked to
discover instead a two-door studio-type
apartment, the plan for which was never shown to
them. In their disappointment, they demanded the
return of their money, but the petitioners avoided
their calls and even changed their phone
numbers. Through counsel, the private
complainants wrote a demand letter for the
petitioners to return their money. In response, the
petitioners offered one apartment unit, with the
cost of the lot where it stands to be paid for
separately. The private complainants outrightly
rejected the offer.
Hiroshi testified that he had been coming back and
forth from Japan to the Philippines for 30 years
purchasing and exporting locally manufactured
women's clothes. The petitioners were referred to
him by a Japanese friend, and he soon began
buying merchandise from them in 1988. The
petitioners subsequently broached the idea of a
joint venture to manufacture women's clothes,
with the private complainants contributing to the
cost of constructing a two-storey factory building.
Since the petitioners' shop in Cubao is too small,
they showed him a rough sketch of a two-storey
factory on a white board, and brought him to see
their lot in Cainta where the factory would be built.
The petitioners explained to him that one-half of
the lot would be used for the two-storey factory.
Later, he asked Belen to check the state of the
factory because the petitioners had been rejecting
his phone calls. Belen saw a two-door studio-type
apartment, instead of a two-storey factory, and
took pictures of the same. Hiroshi was never
shown the plan for a two-door studio-type
apartments, which Rosalinda presented in court.
The private complainants tried to contact the
petitioners but they could no longer be reached.
They felt deceived because their agreement was
not complied with.11
On cross-examination, Hiroshi admitted that the
negotiations for the joint venture were done in his
Elizabeth Mansions office in Quezon City. He
recalled having seen the petitioners in Las Piñas
City only once or twice. There was no written
contract anent the joint venture because he
trusted the petitioners.12
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC, in its Decision13 dated December 9,
2009, convicted the petitioners, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds [the petitioners], GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime
of Estafa punishable under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the [RPC]. Consequently,
[the petitioners] are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two

(2) months of Prision Correcional maximum as
MINIMUM to twenty (20) years of Reclusion
Temporal as MAXIMUM.
Moreover, this Court hereby orders [the
petitioners] to reimburse private complainants the
sum of x x x FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (Php400,000.00), plus interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, from January 21, 1991,
until fully paid, as actual damages, and ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(Phpl00,000.00), as litigation expenses and
attomey[']s fees.
SO ORDERED.14
Unfazed by the above, the petitioners appealed to
the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision15 dated June 27, 2013, the CA
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. The CA agreed
with the RTC that it had jurisdiction over the crime
charged. All the elements of the crime of estafa
are present, and that the petitioners conspired in
committing the crime. The evidence of the
prosecution showed that the parties agreed to
form a joint venture to manufacture women's wear,
with the petitioners contributing the use of one half
of their lot in Cainta to build a two-storey garments
factory, while the private complainants would
contribute P400,000.00 for the construction
thereof. On January 25, 1991, the private
complainants gave the amount of P400,000.00,
with which Belen and Rosalinda opened a joint
account in Boston Bank, San Juan City. On
different dates, four checks, each bearing the
amount of P100,000.00, were issued by Belen to
Rosalinda. The petitioners' messenger picked up
the checks from the private complainants'
residence in Las Piñas City and thereafter, the
amounts indicated therein were withdrawn from
Boston Bank joint account. After the entire amount
of P400,000.00 had been withdrawn, the
petitioners could no longer be contacted by phone.
This prompted Belen to visit the construction site.
She discovered that what was constructed was
not a two-storey factory building but a residential
duplex apartment. Belen took pictures of the
apartment and showed them to Hiroshi, who then
decided to withdraw from the joint venture and
demanded the return of their money. The private
complainants consulted a lawyer, who sent
demand letters, but they received no reply from
the petitioners.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution16 dated November 21, 2013.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors:
I. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN MAINTAINING
THAT THE RTC OF LAS PINAS CITY HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
II. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS
INSTEAD OF FINDING THAT THEIR LIABILITY,
IF ANY, IS ONLY CIVIL IN NATURE.
III. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN THE
PETITIONERS.17
The Issues
Essentially, the issues for resolution are the
following: (1) whether the evidence submitted is
sufficient to establish guilt of the petitioners
beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the
evidence submitted establishes conspiracy
between the petitioners.18
In this petition, the petitioners reiterate their
contention that the crime for which they were
indicted was committed in Quezon City, San Juan
City and Cainta, Rizal, and not in Las Piñas City.
Moreover, no conspiracy between the petitioners
was established. They point out that Belen herself
admitted that the amount of P400,000.00 was
deposited in a joint account, which Belen and
Rosalinda opened in a bank in San Juan City.
Moreover, there was no criminal intent to swindle
the private complainants. It was Hiroshi himself
who approached the petitioners to propose a joint
venture. In fact, as agreed, a structure was
erected on the lot of the petitioners, which,
although not exactly what the private
complainants had in mind, is suitable for the
operation of a garments factory. Hiroshi even
delivered and installed sewing machines in the
building. After two weeks, he pulled out the sewing
machines for the purpose of having them repaired.
The petitioners also point out that they never
stopped communicating with the private
complainants. Besides, 10 years had elapsed
from the time the factory was constructed before
the private complainants decided to file a criminal
complaint.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) maintains that the RTC of Las
Piñas City had jurisdiction over the case. The
delivery of the checks and acceptance thereof by
the petitioners through their authorized
representatives connote not merely the transfer of
money but also marked the creation of a fiduciary
relation between the parties. Hence, in legal
contemplation, the petitioners received the
amount of P400,000.00 in the private
complainants' residence in Las Piñas City. The
OSG further insists that all the elements of the
crime and the fact of conspiracy are present.19
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition is meritorious.
The RTC of Las Pifias City had
jurisdiction over the case.
The Court agrees that the RTC of Las Pifias City
had territorial jurisdiction over the case. Although
the bank account for the joint venture was set up
in San Juan City, in which the P400,000.00 capital
contribution of the private complainants was
deposited and eventually withdrawn, Belen issued
four checks from her residence in Las Pifias City.
These checks were picked up by the messenger
sent by the petitioners.
The Court has ruled in the case of Tan v.
People20that "[t]he delivery by the private
complainant of the check and its acceptance by
[the accused] signified not merely the transfer to
the accused of the money belonging to private
complainant, [but] it also marked the creation of a
fiduciary relation between the parties."21
Not all the elements of the crime of
estafa are present.
However, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the
RTC, which convicted the petitioners of estafa as
the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of
the crime charged.
2
Under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the RPC,22 the
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are
as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) that there is demand by the
offended party to the offender.23
In the case at bar, the presence of the first and last
elements is undisputed. The petitioners received
money in trust or for administration to build a
factory in Cainta, and that the private
complainants, through counsel, demanded the
return of their P400,000.00 via letters dated
December 13, 1999 and January 25, 2000, which
were received on December 28, 1999, and
January 5, 2000, respectively.24 However, the
elements of misappropriation and prejudice were
not sufficiently established.
The essence of estafa committed with abuse of
confidence is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the
entity to whom a return should be made. The
words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the
act of using or disposing of another's property as
if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose
or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one's own use includes not
only conversion to one's personal advantage, but
also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right.25
Here, Rosalinda received P400,000.000 for the
purpose of constructing a garments factory inside
the Monte Vista Park Subdivision, Cainta, Rizal.
True to their agreement, she caused the erection
of a two-door studio-type apartment, one of which
would serve as the garments factory. The private
complainants however posit that the structure was
not in compliance with their agreed plan.
Nonetheless, the purpose of the money had been
complied with by the petitioners, albeit modified.
The Court believes that the ends sought to be
achieved by the money have not been rendered
illusory by the modification. In fact, after the
construction, the private complainants sent five
sewing machines for use in the garments factory,

but these were subsequently pulled out after two
weeks for repairs.
"Not to be overlooked is that this felony falls under
the category of mala in se offenses that require
the attendance of criminal intent.1avvphi1 Evil
intent must unite with an unlawful act for it to be a
felony. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea."26
The element of intent - on which the Court shall
focus - is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden
act.27 It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.28 It does
not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the
act, while intent concerns the result of the
act.29 While motive is the "moving power" that
impels one to action for a definite result, intent is
the ''purpose" of using a particular means to
produce the result.30 On the other hand, the term
"felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous,
and/or proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose.31 With these elements taken together,
the requirement of intent in intentional felony must
refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and
malevolent state of mind accompanying a
forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony
requires the existence of dolus malus - that the act
or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with
deliberate evil intent," and "with malice
aforethought."32 The maxim is actus nonfacit
reum, nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed
ifthe mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.33 As is required of the
other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.34
In the instant petition, the records do not show that
the prosecution was able to prove the existence of
malicious intent when the petitioners used the
money they received to construct two-door studio-
type apartments, one of which would serve as the
garments factory. To reiterate, the purpose of the
money was achieved. Furthermore, the factual
precedents of the case do not sufficiently warrant
conviction for the crime of estafa, much less
deserve deprivation of liberty. At best, the
petitioners could be held liable for damages for
violating the tenor of their agreement.
Ultimately, the amount of P400,000.00 given to
the petitioners could hardly be considered as the
damage sustained by the private
complainants.1âwphi1 Damage, as an element of
estafa, may consist in: (1) the offended party being
deprived of his money or property as a result of
the defraudation; (2) disturbance in property right;
or (3) temporary prejudice.35 In this case, the
amount was voluntarily given pursuant to a joint
venture agreement for the construction of a
garments factory, and with which the petitioners
complied. Absent the element of misappropriation,
the private complainants could not have been
deprived of their money through defraudation.
Moreover, the allegation of lost profits, which
could have arisen from the aborted joint venture,
is conjectural in nature and could barely be
contemplated as prejudice suffered.
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused while the other may be compatible with
the finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the
accused because the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty required for conviction.36
Consequently, the Court is constrained to uphold
the presumption of innocence in the petitioners'
favor and acquit them.
Anent the allegation of conspiracy, the Court
deems it proper not to discuss the same in view of
the fact that the prosecution failed to establish the
existence of all the elements of the crime charged.
Reimbursement of the amount
given to the petitioners, plus
interests, are due.
While the petitioners cannot be made criminally
liable on the grounds of absence of some of the
elements of estafa, and of reasonable doubt, it is
undisputed that they received the amount of
P400,000.00 from the private complainants. Lest
unjust enrichment results, reimbursement of the
amount is in order. An additional annual interest of
six percent (6%) shall be imposed from the finality
of this Decision until full payment thereof.37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated June 27, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 33961, affirming the
Decision rendered on December 9, 2009 by the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pifias City, Branch
253, in Criminal Case No. 00-1023, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Rosalinda
S. Khitri and Fernando S. Khitri are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa.
However, they are DIRECTED to
REIMBURSE the private complainants, Spouses
Hiroshi and Belen Fukami, of the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00),
subject to an annual interest of six percent (6%)
from the finality of this Decision until full
satisfaction thereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and
ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38),
in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio
Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio
Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio
Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has
remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus
moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to
pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd
Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of
Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of
course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal
from the trial court's decision. During the
pendency of their appeal and before judgment
3
thereon could be rendered by the Court of
Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants,
except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their
appeal and chose instead to pursue their
respective applications for parole before the then
Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole
Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in
that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd
Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all
other respect, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling
in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court
certified this case to us for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February
21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from
his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had
just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and
thus would like to surrender to the authorities.
Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly
used in the killing and Fausta with her dress
smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a
nephew of his to take the spouses to the police
authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy.
As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the
Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon
reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple
informed the police on duty of the incident. That
same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the
Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went
back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay
Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where
Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman
Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's
residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing
incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the
lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an
underwear, sprawled face down inside the
bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour
during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected
the scene and started to make a rough sketch
thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The
next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00
o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno,
accompanied by a photographer, went back to the

scene of the killing to conduct further
investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other
hand, was brought back that same day by
Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in
Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his
companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two
members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in
Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the
incident, were already there conducting their own
investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with
his sketch; photographs of the scene were
likewise taken. The body of the victim was then
brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was
performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
1981; after completed, a report was made with the
following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height,
body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length,
located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm,
right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the
proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with
an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length
with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of
the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle
3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in
width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the
right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs,
right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth,
directed inward to the thoracic cavity right, located
at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th
rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth
directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located at
the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th
intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the
base of the left armpit directed toward the left
thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in
length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle,
located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in
length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd
arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width,
and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right,
directed inward with portion of large intestine and
mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the
posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed
downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length,
located at the medial portion of the medial border
of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in
length, located at the posterior aspect of the right
elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length,
located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd,
forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle
with fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of
the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right
lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe
of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending
colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex
of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE
LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas
"found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are
fatal because they penetrated the internal organs,
heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident,
Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police
sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for
detention and protective custody for "having been
involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C.
headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife,
Fausta, was already detained having been
indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations
conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st
P.C. Company, an information for murder dated
August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses
FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO
GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed
as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981,
in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused with four other
4
companions whose identities are still unknown
and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed
and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating
and helping each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided
purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and number, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada,
with the weapons with which said accused were
provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said
Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on
different parts of his body as shown by autopsy
report attached to the record of this case which
multifarious wounds caused the immediate death
of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto
and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty.
Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who
claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie
Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6,
1981, and volunteered to testify for the
prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was
therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of
Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended
Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as
additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the
herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio
Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again,
all the accused except as earlier explained,
Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus
Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno
and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force;
Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo
Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara,
Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the
widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the
autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd
Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February
22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of
Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim

suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four
(4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound.
In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the
possibility that only one weapon might have
caused all the wounds (except the lacerated
wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined
that due to the number and different
characteristics of the wounds, the probability that
at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The
police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their
part testified on the aspect of the investigation
they respectively conducted in relation to the
incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on
the expenses she incurred by reason of the death
of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome
Paja related the events surrounding the surrender
of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to
him, the location of the houses of the accused, as
well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on
Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the
incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age
as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he
left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo
where he was employed as a tractor driver by one
Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-
cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the
Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock
in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity
prompted him to approach the place where the
shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to
20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of
banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw
all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in
stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd
Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing
platform. He said he clearly recognized all the
accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after
the accused were through in stabbing and hacking
the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it
into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was
situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the
"linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way
home. Upon reaching his house, he related what
he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he
went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that he did not
immediately report to the police authorities what
he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981
however, eight months after the extraordinary
incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
conscience plus the fact that his father was
formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind,
made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he
thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie
Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he
travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in
Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara,
Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to
her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd
Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the
deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused
denied participation in the crime. The herein
accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr.,
claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which
was located some one kilometer away from the
scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened.
He asserted that he only came to know of it after
his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales went to his house that night of February
21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the
defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia
Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that
the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis
of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged
eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of
alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both
assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's
testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused,
including the herein accused-appellant, as the
assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27,
1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty
recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20
meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria
knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria
could not say who was hacking and who was
stabbing the deceased, it was only because the
assailant were moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the
authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation is
satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp.
50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of
most people to get involved in a criminal case is of
judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the
initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to
volunteer information about a criminal case and
their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged
into criminal investigations is common, and has
been judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self
admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10
years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms
and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN,
p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not
think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate
him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is
beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the
appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court,
however, found the sentence imposed by the trial
court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said
the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously
sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and
1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal
should have been brought to the Supreme Court.
With regard to the indemnity for death, the award
of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00,
in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA
518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31
(1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984);
People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27,
1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us
upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the
penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to
convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the
police authorities leave much to be desired.
Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his
sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the
commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981."
5
Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged
various blood stains and their locations relative to
the scene of the crime, there was however no
indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because,
considering that there are two versions proferred
on where the killing was carried out, the extent of
blood stains found would have provided a more
definite clue as to which version is more credible.
If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing
transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales
spouses, there would have been more blood
stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the
ground directly under it. And this circumstance
would provide an additional mooring to the claim
of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the
other hand, if the prosecution's version that the
killing was committed in the field near the linasan
is the truth, then blood stains in that place would
have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the
investigation conducted by the other authorities.
Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that
accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on
February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the
reason for the "surrender." It would even appear
that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be
safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins.
Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto
never mentioned to him the participation of other
persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without
any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of
the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted
an investigation of the killing mentioned in their
criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons,
aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd
Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined
that it is possible that the sixteen wounds
described in the autopsy report were caused by
two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he
admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument
might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas'
testimony and the autopsy report are concerned,
Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was
responsible for the killing appears not at all too
impossible. And then there is the positive
testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five
wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen
described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss
more the significance of these wounds later.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the
conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is
to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed
eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of
Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw
all the accused, including the appellant, take turns
in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at
about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21,
1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he
(Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of
banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from
where the crime was being committed. According
to him, he recognized the six accused as the
malefactors because the scene was then
illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the
stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on
cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he
could not determine who among the six accused
did the stabbing and/or hacking and what
particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-
examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it
correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you
saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that distance
by the herein accused as identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you
please tell this Honorable Court who was hacking
the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada
and were in constant movement, I could not
determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu"
or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid movement
of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine
who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw
the hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court
who really hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the
hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this
Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could
not even identify the weapons used because
according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute
a definite and specific act committed, or
contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the
findings of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals which would categorize the criminal
liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in
the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates
him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the
same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation
under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the
direct part in the killing did the appellant perform
to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the
Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how
criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability
is incurred is through the commission of a felony.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions
punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of
deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent; and there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1)
there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or
omission must be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the
omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two
lower courts both found, that the appellant has
committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as
to what act was performed by the appellant. It has
been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any
bodily movement tending to produce some effect
in the external world." 40 In this instance, there
must therefore be shown an "act" committed by
the appellant which would have inflicted any harm
to the body of the victim that produced his death.
6
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized,
admitted quite candidly that he did not see who
"stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this
principal witness did not say, because he could
not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed"
victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what
specific act was performed by the appellant. This
lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of
the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact
that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out
of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to
above, while there are six accused charged as
principals, it follows to reason that one of the six
accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal
wound. And this one could as well be the
appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he
took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by
Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the
oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and
practically the father of the five accused? And
pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is
possible, nay even probable, that only four, or
three, or two of the accused could have inflicted
all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two,
three, or four of them. And stretching the logic
further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the
fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal
wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage
against the assault on her womanhood and honor.
But more importantly, there being not an iota of
evidence that the appellant caused any of the said
five fatal wounds, coupled with the prosecution's
failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can
not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is
likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came
out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21,
1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to
report at once to the police authorities the crime
he
had witnessed should not be taken against him
and should not affect his credibility,41 here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence
of coming out an alleged eyewitness for several
weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more
it should be for one who was mute for eight
months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling
what he allegedly witnessed, has not been
satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he
feared his life would be endangered is too pat to
be believed. There is no showing that he was

threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if
it were true that he feared a possible retaliation
from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to
testify considering that except for the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already
under police custody, the rest of the accused were
then still free and around; they were not yet named
in the original information, 45 thus the supposed
danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and
present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested
witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He
admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In
fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons
why he testified was because the victim was also
his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long
from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking of
Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs.
Peñacerrada about what happened to her
husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but
because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my landlord I
revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.46
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that
under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes
the very source of his livelihood, if not existence
itself, from his landlord who provides him with the
land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are
naturally beholden to their landlords and seek
ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the
latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as
a purported eyewitness and providing that
material testimony which would lead to the
conviction of the entire family of Augusto
Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to
the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a
perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria
sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving
family of his deceased landlord. This is especially
so because the need to get into the good graces
of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency
considering that he ceased to be employed as
early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services
would alleviate the financial distress he was in.
And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice
of action for shortly after he volunteered and
presented himself to the victim's widow, he was
taken under the protective wings of the victim's
uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment
and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the
foregoing circumstances, we can not help but
dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say
the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find
the alleged participation of the appellant in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is
contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the
Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents
are sheltered and insulated by their adult children
from any possible physical and emotional harm. It
is therefore improbable for the other accused who
are much younger and at the prime of their
manhood, to summon the aid or allow the
participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the
appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary,
granting that the victim was indeed an adversary.
And considering that the appellant's residence
was about one kilometer from the scene of the
crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant
went there just for the purpose of aiding his three
robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and
Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister,
Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak
defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like
in the instant case in which the participation of the
appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered
as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look
with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in
the light of the other evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The fraternal contract should not be signed in
blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries,
and perpetrated through suffering. That is the
essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the
Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision1 and the October 8, 2013 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners
Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal,
Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049,
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the
Information4 against the petitioners before the R
TC, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on
or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14,
2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
,City, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, during an initiation rite and being
then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and
present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less
twenty other members and officers, whose identity
is not yet known, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault and use
personal violence upon one M4-RLON
VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and
as condition for his admission to the fraternity,
thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting
to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim.
7
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC
admitted the Amended Information5 which reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of
January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-name accused, during a planned initiation
rite and being then officers and members of Alpha
Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet
known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and use personal violence
upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a
neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him
to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to
quash for lack of probable cause,6 but it was
denied by the trial court because the ground cited
therein was not provided by law and
jurisprudence. When arraigned, the petitioners
pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses
to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January
14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva
(Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room
of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal
Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr.
Masilungan), who was then the attending
physician at the emergency room, observed that
Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had
no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive
Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva,
however, did not respond to the resuscitation and
was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a
big contusion hematoma on the left side of the
victim's face and several injuries on his arms and
legs. He further attested that Villanueva 's face
was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer

running through his body due to lack of oxygen;
and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he
saw large contusions on both legs, which
extended from the upper portion of the thighs,
down to the couplexial portion, or back of the
knees.
Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought
Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that
they found Villanueva lying motionless on the
ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City,
and brought him to the hospital. When he asked
them where they came from, one of them
answered that they came from Los Baños,
Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He
questioned them on how they found Villanueva,
when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City.
One of the men just said that they were headed
somewhere else.
Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-
legal report.8 Due to the nature, extent and
location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva
was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing
injuries because he had undergone hazing himself
when he was a student, and also because of his
experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal
Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente
Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he
performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva
on January 14, 2006 and placed down his findings
in an autopsy report.9 Upon examination of the
body, he found various external injuries in the
head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-
three (33) external injuries, with various severity
and nature. He concluded that the cause of death
was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury
contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries
and contusions on the body, and his previous
examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo
opined that these injuries were hazing-related.
During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2)
matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of
Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fraternity.10
Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-
sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba
City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was
barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at
around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she
was tending her store when she saw a jeepney
with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the
resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person
seated beside the driver of the jeepney.11 She
estimated the ages of these persons in the group
to be between 20 to 30 years old. They were in
civilian clothes, while the other men wore white
long-sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the
men and women shook hands and embraced
each other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single
motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.
Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on
top of the terrace of the resort who looked like they
were praying, and then the lights of the resort were
turned off. Later that evening, at least three (3) of
these persons went to her store to buy some
items. During her testimony, she was shown
photographs and she identified Christopher
Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went to
her store.12 It was only on the morning of January
14, 2006 that she learned from the policemen
visiting the resort that the deceased person was
Villanueva.
Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the
route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that at
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14,
2006, he was waiting for passengers at the comer
of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him
and told him that someone inside the resort
needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked
the two (2) men at the gate who needed a ride.
Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's
carrying another man, who looked very weak, like
a vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched
the body of the man being carried and sensed it
was cold.
Magat asked the men what happened to their
companion. They replied that he had too much to
drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the
nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal
Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers
brought their unconscious companion inside the
emergency room, while their other companion
paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go home.
Several days after, he learned that the person
brought to the hospital had died.
Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino
Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards
on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00 o'clock in
the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00 o'clock
in the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early
morning of January 14, 2006, two men, who
signed on the logbook13 under the names Brandon
Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the lifeless
body of a person. Pursuant to the standard
operating procedure of the hospital, the security
guards did not allow the two men to leave the
hospital because they called the police station .so
that an investigation could be conducted. Two
policemen arrived later at the hospital. During his
testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as
the two persons who brought Villanueva to the
hospital.
PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified
that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock in
the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP
Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless body
of a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When
P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva' s corpse
with contusions and bite marks all over his body.
P02 Ignacio and his policemen companions then
brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He
asked them about what happened, but they
invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen
then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa
Novaliches Resort, they knocked on the door and
the caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened
it.
The police asked Capillan if there were University
of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños)
students who rented the resort on the evening of
January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added
that about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a
jeepney and told her that they would be renting the
resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00
o'clock the following morning.
Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food
technology student at UP Los Baños during the
academic year of 2005-2006 and a member of the
Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, she
was at their organization's tambayan in the UPLB
Biological Sciences Building, when she noticed
three (3) men seated two meters away from her.
She identified the two of the three men as Sibal
and Dungo.14 They were wearing black shirts with
the logo of APO. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, two more men arrived and, with their
heads bowed, approached the three men. One of
them was Villanueva, who was carrying a 5-gallon
water container. Dungo then stood up and asked
Villanueva why the latter did not report to him
8
when he was just at their tambayan. Dungo then
punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just kept
quiet with his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later,
all the men left.
Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of
Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates at
the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory and
housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali
Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna. According to
Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva
introduced him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as his
APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also to
undergo final initiation rites on January 13, 2006.
Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs
at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and Sibal
were both members of the APO Fraternity, and
that there was no record of any request for
initiation or hazing activity filed by the said
fraternity.
McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP
Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a B.S.
Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los
Baños,15 as evidenced by his official transcript of
record.16
Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of
the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the UP
Los Baños, testified that an administrative
disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006
against the APO Fraternity regarding the death of
Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of Villa
Novaliches Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO
Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses for
the complainant.17
Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal
Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified that he
met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between
July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to convince
her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however,
refused because she feared for her safety. She
said that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her
place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked and
vandalized.
Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva,
testified that, as a result of the death of her son,
her family incurred actual damages consisting of
medical, burial and funeral expenses in the
aggregate amount of ₱140,000.00 which were

evidenced by receipts.18 Her husband also
incurred travel expenses in the amount of
₱7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend
his son's wake and burial, as supported by a plane
ticket.19 She further attested that she experienced
mental anguish, sleepless nights, substantial
weight loss, and strained family relationship as a
result of her son's death.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to
prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their
testimonies are summarized as follow:
Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity
member, testified that on January 13, 2006,
around 4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he
met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School.
Dungo asked him if he would attend the initiation
ceremony, and Cornelio answered in the negative
because he had other things to do. At 10:00
o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cornelio
again met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a
hamburger at the Burger Machine along
Raymundo Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños,
Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked Dungo if he
would attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo
replied that he would not because he and his
girlfriend had something to do.
Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of
Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at
around 1 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came
and visited her at her boarding house on
Raymundo Street. Around 4:00 o'clock of the
same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños
Graduate School and saw Cornelio. Afterwards,
they went back to her boarding house and stayed
there from 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00
o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo
Restaurant for dinner and left at around 10:00
o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her
boarding house, they encountered Cornelio again
at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and
slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock
in the early morning of January 14, 2006, they
were roused from their sleep by a phone call from
Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in Pansol,
Calamba City. Dungo then left the boarding
house.
Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the
early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at
the boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on
Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños
Graduate School and inquired about the
requirements for a master's degree. They walked
back to the boarding house and met Cornelio.
They talked about their fraternity's ,final initiation
ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City.
Dungo and Rivera then reached the latter's
boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant,
near Crossing Junction, Los Baños. They ate and
stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half
hours. Then they walked back to the boarding
house of Rivera and, along the way, they met
Cornelio again at the Burger Machine along
Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he
would attend their fraternity's final initiation
ceremony, to which he replied in the negative.
Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding house
around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept
there.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of
January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his
sleep because Sibal was palling him on his
cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him
to go to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol,
Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at the resort,
Sibal led him inside. There, he saw Rudolfo
Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother,
and Villanueva, who was unconscious. Dungo told
them that they should bring Villanueva to the
hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called a
tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He
identified himself before the security guard as
Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his real
name.
Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the
Grand Chancellor of the APO -Theta Chapter for
years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the
tambayan of their fraternity in UP Los Baños
because their neophytes would be initiated that
night. Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met
their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada, Los
Baños. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva,
was with Castillo and that there was a bruise on
the left side of his face. Then they boarded a
jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort
in Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed
Sibal to take Villanueva to the second floor of the
resort. He confronted Castillo as to what
happened to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30
o'clock in the evening, Gopez decided to cancel
the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort
and accompany Villanueva and Castillo. Together
with the other neophytes, Gopez left the resort and
went back to UP Los Baños.
Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the
UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up B.S.
Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary
of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in charge of
fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free
medical and dental missions, and blood
donations. On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00
o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's
tambayan for the final initiation rites of their
neophytes. After preparing the food for the
initiation rites, Sibal, together with some
neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños,
where he saw fellow fraternity brother Castillo with
their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised face.
Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney and
proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol,
Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he
accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to
take a rest. A few minutes later, he went down and
confronted Castillo about the bruises on
Villanueva's face. He was angry and irritated with
Castillo. He then stayed outside the resort until
Gopez and the other neophytes came out and told
him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and
that they were returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal
wanted to go with them but ;he was ordered to stay
with Villanueva and Castillo.
After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the
condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping on the
second; floor of the resort. Then he went outside
for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the
resort again and saw Villanueva, who looked
unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on the
ground floor. Sibal inquired about Villanueva's
condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then
called Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the
resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought
Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a
false name to the security guard as he heard that
Dungo had done the same.
The RTC Ruling
On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and
Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of
9
the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court
stated that the prosecution established the
presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los
Banos Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of Sunga
and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00
o'clock in the evening of the same day by the
testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive
testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo,
the prosecution also proved that Villanueva died
from hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the
prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a
UP Los Bafios student, was a neophyte of the
APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and
Sibal were members of the said fraternity; that on
the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and
Sibal, together with the other fraternity members,
officers and alumni, brought and transported
Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa
Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba
City, for the final initiation rites; that the initiation
rites were conducted inside the resort, performed
under the cover of darkness and secrecy; that due
to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the
fraternity members and the other two neophytes
haphazardly left the resort; and that Dungo and
Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless
body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where
Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no
evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to
bodily assault and harm the victim, it was
irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the
resort for their final initiation rites. Clearly, they did
not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final
initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa
Novaliches Resort.
The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi
were self-serving negative assertions. The
defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was
corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend
Rivera and his co-fraternity brother, could not be
given credence. The witnesses presented by the
defense were partial and could not be considered
as disinterested parties. The defense of denial of
Sibal likewise failed. The corroborative
testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect
because they had so much at stake in the
outcome of the criminal action.

The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of
violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and order them to
jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of
Deceased Marlon Villanueva the following sums of
money:
1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual
damages;
2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral
damages;
3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary
damages; and
4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon
Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal.
In their brief, they contended that the prosecution
failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also
assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the
said law, which stated that mere presence in the
hazing was prima facie evidence of participation
therein, because it allegedly violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the
accused.
The CA Ruling
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal
was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them
guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly
relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the
unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to
convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime
of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi
of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the
positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak,
could not prevail over the positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. The
CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only
convicted based on their presence in the venue of
the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the
victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the final
initiation rites.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case
No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.21
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but
their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed
October 8, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE
JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO
CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED
TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM
BECAUSE THE OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND
AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT
FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION,
NOR DOES ONE INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY
INCLUDE THE OTHER.22
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the
amended information charged them as they "did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one
Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla."23 Yet, both the RTC
and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No.
8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim to be
present"24during the initiation rites. The crime of
hazing by inducement does not necessarily
include the criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a
crime not stated or necessarily included in the
information. By reason of the foregoing, the
petitioners contend that their constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against them has been violated.
In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office
of the Solicitor General (DSG) asserted that
Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended
information with the proper offense and convicted
for such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in
conspiracy with more or less twenty members and
officers" in the amended information sufficiently
cover "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the
hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat." The planned initiation rite would not have
been accomplished were it not for the acts of the
petitioners in inducing the victim to be present
thereat and it was obviously conducted in
conspiracy with the others.26 In their Reply27 filed
on September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted
that there was a variance between the, offense
charged of "actually participated in the infliction of
physical harm," and the offense "knowingly
cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing
the victim to be present thereat."28 The
prosecution, moreover, failed to establish
conspiracy because no act or circumstance was
proved pointing to a joint purpose and design
between and among the petitioners and the other
twenty accused.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Matter
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a
decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher
court authority.29The right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor is it a component of due process.
It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law.30
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-
5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the
procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court
when the penalty imposed is either reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.31 According to the
said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of
Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render
and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by notice of appeal filed with the Court of
Appeals."
10
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been
imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of
appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a
matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a
criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question including one not raised by the
parties.32Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court
in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.33
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in
resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to
this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall
raise only questions of law.34Moreover, such
review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons.35 In other words,
when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may:
(1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ),
Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right
before the Court and open the entire case for
review on any question; or (2) file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an
appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only
questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon
the petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA
decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of
law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the
existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a
question of fact that would require an examination
of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of
justice, however, and due to the novelty of the
issue presented, the Court deems it proper to
open the whole case for review.37Substantive
Matter
In our contemporary society, hazing has been a
nightmare of parents who send their children to
college or university. News of deaths and horrible
beatings primarily among college students due to
hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid
images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and
pounded arms and shoulders of young men are
depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare
undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless death
of these promising students, and the agony, cries
and ordeal of their families, resonate through the

very core of our beings. But no matter how modem
and sophisticated our society becomes, these
barbaric acts of initiation of fraternities, sororities
and other organizations continue to thrive, even
within the elite grounds of the academe.
The history and phenomenon of hazing had been
thoroughly discussed in the recent case of
Villareal v. People.38 It is believed that the
fraternity system and its accompanying culture of
hazing were transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century.39 Thus, a
study of the laws and jurisprudence of the United
States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current
predicament of violent initiations in fraternities,
sororities and other organizations.
United States Laws and
Jurisprudence on Hazing
There are different definitions of hazing,
depending on the laws of the states.40 In the case
of People v. Lenti,41 the defendant therein
challenged the constitutionality of the state law
defining hazing on the ground of vagueness. The
court rejected such contention and held that it
would have been an impossible task if the
legislature had attempted to define hazing
specifically
because fraternal organizations and associations
never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms of
hazing. Presently, the acceptable definition of
hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally
abusing newcomers to an organization as a
means of initiation.42
Hazing can be classified into various categories
including, but not limited to, acts of violence, acts
of humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-
related acts.43 The physical form of hazing may
include beating, branding, paddling, excessive
exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing
have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and
forced kissing.44 Moreover, hazing does not only
result in physical injuries and hospitalization, but
also lead to emotional damage and traumatic
stress.45
Based on statistics and alarming frequency of
hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing
through the passage of state laws that prohibit
such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception
of Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South
Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-hazing
laws.47 The severity of these laws can range from
minor penalties to a prison sentence for up to six
years.48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri,
Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result in
death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a
felony.49
In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named
after a student who died in a hazing incident, was
enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person
commits a third degree felony when he or she
intentionally or recklessly commits any act of
hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily
injury or death. If a person only creates substantial
risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is
categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. A
similar provision can be observed in the Penal
Law of New York.51
Interestingly, some states included notable
features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its
effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina
and Texas, the law imposes a duty on school
personnel to report hazing.52 In fact, in Alabama,
no person is allowed to knowingly permit,
encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing
the offense of hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its
commission.53
Also, some states enacted statutes that have been
interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of
hazing even if they have the consent of the
victim.54 In New Jersey, consent is not a defense
to a hazing charge, and its law permits the
prosecution of offenders under other applicable
criminal statutes.55 By including these various
provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these
states have removed the subjective inquiry of
consent from consideration, thus, presumably
allowing courts to effectively and properly
adjudicate hazing cases.56
In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal
action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil
suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law,
against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university
or college concerned.57 Hazing, which threatens
to needlessly harm students, must be attacked
from whatever legal means are possible.58
In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa
Alpha at Kent State University was indicted for
complicity to hazing. The group physically
disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand
on their heads, beating them with paddles, and
smacking and striking initiates in the face and
head. The Ohio court held that evidence
presented therein was more than sufficient to
sustain a conviction.
Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity
initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v.
Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc.,60 a 17-
year old college freshman died as a result of
aspirating his own vomit after consuming
excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity
initiation ritual. The defendants in the said case
contended that they only furnished the alcohol
drinks to the victim. The court denied the defense
because such acts of the fraternity effectively
contributed to the death of the victim as part of
their hazing.
Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v.
Centennial Area School District,61 a tenth-grade
wrestler at William Tennet High School was
subjected to various forms of hazing, including; a
ritual where the victim was forcibly held down,
while a teammate sat on his face with his buttocks
exposed. The parents of the student sued the
school because it failed to prevent the incident
despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The
court approved the settlement of the parties in the
amount ofUS$151,000.00.
More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash
College62 involved the hazing of an 18-year old
freshman, who suffered physical and mental
injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi
Kappa Psi fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was
thrown into a creek and was placed in a
chokehold, until he lost consciousness. The court
upheld that action against the local fraternity
because, even if the student consented, the
fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its
activities.
The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show
that victims of hazing can properly attain redress
before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting
offenders, the state can address the distinct
dilemma of hazing.
11
Anti-Hazing Law in the
Philippines
R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995,
has been enacted to regulate hazing and other
forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities,
and other organizations. It was in response to the
rising incidents of death of hazing victims,
particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa.63 Despite its passage, reports of deaths
resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent
victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St.
Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin Reglos of
the San', Beda College - Manila, and Cris Anthony
Mendez of the University of the Philippines -
Diliman. With the continuity of these senseless
tragedies, one question implores for an answer: is
R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against
hazing?
To answer the question, the Court must dissect
the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect,
implication and application.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts
wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and
acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
positive law forbids them, called acts mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with
reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala
in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial.64 When the doing of an act
is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to
public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act
is the crime itself.65
A common misconception is that all mala in se
crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are
provided by special penal laws. In reality,
however, there may be mala in se crimes under
special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No.
7080, as amended.66 Similarly, there may be mala
prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as
technical malversation.67
The better approach to distinguish between mala
in se and mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or
vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act
or .omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime

mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is not immoral in
itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its
commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is
mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not
a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute.68
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum
prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show
that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing
statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows:
SENATOR GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not
all, are already punished under the Revised Penal
Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at
present and it results in death, the charge would
be murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in
death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who
commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized
under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale
for making a new offense under this definition of
the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group
of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity
or any association from making this requirement
of initiation that has already resulted in these
specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a
strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical
initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be
the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not
punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking
the punishment of an initiation into a club or
organization, he is seeking the punishment of
certain acts that resulted in death, etcetera as a
result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we
would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing,
but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two
or more charges or offenses, because these very
same acts are already punishable under the
Revised Penal Code
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a
very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for
gaining entry into an organization, the intent to
commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr.
President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is
homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But
if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important
is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what
will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities;
that they should really shun this activity called
"hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or
sororities do not even consider having a neophyte
killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are
even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called
initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang
nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-
recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiybng
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa
iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay
nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong
patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung
maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin
isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after
the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa
mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong
hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay
diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives,
Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I
am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent that
resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious
physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have
to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving
or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to
me, a novel situation where we create the special
crime without having to go into the intent, which is
one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent
were merely to initiate, then there is no offense.
And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that
the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to
have a new society or a new club is, per se, not
punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not
going to be proven by intent, but just because
there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the
basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing,
precisely, is being criminalized because in the
context of what is happening in the sororities and
fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will
admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So,
we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting
physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and
we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity
to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is
the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can
easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not
have the intention to kill. This is part of our
initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim."
12
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well
have been charged therefore with the ordinary
crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the
prosecution will have a difficulty proving the
elements if they are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR LINA. x x x
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority
Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether it
is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a
radical amendment if that is the point that he
wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can
just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal
Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.69
[Emphases Supplied]
Having in mind the potential conflict between the
proposed law and the core principle of mala in se
adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not
simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the
principle of mala prohibita.70 In Vedana v.
Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our nation's
very recent history, the people had spoken,
through the Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of hazing, an act previously
considered harmless by custom, as
criminal.72 The act of hazing itself is not inherently
immoral, but the law deems the same to be
against public policy and must be prohibited.
Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is
immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the
defense of good faith cannot be raised in its
prosecution.73
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an
initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority
or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or
applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating
situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or
otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury. From the said

definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can
be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission
into membership in a fraternity, sorority
or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit,
neophyte or applicant of the fraternity,
sorority or organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or
applicant is placed in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations
such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or
injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent
that there must be an initiation rite or practice
performed by the fraternities, sororities or
organization. The law, however, did not limit the
definition of these groups to those formed within
academic colleges and universities.74 In fact, the
second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the
term "organization" shall include any club or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine
National Police (PNP), Philippine Military
Academy (PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the
Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army
Training. Even the president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of a corporation engaged
in hazing as a requirement for employment are
covered by the law.75 R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that
the physical, mental and psychological testing and
training procedure and practices to determine and
enhance the physical, mental and psychological
fitness of prospective regular members of the AFP
and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary of
National Defense and the National Police
Commission, duly recommended by the Chief of
Staff of the AFP and the Director General of the
PNP, shall not be considered as hazing.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited
by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that
initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or
organizations shall be allowed provided that the
following requisites are met:
1. That the fraternity, sorority or
organization has a prior written notice to
the school authorities or head of
organization;
2. The said written notice must be
secured at least seven (7) days before
the conduct of such initiation;
3. That the written notice shall indicate:
a. The period of the initiation
activities, which shall not
exceed three (3) days;
b. The names of those to be
subjected to such activities;
and
c. An undertaking that no
physical violence be
employed by anybody during
such initiation rites. Section 3
of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an
obligation to the head of the
school or organization or their
representatives that they
must assign at least two (2)
representatives, as the case
may be, to be present during
these valid initiations. The
duty of such representative
,is to see to it that no physical
harm of any kind shall be
inflicted upon a recruit,
neophyte or applicant.
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or
sanction to fraternities, sororities or organizations
that fail to comply with the notice requirements of
Section 2. Also, the school and organization
administrators do not have a clear liability for non-
compliance with Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall
be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the law,
which provides different classes of persons who
are held liable as principals and accomplices.
The first class of principals would be the actual
participants in the hazing. If the person subjected
to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers
any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the
officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or
organization who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals. Interestingly, the presence of any
person during the hazing is prima facie evidence
of actual participation, unless he prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein.76
The prescribed penalty on the principals depends
on the extent of injury inflicted to the victim.77 The
penalties appear to be similar to that of homicide,
serious physical injuries, less serious physical
injuries, and slight physical injuries under the
RPC,78 with the penalties for hazing increased one
degree higher. Also, the law provides several
circumstances which would aggravate the
imposable penalty.79
Curiously, although hazing has been defined as
consisting of those activities involving physical or
psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for
hazing only covered the infliction of physical harm.
At best, the only psychological injury recognized
would be causing insanity to the victim.
Conversely, even if the victim only sustained
physical injuries which did not incapacitate him,
there is still a prescribed penalty.80
The second class of principals would be the
officers, former officers, or alumni of the
organization, group, fraternity or sorority who
actually planned the hazing.81 Although these
planners were not present when the acts
constituting hazing were committed, they shall still
be liable as principals. The provision took in
consideration the non-resident members of the
organization, such as their former officers or
alumni.
The third class of principals would ht; officers or
members of an organization group, fraternity or
sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out
the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat.82 These officers or members are
penalized, not because of their direct participation
in the infliction of harm, but due to their
indispensable cooperation in the crime by
inducing the victim to attend the hazing.
The next class of principals would be the fraternity
or sorority's adviser who was present when the
acts constituting hazing were committed, and
failed to take action to prevent them from
13
occurring.83 The liability of the adviser arises, not
only from his mere presence in the hazing, but
also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents
of the officers or members of the fraternity, group,
or organization.84The hazing must be held in the
home of one of the officers or members. The
parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted in their homes and failed to take any
action to avoid the same from occurring.
The law also provides for accomplices in the crime
of hazing. The school authorities, including faculty
members, who consented to the hazing or who
have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take
any action to prevent the same from occurring
shall be punished as accomplices.85 Likewise, the
owner of the place where the hazing was
conducted can also be an accomplice to the
crime.86 The owner of the place shall be liable
when he has actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted therein and he failed to take any steps
to stop the same. Recognizing the malum
prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law
provides that any person charged with the said
crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance that there was no intention to
commit so grave a wrong.87 Also, the framers of
the law intended that the consent of the victim
shall not be a defense in hazing. During the
discussion of whether sodomy shall be included
as a punishable act under the law, the issue of
consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x x x
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing,
Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy.
The infliction of pain may be done with the consent
of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not
make the act of hazing not punishable because
the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon
himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries,
but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that
reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent
of the victim, then we would not have passed any
law at all. There will be no significance if we pass
this bill, because it will always be a defense that
the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering.
He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that
we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering
is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act
of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the
defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can
only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole
foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the
committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair
hears none; the same is approved.88
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended
party in the crime of hazing can seek different
courses of action. n '.'provides that the responsible
officials of the school or of the police, military or
citizen's army training organization, may impose
the appropriate administrative sanctions on the
person or the persons charged under this
provision even before their
conviction.89 Necessarily, the offended party can
file either administrative, civil, or criminal actions
against the offenders.90
The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049
shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum
prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow
the defense of good faith. It took into consideration
the different participants and contributors in the
hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law
are penalized, the penalties imposed therein
involve various and serious terms of imprisonment
to discourage would-be offenders. Indeed, the law
against hazing is ideal and profound. As to
whether the law can be effectively implemented,
the Court begs to continue on the merits of the
case.
The Information properly
charged the offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended
,information avers a criminal charge of hazing by
actual participation, but the only offense proved
during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1
contention must fail. The Amended Information
reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of
January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, during a planned initiation
rite and being then officers and members of Alpha
Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet
known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and use personal violence
upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a
neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him
to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.91
On the manner of how the Information should be
worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for
the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the
exact language of the statute in alleging the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge
against him, and the court to render judgment
properly.92
14
The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators
initiation rite" as stated in the information included by moving them to execute or implement the
the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In criminal plan.95
ordinary parlance, a planned event can be
understood to have different phases. Likewise, the
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the
hazing activity had different stages and the
parties actually came together and agreed in
perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely
express terms to enter into and pursue a common
inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of
design. The assent of the minds may be and, from
the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity
the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from
was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo
proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be
together, indicate that they are parts of some
present at the resort, but they actually brought him
complete whole.96Responsibility of a conspirator is
there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned
not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
hazing rite which eventually led to the death of
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral
Villanueva. The hazing would not have been
acts and offenses incident to and growing out of
accomplished were it not for the acts of the
the purpose intended.97
petitioners that induced the victim to be present.
The lawmakers deliberated on whether the
Secrecy and silence are common
prosecution was still obliged to prove the
characterizations of the dynamics of hazing.93 To
conspiracy between the offenders under R.A.
require the prosecutor to indicate every step of the
8049, to wit:
planned initiation rite in the information at the
inception of the criminal case, when details of the
clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming
arduous task, if not downright impossible. The law there was a group that initiated and a person died.
does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad The charge is murder. My question is: Under this
impossibilia). bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have
to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
The proper approach would be to require the
prosecution to state every element of the crime of SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is
hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying present during hazing x x x
circumstances in the planned initiation activity
which has been satisfied in the present case.
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are
Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently
informed the petitioners that they were being present. First, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution
criminally charged for their roles in the planned
have to prove intent to kill or not?
initiation rite.
Conspiracy of the SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second
question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no
offenders was duly proven
need to prove intent to kill.
The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
establish the fact of conspiracy.
The Court disagrees. SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should
not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President.98
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the
The Court does not categorically agree that, under
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove
determine conspiracy, there must be a common
conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that
design to commit a felony.94 The overt act or acts
conspiracy must be established, not by
of the accused may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself or may conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere

companionship and mere presence at the scene
of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent
any active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.99
R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel
provision that introduces a disputable
presumption of actual participation; and which
modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4,
paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of
any person during the hazing is prima facie
evidence of participation as principal, unless he
prevented the commission of the punishable acts.
This provision is unique because a disputable
presumption arises from the mere presence of the
offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted
by proving that the accused took steps to prevent
the commission of the hazing.
The petitioners attempted to attack the
constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049
before the CA, hut did not succeed. "[A] finding of
prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the
presumptive innocence the accused enjoys
because, before prima facie evidence arises,
certain facts have still to be proved; the trial court
cannot depend alone on such evidence, because
precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still
satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither
can it rely on the weak defense the latter may
adduce."100
Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by
disputable presumptions against the offenders are
not new, and can be observed in the following: (1)
the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to
prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous
drug;101 (2) the dishonor of the check for
insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit;102 and (3) the possession of any good
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.103
Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No.
8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the crime
of hazing. The common design of offenders is to
haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could
be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan
the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's
initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to
attend the hazing; and (3) actually participate in
the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the
petitioners' participation in the hazing because of
their presence in the venue. As correctly held by
the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during
the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was
established by the testimony of Ignacio. She
testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort
and approach her store, to wit:
MR. DIMACULANGAN
Q: And how many persons from this group did you
see again?
WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.
Q: Where did they come from, did they come out
from the resort? Where did this 3 people or this
group of people coming from?
A: Inside the resort, sir.
Q: And around what time was this?
A: Around 9:00, sir.
Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of
the resort?
A: They went to my store, sir.
xxxx
Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store
that night?
xxxx
A: "Meron po".
Q: Who were these visitors?
A: I don't know their names but I recognize their
faces, sir.
Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you
be able to identify them before this Court.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of
persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial, can
you please look over this document carefully and
see if any of the persons whom you said visited
your store is here?
xxxx
A: "Siya rin po."
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the
first picture appearing on the left picture on the first
row.
xxxx
ATIY. PAMAOS:
For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the
picture and the name pointed by the witness has
been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and
previously admitted by the defense as referring to
Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case…104
Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among
the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the night
of the hazing, to wit:
COURT
Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could
identify who are not in the pictures then how would
you know that these people are indeed those
people you could identify?
WITNESS
15
A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na
dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka
iyong nagyakapan po ... "
Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged
embrace and shake hands for you to say that you
could identify those people?
A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang
jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng driver
bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapos
iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod nagbaba-an
din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."
Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify
these people?
A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong
iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa kabila
iyon."
Q: And who was that person?
A: "Siya po, iyon po."
Q: Who are you pointing to?
A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing
to Dandy Dungo)
Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person
you positively saw seated beside the driver came
out and subsequently embraced and shook hands
with the other people from the jeepney, is that your
testimony?
A: Yes, your Honor.105
The testimony of Ignacio was direct and
straightforward. Her testimony was given great
weight because she was a disinterested and
credible witness. The prosecution indubitably
established the presence of Dungo and Sibal
during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima
facie evidence of their actual participation in the
hazing of Villanueva. They were given an
opportunity to rebut and overcome the prima facie
evidence of the prosecution by proving that they
prevented the commission of the hazing, yet they
failed to do so.

Because of the uncontroverted prima facie
evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that
they performed an overt act in the furtherance of
the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they
induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the
petitioners also actually participated in it based on
the prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient
to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.106 Exceptionally, under R.A. No.
8049, the participation of the offenders in the
criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima
facie evidence due to their presence during the
hazing, unless they prevented the commission of
the acts therein.
The guilt of the
petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the
initiation rites and their presence during the
hazing, the petitioners? guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the sequence of
circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of
Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie
evidence but was also established by
circumstantial evidence.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start
with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions,
he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.107 In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such degree of proof that
produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty
is required or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.108
While it is established that nothing less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not
preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when
direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is
not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of
an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually
committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence
is insisted on under all circumstances, the
prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous
crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if
not impossible, to prove.109 Needless to state, the
crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy.
Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek
organizations, are secretive in nature and their
members are reluctant to give any information
regarding initiation rites.110 The silence is only
broken after someone has been injured so
severely that medical attention is required. It is
only at this point that the secret is revealed and
the activities become public.111 Bearing in mind
the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and
proper for the prosecution to resort to the
presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it.
The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain
the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence require the existence of
the following requisites: (1) there are more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be
based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of
all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.112 To
justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be such as
to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the
criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence
requires that the circumstances must be
established to form an unbroken chain of events
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the author of the crime.113
The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken
chain of circumstantial evidence which
established the petitioners' gult in the death of
Villanueva as follows:
1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of
Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his
roommate Joey Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga
was staying at their tambayan, talking to
her organization mates. Three men
were seated two meters way from her.
She identified two of the men as
appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she
did not know the third man. The three
men were wearing black shirts with the
seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
two more men coming from the
entomology wing arrived and
approached the three men. Among the
men who just arrived was the victim,
Marlon Villanueva. One of the men
wearing black APO shirts handed over
to the two fraternity neophytes some
money and told the men "Mamalengke
na kayo." He later took back the money
and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."
4. One of the men wearing a black APO
shirt, who was later identified as
appellant Dungo, stood up and asked
Marlon if the latter already reported to
him, and asked him why he did not
report to him when he was just at the
tambayan. Dungo then continuously
punched the victim on his arm. This
went on for five minutes. Marlon just
kept quiet with his head bowed down.
Fifteen minutes later, the men left going
towards the Entomology wing.
5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was
'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00
in the evening of 13 January 2006, from
whom he borrowed the shoes he wore
at the initiation right [sic]. Marlon told
Joey that it was his "finals" night.
6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30
to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan
Ignacio saw more than twenty (20)
persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches
Resort onboard a jeepney.1âwphi1 She
estimated the ages of these persons to
be between 20 to 30 years old. Three
(3) persons riding a single motorcycle
likewise arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15)
persons gather on top of the terrace at
the resort who looked like they were
praying. Later that evening, at least
three (3) of these persons went to her
store to buy some items. She did not
know their names but could identity [sic]
their faces. After she was shown
colored photographs, she pointed to the
16
man later identified as Herald
Christopher Braseros. She also pointed
out the man later identified as Gregorio
Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying
the route of Pansol, Calamba City,
testified that around 3:00 o'clock in the
morning of January 14, 2006, he was
waiting for passengers at the corner of
Villa Novaliches Resort when a man
approached him and told him that
someone inside the resort needed a
ride. Magat then went to the resort and
asked the two (2) men standing by the
gate who will be riding his tricycle.
9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle
but Magat noticed that when he touched
the body of the man who was being
carried, it felt cold. The said man looked
very weak like a vegetable.
10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified
that he worked as a security guard at
the J.P. Rizal Hospital and was
assigned at the emergency room. At
around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning
of January 14, 2006, he was with
another security guard, Abelardo
Natividad and hospital helper Danilo
Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle
arrived at the emergency room
containing four (4) passengers,
excluding the driver. He was an arm's
length away from said tricycle. He
identified two of the passengers thereof
as appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina
said he and Glinda helped the
passengers unload a body inside the
tricycle and brought it to the emergency
room.
11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two
meq for identification cards. The latter
replied that they did not bring with them
any I.D. or wallet.1âwphi1 Instead of
giving their true names, the appellants
listed down their names in the hospital
logbook as Brandon Gonzales y Lanzon
and Jericho Paril y Rivera. Espina then
told the two men not to leave, not telling
them that they secretly called the police
to report the incident which was their

standard operating procedure when a
dead body was brought to the hospital.
12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was
then the attending physician at the
emergency room, observed that Marlon
was motionless, had no heartbeat and
already cyanotic.
13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive
Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes.
However, the latter did not respond to
resuscitation and was pronounced
dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big
contusion hematoma on the left side of
the victim's face and several injuries on
his arms and legs. He further attested
that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.
14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down
Marlon's pants, he saw a large
contusion on both legs which extended
from the upper portion of his thigh down
to the couplexial portion or the back of
the knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and
location of Marlon's injuries, Dr.
Masilungan opined that he was a victim
of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar
with hazing injuries, having undergone
hazing when he was a student and also
because of his experience treating
victims of hazing incidents.
16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal
Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that
he performed an autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim on January 14j
2006; that the victim's cause of death
was blunt head trauma. From 1999 to
2006, he was able to conduct post-
mortem examination of the two (2)
persons whose deaths were attributed
to hazing. These two (2) persons
sustained multiple contusions and
injuries on different parts of their body,
particularly on the buttocks, on both
upper and lower extremities. Both
persons died of brain hemorrhage.
Correlating these two cases to the
injuries found on the victim's body, Dr.
Camarillo attested that the victim,
Marlon Villanueva, sustained similar
injuries to those two (2) persons. Based
on the presence of multiple injuries and
contusions on his body, he opined that
these injuries were hazing-related.114
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand,
presented the defense of denial and alibi. These
defenses, however, must fail. Time and time
again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are
the weakest of all defenses, because they are
easy to concoct and fabricate.115 As properly held
by the RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over
the positive and unequivocal identification of the
petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and
Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses
also lacked credibility and reliability. The
corroboration of defense witness Rivera was
suspect because she was the girlfriend of Dungo,
and it was only logical and emotional that she
would stand by the man she loved and cared for.
The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers,
likewise, do not hold much weight because they
had so much at stake in the outcome of the case.
Stated differently, the petitioners did not present
credible and. disinterested witnesses to
substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.
After a careful review of the records, the Court
agrees with the CA and the R TC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was overwhelming enough to
establish the guilt of the petitioners beyond a
reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events
laid down by the CA leaves us no other conclusion
other than the petitioners' participation in the
hazing. They took part in the hazing and, together;
with their fellow fraternity officers and members,
inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as a
requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The
physical injuries eventually took a toll on the body
of the victim, which led to his death. Another
young life lost.
With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the
petitioners, and their participation therein duly
proven, the moral certainty that produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been
satisfied.
Final Note
Hazing has been a phenomenon that has
beleaguered the country's educational institutions
and communities. News of young men beaten to
death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites
supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent
disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No.
8049 was signed into to law on June 7, 1995.
Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were
raised. The Court, however, scrutinized its
provisions and it is convinced that the law is
rigorous in penalizing the crime of hazing.
Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide
to the bench and the bar on the application of R.A.
No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and
proper presentation of evidence before the court,
it is not impossible for the exalted constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused to be
overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution must bear in mind the secretive
nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of
circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the defense
must present a genuine defense and substantiate
the same through credible and reliable witnesses.
The counsels of both parties must also consider
hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's
distinctive provisions.
While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to
deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from
perfect. In Villareal v. People,116 the Court
suggested that the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity
members during hazing should be considered as
aggravating circumstances that would increase
the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the
discussion earlier, this Court suggests some
further amendments to the law. First, there should
be a penalty or liability for noncompliance with
Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and
with Section 3, or the representation requirement.
Second, the penalties under Section 4 should also
consider the psychological harm done to the victim
of hazing. With these additional inputs on R.A. No.
8049, the movement against hazing can be
invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic
response to the uproar against hazing. It
demonstrates that there must, and should, be
another way of fostering brotherhood, other than
through the culture of violence and suffering. The
senseless deaths of these young men shall never
be forgotten, for justice is the spark that lights the
candles of their graves.
17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April
26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-
H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let
copies of this Decision be furnished to the
Secretary of the Department of Justice as
guidance for the proper implementation and
prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to
the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible
consideration of the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the penalty for
noncompliance with its Section 2 and 3, and the
:penalty for the psychological harms to the
surviving victims of hazing.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192330 November 14, 2012
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with
illegal diversion of food intended for those
suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of
reconsideration projects affecting the homes of
victims of calamities.
The Facts and the Case
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas
accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of
violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical
malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code.1
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare
and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte,
Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance
Program (CSAP) that provided construction
materials to indigent calamity victims with which to
rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided
the labor needed for construction.

