Summary Dismissal Board v.
Torcita anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place
[GR 130442, 6 April 2000]
Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro
Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with
two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up
owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo
with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario,
Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda
pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular
collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to
Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the
congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until
it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the
confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita
identified himself but the same had no effect.
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men
around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at
this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the
back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt.
Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12
verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse
of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints
were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming
of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not
find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened
between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and
held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were
not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in the
performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he
allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty
(for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty)
and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same
period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional
Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI,
Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the
conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of
procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss,
which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and
annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar
as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of
duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of
review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the
reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of
irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed.
The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for
breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him
were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
Held: Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent
be informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of
specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty
is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-
cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious
offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for
an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly
charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the
rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12
administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or
offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being
drunk while in the performance of official duty. There is no
indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings
that Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal
discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the
judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not
notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of the
Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal
discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should
have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this
particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular
performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the
odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because
he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was
on a private trip fetching his wife.
Office of the Ombudsman v Coronel
G.R. No. 164460, June 27, 2006
In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by
substantial evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated
photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute substantial
evidence to show that respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact,
absent any authentication, the photocopy is inadmissible in
evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.
Facts: Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of the
Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte. Board of Directors of
Linamon Water District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056, Series of
1997, designated [respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective
October 1, 1997 until a General Manager shall have been
appointed. In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent] called
for a meeting the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao
del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Since it was nearing lunchtime, the
group opted to continue their meeting the luncheon meeting,
attended by more or less ten (10) persons. [respondent] paid for the
lunch in the amount of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice
No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.[respondent] claimed for
reimbursement of her expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23,
chargeable against the representation and entertainment account
of her office. That very same day, the voucher was approved and
[respondent] got her reimbursement in the amount of One
Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00). Pedro C.
Sausal, Jr. was appointed General Manager of Linamon Water
District filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn
letter-complaint against herein Coronel for dishonesty. The
complaint alleges that [respondent] falsified the cash invoice she
submitted for reimbursement by making it appear that the
(P1,213.00) when in fact, it was only (P213.00), as reflected in the
photocopy of the original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated
October 14, 1998.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office finds and so holds
that respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of DISHONESTY
and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to Section 22 (a) in
relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is disqualified from
re-employment in the national and local governments, as well as in
any agency, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal
records of respondent.
Issue: Whether or not Coronel was deprived of due process
Whether or not the administrative proceedings of the Ombudsman
erred in the decision rendered.
Held: The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due
process. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process
lies simply in the opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What is
proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. In this case,
respondent was given every opportunity to be heard. Significantly,
her intelligible pleadings before the CA and this Court indicate that requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for
she knew the bases for the ombudsman’s Decision. In fact, she very the admission of documents.
ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would merit our
Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original
review. Not having been left in the dark as to how it was reached,
duplicate should be considered inadmissible and, hence, without
respondent’s insistence on a denial of due process has no legal leg
probative value.
to stand on.

Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a
respondent, there is no need for her to present additional evidence
finding of guilt is substantial evidence;that is, such relevant
to vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
dismissed the Administrative Complaint against her in the first
support a conclusion. In the instant case, the complainant did not
place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by substantial evidence.
present evidence to support his theory that the photocopy of the
original duplicate reflected the true amount, or that OR No. 0736
had indeed been falsified. That oversight was fatal to the discharge
of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D.
the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of the charge against her for lack of
substantial evidence. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

The complainant’s evidence to prove falsification consisted of an

unauthenticated45 photocopy of the original duplicate. He could
have obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or
employee who had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due
execution and authenticity. Absent any proof of due execution and
authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of OR
No. 0736 does not convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the
actual bill incurred.

While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of

proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently
Justice Secretary v. Lantion
[GR 139465, 17 October 2000]
Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin
M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution
11,
expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the
documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification
by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state
resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department
of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were
the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United
States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense
or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201
(Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud
by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election
contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the
Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing
a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents,
Jimenez (on 1 July 1999requested copies of the official extradition
request from the US Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August
1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to
compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter
dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice
Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing
an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act
directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of
Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to
furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the
Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
the evaluation stage of an extradition process. which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide
to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial
of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its
supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition
in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the
summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee. There is noprovision in the Treaty and
in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the
Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon
while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the
DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and
PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an
international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of
the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the extradition process’ evaluation stage. Further, as an
extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the
evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a
preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter
do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process
required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for
"not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same
kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege
Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan considered him as a flight risk when he fled the United
Statesafter learning of the criminal charges filed against him.
G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002

In the case of Government of the United States v. Hon. Purganan

the court had the occasion to resolve the issue as to whether or not FACTS:
extraditees are entitled tothe right to bail and provisional liberty
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US
while the extradition proceedings are pending. Private respondent
Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing
(extraditee) invoked the constitutional provision under the 1987
was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be issued.
Constitution, that persons are entitled to bail except those charged
Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when
Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.
evidence of guilt is strong. The court, in rejecting the claim of
private respondent held that said constitutional provision is
applicable only in criminal cases but not to extradition
proceedings.Again, the court reiterated its pronouncement in the ISSUE:
Lantion case that the Ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings
in court is only to determine whether theextradition request
complies with the Extradition treaty, and whether the person 1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before
sought is extraditable. issuance of warrant of arrest

