Waller v. Waller - Sworn Account - Motion For New Trial

bill@wallertec.
com Bill Waller, 11652 CR 2210, Tyler, TX 75707 (903) 253-5555
June 28, 2019
Alison Dotson
Cherokee County District Clerk
135 South Main St. #2
Rusk, TX 75785
Re: Motion for New Trial in Cause No. 2019-01-0048
Dear Mrs. Dotson,
Please accept my Motion for New Trial for filing and the attention of the Judge. An
Order on Motion for New Trial will follow.
Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.
If you have questions, you may contact me anytime on my cell phone or by email.
Yours sincerely,
/s/ William D. Waller, Jr.
Bill Waller
TABLE OF DOCUMENTS
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
IN CAUSE NO. 2019-01-0048
Cause No. Date Document Pg.

2019-01-0048 06/28/2019 Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial………………………………. 1
2019-01-0048 06/03/2019 Plaintiff’s Resp. to Def. Reply to P Resp. to D MSJ………... 35
2019-01-0048 06/03/2019 Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to D MSJ………. 44
2019-01-0048 05/29/2019 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment………………….. 52
2019-01-0048 05/22/2019 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants MSJ…………………….. 61
2019-01-0048 05/01/2019 Defendants Supplemental Answer…………………………… 78
2019-01-0048 05/01/2019 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment……………….. 81
2016-11-0772 04/02/2019 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment……………….. 177
2016-11-0772 03/27/2019 Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition after special exceptions 184
2016-11-0772 03/27/2019 Court’s Order on Special Exceptions…………………………. 190
The documents listed above are included herein and are true and correct
copies of the same documents which are in the record of Cause No. 2016-01-0772
and Cause No. 2019-01-0048.
UNSWORN DECLARATION
My name is William D. Waller, Jr., my date of birth is August 28,

1953, and my address is 11652 CR 2210, Tyler, TX 75707, United
States. I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts stated in this
document are true and correct.
Executed in Smith County, State of Texas, on June 28, 2019.
____________________________________
William D. Waller, Jr.
See Bookmarks in Acrobat for more detailed listing.

CAUSE NO. 2019-01-0048
WILLIAM D. WALLER, JR §
plaintiff § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
v. §
§ 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SUSAN J. WALLER, §
DOROTHY REID WALLER, and §
WALLER MEDIA, LLC § CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS
defendants §
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
1. Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., asks the Court to grant a new trial
in the interest of justice and fairness.
INTRODUCTION
2. Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., sued defendants, Susan J. Waller,

Dorothy Reid Waller, and Waller Media, LLC for debt on a sworn
account under Tex. R. Civ. P. 185.
BACKGROUND
3. Defendants, Susan J. Waller, Dorothy Reid Waller, and Waller

Media, LLC filed a motion for summary judgment (MSJ) based on
res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Motion for New Trial Page 1 of 34
1
4. The Court granted the MSJ and signed a final judgment on June 5,
2019.
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
5. Under Texas law, a defendant who moves for summary judgment

based on an affirmative defense has the burden to prove all the
elements of the affirmative defense as a matter of law. The non-

movant can defeat the MSJ by raising a fact issue on any
element of their affirmative defense. The non-movant is not

required to prove the fact issue, but only to raise it. Tex. R.
Civ. P. 94; Barnes, 395 S.W.3d at 173. KPMG Peat Marwick v.
Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999);
see Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995).
6. The defendants’ affirmative defense of res judicata fails because it

was based on the plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition in Cause No.
2016-11-0772 which had been superseded by the plaintiff’s Sixth
Amended Petition on March 4, 2019, and could not be regarded as a
pleading in the record of the cause at the time of summary
judgment. Therefore, the basis for the defendants' motion no
longer existed, and summary judgment was improper. Sosa
v. Central Power & Light, 909 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1995)
Tex. R. Civ. P. 65 provides that a superseded instrument shall no longer

be regarded as a part of the pleading in the record of the cause.
2
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) states that “The motion for summary judgment
shall state the specific grounds therefor.”
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) provides that the Court must render summary
judgment based on the pleadings in the record of the cause at the time
of the summary judgment hearing.
Because the Sosas timely filed their second amended original petition, it
superseded their first amended original petition containing the
statements on which the defendants based their motion for summary
judgment. Contrary to statements in live pleadings, those contained in
superseded pleadings are not conclusive and indisputable judicial
admissions. Drake Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex.1980).
Therefore, the basis for the defendants' motion no longer existed, and
summary judgment was improper. Sosa v. Central Power & Light, 909
S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1995) (Supreme Court of Texas)
7. In paragraph 8 of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

he included excerpts from Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837
S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992). The Barr Court examined multiple
disparate theories of res judicata, explaining how some had
produced unpredictable or undesirable results. The defendant
seized the opportunity to cherry-pick the following excerpts.
By omitting the very next sentence, which revealed the fallacy of
the rules stated therein, the defendant misrepresented the
meaning intended by the court.
Broadly speaking, res judicata is the generic term for a group of related
concepts concerning the conclusive effects given final judgments.
Puga v. Donna Fruit Company, 634 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1982).
Within this general doctrine, there are two principal categories: (1)
claim preclusion (also known as res judicata); and (2) issue preclusion
(also known as collateral estoppel). Res judicata, or claims preclusion,
3
prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been
finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of
diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit. Gracia v. RC
Cola-7-Up Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. 1984);
Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W. 2d 816, 818 (Tex.
1984). Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents relitigation of
particular issues already resolved in a prior suit. * * *
Claim preclusion prevents splitting a cause of action. Jeanes v.
Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985). The policies behind the
doctrine reflect the need to bring all litigation to an end, prevent
vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court decisions, promote
judicial economy and prevent double recovery. (citation omitted)
The question that has given courts the most difficulty is
determining what claims should have been litigated in the prior suit.
Early on, this Court held that res judicata “is not only final as to the
matter actually determined, but as to every other matter
which the parties might litigate in the cause, and which they
might have decided.” Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101, 104 (1849). We
have never repudiated this definition of claim preclusion and it appears
in some form of most definitions of res judicata. See, e.g., Jeanes v.
Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985) (res judicata bars not
only what was actually litigated but also claims that could have been
litigated in the original cause of action). [bold emphasis supplied]
8. The above excerpt leads the reader to believe the court was
affirming the rules. It wasn’t. The defendant omitted the very next
sentence because it exposes the defect. The main point of Barr was
the resolution of that defect by adding the subject matter clause
and the transactional approach. In his operative pleading of res
judicata, paragraph 12 of his MSJ, the defendant quotes a pre-Barr
res judicata rule which he attributes to Barr. Whether by deceit or
ignorance, the defendant misstated Texas law.
If taken literally, this definition of the rule would require

that all disputes existing between parties be joined,
4
regardless of whether the disputes have anything in
common.
9. Paragraph 9 of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment

included an excerpt from Getty Oil Company v. Insurance Company
of North America. Here again, is another instance of cherry-picking
an opinion to misrepresent the meaning intended by the court. The
accompanying quotation was not an original quote from the 1992
Getty case. Getty attributed the quotation to Texas Water Rights
Comm. v. Crow Iron Works, 582 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1979) which in
turn credited Steakley & Howell, Ruminations on Res Judicata, 28
Sw. L.J. 355, (1974). The defendant’s wording might lead the
reader to expect that the excerpt would describe the “transactional
approach” to res judicata but it didn’t — the opinion in Texas Water
Rights Comm. v. Crow Iron Works contained no reference to the
transactional approach. Getty expanded the transactional test in
the next paragraph but the defendant omitted that from his
excerpt. Barr and Getty, both include descriptions of the
transactional test as found in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24 (and also Tex. R. Civ. P. 97(a) Compulsory
Counterclaims.) The defendant repeatedly cites Barr v. Resolution
Trust Corp. and even uses the words, “transactional test” but never
gets any closer than a circa 1974 rule of res judicata? The
defendant does not identify the elements of the transactional test
and certainly makes no attempt to apply them. The Court must
identify the correct law and apply it to the facts regardless of the
5
defendant’s shenanigans to misstate the law. The Court erred by
failing to identify the correct res judicata law and apply it to the
facts. The court erred by granting summary judgment because,
under the transactional approach, the defendant’s affirmative
defense of res judicata fails.
9. Following Barr, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adoption of the

“transactional approach” to res judicata.
Under this approach, a judgment in an earlier suit “precludes a second

action by the parties and their privies not only on matters actually
litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the
same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first
suit.”
Getty Oil Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 845 S.W.2d

794, 798 (Tex. 1992).
10. The Supreme Court of Texas is exceedingly clear in Barr v.

Resolution Trust Corp. regarding the required element of subject
matter as determined by the transactional approach as further
expanded in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 and Tex.
R. Civ. P. 97(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. What the defendant
ultimately failed to address was the importance of the subject
matter element and the use of the transactional approach in its
determination. The Court erred by granting summary judgment
because the Court failed to determine and apply Texas law.
The definition of res judicata in Gracia and Crow Iron Works is

substantially similar to the rule of compulsory counterclaims embodied
6
in the rules of civil procedure. A party defending a claim must bring as a
counterclaim any claim that "arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim...." TEX.R.CIV.P.
97.
*631 The Restatement of Judgments also takes the transactional

approach to claims preclusion. It provides that a final judgment on an
action extinguishes the right to bring suit on the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the action arose. Restatement of
Judgments § 24(1). A "transaction" under the Restatement is not
equivalent to a sequence of events, however; the determination is to be
made pragmatically, "giving weight to such considerations as whether
the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they
form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a trial unit
conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or
usage."[6]Id. § 24(2).
We conclude that the transactional approach to claims preclusion of the

Restatement effectuates the policy of res judicata with no more hardship
than encountered under rule 97(a) of the rules of civil procedure.
Modern rules of procedure obviate the need to give parties two bites at
the apple, as was done in Griffin, to ensure that a claim receives full
adjudication. Discovery should put a claimant on notice of any need for
alternative pleading. Moreover, if success on one theory becomes
doubtful because of developments during trial, a party is free to seek a
trial amendment.
We reaffirm the "transactional" approach to res judicata. A subsequent

suit will be barred if it arises out of the same subject matter of a previous
suit and which through the exercise of diligence, could have been
litigated in a prior suit — Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627,
628-29 (Tex. 1992).
11. Under the Restatement of Judgments § 24, the determination of

transaction(s) from which a claim arises must be pragmatic. That
means it must be practical and without theoretical inferences. The
7
acts of libel and slander from which the plaintiff’s claims arose in
Cause No. 2016-11-0772 aren’t just different from the transactions
from which this action arose; they were different types of
transactions. Under the transactional approach to res judicata, the
subject matter from which the plaintiff’s two lawsuits arose is
different. Therefore the defendant cannot prove the required
elements, and the defendant’s affirmative defense of res judicata
fails. The Court erred by granting summary judgment on the
affirmative defense of res judicata.
a. Cause No. 2016-11-0772 was an action in tort. The

transactions from which Plaintiff’s claims arose were acts of
libel and slander and intrusions into the Plaintiff’s
privacy.
b. Cause No. 2019-01-0048 is an action in debt. The
transactions from which the Plaintiff’s claims arose were
transfers of goods, merchandise, and services from the
Plaintiff to Waller Media, LLC on open account.
Restatement of Judgments § 24(1). A "transaction" under the

Restatement is not equivalent to a sequence of events, however; the
determination is to be made pragmatically. . .
12. The defendant's affirmative defense of collateral estoppel fails

because no facts were fully and fairly litigated in the first
action. Because all three elements must be proved to sustain an
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel, there is no need for
8
further analysis. The Court erred by granting summary judgment
on the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel.
“Collateral estoppel bars a claim only if

(1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and
fairly litigated in the first action;
(2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and
(3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.”
Hallco Texas v. McMullen County, 221 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2007)(Supreme
Court of Texas)
13. Instead of relying on his acuity of mind, his ability to comprehend

and assimilate facts, and his superior knowledge of the law, the
defendant resorted to the cheap trick of taking a quotation out of
context to impart the opposite of what the court had intended.
“There’s a fool born every minute.” – Unknown, sometimes
attributed to P.T. Barnum. Regardless of the defendant’s tricks, “A
trial court has no "discretion" in determining what the law is or
applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833
(Tex. 1992)(Supreme Court of Texas)
14. Adding, omitting, resequencing, taking words out of context, or

using any other device to impart a meaning other than that
intended is deceptive. The defendant has once again in his motion
for summary judgment used deception to misstate the law.
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule 3.03. Candor Toward the Tribunal
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
9
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct

Canon 3: Performing the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and
Diligently
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities.
(2) A judge who receives information clearly establishing that a lawyer
has committed a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct should take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge that
a lawyer has committed a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall
inform the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas or take
other appropriate action.
15. In paragraph 12 of their MSJ, the defendant quoted words the

Court intended as a broad general introduction, not as a test for res
judicata under Texas law. The selection of the particular sentence
represented by the defendant as proof of his res judicata
affirmative defense betrays his intent to deceive. In a Summary
Judgment, the Court must determine what the law is and apply it
to the undisputed facts. In this instance, the Court failed to do so
and granted summary judgment in error.
A trial court has no "discretion" in determining what the

law is or applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992)(Supreme Court of Texas)
16. From the defendants’ motion for summary judgment:
12. As shown by his Fourth Amended Petition, plaintiff had every

opportunity to sue in Cause No. 2016-11-0772 for the money that he has
now (again) alleged that Waller Media owes him. But, courtesy of the
10
summary judgment that this Court has rendered in Cause No. 2016-11-
0772, that claim and all others that were finally adjudicated, as well as
related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been
litigated in the prior suit. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627,
628-29 (Tex. 1992).
17. The defendant’s paragraph 12 in his motion for summary judgment

is the only specific assertion of res judicata, but it fails because the
pleading to which it refers does not exist in the record of the cause.
Because the Sosas timely filed their second amended original petition, it
superseded their first amended original petition containing the
statements on which the defendants based their motion for summary
judgment. Contrary to statements in live pleadings, those contained in
superseded pleadings are not conclusive and indisputable judicial
admissions. Drake Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex.1980).
Therefore, the basis for the defendants' motion no longer existed, and
summary judgment was improper. Sosa v. Central Power & Light, 909
S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1995) (Supreme Court of Texas)
18. The defendant’s paragraph 12 in his motion for summary

judgment, even if it had been based on a pleading in the record of
the cause, wouldn’t prove the defendant’s assertion of res judicata
because it misstates the law by taking words out of context. Here’s
what Barr said:

628-29 (Tex. 1992).
11
determination is to be made pragmatically, "giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a trial unit conforms to the parties' expectations or
business understanding or usage."[6]Id. § 24(2).
19. The defendant’s paragraph 12 in his motion for summary

judgment, would fail even if it had been based on a pleading in the
record of the cause. The mention of money owed by Waller Media,
LLC couldn’t constitute a claim because Waller Media, LLC was
not a defendant in Cause No. 2016-11-0772. Waller Media, LLC
could not be a defendant in the causes of action brought in Cause
No. 2016-11-0772 because Waller Media, LLC is not a person and
therefore has no capacity to be sued in a conspiracy to harm the
plaintiff’s reputation.
20. The defendant failed to prove or even address the element of

subject matter as determined by the transactional approach in the
pleading of his affirmative defense of res judicata. Therefore, the
court erred by granting summary judgment.
21. The plaintiff had raised an issue of fact regarding the subject
matter element of res judicata. Raising a fact issue on any element
of the defendant’s affirmative defense is sufficient to defeat the
motion for summary judgment. Therefore the court erred by
granting summary judgment.
12
22. Waller Media, LLC was not a party to the previous Cause No. 2016-
11-0772, and therefore res judicata does not apply to Waller Media,
LLC. Therefore the court erred by granting summary judgment.
23. A claim is a legal assertion demanding compensation, payment, or

reimbursement for a loss due to debt or tort. Even if it had been in
the record of the cause at the time of summary judgment, the
referenced pleading did not constitute a claim. The plaintiff had
raised that as a fact issue defeating that element of the defendant’s
affirmative defense. Summary judgment must be decided on
undisputed issues of fact. It would not be proper for the Court to
make a finding of fact inferring a claim in favor of the movant in a
summary judgment proceeding. The plaintiff raised fact issues on
the elements of the defendant's affirmative defense. Therefore the
court erred by granting summary judgment.
24. The defendant failed to identify or address the elements of res

judicata, but based his grounds for summary judgment on “should
have been litigated in the prior lawsuit.” The defendant thought all
he had to do was prove that the plaintiff’s suit on sworn account
could have been litigated in the first lawsuit, and the Court would
ignore the other required elements of res judicata, go along with
him and grant summary judgment. He was right. However, the
Court is obligated to base it’s rulings on the binding precedent of
the Supreme Court of Texas and not on the defendant’s
misunderstanding of the law. The defendant did not prove the
13
elements of his affirmative defense, and therefore, the court erred
by granting summary judgment.
25. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction by applying the defendant’s

misstated versions of the law. The defendant completely ignored
the elements of subject matter, precipitating transactions, matters
actually litigated, privity of the parties, convenience of the trial
unit, and business expectation of the parties. Therefore the
defendant failed to prove their affirmative defense of res judicata,
and the Court granted their motion for summary judgment in error.
a. The subject matter (determined by the precipitating

transactions) of the two lawsuits was different. The subject
matter of Cause No. 2016-11-0772 was a conspiracy to harm
the plaintiff’s reputation. The subject matter of this lawsuit is
a debt on an open account.
b. The precipitating transactions in Cause No. 2016-11-0772 were

acts of libel and slander. The precipitating transactions of this
lawsuit were transfers of ownership of goods, merchandise, and
services to Waller Media, LLC.
c. The only matters identified by the defendants did not exist in

the record of Cause No. 2016-11-0772 at the time of summary
judgment, and they were never broached before the Court. Tex.
R. Civ. P. 166a(c) requires summary judgment must be
14
rendered on the pleadings on file at the time of the summary
judgment hearing.
d. The capacity of the parties in Cause No. 2016-11-0772 was as

individuals and Waller Media, LLC was not a party. The
plaintiff brought this action in his capacity as a creditor of
Waller Media, LLC, which conforms to privity of contract.
Susan Waller and Dorothy Waller were defendants in their
capacity as officers of Waller Media, LLC. They were in privity
because they had legal control over Waller Media, LLC. The
defendants never addressed the issue of privity. The plaintiff
raised the issue in his response to the defendants MSJ.
e. The defendants failed to prove their affirmative defense of res

judicata because the wording of the binding precedent of the
Supreme Court of Texas very precisely precedes the element,
“might have been litigated” by a qualifying clause, “which arise
out of the same subject matter” followed by the conjunction
“and.” The defendants failed to prove res judicata because they
didn’t satisfy the qualifying clause. Therefore the court erred
by granting summary judgment.
The court expanded the “transactional approach,” citing the

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 97
Compulsory Counterclaims.
15
628-29 (Tex. 1992).
A trial court has no "discretion" in determining what the law is or

applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.
1992)(Supreme Court of Texas)
26. Because the defendant failed to prove each of the elements of res
judicata, the Court erred by granting summary judgment. See
Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015);
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16
(Tex. 2003); M .D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28
S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). Unless the movant meets its burden, the
burden never shifts to the nonmovant. M.D. Anderson, 28 S.W.3d
at 23; Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989); City of
Hous. v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).
A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in

applying the law to the facts. See Cayton v. Moore, 224 S.W.3d 440, 445
(Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial
court clearly failed to analyze and determine the law correctly or applied
the law incorrectly to the facts. Id.
27. The defendants asserted in paragraph 4 of their MSJ that “Susan

J. Waller and Dorothy Reid Waller are the same persons who are
defendants in this suit.” The defendant was trying to create the
illusion that the parties were the same in both lawsuits. The
parties weren’t the same, and the defendant only proves his failure
16
to grasp the dynamics of the plaintiff’s two lawsuits or Texas law or
both. Consolidating the action in tort with the action in debt would
have resulted in endless confusion.
a. Cause No. 2016-11-0772 was an action in tort for conspiracy to

harm the plaintiff’s reputation. The defendants were in privity
as coconspirators. Waller Media, LLC is not a person, cannot to
have a meeting of the minds, and could not be in privity with a
conspiracy. Waller Media, LLC had no capacity to be sued in
Cause No. 2016-11-0772.
b. Cause No. 2019-01-0048 is an action in debt. The plaintiff, in

the capacity of creditor, sued Waller Media, LLC as a party to
the transactions and debtor. Susan Waller and Dorothy Reid
Waller were defendants as officers of Waller Media, LLC. They
were in privity because they had legal control of Waller Media,
LLC. Alicia Tennison had no legal right to control Waller
Media, LLC, was not in privity of contract and therefore had
no capacity to be sued in Cause No. 2019-01-0048.
c. The defendant harped endlessly on, “could have been litigated

in the prior suit,” but that’s not Texas law. By binding
Supreme Court of Texas precedent, Texas law precedes the
defendant’s clause with a subject matter qualifier such as
“arose from the same subject matter and could have been
litigated in the prior suit.”
17
d. The defendant continuously plucks sequences of words from
Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. but fails to grasp the gist of the
case, especially concerning the transactional approach which
gives weight to whether the transactions “form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a trial unit conforms
to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or
usage”
e. In the case of the plaintiff’s two lawsuits, consolidation of the

transactions into one lawsuit would not have formed
convenient trial units, especially considering that the instant
lawsuit is a Rule 185 action which is procedurally different
from an action in tort.

628-29 (Tex. 1992).

determination is to be made pragmatically, "giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a trial unit conforms to the parties' expectations or
business understanding or usage."[6]Id. § 24(2).
Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992).
28. Res judicata doesn’t apply to Waller Media, LLC because it wasn’t
a defendant in Cause No. 2016-11-0772. (Should have been
18
litigated in the prior action doesn’t apply if the subject matter
under the transactional approach was different and it was.)
29. The defendants asserted in paragraph 7 of their MSJ,
“The allegations in this suit are remarkably similar to

those asserted in Cause No. 2016-11-0772, in many,
many paragraphs.”
30. That’s not even a proper summary judgment pleading. It lacks the
specificity required under Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The defendant
may think the allegations are remarkably similar because they all
have numbers and English language words on a white background.
The Court erred by granting summary judgment on the absurdly
general and non-specific grounds of “many, many, remarkably
similar allegations.”
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) The motion for summary judgment shall state the
specific grounds therefor.
31. The defendants asserted in paragraph 10 of their motion for

summary judgment,

Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex.1985). The policies behind the
vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court decisions, promote judicial
economy, and prevent double recovery.
32. Bluntly, “so?” The defendant quotes a line from the Jeanes court
but fails to connect it to any facts in the instant case or to make a
19
conclusion relative to the facts of the instant case. Frankly, the
defendant doesn’t grasp what the court meant by the term claim-
splitting as applied in Jeanes. An example of claim splitting is
when a plaintiff sues for damages in one suit and then brings a
second suit for declaratory relief on the same cause of action arising
from the same transactions against the same defendants. There
was no claim-splitting between the plaintiff’s two lawsuits.
Jeanes sued for damages on a contract in federal court and then sued for
declaratory relief in a Texas court under the same cause of action arising
from the same subject matter, the same transactions, and against the
same defendants. Jeanes involved a determination of res judicata under
federal law. The holding in Jeanes was that res judicata barred bringing
the same cause of action arising from the same transaction against the
same defendant even though the type of relief sought in the first suit in
federal court was for damages and the second suit was for declaratory
relief. The Court also held that res judicata did not apply to different
transactions, even transactions of the same type if they were not the
subject of the first lawsuit.
33. For the movant to be entitled to summary judgment, the grounds

for summary judgment must be supported by the movant's
pleadings. See Daniels v. Daniels, 45 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). Thus, an unpleaded affirmative
defense cannot serve as the basis for summary judgment if the
nonmovant objects. Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d
492, 494 (Tex. 1991); Downs v. Triad-Denton Hosp., L.P., No. 02-05-
303-CV (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (memo op.; 3-30-06).
The plaintiff has previously objected and does so again herein.
20
34. Defendants did not plead collateral estoppel in their answer and
were not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of collateral
estoppel. The Court erred by granting the defendant’s MSJ on the
grounds of collateral estoppel.
35. The plaintiff filed an MSJ in this case on January 3, 2019. The
plaintiff had satisfied all the elements of his cause, and the
defendant's answer was legally insufficient. The plaintiff was
entitled to summary judgment at that time as a matter of law. The
Court erred by denying the plaintiff’s MSJ.