On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity
victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was
70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for
work for the reason that they had to find food for
their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia),
the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction
stoppage could result in the loss of construction
materials particularly the cement. Thus, she
sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an
officer of the MSWDO in charge of the
municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program
(SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of
rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And
since she had already distributed food to the
mother volunteers, what remained could be given
to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold
James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to
seek his approval. After explaining the situation to
him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the
withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes
of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Mayor
Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to
consult the accounting department regarding the
matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the
supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant’s
Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her
view that it was an emergency situation justifying
the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP
delivered those goods to its beneficiaries.
Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter to the
MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per
auditing rules.
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed
the present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna
Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head,
testified that the subject SFP goods were intended
for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished
children. She also pointed out that the
Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines
for Local Government Units governed the
distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro
committed technical malversation when he
approved the distribution of SFP goods to the
CSAP beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of
the subject goods to a project also meant for the
poor of the municipality was valid since they came
from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity
Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing
that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries
were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore,
Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal
Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their
municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in
its transactions.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found
Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
technical malversation. But, since his action
caused no damage or embarrassment to public
service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the
sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that
Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose
other than that for which it has been appropriated
by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the
Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for
reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro
appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this
Court.
The Questions Presented
In essence, Ysidoro questions the
Sandiganbayan’s finding that he committed
technical malversation. He particularly raises the
following questions:
1. Whether or not he approved the
diversion of the subject goods to a
public purpose different from their
originally intended purpose;
2. Whether or not the goods he
approved for diversion were in the
nature of savings that could be used to
augment the other authorized
expenditures of the municipality;
3. Whether or not his failure to present
the municipal auditor can be taken
against him; and
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid
defense for technical malversation.
The Court’s Rulings
One. The crime of technical malversation as
penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is
an accountable public officer; b) that he applies
18
public funds or property under his administration savings are not considered appropriated by law or
to some public use; and c) that the public use for ordinance and can be used for other public
which such funds or property were applied is purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoro’s
different from the purpose for which they were argument.
originally appropriated by law or
ordinance.5 Ysidoro claims that he could not be
The subject goods could not be regarded as
held liable for the offense under its third element
savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran
because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of
throughout the year. Consequently, no one could
sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not
say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already
appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific
finished its project, leaving funds or goods that it
purpose.
no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had
already distributed the food items needed by the
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001
the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted does not mean that the remaining food items in its
Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual storeroom constituted unneeded savings. Since
general fund for 2001.6 This appropriation was the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to
based on the executive budget7 which allocated predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines,
P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the the view that the subject goods were no longer
Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social needed for the remainder of the year was quite
Services8 which covers the CSAP housing premature.
projects.9 The creation of the two items shows the
Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate
In any case, the Local Government Code provides
funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly
apply funds, already appropriated for a
Since the municipality bought the subject goods determined public purpose, to some other
using SFP funds, then those goods should be purpose. Thus:
used for SFP’s needs, observing the rules
prescribed for identifying the qualified
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and
beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target
Savings. – Funds shall be available exclusively for
clientele of the SFP according to its manual10 are:
the specific purpose for which they have been
1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-
appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed
school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and
authorizing any transfer of appropriations from
2) the families of six members whose total monthly
one item to another. However, the local chief
income is P3,675.00 and below.11 This rule
executive or the presiding officer of the
provides assurance that the SFP would cater only
sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be
to the malnourished among its people who are in
authorized to augment any item in the approved
urgent need of the government’s limited
annual budget for their respective offices from
resources.
savings in other items within the same expense
class of their respective appropriations.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he
approved the distribution of the goods to those
The power of the purse is vested in the local
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own
legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the
homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro
law gives the Sanggunian the power to determine
could not legally distribute the construction
whether savings have accrued and to authorize
materials appropriated for the CSAP housing
the augmentation of other items on the budget
beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients
with those savings.
neither could he distribute the food intended for
the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal
auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods
the subject goods, such finding should be
already constituted savings of the SFP and that,
respected. The SB ruled, however, that since
therefore, the same could already be diverted to
Ysidoro failed to present the municipal auditor at
the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v.
the trial, the presumption is that his testimony
People12 which states that funds classified as
would have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro

argues that this goes against the rule on the
presumption of innocence and the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for
assuming that had the municipal auditor testified,
his testimony would have been adverse to the
mayor. The municipal auditor’s view regarding the
transaction is not conclusive to the case and will
not necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if it
happened to be favorable to him. The Court will
not, therefore, be drawn into speculations
regarding what the municipal auditor would have
said had he appeared and testified.
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith
since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the
CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from
Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be
distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no
criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be
convicted of the crime.1âwphi1
But criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or
ordinance for a particular public purpose to
another public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense
because positive law forbids its commission based
on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as
defined by the law, and not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Hence, malice or
criminal intent is completely irrelevant.14
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how
noble or miniscule the amount diverted,
constitutes the crime of technical malversation.
The law and this Court, however, recognize that
his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely
the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 4, RPC
G.R. No. 206227
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee
vs.
STANLEY BUENAMER STANLEY BUENAMER
y MANDANE, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 7, 2012
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CR-H.C. No. 04881, which affirmed with
modification the May 18, 2010 Decision2 of the
Regitnal Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33,
in Criminal Case No. 09-272017, finding appellant
Stanley Buenamer y Mandane (Buenamer) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide, as defined and penalized in Article
294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Proceedings before the Regional. Trial Court
Buenamer and his co-accused Jerome Lambada
y Landero (Lambada) were indicted for the felony
of f()bbery with homicide for staging an anned
robbery inside a passenger FX taxi and causing
the death of one of the passengers therein. The
indictment against them alleged
The undersigned accuses STANLEY
BUENAMERy MANDANE an JEROME
LAMBADA y LANDERO of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about October 20, 2009 in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence, and intimidation, to wit: by
boarding a passenger FX taxi going to Espana
Blvd., Sampaloc, this City, announcing a hold up
then pointing their guns to its passengers and
FERRARIE TAN y OALLESMA and divesting from
him his black bag containing a Sony PSP colored
black with casing and one q) brown envelope with
cash money in the amount of ₱5,460.00, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
rob and carry away the same, against his will, to
the damage arid prejudice of the said FERRARIE
TAN y OALLESMA in the amount of more than
₱5,460.00, Philippine Currency; that on occasion
of or by reason of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling themselves to take, rob and
carry away the personal properties of the
passengers, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon said FERRARIE TAN y OALLESMA
when he chased the said accused who boarded a
passenger jeepney in order to escape, but was
boxed when he held on the handle bar of the
jeepney causing him to [lose] his grip and [fall]
from the jeepney and thereafter was ran over by
the rear tire of said jeepney, thereby inflicting upon
him physical injuries which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Arraigned on December 17, 2009 both accused,
assisted by counsel, entered a negative plea to
the crime chluged. After the pre.trial conference,
trial on the merits followed.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: Manila Traffic and Parking
Bureau (MTPB) Enforcers Peter Paul de Jesus
(De Jesus), Raymond Buaron (Buaron), anq
James Mendez y Dones (Mendez), Police Officer
3 Jay Santos (P03 Santos), Diana David y Del
Pilar (David), Carolyn Tan (Carolyn), and Dr.
Romeo Salen (Dr. Salen). Their collective
testimonies tended to establish the following facts:
On October 20, 2009, at around 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, David was on board a passenger FX
taxi on her way home from Quezon City to
Sampaloc, Manila, when along Espana
Boulevard, comer Maceda Street in Sampaloc,
Manila, a hold-up was announced by Buenamer
and Lambada. The armed duo demanded for the
wallets, cellphones, and other valuables of the FX
passengers. The two threatened to shoot and
blow up the brains of anyone who resisted them
(''pasabugin ang ulo namin").' David heard the
now deceased Ferrarie Tan (Ferrarie), who was
then wearing a nurse's uniform, crying and
pleading to robbers that he had already given to
them his cellphone, a Sony PSP, and that he was
only a student. Nevertheless, the armed robbers
proceeded to divest, as indeed they divested, the
passengers of their personal effects, including
David's own Nokia cellphone and coin purse.
19
When the FX stopped at an intersection along
Maceda Street and Espana Boulevard in
Sampaloc, Manila, David quickly got off the FX
and shouted for help. Traffic enforcers and
bystanders heard her shout and plea for
assistance, and at once chased after Buenamer;
and Lambada who were trying to flee from the
scene of the crime. Not long after this, David saw
the lifeless Ferrarie lying along Espania Boulevard
in Sampaloc.
De Jesus was an MTPB traffic enforcer on duty
along Espania Boulevard when the incident took
place. De Jesus testified that he responded to
David's call for help, along with another MTPB
traffic enforcer, Mendez. David told the traffic
enforcers that the fleeing suspects had boarded a
red jeepney. So De Jesus quickly rode his
motorcycle and went after the red jeepney which
was carrying the robbers. One of the robbers got
off at Florentino Street in Sampaloc, Manila. Here,
De Jesus was able to apprehend BuenameI'i after
a tricycle accidentally ran over the latter.
Buenamer was beaten up by the by-standers, and
then brought to the barangay hall nearby, where
people there were able to recover from him a bag
containing a Sony PSP, cellphone, a gun with
several bullets, a pay slip with brown envelope,
and money.
Another MTPB employee, traffic enforcer Mendez,
also heard David's shout for help, and when David
pointed to the jeepney where the hold-uppers
were, he (Mendez) went near the jeepney, just in
time to see a person in white uniform holding on
to the estribo (the handle bar) of the jeepney.
Mendez testified that he saw this person's hands
teaching inside the front seat of the jeepney, trying
to regain possession of his Sony PSP, cellphone
and other valuables from Buenamer who was then
sitting in front of the jeepney, near the driver; that
he then saw Buenamer strike or box that other
person (who turned out to be Ferrarie), causing
Ferrarie to fall off; and that after Ferrarie fell off,
the jeepney's rear tire ran over Ferrarie. After this
Mendez mounted his motorcycle and went after
Buenamer who fled the crime scene.
Still another MTPB tratfic enforcer presented by
the prosecution was Buaron. This traffic enforcer
testified that he was the one who apprehended
Lambada somewhere near the vicinity of the North
Cemetery along Bonifacio Avenue; tilld that he
then brought Lambada to Police Station No. 1 in
Quezon City because the police authorities of

Quezon City ilisisted on asserting jurisdiction over
his case.
P03 Santos of the Manila Police Department was
the police investigator who prepared the Crime
Report, Booking Sheet, and Arrest Report for
Buenamer and Lambada. It was also P03 Santos
who took the sworn statements of David, Mendez,
and De Jesus. P03 Santos testified that it was he
who recovered a Sony PSP, black cellphone, a
brown envelope with the name "Tan, Ferrarie," a
pay slip containing ₱5,460.00, and a .38 caliber
revolver with seven live bullets.
Carolyn was the mother of the victim. She
identified her son Ferrarie at the Universal Funeral
Parlor, despite his broken face.1âwphi1 She
testified that her son was a registered nurse at the
Ospital ;ng Makati and was earning ₱6,000.00
every 15 days. She claimed that she spent P2
million for the interment and burial of Ferrarie.
Dr. Salen, the Medico-Uegal Officer of the Manila
Police District Crime Laboratory, conducted the
post-mortem examination on the corpse of
Ferrarie. Dr. Salen testified that the victim's corpse
was already in a state of rigor mortis when he
examined it; that he found a 10 x 3 cm. lacerated
wound on Ferrarie's forehead, abrasions from the
right and left side of the following: nose; chest;
knees; feet; thighs; and from the victim's
abdomen; and two lacerated wounds at the lower
lip and on the chin. According to Dr. Salen,
Ferrarie's ribs were fractured and his lungs
macerated.
The accused waived their right to present their
defense.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 18, 2010, the RTC rendered judgment
finding Buenamer guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with homicide. The RTC
however found Lambada guilty merely of simple
robbery. The RTC disposed thus
- The appeal will not prosper.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused STANLEY BUENAMER guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the. crime of Robbery
with Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code as principal and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As for the accused JEROME LAMBADA,
judgment is hereby rendered finding him guilty pf
the crime of Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as principal and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
Two (2) years, Ten (10) months and Eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as minimum TO Six
(6) years, One (1) month and Eleven (11) days of
prision mayor medium, as maximum.
The accused are likewise directed to pay the
amount of ₱5,460.00 and the value of the Sony
PSP taken from Ferrarie Tan.
Accused Stanley Buenamer is also ordered to pay
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied with the RTC's disposition, Buenamer
appealed to the CA, arguing that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
since his' identity as the alleged perpetrator of the
crime was not sufficiently established. Buenamer
also cqutended that the mitigating circumstance
under Article 13(3) of the RPC should/have been
appreciated in his favor because he had no
intention to commit so gravel a wrong as that he
committed. Buenamer insisted that when he hit or
boxed Ferrat/ie on the arm, he had no intention of
killing him at all.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 7, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC and
ruled that Buenamer's appeal was without merit.
The1 CA found that the prosecution was able to
prove the identity of Buenamer through the
testimonies of David and Mendez, both of whom
were eyewitnesses to'thelcrime. The CA noted in
particular that David was able to see the face of
Buenamer inside the passenger FX taxi because
David was herself a passenger in that vehicle.
As to Buenamer's invocation of the mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(3) of the RPC, the
CA held that this plea was unavailing. The CA
ruled that all the elements of the crime of ro~bel)'
were present when Buenamer and Lambada held
up the, passengers of the F4 taxi. The CA
stressed that the felony of robbery I with homicide
is committed once it is clearly shown that the
criminal intention of the felon is to rob, and that
there is a killing which occurs before, during, or
after the robbery.
The CA thus disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Decision dated May 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 33, Manila in Criminal Case
No. 09-272017 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is found
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and is hereby
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, and is
ordered to pay ₱75,000.00 as civil damages and
1150,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.5
From that Decision, Buenamer took the present
appeal and in support thereof now contends
that.the CA's Decision was contrary to the
evidence, the law, and jurisprudence.
Buenamer insists that the prosecution was not
able to positively identify the perpetrators of the
crime since the alleged eyewitness, David, was
not in a position to recognize them; that when the
traffic enforcers heeded David's call for help and
ran after the suspects, they did not know who to
pursue; and that in any event, the mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 3 of the
RPC should benefit him because he did not interid
tq kill Ferrarie when he hit the latter's right arm that
caused the latter to fall off the p~senger jeepney
and be run over by the jeepney's rear tire.
Our Ruling
We hold that both the RTC and the CA correctly
found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide.
20
Indeed, we are satisfied that in this case the
prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish the
elements of robbery with homicide, to wit:
(1) The taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) The property taken belongs to another;
(3) The taking is with animo lucrandi; and
(4) By reason of the robbery, or on the occasion
thereof, homicide is committed.6
All the elements mentioned above are present in
this case.1âwphi1 In point of fact, the prosecution
succeeded in showing that the primary aim or
objective of the malefactors Buenamer and
Lambada was to rob the passengers of the FX
taxi. Prosecution witness David, a passenger of
the FX taxi in which the two robbers staged the
heinous felony, was herself a victim of the robbery
that was staged by the malefactors that afternoon
of October 20, · 2009 along Espana Boulevard in
Sampaloc, Manila. David positively identified
Buenamer as the very perpetrator of the crime
together with his co-accused Lambada. David
testified that she saw the faces of these two
malefactors when these two boarded the FX taxi
at the Pantranco terminal in Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City; that Buenamer and Lambada, then
armed with firearms, declared a hold-up on board
the moving vehicle, after which these two divested
the passengers of their personal belongings, while
threatening the passengers that they would blow
off their heads (''pasabugin ang ulo namin") should
the passengers resist the robbery. By taking the
personal belongings and valuables of the
passengers, employing force, violence, and
intimidation, and motivated moreover by animus
lucrandi or intent to gain or profit, and thereafter
hitting Ferrarie causing him to fall from the
passenger jeepney resulting to his death, there
can be no question that Buenamer did commit
robbery with homicide.
Traffic enforcer Mendez saw Buenamer box or
strike Ferrarie who, in consequence of such a blo,
lost his grip on the estribo (or the handle bar) of
the moving vehicle, and fell off that vehicle, and at
once ran over by the vehicles right rear tire,
resulting in Ferrarie’s sustaining lacerated
wounds, and numerous abrasions in various parts

of his body that ultimately led to his death. In the
face of these actual, incontrovertible facts, there
can be no doubt that all the elements of robbery
with homecide are present in this case.
Buenamer insists that his identity as the
perpetrator of the crime was clearly established
because David was not in a position to recognize
him.
We are not persuaded. David , who was a co-
passenger of the now deceased Ferrarie that
fateful afternoon of October 20, 2009,
categorically declared that it was Buenamer and
Lambada who perpetrated the hold-up:
[Prvate Prosecutor] Atty. ARNULFO PEAGIO
Q Now, you said that there were two male persons
who boarded the FX, what about the other one,
would you able to recognize him also?
THE WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Again, will you please look inside the Courtroom
and tell the Honorable Court if he is inside the
Courtroom?
Note: At this point the Witness is pointing to
accused Stanley Buenamer y Mandane.
Q Now, after this male person who was seated at
the middle seat announced the hold up and
pointed the gun to the driver, what happened next,
Madam Witness?
A He told [us] to bring out the cellphones and
wallet, sir. And then he [threatened] to kill us if we
will not give our belongings to them and if ever we
will fight back then he will [blast] our heads away
[pasabugin ang ulo namin], he will fire at our
heads.7
And, no less clear and convincing, is the testimony
of traffic enforcer Mendez about the identity of
Buenamer. Mendez was one of the traffic
enforcers who immediately responded to David's
plea for help about the robbery hold-up; in fact,
this witness boarded the very vehicle where the
robbery hold-up took place. And, as his testimony
attests, there can be no doubt or question that
Buenamer was one of the perpetrators of this
heinous crime:
Q Could you tell .us that incident, Mr. Witness?
A Because that hour is a rush hour, we were
directing traffic at that time at our jurisdiction Sir
when all of a sudden we heard a voice from a
woman coming from my right side asking for
assistance.
Q Could you recall the words that you heard from
the woman?
A "Tulungan nyo po kami hinohold-up kami."
Q Upon hearing those 'Words from that woman,
what did you do Mr. Witness?
A I approached her and she pointed to the jeepney
where the hold-uppers boarded.
Q Could you please describe to us, Mr. Witness,
the jeepney?
A It is a red jeepney.
Q After x x x Diana pointed to you the jeepney
where the hold-uppers transferred, what did Jou
do?
A I approached the jeepney and I saw a person
wearing white clothes was holding at the "estribo"
in the passenger side of the jeepney and that
person cannot ride at the front portion because
[sic] of the jeepney and so he was being drag [sic]
by thejeepney.
Q You said that the person weaiing white uniform
[was] holding at the bar or the "estribo" of the
jeepney at the right side, could you tell us which
hand was x x x holding on to the bar?
A His right hand, Sir.
Q What about his left arm?
A What I saw [Was] that that person wearing white
uniform [was] getting something from [the] person
seated inside the jeepney.
Q After you saw this incident, what happened next
after that?
A I saw the person holding the iron bar was hit on
his arm so he fell down and he was r[a]n over by
the last tire of the jeepney, Sir.
Q Could you tell us who was that person which
you said bit the arm of the person wearing white
uniform while he was holding at the iron bar or
"estribo''?
A Yes, Sir. Because I was near them.
Q Could you tell us who _is that?
A Stanley Buenamer, Sir.8
Anent appellant's claim that the CA erred in not
appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed, this Court agrees with
the CA that this mitigating circumstance cannot be
invoked by the appellant. "This mitigating
circumstance addresses itself to the intention of
the offender at the particular moment when the
offender executes or commits the criminal act"9 -
an intention that must comport, amongst others,
with the weapon’s used by the: offender and the
mode of attack adopted by the latter, vis-a-vis the
injuries sustained by his victim. Thus, in People v.
Gonzalez, Jr.,10 we explained- ,
[t]his mitigating circumstances is obtaining when
there is a notable disparity between the means
employed by the accused to commit a wrong and
the resulting crime committed. The intention of
the accused at the time of the commission of
the crime is manifested from the weapon used,
the mode of attack employed, and the injury
sustained by the victim. x x x
Here, the records showed that Buenamer boxed
or struck Ferrarie with such force that the latter lost
his grip on the estribo or handle bar of the vehicle,
fell off and run over by the vehicle's rear tire. He
subsequently died. The legal postulate enshrined
under Article 3 of the RPC decrees that every
21
person shall be held responsible for all the natural
and logical consequences of his felonious act And,
complementing this Article 3 is Article 4 of the
same RPC, which provides that "criminal liability
shall be incurred (1) by any person committing a
felony, although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended." These two articles
of the RPC must thus apply with implacable force
against appellant; he must be called to account for
all the natural and logical consequences of his
felonious act; and hence must be deemed to have
incurred criminal liability, although the felonious
act he committed might have been different from
that which he intended.
Nonetheless, the CA's award of moral damages in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 is hereby upgraded to
₱75,000.00 in conformity with recent
jurisprudence. In addition, appellant must pay
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 7,
2012 in CA-GRCR-H.C. No. 04881, is AFFIRMED
subject to the MODIFICATION that the appellant
Stanley Buenamer y Mandane is condemned to
pay the heirs of Ferrarie Tan moral damages in the
increased amount of ₱75,000.00 and exemplary
damages of ₱75,000.00. The award of civil
damages, also in the amount of ₱75,000.00, is
maintained. These monetary awards shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per anum, reckoned from
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186412 September 7, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
ORLITO VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02550, which affirmed the Decision2 dated
September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case