Equally important, is the pronouncement that the courtof

the requested state has the discretion to grant or deny bail and that 2. Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition
as a rule bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But the proceedings
court enunciated that thereare exceptions to this rule if only to
serve the ends of justice, (1) once granted bail, the applicant will not
be a flight risk or danger to the community; (2) that thereexist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. Having no
statutory basis the applicant bears the burden of proving these
exceptions with clarity andprecision. Unfortunately, the court
exercised its discretion in denying bail to private respondent who
RULING:
Held:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of
Crime .First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other. With the advent of
easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent
criminals from one country to another for the purpose of
committing crime and evading prosecution has become more
frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of
dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international
boundaries. Today, a majority of nations in the world community
have come to look upon extradition as the major effective
instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of
crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordance with municipal and international law. xxx Indeed, in this
era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an
expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot
afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other
states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our
own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the
Accused Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both
parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each
other s legal system and judicial process. More pointedly, our duly
authorized representative s signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the
other stateto protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused
will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant
and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place
therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would
have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights
of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a
class by itself -- they are not. An extradition proceeding is sui
generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation
all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To
begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will
be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot
be invoked by an extradite. There are other differences between
an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve
a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the
rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of
evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of
evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered
extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.
Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding,
our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President
has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres
to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide
discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of
the nation s foreign relations before making the ultimate decision
to extradite. Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition
court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of
the person sought to be extradited. Such determination during the
extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and
delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to
enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith. Fourth, our executive
branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition
Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the
national interest .Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition
Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other
hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image
of our country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. Verily,
we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with
our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we
deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions
precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In
other words, the demanding government, when it has done all
that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the
delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the
other government is under obligation to make the surrender.
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth, persons to be
extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive
branch: nothingshort of confinement can ensure that the accused
will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to
thwart their extradition to the requesting state. The present
extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought
to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition
hearings would noteven begin, if only the accused were willing to
submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein
respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in
the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the
requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all
cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high
risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the
will to flee. Having fled once,what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
Due Process
Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance
of a warrant of arrest? It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD
1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify
the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant.
Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving
facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare
and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could
not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the
whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in
the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial
court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret
out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the
petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it,
the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a
prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants,
the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath
or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges
merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the
present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting
the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early
stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system.
If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present
evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire
plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to
negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature
of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a
criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure
were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite --
would be justified in view of respondent s demonstrated
predisposition to flee.
Right to Bail
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as hereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply toa case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence
is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.
It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion. Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that
are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in
the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate
and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged.
He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal lcases
against him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb
grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad
enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed,
the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property
of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application.
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so
hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed
under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that,
once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and

since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes
of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not
normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts
into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution,
so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country
will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while
this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it
also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to
fulfill international obligations.

Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19, 2007)
Facts
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court.
Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the
validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the
private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no
Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition
that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear
for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before
this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused,
real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets
be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by
the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to
bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of

United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public

international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal

human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where

emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of
human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and
held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
OCAMPO V. ABANDO (G.R. NO. 176830; FEBRUARY 11, 2014)
CASE DIGEST: SATURNINO C. OCAMPO v. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO,
et al.
FACTS: On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by
elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio
Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The mass grave
contained skeletal remains of 67 individuals believed to be victims
of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP)
to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge
Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).The letters
requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits
attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including
petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias
Piedad,Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel,
Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they
were former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them,
Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo
(Ocampo),Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis
(Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members of the
Central Committee.
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-
tied, tortured and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF
pursuant to Operation VD.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor
Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to
submit their counter-affidavits and those of their
witnesses.Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-
affidavit.Petitioners Echanisand Baylosis did not file counter-
affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of
petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8
December 2006 during the preliminary investigation. However,
petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was
allegedly not served a subpoena.
In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an
Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad,
Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be
dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their
testimonies were vital to the success of the prosecution.
The Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S.
Abando (Judge Abando).
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable
cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime
charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando
and the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.The petition prayed for the
unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as
well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further
proceedings during the pendency of the petition.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and
44 others (including petitioners Echanis and Baylosisand Ladlad) was
then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC
Makati).Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner
Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case,
are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of
rebellion.
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was
arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando.
On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion
for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with
Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to
Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.
Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration but before
being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order
transmitting the records of Criminal Case to the Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC Manila.
Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and
a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail respectively.The OSG
interposed no objection to the grant of aP100,000 cash bail to
them. The Court granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and
Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount ofP100,000, subject to
the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the
period of their actual participation in the peace negotiations
ISSUE: [1] Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a
investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest? majority of them could no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and
the attached documents or evidence.
[2] Should the murder charges against petitioners be dismissed
under the political offense doctrine?
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to
HELD: "The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be
secure copies of the complaint after his counsels formal entry of
heard and submit evidence in support of one's defense." What is
appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary
proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has
investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
been afforded a chance to present ones own side of the story
cannot claim denial of due process.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was

denied the right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits
due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental
because they could no longer be found in their last known address,
Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the
per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo
prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has
@ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad
asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on
submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and
the collective affidavits of several other witnesses attesting to the
Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in
allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.
Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor

Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if
a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to
serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
the requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against Judge Abando as the trial judge.
petitioners.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated
in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character
as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been
main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently,
defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
been committed by the person sought to be arrested." Allado v.
penalty." People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994.Although the Constitution
provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after
an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in
and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for
the crime of rebellion.Thus, when a killing is committed in
the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination
furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.
of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of
its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as
arrest.
rebellion alone.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in
report and supporting documents showing the existence of
the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine
probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a
whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end,
warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no
and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively
probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require
demonstrated.
the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence. Delos Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr. 317
Phil. 101
***
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA,
401 Phil 905 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the
alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion,
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of
Amendment or substitution.

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should

have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder
charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as
long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN - CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41
January 21, 2015
FACTS:
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman
served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder,
among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the
two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December
2013 and 14 March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished
with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen.
Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent
‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c],
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the
subject of the present certiorari case.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law
HELD:
NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to
due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to
furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
for ready reference.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to
due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule
which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent
with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section
3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor
Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint
and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order
to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is
clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of
the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the
investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of
the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his
counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-
affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b)
refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the
affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of
the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to
the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which
denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.
Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not
a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can
demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront
and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus,
the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited
to those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for
the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof.
A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation
of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings
in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being
sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts
obtaining therein.
Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal
who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could
be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a
strict application of the evidentiary rules.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not
akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed
in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence
needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or
to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant
the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only
more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would
justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we
borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition
of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as
long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and
obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial
evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay
evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence
because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while
substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the
application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary
investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in
determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or
probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even
furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his
co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-
affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint
Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of
the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted
Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to
formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The
Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on
preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada
beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not
be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary
investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to
mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations
without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due
process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present
procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were
never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and
obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed
by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision
against the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary
investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To
apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations
will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable
cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary
investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified

in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the
fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In
preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder,
investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and
supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or
Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare
that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary
investigations will render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This
will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now
pending in all courts throughout the country. No preliminary
investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public
officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable
cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would
have to be released from prison because their conviction violated
constitutional due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes

forum shopping.
Guzman vs. National University,
G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699
In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142
SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to allow the petitioning
students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective
courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that may
be conducted in connection with their participation in the protests
that led to the stoppage of classes.
Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and
Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have
come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their
school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol."
In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7,
1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they
were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the
premises of the University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the
petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year
1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged
exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to
Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in
leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges
for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent
University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are
not of good scholastic standing.”
Held:
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents'
comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not
petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities
within the university premises, conducted without prior permit
from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein"
3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation,
slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and
defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of
a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief
against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient
warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also
apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any
duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or
refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating

committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE

DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Non v. Dames
[GR 89317, 20 May 1990]
Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano,
Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel
Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos
and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for
the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They
thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38)
seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the
trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A
motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the
trial court on 24 February 1989; stating that they waived-their
privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college
when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the
first semester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same
semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all
the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the
College Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the
affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing
grades when the cause for the action taken against them relates to
possible breaches of discipline.
Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the
high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to
the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a
student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one
semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions'
discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major
component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of
higher learning. The right of an institution of higher learning to set
academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech
and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to
equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual
obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a
serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required
academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court
should not review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding
students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of
discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a
violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one
or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic
deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the
academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of
information. Herein, the students could have been subjected to
disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but
the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate
to the offense committed and it must be imposed only after the
requirements of procedural due process have been complied with
(Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). But this
matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have become moot and academic; as the
students have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and have
been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been
more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they
might have committed when they led and participated in the mass
actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject
them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and
would only further aggravate the strained relations between the
students and the officials of the school which necessarily resulted
from the heated legal battle.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO
CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner
University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido
Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center.
Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice
also required respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although
respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they
failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The
Investigating Committee found a prima facie case against
respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School
Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their written
answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary
Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board
found respondent students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline
which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view
of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the
penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to
the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent
students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A day after the expiration of the
temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special
Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent
students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out
by the respondents and
argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated
to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was
granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent
students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly
procedural due process. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.
The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out
in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and
hearing.
The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner
university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them
with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were
not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner
Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit
within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident,
the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. While of the
students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted
written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their
statements . Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation
were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February
14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991
letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained
in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to
respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were
given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to
answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very
start of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-
Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and
Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of
respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they
were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14,
1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that
they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to
detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases
involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross
examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING conducted to
investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be
clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer
examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the
rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that
respondent students have no righ t to examine affiants-neophytes,
reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz .
Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee
failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the
February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only
after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies
of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution
dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991
wherein respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions.
UP vs. Ligot-Telan
227 SCRA 342 G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.)
truly the University of the People, U.P. administration
conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition
fee payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP),
popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad
consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P.
President Jose V.
Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a
Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted
official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a
portion of
the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the
interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all
students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include
reduction in
fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give
undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by
working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a
questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and
source of the annual income of the
family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances
from which the University may evaluate their financial status and
need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To
further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling
scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's
application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for
STFAP benefits for School
Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College
of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo
Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal.
Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the
team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino,
Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the
report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M.
Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student
Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on
Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said
Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him
that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only
the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was
owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was
supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise
informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to
Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could
submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back
the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on
current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would
mean the
suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of
clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his
case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for
further
investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that
mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the there was
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also
as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the
warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary
charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal
Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a certification
falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear
stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United
case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even
States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been
warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote
legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-
that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the
paying employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student
matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him
countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored
guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about
solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant,
the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was
and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT imposed
dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established
upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and
in the investigation and the reviews."In the morning of March
required him to reimburse
29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal
all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983.
make reimbursement, it shall be "effected” by the University thru That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, according to
outside legal action. The SDT decision was thereafter Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal
automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional
for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with
and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty from preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order
Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.
reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.
interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a
certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion
for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to
Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of the due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the
truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.
scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University
(AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that
it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there
Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a mere
considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned,
inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that
Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a
imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of
"TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying
procedural due process," the phrase obviously referring to the
employment" but that she was supporting the education of his
sending of notice of the meeting. However BOR ruled that in any
brothers with the help of another son. The court constitutes this as
event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with
a sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the
the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to
income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. The court
respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR
also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the
meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the
professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice
agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose
may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one
disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as
spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of
the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of
chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this the court ruled
lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special
that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of
BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Counsel for
dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with
Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due
his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the
process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which
Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of
he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge.
petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to
Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on
impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully
March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he
exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s
claimed
right of due process. The lower court is hereby ordered to
that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge
considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding
information on the income of

Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent

Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a
scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally
convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought
additional insights into the character of Nadal through the
information that would be obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in
Lao Gi v CA (1989)
180 SCRA 756
Facts: Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of
Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However, this was revoked
when his father’s citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and
misrepresentation. Charges of deportation were filed against the
Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens
and that they committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said that
the CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the
CID. They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of
preliminary injunction which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their
MFR was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chia’s case of falsification of public documents in
alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this
for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying
that Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by
Opinion 147. The CID set the hearing for the deportation case
against the Chias and told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks
further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the
CFI of Manila. They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias was
denied.
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They
argued that they weren’t subject to immediate deportation, the
presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CA’s overstepping of
appellate jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didn’t make a
ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses.
Issue: Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the
deportation?
Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine
if they are really aliens
Ratio:
Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien:
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of
this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated
port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground
charged, particularly illegal entry into the country. Only after the
hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive
finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to
register as such. This power is the police power to protect the state
from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.

Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be

observed. In the same law, it is provided that:

No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific

grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under
rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration.

The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary

language for the person to be informed and for the CID to make a
proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in
accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.