36. On May 29, 2019, the plaintiff filed his Second MSJ, and once
again, the plaintiff proved that he was entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law. Again, the Court erred by failing to
grant the plaintiff’s MSJ.
37. The grounds for the defendants’ MSJ in Cause No. 2016-11-0772
was “that the plaintiff’s operative pleadings stand devoid of any
stated causes of action or any factual allegations that would
support a cause of action.
From defendants MSJ in Cause No. 2016-11-0772

As a direct, proximate result of this Court’s rulings on defendants’ special
exceptions to plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition, plaintiff’s operative
pleadings stand devoid of any stated causes of action against the
defendants or of any factual allegations that would support a cause of
21
action against the defendants. Defendants are, therefore, entitled to
summary judgment that plaintiff take nothing by his lawsuit against the
defendants.
38. The grounds for the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in
Cause No. 2016-11-0772 were clearly and blatantly false as can be
determined from the pleadings on file at the time of summary
judgment. The Court’s order on special exceptions did not order the
exception of plaintiff’s causes of action from his active petition. The
Court erred boldly by ignoring the plain and irrefutable facts in the
record of the cause and granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant's in Cause No. 2016-11-0772 and nothing in that lawsuit
can be grounds for a res judicata defense because the final
adjudication is voidable.
39. The defendants did not disprove or even challenge the plaintiff’s
Causes of Action in their motion for summary judgment in Cause
No. 2016-11-0772. They claimed the plaintiff's active petition was
devoid of causes of action. The Court must render summary
judgment on the grounds expressly stated in the motion for
summary judgment and may not grant more relief than requested.
Therefore, the Court made two errors in granting the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment in Cause No. 2016-11-0772.
1) The Court erred by granting summary judgment on false

grounds that the Plaintiff’s active petition was devoid of
causes of action and issues. The Plaintiff’s active petition
was not devoid of causes of action and issues.
22
2) The Court erred by disposing of the plaintiff’s Causes of
Action because the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment did not request the Court to dispose of any
causes of action. The Court granted more relief than
requested in the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.
REMOVAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW
40. The Complainant originally filed Cause No. 2019-01-0048 in the

Cherokee County Court at Law as Cause No. CV09786. The
Complainant was alarmed when the Judge in that Court
mysteriously recused, supposedly sua sponte, and removed the case
to the 2nd Judicial District Court. The Complainant had several
reasons for filing the Rule 185 action in the County Court at Law.
The main reason for bringing the action in debt in a separate
lawsuit was that the Complainant needed his money and the Rule
185 framework provided under Texas law provided the fastest and
most convenient way to get it. The suit on sworn account arose
from different subject matter than the Complainant’s defamation
lawsuit, and it involved none of the same facts or claims. The
Complainant had every right to bring this suit separately.
41. By bringing the suit on sworn account in the County Court at Law,
the plaintiff intended to avoid conflicts of res judicata on issues not
actually litigated in the lower court. That option was available to
23
the Plaintiff as a matter of law. The Complainant expected that the
suit on sworn account under Tex. R. Civ. P. 185 would be concluded
long before the tort action in the District Court. It would have been
had the two lawsuits proceeded lawfully. It was the plaintiff’s right
to use Texas law to his advantage. The Court deprived the plaintiff
of that right with no explanation to the plaintiff.
Sec. 31.004. EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION IN LOWER TRIAL COURT. (a) A

judgment or a determination of fact or law in a proceeding in a lower
trial court is not res judicata and is not a basis for estoppel by judgment
in a proceeding in a district court, except that a judgment rendered in a
lower trial court is binding on the parties thereto as to recovery or denial
of recovery.
42. The defendants’ history of underhanded dealings raises the

plaintiff’s strong suspicion that the recusal and removal to the
District Court was a tactical manipulation, perhaps seeking a more
favorable forum. The plaintiff doesn’t know the details because the
actions were ex parte. The plaintiff has good reason to be
suspicious, and the record of the plaintiff’s two lawsuits and the
plaintiff’s evidence will show why.
SOCIOECONOMIC OPPRESSION
43. In the closing paragraph, the prayer of his response to the

plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, the defendant reveals his assessment of the Court. Why
would the defendant presume that such an obvious play on the
24
Judge’s emotions would elicit the Judge’s response of lashing out in
oppression against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s
socioeconomic status as a pro se litigant who can’t afford to hire a
lawyer? The defendant’s statement appears to be a manifestation of
group (lawyers) mentality.
Plaintiff should have paid heed to this Court’s

admonition in Cause No. 2016-11-0772, that he retain
counsel. He did not do so and now faces the joy of
learning the truth of the adage of “he who represents
himself, etc..”
44. After getting to know the Judge, why would the defendant assume
that the Judge would grant summary judgment in response to the
defendant’s obvious appeal to (group) cronyism? His prayer was
tantamount to saying, “How dare him to stand before our sovereign
lawyer’s only court. Teach him a lesson.” The statements sound
ominously like a manifestation of pack mentality as if he’s speaking
for the pack.
45. The Court belongs to the people and is governed by the laws of
Texas. It belongs no more to the lawyers or the Judge than to any
other citizen. The lawyers, the Judge, and the Court’s employees
are officers of the Court and as such are granted special powers by
the Supreme Court of Texas contingent upon their adherence to the
rules and the oath of their office.
25
46. Ironically, it’s the licensed attorney, not the pro se plaintiff who
stooped to pleading in such an unprofessional manner. His prayer
has no justification in laws, rules, jurisprudence, or social or
courtroom etiquette. Such a pleading violates the civility clause of
his oath and the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(7). The Court
erred by granting summary judgment in the act of oppression
against the plaintiff because of his inferior socioeconomic status as
a pro se litigant.
47. The defendant’s assertion that the Court should punish the
plaintiff because he couldn’t afford a lawyer is shocking. Is that
what the Court did? It makes sense. The Court couldn’t have
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as a matter
of law because the defendants failed to prove the elements of their
affirmative defense. That leaves the possibility that the court
obliged the defendant’s prayer and granted summary judgment as
an act of oppression to teach the plaintiff a lesson because of his
inferior socioeconomic status as a pro se litigant.
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct

Canon 3 Performing the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.
(6) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or

conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not knowingly
26
permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction
and control to do so.
(7) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to

refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based
on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This
requirement does not preclude legitimate advocacy when any of these
factors is an issue in the proceeding.
(8) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a
proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to
law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte
communications or other communications made to the judge outside the
presence of the parties between the judge and a party . . .
PACK MENTALITY
48. Understandably, the defense lawyers didn’t welcome the Plaintiff’s

intrusion. They had been in control until the Plaintiff let his
lawyers go to represent himself. The defendants had evaded
answering discovery for two years by their influence over the
plaintiff’s lawyers. When the plaintiff took over representing
himself, the defendant’s panicked because they might have to
answer discovery. They weren’t about to do that, but what could
they do to avoid it?
49. The objective was to conceal their involvement in organized crime,

so they needed to bring in a specialist, someone as crooked as a
washboard. They brought in L.T. Bradt as lead counsel (alpha). (He
proved the point in the first hearing on January 8, 2019.) The
defendants called in reinforcements, doubling their ranks to six
27
attorneys. The strategy was obviously to muster a quorum of peers,
and envelop the Court into a pack mentality to steer the
proceedings. 1 The defamatory tactics used by the defendants are
identical to those found in the most depraved work of literature
ever published, “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” 2 The
procedural tactics used by the defendants can be found in Mein
Kampf by Adolf Hitler and The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli. The
downside of sticking your neck out for con artists is when it hits the
fan they scatter, and you’re left holding the bag.
The Inevitable Truth
50. The plaintiff’s two lawsuits had almost nothing to do with each
other. Cause No. 2016-11-0772 was an action in tort which arose
from acts of libel and slander which harmed the plaintiff’s
reputation. Cause No. 2019-01-0048 was an action in debt which
arose from providing goods, merchandise, and services to Waller
Media, LLC on open account. Under the transactional approach,
the suits arose from different transactions of an entirely different
type. The defendants misconstrued a pleading that did not exist in
the record of the cause and made no other assertion of a basis for
their defense of res judicata except one statement that asserted the
1 Proceed with Caution: Exploring the Human Psyche (Jung & Nietzsche) Brian Cronin (11 Nov 2017)
2 Dictated to Mayer Rothschild in 1773 by Lucifer. Published by Znamya in Russian in 1903.
Endorsed by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels. Used in Nazi classrooms. Was a staple of Nazi
Third Reich propaganda. Contributed to the Holocaust.
28
plaintiff’s active petitions contained “many, many, remarkably
similar allegations.” The defendant’s assertion of res judicata was
patently absurd and the Court erred by granting summary
judgment.
51. The stakes in these cases were exceedingly high because the
plaintiff’s evidence implicated Susan Waller, Alicia Tennison, and
Ricky Richards in organized crime. The defendants’ objectives were
to suppress the plaintiff’s evidence, evade answering discovery,
derail the trial before the plaintiff had a chance to put witnesses on
the stand, and deprive the plaintiff of his right to a jury trial. The
record will show that the Court facilitated the concealment of a
fraudulent scheme by Susan Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky
Richards, to take control of Dorothy Waller’s two-million-dollar
estate. Calling it “a squabble in the back yard” or “a legitimate end-
of-life-plan” doesn’t change the facts and the indelible transactions
which prove that Susan Waller used deceit to take control of her
mother’s two million dollar estate. The defendants created a threat
against Dorothy Waller, harming the plaintiff’s reputation in the
process. The plaintiff sued, and the defendants filed a fraudulent
motion for summary judgment so that lawsuit could be used as the
basis of a res judicata defense in this lawsuit.
SUMMARY
52. The defendants failed in every conceivable way to prove their

affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel, but that
29
was just one facet of the judicial failures in this case. The Court
repeatedly, and at every juncture in this and the plaintiff’s prior
lawsuit ignored Texas law and made its rulings according to the
defendant's misstatements of the law. The Court exhibited an
extreme bias to the point of oppression against the plaintiff and
catered to the defendants. The conduct of the court has been
arbitrary, without guiding rules or principles of law, and frankly
bizarre in some instances.
A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in

applying the law to the facts. See Cayton v. Moore, 224 S.W.3d 440, 445
(Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial
court clearly failed to analyze and determine the law correctly or applied
the law incorrectly to the facts. Id.
53. The defendants moved for summary judgment in Cause No. 2016-
11-0772 on the grounds that the live pleading was devoid of causes
of action and issues. It was not. The record of the cause will show
that the Court granted summary judgment in error because the
order on special exceptions had not excepted the plaintiff’s Causes
of Action or Allegation Summaries. They remained in the active
petition at the time of summary judgment. The Court granted
summary judgment in error. By disposing of all claims and issues,
the Court erred by granting more relief than the defendant’s had
requested.
54. The Court erred by granting summary judgment in this suit

because
30
a. summary judgment pleadings must be specific,
b. the only specific pleading on which the defendants based their

affirmative defense of res judicata did not exist in the record of
the cause,
c. the defendants failed to prove the subject matter element as

determined by the transactional approach which is binding
precedential Texas law, and
d. the plaintiff had raised an issue of fact regarding the element

of subject matter.
55. The defendants failed to prove that there was no genuine issue of
fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff’s
causes of action as a matter of law. The plaintiff proved that there
were genuine issues of fact as to the elements of the defendant’s
affirmative defense.
The two quotations illustrate a basic fallacy frequently found in the

approach of some of our courts to the matter of rendering or affirming a
summary judgment in favor of a defendant. In such cases, the question
on appeal, as well as in the trial court, is not whether the summary
judgment proof raises fact issues with reference to the essential
elements of a plaintiff's claim or cause of action, but is whether the
summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of law that there is no
genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the
plaintiff's cause of action. The last sentence of paragraph (c) of Rule 166-
A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, governs. It provides:
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
31
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."
Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970)
56. The defendants MSJ in Cause No. 2019-01-0048 was granted in

error for multiple reasons.
a. The defendants’ affirmative defense of res judicata failed
1) to apply appropriate res judicata law,
2) to claims in pleadings from the record of the cause, and
3) to prove each of the required elements of res judicata.
b. The defendants’ affirmative defense of collateral estoppel failed

1) to plead collateral estoppel in the answer,
2) to apply appropriate res judicata law,
3) to issues in pleadings from the record of the cause,
4) moreover, prove each of the required elements of collateral
estoppel.
It is beyond comprehension how the trial Court erred on so many points

leading up to granting this motion for summary judgment. The Court
exceeded its jurisdiction by applying the defense lawyer’s misstated
versions of law to the defense lawyer’s misstated version of the facts.

57. Res judicata was never intended to deprive a litigant, even a pro se
litigant of his due process right to be heard provided by the
Constitutions of the United States and Texas. In this case, the
32
Court has failed to uphold the supreme law of the land. The right to
due process is a constitutional right, and as such, it takes
precedence over Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel. The Court
erred when it granted the defendants’ MSJ even though the
defendants had failed to prove the elements of their affirmative
defense.
58. The Court's treatment of the plaintiff was oppressive because of his
socioeconomic status as a pro se litigant who couldn’t afford a
lawyer. The plaintiff was deprived of an opportunity to present his
evidence, argue his position, or even have the benefit of discovery in
the prior lawsuit. By granting summary judgment even though the
defendants have failed to prove the elements of their affirmative
defense, the Court deprived the plaintiff of his right to be heard
under Article 1, Section 13 and his right to a jury trial under
Article 1, Section 15 and Article 5, Section 10 of the Texas
Constitution. The Court has deprived the plaintiff of his day in
Court and his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution elevating the plaintiff’s
grievances to a federal question.
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has

no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law and can will
nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course
prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court
to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving
effect to the will of the judge, always for the purpose of giving effect to
33
the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.”.
Osborn V. Bank of the United States, 22 U. S. 738 (1824). John Marshall
Chief Justice of the United States
PRAYER
59. For these reasons, and in the interest of justice and fairness, the
plaintiff asks the Court to grant a new trial.
Respectfully Submitted:
/s/ William D. Waller Jr.

______________________________
Pro Se
11652 CR 2210
Tyler, TX 75707
bill@wallertec.com
Cell: (903) 253-5555
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
BY EMAIL
I certify that on June 28, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of
this document to the following counsel of record:
Micah Satterwhite…………. msatterwhite@sloanfirm.com

Nicholas Summers Peacock. nick@amentpeacocklaw.com

____________________________________
34
CAUSE NO. 2019-01-0048
§
WILLIAM D. WALLER, JR
§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff
§
§
v.
§
SUSAN J. WALLER,
§
DOROTHY REID WALLER.
§ OF CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS
WALLER MEDIA, LLC
§
Defendants
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY TO FIRST AMENDED
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., most respectfully responds to the

Defendants Reply to the Plaintiff’s First Amended Response to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment:
1. Plaintiff acknowledges the Defendants’ Supplemental Answer wherein

they affirmatively raised their affirmative defense of res judicata.
Accordingly, Plaintiff restates his objection in paragraph 19 of his First
Amended Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, “plaintiff objects to Defendant's attempt to seek summary
judgment on collateral estoppel because Defendants have not pleaded
that defense in their answer.”
2. Begging the Defendants’ pardon, but the pertinent question of law is not
whether the Plaintiff could have brought the claims asserted in this case
in Cause No. 2016-11-0772. The question of law is whether the
Defendants’ can satisfy each of the elements in Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Response to Defendants’ Reply Page 1 of 9
35
Joachim, which includes the three elements from Amstadt v. U.S.
Brass Corp. plus the subject matter (transaction) test from Gracia v.
RC Cola-7-Up Bottling Co. because that is a good example of the
precedential Texas law.
3. The Plaintiff kindly suggests that the Defendant review the holding of
Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992) in
which Justice Gonzalez stated, “. . . (res judicata bars not only what
was actually litigated but also claims that could have been litigated in
the original cause of action). (Here’s what Justice Gonzalez says about
the above.) If taken literally, this definition of the rule would
require that all disputes existing between parties be joined,
regardless of whether the disputes have anything in common.
This court has resorted to a wide variety of theories and tests to give
res judicata a more restrictive application.”
The Defendant also cites Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100,103 (Tex
1985), which is 1) dissimilar to the instant case because, in Jeanes, the
previous suit took place in federal court which required the Supreme
Court of Texas to follow the federal res judicata law, and 2) it supports
the Plaintiff’s position rather than the Defendants as the Supreme
Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals finding of res judicata
with regard to Jeanes’ oral development agreement with Stallworth. It
is interesting to note that although Texas and federal res judicata laws
are different, the outcome of the federal “primary right” test could
have been produced by the transactional test affirmed in Barr. Jeanes
had sued in federal district court for damages resulting from tortious
interference arising from a 1971 investment contract. The Texas suit
36
was for declaratory relief arising from tortious interference related to
the same 1971 investment contract, but also to tortious interference
with an oral development agreement between Jeanes and Stallworth
distinct from the relationship created under the 1971 investment
contract. Even though the parties were the same, and the cause of
action was the same, the “primary right” from which the claims arose
was different, and the Supreme Court of Texas held that
Commercial Box & Lumber Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 623 F.2d 371, 373
(5th Cir.1980); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 87 (1982).
When considering whether subsequent claims are based on the
same cause of action as a prior lawsuit, the Fifth Circuit employs
the "primary right" test. Kemp v. Birmingham News Co.,608 F.2d
1049, 1052 (5th Cir.1979). Under this test, "if the primary right and
duty and the delict or wrong are the same in each action, the cause
of action is the same." Hall v. Tower Land & Investment Co., 512
F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir.1975).
(further elaboration of the above for several paragraphs is omitted)
In summary, we hold that res judicata bars Jeanes' actions for

declaratory relief against Henderson and Stallworth and Jeanes'
action against Stallworth for tortious interference with the 1971
Investment Contract. With respect to Jeanes' actions against
Stallworth for tortious interference with the Jeanes-Henderson oral
development agreement and for malicious interference with a
prospective Jeanes-Henderson business relationship, we hold
that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not

apply and that fact issues exist on these claims. Accordingly,
37
except for Jeanes' interference claims not affected by res judicata,
we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Concerning the
remaining interference claims, we reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals and remand that part of the cause to the trial court
for a trial on the merits.
Even though Jeanes isn’t entirely relevant because it was an

application of federal res judicata law, it is instructive that application
of the same test to the instant case would result in a finding of no res
judicata or collateral estoppel. Under the “primary right” theory, the
Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, 2016-11-0772 arose from a conspiracy to harm
the Plaintiff’s reputation, and the instant lawsuit arose from a debt.
The two suits involve different primary rights under federal law and
different subject matter (transactions) under Texas law. Under either
the federal or Texas tests, there is no res judicata.
4. It is unclear how the Defendant got the impression that the Plaintiff was
attempting to discredit Barr and Getty Oil Company v. Insurance
Company of North America, 845 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1992). The Plaintiff
applauds Barr for a long overdue course correction of Texas res judicata
law. Justice Gonzalez’s opinion was appropriate and brilliantly written.
The Plaintiff, most humbly proposes that the Defendant reread Barr more
carefully, and then read the Plaintiff’s previous response more carefully.
The Plaintiff did not state, nor does he have any disagreement with the
holdings in either Barr or Getty Oil. The Plaintiff compliments the
Defendant for getting his excerpt from Travelers partially correct. One
more paragraph and it would be perfect. The inclusion of the holding of
Amstadt is essential because it contains the centrality of Barr.
38
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010)
The party relying on the affirmative defense of res judicata must

prove
(1) a prior final determination on the merits by a court of competent

jurisdiction;
(2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and
(3) a second action based on the same claims as were or could have
been raised in the first action.
Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.,919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex.1996);

(citation of TRCP 94 omitted) "The judgment in the first suit
precludes a second action by the parties and their privies on
matters actually litigated and on causes of action or defenses
arising out of the same subject matter that might have been
litigated in the first suit." Gracia v. RC Cola-7-Up Bottling Co., 667
S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.1984).
The Plaintiff can understand the Defendants misgiving regarding the

citation of Travelers in the Plaintiff’s “ELEMENTS of RES JUDICATA.”
The Plaintiff found that several Courts of Appeals have cited the
Elements of Res Judicata from the 1st Court of Appeals. It’s more
eloquently stated than the above excerpt from Travelers (which includes
Amstadt) as it integrates the subject matter (transaction) test affirmed in
Barr (Amstadt) with the three other elements so that it isn’t necessary to
include and apply the two separate tests from Travelers and Amstadt. The
Houston Court of Appeals included the citation of Travelers with their
Elements of Res Judicata, so the Plaintiff included that in his excerpt. The
39
Plaintiff also included the line, “SOURCE: HOUSTON COURT OF
APPEALS – No. 01-12-0114-CV – 7/11/2013” to indicate the 1st Court of
Appeals as the source. As you can see, the 1st Court of Appeals version
combines the components of both Travelers and Amstadt in a brilliantly
elegant (practical simplicity), yet highly functional package.
ELEMENTS of RES JUDICATA

To prevail on the defense, a party must show that
(1) in a previous action, a court of competent jurisdiction rendered
a final determination on the merits of a claim,
(2) the parties in the earlier action are identical to, or
in privity with, the present parties, and
(3) the pending claim
(a) is identical to the prior claim or
(b) arises out of the same subject matter as the prior claim and
could have been litigated in the previous action.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010).
SOURCE: HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS - No. 01-12-01114-
CV. - 7/11/2013
5. The Plaintiff doesn’t disagree with Getty Oil Company v. Insurance

Company of North America, 845 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1992), but it has no
relevance to the instant case because Getty’s lawsuits arose from the same
accident, the same contract, the same section of the contract, and sought
the same relief from the same defendants as the following excerpt will
show.
We recently clarified that Texas follows the "transactional" approach

to res judicata. See Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627
(Tex. 1992). Under this approach, a judgment in an earlier suit
"precludes a second action by the parties and their privies not only on
40
matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses
which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have
been litigated in the first suit." Id. at 630; Texas Water Rights Comm.
v. Crow Iron Works, 582 S.W.2d 768, 771-72 (Tex.1979).
We conclude that Getty's present suit arises out of the same subject
matter as its earlier cross-claim against NL asserted in the Duncan
suit. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which recognizes *799
the transactional test, suggests that factors to consider in
determining whether facts constitute a single "transaction" are
"their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and
whether, taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial
purposes." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b (1980).
Getty's present action against NL arose from the same accident
that was adjudicated in the Duncan suit. The present suit also
concerns the same contract, HB-5357, and the same section of
that contract, the "Insurance and Indemnity" section. Finally, Getty
seeks the same relief against NL here as in its earlier cross-
claim: reimbursement for Getty's liability to Duncan's estate
and beneficiaries. Thus, both Getty's actions against NL
derived from the same transaction.
(emphasis added to pertinent parts)
6. The Defendant makes a great point regarding the Plaintiff’s citation of

John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v.
Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 288 (Tex. 2002) and the Plaintiff apologizes
for not being clearer. The Plaintiff only intended that the citation
indicate the source for the elements of collateral estoppel.
41
7. The Defendant continues to have difficulty grasping Texas res judicata
law. He’s functionally fixed on the idea that “he could have asserted the
same claims in the previous case,” but that hasn’t been Texas law for
almost 30 years now. The crux of the Barr holding was the addition of the
“subject matter” (transaction) test, but there are other requirements as
well. The Defendant may be confused because when you attack a
Plaintiff’s causes of action, you only have to disprove one of the required
elements. The same is true of an affirmative defense. The Defendant may
be confused, thinking that he only has to prove one of the elements of an
affirmative defense. Whether the Plaintiff could have combined the suit
on sworn account with the defamation lawsuit is irrelevant. Under Texas
law, the two matters arise from separate transactions, and therefore they
do not support an affirmative defense of res judicata. The Plaintiff
encourages the Defendant to keep trying because it’s never too late to
learn something new.
8. The Defendants’ rebuttal is taken in good spirit, and the Plaintiff is not
being sarcastic or facetious when he states that he has learned a great
deal from the Defendant. The Plaintiff is cognizant of the fact that the
Defendant was handed one of the worst cases imaginable, and yet he has
made an impressively valiant effort. There are just times in life when, no
matter how good you are, you don’t have the options. This appears to be
one of those times. Therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to Summary
Judgment as a matter of law.
PRAYER
25. For these reasons, Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. If the Court grants Defendants’ motion for
42
summary judgment, Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the Plaintiff 's
objections so they will be preserved for appeal.