No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant Orlito
Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz
(Cruz) the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
plus the costs of suit.
On June 21, 2002, an Information3 was filed
against Villacorta charging him with the crime of
murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in
Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR
CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim serious
wounds which caused his immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta
pleaded not guilty.4
During trial, the prosecution presented as
witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr.
Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she
was tending her sari-sari store located at C-4
Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and
Villacorta were regular customers at Mendeja’s
store. At around two o’clock in the morning, while
Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store,
Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering
a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s
body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The
bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body.
Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta
fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch
Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store,
she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken
bamboo stick from Cruz’s body.5 Mendeja and
Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.6
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus
Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When
Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23,
2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center,
where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was
only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on
February 14, 2002, where he died the following
day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that
he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres
was able to determine, using Cruz’s medical chart
and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection
secondary to stab wound.7 Dr. Belandres
specifically described the cause of Cruz’s death in
the following manner:
The wound was exposed x x – spurs concerted,
the patient developed difficulty of opening the
mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain
and the cause of death is hypoxic encephalopathy
– neuro transmitted – due to upper G.I. bleeding x
x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.8
The prosecution also intended to present Dr.
Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who attended to Cruz
at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution
and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias’
testimony based on the stipulation that it would
only corroborate Dr. Belandres’ testimony on Cruz
dying of tetanus.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta
himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta
recounted that he was on his way home from work
at around two o’clock in the morning of January
21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank
coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave
the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacorta’s
shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz,
after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did
not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found
out about Cruz’s death upon his arrest on July 31,
2002.9
On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a
Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder,
qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of
said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
Court finds accused Orlito Villacorta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the
sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death
of said victim plus the costs of suit.10
Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal to
assail his conviction by the RTC.11 The Court of
Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacorta’s brief,
within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Villacorta filed his Appellant’s Brief12 on May 30,
2007; while the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's
Brief13 on October 2, 2007.
On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC
judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the
instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file
a supplemental brief, as he was adopting the
Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of
Appeals.14 The OSG, likewise, manifested that it
was no longer filing a supplemental brief. 15
In his Appellant’s Brief, Villacorta raised the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE
COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.16
Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an
eyewitness to the stabbing incident. It was
22
Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the
one who stabbed Cruz in the early morning of
January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that
Mendeja’s account of the stabbing incident is
replete with inconsistencies and incredulities, and
is contrary to normal human experience, such as:
(1) instead of shouting or calling for help when
Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja
attempted to run after and catch Villacorta; (2)
while, by Mendeja’s own account, there were
other people who witnessed the stabbing and
could have chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly, only
Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly
and suddenly as Mendeja described, then it would
have been physically improbable for Mendeja to
have vividly recognized the perpetrator, who
immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4) after
the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran in
opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that
the bamboo stick, the alleged murder weapon,
was left at her store, although she had also stated
that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in
Cruz’s body. Villacorta maintains that the
aforementioned inconsistencies are neither trivial
nor inconsequential, and should engender some
doubt as to his guilt.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court,
is accorded full weight and credit as well as great
respect, if not conclusive effect. Such
determination made by the trial court proceeds
from its first-hand opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and
attitude under grilling examination, thereby
placing the trial court in the unique position to
assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate
their truthfulness, honesty and candor.17
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals gave full faith and credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The
Court of Appeals rejected Villacorta’s attempts to
impugn Mendeja’s testimony, thus:
Appellant’s reason for concluding that witness
Mendeja’s testimony is incredible because she did
not shout or call for help and instead run after the
appellant, fails to impress the Court because
persons who witness crimes react in different
ways.

"x x x the makings of a human mind are
unpredictable; people react differently and there is
no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s second
reason which is, other persons could have run
after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As
explained by witness Mendeja, the other person
whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the
appellant who was wounded. Further, the stabbing
occurred at 2:00 o’clock in the morning, a time
when persons are expected to be asleep in their
house, not roaming the streets.
His [Villacorta’s] other argument that the swiftness
of the stabbing incident rendered impossible or
incredible the identification of the assailant cannot
likewise prosper in view of his admission that he
was in the store of witness Mendeja on January
23, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the morning and that
he assaulted the victim by boxing him.
Even if his admission is disregarded still the
evidence of record cannot support appellant’s
argument. Appellant and the victim were known to
witness Mendeja, both being her friends and
regular customers. There was light in front of the
store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and ¼
meters enables the person inside to see persons
outside, particularly those buying articles from the
store. The victim was in front of the store buying
bread when attacked. Further, immediately after
the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the
appellant giving her additional opportunity to
identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the
attack can be credibly ascertained.18
Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any
reason or motivation for Mendeja to fabricate such
a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz
on January 23, 2002. We have ruled time and
again that where the prosecution eyewitness was
familiar with both the victim and accused, and
where the locus criminis afforded good visibility,
and where no improper motive can be attributed
to the witness for testifying against the accused,
then her version of the story deserves much
weight.19
The purported inconsistencies in Mendeja’s
testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on matters
that have no bearing on the fundamental fact
which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed
Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002,
right in front of Mendeja’s store.
In the face of Mendeja’s positive identification of
Villacorta as Cruz’s stabber, Villacorta could only
muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi,
as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak
and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-
serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.20
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing
factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument
proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found
to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be
held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate
cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."21
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by
Villacorta in the early morning of January 23,
2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-
patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February
14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro
Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection,
where he died the following day, on February 15,
2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of
the emergency medical treatment Cruz received
at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by
Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other
hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab
wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to
February 14, 2002.
In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 the
Court was confronted with a case of very similar
factual background as the one at bar. During an
altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked
Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on
Javier’s hand. Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses.
On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
hospital with lockjaw and convulsions. Dr.
Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that
Javier’s serious condition was caused by tetanus
infection. The next day, on November 15, 1980,
Javier died. An Information was filed against
Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal
Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court found
Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death
was the natural and logical consequence of
Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano appealed before
this Court, arguing that Javier’s own negligence
was the proximate cause of his death. Urbano
alleged that when Dr. Meneses examined Javier’s
wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and
that Javier could have acquired the tetanus germs
when he returned to work on his farm only two (2)
weeks after sustaining his injury. The Court
granted Urbano’s appeal.
We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the
Court in Urbano:
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not
there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time
between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56
days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury
the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as
restlessness, irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but the commonest
presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the
jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing.
As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to
rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is
responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity
becomes generalized, and sustained contractions
called risus sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable.
23
In a small proportion of patients, only local signs
and symptoms develop in the region of the injury.
In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered depend upon the major
muscle groups affected.
"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours
of the first symptoms, an interval referred to as the
onset time. As in the case of the incubation period,
a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be
both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce
more intense and longer lasting spasms with
increasing frequency. Respiration may be
impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible
central nervous system damage and death.
"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation
period of at least 14 days and an onset time of
more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are
brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset
time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The
criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or
less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and
frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive
spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine,
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to
tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo
which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or
on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms
of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs
at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild
case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of
the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
the second day from the onset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's
wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding
Javier's death, his wound could have been
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.23
The incubation period for tetanus infection and the
length of time between the hacking incident and
the manifestation of severe tetanus infection
created doubts in the mind of the Court that Javier
acquired the severe tetanus infection from the
hacking incident. We explained in Urbano that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be
the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that
the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to
a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin,
77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the
wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil.
118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible,
if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but
for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances, which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp.
931-932). (at p. 125)24
We face the very same doubts in the instant case
that compel us to set aside the conviction of
Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval
of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and
the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro
Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus
infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection
from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have
appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the
Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection
has a short incubation period, less than 14 days;
and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three
days from the injury, have one hundred percent
(100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce
that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote
cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus
might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's
death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of
his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal
liability.1âwphi1 Villacorta is guilty of slight
physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the
Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he
inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the
instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the
lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be
made considering that the latter offense is
necessarily included in the former since the
essential ingredients of slight physical injuries
constitute and form part of those constituting the
offense of murder.25
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for
attempted or frustrated murder because the
prosecution was not able to establish Villacorta’s
intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals expressly
24
observed the lack of evidence to prove such an offender, arising from the defense that the
intent beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: offended party might make. This definition sets out
what must be shown by evidence to conclude that
treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of
Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a
such means of execution as would give the person
sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him on the left
attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
side of the body and then immediately fled. The
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious
instrument used is not as lethal as those made of
adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate,
metallic material. The part of the body hit is not
the essence of qualifying circumstance is the
delicate in the sense that instant death can ensue
suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation
by reason of a single stab wound. The assault was
that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the
done only once. Thus, there is doubt as to whether
victim of any real opportunity for self-defense
appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which
while ensuring the commission of the crime
should be resolved in favor of the appellant. x x
without risk to the aggressor.29 Likewise, even
x.26
when the victim was forewarned of the danger to
his person, treachery may still be appreciated
The intent must be proved in a clear and evident since what is decisive is that the execution of the
manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. himself or to retaliate.30
The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant
but on the prosecution. The inference that the
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that
intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the
treachery was duly proven in this case, and we
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this
sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was
fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent
attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is
provocation. It was two o’clock in the morning of
not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.27
January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying
bread at Mendeja’s store, was unarmed. Cruz had
Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought his guard down and was totally unprepared for an
to Tondo Medical Center for medical treatment attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly
immediately after the stabbing appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened
incident.1avvphi1 Right after receiving medical bamboo stick, and without uttering a word,
treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then
Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no swiftly ran away. Villacorta’s treacherous mode of
other evidence to establish that Cruz was attack left Cruz with no opportunity at all to defend
incapacitated for labor and/or required medical himself or retaliate.
attendance for more than nine days. Without such
evidence, the offense is only slight physical
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code
injuries.28
provides:
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and
circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged in the
maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical
Information and proved during trial.
injuries shall be punished:
The Information specified that "accused, armed
1. By arresto menor when the offender has
with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill,
inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
the offended party from labor from one to nine
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
days, or shall require medical attendance during
assault and stab with the said weapon one
the same period.
DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."
The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1)
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of
day to thirty (30) days.31 The Indeterminate
the crimes against persons, employing means,
Sentence Law does not apply since said law
methods or forms which tend directly or especially
excludes from its coverage cases where the
to ensure its execution, without risk to the
penalty imposed does not exceed one (1)

year.32 With the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with
imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in
the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty
(30) days. Consequently, we impose upon
Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30) days of
arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has been
in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time,
already way beyond his imposed sentence, we
order his immediate release.
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, moral damages may be recovered in a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.
Moral damages compensate for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock
suffered by the victim and his family as being a
proximate result of the wrongful act. An award
requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to
previous jurisprudence, an award of Five
Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) moral damages is
appropriate for less serious, as well as slight
physical injuries.33
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02550, affirming the Decision dated September
22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical
injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor.
Considering that Villacorta has been incarcerated
well beyond the period of the penalty herein
imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is
ordered to cause Villacorta’s immediate release,
unless Villacorta is being lawfully held for another
cause, and to inform this Court, within five (5) days
from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance
with such order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the
heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the
sum of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172896 April 19, 2010
ROÑO SEGURITAN y JARA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court
are generally accorded great weight and respect
on appeal, especially when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence on record.1 It is
only in exceptional circumstances, such as when
the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the court below. In
this case, we hold that the trial court did not
overlook such factual matters; consequently, we
find no necessity to review, much less, overturn its
factual findings.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
February 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25069
which affirmed with modification the Judgment3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. VI-892
finding petitioner Roño Seguritan y Jara guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. Likewise impugned is the
Resolution4 dated May 23, 2006 which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
On October 1, 1996, petitioner was charged with
Homicide in an Information, 6 the accusatory
portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about November 25,1995, in the
municipality of Gonzaga, province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, ROÑO SEGURITAN y
JARA alias Ranio, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and box one Lucrecio Seguritan, inflicting
upon the latter head injuries which caused his
death.
Contrary to law.
During the arraignment, petitioner entered a plea
of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
In the afternoon of November 25, 1995, petitioner
was having a drinking session with his uncles
Lucrecio Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor Panis
(Melchor) and Baltazar Panis (Baltazar), in the
house of Manuel dela Cruz in Barangay Paradise,
Gonzaga, Cagayan. Petitioner, who was seated
beside Lucrecio, claimed that Lucrecio’s carabao
entered his farm and destroyed his crops. A
heated discussion thereafter ensued, during
which petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the
latter was about to stand up. Petitioner’s punches
landed on Lucrecio’s right and left temple, causing
him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow
block which was being used as an improvised
stove.
Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with
the assistance of Baltazar. Thereafter, Lucrecio
rode a tricycle and proceeded to his house in the
neighboring barangay of Calayan, Cagayan. Upon
his arrival, his wife noticed blood on his forehead.
Lucrecio explained that he was stoned, then went
directly to his room and slept.
At around 9 o’clock in the evening, Lucrecio’s wife
and daughter noticed that his complexion has
darkened and foamy substance was coming out of
his mouth. Attempts were made to revive Lucrecio
but to no avail. He died that same night.
After the burial of Lucrecio on December 4, 1995,
his wife learned of petitioner’s involvement in her
husband’s death. Thus, she sought the assistance
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). NBI
Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido (Dr.
Vertido) exhumed Lucrecio’s body and performed
the autopsy. Dr. Vertido found hematomas in the
scalp located in the right parietal and left occipital
areas, a linear fracture in the right middle fossa,
and a subdural hemorrhage in the right and left
cerebral hemisphere. Dr. Vertido concluded that
Lucrecio’s cause of death was traumatic head
injury.7
On May 21, 1996, Melchor executed a sworn
statement before the Gonzaga Police Station
recounting the events on that fateful day, including
the punching of Lucrecio by petitioner.
At the time of Lucrecio’s death, he was 51 years
old and earned an annual income of ₱14,000.00
as a farmer.
25
The Version of the Defense
Petitioner denied hitting Lucrecio and alleged that
the latter died of cardiac arrest. Petitioner claimed
that he suddenly stood up during their heated
argument with the intent to punch Lucrecio.
However, since the latter was seated at the
opposite end of the bench, Lucrecio lost his
balance and fell before he could be hit. Lucrecio’s
head hit the improvised stove as a result of which
he lost consciousness.
Petitioner presented Joel Cabebe, the Assistant
Registration Officer of Gonzaga, Cagayan, and
Dr. Corazon Flor, the Municipal Health Officer of
Sta. Teresita, Cagayan, to prove that Lucrecio
died of a heart attack. These witnesses identified
the Certificate of Death of Lucrecio and the entry
therein which reads: "Antecedent cause: T/C
cardiovascular disease."8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 5, 2001, the trial court rendered a
Decision convicting petitioner of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide and sentences the accused to an
indeterminate sentence of 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The
accused is ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Lucrecio Seguritan the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
actual damages and the amount of ₱135,331.00
as loss of earning capacity and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the
Judgment of the RTC.
Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
partly AFFIRMED, WITH MODIFICATION, to read
as follows: The Court finds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide

and sentences the accused to an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The accused Roño Seguritan is
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Lucrecio
Seguritan the amount of ₱ 30,000.00 as actual
damages, the amount of ₱135,331.00 as loss of
earning capacity, ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated May
23, 2006.
Issues
Thus, this petition for review raising the following
issues:
I consciousness. Melchor would not have testified
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court’s judgment of conviction.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the
accused of the crime of homicide.11
Our Ruling
The petition is denied.
Petitioner disputes the conclusion that the fracture
on the right middle fossa of the skull, beneath the
area where a hematoma developed was due to
the blow he delivered because according to the
testimony of Dr. Vertido, the fracture may also be
caused by one falling from a height. Petitioner also
maintains that the punches he threw at Lucrecio
had nothing to do with the fatal head injuries the
latter suffered. According to him, Lucrecio
sustained the head injuries when he accidentally
hit the hollow block that was used as an
improvised stove, after falling from the opposite
end of the bench. Petitioner insists that Lucrecio
died due to a fatal heart attack.
In fine, petitioner contends that the appellate
court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court,
overlooked material and relevant factual matters
which, if considered, would change the outcome
of the case.
We are not persuaded.
It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external
injuries and one internal injury in his head. The
autopsy report showed that Lucrecio died of
internal hemorrhage caused by injuries located at
the upper right portion of the head, left side of the
center of his head, and a "fracture, linear, right
middle fossa, hemorrhage, subdural, right and left
cerebral hemisphere."
We find no reason to doubt the findings of the trial
court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that
petitioner punched Lucrecio twice causing him to
fall to the ground. Melchor categorically testified
that petitioner punched Lucrecio twice and as a
result, Lucrecio fell to the ground and lost
falsely against petitioner, who was his nephew. He
even hesitated to testify as shown by his execution
of a sworn statement just after the autopsy of
Lucrecio which revealed that the cause of death
was traumatic head injury attributed to petitioner.
Melchor’s eyewitness account of the fist blows
delivered by petitioner to Lucrecio and the manner
by which the latter fell from the bench and hit his
head on the improvised stove is consistent with
the autopsy findings prepared and testified to by
Dr. Vertido. Thus:
xxxx
Court:
Q: What is the right parietal area?
A: This is the right parietal area, sir.
(Witness pointing to the upper right
portion of the head).
: And then the left occipital area, this is
left occipital area with a hematoma
again measuring 5.0 x 4.0 centimeters,
sir.
(Witness pointing to the back left part,
middle back portion)12
xxxx
Fiscal Feril:
Q: What about this which reads
"Fracture, linear, right middle fossa",
where is this injury located?
xxxx
Court:
Q: Will you point that from your head?
A: x x x [A]t the base of the brain of the
skull, sir.
If you look at the head at the cut portion,
the fracture is located on the base of the
brain, particularly on the right mid-
cranial fossa, sir.13
xxxx
Fiscal Feril:
Q: Could it be possible that the victim
suffered the injuries specifically the
fracture while he was falling to the
ground, hitting solid objects in the
process?
A: Well, with regard to the hematomas
there is a possibility [that it could be
caused by] falling from a height x x x
although it produces hematoma, sir.
Court:
Q: Falling from a height?
A: Yes, sir.
26
Fiscal Feril:
Q: If an external force is administered to
such victim, such as x x x fist blow[s]
would it accelerate this force and cause
these injuries?
A: Definitely it could accelerate, sir.14
We find no merit in petitioner’s
argument that he could not be held
liable for the head fracture suffered by
Lucrecio. The height from which he
stood to deliver the fist blows to
Lucrecio’s head is sufficient to cause
the fracture.
The testimony of Dr. Vertido also ruled
out petitioner’s contention that Lucrecio
died of a heart attack. The fact that
Lucrecio’s cause of death is internal
hemorrhage resulting from the head
injuries suffered during his encounter
with the petitioner and the certainty that
he had no heart problem are evident in
the following portion of Dr. Vertido’s
testimony:
Atty. Antonio:
Q: Did you notice anything unusual in
the heart of Lucrecio Seguritan?
A: Well, with regard to our examination
of the heart Your Honor I limit only the
examination on the atomic portion,
gross findings, when we say gross
findings that can be seen by the eyes
and so if for example other that the
findings on the brain, if I have not seen
my injury from the brain then my next
examination to contemplate would be to
bring a portion of each particular organ
to Manila and have it subjected to a
hispathologic examination over the
microscope. But then we found out that
there is an injury to the brain so why
should I now perform a hispathologic
examination on the heart, when in fact
there is already a gross finding on the
brain, meaning that the cause of death
now is of course, this traumatic injury,
sir.