On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation

is the sole concern of the state. There is no justification for a private
party to intervene.
COMMISSIONER DOMINGO VS. SCHEER - CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
COMMISSIONER DOMINGO VS. SCHEER G.R. No. 154745.
January 29, 2004
FACTS:
Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given permanent status
to reside in the Philippines on July 18, 1986. He married a Filipina
and have 3 children. He also opened a restaurant in Puerto Prinsesa.
One day, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received
information that Scheer was wanted by the German Federal Police
that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him.
The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer.
In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence
from the German Vice-Consul on its speculation that it was unlikely
that the German Embassy will issue a new passport to the
respondent; on the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of
Germany against the respondent for insurance fraud; and on the
alleged illegal activities of the respondent in Palawan. The BOC
concluded that the respondent was not only an undocumented but
an undesirable alien as well.
When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he
forthwith aired his side to then BID Commissioner Leandro T.
Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in
the Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a
new passport from the German Embassy.
Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not resolve the
respondent's motion. The respondent was neither arrested nor
deported.
Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing
rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case against the
respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila,
thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent.
In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed
Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been renewed
following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his
request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order
dated September 27, 1995, and the restoration of his permanent
resident status.[19] Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German
Embassy issued to the respondent a regular passport, to expire on
March 11, 2006.
The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent's Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the
respondents March 1, 1996, Letter.
The respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his
business in Palawan. On March 20, 1997, the Department of Labor
and Employment approved his application for Alien Employment
Registration Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in
Puerto Princesa City.
In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T.
Domingo assumed office. She wrote the German Embassy and
inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. On
April 12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent
was not so wanted.
At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID
agents apprehended the respondent in his residence on orders of
the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there
held in custody while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties
from the respondent's wife and his employees, the petitioner
refused to release the respondent.
Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly
communicated with his lawyer. The latter filed with the BID a
motion for bail to secure the respondent's temporary liberty.
On June 11, 2002, the respondent's counsel filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a
prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the
respondent's deportation.
The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his
arrest and detention were premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and
unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that there
was no speedy remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law
and that his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been resolved despite
the lapse of more than six years.
The respondent averred that he was a fully documented alien, a
permanent resident and a law-abiding citizen.
CA issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from
deporting the respondent on a bond of P100,000.00.
BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente
lite denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
Motion for Bail/Recognizance.
On August 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in
favor of the respondent granting his petition for certiorari and
prohibition and permanently enjoining the petitioner from
deporting the respondent.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Board of Commissioners is an indispensable party.
2. WON the the Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is a Ground
for the Dismissal of the Petition
3. WON The CA had Jurisdiction Over the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus
HELD:
2. YES. The BOC is an Indispensable Party. We agree with the
petitioner's contention that the BOC was an indispensable party to
the respondents' petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
in the Court of Appeals. The respondent was arrested and detained
on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The
petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the
said Deportation Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum,
prayed that the CA annul not only the Summary Deportation Order
of the BOC but also the latter's Omnibus Resolution, and, thus,
order the respondents immediate release. The respondent also
prayed that the CA issue a writ of mandamus for the immediate
resolution of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The said
motion had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought to be
resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and not by the petitioner
alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not be exercised by
the individual members of the Commission.
2. NO. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires
indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence
of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court
cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack
of authority to act not only of the absent party but also as to those
present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable
parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the
CA did not require the respondent (petitioner therein) to implead
the BOC as respondent but merely relied on the rulings of the Court
in Vivo v. Arca, and Vivo v. Cloribel. The CAs reliance on the said
rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in
the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not
those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an
indispensable party in the aforecited cases.
3. YES. The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel
aliens by a power affecting international relation is vested in the
political department of the government, and is to be regulated by
treaty or by an act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive
authority according to the regulations so established, except in so
far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by
statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene. The judicial
department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom
or the justice of the measures executed by Congress in the exercise
of the power conferred on it, by statute or as required by the
Constitution. Congress may, by statute, allow the decision or order
of the Immigration Commissioner or the BOC to be reviewed by the
President of the Philippines or by the courts, on the grounds and in
the manner prescribed by law.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in
the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the Court of
Appeals, as established by law. Although the courts are without
power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely
their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the
Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such
judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the
act of the legislative or executive department violates the law or the
Constitution. In Harvy Bridges v. I.F. Wixon, the United States
Federal Supreme Court reversed an Order of Deportation made by
the Attorney General for insufficiency of evidence and for improper
admission of evidence. In Nging v. Nagh,the United States Court of
Appeals (9th Circuit Court) held that conclusions of administrative
offices on the issues of facts are invulnerable in courts unless when
they are not rendered by fair-minded men; hence, are arbitrary. In
Toon v. Stump, the Court ruled that courts may supervise the
actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and
reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain them.
When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a
petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the Court of
Appeals as provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.
In this case, the respondent alleges that the petitioner acted
arbitrarily, contrary to law and with grave abuse of discretion in
causing his arrest and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration of the BOCs Summary Deportation Order had
yet to be resolved. There was no factual or legal basis for his
deportation considering that he was a documented alien and a law-
abiding citizen; the respondent, thus, prayed for a writ of
mandamus to compel the petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC, to
resolve the said motion. The petition before the CA did not involve
the act or power of the President of the Philippines to deport or
exclude an alien from the country. This being so, the petition
necessarily did not call for a substitution of the Presidents discretion
on the matter of the deportation of the respondent with that of the
judgment of the CA.
Philcomsat vs Alcuaz
180 SCRA 218
Facts: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted
the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals”
in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to
companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from
the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service
Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later
promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the
jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire
permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its
existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however
directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based
its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz)
assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546)
of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which
were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation
of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546,
providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing
powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction
of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the
exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT
subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order
mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of
legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which
allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix
rates is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more
than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power
may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its
exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this
case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and
must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the
delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.