____________________________________
Pro Se
11652 CR 2210
Tyler, TX 75707
bill@wallertec.com
Cell: (903) 253-5555
BY EMAIL
I certify that on June 3, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of this document
to the following counsel of record:
Micah Satterwhite………… msatterwhite@sloanfirm.com

Nicholas Summers Peacock nick@amentpeacocklaw.com

_____________________________________________
_
43
Cause No. 2019010048
WILLIAM D. WALLER, JR. § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

§
VS. § CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS
§
SUSAN J. WALLER, §
DOROTHY REID WALLER and §
WALLER MEDIA, LLC § 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants show:
1. Plaintiff contends that this Court cannot grant a summary judgment on
res judicata because “defendants have not pleaded that defense in their answer.”
(Response at ¶¶ 18 and 19). But on May 1, 2019, Defendants filed their Supplemental
Answer, wherein they affirmatively raised that defense. For the Court’s convenience,
a true and correct copy of that Supplemental Answer is attached hereto.
2. Whether Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition (in Cause No. 2016-11-
0772) was or was not stricken is immaterial to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. What is material is the allegations that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Petition contains that clearly show that Plaintiff could have brought the claims
asserted in this case in Cause No. 2016-11-0772.
3. Whether the claims asserted in this case were asserted and pending
when the Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants in Cause No. 2016-
44
11-0772 is immaterial for the purposes of this motion for summary judgment. What
is material is that res judicata bars not only what was actually litigated but also
claims that could have been litigated in the original cause of action. Jeanes v.
Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985).
4. None of the authority that Defendants cite in their Motion for Summary
Judgment (Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992)
and Getty Oil Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 845
S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1992)) has been abrogated or overruled.
5. The authority that Plaintiff cites in his futile attempt to discredit Barr
and Getty Oil avails him of nothing. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d
860, 861 (Tex. 2010) actually states:
The party relying on the affirmative defense of res judicata must prove
(1) a prior final determination on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3)
a second action based on the same claims as were or could
have been raised in the first action. [Bold emphasis supplied]
6. The second case that Plaintiff cites, John G. and Marie Stella
Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 288 (Tex. 2002)
is inapposite to the final judgment that Defendants obtained in Cause No. 2016-11-
0772. In Dewhurst (90 S.W.3d at 286), the question was whether “the
Foundation’s claims in this case are barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel—often more usefully referred to, respectively, as claim preclusion and issue
preclusion—based on the federal trial court’s findings and the Fifth Circuit’s holdings
45
in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Sun Oil Co.,1 decided in 1951.” The Supreme
Court held:
“[T]he Humble litigation does not preclude the Foundation’s claims in

the present case. The federal district court in Humble did not determine
the eastern boundary of the Foundation’s property and could not
have done so. Not all of the area was involved in the case. The
parties’s dispute in Humble over the validity of competing mineral
leases covered only a small part of the area in dispute in the present
case. Sun Oil, the State’s lessee, did not claim an interest in most of the
land along the east side of the Foundation’s property, and therefore
could not litigate the boundary. The State, as we have said, was not a
party to Humble because its intervention would have defeated diversity
jurisdiction on which the action was predicated. For this reason, the
Humble litigation cannot be held to preclude the claims made in the
present case.” John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial
Foundation v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d at 288. [Bold emphasis
supplied]
7. Whether this Court determined the claims asserted in this case in Cause
No. 2016-11-0772 is immaterial—it could have done so. Because it could have done
so, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s putative attempts to assert these claims in Cause No.
2016-11-0772, res judicata bars this suit.
8. Plaintiff should have paid heed to this Court’s admonition in Cause No.
2016-11-0772, that he retain counsel. He did not do so and now faces the joy of
learning the truth of the adage of “he who represents himself, etc..” Nevertheless,
Defendants pray that the Court grant them summary judgment that Plaintiff have
and take nothing against them. Defendants pray for general relief.
1
Sun Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 88 F.Supp. 658 (S.D.Tex.1950),
modified and aff'd sub nom. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 191 F.2d 705 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920, 72 S.Ct. 367, 96 L.Ed. 687 (1952).
46
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ L.T. “Butch” Bradt

_____________________________
L.T. Bradt #02841600
14090 Southwest Freeway, Suite 300
Sugar Land, Texas 77478
(281) 201-0700
Fax: (281) 201-1202
ltbradt@flash.net
Lead Counsel for Defendants
SLOAN, HATCHER, PERRY, RUNGE,

ROBERTSON & SMITH
/s/ Micah L. Satterwhite

____________________________
JOHN D. SLOAN, JR.
State Bar No. 18505100
jsloan@sloanfirm.com
MICAH L. SATTERWHITE
msatterwhite@sloanfirm.com
P.O. Drawer 2909

Longview, Texas 75606
Telephone: 903-757-7000
Facsimile: 903-757-7574
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SUSAN
J. WALLER
AMENT PEACOCK
/s/ Nicholas S. Peacock

NICHOLAS S. PEACOCK
State Bar. No. 24048105
nick@amentpeacocklaw.com
P.O. Box 751
Jacksonville, TX 75766
Telephone: 903-586-3561
Facsimile: 903-586-7338
47
ATT OR N E Y F OR DEFENDANTS
DOROTHY REID WALLER & WALLER
MEDIA, LLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned attorney, certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following persons, by email service:
John D. Sloan, Jr. jsloan@sloanfirm.com

Micah L. Satterwhite msatterwhite@sloanfirm.com
Nicholas S. Peacock nick@amentpeacocklaw.com
William D. Waller, Jr. Bill@wallertec.com
on June 3, 2019.

L.T. Bradt
48
Filed 5/1/2019 6:03 PM
Alison Dotson
District Clerk
Cherokee County, Texas
Kelly Curry
Cause No. 2019010048

§
§
SUSAN J. WALLER, §
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER
Defendants supplement their prior-filed Answer and show:
1. Defendants incorporate, by reference, for all intents and purposes as
though set forth herein verbatim, their prior-filed Answers.
2. Defendants supplement their prior-filed Answers to assert the
Wherefore, Defendants pray that upon final trial hereof, the Plaintiff have and
take nothing by his suit and that they go hence, with their costs, without day.
Defendants pray for general relief.

_____________________________
L.T. Bradt #02841600
(281) 201-0700
Fax: (281) 201-1202
ltbradt@flash.net
49
ROBERTSON & SMITH

____________________________
JOHN D. SLOAN, JR.
P.O. Drawer 2909

Telephone: 903-757-7000
Facsimile: 903-757-7574
J. WALLER
AMENT PEACOCK

NICHOLAS S. PEACOCK
P.O. Box 751
Telephone: 903-586-3561
Facsimile: 903-586-7338
ATTORNEY F OR DE F E N DAN TS
MEDIA, LLC

50
on May 1, 2016.

L.T. Bradt
51
CAUSE NO. 2019-01-0048
§
Plaintiff
§
§
v.
§
SUSAN J. WALLER,
§
WALLER MEDIA, LLC
§
Defendants
PLAINTIFF'S F I RS T A M E N D E D
S ECO N D MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., asks the Court to sign a summary judgment under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a on Plaintiff’s suit on sworn account against
Defendants Waller Media, LLC, Susan J. Waller, and Dorothy Reid Waller.
INTRODUCTION
1. On November 27, 2018, Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., sued Defendants, Waller
Media, LLC, Susan J. Waller, and Dorothy Reid Waller to recover a debt on sworn
account under Tex. R. Civ. P. § 185.
BACKGROUND
2. Defendants, Waller Media, LLC, Susan J. Waller, and Dorothy Reid Waller answered
on December 27, 2018, with a Plea In Abatement, Motion To Dismiss and, Subject
to the Foregoing, Original Answer.
3. To defeat a properly pleaded suit under Rule 185, the Defendants’ must answer with a
verified denial. The Defendants’ answer included a section labeled Verified Denial,
but the accompanying affidavit labeled Verification did not refer to the section
Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment Page 1 of 9
52
labeled Verified Denial.
4. Tex. R. Civ. P. 185.
“When any action or defense is founded upon an open account or other claim for goods,
wares and merchandise, including any claim for a liquidated money demand based upon
written contract or founded on business dealings between the parties, or is for
personal service rendered, or labor done or labor or materials furnished, on which a
systematic record has been kept, and is supported by the affidavit of the party, his agent
or attorney taken before some officer authorized to administer oaths, to the effect that
such claim is, within the knowledge of affiant, just and true, that it is due, and that all
just and lawful offsets, payments and credits have been allowed, the same shall be taken
as prima facie evidence thereof, unless the party resisting such claim shall file a written
denial, under oath. A party resisting such a sworn claim shall comply with the rules of
pleading as are required in any other kind of suit, provided, however, that if he does not
timely file a written denial, under oath, he shall not be permitted to deny the
claim, or any item therein, as the case may be. No particularization or description of
the nature of the component parts of the account or claim is necessary unless the trial
court sustains special exceptions to the pleadings.”
5. Tex. R. Civ. P. 93.
A pleading setting up any of the following matters, unless the truth of such matters
appear of record, shall be verified by affidavit.
(10) A denial of an account which is the foundation of the plaintiff's action, and supported
by affidavit.
6. The Defendants’ answer included two documents labeled as Verifications, but they
were legally incompetent under Tex. R. Civ. P. §185 and §93(10).
1) The verification must state positively and unqualifiedly that it is based on the
affiant’s personal knowledge. Day Cruises Maritime, 267 S.W3d at 54; cf.
Humphreys v. Caldwell, 888 S.W.2d 469,470 (Tex. 1994) (not a sworn account
case). The Defendants’ verifications failed to show or state personal knowledge.
2) The affidavit must state that the facts in the answer are true. Brown
Found. Repair & Consulting, Inc. v. Friendly Chevrolet Co., 715 S.W.2d
53
115,117 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Swearing to the facts is
essential to the affidavit’s validity. Id. The Defendants’ verifications failed to
state that the facts in the answer are true.
3) The Defendants’ denial stated that “there was no such account.” It was a pure
conclusion. See Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 316 S.W.2d 116 (CCA), ref.,
n.r.e. Legal conclusions are insufficient to raise issues of fact. CGM Valve &
Gauge Co., Inc. v. Energy Valve, Inc. 698 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Tex. App.–Houston
[14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
4) The Defendants’ assertion that there was no agreement regarding the account
is not relevant because the Plaintiff founded his claim on the business dealings
of the parties, and Rule 185 does not require an agreement.
5) The Defendants’ answer was both conclusory and legally insufficient.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
7. On May 1, 2019, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting the
affirmative defense of res judicata and collateral estoppel, but they failed to identify
any pending claims or issues of fact which meet all the required elements of their
affirmative defenses. The Defendants asserted that they were entitled to Summary
Judgment as a matter of law, but failed to show an awareness of current Texas law
regarding res judicata or collateral estoppel, much less attempt to address the
individual required elements.
8. The only specific claim referenced by the Defendants which they alleged to be subject
to res judicata was from the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition in Cause No. 2016-
11-0772 (Waller-1) which had been stricken from the record of the cause on February
25, 2019 and superseded by the Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition on March 4, 2019.
The Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition was not in the record of the cause and
therefore not a pleading upon which the Court could render Summary Judgment.
Even if the claim had been in the record of the cause, it failed for other reasons as
illustrated in the Boolean hierarchical decomposition below. For this document, the
Plaintiff will refer to this lawsuit, Cause no. 2019-01-0048, as Waller-2.
54
Elements of Res Judicata in Boolean Hierarchical Decomposition

(2) (a) the parties in the earlier action are identical to, or
(b) in privity with, the present parties, and
(b) [1] arises out of the same subject matter as the prior claim and
[2] could have been litigated in the previous action.
SOURCE: HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS - No. 01-12-01114-CV. - 7/11/2013
Boolean Formula: (1)&((2)(a)|(2)(b))&((3)(a)|((3)(b)[1]&(3)(b)[2]))
Boolean Solution: 0&(0|0)&((0|(0&_)) = 0 (False)
Veatch, William S. “Artificial Intelligence and Legal Drafting.” ABA Web. 22 April 2019.
(1) There was no prior final determination on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction because the debt would have been against Waller Media, LLC and
Waller Media, LLC was not a defendant in Waller-1. There was no prior final
determination on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction as the
Plaintiff was never allowed to argue the issue or have the benefit of discovery
regarding the issue, therefore (1) is false,
(2) (a) The identity of the parties was not the same. The rule does not state, “some of
the same,” “nearly the same,” “the same with minor exceptions,” “essentially
the same,” or “two of the same;” the rule is, “identical to.” The parties to the
two lawsuits are most certainly not identical, therefore (2)(a) is false,
(b) Privity with regard to the subject matter of Waller-1 would belong to the
Parties’ with interests or rights in connection to the conspiracy to injure
the Plaintiff’s reputation. Waller Media, LLC could not conspire against
the Plaintiff, so Waller Media, LLC was not in privity with the other
parties regarding the subject matter of Waller-1. Privity with regard to the
subject matter of Waller-2 would be those with interests or rights in
connection to the debt owed by Waller Media, LLC to the Plaintiff. Susan
Waller and Dorothy Waller were in privity in their capacities as officers who
who had control of Waller Media, LLC and as beneficiaries of the money which
was owed but never repaid to the Plaintiff, therefore 2(b) is false and since
(2)(a) is also false, (2) is false,
(3) (a) The pending claim of $35,107 is certainly not identical to the $20,000, which
the Defendants asserted was a claim against Waller Media, LLC by the
Plaintiff, therefore 3(a) is false,
(b) [1] The claims in Waller-1 arose from a conspiracy to injure the Plaintiff’s
reputation. The claims in Waller-2 arose from a debt owed by Waller
Media, LLC to the Plaintiff. The claims in the two lawsuits did not
arise from the same subject matter, therefore (3)(b)[1] is false, since
(3)(b)[1] is false, (3)(b)[2] is irrelevant, so (3)(b) is false, since (3)(a) is also
false, (3) is false.
55
9. To succeed on their affirmative defense of res judicata, the Defendants must prove all
three elements. They have failed to prove even one. Accordingly, Therefore, the
Defendants failed to prove their affirmative defense of res judicata.
Elements of Collateral Estoppel

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party is precluded from raising an issue in a
pending action if in a previous action,
(1) the party was cast as an adversary with respect to the same issue,
(2) that issue was fully and fairly litigated, and
(3) that issue was essential to the judgment rendered.
John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 288 (Tex. 2002);
Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. 2001). SOURCE: Houston Court
of Appeals 01-10-00020-CV 5/12/22
10. The Defendants also asserted collateral estoppel in their motion for summary
judgment but failed to satisfy even one of the three required elements. Therefore, they
failed to prove their affirmative defense of collateral estoppel.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
11. To support the facts in this motion, the Plaintiff incorporates the evidence into this
motion by reference.
April 9, 2019 - Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition

Exhibit A1 – October 31, 2017, Demand letter to Susan Waller and Dorothy Waller
Exhibit A2 – October 31, 2017, USPS Certified Mail Delivery Confirmation
Exhibit B1 – October 31, 2017, Demand Letter to Susan Waller and Dorothy Waller
Exhibit B2 – October 31, 2017, USPS Certified Mail Delivery Confirmation
Exhibit C – November 20, 2018, Charges for Workstation & Equipment
Exhibit D – November 20, 2018, Charges for Personal Property
Exhibit E – November 11, 2018, Charges on Open Account before August 1, 2016
Exhibit F – November 20, 2018, Charges for PTEK Repair, Notary Supp., Utility Bill
Exhibit G – November 20, 2018, Grand Total $35,107
Exhibit H – November 23, 2018, Plaintiff’s affidavit of sworn account
12. To succeed on a traditional motion for summary judgment on his cause of action, th e
Plaintiff must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Denbury
56
Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC v. Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd., 510 S.W.3d 909, (Tex.
2017); Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015); Amedisys,
Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014);
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003). To
meet this burden, the plaintiff must conclusively prove all essential elements of its
claim. MM P, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). A matter is conclusively
established if reasonable people could not differ on the conclusion to be drawn from
the evidence. City of Keller v.Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). If the plaintiff
establishes its right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to
the defendant to present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. See
State v. $90,235, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551,
556 (Tex. 1989).
13. Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on his cause of action for debt on sworn
account under Tex. R. Civ. P. § 185 because the undisputed facts in this case
conclusively establish each essential element. The essential elements of plaintiff 's
cause of action for debt on sworn account under Rule 185 are the following:
a. the plaintiff provided goods, merchandise, and services to Waller Media, LLC
b. the prices were just and true because they were the same usual, customary, and
reasonable prices which were paid by the Plaintiff,
c. the Plaintiff kept a systematic record of the transactions,
d. all lawful offsets, payments, and credits have been applied to the account,
e. the account remains unpaid,
f. the damages are liquidated, and
g. the Plaintiff provided an affidavit of these facts under oath.
14. The defendant resisting the sworn account must strictly comply with the requirements of Rule
185, “or he will not be permitted to dispute the receipt of the services or the correctness of the
charges.” See Panditi, 180 S.W.3d at 927; see also Vance v. Holloway, 689 S.W.2d 403, 404
(Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (“Holloway failed to file a sworn denial, and he has, therefore, waived
his right to dispute the amount and ownership of the account.”).
15. Rule 185 requires the Defendants to “comply with the rules of pleading” and “timely file a
written denial, under oath,” or else the Defendant “shall not be permitted to deny the claim or
57
any item therein.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 185; Panditi, 180 S.W.3d at 927 (noting that Rule 185
requires sworn denial to be written and verified by affidavit). To place the plaintiff’s sworn
account claim at issue, the defendant must file a “special verified denial of the account” in
accordance with Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(10). See Huddleston v. Case Power & Equip. Co., 748
S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(10) (“A pleading
setting up any of the following matters, unless the truth of such matters appears of record,
shall be verified by affidavit: A denial of an account which is the foundation of the plaintiff’s
action . . .”).
16. This properly sworn denial must be included in the defendant’s answer; a sworn denial in a
response to a summary judgment motion does not satisfy Rule 185. See Cooper v. Scott
Irrigation Constr., Inc.,838 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no writ); see also Rush
v. Montgomery Ward, 757 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied)
(“Only in the affidavit accompanying his response to Ward’s motion for summary judgment did
appellant dispute the correctness and fairness of the charges, and demand additional proof of
his liability. Because of the combined effect of Tex. R. Civ. P. 185 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(10)
required the appellant to raise those claims in his answer; we hold that appellant raised his
assertions too late.”).
17. If the defendant fails to file a properly verified denial to the sworn account, the sworn account
is received as prima facie evidence of the debt, and the plaintiff, as summary judgment
movant, is entitled to summary judgment on the pleadings. Nguyen, 108 S.W.3d at 562; see
Livingston Ford Mercury, Inc. v. Haley, 997 S.W.2d 425, 430 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, no
pet.) (holding that when plaintiff files proper sworn account petition but the Defendant does
not comply with Rule 185, the petition will support summary judgment and “additional proof
of the accuracy of the account is unnecessary”).
18. “In other words, a defendant’s noncompliance with rule 185 conclusively establishes that there
is no defense to the suit on the sworn account.” Nguyen, 108 S.W.3d at 562; see Whiteside v.
Ford Motor Credit Corp., 220 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (“When the
defendant fails to file a sworn denial, and the trial court enters summary judgment on a sworn
account, appellate review is limited because the defendant will not be allowed to dispute the
plaintiff’s claim.”).
19. Because the Defendants have failed to prove all the elements of their affirmative defenses,
20. Because the Defendants have failed to file a properly verified denial, the evidentiary
presumption in favor of the plaintiff created by the sworn account rule is not destroyed, and
58
the Defendants have failed to prove all the elements of their affirmative defenses, judgment
may be had on the pleadings without the need for additional summary judgment evidence.
21. The Movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DAMAGES
22. The damages for Plaintiff’s cause of action are liquidated. Based on the facts stated in this
motion and supported by summary judgment evidence, the Plaintiff is entitled to damages for
$35,107.
23. In the alternative, if the Court denies part of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiff asks the Court to sign an order specifying the facts that are established as a matter of
law and directing any further proceedings as are just. Tex. R. Civ. P. § 166a(e).
24. For these reasons, the Plaintiff asks the Court to grant this motion and sign an order for final
summary judgment on all issues, all claims, and all theories of damages, and all parties. In
the alternative, the Plaintiff asks for an order specifying the facts that are established as a
matter of law.

____________________________________
Pro Se
11652 CR 2210
Tyler, TX 75707
bill@wallertec.com
Cell: (903) 253-5555
59
BY EMAIL
I certify that on May 29, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of this document to the
following counsel of record:


______________________________________________
60
CAUSE NO. 2019-01-0048
§
Plaintiff
§
§
v.
§
SUSAN J. WALLER,
§
WALLER MEDIA, LLC
§
Defendants
FIRST AMENDED
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., asks the Court to deny Defendants’, Susan J. Waller,
Dorothy Reid Waller, and Waller Media, LLC's motion for summary judgment.
INTRODUCTION
1. Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., sued Defendants, Waller Media, LLC, Susan J. Waller, and
Dorothy Reid Waller to recover a debt on a Sworn Account under Tex. R. Civ. Proc. § 185.
2. For convenience, the Plaintiff will refer to this lawsuit as Waller-2.
Waller-2 - Action in Debt - Cause No. 2019-01-0048, (this lawsuit)

Subject Matter – Debt.
Precipitating Transaction(s) – Waller Media, LLC’s debt on open account payable to
Plaintiff.
Damages - $35,107
Cause of Action – Debt on Sworn Account – Rule 185 procedure to collect debt on
sworn account
Plaintiff - William D. Waller, Jr. in his capacity as creditor of Waller Media, LLC
Defendants:
(1) Primary - Waller Media, LLC as debtor and party to the transactions which
resulted in the debt on sworn open account
(2) Susan J. Waller in her capacity as an Officer of Waller Media, LLC
(3) Dorothy Reid Waller in her capacity as an Officer of Waller Media, LLC
Filed – November 2018
Filed in – Cherokee County Court at Law - Cause No. CV09786
Court – 2nd Judicial District Court Cherokee County - After voluntary recusal, the case
was removed the 2nd Judicial District Court on January 15, 2019, as Cause No. 2019-
01-0048.
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment Page 1 of 17
61
3. Defendants, Waller Media, LLC, Susan J. Waller, and Dorothy Reid Waller responded on
December 27, 2018, with a Plea In Abatement, Motion To Dismiss and, Subject to the
Foregoing, Original Answer. To defeat a properly pleaded suit under Rule 185, the
Defendants’ answer must include a verified denial. The Defendants’ answer included a
section labeled Verified Denial, but the accompanying affidavit labeled Verification did
not refer to the section labeled Verified Denial. The Defendants’ answer included two
documents labeled as Verifications, but they were legally incompetent under Tex. R. Civ. Proc.
§185 and §93(10).
1) The verification must state positively and unqualifiedly that it is based on the
affiant’s personal knowledge. Day Cruises Maritime, 267 S.W3d at 54; cf. Humphreys
v. Caldwell, 888 S.W.2d 469,470 (Tex. 1994) (not a sworn account case). The
Defendants’ verifications failed to show or state personal knowledge.
2) The affidavit must state that the facts in the answer are true. Brown Found. Repair
& Consulting, Inc. v. Friendly Chevrolet Co., 715 S.W.2d 115,117 (Tex.App.—Dallas
1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Swearing to the facts is essential to the affidavit’s validity. Id.
The Defendants’ verifications failed to state that the facts in the answer are true.
3) The Defendants’ denial stated that “there was no such account.” It was a pure
conclusion. See Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 316 S.W.2d 116 (CCA), ref., n.r.e.
Legal conclusions are insufficient to raise issues of fact. CGM Valve & Gauge Co., Inc.
v. Energy Valve, Inc. 698 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
writ).
4) The Defendants’ assertion that there was no agreement regarding the account is not
relevant because the Plaintiff’s claim is founded on the business dealings of the
parties, and an agreement is not required under Rule 185. The Defendants’ answer
was both conclusory and legally insufficient.
4. On January 3, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that
the Plaintiff had proved his prima facie case, and the Defendants had failed to respond with
legally sufficient defense. With no warning or explanation, on January 15, 2019, the County
Court at Law Judge recused and removed Cause No. CV09786 to the 2nd Judicial District
Court as Cause No. 2019-01-0048. That was of concern to the Plaintiff because the seemingly
arbitrary removal followed a 3-year pattern of unlikely events always fortunate for the
Defendants and prejudicial to the Plaintiff. The Suit on Sworn Account was filed in the
62
Cherokee County Court at Law because the amount of the claim was appropriate for that
Court’s jurisdictional limits.
5. The Plaintiff felt that removal to the 2nd Judicial District Court would be prejudicial to him
because the Defendants’ lawyers have been adept at manipulating the Plaintiff’s former
counsel, OSHA, NLRB, and probably others. The Plaintiff felt that it would diminish the
Defendants’ likelihood of success if they had to manipulate and corrupt two judges instead of
one. Of course, the Defendants have compensated by a force of numbers as six attorneys have
now appeared before the Courts on their behalf. That’s just two less than O.J. Simpson had on
his team in his murder trial.
6. The defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of res judicata and
collateral estoppel because of a previously filed lawsuit which the Plaintiff will refer to as
Waller-1.
Waller-1 - Action in Tort - Cause No. 2016-11-0772

Subject Matter – Injury to the Plaintiff’s reputation and person.
Precipitating Transaction(s) – The Defendants spread false allegations that the
Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars from Waller Media, framed and accused him of
an extortion plot against his mother, and fostered public and professional hatred
against him.
Damages - more than $1,000,000
Causes of action
(1) Defamation,
(2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and
(3) Invasion of Privacy
Plaintiff - William D. Waller, Jr. as an individual
Defendants
(1) Susan J. Waller as an individual
(2) Dorothy Reid Waller as an individual
(3) Alicia G. Tennison as an individual
Filed - November of 2016.
Court - 2nd Judicial District Court of Cherokee County Texas
7. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is wholly incompetent because it fails to
identify or apply appropriate Texas law. In Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627,
628-29 (Tex. 1992) Supreme Court of Texas Justice Gonzalez examined several theories
which had produced unpredictable and undesirable results before advancing a solution. The
Defendants averred the problematic theories instead of the Supreme Court’s holding in Barr
v. Resolution Trust Corp. and ignored the actual holding.
63
8. The Plaintiff had at first thought the Defendants were ignorant of the law, but the
predictability of their misstatements indicated they were deceitful. Their conduct has become
so outrageous; the Plaintiff no longer believes they are fooling anyone with their sophistries.
Their treatment of Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. is a good example of how the Defendants
have become so incredibly blatant as to constitute an outright challenge to the authority
and dignity of the Court.
9. The only specific pleading referenced by the Defendants was an excerpt from the Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amended Petition which is not in the record of the cause because the Court struck it on
February 25, 2019, and the Plaintiff filed his Sixth Amended Petition on March 4, 2019.
RULE 65. SUBSTITUTED INSTRUMENT TAKES PLACE OF ORIGINAL