Court:
Q: Supposed the victim had a heart
attack first and then fell down later, can
you determine then x x x the cause of
death?
A: Well, your Honor as I said a while ago
I opened up the heart, I examined the
heart grossly and there was no findings
that would find to a heart attach on its
function, the heart was okay and
coronaries were not thickened so I said
well – grossly there was no heart
attack.15
xxxx
Court:
Q: Since you were conducting just a
cursory examination of the heart, my
question again is that, could you have
determined by further examination
whether the victim suffered a heart
attack before the injuries on the head
were inflicted?
A: That is why sir, I said, I examined the
heart and I found out that there was
noting wrong with the heart, and why
should I insist on further examining the
heart.16
The notation in the Certificate of Death of Lucrecio
that he died of a heart attack has no weight in
evidence. Dr. Corazon Flor, who signed said
document testified that she did not examine the
cadaver of Lucrecio. She stated that a circular
governing her profession did not require her to
conduct an examination of Lucrecio’s corpse, as
long as the informant tells her that it is not a
medico-legal case. Renato Sidantes (Renato), the
brother-in-law of Lucrecio who applied for the
latter’s death certificate, had no knowledge of the
real cause of his death. Thus, Dr. Flor was
mistakenly informed by Renato that the cause of
Lucrecio’s death was heart attack.
The petitioner belatedly contends that the delay in
the autopsy of Lucrecio’s body and its embalming
compromised the results thereof. To substantiate
his claim, he quotes the book entitled Legal
Medicine authored by Dr. Pedro Solis, viz:
"a dead body must not be embalmed before the
autopsy. The embalming fluid may render the
tissue and blood unfit for toxilogical analyses. The
embalming may alter the gross appearance of the
tissues or may result to a wide variety of artifacts
that tend to destroy or obscure evidence."
"the body must be autopsied in the same condition
when found at the crime scene. A delay in the
performance may fail or modify the possible
findings thereby not serving the interest of
justice."17
Petitioner’s reliance on this citation is misplaced.
Petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the one
month delay in the autopsy indeed modified the
possible findings. He also failed to substantiate his
claim that the embalming fluid rendered the tissue
and blood of Lucrecio unfit for toxilogical analysis.
Further, it is settled that courts will only consider
as evidence that which has been formally
offered.18 The allegation that the results of the
autopsy are unworthy of credence was based on
a book that was neither marked for identification
nor formally offered in evidence during the hearing
of the case. Thus, the trial court as well as the
appellate court correctly disregarded them. The
prosecution was not even given the opportunity to
object as the book or a portion thereof was never
offered in evidence.19
A formal offer is necessary since judges are
required to base their findings of fact and
judgment only – and strictly – upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial. To rule otherwise
would deprive the opposing party of his chance to
examine the document and object to its
admissibility. The appellate court will have
difficulty reviewing documents not previously
scrutinized by the court below.20 Any evidence
which a party desires to submit to the courts must
be offered formally because a judge must base his
findings strictly on the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial.21
We are not impressed with petitioner’s argument
that he should be held liable only for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide due to the
absence of intent to kill Lucrecio. When death
resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the
crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since
with respect to crimes of personal violence, the
penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences
thereof.22 Accordingly, Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
Art. 4. Criminal liability – Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
xxxx
Petitioner committed an unlawful act by punching
Lucrecio, his uncle who was much older than him,
and even if he did not intend to cause the death of
Lucrecio, he must be held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to the
above-quoted provision. He who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused.23
Considering the foregoing discussion, we find that
both the trial court and the appellate court
correctly appreciated the evidence presented
before them. Both courts did not overlook facts
and circumstances that would warrant a
reevaluation of the evidence. Accordingly, there is
no reason to digress from the settled legal
principle that the appellate court will generally not
disturb the assessment of the trial court on factual
matters considering that the latter as a trier of
facts, is in a better position to appreciate the
same.
Further, it is settled that findings of fact of the trial
court are accorded greatest respect by the
appellate court absent any abuse of
discretion.24 There being no abuse of discretion in
this case, we affirm the factual findings of the trial
court.
Penalty and Damages
The penalty for Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal the
range of which is from 12 years and one day to 20
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
27
the penalty next lower in degree is prision
mayor the range of which is from six years and
one day to 12 years. In this case, we find that the
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed, attended the
commission of the crime. Thus, the appellate court
correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of six
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
As regards the amount of damages, civil indemnity
must also be awarded to the heirs of Lucrecio
without need of proof other than the fact that a
crime was committed resulting in the death of the
victim and that petitioner was responsible
therefor.25 Accordingly, we award the sum of
₱50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.26
The award of ₱135,331.00 for the loss of earning
capacity was also in order.27 The prosecution
satisfactorily proved that the victim was earning an
annual income of ₱14,000.00 from the harvest of
pineapples. Besides, the defense no longer
impugned this award of the trial court.
However, the other awards of damages must be
modified. It is error for the trial court and the
appellate court to award actual damages of
₱30,000.00 for the expenses incurred for the
death of the victim. We perused the records and
did not find evidence to support the plea for actual
damages. The expenses incurred in connection
with the death, wake and burial of Lucrecio cannot
be sustained without any tangible document to
support such claim. While expenses were incurred
in connection with the death of Lucrecio, actual
damages cannot be awarded as they are not
supported by receipts.281avvphi1
In lieu of actual damages, the heirs of the victim
can still be awarded temperate damages. When
pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven
with certainty, temperate damages may be
recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed
in cases where from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
adduced, although the court is convinced that the
aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.29 In
this regard, the amount of ₱25,000.00 is in
accordance with recent jurisprudence.30

Moral damages was correctly awarded to the heirs
of the victim without need of proof other than the
fact that a crime was committed resulting in the
death of the victim and that the accused was
responsible therefor.31 The award of ₱50,000.00
as moral damages conforms to existing
jurisprudence.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 25069 finding petitioner Roño
Seguritan y Jara guilty of homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of six years
and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of Lucrecio
Seguritan the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱135,331.00 as loss of earning
capacity is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
petitioner is further ordered to pay ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages,
and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER
PACHECO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995,
eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4
elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson
Quinto, who was also about eleven years old,
were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac.
They saw respondents Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage
culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go
fishing with them inside the drainage
culvert.1 Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that
it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a
grassy area about two meters from the entrance
of the drainage system.2
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along
with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the
drainage system which was covered by concrete
culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with
water about a foot deep.3 After a while,
respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish,
came out of the drainage system and left4 without
saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out,
went back inside, and emerged again, this time,
carrying Wilson who was already dead.
Respondent Andres laid the boy’s lifeless body
down in the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden
turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his
part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother, and
informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto
rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent
Andres followed her.7
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any
autopsy thereon having been conducted. The
police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any
criminal complaint against the respondents for
Wilson’s death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
investigators took the sworn statements of
respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner
Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had
never been to the drainage system catching fish
with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also
declared that he saw Wilson already dead when
he passed by the drainage system while riding on
his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was
exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI
performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery
and submitted his autopsy report containing the
following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of
decomposition, attired with white long sleeves and
dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a
niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital
region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms.,
left forearm.
Laryngo – tracheal lumina – congested and
edematous containing muddy particles with
bloody path.
Lungs – hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on
pressure; section contains bloody froth.
Brain – autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach – partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning;
traumatic head injuries, contributory.9
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide
against respondents Andres and Pacheco in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found
probable cause for homicide by dolo against the
two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the
respondents with homicide. The accusatory
portion reads:
That at around 8 o’clock in the morning of
November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y
Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and
helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and
maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the
three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to
drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution
presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified on
direct examination that the hematoma at the back
of the victim’s head and the abrasion on the
latter’s left forearm could have been caused by a
strong force coming from a blunt instrument or
object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also
indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some
muddy particles were also found on the lumina of
the larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr.
Aguda stated that such injury could be caused
when a person is put under water by pressure or
by force.11 On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda
28
declared that the hematoma on the scalp was
caused by a strong pressure or a strong force
applied to the scalp coming from a blunt
instrument. He also stated that the victim could
have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his
head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter
hematoma at the back of Wilson’s head could
have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he
was thrown in a body of water, the boy could have
died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the
court, the doctor declared that the 4x3-centimeter
abrasion on the right side of Wilson’s face could
have also been caused by rubbing against a
concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a
rough surface. He also stated that the trachea
region was full of mud, but that there was no sign
of strangulation.12
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses
and the respondents had admitted the pictures
showing the drainage system including the inside
portions thereof,13 the prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence
which the trial court granted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated
January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold
the respondents liable for damages because of
the absence of preponderant evidence to prove
their liability for Wilson’s death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of
Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil aspect of the
case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that
–
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO
HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON
QUINTO.14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed
order of the RTC on December 21, 2001. It ruled
as follows:

The acquittal in this case is not merely based on
reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the
accused-appellees did not commit the criminal
acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above
rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex
delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal
action bars the civil action arising therefrom where
the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused
did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.
(Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review
and raised the following issues:
I they are not criminally and civilly liable for the
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF
RESPONDENTS’ CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE
EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT
EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON
QUINTO.16
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in
mere possibilities, surmises and speculations
when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could
have fallen, his head hitting the stones in the
drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or
(b) he might have been bitten by a snake which he
thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head
to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could
have lost consciousness due to some ailment,
such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that
the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution
failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the
respondents to kill the victim, and in considering
that respondent Andres even informed her of
Wilson’s death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the
testimony of the Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda;
the nature, location and number of the injuries
sustained by the victim which caused his death; as
well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists
that the behavior of the respondents after the
commission of the crime betrayed their guilt,
considering that respondent Pacheco left the
scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring out
Wilson’s cadaver, while respondent Andres
returned inside the drainage system only when he
saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for
his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant
evidence on record to show that either or both the
respondents caused the death of her son and, as
such, are jointly and severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents
aver that since the prosecution failed to adduce
any evidence to prove that they committed the
crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson,
latter’s death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.17 The civil liability of such person
established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential
damages.18 When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.19 With the
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one
composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.20
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to
punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order.21 The sole purpose of the civil action is the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious
act of the accused.22While the prosecution must
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove
the cause of action of the private complainant
against the accused for damages and/or
restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist.23
Moreover, a person committing a felony is
criminally liable for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.24 "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the
ordinary course of human life or events, while
"logical" means that there is a rational connection
between the act of the accused and the resulting
injury or damage. The felony committed must be
the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
Proximate cause is that cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately,
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor.25
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the
cause being the felonious act of the offender, the
effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of
the victim. The "cause and effect" relationship is
not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
conditions, such as the pathological condition of
the victim (las condiciones patologica del
lesionado); the predisposition of the offended
party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the physical
condition of the offended party (la constitucion
fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent
conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the
doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido);
or the conditions supervening the felonious act
such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or
gangrene.26
The felony committed is not the proximate cause
of the resulting injury when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened
between the felony committed and the resulting
injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the
accused; or
29
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act
of the victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon
in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and
death follows as a consequence of their felonious
act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated
in producing the factual result. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to
the death of the victim.28 A different doctrine would
tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential
safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:
… Amid the conflicting theories of medical men,
and the uncertainties attendant upon the
treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would
be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby to open a wide door by which persons
guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction
and punishment. …30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
… The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of
April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to the present,
the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible
for the consequences of his act – and in this case,
the physical condition and temperament of the
offended party nowise lessen the evil, the
seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
violence of the means employed, but by the result
actually produced; and as the wound which the
appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the
cause which determined his death, without his
being able to counteract its effects, it is evident
that the act in question should be qualified as
homicide, etc.32
In the present case, the respondents were
charged with homicide by dolo. In People v.
Delim,33 the Court delineated the burden of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused for
homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened
to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two
things: first, the criminal act and second,
defendant’s agency in the commission of the act.
Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two

things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be
dead; (b) that the death was produced by the
criminal act of some other than the deceased and
was not the result of accident, natural cause or
suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the
criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death.
To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there
must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately
killed (with malice); in other words, that there was
intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter
alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained
by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately
after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies
because of a deliberate act of the malefactor,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed.34
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is
concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce
preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the
defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his
evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of
action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that
of the defendants’.35
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence provides how preponderance of
evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how
determined. – In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence
on the issues involved lies, the court may consider
all the facts and circumstance of the case, the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, the probability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same
may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court
may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with
the greater number.36
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the
trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts
on which the civil liability of the respondents
rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely
on the collective testimonies of Garcia, who was
not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by
the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the
deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma
on the scalp. But as to how the deceased
sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He
presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased
could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument
applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could
have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard
object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is – the
hematoma, caused on the back of the head might
be due to the victim’s falling on his back and his
head hitting a pavement?
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite
extensive, so if the fall is strong enough and would
fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement,
then it is possible.
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a
concrete pavement and the head hit the
pavement, the injury might be caused by that
slipping?
A It is also possible.
Q So when the victim was submerged under water
while unconscious, it is possible that he might
have taken in some mud or what?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So it is your finding that the victim was
submerged while still breathing?
A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on
the lung also would indicate that the victim was still
alive when he was placed under water.37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the
right side of the victim’s face could have been
caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or
pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side
of the] face, would it be caused by the face rubbing
against a concrete wall or pavement?
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact
of a skin to a rough surface.
Q Rough surface?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you say that the trachea region was full
of mud, were there no signs that the victim was
strangled?
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your
Honor.38
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of
Dr. Aguda that the deceased might have slipped,
causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on
the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury
might have been caused when the victim fell down
and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit
a blunt object and might have been inflicted as a
result of falling down?
A - If the fall … if the victim fell and he hit a hard
object, well, it is also possible.39
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures
presented by the prosecution that there were
stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit "D" to "D-
3"). The stones could have caused the victim to
30
slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there
was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with
water must be very slippery, aside from the fact
that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head
and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in
some amount of water and drown.40
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial
court, as well as its conclusion based on the said
findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The
general rule is that the findings of facts of the trial
court, its assessment of probative weight of the
evidence of the parties, and its conclusion
anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the
CA, are given conclusive effect by this Court,
unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances
which, if considered, would change the outcome
of the case. The petitioner failed to show any
justification to warrant a reversal of the findings or
conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally
foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the
drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was
so afraid that he refused to join respondents
Andres and Pacheco inside.41Respondent Andres
had no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had
one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain
what might have caused the abrasion on the left
forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to
testify whether the abrasions on the face and left
forearm of the victim were made ante
mortem or post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce
preponderance of evidence that either or both the
respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object
or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object
or instrument that might have been used by any or
both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have
killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at
all.42However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill
the deceased is relevant and admissible in
evidence to prove that no violence was
perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this
case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any

ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the
deceased before or after the latter was invited to
join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified
that respondent Andres used to go to their house
and play with her son before the latter’s death:
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
A Not much but he used to go to our house and
play with my son after going from her mother who
is gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his
face?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and
see if he is around?
A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is
inside the courtroom.)43
When the petitioner’s son died inside the drainage
culvert, it was respondent Andres who brought out
the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of
her son’s death. Even after informing the petitioner
of the death of her son, respondent Andres
followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy
area where the deceased was:
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?
A He went with me, Sir.
Q So when you went to the place where your son
was lying, Dante Andres was with you?
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres
that my son was there at the culvert, I ran
immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just
followed, Sir.
Q So when you reached the place where your son
was lying down, Dante Andres also came or
arrived?
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he
arrived, Sir.44
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce
preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of
action for damages based on the deliberate acts
alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-28324-5 May 19, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL MARCO, SIMEON MARCO and
DULCISIMO BELTRAN, defendants. RAFAEL
MARCO, defendant-appellant.
Jose P. Bengzon (Counsel de Oficio) for
appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant
Solicitor General Felisicimo R. Rosete and
Solicitor Teodulo R. Dino for appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by accused Rafael Marco from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur in Criminal Case No. 2757,
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rafael
Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco, the
dispositive part of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court
renders judgment as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No,
2757, the Court finds Rafael
Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran,
and Simeon Marco, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder, qualified
by abuse of superior strength'
and hereby sentences Rafael
Marco, who has neither
aggravating circumstance
against him or any mitigating
circumstance in his favor, to
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo
Beltran, who surrendered
voluntarily, are hereby
sentenced EACH to an
indeterminate penalty
consisting of TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as minimum,
to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
The Court further sentences the three defendants
to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of
Bienvenido Sabelbero, the amount of P6,000.00,
to suffer the accessory penalties of the law, and to
pay the costs. (Page 69, Record.)
Actually, there were two cases filed against
appellant in connection with two successive
phases of a single occurrence. The two cases
were consolidated and tried together. In Criminal
Case No. 2757, he was charged together with his
son Simeon and one Dulcisimo Beltran with the
alleged murder of one Bienvenido Sabelbero. 1 In
Criminal Case 2758, he was charged together
also with his son Simeon with frustrated murder
allegedly committed against Constancio
Sabelbero, a brother Bienvenido. In this second
case, herein appellant was found guilty only a
slight physical injuries and sentenced to twelve
(12) days of arresto menor. He did not appeal.
Simeon was acquitted.
The incident in question took place on November
5, 1964 at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon
within the vicinity of the market place of Barrio
Subang, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. There
was a fiesta being celebrated, but it was raining.
The details, according to the the are as follows:
Constancio Sabelbero was approached by
Simeon Marco who asked him if he was the one
who boxed the latter's brother the previous year.
Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if he had
cigarettes and when he said he had none, Simeon
said, "I have cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as
he pulled out a one-foot long hunting knife.
Frightened, Constancio ran away and Simeon
chased him. As Constancio was passing by the
31
place were appellant Rafael Marco, the father of
Simeon, was standing, Rafael struck Constancio
with a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and
left shoulder. This was the basis of the information
in Criminal Case No. 2758, where appellant was
convicted of slight physical injuries and his son,
Simeon, was acquitted.
Vicente, the father of Constancio, happened to be
standing in the crowd and heard shout of "Fight!
Fight!" He saw Simeon about to stab Constancio,
so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was
holding the knife.
At this juncture, Rafael Marco approached Vicente
armed with a cane and a hunting knife. Sensing
danger, Vicente shouted to his son Constancio,
who had been hit by Rafael, and his other son
Bienvenido, who appeared on the scene, to run
away because the Marcos were armed.
Constancio was able to run away. So also Vicente.
Bienvenido who was being chased by Rafael was
stabbed by the latter, and when the parried the
blow, he was wounded on the left hand. After
being stabbed by Rafael, Bienvenido still tried to
run father, but unluckily, his foot got caught in a
vine on the ground and he fell, whereupon, out of
nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused
with herein appellant and who did not appeal his
conviction, arrived and stabbed Bienvenido near
his anus while he was in the position described in
the record thus "(Witness demonstrating with his
two hands touching the floor and his both feet (sic)
in a forward position)". (p. 24, t.s.n.) Beltran was
followed by Simeon, 2 who stabbed Bienvenido on
the left breast and the upper part of the left arm.
Afterwards, Rafael, Simeon and Beltran ran away.
"Bienvenido Sabelbero stood up slowly and
walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda and
when he arrived in front of the store, he fell to the
ground." (p.27, t.s.n.)
When Vicente came to know that his son
Bienvenido was wounded, he went to the store of
Pinda and found him lying there. Vicente asked
him what happened, "Bienvenido Sebelvero
answered that he was wounded because he was
ganged up by them and immediately after that he
died." (p. 28 t.s.n.)
For the purposes of this appeal, the foregoing
facts We have gathered from the recorded
evidence and which coincide substantially with the
findings and basis of tea appealed decision are

