774 SCRA 431 Ponente: CJ Sereno November 10, 2015 Facts: A preventive suspension order was issued against Binay Jr. (Mayor of Makati). Binay Jr. obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the Court of Appeals against the suspension order. The Ombudsman assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (CA) to issue the TRO. The issue was whether or the CA had jurisdiction to issue the TRO. The Supreme Court held that the CA had jurisdiction because Paragraph 2 Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act saying who cannot intervene in the investigation process of the Ombudsman is unconstitutional.
• A complaint was filed before the office of the ombudsman against Makati Mayor Binay Jr. • He was accused of plunder, graft, and corruption practices regarding the Makati City Hall Parking Building. • On March 11, 2015, the Office of the Mayor of Makati received a copy of the preventive suspension order. • On the same day noon time, the Court of Appeals (“CA”) granted a resolution for Binay Jr’s Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). • The Office of the Ombudsman argued that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue a TRO because of Republic Act Republic Act 6670 (Ombudsman Act). • Binay Jr. argued that it was well within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue the TRO and that the Ombudsman had no right to issue a preventive suspension order because of the Condonation Doctrine. ISSUE/S: • Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue the Temporary Restraining Order on the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. • Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in grave abuse of discretion when it used the Condonation Doctrine.
RATIO: • The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule- making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
• The Supreme Court ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in the landmark case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn, held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and concurrence, in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. • The Supreme Court abandoned the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO, as it did so base on good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in nature.