However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates
was done without due process since no hearing was made in
ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
Globe Telecom vs NTC
435 SCRA 110
FACTS: On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public
respondent NTC,praying that NTC order the immediate
interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged
that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant
Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS.
Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999,
interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts
failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section
6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the
mandatory Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present
petition.
Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of
cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for
interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation
into the present impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely
within the definition of value-added service or enhanced-service
given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95)
their implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory.The NTC
also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS
without authority from it.
Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC
from taking any further action in the case. Globe reiterated its
previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed
for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum
shopping rule.They claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in
declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that
the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all.They alleged
that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative
penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently
charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process. The
CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999. In its Memorandum, Globe called
the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding Islacom,
holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not
require the prior approval of the NTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NTC’s order is not supported by
substantial evidence.
HELD: There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum
circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and
any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS
should be made with proper regard for due process and in
conformity with the PTA; the assailed Order violates due process for
failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered,
for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing
violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the
absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded
Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 22 November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29
July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are
hereby SET ASIDE. No cost.
CORONA VS. UHPAP
283 SCRA 31
FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD
505, as amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots
and the pilot age profession”.
After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said
charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued
Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding
Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid
up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor
pilot positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for a
term of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal
or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation
of performance” to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling
discipline and give better protection to port users. PPA-AO 04-92
replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring
pilots must have a license and train as probationary pilots, and only
upon satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until
they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after
publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association
of the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the
DOTC, which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of
Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review,
recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office of the President,
which first issued a restraining order to the PPA on the
implementation of the PPA-AO, and after PPA’s answer, then
dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted said order, stating, through
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
that the PPA-AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is
an act of PPA, not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not
forbids practice of the profession, recognizing that such exercise is
property right, and (iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement
in the PD to consult only with relevant Government Agencies and
(d) finally finding affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court,
which ruled that (i) said PPA-AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in
excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion and (iii)
imposed a permanent restraining order on PPA on its
implementation.Assistant Executive Secretary Corona thus filed
petition for review [of the Manila RTC Decision] to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of
jurisdiction.
Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate
respondents’ right to exercise their profession and t heir right to
due process of law.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical
and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-
92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and
Orders are declared null and void;
The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA
Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda,
Circulars and Orders.
NPC V. ZOZOBRADO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NPC V. ZOZOBRADO G. R. No. 153022 April 10, 2006
FACTS:
Agustin A. Zozobrado, herein respondent, is a permanent employee
of petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) assigned as Pilot in
the aviation group, received a letter from NPC President Frederico
C. Puno, informing him that he was being dropped from the rolls.
Zozobrado filed an appeal before the CSC questioning NPCs
implementation of dropping him from the rolls.
CSC dismissed Zobrado’s appeal and MR.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and was granted.
Petitioner filed for MR but was denied.
Respondent had been dropped by petitioner from the rolls due to
Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
CA ruled in favor of herein respondents finding that the separation
was made with utter lack of due process.
ISSUE:
WON due process was followed in dropping respondent from the
rolls.
HELD:
NO. Both the substantive and procedural aspect of due process
were violated by petitioner in dismissing respondent.
As to the procedural aspect, not even one requisites laid down by
Memorandum Circular No. 12 has been complied with. Respondent
was never notified in writing of his Unsatisfactory rating within 30
days from the end of the semester when the Unsatisfactory rating
was given.
Respondent was never warned in writing that a succeeding
Unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the
service. Even the allegation of the oral notice itself (that petitioner
claims and respondent categorically denies) is clearly an
afterthought, having been utilized for the first time in the Motion
for Reconsideration of the assailed Court of Appeals decision and
was never used as an argument in the administrative proceedings.
The proof of such notice, a self-serving affidavit of the very
individual who unilaterally gave the apparently groundless rating,
deserves scant consideration.
Gen. Lagera blocked such review, claiming that he had already
considered the same, albeit minimally. This is a clear indication that
Gen. Lagera really wanted to take it upon himself to solely give the
Unsatisfactory ratings to respondent, in violation of the approved
Performance Appraisal System (PAS) of the NPC.

As to the substantive aspect, evidence shows that petitioner never

denied that respondents unsatisfactory rating was due to
respondents testimony in court concerning the graft charges against
NPC employees. On the day respondent was supposed to testify in
court under pain of contempt, Gen. Lagera suddenly sent him to fly
the NPC President despite the fact that another pilot was assigned
to such mission.

Moreover, Gen. Lagera’s ill motive is further proved by the fact that
respondent was kept in the dark as to the status of his employment
even though the same had already been terminated two months
earlier. It appears that the sad news was relayed to respondent only
on his natal day affair. We can see no reason for the two months
delay other than the devastation Gen. Lagera expected to cause by
imparting the shocking news on respondents birth anniversary,
during a celebration and in front of other people.

As further found by the Court of Appeals, when respondent brought

to the Grievance Committee the matter of his unsatisfactory ratings,
the Grievance Committee recommended a review thereof to take
into account respondents quantity of flying hours. Pilots have
traditionally been rated by the number of flying hours spent in their
career, and respondent had more than double the flying hours of
the two other pilots of the Aviation Group combined. However,
SALAW V. NLRC - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed
on him by the private respondents.
SALAW V. NLRC G.R. No. 90786 September 27, 1991

Petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case against respondent and

FACTS:
likewise submitted an affidavit recanting his Sworn Statement
before the CIS.

Espero Santos Salaw was a credit investigator-appraiser of herein

respondent Associated Bank.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner.

His duties included inspecting, investigating, appraising, and

Private respondents appealed to the NLRC and reversed the LA’s
identifying the company's foreclosed assets; giving valuation to its
decision.
real properties and verifying the genuineness and encumbrances of
the titles of properties mortgaged to the respondents.