more or less admitted by appellant in the brief of
his counsel de oficio to be more credible version
of what happened. Nevertheless, counsel has
assigned seven alleged errors of the trial court,
although the whole thrust of this appeal revolves
around the issue of whether not with what has
been proven, as narrated above, to be the
participation of appellant in the Phase of the
incident that led to the death of Bienvenido
appellant, Rafael Marco, may be held liable for
murder, as found by the court below.
It will be recalled that the whole incident was
started by Simeon Marco, the son of Rafael, who
approached Constancio and after asking him if he
was the one who boxed his (Simeon's) brother the
year before, brandished a hunting knife, which
caused Constancio to run away. While thus
running, he passed by appellant who hit him with
a round cane. Such was the first phase of the
incident subject of this case. According the trial
court for such act of Rafael, he was guilty of slight
physical injuries, since "it is safe to assume that at
that moment there was no intent to kill any one."
As to the second phase, according to the
evidence, when Simeon was about to pursue
Constancio, Vicente grabbed Simeon's hand that
was holding the knife. But when Vicente saw that
Rafael who was holding a round cane a and a
hunting knife, was approaching them, he shouted
Constancio and his other son Bienvenido who was
around to run away, which they did, as he himself
released Simeon and ran away. Rafael followed
Bienvenido and stabbed him, but the latter parried
the blow with his left hand. And as Bienvenido was
trying to to run farther, unluckily, his feet got
entangled with some vines and he fell down.
Whereupon, Beltran, who came from nowhere,
stabbed him near the anus, followed by Simeon
who Stabbed him on the left side of the breast.
Upon these facts, the People maintain that
appellant is as guilty as Simeon and Beltran of the
killing of Bienvenido, the theory being that there
was obvious conspiracy among there
The trouble with the evidence of the prosecution is
that it is vague and incomplete. For instance, as to
the first phase of the incident, the relative
Positions and distances from each other Of the
three Protagonist, Simeon, Constancio and Rafael
are not revealed. How far Rafael was from Simeon
and Constancio when Simeon sort of threatened
him with a knife is not clear. Neither is it shown
how Rafael happened to be in the path of
Constancio when the latter was running away from
Simeon, such that Rafael was able to hit him with
a cane. In this situation, We do not feel safe in
concluding that there was concerted connection
between the act of Simeon, on the one hand, and
that of Rafael, on the other. Thus, the trial court
was correct in acquitting Simeon and holding
Rafael guilty only of slight physical injuries instead
of frustrated murder as charged.
Likewise, in regard to the second phase of the
incident, We are at a loss as to what Bienvenido
was actually doing and what participation he had
at the early stages of the incident, when Vicente
shouted him to run away. 3 The pertinent portion
of testimony of the lone eye-witness, Dominador
Carbajosa, is as follows:
Q Then what happened?
A Then Vicente Sabelvero held the arm of
Simeon Marco and at the same time
Vicente Sabelvero shouted to his sons,
Constancio and Bienvenido Sabelvero to
run away because they were all armed.
Q This Vicente Sebolvero you mentioned,
how is he related to Constancio and
Bienvenido Sabelvero?
A Vicente Sabelvero is the father.
Q Do you know if Constancio Sabelvero
and Bienvenido Sabelvero ran away?
A Yes, they ran away.
Q This Bienvenido Sabelvero, where was
he when this incident happened?
A He was only a few meters away,
Q What happened to him?
A He was overtaken by Rafael Marco and
he was stabbed by Rafael Marco.
Q Who stabbed him'?
32
A Rafael Marco. A In this manner. (Witness demonstrating
with his two hands touching the floor and
his both feet in a forward position).
Q Will you tell the Honorable Court what
part of the body of Bienvenido Sabelvero
did Rafael Marco stab? Q Then when Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed
him in that position, what happened next?
A Bienvenido Sabelvero was able to parry
the thrust which was directed to his left A While Bienvenido Sebolvero was in that
side and he was not wounded and instead position, he was stabbed by Simeon
in parrying the thrust he was wounded on Marco on the left breast and because he
the hand. was able to parry the weapon he was
wounded on the upper part of his left
hand.
Q Do you know what kind of weapon did
Rafael Marco use in injuries upon
Bienvenido Sabelvero? Q This Dulcisimo Beltran whom you said
stabbed Bienvenido Sebolvero, do you
know what was his weapon?
A I know.
A I know.
Q What kind of weapon?
Q What was his weapon?
A Flamingco or hunting knife.
A Bayonet.
Q Then after Rafael Marco inflicted
injuries upon Bienvenido Sabelvero, what
to Bienvenido Sabelvero? Q This Dulcisimo Beltran, according to
you, stabbed Bienvenido Sebolvero near
the buttock?....
A While Bienvenido Sabelvero was trying
to run away his feet were wrapped by the
having of the cover crop and he fell down ATTY. PIELAGO —
and right at that time Beltran approached
him and dabbed Bienvenido Sabelvero
Misleading, Your Honor.
near his anus
COURT —
ATTY. ORGANO —
This witness testified that this Bienvenido
(Addressing the Court)
Sebolvero was stabbed near the anus.
If Your Honor please I would like to make
(To the witness)
it of that the witness indicated to a portion
above his body which is above the anus.
Q This Dulcisimo Beltran whom you said
also stabbed Bienvenido (Beltran), is he
(To the witness)
here in court?
Q What was the position of Bienvenido
A Yes, sir.
Sebolvero when this Dulcisimo Beltran
stabbed him?
Q Please point to him?

A That one. (Witness pointing to accused
Dulcisimo Beltran).
Q This Simeon Marco whom you said
stabbed Bienvenido Sebolvero on the left
breast and hand is he here in court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is he?
A That one. (Witness pointing to accused
Simeon Marco).
Q Do you know what kind of weapon did
Simeon Marco use in stabbing the left arm
of Bienvenido Sebolvero?
A I know.
Q What kind of weapon?
A A bayonet.
(to the direct examiner)
Proceed.
ATTY. ORGANO —
(continuing)
Q Presenting to you this weapon . . . .
(counsel hands over the same to the
witness). . . . Will you tell the Honorable
Court whether this is the very weapon
used by Simeon Marco in stabbing
Bienvenido Sebolvero?
A It is shorter than this one.
Q Now, during that time that Rafael
Marco, Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo
Beltran were inflicting injuries on the body
of Bienvenido Sebolvero, what did the
father of Bienvenido Sebolvero do?
Where were they at that time?
A Constancio Sebolvero and the father
ran away and they have not seen the
incident.
Q Do you remember if the father of
Bienvenido Sebolvero ever ran
afterwards?
A No, sir.
Q Now, that happened to Bienvenido
Sebolvero after Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo
Beltran and Simeon Marco stabbed him?
A They ran away and after they ran away,
Bienvenido Sebolvero stood up slowly
and walked zigzagly towards the store of
Pinda and when he arrived in front of the
store he fell down to the ground. (Pp. 23-
27, t.s.n.)
The nearest indication of Bienvenido's position
vis-a-vis those Of the Marcos and Beltran at the
moment that Vicente was holding the hand of
Simeon appears only in the cross-examination of
Garbajosa, when he said that "Bienvenido
Sabelvero, was nearer to the three accused" than
either Vicente or Constancio, which makes the
whole matter more confusing.
As matters stand, Our problem is to determine
whether or not the act of Rafael in stabbing
Bienvenido is a separate one from the stabbing of
said deceased by the two other accused who did
not appeal, Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran.
To be sure, the acts of each of the three of them
followed one after the other in rather fast
succession, as if propelled by a common and
concerted design, but this circumstance alone
does not prove criminal conspiracy. In order that
mere simultaneity or near simultaneity of the acts
of several accused may justify the conclusion that
they had conspired together, the inference must
be ineludible.
It would seem that there must have been some
bad blood between the Sabelveros and the
Marcos but Vicente categorically denied that there
was any misunderstanding between them and
although Constancio suggested that there was, he
was quick in adding that the same had been
patched up. This makes commonality of intent on
33
the part of the three accused not necessarily ... As a facile device by which an accused
existent. may be ensnared and kept within the
penal fold, conspiracy requires conclusive
proof if we are to maintain in full subbed
As already stated, Simeon and Beltran did not
the substance of the time-honored
appeal from the decision of the trial court which
principle of criminal law requiring proof
credited them with the mitigating circumstance of
beyond reasonable doubt before
voluntary and imposed on them the penalty of only
conviction ... (People vs. Tividad,, L-
Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor,
21469, June 30, 1967; 20 SCRA 549, 554;
as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4)
emphasis supplied).
Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. And indeed there can be no doubt as
to the homicidal character of their assault on The Court also laid down the following
Bienvenido. In the case of herein appellant, while norm in the said case of People vs.
it is true that he somehow started the by trying to Tividad:
stab Bienvenido, and did cause him injury on the
left hand, there is no clear evidence connecting his
... It is undubitably clear from the record
act with those of Beltran and Simeon. As We have
that the accused did not attack the
noted earlier, Beltran came out of nowhere and it
deceased simultaneously. Even if they
is not shown that Rafael saw him before the latter
did, this would not of itself indicate the
stabbed Bienvenido near the anus. On the other
existence of a conspiracy among them as
hand, the most that We can gather from
simultaneity per se is not a badge of
Carbajosa's testimony is that Simeon was being
conspiracy, absent the requisite
held by Vicente, when Rafael tried to chase
concurrence of wills. It is not sufficient that
Bienvenido. In any event, if Rafael had any
the attack is joint and simultaneous; it is
intention to really kill Bienvenido, he did not have
that the assailants are animated by one
to await for Simeon and Beltran to do it.
and the same purpose (U.S. vs.
Bienvenido had fallen to the ground, and that was
Magcomot, 13 Phil 386, 389; People vs.
the chance to finish with him. But here is precisely
Caballero , 53 Phil. 584, 595-
where the prosecution's evidence is incomplete.
596). Evidently, in a situation where the as
The distance and relative position of Rafael from
were not simultaneous but successive,
where Bienvenido fell are not indicated. What
greater proof is demanded to establish
appears instead is that Beltran and Simeon were
concert of crime design. The evidence for
the ones who stabbed him fatally. What Rafael did
the prosecution was that the assaults on
or where he was after Bienvenido fell and while
the were out by a successively (Id., pp.
Beltran and Simeon were assaulting has not been
554-55; emphasis supplied)
shown.
As happened in the Tividad
We find the following ratiocination of appellant's
case, the facts established by
counsel de oficio to be well taken:
the evidence hem show that
appellant did not attack the
2. The evidence on record does not show document simultaneously
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant and in concert with the two
acted in conspiracy with the two other other accuse From the
accused in the actual killing of the testimony of Dominador
decedent. Carbajosa, it will be seen
that: (1) it was the appellant
who went after the decedent
This Honorable Court has established the
first. And the situation at that
rule that conspiracy, although implied or
moment was this: Simeon
indirect, must, nonetheless, be positively
Marco was chasing
and convincingly proved and established
Constancio Sebelvero while
(People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571). Only
appellant, on the other hand,
recently, this Honorable Tribunal said,
was approaching Vicente
through the pen of Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Sebelbero. The latter had just
Castro, that:
shouted to his two sons to run

away when the appellant
overtook the document and
stabbed at hint Accused
Dulcisimo Beltran, it will be
noted, was not yet a
participant. (2) After the
appellant wounded the
decedent on the hand, the
latter continued
running. There is no
evidence however, that
appellant continued running
after him (3) While running,
the decadent ripped and fell
down. Accused Dulcisimo
Beltran just came from
nowhere and stabbed the
decedent near the anus. It
will be noted from the time
appellant wounded the
document on the hand up to
the time Dulcisimo Beltran
stabbed him at the back, an
appreciable length of time
elapse There is no evidence
just how far Beltran was from
the respondent when the
latter felt Neither is there
evidence that the decadent
was running in the direction
of Beltran The evidence is
only that Dulcisimo Beltran
came upon the document
who had fallen to the ground
and nabbed him. (4) After
Dulcisimo Beltran had
stabbed the decedent
Simeon Marco, who earlier
had been chasing
Constancio Sebelbero came
also and stabbed the
decedent. From Dominador
Carbajosa's testimony, it
appears that there was no
appreciable lapse of time
between the stabbing by
Dulcisimo Beltran and that by
Simeon Marco. (5) There is
no showing that appellant
joined his two other accused
during or after their stabbing
of the respondent Carbajosa
merely stated that after the
stabbing, "they ran away"
(session of Sept. 13, 1965;
t.s.n., p. 27)
From the foregoing, this
Honorable Court will that the
stabbing of the decedent by
the three accused (including
appellant) was not
simultaneous. Rather, it was
successive, with appellant
inflicting the first blow. And,
Dulcisimo Beltran and
Simeon Marco were nowhere
around yet. It was only after
the decedent fell down that
the latter two came and
successively stabbed him.
The manner in which the
incident occurred indicates
that there was no pre-
conceived plan among the
three accused to kill the
decedent. It strongly
suggests, on the other hand,
that Dulcisimo Beltran and
Simeon Marco participated
suddenly, unexpectedly and
without any previous
agreement.
Another interesting point to
observe is that there is
absolutely no showing that
appellant knew of the criminal
intentions of Dulcisimo
Beltran or Simeon Marco as
to the decedent. There is no
proof that appellant chased
the decedent in the direction
of Simeon Marco or
Dulcisimo Beltran. It was not
even shown that appellant
knew that Dulcisimo Beltran
was around at the start. As to
Simeon Marco, it will be
remembered that when the
appellant started after the
decedent, Simeon Marco
was running after Constancio
Sebelbero. Hence, appellant
could not
have intentionally chased the
decedent in the direction of
Simeon Marco. Besides, as
previously pointed out
already, there is no evidence
showing that appellant ran
after or chased the decedent
at all. Dominador Carbajosa
said only that appellant
overtook the decedent who
was just nearby and then
stabbed at him (Session of
Sept. 13, 1965; t.s.n., p. 23).
Likewise, there is no
evidence that after the
decedent ran again, the
appellant continued going
after him.
Neither is there any showing
that after the decedent was
able to run away from the
appellant with only a slight
would on the hand, the latter
shouted to Dulcisimo Beltran
or Simeon Marco for
assistance. As the facts were
related by the star
prosecution witness.
Dulcisimo Beltran and
Simeon Marco just came
upon the fallen decedent and
stabbed him. There is no
showing that Dulcisimo
Beltran and Simeon Marco
fell upon the decedent in
response to shout or cries
from the appellant. Lastly,
there is no proof that while
Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo
Beltran were stabbing the
decedent, appellant gave
them any inciting or
encouraging words, or that
he even joined them.
The point appellant wants to
established with all the
foregoing considerations is
that the prosecution utterly
failed to established the guilty
knowledge and assent of
appellant concerning the
criminal design of Dulcisimo
Beltran and Simeon
Marco. And the established
rule is that:
xxx xxx xxx
... a person may be convicted
for the criminal act of another
34
where, between them there
has been conspiracy or unity
of purpose and intention in
the commission of the crime
charged. In other words, the
accused must be shown to
have had guilty participation
in the criminal design
entertained by the
slayer, and this presupposes
knowledge on his part of such
criminal design. It is not
enough that there be a
relation between the acts
done by the principal and
those attributed to the person
charged as co-principal or
accomplice; it is furthermore,
necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the former's
criminal intent, should
cooperate with moral or
material aid in the
consummation of the crime ...
(People vs. Ibañez, 77 Phil.
664, 665-666; emphasis
supplied).
The trial court, therefore,
seriously erred in holding
appellant responsible
together with Dulcisimo
Beltran and Simeon Marco
for the death of the
decedent on the basis of
incorrect conspiracy.
3. Appellant cannot be held
liable for the death of
decedent under death of the
Revised Penal Code.
Article 4, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code
provides that, "criminal
liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a
felony (delito)although the
wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended."
Under this provision, one who
commits an intentional felony
is responsible for all the
consequences which may
naturally and logically result

thereto whether form or
intended or not. (I Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, 6th ed.,
p. 62).
It cannot be denied that the
stabbing of the decedent by
the appellant which caused a
slight wound on the former's
hand was intentionally made;
hence, felony. However, the
ensuing death of the
decedent was not the direct,
natural and logical
consequence of the wound
inflicted by the
appellant. There was an
active intervening
cause, which was no other
than the sudden and
appearance and participation
of Simeon Marco and
Beltran. And there is authority
that if the consequences
produced have resulted from
a distinct act or fact
absolutely from the criminal
case the offender is not
responsible for such
consequence. (People vs.
Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038; I Reyes,
75). (Pp. 18-22, Appellant's
brief — pp. 53-57, Record.)
All circumstances considered, We are not
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was in any conspiracy with Simeon and
Beltran to kill Bienvenido or any of the Sabelberos.
In the absence of clear and convincing the We can
only speculate as to why appellant did not join his
son, Simeon, and Beltran in attacking Bienvenido
after he had fallen to the ground. Either the two
were too fast for him and were thus able to act
ahead of him or that he voluntarily desisted from
further pursuing the deceased after hitting him on
the left hand. In line with the presumption of
innocence which We are constitutionally bound to
accorded. We are constrained to hold that he had
no homicidal intent. He can be held criminally
responsible only for the wound on the back of the
left hand of the deceased which is described as a
"stab wound, 2-1/2 inches wide at the back of the
left hand" by witness Felix S. Toledo, the Sanitary
Inspector, who examined the corpse. And there
being no evidence as to the period of incapacity or
medical attendance consequence to said wound,
appellant is guilty only of slight physical injuries.
(Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, p. 1258,
1961 ed.)
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby modified, and in its stead
appellant is found guilty only of slight physical
injuries and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of twenty (20) days of arresto menor, and to pay
the costs.
G.R. No. 94643 February 21, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JOVITO CALLAO y CALLORA, FRUCTUOSO
CALLORA, NARIA CALLAO (at large) and
SEGUNDINA CALLAO (at large), accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellants.
NOCON, J:
Subject of this appeal is the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Dumaguete
City, in Criminal Case No. 8668 entitled: "People
vs. Jovito Callao y Callora, et. al.", convicting
appellants, Jovito Callao and Fructuoso Callao
of the crime of murder under the information
which reads:
That on or about March 28, 1989 at 5:30 o' clock
in the afternoon, more or less, at barangay Ilaya-
Tayasan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously waylay, assault,
attack, stone, stab and wound one VICENTE
AMISTOSO, with the use of stones and
a "plamingko" with which accused Jovito Callao
was then armed and provided, thus inflicting
injuries to wit:
1. Contusion measuring 1 cm. wide 3 cm. long
located at the right shoulder.
2. Abrasion measuring 1/2 cm. wide x 3 1/2 cm.
long located at the left elbow laterally.
3. Abrasion measuring 1/4 cm. wide x 2 cm. long
located at the left elbow posteriorly.
4. Abrasion measuring 1 1/2 cm. wide x 2 cm.
long located at the left middle portion of the leg
anteriorly.
5. Abrasion measuring 1 cm. wide x 3 cm. (sic)
long located at the right middle portion of the leg
laterally.
6. Abrasion measuring 1 cm. wide x 1 1/2 cm.
(sic) long located at the distal portion of the right
leg laterally.
7. Stab wound measuring 1 cm. wide x 4 cm.
(sic) long located at the left 5th intercostal space
along the mid-clavicular line penetrating the
thoracic cavity.
which caused victim's death immediately
thereafter. 1
Only Fructuoso Callao and Jovito Callao were
arraigned during which they entered a plea of
''NOT GUILTY". The two other accused-
appellants are still at large.
The facts of the case are as follows:
It was election day for barangay officials, March
28, 1989 when Ana Amistoso and husband
Vicente Amistoso (now deceased), were in the
electoral polling place of barangay Ilaya in the
town of Tayasan, Negros Oriental to cast their
vote. Accused Fructuoso Callao and Jovito
Callao, father and son respectively, together
with their wives, were there too for the same
purpose. Accused Fructuoso Callao left the
precinct ahead of the Amistoso couple, who left
at around 5:30 that afternoon. Vicente Amistoso
and his wife reached a place near the river bank
about 16 meters below their house which was
on top of a hill, when they were suddenly met by
the four accused who immediately pelted
35
Vicente with stones hitting him on various parts
of his body, particularly on the legs, on the left
arm, on the shoulder, on the right cheek and at
the back. Vicente tried to run away but in his
attempt, he stumbled to the ground as a result
of which he was overtaken and stabbed by
accused Jovito Callao with a small bolo
(plamingko) on the left chest causing his death.
Dr. Julio L. Abella, Municipal Health Officer of
Ayungon, Negros Oriental, examined the dead
body of Vicente and thereafter submitted his
report. 2
Accused-appellants relying on self-defense and
on defense of relative, advanced their own
version of the facts which are as follows:
Fructuoso Callao and Jovito Callao together
with their respective wives were in the polling
place in Ilaya, Tayasan, Negros Oriental at
10:00 o'clock in the morning of March 28, 1989.
In order to cast their vote during the election of
barangay officials being held on that day. The
wives of Fructuoso and Jovito left the polling
place at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon leaving
their husbands behind. At about 5:30 that same
afternoon, the two accused, father and son, left
for home. When they reached the portion of the
road at the foot of the hill above which the house
of Vicente Amistoso was perched, they saw the
latter, being held back by his wife, running
towards them carrying a stainless knife. Upon
reaching the two accused, Vicente Amistoso
immediately thrust his knife at Jovito Callao
which the latter parried, causing the knife to fall
to a river nearby. The tip of the knife, however,
grazed Jovito's abdomen. Fructuoso then
picked up the knife and used it in stabbing
Vicente Amistoso on the chest which resulted in
the latter's death. Fructuoso and Jovito went
home and there they were picked up by the
police authorities bringing with them the fatal
knife.
Finding the version of the prosecution to be
more credible, both accused were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and each of them sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to
jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
Vicente Amistoso in the amount of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos and to pay the
costs.