Unless the substituted instrument shall be set aside on exceptions, the instrument for
which it is substituted shall no longer be regarded as a part of the pleading in the record
of the cause, unless some error of the court in deciding upon the necessity of the
amendment, or otherwise in superseding it, be complained of, and exception be taken to
the action of the court, or unless it be necessary to look to the superseded pleading upon a
question of limitation.
10. The Defendants’ operative pleading as to res judicata relied on an excerpt from the stricken
petition which was not in the record of the cause. The Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition filed
on March 4, 2019, contained no reference to credit extended by Plaintiff to Waller Media, LLC.
“As shown by his Fourth Amended Petition, Plaintiff had every opportunity to sue in
Cause No. 2016-11-0772 for the money that he has now (again) alleged that Waller Media
owes him. But, courtesy of the summary judgment that this Court has rendered in Cause
No. 2016-11-0772, that claim and all others that were finally adjudicated, as well as
related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit.
Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992).”
11. The Defendant asserts that the Court finally adjudicated the claim, but it didn’t. First, there
was no claim to adjudicate because it wasn’t a claim. The Plaintiff never had an opportunity to
argue the issue in court, nor did the Plaintiff propound discovery requests related to the claim.
If it had been a claim for repayment of a debt, the amount would have been $35,107, not
$20,000. Because Waller Media, LLC wasn’t a party in Cause No. 2016-11-0772 (Waller-1), the
Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim against Waller Media, LLC. Under Tex. R. Civ.
Proc. § 47(a), a Plaintiff is required to include a short statement of causes of action sufficient
to give fair notice of the claim involved. The Plaintiff clearly and concisely stated his causes of
action in paragraph 8a of both his Fourth and Sixth Amended Petitions in Cause No. 2016-11-
0772 (Waller-1), but no cause of action was listed to recover a debt. Waller-1 was exclusively
an action in tort.
64
12. Under the Defendant’s Arguments and Authorities, Paragraph 8 of his Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Defendant included excerpts from a deliberation regarding res judicata by
Justice Gonzalez in Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992).
Much of the difficulty associated with the doctrine of res judicata

is due to the confusion of several related theories. <begin clip>
Broadly speaking, res judicata is the generic term for a group of related concepts
concerning the conclusive effects given final judgments. Puga v. Donna Fruit Co., 634
S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex.1982). Within this general doctrine, there are two principal
categories: (1) claim preclusion (also known as res judicata); and (2) issue preclusion
(also known as collateral estoppel).[1] Res judicata, or claims preclusion, prevents the
relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as
related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit.
Gratia v. RC Cola-7-Up Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.1984); Bonniwell v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984). Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel,
prevents relitigation of particular issues already resolved in a prior suit.[2]Bonniwell, 663
*629 S.W.2d at 818. Barr's argument, that Sunbelt should have brought all theories of
liability in one suit, is the defense of claim preclusion.
Claim preclusion prevents splitting a cause of action. Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d
100, 103 (Tex.1985). The policies behind the doctrine reflect the need to bring all litigation
to an end, prevent vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court decisions, promote
judicial economy, and prevent double recovery. Zollie Steakley & W eldon U. Howell, Jr.,
Ruminations on Res Judicata, 28 Sw.LJ. 355, 358-59 (1974).
“The question that has given courts the most difficulty is determining what claims
should have been litigated in the prior suit. Early on, this Court held that res
judicata "is not only final as to the matter actually determined, but as to every
other matter which the parties might litigate in the cause, and which they
might have decided." Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101,104 (1849). We have never
repudiated this definition of claim preclusion, and it appears in some form in most
definitions of res judicata. See, e.g., Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103
(Tex.1985) (res judicata bars not only what was actually litigated but also claims
that could have been litigated in the original cause of action). <end clip> If
taken literally, this definition of the rule would require that all
disputes existing between parties be joined, regardless of
whether the disputes have anything in common. This court has
resorted to a wide variety of theories and tests to give res
judicata a more restrictive application.” [emphasis added]
13. When someone knows their averments are too obvious to fool anyone and they make them
anyway, that’s just bravado of the alpha. The Defendant took the excerpt out of context to
convey the opposite meaning intended by the Supreme Court of Texas. The Defendant omitted
both the introduction and conclusion, altering the meaning completely. It’s just one more way
the Defendant has falsified the holdings of the courts. The Defendants have repeatedly,
blatantly, and boldly defiled the honor of the Court by misrepresenting facts, laws, and
holdings of courts to gain an advantage and prejudice the Plaintiff. The Court’s record.
65
14. The Defendant seized on the statement by Justice Gonzalez, ”If taken literally, this
definition of the rule would require that all disputes existing between
parties be joined, regardless of whether the disputes have anything
in common.” That was exactly the effect the Defendant was seeking. He omitted the
caveats regarding the defective theories he was adducing.
15. Texas law regarding res judicata, though it may have been confusing before Barr v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992), has now been refined to a
clear and concise list of elements which are not ambiguous or difficult to understand.
ELEMENTS of RES JUDICATA

(1) in a previous action, a court of competent jurisdiction rendered a final
determination on the merits of a claim,
(2) the parties in the earlier action are identical to, or
in privity with, the present parties, and
(b) arises out of the same subject matter as the prior claim and
SOURCE: HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS - No. 01-12-01114-CV. - 7/11/2013
Claim, N 1: A challenge of the property or ownership of a thing which is wrongfully
withheld from the possession of the claimant. 1
ELEMENTS of COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party is precluded from raising an issue in a
pending action if in a previous action,
John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 288 (Tex. 2002);
Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. 2001). SOURCE: Houston Court
of Appeals 01-10-00020-CV 5/12/22
1 href="https://thelawdictionary.org/claim-n-1/" title="CLAIM, N 1">CLAIM, N 1
66
16. The defendants asserted that the Plaintiff’s statement in Waller-1 that he had advanced
Waller Media, LLC $20,000 in credit was a claim for debt. It was not. The amount of the debt
owed by Waller Media, LLC to the Plaintiff, was $35,107, as stated in the Plaintiff’s Original
Petition in Cause No. 2019-01-0048.
a. On November 27, 2018, the Plaintiff filed suit against Waller Media, LLC and it’s two
officers, Dorothy Waller, and Susan Waller for debt on an open account in the amount of
$35,107.
b. On December 10, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Petition in Cause No. 2016-
11-0772 (Waller-1).
c. On February 25, 2019, the court struck the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition from the
record of the cause.
d. On March 4, 2019, the Plaintiff filed his Sixth Amended Petition from which the
statement about advancing $20,000 to Waller Media, LLC in the interest of continuous
operations had been removed.
e. The subject matter of the Plaintiff’s statement which the Defendant has asserted is res
judicata was not the debt owed to the Plaintiff by Waller Media, LLC; it was about the
Plaintiff’s contribution to the continuous operation of Waller Media, LLC by extending
credit for goods, merchandise, and services to Waller Media, LLC.
f. The amount of credit extended to Waller Media, LLC in the interest of continuing
operations while the Plaintiff was an employee of Waller Media, LLC was more than
$20,000. The exact amount is unknown because the Plaintiff was unable to retrieve a cash
ledger which listed transactions paid with out-of-pocket cash by the Plaintiff.
g. The amount of debt owed by Waller Media, LLC to the Plaintiff, included an additional
$15,000 which was not credit extended to Waller Media, LLC in the interest of continuing
operations while the Plaintiff was an employee of Waller Media, LLC. The $15,000 was
not even extended voluntarily by the Plaintiff. That portion of Waller Media, LLC’s debt to
the Plaintiff was extended after the Plaintiff was fired.
h. The Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition clearly, concisely, and in short commonly worded
phrases, listed his causes of action in paragraph 8a. All were causes of action in tort, and
not one was a cause of action in debt.
67
i. The Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for debt in Waller-1 against Waller
Media, LLC because Waller Media, LLC was not a defendant in Waller-1.
17. Because the structure of the defendant groups is fundamentally different, if the Sworn
Account action had been combined, the Defendants’ Attorneys would have capitalized on the
complexity to obfuscate and confuse the issues as a dilatory tactic to destroy the coherent
progression of the case.
a. A Rule 185 action handled properly is a streamlined procedure that can and often does
result in a final judgment in 30 to 60 days. The Plaintiff was entitled by Texas law to the
efficiency of a Rule 185 action without the distractions.
b. Waller-2, a Rule 185 action in debt is vastly different procedurally than Waller-1, an
action in tort for defamation, intentional inflictions of emotional distress, and invasion of
privacy under a recovery theory of civil conspiracy.
c. Bringing the Suit on Sworn Account as a separate action is, by far, the most efficient use
of the Court’s time. It results in the most convenient and least confusing trial units
possible with the highest probability of reaching a just resolution.
d. The parties to Waller-1 are not identical to the parties in Waller-2. Texas law
regarding res judicata is precise and unambiguous. The wording used is not, “almost
identical,” “nearly identical,” or “with minor exceptions identical;” the wording is “the
parties are identical.”
e. There is no mutuality of privity between Waller-1 and Waller-2 because the two lawsuits
arose from different subject matter and different types of transactions. Privity is “a
connection or bond between parties to a particular transaction.” – West’s Encyclopedia of
American Law, edition 2, Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
1) Alicia Tennison was not a defendant in Waller-2 because she was not in privity
with the other parties regarding the transaction from which the lawsuit arose.
2) Waller Media, LLC was not a defendant in Waller-1 because it was not in privity with
the other parties regarding the transaction from which the lawsuit arose.
18. Bringing the two lawsuits was more than just a convenience of the trial units, it was common
sense, and the Plaintiff was entitled to do so under Texas law.
a. no duplication of claims for relief,
b. no duplication of issues to be adjudicated,
68
c. the parties weren’t identical, even those who are the same persons are in different
capacities,
d. no need for discovery in Waller-2,
e. Alicia Tennison had no capacity as a Defendant In Waller-2,
f. The Plaintiff had no standing to sue Alicia Tennison in Waller-2.
g. Waller Media, LLC had no capacity as a Defendant in Waller-1.
h. The Plaintiff had no standing to sue Waller Media, LLC in Waller-1.
19. In their motion for summary judgment, defendants asserted the affirmative defense of res
judicata to plaintiff 's suit on sworn account under Tex. R. Civ. Proc. § 185. The Defendants’
arguments supporting their affirmative defense of res judicata are not based on Texas law, but
on disjoined phrases which are meaningless out of context. Texas res judicata law has been
refined well beyond the 170-year-old position taken by the Defendants. The current Texas law
of res judicata is a precisely worded compound statement with multiple Boolean operators and
requires a literal application. It’s not as simple as grabbing any of the terms you think will
support your position and harping on it incessantly.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party is precluded from

litigating a claim in a pending action if:
(2) the parties that litigated the prior claim are identical to, or
in privity with the parties litigating the pending claim, and
(3) the pending claim is identical to the prior claim or
arises out of the same subject matter as the prior claim, and
20. When a law is stated precisely and unambiguously, it is reasonable that the author intended
that it be interpreted literally with due respect for any Boolean operators and punctuation it
might contain. To support a claim of res judicata under Texas law, all three elements of the
rule must be satisfied. Terms joined by “and,” must both be true. If either of two terms joined
by “or,” are true, then the union of those two terms is true. Conjunctions not preceded by a
comma take precedence in the order of operations. See Veatch, William S. “Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Drafting.” ABA Web. 22 April 2019.
21. The application of Texas law for res judicata is not difficult, but it’s not as simple as the
Defendant would have you believe. The Defendant simply picks whatever term he thinks will
support his position and harps on it incessantly as if it’s the only thing that matters. For
example, “He could have litigated that claim in the first lawsuit.” Under Texas law, unless the
69
claims in the two lawsuits are identical or arise out of the same subject matter, the question as
to whether they could have been litigated in the previous lawsuit is irrelevant. Barr v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992) changed that. As for the 170-
year-old precedent set forth in Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101, 104 (1849), Justice Gonzalez
stated, “If taken literally, this definition of the rule would require that all disputes existing
between parties be joined, regardless of whether the disputes have anything in common.”
22. Even if the excerpt quoted by the Defendants were part of the live pleading in Waller-
1, it would still fail to support a defense of res judicata. The Defendant misrepresents
the intended meaning by taking words out of context. The Defendant’s clip points are
illustrated below by “begin clip” and “end clip.” Notice that the sentence immediately
before the Defendant’s excerpt identifies the subject matter of the Plaintiff’s
statement, which is contraposition to the allegations of misappropriation and stealing
as indicated by the word, “Contrarily.” The sentence immediately after the Defendant’s
excerpt confirms that the Plaintiff’s statement was in rebuttal to the false allegations
that money was missing from Waller Media, LLC due to misappropriation and stealing
by the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff did not handle cash or write checks, so he had no opportunity to
misappropriate or steal money from Waller Media. <begin clip>Contrarily, when cash
was tight, the Plaintiff paid for gasoline for the companies two promotional vehicles and
the engineering truck, purchased parts and equipment, and paid the telephone bills for the
company. Waller, Media owed more than $20,000 of these advances to the Plaintiff, but
never reimbursed him. <end clip>The only missing money was from the Plaintiff’s
pocket.
23. When a law is clear, precise, and unambiguous, it stands to reason that the legislators or judge
who wrote it intended literal interpretation. Even if the Defendants were allowed to claim res
judicata of a pleading which was not in the record of the cause, it still wouldn’t support a
defense of res judicata by applying the Texas rule:
70
Res Judicata – Boolean Hierarchy
(2) (a) the parties in the earlier action are identical to, or
(b) in privity with, the present parties, and
(b) [1] arises out of the same subject matter as the prior claim and
[2] could have been litigated in the previous action.
SOURCE: HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS - No. 01-12-01114-CV. -
7/11/2013
Boolean Formula: (1)&((2)(a)|(2)(b))&((3)(a)|((3)(b)[1]&(3)(b)[2]))
See Veatch, William S. “Artificial Intelligence and Legal Drafting.” ABA Web. 22 April
2019.
(1) There was no prior final determination on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction because the debt would have been against Waller Media, LLC and
Waller Media, LLC was not a defendant in Waller-1. There was no prior final
determination on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction because the
Plaintiff was never allowed to argue the issue or have the benefit of discovery
regarding the issue, therefore (1) is false,
(2) (a) The identity of the parties was not the same. The rule does not state, “some of
the same,” “nearly the same,” “the same with minor exceptions,” “essentially
the same,” or “two of the same;” the rule is, “identical to.” The parties to the
two lawsuits are most certainly not identical, therefore (2)(a) is false,
(b) Privity with regard to the subject matter of Waller-1 would belong to the
Parties’ with interests or rights in connection to the conspiracy to injure
the Plaintiff’s reputation. Waller Media, LLC could not conspire against
the Plaintiff, so Waller Media, LLC was not in privity with the other
parties regarding the subject matter of Waller-1. Privity with regard to the
subject matter of Waller-2 would be those with interests or rights in
connection to the debt owed by Waller Media, LLC to the Plaintiff. Susan
Waller and Dorothy Waller were in privity in their capacities as officers who
who had control of Waller Media, LLC and as beneficiaries of the money which
was owed but never repaid to the Plaintiff, therefore 2(b) is false and since
(2)(a) is also false, (2) is false,
(3) (a) The pending claim of $35,107 is certainly not identical to the $20,000, which
the Defendants asserted was a claim against Waller Media, LLC by the
Plaintiff, therefore 3(a) is false,
(b) [1] The claims in Waller-1 arose from a conspiracy to injure the Plaintiff’s
reputation. The claims in Waller-2 arose from a debt owed by Waller
Media, LLC to the Plaintiff. The claims in the two lawsuits did not
arise from the same subject matter, therefore (3)(b)[1] is false, since
(3)(b)[1] is false, (3)(b)[2] is irrelevant, so (3)(b) is false, since (3)(a) is also
false, (3) is false.
71
24. Regarding the precedent set forth in Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101, 104 (1849), Justice
Gonzalez stated in Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., “If taken literally, this definition of the
rule would require that all disputes existing between parties be joined, regardless of whether
the disputes have anything in common.” The effect of Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. is that
whether a claim could have been litigated in a previous action is predicated on whether
the claim arises out of the same subject matter as the prior claim.
OBJECTIONS
25. Although the Defendants included excerpts and citings from several cases purporting to be the
law regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel, their attempts were misguided, and wholly
incompetent because they relied on fragments of outdated and superseded precedents. Barr v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992) is a landmark Supreme Court
of Texas case in which Justice Gonzalez examined the unpredictable and unacceptable
results of confusing various theories of res judicata. One such theory was the 170-year-old
precedent from Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101, 104 (1849) of which Justice Gonzalez commented,
“If taken literally, this definition of the rule would require that all disputes existing
between parties be joined, regardless of whether the disputes have anything in
common.” Justice Gonzalez analyzed several theories which had resulted in undesirable
results when used by Texas Courts. It was essentially these rejected theories which the
Defendant cited and quoted in his Motion for Summary Judgment as the current state of
Texas law. The Defendant sought to take advantage of the undesirable effects of the various
theories to prejudice the Plaintiff. The point is that a Motion for Summary Judgment based on
superseded precedents, fragments of selected theories, or anything other than the current,
complete, and correct Texas law cannot be competent. Texas law regarding res judicata and
collateral estoppel is no longer confusing and likely to lead to unpredictable results. The
Supreme Court has refined the rules regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel. The res
judicata rule is, however, compound with several Boolean relationships.
26. The Defendant emboldened what he purported to be Texas law regarding res judicata:
res judicata "is not only final as to the matter actually determined, but
as to every other matter which the parties might litigate in the cause,
and which they might have decided." Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101,104
(1849).
That’s the Defendant’s idea of the law, but Justice Gonzalez didn’t agree with
the Defendant. Justice Gonzalez comment regarding the Defendant’s
72
emboldened law was, “If taken literally, this definition of the rule would require
that all disputes existing between parties be joined, regardless of whether the
disputes have anything in common.”
27. Accordingly, Plaintiff objects to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment because they have
based their arguments on misstated, misconstrued and outdated law and incomplete
fragments of several disparate and unrelated theories. Arguments based on misconstrued
versions of law cannot be legally sound. Therefore the Defendants’ affirmative defense of res
judicata and collateral estoppel are not sufficient to warrant summary judgment.
28. In paragraphs 6 and 12 of the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, they used excerpts
from the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition in Cause No. 2016-11-0772 (Waller-1) as grounds
for their defense of res judicata. The Plaintiff objects to the Defendants using the excerpt from
the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition because the Court struck the petition in its entirety
from the Court’s record on February 25, 2019, and the Plaintiff filed his Sixth Amended
Petition on March 4, 2019. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition was no longer
part of the pleading in the record of the cause under Tex. R. Civ. Proc. § 65. The Defendants
attached the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition to their motion for summary judgment, but
that only makes it evidence, it does not restore it to a pleading in the record of the cause. The
issue raised in the statements quoted by the Defendants were not essential to a judgment in
Waller-1. The Plaintiff never had a chance to litigate the issues, and the Court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue because Waller Media, LLC wasn’t a defendant in Waller-1.
The amount mentioned wasn’t the debt owed by Waller Media to the Plaintiff. It was the
amount of credit which the Plaintiff voluntarily and generously extended to Waller Media,
LLC during his employment at Waller Media, LLC.
29. Accordingly, Plaintiff objects to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment because they have
not based their arguments on the pleadings and evidence in Waller-2 and current Texas law,
but on misstated and misconstrued facts, laws, and holdings of courts.
30. The Plaintiff objects to vague, ambiguous, and utterly false grounds for Summary Judgment
such as the Defendant proffered in paragraph 7 of his Motion for Summary Judgment, “The
allegations in this suit are remarkably similar to those asserted in Cause No. 2016-11-
0772, in many, many paragraphs. ” Such a broad and non-specific statement is idle
rhetoric, has no force of law, and no place in a Motion for Summary Judgment. Tex. R.
Civ. Proc. § 166a(c) The motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds
therefor.
73
31. Accordingly, Plaintiff objects to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment because
they have not based their arguments on the live pleadings in Waller-1, but on a
petition which was not in the record of the cause and even then, the Defendants
misstated and misconstrued facts. Therefore the Defendants have failed to support
their affirmative defense of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
CONCLUSION
18. For the movant to be entitled to summary judgment, the grounds for summary judgment must
be supported by the movant's pleadings. See Daniels v. Daniels, 45 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). Thus, an unpleaded affirmative defense cannot serve as the
basis for summary judgment if the nonmovant objects. Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc.,
813 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. 1991); Downs v. Triad-Denton Hosp., L.P., No. 02-05-303-CV (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (memo op.; 3-30-06).
19. Accordingly, plaintiff objects to Defendant's attempt to seek summary judgment on

collateral estoppel because Defendants have not pleaded that defense in their
answer.
20. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on a plaintiff 's cause of action if the defendant
can prove as a matter of law that it has an affirmative defense to the cause of action. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 166a(b), (c); KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015); Long
Distance Int' /, Inc. v. Telefonos de Mex., S.A. de C. V., 49 S.W.3d 347, 350-51 (Tex. 2001). To
meet its burden, the defendant must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact on
any of the elements of the affirmative defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
21. In their motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants asserted the affirmative defense of
res judicata to the Plaintiff’s cause of action for a suit on sworn account.
22. The Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff 's cause of action because
the undisputed facts in this case and the Defendant's summary-judgment evidence do not
conclusively establish each essential element of res judicata. To prevail on the affirmative
defense of res judicata, the Defendant must prove all three of the following elements:
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party is precluded from

litigating a claim in a pending action if:
(2) the parties that litigated the prior claim are identical to, or
74
in privity with the parties litigating the pending claim, and
(3) the pending claim is identical to the prior claim or
arises out of the same subject matter as the prior claim, and
23. The Defendants have asserted an affirmative defense of res judicata. The Defendants are not
entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff 's cause of action because the Defendants only
specific assertion of res judicata relied on the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition which the
Court struck from the record of the cause on February 25, 2019, and superseded by the
Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition on March 4, 2019. Under Tex. R. Civ. Proc. § 65, the
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition was not in the record of the cause. The Defendants
attached a copy of the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition to their Motion for Summary
Judgment, but that only brought it into the cause as evidence, it did not restore it as a
pleading in the record of the cause. The undisputed facts in this case and the Defendant's
summary-judgment evidence do not conclusively establish each essential element of res
judicata.
24. The Defendants have failed to prove even one of the elements of a res judicata defense.
25. The Defendants have asserted an affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. The Defendants
are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff 's cause of action because the undisputed
facts in this case and the Defendant's summary-judgment evidence do not conclusively
establish each essential element of collateral estoppel. To prevail on the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel, the Defendant must prove all three of the following elements:
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party is precluded from raising an

issue in a pending action if in a previous action,
26. The Defendants asserted an affirmative defense of collateral estoppel but gave no specific
instances of issues for which collateral estoppel would apply. Their only pleading regarding
collateral estoppel was, “The allegations in this suit are remarkably similar to those
asserted in Cause No. 2016-11-0772, in many, many paragraphs. ” Such a statement
falls far short of the specificity requirement for Summary Judgment pleadings under Tex.
75
R. Civ. Proc. § 166a(c). The undisputed facts in this case and the Defendant's summary-
judgment evidence do not conclusively establish each essential element of collateral estoppel.
27. The Defendants have failed to prove even one of the elements of a collateral estoppel defense.
28. The Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment asserted the affirmative defense of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, but they have failed to identify any pending claims or issues
of fact which meet all the required elements of their affirmative defenses. Indeed, the
Defendants failed even to identify the elements of their affirmative defenses.
29. The Defendants’ asserted in their Motion that they were entitled to Summary Judgment as a
matter of law, but they failed to show an awareness of current Texas law regarding res
judicata or collateral estoppel, much less attempt to address the individual required elements.
Because the Defendants’ Attorneys have access to advanced legal tools, the only reason for
them to ignore something as rudimentary as the current Texas law is that they couldn’t satisfy
all the elements of their res judicata or collateral estoppel affirmative defenses. They have not
satisfied the required elements of their affirmative defenses. Bad laws applied to bad facts
don’t constitute grounds for summary judgment.
30. Therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
PRAYER
25. For these reasons, Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. If the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the Plaintiff 's objections so they
will be preserved for appeal.