Petitioner’s MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

Salaw and a fellow employee were alleged to have conspired in

selling twenty (20) sewing machines and electric generators which
ISSUE:
had been foreclosed by the respondent bank from Worldwide
Garment and L.P. Money Garment, for P60,000.00, and divided the
proceeds thereof in equal shares of P30,000.00 between the two of
them. The Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine WON petitioner’s dismissal was legally justified.
Constabulary extracted Sworn Statement from them without the
assistance of a counsel.
HELD:

Rollie Tuazon, the bank manager, requested petitioner to appear

before the bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee NO. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the
(PDIC) which petitioner attended and 3 months after, his lawful dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the
termination became effective for alleged serious misconduct or substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a
valid or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279, 281, 282-
284, New Labor Code), but the rudimentary requirements of due
As aptly observed by the labor arbiter, the respondents premised
process — notice and hearing — must also be observed before an
their action in dismissing the complainant on his supposed
employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their
admission of the offense imputed to him by the Criminal
concurrence, the terminate would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
Investigation Service (CIS) in its interrogation in November 1984.
The said admission was carried in a three-page Sworn Statement
signed by the complainant. Aside from this Statement, other
As to the LA’s finding, petitioner was terminated without the
evidence was presented by the respondents to establish the
benefit of due process of law. The respondents' initial act in
culpability of the complainant in the fraudulent sale of respondents'
convening their Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee
foreclosed properties. Even the minutes of proceeding taken during
(PDIC) to investigate complainant (after the CIS experience) would
the investigation conducted by respondents were not presented. ...
have complied with the demands of due process had complainant
This is a glaring denial of due process.
been given the opportunity to present his own defense and
confront the witnesses, if any, and examine the evidence against
him. But as the records clearly show, the complainant was denied
Considering further that the admission by the petitioner which was
that constitutional right when his subsequent request refute the
extracted from him by the Criminal Investigate Service of the
allegations against him was granted and a hearing was set "without
Philippine Constabulary (National Capital Region) without the
counsel or representative.
assistance of counsel and which was made the sole basis for his
dismissal, cannot be admitted in evidence against him, then, the
finding of guilt of the PDIC, which was affirmed by the public
The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent Bank'
respondent NLRC; has no more leg stand on. A decision with
investigating committee violated his constitutional right to due
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
process, in as much as he was not given a chance to defend himself,
as provided in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code governing the dismissal of
Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his employment
employees. Section 5 of the said Rule requires that "the employer
was characterized by undue haste. The law is clear that even in the
shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
disposition of labor cases, due process must not be subordinated to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so
expediency or dispatch. Otherwise, the dismissal of the employee
desires."11 (Emphasis supplied.) Here petition was perfunctorily
will be tainted with illegality.
denied the assistance of counsel during the investigation to be
conducted by the PDIC. No reasons preferred which vitiated the
denial with irregularity and unfairness.
CASTILLO-CO V. BARBERS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Said order was signed by Emilio A. Gonzalez III, Director, and
approved by Jesus Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
CASTILLO-CO V. BARBERS G.R. No. 129952. June 16,
1998

Petitioners thereafter filed separate motions for reconsideration.

Both motions were denied in a Joint Order signed by Director
FACTS:
Gonzales and approved by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero.

Petitioner Josie Castillo-Co is a Governor of Quirino. Congressman

Petitioner file for special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
with a prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor
injunction, seeks to nullify the Order of the Deputy Ombudsman
for alleged fraud against the public treasury and malversation.
directing her preventive suspension and claiming that the Deputy
(Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Ombudsman has no authority to issue the preventive suspension
as amended, and Articles 213 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code.)
against them.

Congressman Cua charged that the equipment purchased was

ISSUE:
reconditioned instead of brand new as required by resolutions of
the provinces Sanggunian authorizing such purchase. Other
irregularities claimed to have been committed included overpricing,
WON the Deputy Ombudsman has authority to issue the preventive
lack of public bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to
suspension
delivery in violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code,
and an attempt to cover up such irregularities. WON petitioner was denied due process because she was not
afforded the opportunity to controvert the evidence against her
before the order of preventive suspension was issued.
A week after the complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co and
Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed under preventive
suspension for a period of six (6) months. HELD:
1. YES. Petitioner claims that under Republic Act No. 7975, only the
Ombudsman has the authority to sign the order placing officials
with a 27 salary grade or above, like petitioner-governor, under
preventive suspension. In this case, the suspension order was
neither signed nor approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
Rather, said order was signed by Director Emilio Gonzales III and
approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero.
There is nothing in RA 7975, however, that would remotely suggest
that only the Ombudsman, and not his Deputy, may sign an order
preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as
grade 27 or above.
Moreover, Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman similarly
provides:
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. -- The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence
of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or
neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charge would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him. Xxx
SEC. 9. Preventive suspension. Pending investigation, the
respondent may be preventively suspended without pay for a
period of not more than six (6) months, if, in the judgment of the
Ombudsman or his proper deputy, the evidence of guilt is strong,
and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, (b) the charge would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him. xxx
Under these provisions, there cannot be any doubt that the
Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend an officer or
employee, where appropriate, as indicated by the word or between
the Ombudsman and his Deputy. The word or is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each
of the other things enumerated. The law does not require that only
the Ombudsman himself may sign the order of suspension.
2. NO. A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an
official under investigation after charges are brought and even
before the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a
penalty,[13] but merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file
his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the
suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of
dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
measure. A suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established
and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There
is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be
given an opportunity to prove his innocence.