The accused-appellants assigned the following
as errors of the lower court:
1. In not giving exculpatory weight to the
evidence adduced by the defense.
2. In holding that there was conspiracy on the
part of accused-appellants relative to the
stabbing of the victim.
3. Assuming that accused-appellants are guilty,
the trial court erred in a) convicting them of
murder; and b) in not considering the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Fructuoso's testimony tried to show, among
others, that when he first saw Vicente Amistoso
at what he called the "ambush" site or the scene
of the incident, Vicente was being held back by
his wife but was able to slip away from his wife's
hold causing him to stumble to the ground and
roll 5 meters down the incline. When he stopped
rolling, Vicente stood up and thrust the knife at
Jovito but the latter was able to hold the hand of
Vicente and twisted it causing the knife to fall. 3
Jovito's testimony however is that while he and
his father were walking in a column, he saw
Vicente Amistoso 8 meters away running
towards them, carrying a "hunting knife"
shouting, "Here Is the Barangay Tanod of the
stupid Barangay Captain (sic)." Then Vicente
thrust his knife at Jovito, grazing Jovito's
abdomen, and the latter took hold with his two
hands the hand of Vicente that was holding the
knife and twisted it, causing the knife to fall to
the river. 4
It is difficult to ignore the inconsistency in the
testimonies of both the accused. The testimony
of Fructuoso concentrated on the claim that
Vicente stumbled to the ground after having
freed himself from the hold of his wife and rolled
down the incline while Jovito claimed that
Vicente was running continuously even after
freeing himself from his wife's hold.
Fructuoso's testimony shows that at the time of
the confrontation with Vicente Amistoso he and
co-accused Jovito Callao were following a
footpath on the opposite side of a small stream
which is three feet wide and the water less than
a foot deep. They were between 80 to 100
meters from the house of Vicente Amistoso. He
further testified that he saw Vicente running
down the incline towards their direction, holding
a hunting knife, shouting, "You have the same
mind as that crazy Barangay Captain of
yours." 5 However, what Jovito heard Vicente
was shouting while running towards them was,
"Here comes the Barangay Tanod of the stupid
Barangay Captain (sic)," contrary to what
Fructuoso said. 6
The foregoing shows that appellants were
already alerted to Vicente Amistoso's alleged
impending assault while still far (80 meters) from
them, and which, naturally, have put them on
guard. Ordinarily, since neither of them claimed
not to have carried a weapon, they would have
run away following the natural instinct of self-
preservation, or prepared themselves with any
available means with which to successfully
thwart the assault considering their numerical
superiority over Vicente. That Vicente was able
to hit Jovito on the abdomen with thrust of the
knife on the basis of the facts mentioned is an
improbable situation, one contrary to ordinary
human experience.
Furthermore, Fructuoso alleged that Vicente
Amistoso was rolling on the ground up to about
a fathom from Jovito when he got up and
stabbed Jovito. Considering Fructuoso's own
testimony that from the house of Vicente one
had to cross a stream, about three feet wide,
before reaching the footpath where they were at
the time, it is difficult to believe that Vicente had
been rolling up to about a fathom from where
Jovito was. By no stretch of the imagination
could that circumstance be perceived to have
happened, even taking into account the
shallowness of the water.
Fructuoso's testimony that Jovito twisted
Vicente's hand which was holding the knife
causing the same to drop two fathoms away into
the water of the stream and which Vicente
attempted to pick up but was beaten to it by
Fructuoso is highly incredible, considering that
Fructuoso was two fathoms behind Jovito as
testified to by him. How then can Fructuoso
have reached for the knife which was four
fathoms away from him than Vicente who was
just two fathoms from said knife?
Finally, Fructuoso claimed that Vicente had no
more weapon after he lost his knife and yet he
still stabbed Vicente with the knife hitting the
latter on the left breast, and his reason for doing
so was in "retaliation" for the injury inflicted by
Vicente on Jovito. When the knife fell off the
hand of Vicente, following the line of the
evidence of the defense, and there was no
showing that Vicente had another weapon other
than said knife, he was no longer a threat nor a
danger to the lives and limbs of the two accused.
There was nothing more to repel or prevent by
means of a knife. It is precisely the helpless
condition of Vicente that Fructuoso took
advantage of by stabbing the former on the
breast "in retaliation" and therefore, no longer in
legitimate defense of his son.
Evidence shows that Vicente Amistoso
sustained not only a stab wound on the chest
but also six contusions and abrasions on
different parts of his
body, 7 thus giving sufficient corroboration to the
prosecution witnesses' testimony that Vicente
and his wife were waylaid and then pelted with
stones by Fructuoso Callao and Jovito Callao
with the cooperation of their respective wives.
That the said wives left the polling place ahead
of their respective husbands gave them the
opportunity to participate in the ambush of
Vicente Amistoso.
It is worthwhile mentioning that the testimonies
of father and son only dealt with the stab wound
inflicted on the deceased but there was no
mention as to the contusions and abrasions
found on the body of Vicente. To this, no valid
explanation was given by the defense.
As the evidence would show, the house of the
Callaos were only about 750 meters from the
polling place towards the northwest while that of
Vicente Amistoso was more than a kilometer
away towards the east. The incident happened,
as the evidence would further show, between 80
to 100 meters from the house of the deceased.
That Fructuoso Callao and Jovito Callao were in
the vicinity of the house of Vicente Amistoso at
the time of the incident when their own house
could be reached ahead of that of Vicente is a
circumstance indicating that they were possibly
waiting for someone for they had no legitimate
reason being within the vicinity of Vicente's
G.R. No. 162540
house.
36
The information alleges conspiracy among all
the accused which allegation has been
sufficiently shown by the evidence that
Fructuoso Callao participated in pelting Vicente
with stones until the latter fell to the ground after
which he was stabbed by Jovito on a vital spot
of his body. 8 The attack on Vicente was
treacherous for upon reaching that place of the
incident near their house, Vicente Amistoso was
suddenly pelted with stones by Fructuoso and
Jovito together with their wives, forcing Vicente
to run until he stumbled to the ground and
stabbed on the left chest by Jovito
Callao. 9 Nothing can be more indicative of
treachery than the conduct of the two accused.
Appellants' claim of voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in their favor does not
deserve serious consideration. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, it is necessary that
the same be spontaneous in such manner as to
show the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or because
he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
incident to his search and capture. 10 As found
by the court a quo:
If Fructuoso Callao did in fact act in defense of
his son, it is surprising why he did not surrender
to the authorities immediately after the incident
and spontaneously give that statement to the
police. He instead went home with his son,
Jovito, only to go to the Police Station upon
being apprehended by the police authorities. 11
PREMISES considered, the guilt of the
appellants, Jovito Callao and Fructuoso Callao
of the crime of murder, as charged, has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, and each of the accused-
appellants sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of Vicente
Amistoso in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00). 12 Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed
by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December
16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the
crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated
March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely,
Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with
the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of
July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, being then all
employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL
INC., herein represented by JOSEPH
DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access
inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave
abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them
with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro
Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the
sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made
by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l.
Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC
and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the
events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino
Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number
0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of
₱10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby
Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc.,
and petitioner was then the collector of Mega
Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the
Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the
husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the
sister of petitioner and the former pricing,
merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their
customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable
to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing
the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had
apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle
to make check payments to Mega Foam payable
to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also
received a phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to
inform Capitle that the subject BDO check
deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia,
a former employee/collector of Mega Foam,
asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle
about the phone call from Land Bank regarding
the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she
had to call and relay the message through
Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a
phone; but they could be reached through
Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of
Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came
from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to
ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash.
Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the
cash and divide it equally into four: for herself,
Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline
Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega
Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the
owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby
Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for
₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment
for her purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino
further testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her
that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from
company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino said that she had already
paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997
as replacement for the dishonored check.6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness,
admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his
bank account, but explained that the check came
into his possession when some unknown woman
arrived at his house around the first week of July
1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted
with his cash in exchange for the check without
even bothering to inquire into the identity of the
woman or her address. When he was informed by
the bank that the check bounced, he merely
disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the
woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked
out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten
pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco
were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder
by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to
Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she
was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner
met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then
holding the bounced BDO check, handed over
said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended
to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the
check replaced with cash, but the plan did not
push through. However, they agreed to meet
again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to
petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and
Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and
Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia;
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the
group because she decided to go shopping. It was
only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and
Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and
went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca
alighted from the jeep and entered the premises
of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting
cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she
actually brought out from the premises was the
₱10,000.00 marked money previously given to her
by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and
37
upon returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each
to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who
had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI
office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal
aspects of both of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valencia handled the marked
money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified
theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was
later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of
Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having
taken the subject check and presented the
following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for
Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997,
but claimed that she had stopped collecting
payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time
before her resignation from the company. She
further testified that, on the day of the arrest,
Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where
she was staying at that time, and asked that she
accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's
house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal
check-up at the Chinese General Hospital,
Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former
and her husband in their jeep going to Baby
Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly
had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in
their jeep, which they parked outside the house of
Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the
NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the
cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June
30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect
payments from customers. According to her, on
the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called
her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could
accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby
Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so,
despite her admission during cross-examination
that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided,
as she had never been to said house. They then
met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode the
jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded
to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said
place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to

wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes,
Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise,
Ricablanca gave her money and so she even
asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents
arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual
course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y
Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and
each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December
16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of
the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused
Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita
Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto
mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is
acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner
Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied
per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues
raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be
convicted of a crime not charged in the
information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can
be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has
proved petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following
pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of
the crime of qualified theft defined under Article
308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised
Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property -
as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector
for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check
payment to her employer and, instead,
appropriated it for herself; (2) said property
belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby
Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she
made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain
– this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking
and further shown by the fact that the check was
deposited to the bank account of petitioner's
brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s
consent – petitioner hid the fact that she had
received the check payment from her employer's
customer by not remitting the check to the
company; (5) it was accomplished without the use
of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things – the check was voluntarily
handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was
known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it
was done with grave abuse of confidence –
petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the
collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the
aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal
Code, the personal property subject of the
theft must have some value, as the intention of
the accused is to gain from the thing
stolen.This is further bolstered by Article 309,
where the law provides that the penalty to be
imposed on the accused is dependent on the
value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the
postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was
actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and
applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the
latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm
came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod
guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by
this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of
an impossible crime as defined and penalized in
paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both
of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual
impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent
portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal
responsibility shall be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate to ineffectual means.
(emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure
to commit the crime because the means employed
or the aims sought are impossible. - When the
person intending to commit an offense has already
performed the acts for the execution of the same
but nevertheless the crime was not produced by
reason of the fact that the act intended was by its
nature one of impossible accomplishment or
because the means employed by such person are
essentially inadequate to produce the result
desired by him, the court, having in mind the social
danger and the degree of criminality shown by the
offender, shall impose upon him the penalty
of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500
pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1)
that the act performed would be an offense
38
against persons or property; (2) that the act was
done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent
impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime
under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was
further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this
wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the
offender cannot produce an offense against
persons or property because: (1) the commission
of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is
either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible
of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To
be impossible under this clause, the act intended
by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be
either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead
falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of
an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e.,
a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but
gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the
above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the
acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil
 39

intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam
showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.
Were it not for the fact that the check bounced,
she would have received the face value thereof,
which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was
only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken
by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless,
because the check was eventually dishonored,
and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace
the value of said dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped
receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked money, which
she thought was the cash replacement for the
dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court
held in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the
definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of
execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the
taking of personal property of another."
Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of
theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law — that
theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of]
personal property of another without the latter’s
consent."
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There
would be all but certain unanimity in the position
that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with
intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already
ensued from such acts of execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking,
or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of
the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of
one’s personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x
x 13
From the above discussion, there can be no
question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega
Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the
₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the
dishonored check was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime of qualified theft.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to
give cash as replacement for the check was
hatched only after the check had been dishonored
by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not
a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving
the cash replacement should not be considered as
a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money
was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen
proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned
to have the dishonored check replaced with cash
by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent
scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was
not included or covered by the allegations in the
Information, the Court cannot pronounce
judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would
violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been
another possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its
Resolution dated March 5, 2004,
are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as
defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2,
and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for
review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City,
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted
murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod,
Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and
asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya
and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
killed because of a land dispute between them and
that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men,
otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same
day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room.
It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by
her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively
identified by witnesses. One witness testified that
before the five men left the premises, they
shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will
come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod
of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner
was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks
from this Court a modification of the judgment by
holding him liable only for an impossible
crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal
Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY. —
Criminal Responsibility shall
be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing
an act which would be an
offense against persons or
property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on
account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual
means.
Petitioner contends that,
Palangpangan's absence from her
room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made
the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the
Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there
was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition,
respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was
not consummated, not
because of the inherent
impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2),
Revised Penal Code), but
due to a cause or accident
other than petitioner's and his
accused's own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.)

Palangpangan did not sleep
at her house at that time. Had
it not been for this fact, the
crime is possible, not
impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the
void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the
execution of the act has been
commenced, that the person
conceiving the idea should
have set about doing the
deed, employing appropriate
means in order that his intent
might become a reality, and
finally, that the result or end
contemplated shall have
been physically possible. So
long as these conditions were
not present, the law and the
courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely
unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired
by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender
his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act
which were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate, would constitute a felony against
person or against property. 8 The rationale of
Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal
tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the
offender cannot produce an offense against
person or property because: (1) the commission of
the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is
either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible
of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To
be impossible under this clause, the act intended
by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be
either impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible
crime.
40
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended not accomplished simply be administered, equally
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a because of an obstruction in whether in the unseen depths
crime. 13 Thus: the way of the thing to be of the pocket, etc., what was
operated upon, and these supposed to exist was really
facts are unknown to the present or not. The
Legal impossibility would
aggressor at the time, the community suffers from the
apply to those circumstances
criminal attempt is mere alarm of crime. Again:
where (1) the motive, desire
committed. Where the thing intended
and expectation is to perform
(attempted) as a crime and
an act in violation of the law;
what is done is a sort to
(2) there is intention to In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the
create alarm, in other words,
perform the physical act; (3) accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the
excite apprehension that the
there is a performance of the victim because the latter did not pass by the place
evil; intention will be carried
intended physical act; and (4) where he was lying-in wait, the court held him
out, the incipient act which
the consequence resulting liable for attempted murder. The court explained
the law of attempt takes
from the intended act does that:
cognizance of is in reason
not amount to a crime. 14
committed.
It was no fault of Strokes that
The impossibility of killing a person already the crime was not committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to
dead 15 falls in this category. . . . It only became impossible
kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking
by reason of the extraneous
that the latter was inside. However, at that
circumstance that Lane did
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs moment, the victim was in another part of the
not go that way; and further,
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the house. The court convicted the accused of
that he was arrested and
actor or beyond his control prevent the attempted murder.
prevented from committing
consummation of the intended crime. 16 One
the murder. This rule of the
example is the man who puts his hand in the coat
law has application only The aforecited cases are the same cases which
pocket of another with the intention to steal the
where it is inherently have been relied upon by Respondent to make
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
impossible to commit the this Court sustain the judgment of attempted
crime. It has no application to murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot
The case at bar belongs to this category. a case where it becomes rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at
Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his impossible for the crime to be hand. There is a difference between the Philippine
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was committed, either by outside and the American laws regarding the concept and
not present in said place and thus, the petitioner interference or because of appreciation of impossible crimes.
failed to accomplish his end. miscalculation as to a
supposed opportunity to
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in
commit the crime which fails
One American case had facts almost exactly the Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible
to materialize; in short it has
same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the
no application to the case
accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal
when the impossibility grows
spot where he thought the police officer would be. Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it
out of extraneous acts not
It turned out, however, that the latter was in a provided for were attempts of the crimes
within the control of the party.
different place. The accused failed to hit him and enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said
to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the
accused of an attempt to kill. It held that: In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge.
defendant liable for attempted robbery even if In this regard, commentators and the cases
there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, generally divide the impossibility defense into two
The fact that the officer was
the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit: categories: legal versus factual
not at the spot where the impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court
attacking party imagined held that:
where he was, and where the It being an accepted truth that
bullet pierced the roof, defendant deserves
renders it no less an attempt punishment by reason of his . . . factual impossibility of the
to kill. It is well settled criminal intent, no one can commission of the crime is
principle of criminal law in this seriously doubt that the not a defense. If the crime
country that where the protection of the public could have been committed
criminal result of an attempt is requires the punishment to had the circumstances been

as the defendant believed
them to be, it is no defense
that in reality the crime was
impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense
which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for
an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused
was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters
into and out of prison. The law governing the
matter made the act criminal if done without
knowledge and consent of the warden. In this
case, the offender intended to send a letter without
the latter's knowledge and consent and the act
was performed. However, unknown to him, the
transmittal was achieved with the warden's
knowledge and consent. The lower court held the
accused liable for attempt but the appellate court
reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of
the state that "elimination of impossibility as a
defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as
suggested by the Model Penal Code and the
proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the
overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this
contention, the Court held that the federal statutes
did not contain such provision, and thus, following
the principle of legality, no person could be
criminally liable for an act which was not made
criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet
enacted a law that provides
that intent plus act plus
conduct constitutes the
offense of attempt
irrespective of legal
impossibility until such time
as such legislative changes
in the law take place, this
court will not fashion a new
non-statutory law of criminal
attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense
sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape
criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt
to commit the substantive crime where the
elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears,
therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an
impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a
crime. On the other hand, where the offense is
legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor
cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for
an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only
41
reason for this is that in American law, there is no
such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only
recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime
charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our
jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized.
The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal
intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2)
of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction
between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a
physical impossibility which rendered the intended
crime impossible of accomplishment. And under
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the
offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening
cause independent of the actor's will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a
person criminally liable for an act "which would be
an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment
. . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be
treated as an accident independent of the actor's
will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the
petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Having in mind the social danger and
degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this
Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, together with the
accessory penalties provided by the law, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.