____________________________________
Pro Se
11652 CR 2210
Tyler, TX 75707
bill@wallertec.com
Cell: (903) 253-5555
76
BY EMAIL
I certify that on May 28, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of this document to the


______________________________________________
77
Filed 5/1/2019 6:03 PM
Alison Dotson
District Clerk
Kelly Curry
Cause No. 2019010048

§
§
SUSAN J. WALLER, §
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER
Defendants supplement their prior-filed Answer and show:
1. Defendants incorporate, by reference, for all intents and purposes as
though set forth herein verbatim, their prior-filed Answers.
2. Defendants supplement their prior-filed Answers to assert the
Wherefore, Defendants pray that upon final trial hereof, the Plaintiff have and
take nothing by his suit and that they go hence, with their costs, without day.
Defendants pray for general relief.

_____________________________
L.T. Bradt #02841600
(281) 201-0700
Fax: (281) 201-1202
ltbradt@flash.net
78
ROBERTSON & SMITH

____________________________
JOHN D. SLOAN, JR.
P.O. Drawer 2909

Telephone: 903-757-7000
Facsimile: 903-757-7574
J. WALLER
AMENT PEACOCK

NICHOLAS S. PEACOCK
P.O. Box 751
Telephone: 903-586-3561
Facsimile: 903-586-7338
ATTORNEY F OR DE F E N DAN TS
MEDIA, LLC

79
on May 1, 2016.

L.T. Bradt
80
Filed 5/1/2019 6:07 PM
Alison Dotson
District Clerk
Kelly Curry
Cause No. 2019010048

§
§
SUSAN J. WALLER, §
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(With Notice of Setting)
Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims and show:
SUMMARY OF MOTION:
1. ON May 1, 2019, this court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff
in Cause No. 2016-11-0772.
2. That judgment is res judicata as to every cause of action asserted or that
could have been asserted in this case.
3. Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of res judicata. As a
matter of law, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment that Plaintiff take
nothing by his suit.
UNDISPUTED FACTS:
4. Attached hereto, marked Exhibit A, and incorporated by reference for
the purpose of showing who the parties were in Cause No. 2016-11-0772, is the
Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition in that suit. That pleading shows that the Plaintiff
81
is the same William D. Waller, Jr., who is the plaintiff in this suit. That pleading also
shows that the defendants therein were Susan J. Waller, Alicia G. Waller Tennison
and Dorothy Reid Waller. Susan J. Waller and Dorothy Reid Waller are the same
persons who are defendants in this suit.
5. Attached hereto, marked Exhibit B, and incorporated by reference for
all purposes is the final judgment that the Court granted in Cause No. 2016-11-0772.
6. Attached hereto, marked Exhibit C, and incorporated by reference for
the purpose of showing allegations that were made in Cause No. 2016-11-0772, is a
true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Petition. Therein, in ¶ 21,
Plaintiff, William Waller, Jr., alleged “Contrarily, when cash was tight, the Plaintiff
paid for gasoline for the companies two promotional vehicles and the engineering
truck, purchased parts and equipment, and paid the telephone bills for the company.
Waller, (sic) Media owed more than $20,000 of these advances to the Plaintiff, but
never reimbursed him.” Defendants request the Court to take judicial notice of these
facts as reflected in Plaintiff’s prior pleadings in Cause No. 2016-11-0772.
7. The allegations in this suit are remarkably similar to those asserted in
Cause No. 2016-11-0772, in many, many paragraphs.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES:
8. The Supreme Court of Texas has addressed the problem presented by
this sort of multiplicity of litigation in the concepts of res judicata, collateral estoppel
and claim preclusion.
82
Broadly speaking, res judicata is the generic term for a group of related
concepts concerning the conclusive effects given final judgments.
Puga v. Donna Fruit Company, 634 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1982).
Within this general doctrine, there are two principal categories: (1)
claim preclusion (also known as res judicata); and (2) issue preclusion
(also known as collateral estoppel). Res judicata, or claims preclusion,
prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been
finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of
diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit. Gracia v. RC
Cola-7-Up Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. 1984);
Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W. 2d 816, 818 (Tex.
1984). Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents relitigation of
particular issues already resolved in a prior suit. * * *
Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985). The policies behind the
vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court decisions, promote
judicial economy and prevent double recovery. (citation omitted)
The question that has given courts the most difficulty is
determining what claims should have been litigated in the prior suit.
Early on, this Court held that res judicata “is not only final as to the
matter actually determined, but as to every other matter
which the parties might litigate in the cause, and which they
might have decided.” Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101, 104 (1849). We
have never repudiated this definition of claim preclusion and it appears
in some form of most definitions of res judicata. See, e.g., Jeanes v.
Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985) (res judicata bars not
only what was actually litigated but also claims that could have been
litigated in the original cause of action). [bold emphasis supplied]
Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992).
9. Following Barr, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adoption of the
“transactional approach” to res judicata.
Under this approach, a judgment in an earlier suit “precludes a second

action by the parties and their privies not only on matters actually
litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the
same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first
suit.”
83
Getty Oil Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 845 S.W.2d
794, 798 (Tex. 1992).
10. Claim preclusion prevents splitting a cause of action. Jeanes v.
Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex.1985). The policies behind the doctrine
reflect the need to bring all litigation to an end, prevent vexatious litigation, maintain
stability of court decisions, promote judicial economy, and prevent double recovery.
11. A trial court’s judgment is final for purposes of res judicata or collateral
estoppel even while the case is on appeal. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724
S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.1986).
12. As shown by his Fourth Amended Petition, Plaintiff had every
opportunity to sue in Cause No. 2016-11-0772 for the money that he has now (again)
alleged that Waller Media owes him. But, courtesy of the summary judgment that
this Court has rendered in Cause No. 2016-11-0772, that claim and all others that
were finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence,
should have been litigated in the prior suit. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837
S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992).
13. Defendants therefore move for summary judgment that Plaintiff take
nothing by his claims against them.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER:
14. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. Therefore, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff have and take
84
nothing by his suit against them.
15. Defendants pray that the Court grant them summary judgment that
Plaintiff have and take nothing against them. Defendants pray for general relief.

_____________________________
L.T. Bradt #02841600
(281) 201-0700
Fax: (281) 201-1202
ltbradt@flash.net

ROBERTSON & SMITH

____________________________
JOHN D. SLOAN, JR.
P.O. Drawer 2909

Telephone: 903-757-7000
Facsimile: 903-757-7574
J. WALLER
AMENT PEACOCK
85
NICHOLAS S. PEACOCK
P.O. Box 751
Telephone: 903-586-3561
Facsimile: 903-586-7338
ATT OR N E Y F OR D E F ENDANTS
MEDIA, LLC

on May 1, 2019.

L.T. Bradt
NOTICE OF SETTING
Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment will be heard by the Court on
June 4, 2019, at 9:00 o’clock a.m..
_____________________________
UNSWORN DECLARATION UNDER PENALTIES OF PERJURY
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 132.001
86
et seq., I declare under penalties of perjury that my name is Leonard Thomas Bradt.
I am also known as L.T. “Butch” Bradt. I am over the age of 18 years, and am
competent to make this declaration. My date of birth is January 23, 1952. My
address is 14090 Southwest Freeway, Suite 300 Sugar Land, Texas 77478. This
document is not a lien required to be filed with a county clerk, an instrument
concerning real or personal property required to be filed with a county clerk, or an
oath of office or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a
notary public. I have not been forced to sign this declaration. I declare that under
the penalties of perjury that the documents that are attached to the Motion for
Summary Judgment as Exhibits are true and correct copies of the documents
referred to.
Signed on May 1, 2019.

______________________________
L.T. Bradt
87
EXHIBIT A
88
Filed 3/4/2019 3:28 PM
Alison Dotson
District Clerk
Bill Waller
11652 CR 2210
Kelly Curry
Tyler, TX 75707
bill@wallertec.com
(903) 253-5555
March 4, 2019
Alison Dotson
Cherokee County District Clerk
135 South Main St. #2
Rusk, TX 75785
Re: Request for Subpoena
Dear Mrs. Dotson,
Please accept my Sixth Amended Original Petition and Authorities for filing.
Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.
If you have questions, you may contact me anytime on my cell phone or by email.
Yours sincerely,
Bill Waller
89
CAUSE NO. 2016-11-0772
Plaintiff § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
v. §
SUSAN J. WALLER, §
ALICIA G. WALLER TENNISON, §
and § OF CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS
DOROTHY REID WALLER. §
Defendants §
PLAINTIFF’S SIXTH AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION AND AUTHORITIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
Plaintiff William D. Waller Jr. submits this Fifth Amended Original Petition and complaining
of Defendants Susan J. Waller; Alicia G. Tennison; and Dorothy Reid Waller, Defendants
(collectively known as Defendants) and for cause would show as follows.
I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN
1. Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery under Level 3.
II. PARTIES
2. William D. Waller, Jr. (Bill Waller) - Mr. Waller is an individual residing in Smith
County, Texas. Plaintiff may be served at 11652 CR 2210, Tyler, Texas 75707 or by
email at bill@wallertec.com.
3. Susan (Susan) Waller - Ms. Waller is an individual residing in Cherokee County

Texas. Ms. Waller may be served through her attorney of record, John Sloan.
4. Alicia G. Tennison - Mrs. Tennison is an individual residing in Cherokee County

Texas. Mrs. Tennison may be served through her attorney of record, Ricky Richards.
5. Dorothy Reid Waller - Mrs. Waller is an individual residing in Cherokee County,

Texas. Mrs. Waller may be served through her attorney of record, Nicholas Peacock.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Sixth Amended Original Petition Page 1 of 15

90
6. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit, and the amount in
controversy exceeds this Court's minimum jurisdictional limits.
7. Venue is proper in Cherokee County, Texas because suit for damages for libel and/or
slander shall be brought and can only be maintained in the county in which the
plaintiff resided at the time of filing suit, or in the county of the residence of the
defendants, or the domicile of any corporate defendant, at the election of Plaintiff. Tex.
Civ. Prac. and Rem. Code §§ 15.007 and 15.002.
IV. RULE 47 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
8. Pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure § 47 Claims for Relief:
a. The Plaintiff brings causes of action for
1) Libel and Slander (Defamation) per se and per quod,

2) Invasion of Privacy (Public disclosure of private facts),
3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
4) Civil Conspiracy.
b. The damages sought by the Plaintiff are within the jurisdictional limits of the
court.
c. Plaintiff is seeking:
5) monetary relief over $1,000,000.00 and
d. Plaintiff demands judgment for all the other relief to which the Plaintiff deems
himself entitled.
V. DEFINITIONS
9. Aliases, Pseudonyms, and Definitions
a. Alicia – Alicia G. Tennison

b. Dorothy – Dorothy Waller
c. Susan – Susan Waller
d. Defendants – all three defendants including Susan J. Waller, Alicia G. Tennison,
and Dorothy Reid Waller
e. Defamation – Libel and/or slander
f. DPA – Durable General Power of Attorney
g. JPD – Jacksonville Police Department
h. JPD Video – AXON Body 2 Vest Camera video recorded on August 1, 2016, by
Officers of the Jacksonville Police Department at the Waller Media Offices and in
91
the south driveway of Dorothy Waller’s home.
i. JPD-02, JPD-04, JPD-05, JPD-06, JPD-07 – JPD Video files and transcripts
j. Media Event – an event intended primarily to attract publicity.
k. Entities – Waller Media, LLC or the collection of business entities owned by
Dorothy Waller, Waller Media, LLC, Waller Broadcasting, Inc., and Waller
Properties, Inc.
l. Waller Media – Waller Media, LLC or the collection of business entities owned by
Properties, Inc.
VI. FACTUAL SUMMARY
General Denial of Defendant’s Allegations
10. The defendant’s allegations of criminal misconduct against the Plaintiff are
preposterous, vague, non-specific, unsubstantiated, baseless, utterly false, contrived
with malicious intent, for the purpose of the defendants enriching themselves, and for
their sadistic pleasure. The Plaintiff’s scope of responsibilities, privileges, and control
within the framework of Waller Media’s structure and organization were not
consistent with the misappropriation or theft of which he has been accused. The
Plaintiff did not handle money or write checks, and the Waller Media double-entry
accrual accounting systems were competently maintained by the Waller Media
Business Manager according to GAAP (non-standard procedures may represent an
attempt to conceal fraud), bank statements were reconciled monthly, all transactions
were properly described, and that there was no money missing from Waller Media.
The Plaintiff absolutely and unequivocally denies any and all allegations that he has
stolen, misappropriated, mismanaged, had a plan to take his mother’s money, made
death threats against anyone, got kicked out of the Marine Corps, or did anything else
but provided Waller Media with honest, diligent, and competent service.
The Gist of Defamatory The Conduct
11. Susan Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Dorothy Waller participated in a conspiracy to
brutally, viciously, criminally, and with focused intent, to assassinate the Plaintiff’s
character and destroy his professional reputation in the radio broadcast industry in
which the Plaintiff had invested and served honorably for almost 40 years.
92
12. The defendant’s circulated slanderous and libelous content against the Plaintiff in
Facebook Postings, SMS text messages, private Facebook messages, telephone
conversations, and the many meetings between Defendants and prospective buyers of
the Waller Media radio stations.
13. The defendants coordinated telephone tag teams and mustered quorums of
corroborators to instill a common interest of hatred for the Plaintiff. The Defendants
aligned their followers against a common enemy, the Plaintiff.
14. Susan Waller had more than 1,000 facebook followers, and the Plaintiff was not one of
them, so he had to rely on concerned parties who forwarded the posts and photographs
to him. To deny the Plaintiff of evidence against her, Susan used the “hit and run”
Facebook tactic of allowing just enough time for her followers to see the postings
before deleting them after they had done their damage.
15. Among the defamatory statements circulated by the Defendants was that the Plaintiff
a. had stolen millions of dollars from Waller Media, LLC;

b. had an elaborate mastermind plan to take all his mother’s money;
c. had organized a walkout in an attempted to force his mother to give him her radio
stations;
d. was volatile, crazy, and would do anything;
e. had sabotaged the Waller Media towers;
f. had been kicked out of the Marine Corps for homosexual conduct;
g. had misappropriated money from Waller Media;
h. had misappropriated money from Dorothy Waller;
i. had made death threats against Dorothy Waller and others;
j. had threatened to kill Susan Waller;
k. was responsible for ten million dollars that were missing;
l. was responsible for many fraudulent charges; and
m. had committed other crimes involving moral turpitude.
16. The Defendants have made many allegations of criminal conduct against the Plaintiff
but have not and cannot produce a scintilla of evidence to prove their allegations.
Below are just a few examples of the Defendants’ allegations which impute crimes
involving moral turpitude and cast the Plaintiff as unfit to serve his profession and are
93
therefore defamatory per se.
a. An SMS message from Susan Waller to Rhonda Parsons began, “I guess you heard
Bill’s been stealing.”
b. In JPD-02 at line 90, Susan Waller told a JPD Officer, “He’s taken millions out of
it.” (meaning Waller Media)
c. In JPD-05 at line 29, Alicia Tennison stated, “They have been brainwashed by My
Brother. My Brother. I’ll tell you this. Here’s the deal. There are ten million
dollars gone. Ten million dollars . . .”
d. In his response to OSHA, Nick Peacock stated, “Dorothy began to discover that
Bill was misappropriating money from both her and the company.”
e. In JPD-05 at line 62, Alicia stated, “he had signed several things over to him
without her signature or her knowledge and she, not knowing that he’s taking her
for her last dime . . .”
f. In JPD-05 at line 64, Alicia stated, “Ricky Richards said, all those would have been
sent to you, you know, you should have seen that and he had all that put back in
his name and she never saw one of those so he could buy that building off the
courthouse steps you know cheaply . . .”
17. The evidence will show that the defendants made certain criminal allegations against
the Plaintiff with enough specificity to imply they had a basis in fact. If the defendants
can not or will not provide a factual basis for their allegations, it is reasonable to
conclude that their allegations were made falsely and with malicious intent.
a. Susan Waller - In Clarissa Ochoa’s incident report dated June 10, 2016, according
to Clarissa, Susan stated that she had discovered that the Plaintiff was the cause
of many fraudulent charges.
b. Susan Waller – In JPD-02, Susan Waller states many times that the employees
threatened to quit in a letter which she and Phil Shinalt both said Ricky Richards
had. Phil Shinalt even offered to get the letter from Mr. Richards office.
Accordingly, either
1) Susan Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Nick Peacock falsely claimed that there
was such a letter with the intent to defraud, or
2) the letter has been concealed to obstruct justice.
c. Dorothy Waller – In Nick Peacock’s August 23, 2016 response to OSHA, he stated,
94
“Dorothy began to discover that Bill was misappropriating money from both her
and the company.
d. Alicia Tennison – In the video JPD-05, Alicia stated my brother, I’ll tell you this,
there are ten million dollars missing.
18. In JPD-05, Alicia Tennison claimed, “My brother, I’ll tell ya. Here’s the deal. There are
ten million dollars missing. Ten million dollars and a $400,000 debt.” Alicia Tennison
knew her statement was untrue because:
a. she offered no proof or basis in fact;

b. Dudley and Dorothy Waller never had ten million dollars net worth;
c. the disposition of Dorothy and Dudley Waller’s funds is recorded in banking
transactions and therefore not missing;
d. much of the “so-called” missing money can be attributed to disbursements made
for the exclusive benefit of Susan Waller and Alicia Tennison, which Alicia knows
or should know about;
e. other disbursements of significant amounts are well known to members of the
Waller family;
f. money spent by Susan Waller and Alicia Tennison or for some other known reason
couldn’t have been stolen by the Plaintiff.
MEDIA EVENT TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL PROMINENCE
19. Susan Waller and Alicia Tennison had been spreading rumors portraying the Plaintiff
as a brainwashing cult leader who had stolen millions of dollars from his mother, but
there was still skepticism. All they needed was a police raid on Waller media to give
the story some real credibility and make a sensational gossip line. “Police Raid on
Waller Media. Bill Waller Fired. Ten million dollars missing. He took his mother’s last
dime.” Injecting a police raid into the rumor mill would ingrain an indelible image of
the Plaintiff as a despicable and loathsome crook in the public eye. The facts in
evidence will corroborate every facet of this meticulous plan by the Defendants to
orchestrate a media event, including the name they gave the operation, “SHOCK AND
AWE” in their Facebook posts.
a. On the morning of August 1, 2016, Susan Waller and Phil Shinalt left a side door
open and then circled the Waller Media Offices at a distance, waiting in ambush

95
for the Plaintiff and the employees to enter the building.
b. When Susan Waller and Phil Shinalt saw that some employees had entered the
building, Susan went to the Jacksonville Police Department and made a false
report. She claimed that the employees had all received letters on Friday
afternoon (July 29, 2016) notifying them that their employment was terminated
and that they were not to enter the building. She told the officer that the
employees had now broken into the building, that they were criminally
trespassing, and that they wouldn’t leave.
c. After Susan made her report to the officer, the plan seemed to stall, but then:
From JPD-02
20 Officer: I mean, if that’s what it takes to keep. I mean if you’ve got power of attorney and
21 they don’t want to abide by it then you may have to hire a security guard.
22 Susan: Okay. [long pause] Guess I’ll call a lawyer.
23 Susan: Hey Angela would you tell Ricky that the employees won’t leave and that Bill has been
23 served by Rodney, and he’s still loitering around down there at the radio station? Okay.
24 Okay. Hey, Ricky, Bill was served this Morning [video ends]
d. Within a few minutes, the plan was back in motion.

e. Four police cruisers were deployed and moved into line formation across the street
from the Waller Media Offices.
f. Just half a block from the busiest intersection in 25 miles, the Waller Media
employees and the Plaintiff still in shock, stood outside the building as four JPD
Officers moved in to secure the scene.
g. Hundreds of cars passed by the eye-catching spectacle; the formation of cruisers,
uniformed police officers, and Waller Media employees standing on the sidewalk.
h. The event was a success for the Defendants and a disaster for the Plaintiff. Local
television stations, the Tyler newspaper, industry trade magazines publicized the
story. Most significantly, it would be the dominant topic of discussion for the
1,000+ broadcasters who were to attend the Texas Association of Broadcasters
Annual Convention coming up in just seven days.
Defamatory Frame-up of the Plaintiff
20. On July 27, 2016, the Waller Media employees delivered a letter to Dorothy Waller
reporting OSHA violations. From JPD-02 and statements made by Alicia Tennison

96
and Nick Peacock in telephone conversations, it is evident that the defendants altered
said letter by adding, “If you don’t turn the radio stations over to Bill Waller by Friday
at 9:00 AM, we will quit, we will walk out.” The Defendants had committed forgery
and fraud so that they could allege the Plaintiff had attempted extortion, a violation of
the Hobbs Act, against his mother. It was libel per se.
21. In JPD-05, Alicia stated that on July 29, 2016, she presented the letter to Ricky
Richards and that upon reading the letter Mr. Richards advised Dorothy and family,
“There is no question in my mind that this is an elaborate mastermind plan by Bill to
take all your mother’s money.” “You have got to get him, out of there.” “They are all
in.” “Fire them all.” According to Susan Waller, Mr. Richards drafted the letter
terminating the Plaintiff’s employment.
22. The Plaintiff found out about the forgery plot after the media event on August 1, 2016,
in a phone conversation with Nick Peacock. After Mr. Peacock had quoted the falsified
content of the letter, the Plaintiff asked Mr. Peacock if he could read that statement.
Mr. Peacock replied, “I have the letter. I read the letter, and those were their exact
words.” The Plaintiff informed Mr. Peacock that the real letter from the employees
contained no such wording and that the letter he had was a forgery.
23. The Defendant’s character assassination plot against the Plaintiff involved felony
violations under Title 18 of the U.S. Code and Texas Penal Code.
a. The July 27, 2016 letter from the employees of Waller Media reported OSHA
violations and was therefore protected under Section 11(c) of the Osh Act.
b. The alteration of the letter falsified evidence in federal jurisdiction.
c. The alteration created a fraudulent pretext for firing the Waller Media employees
in circumvention of Section 11(c) of the OSH Act.
d. The alteration was intended to create a fraudulent defense to claims of retaliation
in a conspiracy to interfere with or obstruct a federal investigation.
e. The alteration of the letter was a deception intended to secure the execution of a
letter terminating the Plaintiff’s employment. Securing execution of documents by
deception is a violation of Tex. Penal Code § 32.46.
f. By knowingly concealing felony forgery and fraud by their clients, Mr. Richards
and Mr. Peacock aided and abetted and became participants in a criminal

97
conspiracy to destroy the Plaintiff’s reputation. See Exceptions to Lawyer-Client
Privilege in Tex. R. Evid 503(d)(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud.
24. There is no question that the advice given by Ricky Richards to Dorothy Waller and
family proximately caused the termination of the Plaintiff’s employment. Susan
Waller and Alicia Tennison repeated Mr. Richards advice as they circulated it among
the broadcasters they entertained and others. Mr. Richards advice to Dorothy and
family became the Defendants’ bona fide proof that the Plaintiff was a scoundrel and a
thief. Mr. Richards legitimized and gave credibility to the Defendants’ false
allegations.
25. After meeting with Dorothy, Susan, and Alicia, Dave Garland, a prominent media
broker from Houston said to the Plaintiff, “Your days in radio are over.” The Plaintiff
asked Mr. Garland if people believed all of Susan’s stories. Mr. Garland responded, “It
doesn’t matter. There are plenty of younger men looking for jobs, and nobody wants to
take a chance.”
VII. CAUSES OF ACTION
26. All previous allegations are incorporated herein by reference
A. CAUSE OF ACTION - LIBEL AND SLANDER
27. The Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., is a private individual and is neither a public
official nor a public figure for any purpose.
28. Defendants are all non-media defendants.
29. The defamatory statements made and published by Defendants were statements of
fact that were false, both in their particular details and in their main point, essence, or
gist in the context in which they were made.
30. The defamatory statements made and published by Defendants directly or indirectly
referred to the Plaintiff.
31. The defamatory statements made and published by Defendants were libelous per se
and slanderous per se because they injured the Plaintiff’s reputation and have exposed
the Plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, and/or financial injury.