The fact that the said order was issued seven days after the
complaint was filed did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The
immediate issuance of such order is required in order to prevent the
subject of the suspension from committing further irregularities.
Such prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with Section 15 of
RA 6770 which exhorts the Ombudsman to:

xxx give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government

officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints
involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums
of money and/or properties.
AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORP. V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT -
CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORP. V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 92422 May 23, 1991
However, on July 25, 1984, respondent GLORIOUS filed a
manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition. On August
20, 1984, the Court granted respondent GLORIOUS' motion for
withdrawal.

Respondent GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with

FACTS:
prejudice, which was duly noted by the Court in a resolution dated
September 10, 1984.

On April 27, 1984, respondent Glorious Sun Fashion (GLORIOUS)was

found guilty of dollar-salting ((occurs when dollars are removed
More than two years later, on October 15, 1986, respondent
from the Philippines without approval from the Central Bank and
GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition for the restitution of its
transferred to an account outside the county.) ) and misdeclaration
export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the
of importations by the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) in
GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984.
OSC Case No. 84-B-1 and, as a result of which, the export quotas
allocated to it were cancelled.

Once again, respondent GLORIOUS alleged that the charges against

it in OSC Case No. 84-B-1 were not supported by evidence.
Soon after the rendition of the GTEB decision, respondent
Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision cancelling its export
GLORIOUS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
quotas was rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 67180, contending that its right to due
undue influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in
process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not
order to transfer GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos crony-
supported by substantial evidence.
owned" corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation
[DSA] and petitioner American Inter-fashion (AIFC).

Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the

Court issued a resolution on June 4, 1984, ordering GTEB to conduct
Respondent GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr.
further proceedings in the administrative case against respondent
Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 67180 and to
GLORIOUS.
enter into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation
of DSA and petitioner AIFC which were allowed to service
respondent GLORIOUS' export quotas and to use its plant facilities, WON the final judgment in G.R. No. 67180 constitutes res judicata
machineries and equipment. to the instant case on the ground that the final judgment in G.R. NO.
67180 was a judgment on the merits.

On September 4, 1987, the GTEB denied the petition of respondent

GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken on October 5, 1987 to the WON private respondent Glorious Sun was not denied due process
Office of the President, docketed as OP Case No. 3781. during the hearings held in GTEB.

At this point, petitioner AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings

and filed its opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal on November 27,
HELD:
1987, claiming that the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984 has long
become final, and that a favorable action on the appeal would result
in the forfeiture of the export quotas which were legally allocated to
it. 1. NO. The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal of
private respondent Glorious, the Office of the President “had
unwittingly made itself a tool in a cunning move to resurrect a
decision which had become final and executory more than three
On September 7, 1989, the Office of the President ruled in favor of
years earlier. The petitioner asseverates resolution dismissing G.R.
respondent GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the GTEB in
No. 67180 was res judicata on the matter.
1984 irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further
proceedings.

The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements for a

judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case is that it must be a
The motion for reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied on
judgment on the merits. A judgment is upon the merits when it
February 20, 1990.
amounts to a declaration of the law as to the respective rights and
duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts
disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right
Hence, this petition.
of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objection or contentions.

ISSUE:
Certainly, the dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 cannot be categorized as a
judgment on the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve
AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the
anything. In fact, when the court heard the parties during the oral
evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984
arguments, GTEB was not able to present any showing of
GTEB resolution.
misdeclaration of imports.

The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB
The motion to withdraw the petition arose from the fears of Mr.
failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution
Nemesio Co that not only Glorious Sun but his other businesses
against Glorious.
would be destroyed by the martial law regime. The resolution
dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was based solely on the notice of
withdrawal by the private respondent. The dismissal of the petition
was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits of Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987
the petition. enhanced the charge that the former was denied due process.

Hence, it cannot constitute res judicata. Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the
Chairman of the Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry admitted that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin to
look for ways and means to remove the quotas from Glorious. AIFC
2. NO. The Petitioner contends that Glorious Sun was not denied
claims that it is an inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board
due process. Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision
did not give credence to it and also, none of the members of the
failed to disclose to Glorious vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving
committee would agree that there was any pressure or instruction
at its conclusion that Glorious was guilty of dollar-salting, it
from Minister Ongpin.
contends that the subsequent disclosure in 1987, where relevant
documents were given to Glorious and that the latter was given an
opportunity to comment thereon, cured the defect.
The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other members would
not agree that there was pressure from Ongpin does not mean that
Puno was not telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated that he was
This contention by AIFC, the court holds, is misleading. The SC
pressured. He did not state that the members of the investigating
recognized that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of
panel were pressured. Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the
the GTEB.
Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of his position
he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is every reason
to suspect that even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a
decision to strip it of its quotas and to award them to friends of
their administration had already been made.

The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of

administrative agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual
findings may be disregarded if they are not supported by evidence;
where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave
abuse of discretion arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.

Contrary to the petitioner's posture, the record clearly manifests

that in canceling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB
violated the private respondent’s constitutional right to due
process. Before the cancellation in 1984, Glorious had been
enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. In effect, the
private respondent’s export quota allocation which initially was a
privilege evolved into some form of property right which should not
be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to
hurriedly confer it on another.