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32. The defamatory statements made and published by the Defendants were libelous per
se and slanderous per se because they impeach the Plaintiff’s honesty, integrity,
virtue, and/or reputation.
33. The defamatory statements made and published by the Defendants were libelous per
se and slanderous per se to the extent they falsely charged the Plaintiff with the
commission of crimes.
34. In the alternative, the defamatory statements made and published by the Defendants
were libelous and/or slanderous through innuendo and/or implication.
35. Defendants are strictly liable for the damages caused by the libel and slander.
36. Alternatively, Defendants knew the defamatory statements were false, or the
Defendants were reckless with regard to whether the statements of fact were false.
37. Alternatively, Defendants should have known the defamatory statements were false.
38. The Plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages, general damages, assumed
damages, special damages, and/or exemplary damages.
B. CAUSE OF ACTION – CIVIL CONSPIRACY
39. The Defendants entered into a conspiracy to destroy the Plaintiff’s character by
slander and libel (defamation) for their enrichment and sadistic pleasure. The
Defendants committed forgery and falsification of evidence to frame the Plaintiff in an
extortion plot. Susan Waller, Alicia Tennison, Dorothy Waller, Ricky Richards, Nick
Peacock, and others known and unknown acted in concert to conceal the crimes,
obstruct justice and deprive the Plaintiff of due process of law. There was a meeting of
the minds of the Defendants to destroy the Plaintiff’s public and professional
reputation. The Defendants used unlawful means. The Plaintiff was proximately
damaged as a result of the Defendants’ conspiracy to destroy his character.
a. Susan Waller - the dominant member and the most outspoken.

b. Alicia Tennison –Alicia was steadfast in her support of Susan Waller’s objectives,
attending many meetings both by phone and in person with members of the
broadcast community who were the prospective buyers of the Waller Media radio
stations. Susan used the meetings as a platform to spread false rumors about the

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Plaintiff and Alicia’s presence, and solidarity gave Susan credibility she otherwise
wouldn’t have had.
c. Dorothy Waller – played a significant and crucial role in the conspiracy by
funding, empowering, enabling, and supporting the Susan Waller and Alicia
Tennison. Had Dorothy not given Susan control of Waller Media and Waller
Broadcasting, Susan wouldn’t have had a reason to associate with broadcasters.
C. CAUSE OF ACTION - INVASION OF PRIVACY

Public Disclosure of Private Information
40. The Plaintiff had every reason to expect that his workstation would remain private
and secure at the Waller Media Offices. The Plaintiff’s expectation of privacy was
based on:
a. The Plaintiff’s computer was his personal property.

b. The Plaintiff’s computer was password protected.
c. The Plaintiff’s email accounts were password protected, and the Plaintiff had
exclusive control of those passwords.
d. The Plaintiff had two email accounts which were breached. One was a Waller
Media company email account, and the other was a gmail account.
e. The Plaintiff’s computer was kept in the engineering office which was locked with
an electronic door lock which Plaintiff had provided.
f. The Plaintiff’s computer contained more than ten years of personal and private
information including personal identifying information, federal income tax
returns, credit information, credit card statements, bank statements, personal
health information, medical records, personal correspondence, personal email, and
personal journals. Anyone would have known that this was personal and not
company information.
g. The Plaintiff was the IT Manager of Waller Media with complete charge of the
company’s computer systems, software, and email.
h. Waller Media was owned by the Plaintiff’s parents who had never interfered with
the IT Management of the company, the computers, or email accounts.
i. The Plaintiff had no reason to expect that his computer would be confiscated and
that his computer and email would be hacked to breach password security.

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41. On August 1, 2016, Susan Waller confiscated the Plaintiff’s computer and breached its
password security in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 33.02 Breach of Computer
Security. Susan Waller had no legitimate reason to access the Plaintiff’s personal and
private information, and it was easily recognizable as such. With malice and intent to
embarrass, humiliate, and cause harm to the Plaintiff, Susan Waller invited her house
guests, including Rob Gregg, who had no connection to Waller Media, to rummage
through the Plaintiff’s private and personal files for their amusement. The
indiscriminate public exposure of the Plaintiff’s personal and private information
proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff.
D. CAUSE OF ACTION - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS
42. Plaintiff continues to suffer severe emotional distress because of Defendants’ extreme
and outrageous conduct. Defendants intentionally and/or recklessly made statements
that were calculated and intended to harm the Plaintiff. The Defendants meticulously
planned and orchestrated their attack on the Plaintiff to have maximum destructive
impact on the Plaintiff’s reputation, to humiliate and embarrass him, and to blacklist
in his profession. The Plaintiff’s emotional distress has been severe. Examples of the
Defendants’ outrageous allegations and actions include, but are not limited to:
a. The Plaintiff is responsible for ten million dollars that are missing.
b. The Plaintiff has stolen millions of dollars from Waller Media.
c. The Plaintiff had an elaborate mastermind plan to take all his mother’s money.
d. The Plaintiff made death threats on his mother and others.
e. The Plaintiff mismanaged Waller Media and bankrupted it.
f. The Plaintiff was kicked out of the Marine Corps for homosexual conduct.
g. Egregiously, the Defendants falsified a July 27, 2016 letter from the employees of
Waller Media, LLC reporting OSHA violations to Dorothy Waller to frame the
Plaintiff in an extortion plot to force his mother to give him her radio stations.
43. The Defendants acted intentionally and recklessly. Their conduct was extreme and
outrageous. Their actions caused the Plaintiff emotional distress. The Plaintiff’s
emotional distress was severe. The Defendants’ actions proximately caused harm to
the Plaintiff.

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VIII. REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE
44. Pursuant to Rule 194 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff requests that
Defendants disclose, within the time required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
IX. DAMAGES
45. All previous allegations are incorporated herein by reference.
46. Plaintiff respectfully requests the following damages to be considered separately and
individually to determine the sum of money that will fairly and reasonably
compensate him:
a. The loss of reputation and character the Plaintiff has suffered in the past and will
continue to suffer in the future;
b. The mental anguish Plaintiff has suffered in the past and will continue to suffer in
the future; and
c. The loss of any earnings sustained by Plaintiff in the past, and in the loss or
reduction of Plaintiff’s earning capacity in the future;
47. Plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages within the jurisdictional limits of this court.
Respondeat Superior
48. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, Mr. Richards was acting as an agent of
Susan Waller, and Alicia Tennison in the course and scope of client representation and
therefore Susan Waller and Alicia Waller assume vicarious liability for Mr. Richards’
actions. Likewise, Mr. Peacock was acting as an agent of Dorothy Waller and Waller
Media in the course and scope of client representation, and therefore Dorothy Waller
must assume vicarious liability for the actions of Mr. Peacock.
49. Susan Waller and Alicia Tennison were acting as agents on behalf of Dorothy Waller
who had empowered and enabled Susan Waller by power of attorney and who had
funded Susan and Alicia and paid their legal fees. Therefore Dorothy Waller assumes
vicarious liability for the actions of Susan Waller and Alicia Tennison to the extent
that they were acting as her agents.

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Corporate Disregard
50. On August 1, 2016, the business entities owned by Dorothy Waller, including Waller
Media, LLC, and Waller Broadcasting, Inc., and Waller Properties, Inc., herein
referred to as “entities” ceased business operations and came under the exclusive
control of Dorothy Waller through her agent, Susan Waller. Under 100% unity of
interest and control, with no employees and no ongoing business operations, the
entities became the alter egos of Dorothy Waller through her agent, Susan Waller.
51. Plaintiff also contends that Dorothy Waller through her agent, Susan Waller, has
transferred the assets of Waller Media, LLC, Waller Broadcasting, Inc., and Waller
Properties, Inc. out of those entities leaving them insolvent and unable to meet their
obligations to creditors in violation of Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 24.005 Transfers
Fraudulent as to Present and Future Creditors.
52. If the Court determines that any or all of the entities are liable for damages to the
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff requests that the Court disregard the corporate and/or LLC
fictions under either the alter ego theory or to prevent the perpetuation of injustice
pursuant to Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.223(b), This rule also applies to limited liability
companies under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.002(a). The Doctrine of Corporate
Disregard under the alter ego theory or to prevent injustice is well established in
Texas Courts. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986).
Recover From Defendants Jointly and Severally
53. Plaintiff seeks to recover of and from Defendants, jointly and severally, all his actual,
special and exemplary damages as well as his attorney fees, costs of court, along with
pre and post-judgment interest and all other relief to which he is entitled.
Exemplary Damages
54. The Plaintiff suffered actual damages which resulted from fraud, malice, and gross
negligence of the Defendants. The defendants have exceeded the threshold of
Exemplary Damages under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.003.
55. The Plaintiff asserts the exclusion of the Limitations on the Amount of Recovery under
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008 under Id. 41.008(c) because the Defendants

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violated Tex. Penal Code §§ 32.21 Forgery (first degree), and 32.46 Securing execution
of documents by deception (first degree) which resulted in the injuries for which the
Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages.
X. CLAIM
56. The Maximum Amount of damages sought by the Plaintiff, at this time, will be
$25,000,000.00.
XI. JURY DEMAND
57. Plaintiff DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY and has submitted the appropriate fee.
XII. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
58. All conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred as required by TEXAS
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54.
XIII. PRAYER
59. WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff William Dudley Waller, Jr. asks
that the Court issue citation for each Defendant appear and answer, and that Plaintiff
is awarded a judgment against Defendants for the following:
a. Actual Damages,
b. Special Damages,
c. Exemplary damages,
d. Prejudgment interest,
e. Postjudgment interest,
f. Court costs, and
g. Such further relief, both general and special, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff
may show himself to be justly entitled.

______________________________________
Pro Se
11652 CR 2210
Tyler, TX 75707
bill@wallertec.com
Cell: (903) 253-5555

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AUTHORITIES
I. DEFAMATION
LIBEL
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem § 73.001. ELEMENTS OF LIBEL. A libel is a defamation expressed in
written or other graphic form that
a. tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living person's
reputation and thereby
b. expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach
any person's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or
c. to publish the natural defects of anyone and thereby expose the person to public hatred,
ridicule, or financial injury.
SLANDER
Slander is a defamatory statement that is orally communicated or published to a third person

without legal excuse.
Diaz v. Rankin, 777 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ);
Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).
PER SE
Statements are defamatory per se if they:
(1) unambiguously charge a crime, dishonesty, fraud, rascality, or general depravity or
(2) that are falsehoods that injure one in his office, business, profession, or occupation.
Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 Tex. Supreme Court 2002
Main v. Royall, 348 S.W.3d 318, 390 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). It is up to Texas courts’
interpretation of what statements are considered defamatory per se.
Authorities - Sixth Amended Original Petition Page 1 of 8

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REFRENCES TO OPPOSING COUNSEL IN PETITION
Ricky Richards and Nick Peacock made and/or propagated false allegations which proximately
injured the Plaintiff. They did so on behalf of their clients who are not shielded by attorney
immunity. The Defendants assume vicarious liability for the actions of their attorneys acting in
the course, scope, and authority of legal representation. It is no more proper to prohibit a Plaintiff
from claiming injury proximately caused by an attorney than it would be to prohibit a prosecutor
from mentioning a weapon used in an armed robbery.
PRIVILEGE
Tex. R. Evid. 503 Lawyer-Client Privilege
(b) Rules of Privilege
(2) Special Rule in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case, a client has a privilege to
prevent a lawyer or lawyer’s representative from disclosing any other fact that came
to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative by reason of the
attorney–client relationship.
(d) Exceptions
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the lawyer’s services were sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably
should have known to be a crime or fraud.
Tex. R. Evid. 508. Informer’s Identity Privilege
(b) Who May Claim.The privilege may be claimed by an appropriate representative of the
public entity to which the informer furnished the information.
Tex. R. Evid. 511. Waiver by Voluntary Disclosure
(a) General Rule. A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure
waives the privilege if:
(1) the person or predecessor of the person while holder of the privilege voluntarily
discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter
unless such disclosure itself is privileged.
(2) the person or a representative of the person calls a person to whom privileged
communications have been made to testify as to the person’s character or character
trait insofar as such communications are relevant to such character or character trait.

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Gist of Defamatory Impression
Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, Tex: Supreme Court 2000
Defendants also cite Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.1994). In Cain we rejected the false
light tort because it largely duplicated defamation without that more established tort's procedural
and substantive safeguards. See id. at 579-80. Cain did not limit a plaintiff's right to claim
defamation from the whole of a publication; it merely prevented such a plaintiff from bringing a
false light claim. Unlike false light, a plaintiff claiming defamation based on a publication as a
whole must prove that the publication's "gist" is false and defamatory and that the publication is
not otherwise privileged. See id.at 581-84 (delineating the differences between false light and
defamation). We therefore reject KTRK's argument and hold that a plaintiff can bring a claim for
defamation when discrete facts, literally or substantially true, are published in such a way that
they create a substantially false and defamatory impression by omitting material facts or
juxtaposing facts in a misleading way. We thus disapprove of the language of these court of
appeals cases to the extent that they hold or suggest otherwise.
American Broad. Cos. v. Gill, 6 S.W.3d 19, 43 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied);
Evans v. Dolcefino, 116*116 986 S.W.2d 69, 78 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.);
KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes, 981 S.W.2d 779, 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet.
denied);
Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 943 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1997, no writ).
II. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
a. the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;

b. the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous;
c. the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and
d. the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe.
Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex.1993).
III. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
Elements of Public Disclosure of Private Information
a. publicity was given to matters concerning his or her private life;

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b. the publication of these facts would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities; and
c. the matter publicized was not of legitimate public concern.
IV. CIVIL CONSPIRACY

a. two or more persons,
b. an object to be accomplished,
c. a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action,
d. one or more unlawful, overt acts, and
e. damages as the proximate result.
Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983)
Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 675 (Tex. 1998)
V. GENERAL
Tex. Civ. Prac. And Rem. 16.068 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. If a
filed pleading relates to a cause of action, cross action, counterclaim, ordefense that is not subject
to a plea of limitation when the pleading is filed, a subsequent amendment or supplement to the
pleading that changes the facts or grounds of liability or defense is not subject to a plea of
limitation unless the amendment or supplement is wholly based on a new, distinct, or different
transaction or occurrence.
VI. VIDEO EVIDENCE
The video recordings described herein are submitted pursuant to the Texas Rules of Evidence Rule
803(8) Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay – Regardless of Whether the Declarant is Available
as a Witness.
a. The video was released under the Tex. Gov’t Code Section 552.022.
b. The Tex. Gov’t Code Sections 552.101 Informant’s Privilege and 552.108 Law
Enforcement, Corrections, and Prosecutorial Information relate to whether
information should be released and are not applicable to admissibility.
c. The video recordings are public records of the Jacksonville Texas Police Department.
d. The video recordings were made in the course and scope of official responsibilities as
officers of the Jacksonville Texas Police Department.
e. The video recordings were made pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report.
f. The video recordings set forth factual findings resulting from an investigation made
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Cause No. 2016-11-0772
pursuant to authority granted by law.
g. The equipment used was AXON Body 2 Vest Cameras by Taser International, widely
considered to be the best available.
h. The operators were in all respects properly trained and qualified to do the recording.
i. The witnesses providing testimony in the video recordings are identified and available for
cross-examination.
j. The video recordings are an accurate reproduction of the events on the morning of August
1, 2016 at the Waller Media Offices and the driveway of Dorothy Waller’s home in
Jacksonville, Texas.
k. The JPD video recordings from August 1, 2016 may be authenticated pursuant to Tex. R.
Evid. 901(b) Distinctive Characteristics.
l. The JPD video recordings fall under the exceptions to the rule against hearsay in Tex. R.
Evid 803(a)(1)(A).
VII. HEARSAY
Tex. R. Evid. 801(d) “Hearsay” means a statement that a party offers in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement.
a. Conclusion: A statement offered in evidence only to prove it was said, but not to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement is not hearsay.
NOT HEARSAY
Tex. R. Evid 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay—Regardless of Whether the
Declarant is Available as a Witness
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is
available as a witness:
(a) Public Records. A record or statement of public office if:
(1) it sets out:

(A) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a
criminal case, a matter observed by law enforcement personnel;
(B) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings
from a legally authorized investigation; and
(2) the opponent fails to demonstrate that the source of information or other
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

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AUTHENTICATION AND ADMISSIBILITY
Tex. R. Evid. 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence
(b) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all
the circumstances.
Mirola v. State, Tex: Court of Appeals, 7th Dist 2015
“. . . the ability of the trial court to identify the individuals and their voices by seeing those
individuals and hearing their voices in such a way as to be able to connect the voices with the
alleged speakers, the trial court had before it sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence that
the DVD was, in fact, what the State purported it to be: a copy of the original recording of the
stop and arrest . . .”
Tex. Gov’t. Code SUBCHAPTER B. RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION.
Tex. Gov’t. Code Sec. 552.022. CATEGORIES OF PUBLIC INFORMATION; EXAMPLES.
Without limiting the amount or kind of information that is public information under this
chapter, the following categories of information are public information and not excepted from
required disclosure unless made confidential under this chapter or other law:
(1) a completed report, audit, evaluation, or investigation made of, for, or by a

governmental body, except as provided by Section 552.108;
Conclusion: Not applicable because the video has been disclosed.
Tex. Gov’t. Code SUBCHAPTER C. INFORMATION EXCEPTED FROM REQUIRED

DISCLOSURE
Sec. 552.101. EXCEPTION: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. (Informant’s Privilege)
Not applicable because the Jacksonville Police Department has disclosed the video.
Sec. 552.108. EXCEPTION: CERTAIN LAW ENFORCEMENT, CORRECTIONS, AND

PROSECUTORIAL INFORMATION.
Not applicable because the Jacksonville Police Department has disclosed the video.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
1. The Waller Radio stations were licensed and regulated by the FCC which was created by
Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution. In Fisher’s Blend Station, Inc. v. Tax
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Cause No. 2016-11-0772
Comm’n of Wash., 297 U.S. 650 (1936), the United States Supreme Court said: By its very
nature broadcasting transcends state lines and is national in its scope and importance—
characteristics which bring it within the purpose and protection, and subject it to the control,
of the commerce clause. Waller Media contractually served advertisers and syndicators who
were engaged in interstate commerce and were national in both scope and origin. Because
Waller Media operated in the domain of interstate commerce, it is within reach of both the
Hobbs and RICO Acts.
VIII. CORPORATE DISREGARD
Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986).
The Texas Supreme Court recognized several situations in which Texas courts will disregard the
corporate fiction. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986)
(1) when the fiction is used as a means of perpetrating fraud;

(2) where a corporation is organized and operated as a mere tool or business conduit of another
corporation;
(3) where the corporation fiction is resorted to as a means of evading an existing legal
obligation;
(4) where the corporate fiction is employed to achieve or perpetuate monopoly;
(5) where the corporate fiction is used to circumvent a statute;
(6) where the corporate fiction is relied upon as a protection of crime or to justify wrong. Id. at
272.
In a footnote, Castleberry goes on to state: "Inadequate capitalization is another basis for

disregarding the corporate fiction." Id. at 272 n.3.
** Note to lawyers who assert that “All attempts to disregard corporate entities by attempting
to hold individuals liable for actions taken by corporate entities are improper.” – That’s
absurd. Stop being pretentious.
IX. TEXAS UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 24.005 Transfers Fraudulent as to Present and Future Creditors
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether

the creditor's claim arose before or within a reasonable time after the transfer was made
or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; ? or

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(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation, and the debtor:
(A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the
business or transaction; ? or
(B) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor
would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due.
(b) In determining actual intent under Subsection (a)(1) of this section, consideration may be
given, among other factors, to whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or
threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(6) the debtor absconded;
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the
value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or
the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred;
and
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred
the assets to an insider of the debtor.
Respectfully submitted:

______________________________________
Pro Se
11652 CR 2210
Tyler, TX 75707
bill@wallertec.com
Cell: (903) 253-5555

112
BY EMAIL
I certify that on March 4, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of this document to the
John D. Sloan ……………… jsloan@sloanfirm.com
R.W. Richards ……………… rwr@therichardslawfirm.com
L.T. Bradt ………………… ltbradt@flash.net

______________________________________________
Fifth Amended Original Petition Page 1 of 1

113
EXHIBIT B
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Cause No. 2016-11-0772

§
vs. § CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS
§
SUSAN J. WALLER,ALICIAG. §
WALLER TENNISON and §
DOROTHY REID WALLER § 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FINAL JUDGMENT
On this day the Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Thereupon, Defendant Susan Waller announced on the record that she
was non-suiting her counterclaim without prejudice. There are no other pending
counterclaims.
It is ORDERED that William D. Waller, Jr., have and take nothing by his suit
against Susan J. Waller, Alicia G. Waller Tennison and Dorothy Reid Waller.
All costs of court are awarded against Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr .. This
judgment shall bear interest at the legal rate until paid. For all of which let execution
issue if not timely paid.
This Judgment disposes of all issues between all parties. All relief not
expressly granted is DENIED.
Signed May 1, 2019.
AtU.~M, Judge Presiding ·

MAYO 1 2019
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EXHIBIT C
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CAUSE NO. 2016-11-0772
§
v. §
SUSAN J. WALLER, §
Defendants §
PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION
Plaintiff William D. Waller Jr. submits this Fourth Amended Original Petition and
complaining of Defendants Susan J. Waller; Alicia G. Tennison; and Dorothy Reid Waller,
Defendants (collectively known as Defendants) and for cause would show as follows.
1. Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery under Level 3 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.
II. PARTIES
County, Texas. Plaintiff may be served at 11652 CR 2210, Tyler, Texas 75707.
3. Susan (Susie) Waller - Ms. Waller is an individual residing in Cherokee County Texas.
Ms. Waller may be served through her attorney of record, John Sloan.


III.
PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION Page 1 of 57

117
IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
V. TRCP § 47 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
(a) The Plaintiff brings causes of action for Libel and Slander per se and per quod,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Invasion of Privacy, and Civil
Conspiracy.
(b) The damages sought by the Plaintiff are within the jurisdictional limits of the
court.
(c) Plaintiff is seeking:
(5) monetary relief over $1,000,000.00 and
(d) Plaintiff demands judgment for all the other relief to which the Plaintiff deems
himself entitled.
VI. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
9. In connection with the acts described below, Defendant Susie Waller was acting within
the course and scope of her employment as an agent for Dorothy Waller. On July 20,
2016, Dorothy Waller executed a durable general power of attorney officially naming
Susie as her attorney-in-fact. Therefore Dorothy Waller has assumed vicarious
liability for the actions of Susie Waller as her agent.
10. In the event any parties misnamed are not included herein, Plaintiff contends that
such was a “misidentification,” “misnomer,” and/or such parties are/were “alter egos”
of parties named herein.
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11. Plaintiff contends that the business entities, two corporations, and one LLC, under
100% unity of interest and control, were the alter egos of Dorothy Waller, and
vicariously through her agent, Susie Waller. The corporations and/or LLC were not
separate from the owner/individual/agent. Plaintiff also contends that Dorothy Waller
and/or vicariously her agent, Susie Waller caused the corporations and/or LLC to be
used to perpetrate actual fraud for direct personal benefit. Under either circumstance,
holding the corporations and/or LLCs liable would perpetuate injustice by allowing the
owner/agent to rely on the corporate and/or LLC fiction for protection of crime or to
justify a wrong. The Plaintiff, therefore, asks the court in the interest of justice to
disregard the corporate and/or LLC fictions altogether pursuant to Tex. Bus. Orgs.
Code § 21.223(b), This rule also applies to limited liability companies under Tex. Bus.
Orgs. Code § 101.002(a).
VII. ANCILLARY NOTES
12. 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States is properly applied when
fraud is used to interfere with or obstruct a government process. In the 1924
case Hammerschmidt v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an
opinion authored by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, held that "To conspire to
defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the government out of property or
money, but it also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental
functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest."
13. In a desperate attempt to conceal their criminal conduct, the defendants and the
lawyers involved in this case have trivialized it as a family squabble and/or two
siblings squabbling over an inheritance. They know better. They are playing on the
archetypal paradigms that in an altercation, the truth is somewhere in the middle and
every action is the result of a cause. However, in this instance, libel and slander
against the Plaintiff were not a counterbalance to wrongs the Plaintiff had committed
against them, but unilaterally contrived fictions to justify their crimes. The brutality
and intensity of their attack on the Plaintiff is a reflection of their degree of
culpability. This case isn’t about a squabble. It represents and reveals a potentially
life-altering drama, not just for the defendants, but for their lawyers. It started as an
inheritance grab by Susie Waller and escalated when the Plaintiff discovered that the
defendants had intercepted and altered a Federally protected document to commit
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forgery and fraud. In their efforts to cover-up their crimes the actions of the
defendants and the lawyers evolved into a massive criminal conspiracy, organized
crime, and violations of the RICO Act.
VIII. ENTITIES
14. Waller Media, LLC, Waller Broadcasting, Inc, and Waller Properties, Inc. were
collectively known as Waller Media. Waller Media operated four FM radio stations in
the Tyler/Longview Nielsen rated market which were licensed by the FCC to Waller
Media, LLC and Waller Broadcasting, Inc. Waller Media had offices and studios at 402
South Ragsdale in Jacksonville, TX, in a building owned by Waller Properties, Inc.
Waller Media was also known by the monikers, “The Breeze” and “Kompa” which were
DBA’s registered in Cherokee County, Texas. The Breeze was a CHR format simulcast
on radio stations KLJT and KFRO-FM. Kompa was a Mexican Regional format
simulcast on radio stations KMPA and KZXM.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
15. The Waller Radio stations were licensed and regulated by the FCC which was created
by Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution. In Fisher’s Blend Station,
Inc. v. Tax Comm’n of Wash., 297 U.S. 650 (1936), the United States Supreme Court
said: By its very nature broadcasting transcends state lines and is national in its scope
and importance—characteristics which bring it within the purpose and protection, and
subject it to the control, of the commerce clause. Waller Media contractually served
advertisers and syndicators who were engaged in interstate commerce and were
national in both scope and origin. Because Waller Media operated in the domain of
interstate commerce, it is within reach of both the Hobbs and RICO Acts.
16. Dudley and Dorothy Waller owned Waller Media until his death on May 29, 2016, at
which time, Dorothy Waller became the sole owner. On July 20, 2016, Susie Waller
obtained power of attorney giving her control of Waller Media. On August 1, 2016,
Susie Waller fired all of the Waller Media employees including the Plaintiff and took
charge of the company.
17. Before 2005, Waller Media, LLC was composed of ten radio stations in the Nielsen
rated Tyler/Longview market. In late 2004, the five most profitable radio stations were

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sold to Access One for $26 million. The radio stations that were sold included the
legendary Class-C0 100,000-watt (at 1480-feet Above Average Terrain (AAT)) KOOI
flagship and its sister station, the Class-C1 100,000-watt (at 1040-feet AAT) KYKX,
both of which covered the Nielsen rated Tyler/Longview market with strong building
penetration. Also sold to Access One were two Class-C2 50,000-watt (492-feet AAT)
FM’s, KOYE and KKUS. Because of the decline of the radio broadcast industry, the
valuation of these five radio stations has fallen from $26 million in 2004 to just over
$3.8 million today based on widely accepted valuation heuristics and the most recently
available Nielsen audience share of 16.7%, BIA market revenue of $15.1 million,
power ratio of 1, EBITDA margin of .25, and EBITDA multiple of 6.1. Using the
revenue multiple method, an estimated $2.5 million in revenue times a multiple of 1.5
gives $3.75 million valuation.
18. The radio stations that remained in possession of Waller Media after the 2004 sale of
five radio stations to Access One were known in the industry as rimshots meaning
that their market coverage was only fractional. The four FM and one AM radio
stations were equivalent to two fractional market coverage radio stations, so they were
at a substantial disadvantage to other competitive radio stations in the market. When
the Plaintiff’s father asked him to go to work for Waller Media, the Plaintiff talked
with his father and suggested that those stations would be extremely difficult if not
impossible to operate profitably. Dudley wouldn’t even consider selling his five
remaining radio stations. Unfortunately, Dudley was suffering from dementia
psychosis, and he thought of the remnants as if they were KOOI. They weren’t even
remotely in league with KOOI.
19. The broadcast facility had (at times pertinent to the pleadings and allegations herein)
a general manager, to-wit: Angela Dolezal, who was in charge of day-to-day operations
including Marketing, Promotion, and Sales. There was at all times pertinent a full-
time Business Manager, Chrispin Chifwepa who managed two other employees,
Clarissa Ochoa, the Traffic Director, and under her, Nathan Bentley, the Office
Manager. Mr. Chifwepa graduated Magna Cum Laude with a Master of Business
Administration (MBA) from the University of Texas. Chrispin kept the Waller Media
double-entry accrual accounting systems immaculately. They were GAAP compliant
with every transaction sourced, documented, and locked to prevent tampering once

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entered. Bank Statements were reconciled with the accounting systems monthly.
There was no money missing from Waller Media.
IX. FACTS
20. While it may seem that this complaint digresses by moving from defamation to OSHA
Retaliation, to RICO Predicates, every facet of this case has a common theme that
defamation was used as an instrument of crime. Instead of hinting to someone that
their business might burn down if they don’t pay for protection, Susie, Alicia, and
Ricky Richards convinced Dorothy Waller that the Plaintiff would take her last dime if
she didn’t give control of her assets to Susie. They tormented Dorothy and made her
afraid not to cooperate and turn her assets over to Susie. That’s the case, in a nutshell,
but blundering and a slip-of-the-tongue put the defendants into a tailspin as the cover-
up spiraled out-of-control proving to be an order of magnitude worse than the original
crime.
21. When the Plaintiff went to work for Waller Media, he replaced two employees, Murry
Camper, and Sans Hawkins. The Plaintiff was the Chief Engineer and IT Manager
with responsibility for maintaining four transmitting sites, two master control rooms,
two studios, a 500-foot tower, a 700-foot tower, four air chains including studio-to-
transmitter links, an IT network with more than 50 nodes. The Plaintiff also
maintained and supported all software for the operation including Order
Management, Accounts Receivable, Avails Inventory, Traffic Scheduling, Music
Scheduling, Production, Materials Management, General Accounting, Audit,
Telemetry, and Control. The Plaintiff managed the company’s multiple servers and on-
air workstations as well as related devices such as satellite receivers, Emergency Alert
Systems, switchers, switches, routers, IP radios, and miles of wiring. Having designed
and written software for radio stations, the Plaintiff has comprehensive and in-depth
knowledge of all facets of the radio station enterprise. The Plaintiff was available to
provide installation, instruction, troubleshooting, and support to all members of the
staff 24/7/365. It was not unusual for the Plaintiff to be called to leave home at 10:00
PM and not return for 36 hours. Each of the transmitters had towers from 500-foot to
700-foot, so lightning strikes damaged equipment often. The transmitting sites were in
Gallatin, Midway, Gilmer, and Bullard and during storms it was not unusual to have
multiple sites off-air. There were many nights when at 3:00 AM in the pouring rain or
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sleet, the Plaintiff, soaking wet with a chainsaw, had to buck trees that had fallen
across country roads blocking access to the transmitter sites. The Plaintiff often
climbed the 500-foot and 700-foot towers to maintain the hazard lighting systems and
make repairs on the STL’s or transmitting equipment. The Plaintiff did not handle
cash or write checks, so he had no opportunity to misappropriate or steal money from
Waller Media. Contrarily, when cash was tight, the Plaintiff paid for gasoline for the
companies two promotional vehicles and the engineering truck, purchased parts and
equipment, and paid the telephone bills for the company. Waller, Media owed more
than $20,000 of these advances to the Plaintiff, but never reimbursed him. The only
missing money was from the Plaintiff’s pocket.
22. Susie Waller received $48,000 per year from Waller Media, but she did not work for
the company. Susie also received substantial supplemental income from Dorothy.
While Plaintiff was working at least 60+ hour weeks, Susie spent her time conniving,
backstabbing, undermining, and manipulating.
23. In late 2007, and the Plaintiff had been working feverishly for two years to rebuild the
transmitter sites. The Plaintiff hadn’t yet had a chance to look into the company
books, but Alex Dryden, an analyst for International Profit Associates (IPA), had.
Alex was analyzing the holdings of Dorothy and Dudley Waller in preparation for an
estate plan that would be finished in 2008. Dorothy Waller had been concerned that if
anything happened to Dudley, Susie would exploit Dorothy and take over, which
despite Dorothy spending $250,000 with IPA to prevent, is what happened. Dorothy is
living the nightmare she was trying to prevent when she hired IPA
24. As Alex Dryden analyzed the Waller’s finances and accounting records, he came to a
startling conclusion. The fortune that Dudley Waller had at the beginning of 2005 was
almost gone. Out of the $26 million from the sale, Dudley had paid off $11 million in
debt, about $7 million in taxes, and $1 million bonus to Rick Guest. They paid off the
mortgages for all their children (except Plaintiff’s), they bought new cars for Susie and
Alicia, they spent more than half a million on the Waller Family Life Center at the
Methodist Church, and half a million on lake property for Susie to use as a party
place. Susie and Alicia were getting their bills paid out of the company books in
addition to their $48,000 per year salaries. Susie was buying friends by putting them
on the payroll and then having them follow her around all day instead of working for

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the company. Susie and Alicia never thought they could spend $26 million. They
thought they were rich. It was time for a reality check, and Susie and Alicia weren’t
going to like it. Alex, the IPA analyst, had come to a startling conclusion. In 2005,
2006, and 2007, Dorothy and Dudley Waller had spent about $3 million per year. Alex
advised the family that the $26 million they had received when they sold five stations
in 2004 would be gone by the end of 2008, just over a year away.
25. International Profit Associates (IPA) created an estate plan which included irrevocable
trusts and the last wills of Dorothy and Dudley Waller in early 2008. The IPA lawyers
were not licensed to practice in Texas, so the wills were taken to a local attorney who
was said to be Ricky Richards, to be finalized. The IPA estate plan had been explicitly
designed to keep Susie Waller from taking over the estate in the event of Dudley
Waller’s death. Susie Waller and Alicia Tennison participated in a deceitful plot to
convince Dorothy that the Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars from Waller Media,
that he had devised a plan to take all her money, and that he would take her last dime
if she didn’t give control of her assets to Susie. The IPA estate plan would have
prevented Susie from taking control. After Dudley passed away on May 29, 2016,
Dorothy, Susie, and Alicia all claimed they did not know about the Will, IPA, or Alex
Dryden. That was preposterous because Dorothy had paid IPA $250,000 to create the
estate plan and Alex Dryden had been resident in the Waller Media offices for several
weeks. Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy knew Alex very well. However, Susie had terrorized
Dorothy into believing the Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars from Waller Media
and that he would take all her money if she didn’t go along with suppressing the IPA
estate plan. Susie, Alicia, and Ricky concealed the IPA estate plan in violation of Tex.
Penal Code § 32.47 Fraudulent destruction, removal, or concealment of document, a
state jail felony.
26. A rogue employee, Charles Pribilski (aka JJO or Jammin Jimmy Olsen) had nearly
destroyed Waller Media before he was fired in October 2014 for trying to steal $3,000.
Morale was terrible, and by the end of 2014, there were no salespeople and no money
to hire salespeople. Miraculously, Angie Dolezal rallied the remaining employees and
transformed the on-air personalities into salespeople. By the end of 2015, orders-on-
the-books had increased from $24,000 to $370,000. The company had realized a profit
for the first time since 2005.

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27. Although the equity of the company had increased by $154,000, there was an
accumulated cash deficit of about $300,000. The estimated value of the company was
about $1.3 million, and with only $300,000 in debt, that is an asset-to-debt ratio of 4-
to-1, which is extremely good for radio stations. By the end of July 2016, Waller Media
had approximately $596,000 in orders on the books. These were mostly 52-week orders
which would be converted to cash over the following 18 months. As with most
companies in growth mode, cash flow lagged, but would eventually catch up. A radio
station’s revenue engine is like a pipeline that must be charged to capacity before
producing at the destination. Waller Media started 2015 with an empty pipeline and
ended 2015 with $370,000 in the pipeline. That $370,000 was revenue, but it wasn’t
cash available to pay bills. In the contemporary world of Radio Broadcasting,
profitable operation is the exception rather than the rule. With a debt/equity ration of
less than .25, the $300,000 cash deficit was, or should have been a relatively trivial
matter of leveraging assets to manage liquidity. A change in strategy of focusing on
annual contracts had reduced immediate cash flow but would increase revenue
substantially in the long run. The key performance metrics indicated long-term
sustained growth for Waller Media.
28. The growing momentum of Waller Media was apparent to the employees and many of
their loyal followers. Ratings were up, sales were up, and the company would begin
August with more than 90% of their cash requirements already on the books.
However, the Waller Media employees faced one obstacle that would prove to be
insurmountable. It wasn’t the $300,000 cash deficit. That could have been quickly
resolved, except that it served Susie Waller’s objectives. She could use it. It provided
an opportunity for Susie Waller to proclaim that the company couldn’t pay its bills and
therefore the Plaintiff had bankrupted it. Waller Media, LLC and the other Waller
companies collectively weren’t even close to insolvency. The fact that Susie sold Waller
Media for $1.2 million in March of 2017 proves unequivocally that the companies
weren’t insolvent. The companies had a debt/equity ratio less than .25, which is
considered to be excellent, especially for radio stations.
29. Susie’s meddling was frustrating for the employees of Waller Media, but for the
Plaintiff, it was especially troubling. Susie and Alicia had sequestered Dorothy and
interposed themselves as intermediaries. Any dealings between Waller Media and

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Dorothy had to go through them. Susie and Alicia had been disproportionate
benefactors of Dorothy and Dudley’s money, and they felt entitled to it.
30. In 2007, Dorothy was afraid that if Dudley passed away, Susie would take control of
her assets and her life, so Dorothy spent a quarter million dollars to prevent that from
happening by hiring International Profit Associates to create an estate plan with
irrevocable trusts and their Last Wills. The IPA lawyers were not licensed to practice
in Texas, so the Wills were sent to a local attorney, Ricky Richards, to be finalized. By
the time Dudley Waller passed away on May 29, 2016, Susie and Ricky were already
partners in crime. (See Paragraph 69)
31. Susie and Alicia present the image that they are taking care of Dorothy, but what they
are doing is guarding the entrance to their goldmine. Look at the power of attorney
that Dorothy signed giving Susie legal control of her assets. There could be only one
reason for the inclusion of express permission for self-dealing, and even more
probative of malicious intent was permission to loan Dorothy’s money to herself or
anyone else at 0% APR in perpetuity.
32. Susie and Alicia coerced Dorothy to execute a new will. Dorothy was still reluctant to
condemn and eject her son because there was no hard evidence to back up Susie’s
rhetoric. A federally protected letter was intercepted and altered to frame the Plaintiff
and make it look as if he had engaged in an extortion plot against Dorothy. Even that
wasn’t enough, so Susie brought Ricky Richards in to eliminate the final obstacle by
corroborating her fiction and convincing Dorothy that her first-born was an
incorrigible crook, that he had a plan to take her last dime, that she had to get rid of
him, and give control of her assets including Waller Media to Susie.
33. All one has to do to is watch the segment of the police video in evidence in which a
JPD Officer wanted to speak to Dorothy. Susie wasn’t about to allow the officer to
contact Dorothy without controlling the situation. If Dorothy was going to talk to the
officer, Susie wanted to 1) let Dorothy know that she was present to intimidate her,
and 2) coach Dorothy on precisely what she was to say to the police officer. Dorothy is
being held hostage while Susie and Alicia plunder what remains of her estate.
34. In the Spring of 2016, a local bank had notified Adult Protective Services of suspicious
activity regarding Susie and Dorothy’s bank accounts, but their investigative

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techniques are naïve. Like the 1983 Stockholm bank robbery hostages, Dorothy has
been conditioned at a primal level by deep psychological torture to comply with Susie’s
control, and she is terrified to stir Susie’s wrath. Dorothy will zealously defend Susie
to avoid the inevitable repercussions of failing to do so.
35. Susie, Alicia, and Ricky have justified their actions by claiming that Dorothy
consented, but the courts have held that deceit vitiates consent. An examination of the
psychology involved is a time consuming, complicated, and unreliable method of
investigation that leads only to a “he said, she said” battle of tongues. As Aristotle
said, “Law is reason free from passion.” The fastest and most reliable way to reveal the
truth is by examination of the cold, hard facts, the underlying transactions. There
aren’t that many, and they will cut through all the emotional rhetoric with laser-like
precision.
36. When Susie took over on August 1, 2016, she told one of the policemen, “My Daddy
never had to borrow any money.” That was completely ludicrous. Dudley Waller had
gone through many such situations and borrowed money many times to supplement
liquidity. He paid off approximately $11 million in long-term debt when he sold his
best five radio stations in 2004. In July of 2016, Waller Media had no long-term debt.
37. Because of Susie’s influence, Dudley and Dorothy refused to cooperate with the
management staff at Waller Media. Without their cooperation, the Waller Media
management staff had no means by which to manage liquidity. Building maintenance
fell behind, and by June of 2016 all the air conditioners had gone out, and the roof was
severely leaking when it rained. Because of the severe cash shortage, Waller Media
was unable to hire professional tower crews or an engineering assistant, so the
Plaintiff had to maintain and climb the 500-foot and 700-foot towers and working with
components energized to 10,000 volts alone and in remote locations. OSHA rules
require two workers present when working with components energized to more than
700 volts. Waller Media was becoming not just uncomfortable, but hazardous
especially for the Plaintiff.
38. Because of Susie’s influence, Dorothy and Dudley Waller abandoned Waller Media
stifling its operation. The Waller Media employees knew what they needed to do, but
they were powerless without the cooperation of the owners.

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39. Susie and her co-conspirators knew that the Waller Media employees and the Plaintiff
posed a significant threat of exposing the truth and spoiling their plan. Susie knew
that the Waller Media employees would oppose her. Susie and her cohorts contrived a
body of lies to create a plausible fantasy conducive to their objectives and then create a
wall around Dorothy to prevent her exposure to conflicting information. They isolated
Dorothy controlling her communications with others including the Waller Media
employees and Plaintiff. That rendered the Waller Media Management Staff incapable
of dealing with issues that required Dorothy’s signature and approval. It stifled the
company, caused maintenance to fall behind, and resulted in hazardous conditions in
the workplace. Jimmy Arber and Susie have moved into Dorothy’s house because they
want to keep a close eye on Dorothy and their fortune. They can’t take a chance that
someone might come in, find out what they are doing, and spoil it.
40. Susie and Alicia terrorized Dorothy by repeatedly chanting, “He’s stolen millions from
you.” “He will take your last dime.” “You will be out on the street without a pot to piss
in.” “You have to give me control so I can protect you.” “We’ll make sure he doesn’t
take your home and everything else.” Susie wanted unlimited control of Dorothy’s
assets. She and her cronies made up anything and everything they could think of to
portray the Plaintiff as the vilest and most despicable person imaginable. Susie and
Ricky Richards conducted an exhaustive fishing expedition trying to find some
evidence they could use against the Plaintiff, but they came up empty-handed. Their
case was 100% emotional rhetoric and 0% substance. They had to create an image of
the Plaintiff that caused people to loathe him to get them to believe that he had stolen
millions of dollars and that he had a plan to take all Dorothy’s money.
41. Susie and Alicia tormented Dorothy by threatening that the Plaintiff would take her
for everything she had until she gave in and consented to give control of her assets to
Susie. Waller Media, LLC and Waller Broadcasting, Inc. were licensed by the FCC to
operate four FM radio stations which are, under the Communications Act of 1934,
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Susie’s essential message to Dorothy was,
“Give me control or Bill will take everything you have.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951 Interference
with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence.
42. On July 20, 2016, Susie and Alicia arranged for Dorothy Waller to meet at the offices
of Feliciano Financial Services in Tyler, Texas. They had convinced Dorothy that the

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Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars from Waller Media and that he would take her
last dime if she didn’t give control of her assets to Susie. Susie had two documents that
she held out to Dorothy and told her if she didn’t sign them, the Plaintiff would take
everything she had.
43. Susie and Alicia had deceitfully threatened and terrorized Dorothy to convince her to
sign a durable general power of attorney (DPA) giving Susie unlimited control of her
assets. Tex. Penal Code § 32.46 Securing execution of documents by deception in the
first degree. The DPA contained two clauses for which the intent could only be
preparatory for fraud.
44. Express permission for self-dealing waived the customary fiduciary duty of the agent
to act in the best interest of the principal.
45. Permission to loan Dorothy’s money to herself or anyone else at 0% APR in perpetuity.
26 U.S.C. § 7201 Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax.
46. Susie and Alicia convinced Dorothy that the Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars and
that he didn’t deserve an inheritance. They deceived Dorothy to get her to sign a new
will naming Susie as executrix and sole heir in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 32.46
Securing Execution of documents by deception in the first degree.
47. Susie, Ricky, and Alicia had conducted an extensive fishing expedition searching for
something they could use against the Plaintiff but came up empty-handed. In the JPD
Police video, Alicia Tennison says things like, “and he had all these things put in his
name …,” but nothing was put in Bill’s name. The Plaintiff did ask Dudley Waller to
make Plaintiff the registered agent of Waller Media, but not to keep anything from his
parents and nothing was ever kept from his parents because of naming Plaintiff as the
registered agent. Because of their advanced age, Dudley and Dorothy Waller were
often not available to take care of certain issues which required the signature of the
registered agent or managing member. One thing was a Region’s credit card which
listed two former employees as account administrators.
48. In the Police video, Alicia Tennison says that Ricky Richards declared that naming the
Plaintiff as the registered agent for Waller Media, would prevent Dorothy and Dudley
Waller from receiving notices from the Appraisal District. That is a false, negligent,
and harmful statement. Ricky’s confusion may have resulted from projecting the
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standard practice of lawyers to direct legal correspondence to the agent registered
with the Texas Secretary of State in the absence of a more appropriate recipient. Still,
as a lawyer, he should have considered the statutory framework under which the
Appraisal Districts operate. The Texas Tax Code – TAX § 1.07 Delivery of Notice states
that the Appraisal District will send notices to the property owner or the agent
designated by the property owner under Section 1.111(f) Representation of Property
Owner. There is no provision in the Property Tax Code for an Appraisal District to
change the recipient of property tax notices based on a change of registered agent with
the Texas Secretary of State. That misinformation was harmful to the Plaintiff
because people expect licensed practitioners of law to be diligent in giving legal advice.
49. Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards saw an opportunity when the
employees of Waller Media delivered a letter to Dorothy on July 27, 2016, reporting
OSHA violations. The letter was intercepted and altered by adding the statement, “If
you don’t turn the radio stations over to Bill Waller by Friday at 9:00 AM, we will all
quit, we will walk out.” Because the letter had reported OSHA violations, it was
protected under Section 11(c) of the OSH Act and was within Federal jurisdiction. The
letter was altered in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 32.21 Forgery in the first degree.
The statement was brilliantly crafted to serve a dual purpose.
50. On July 29, 2016, Susie and Alicia Tennison arranged a meeting at Ricky Richards
Law Office. Present were Dorothy Waller, her youngest son, Reid Waller, Susie, Alicia,
and Ricky. Upon reading the altered version of the letter from the employees, Ricky
proclaimed, “There is no doubt in my mind this is a mastermind elaborate plan that he
has had to take all this money from your Mother.” “You have got to get your Brother
out of there.” “fire every one of them.” With those proclamations, Ricky clinched
Dorothy’s approval to issue a letter terminating the Plaintiff’s employment. Not only
did he close the deal for Susie, but Ricky immediately drafted a letter terminating the
Plaintiff’s employment. Ricky had no evidence against the Plaintiff, only the word of a
known unreliable source and a fraudulent and forged letter. Ricky Richards gives
himself a license to lie by thinking its okay to assert something as long as he doesn’t
know it isn’t true. Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards conspired to
secure the execution of a letter terminating the Plaintiff’s employment. Tex. Penal
Code § 32.46 Securing execution of documents by deception.

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51. The statement added to the letter from the employees would also serve as a pretext for
firing the Waller Media employees and as a defense to claims of retaliation. Susie
Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards conspired with deceptive intent to
interfere with or obstruct a Federal process of the OSHA Whistleblower Protection
Programs in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to defraud the United States.
52. On August 1, 2016, just two working days after engaging in protected activity under
Section 11(c) of the OSH Act, the employees of Waller Media arrived at work to find
they had been locked out and that Susie had terminated all 18 employees without
notice.
53. Earlier that morning, Susie Waller and Phil Shinalt had left a side door unlocked.
They circled the Waller Media Office Building watching and waiting for the employees
to find and enter the unlocked side door. When they did, Susie went to the
Jacksonville Police Station and reported that the employees had all received a letter
on the afternoon of Friday, July 29, 2016, notifying them of their terminations. She
asserted that the employees knew that they were not allowed to enter the Waller
Media Office Building, but that they had broken into the side door and were now
criminally trespassing. She told the officers, “I have the letter right here” as she held
up an envelope to prove it. One of the investigators from the Jacksonville Police
Department read the letter and then questioned Susie about the details of how the
employees supposedly received the letters. He told Susie that the timeline of her
account didn’t add up and that he had read the letter and it did not contain a notice of
termination as she had claimed. Susie already had what she wanted, control of Waller
Media, so having the employees arrested served no purpose other than Susie’s sadistic
pleasure of seeing them humiliated. To her, that justified making a false report to the
police.
54. The very first thing Susie told the police was that all the employees had been fired and
she was in charge. During the police interviews with Susie, she repeatedly, adamantly,
and unrelentingly asserted that the employees were fired, that they were not wanted
back, and that she had hired an all new staff.
55. After the police had caught Susie in the first round of lies, she changed her story. She
started asserting that the reason for the adverse action of the employer was that the
employees had sent Dorothy a letter which said, “If you don’t turn the radio stations
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over to Bill Waller by Friday at 9:00 AM, we will all quit, we will walk out.” The real
letter from the employees had no wording that could have been construed as such.
Susie and her tag-along crony, Phil Shinalt adamantly and repeatedly asserted that
the reason for the employer’s actions was the letter from the employees threatening to
quit. They said that Ricky Richards has the letter and Phil offered to retrieve it from
Ricky’s office.
56. Susie started with lie #1, “the employees were all terminated in a letter which they
had received on Friday (meaning July 29, 2016).” She got caught in that lie and
changed her story to lie #2, “They are fired because they quit in a letter.” The Plaintiff
caught her in that lie and informed Waller Media’s lawyer Nick Peacock that he
couldn’t use the forged letter. So, on August 23, 2016, Nick Peacock stated three times
in his response to OSHA the equivalent of, “Nobody but Bill was fired.” That was lie #3
regarding the reason for the terminations. The truth is that the letter from the
employees offended Susie’s sovereignty and she was incensed. If you cross Susie
Waller, you shall feel her wrath and in no small measure. Susie leaves nothing but
scorched earth in her path.
57. When the Plaintiff spoke with Nick Peacock on August 1, 2016, he asked him why they
had fired all the employees. Nick responded, “It’s an at-will state, Bill. You can fire
anyone, anytime, for any reason you like and there is nothing you can do about it.” Bill
told Nick that the firings were two working days after a letter to Dorothy reporting
OSHA violations and asked him if he wasn’t worried about the employees filing claims
for retaliation under Section 11(c) of the OSH Act. Nick responded, “Your employees
wrote Dorothy a letter saying that if she didn’t turn the radio stations over to you by
9:00 AM on Friday morning that they would all quit, that they would walk out. So,
they threatened to quit, and we accepted their resignations.” Bill, told Nick that the
real letter contained no wording which could have been construed as such. Bill asked
Nick if he had the letter and if he could read the exact wording. Nick was irritated as
he replied, “I have the letter. I read the letter, and those were their exact words.” The
Plaintiff warned Nick that the letter he had was a forgery and that he could not use it
to defend claims of retaliation. Nick didn’t act as if he believed it, but the next day he
would confirm that he did.

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58. Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards had used the forged letter to
convince Dorothy to execute a letter terminating the Plaintiff’s employment and to
give Susie control of Waller Media. Ricky then advised Dorothy to fire all 18 employees
of Waller Media because he believed the forged letter would serve as a pretext. He was
confident that he had a ready defense to claims of retaliation. When the Plaintiff
exposed the forgery to Nick Peacock, it must have been upsetting to them because they
changed their strategy completely. By August 2, 2016, their attitude changed from
“nothing you can do about it” to a letter which began, “Please be advised that you
remain an employee of Waller Media in good standing. There was a misunderstanding
that you had resigned your position due to a July 27th letter.” That was a complete
reversal of his original position on August 1, 2016. Even though Nick Peacock knew
the July 27, 2016 letter was a forgery, and he knew it had been used to deceive his
client, Dorothy, he did not disclose to her that Susie and Ricky had defrauded her.
Instead, Nick, participated in collusion with Susie and Ricky to cover up the fraud.
59. Ricky Richards, Nick Peacock, Dorothy Waller, and Susie Waller were in trouble. They
faced significant liability with claims of egregious retaliation warranting punitive
damages of up to nine times actual damages. Even worse, a legitimate investigation
would expose a conspiracy to defraud both Dorothy Waller and the United States.
60. Jose Sanchez was a young attorney with negligible experience as a litigator, political
aspirations, and admiration for Ricky because of his reputation as a formidable
opponent. Jose may have reasoned that regardless of how much effort he put into this
case, in a head to head confrontation with Ricky, he would go down in flames. On the
other hand, Jose was in a position to gain Ricky’s eternal gratitude by rescuing him
from this dire situation.
61. Even with Jose Sanchez’s commitment to throw the cases by undermining his client,
such a strategy came with risks. What if under pressure from the Plaintiff, Jose’s
loyalty for Ricky waivered or what if he failed to recognize a potential failure at a
critical juncture? There was another lawyer whom Ricky had worked with for years
and whom Ricky knew he could trust to do precisely this kind of job. That was Ricky’s
long-time friend and Baylor Law School classmate, Steve Guy. Steve knew how to lose
a case without tipping his hand to the client and Ricky could depend on Steve’s loyalty.

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So, Ricky had Jose Sanchez hire Steve Guy as co-counsel. The enemy had been planted
behind the Plaintiff’s gates like the Trojan Horse of Troy. It was a ruse de guerre.
62. The very first thing the Plaintiff told Jose Sanchez in their representation negotiations
was that he wanted to bring the defamation case in Smith County where he had
resided for years. The Plaintiff was adamant and told Jose what Susie had said, “I
have four badass lawyers, and there isn’t a judge in Cherokee County who isn’t in my
pocket.” The Plaintiff told Jose that Susie Waller was proud of her acumen for
corruption and that she had bragged that she had gotten Judge Fletcher elected as
County Court Judge in Cherokee County in anticipation of her upcoming divorce
which left her former husband penniless and allowed her to take all of his separate
property. Jose told the Plaintiff that the case had to be brought in Cherokee County.
After the Plaintiff began to get suspicious that Jose was undermining him, he Googled
it. According to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure § 15.017 Libel, Slander, or Invasion
of Privacy, “A suit for damages for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy shall be
brought and can only be maintained in the county in which the Plaintiff resided at the
time of the accrual of the cause of action, or in the county in which the defendant
resided at the time of filing suit, or in the county of the residence of defendants, or any
of them, or the domicile of any corporate defendant, at the election of the Plaintiff.”
There is no doubt that Jose Sanchez deceived the Plaintiff to give the advantage to
Ricky Richards. Not only would the case be heard on Richards’ home turf, but the
Plaintiff would be disadvantaged by having to drive two hours for each court
appearance.
63. Steve Guy had been hired by Jose Sanchez as co-counsel to file a defamation action, to
recover roughly $20,000 in advances that Plaintiff had advanced to Waller Media, and
to contest the fraudulent filing of a Will. Plaintiff had expressed that it was urgent to
issue discovery requests as expeditiously as possible because if the Defendant’s
realized they would be held accountable, they would most likely abate the ongoing
defamation. Plaintiff wanted interrogatories to be issued with the original petition.
The Plaintiff wanted if nothing else, to ask the one question, “what reason do you have
to believe Bill Waller was stealing money?” That was a question the defendants
couldn’t answer. The Plaintiff told Jose Sanchez not to even attempt negotiations
before issuing interrogatories, but Jose ignored the Plaintiff. After eight months, Steve

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and Jose continued to refuse to send out interrogatories. Plaintiff also noticed that the
disclosures hadn’t been answered by the Defendants. The Plaintiff suspected that Mr.
Guy was refusing to issue interrogatories because it would be the death knell of the
Defendant’s case. The defendants had no excuse for the brutal and vicious attack on
the Plaintiff’s character. Their witnesses had already self-impeached. They had no
evidence. By contrast, the Plaintiff had an abundance of compelling evidence. It would
have been incredibly easy to take the initiative, but that is exactly what Jose Sanchez
and Steve Guy were determined to avoid. Almost a year after Plaintiff had retained
Mr. Sanchez, he began to pressure Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Guy to issue interrogatories.
They cinched their heels and balked. Plaintiff finally realized that Mr. Sanchez and
Mr. Guy knew that the interrogatories would be a decisive blow to the Defendants and
that their objective was to stall the case and do nothing that would cause problems for
the defendants.
64. Under pressure from the Plaintiff to issue the interrogatives, Steve Guy withdrew
from the case. Plaintiff wasn’t surprised because he had known that Mr. Guy wasn’t
about to do anything of substance in his favor. Mr. Guy’s apparent objective was to
queer the case. Nothing was ever done regarding the actions for the recovery of assets
and contest of the Will. The Plaintiff has documentation that will prove by a
preponderance, if not beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose Sanchez and Steve Guy
engaged in a pattern of conduct that was designed to steer the legal actions of the
Plaintiff for the benefit of the defendants. In retrospect, the Plaintiff should have
realized that his actions were matters of grave concern to the defendant’s lawyers.
They were deeply vested in the plot with both civil and criminal liability. They were
committed to any underhanded and illegal trick necessary to avoid having their
criminal conduct exposed.
65. Plaintiff assembled an 80-page complaint documenting the many failures and
omissions of Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Guy. Plaintiff supplied this complaint and a letter
notifying Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Guy that they were in breach of their representation
agreement, in violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, and
that they had broken their oath as members of the State Bar of Texas. Mr. Sanchez
and Mr. Guy promptly agreed to refund the Plaintiff’s money, but with the stipulation
that the Plaintiff signs an agreement not to pursue action against them. Plaintiff

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considered that the refund of $20,000 in fees wouldn’t even come close to compensating
for the damages sustained by perpetuating the campaign of the Defendants to ruin his
life.
66. Susie Waller stated, “I have four badass lawyers, and there isn’t a judge in Cherokee
County who isn’t in my pocket.” Ostensibly, Susie had one lawyer at that time. Ricky
Richards. Ricky had arranged for Nick Peacock to represent Dorothy, but Nick’s
loyalty became apparent when he concealed the forgery and fraud by Susie and Alicia
that was used to get control of Dorothy’s assets. Then Plaintiff’s lawyer, Jose Sanchez,
sprung it on him that he had hired Ricky Richards’ Baylor Law School classmate and
long-time friend Steve Guy as co-counsel. Then Jose lied to Plaintiff and told him that
the case had to be filed in Cherokee County instead of Smith County where he had
lived for years.
67. One or two things could be excused as errors, but it became a sequence of errors at
every opportune point, all giving the advantage to the Plaintiff’s opponents. What
Susie was saying was that she had control of all four lawyers. One of Susie’s quirks is
that it’s not good enough just to put one over on someone. Susie wants her victims to
know she outsmarted them and not be able to do anything about it. What Susie lacks
in intelligence, she makes up for in pure mean, and she has an unmatched acumen for
recruiting corrupt co-conspirators and corrupting others. The horrifying thing about
this case is that Susie and the lawyers had no compunction whatsoever about their
wrongful and criminal acts. They made a sport of it.
68. It is inconceivable that Ms. Nardizzi and other OSHA employees would have gone to
such great lengths and taken the risk of being charged with serious felonies without
significant motivation. Ms. Nardizzi and other OSHA employees willfully and
knowingly engaged in the Destruction, Alteration, or Falsification of Evidence made
false statements and flouted the procedures outlined in the OSHA Whistleblower
Investigations Manual. The extraordinary and laborious efforts by the OSHA
employees involved would only make sense had they been bribed. Further proof of
bribery will become evident if OSHA discloses the case files without unlawful
redactions. Rosanna Nardizzi, Anthony Incristi, and Angela Fisher were therefore in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1-2) Bribery. Money or property obtained through

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violations of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). Funds obtained from bribery under this section are
subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).
69. In November of 2016, Steve Guy filed this lawsuit on the Plaintiff’s behalf against
Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy. The Plaintiff wasn’t surprised when Ricky refused to
represent Susie as a Defendant. Susie said that he told her there wasn’t enough
money to get him to represent her. Ricky had participated in a conspiracy to defraud
Dorothy Waller and the United States, and he had aided and abetted Susie in the
wanton destruction of Plaintiff’s character. He was already implicated, and as a
matter of self-preservation, he had to dissociate himself from Susie, but she was a
wildcard that he couldn’t let outside his realm of control. Ricky arranged for another
Baylor Law School classmate, John Sloan, to represent her. Susie had been drawn to
Ricky because of his reputation for doing whatever it takes to win. She pumped up his
ego, and in return, Ricky showed off his skill at underhanded dealing. Before the
debacle with the forged letter, Ricky and Susie had gotten away with blackmailing
Susie’s former husband, Jerry Roberts, so their confidence was running high, but now,
Susie was a liability. Ricky Richards, Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, Nick Peacock,
Jose Sanchez, and Steve Guy conspired to dismiss the OSHA retaliation investigation
wrongfully and to defang and render impotent the Plaintiff’s action for defamation. In
doing so, they deprived the Waller Media employees and Plaintiff of their Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 Conspiracy
Against Rights.
70. What kind of sports game couldn’t be won if you were allowed to choose players for the
other teams as well as your own? Ricky Richards chose Nick Peacock and arranged for
him to represent Dorothy Waller and Waller Media. Ricky had Jose Sanchez hire
Steve Guy because he knew he could depend on Steve Guy’s loyalty. When Ricky had
to disassociate himself from Susie, the case was potentially volatile, so he wanted to
maintain control. He chose another Baylor Law School classmate to represent Susie.
Ricky Richards, Steve Guy, and John Sloan all graduated from Baylor Law School in
1980.
71. The only evidence Ricky had against the Plaintiff was the forged letter, and the
Plaintiff believes he knew about it because he is most likely the one who authored it. If
it isn’t evident to the Judge and Jury from samples of Susie’s prose, it would be

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apparent to an expert witness that Susie couldn’t have written the added statement. It
was far too articulate and brilliantly composed to accomplish a dual purpose. It would
take someone familiar with employment law to write that statement, and it surely
wasn’t Susie. It was more likely that Ricky supplied it to Susie. Regardless of who
authored this slanderous statement, it was the product of a conspiracy by Susie
Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards.
72. The Plaintiff made Nick aware of the forged letter on August 1, 2016, and Nick’s letter
to the Waller Media employees dated August 2, 2016, confirmed that he had believed,
but changed his mind that the employees had quit in the July 27, 2016, protected
letter from the employees. Nick Peacock had to know that Susie, Alicia, and Ricky
were swindling Dorothy, but his interest wasn’t in his client. Nick Peacock was loyal to
Ricky Richards. Instead of disclosing the criminal acts against his client, he engaged
in an elaborate cover-up for Ricky Richards. Nick Peacock conspired to perpetuate the
false and slanderous statements against the Plaintiff.
73. By conspiring to interfere with or obstruct a federal investigation, Susie Waller, Alicia
Tennison, Ricky Richards, Nick Peacock, Jose Sanchez, and Steve Guy violated 18
U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States.
74. Jose Sanchez allowed Susie’s lawyer, Ricky Richards to coach him rather than using
the information that the Plaintiff provided to him. As the OSHA investigator revealed
in her allegation summary, Mr. Sanchez capitulated to the employer’s position. When
the Plaintiff debriefed Jose after the negotiations with NLRB, Jose told the Plaintiff
that he agreed with the employer’s lawyer that Waller Media was insolvent. He didn’t
get that idea from the Plaintiff, so it must have come from Ricky. As the Plaintiff had
told Jose, Waller Media was nowhere near insolvent with a debt/equity ratio of .17.
Absolute proof that Waller Media was not insolvent is that it sold for $1.2 million in
May of 2017 after having been off the air for nine months. By capitulating to the
position of the employer against the Plaintiff’s instructions and because the position of
the employer was false and fraudulent, Jose Sanchez, while dealing with the National
Relations Labor Board (NLRB) and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 False Statements, 18 U.S.C. § 371
Conspiracy to defraud the United States, and 18 U.S.C. § 1505 Obstruction of
Proceedings Before Departments, and 18 U.S.C. § 241 Conspiracy Against Rights.

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75. On August 23, 2016, Nick Peacock issued his response to the claims of retaliation. His
response was not a position statement, but an emotional diatribe replete with false
statements, ad hominem attacks on the Plaintiff, innuendo, aspersions, and his
misleading opinions. Nick started by characterizing it as an “unfortunate family
squabble,” a tactic to divert attention from the truth by trivializing it as unworthy of
consideration. He stated three times that no one but the Plaintiff was fired. Nick
Peacock’s response to OSHA couldn’t have been more misleading. Nick Peacock made
false statements with the intent of misleading the OSHA WPP and causing them to
dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint of retaliation because of misconduct by the Plaintiff.
His deceit was intended to single the Plaintiff out as the central culpable figure in
termination of the Waller Media employees. If Nick Peacock didn’t know what had
happened at Waller Media on August 1, 2016, he should have. Thirty seconds into the
first video, Susie claims, “All the employees of Waller Media have were fired, and I am
in charge.” Nick wasn’t there, and his statements don’t match up with Susie’s
testimony in the police video. Susie testified that the reason for the adverse action was
the letter from the employees. Nick denied any adverse action by the employer. Nick
said they didn’t know why the employees left and blamed the Plaintiff for sabotaging
his mother’s company. The video shows that Susie locked the employees out and
wouldn’t even let them retrieve their personal belongings. Nick Peacock lied profusely
to OSHA in his response. Nick Peacock and Ricky Richards make up stories, and if
challenged, they use the excuse that they didn’t know it wasn’t true.
76. Making things up and saying whatever you think will accomplish your objective is
lying regardless of whether you know it is false. Nick Peacock violated 18 U.S.C. §
1001 False Statements in an attempt to interfere with or obstruct a Federal process in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to defraud the United States. Because Nick
Peacock used the U.S. Postal Service to deliver his response to OSHA, it violated
U.S.C. § 1341 Swindles and Frauds and U.S.C. 1349 § Conspiracy.
77. Mr. Sanchez had refused to deal with the forgery and fraudulent misrepresentation of
the letter from the employees. The Plaintiff made both Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Guy
aware of the evidence which he had provided including the letter from the employees,
the AXON Body 2 video from the Jacksonville Police Department, and the statement
by Nick Peacock that he had in his possession a copy of a forged letter. (The altered

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copy of the letter from the employees of Waller Media to Dorothy Waller dated July 27,
2016.) The video showed Susie Waller and Phil Shinalt misrepresenting the letter
from the employees by quoting the forged letter. Susie Waller Phil Shinalt and Alicia
Tennison clearly stated that the letter was the reason for the adverse action of the
employer. The evidence proved unequivocally that the employer had violated Tex.
Penal Code § 32.21 Forgery in the first degree. Because the objective of the forgery
was to secure a letter terminating the Plaintiff’s employment it was a violation of Tex.
Penal Code § 32.46 Securing execution of documents by deception. Because the
statement added to the letter from the employees was intended to establish a false
pretext for firing the employees and a fraudulent defense to claims of retaliation,
therefore, interfering with or obstructing a Federal process, they violated 18 U.S.C. §
371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States. The police video also proved that Nick
Peacock's response of August 23, 2016, contained false statements in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001 False Statements. The use of the U.S. Postal Service to transmit the
fraudulent response was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 Frauds and Swindles and 18
U.S.C. § 1349 Conspiracy Attempt. By their failure to report these crimes, Mr.
Sanchez and Mr. Guy violated 18 U.S.C. § Misprision.
78. On August 29, 2016, the OSHA regional investigator spoke with Jose Sanchez. In her
allegation summary, she said, “As for Bill, his problems are unrelated to OSHA. RI
discussed this issue with the group’s attorney on 8.29.16. He asked that we wait until
9.02.16 in case he wanted to issue a rebuttal but he did not contact us.” OSHA held
their decision, waiting for a rebuttal from Mr. Sanchez. When they did not receive the
rebuttal, they dismissed the case. The failure by Mr. Sanchez to issue a rebuttal
became the deciding issue and the proximate cause of OSHA dismissing the case. In
other words, Mr. Sanchez didn’t even resist the dismissal of the case by OSHA. The
employer’s lawyer, Nick Peacock, had made false and misleading statements in his
response to OSHA which a rebuttal could have controverted with transcripts from the
Jacksonville Police Department video. Mr. Sanchez should have cited the
inconsistencies between the video and Mr. Peacock’s response and at the very least
asked the State Bar for sanctions against Mr. Peacock for his misconduct, but Mr.
Sanchez remained silent. Mr. Peacock had violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 False Statements,
18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to defraud the United States, and 18 U.S.C. § 241
Conspiracy against rights.
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79. The only plausible explanation is that Mr. Sanchez’s loyalty was for the opposition and
not his client. Mr. Sanchez, no doubt intended to protect Mr. Peacock whos lies were at
best willful ignorance of the facts. Not only had Jose Sanchez capitulated to the
position of the employer, but he knew the rebuttal was due and knowingly failed to
issue it to the detriment of his client in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 Misprision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States and 18 U.S.C. § 241 Conspiracy against
rights.
80. After receiving the OSHA Secretary’s Findings dated September 6, 2016, the Plaintiff
knew it was grossly in error because it stated the reason for dismissal was “no
protected activity.” That couldn’t be right because the letter from the employees dated
July 27, 2016, had reported OSHA violations, which was protected activity under 29
U.S.C. § 660(c). The Plaintiff asked Mr. Sanchez to object to or appeal the finding. The
OSHA Whistleblower Investigations Manual (WIM) CPL_02-03-007 describes the
appeal process in detail, but it was ignored and circumvented in this case by the
Plaintiff’s lawyer and by the DWPP. Jose could have filed an objection with the
Administrative Law Judge or asked for a hearing by the Administrative Law Judge
immediately upon receiving the secretary’s findings. Alternatively, Mr. Sanchez could
have filed an appeal with the Directorate of Enforcement Programs (DEP) as provided
for by the WIM. Mr. Sanchez did neither of those. If Mr. Sanchez had followed the
proper procedure, either by filing an objection with the ALJ or filing an appeal with
the DEP, the objection or appeal would have most likely been rejected because
he had failed to issue a rebuttal to the employer’s response. The OSHA
investigator spoke with Mr. Sanchez on Friday, August 29 and asked him if he was
going to issue a rebuttal. He told her to keep it open until Tuesday, September 2, 2016,
just in case he decided to issue one. It is evident that Mr. Sanchez was not planning to
issue a rebuttal.
81. Once Mr. Sanchez had capitulated to the position of the employer in betrayal of his
client, he couldn’t issue a rebuttal, he couldn’t bring the case before an ALJ, and he
couldn’t file an appeal with the DEP. He had to do whatever he could to keep the
matter isolated to the DWPP, and it is most likely that the DWPP accommodated Mr.
Sanchez by feigning a bogus review to placate his client. It was in the interest of all co-
conspirators to appease the Plaintiff.

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82. The OSHA Whistleblower Investigations Manual is very clear Instead of filing an
objection with the ALJ or an appeal with the DEP as the Plaintiff had asked him to do,
Mr. Sanchez sent a letter to OSHA saying, “We ask that the case be reversed or in the
alternative, it be returned to the investigator for further investigation.” The Plaintiff
was utterly dumbfounded by such a stunt. He didn’t want the case to go before an
independent appeals committee or another perhaps honest investigator.
83. The Findings letter specifies the address of the DWPP for filing appeals, while the
WIM specifies in two locations the address of the DEP. The Secretary’s Findings
issued by OSHA directs appeals back to the DWPP. The right to appeal is not included
in Section 11(c) of the OSH, Act, but a precedent has been set by the practice of
allowing whistleblowers and employees to appeal decisions. The problem, at least in
this case, is that OSHA has capriciously and arbitrarily abused administrative
discretion to violate the Plaintiff’s right to equal protection of the law. Another
seemingly strange anomaly is that the Secretary’s Findings of September 6, 2016, was
sent from OSHA’s Baton Rouge Office.
84. The following facts are proved in the FOIA disclosure, the case correspondence, email
between Mr. Sanchez and I, and the police video. Jose Sanchez wasn’t negligent or
incompetent. He was quite creative and diligent in undermining his client. His actions
were by no stretch of the imagination mistakes or oversights. Mr. Sanchez acted
knowingly and intentionally to obstruct a federal process in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4
Misprision, 18 U.S.C. § 201 Bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 241 Conspiracy against rights, 18
U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 False
Statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 Frauds and Swindles, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 Fraid by wire, 18
U.S.C. § 1349 Conspiracy Attempt, 18 U.S.C. § 1505 Obstruction of process before
departments, and 18 U.S.C. § 1951 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats
or Violence.
85. The culpability of the OSHA Regional Investigator can be established unequivocally,
irrefutably, and beyond any doubt by a mere cursory examination of the facts. Ms.
Rossana Nardizzi’s misconduct is blazingly evident from the omission of the first and
most fundamental requirement of the investigation. The OSHA Whistleblower
Investigations Manual  Chapter 3-Conduct of the Investigation  VI-The
Field Investigation  B-Contact with Complainant states, “The investigator’s

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initial contact with the complainant should be made during the complaint intake and
evaluation process. The assigned investigator must contact the complainant as soon as
possible after receipt of the case assignment. Contact must be made even if the
investigator’s caseload is such that the actual field investigation may be delayed.” Ms.
Nardizzi’s intentions couldn’t have been more conspicuous. She never intended to
listen to what the Plaintiff had to say. OSHA issued the Secretary’s Findings
dismissing the case on September 6, 2016, without contacting the Plaintiff. That was a
clear violation of the Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right to due process of law in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 243 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law and 18 U.S.C. §
241 Conspiracy against rights.
86. On September 6, 2016, OSHA issued the Secretary’s Findings dismissing the case. The
reason given for the non-merit finding was that there had been no protected activity.
That was absurd because the letter from the employees had reported OSHA violations
which is expressly protected under Section 11(c) of the OSH Act. The wording in the
Secretary’s Findings issued on September 6, 2016, was: “The evidence gathered during
the investigation showed that three employees complained to Respondent when they
signed and sent the letter to Respondent. Respondent terminated their son, for family
reasons and because of this, the other Complainants assumed they were fired and left
the worksite. Therefore, OSHA does not have reasonable cause to believe Complainant
engaged in protected activity.” However, OSHA’s opinion doesn’t count. OSHA
somehow believes that as an administrative agency, they can make law by fiat. They
have taken the term, “discretionary latitude” to mean omnipotence and they have
overstepped their legal bounds, It doesn’t matter what OSHA thinks. A letter from the
Waller Media employees reported OSHA violations. That is quintessentially protected
activity. Rossana Nardizzi, Anthony Incristi, Angela Fisher, other OSHA employees,
and others known and unknown conspired with Ricky Richards, Susie Waller, Alicia
Tennison, and Nick Peacock to assure the dismissal of the OSHA investigation in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States.
87. When Ms. Nardizzi started contacting the Waller Media employees in March of 2017,
she told them that she was taking the interviews a second time because the case files
had all been destroyed. That is confirmed in a February 7, 2017 email from William T.
White to Anthony Incristi. After Ms. Nardizzi conducted the interviews a second time,

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OSHA internal email indicated that the second round of recorded interviews had also
gone missing just as the first had. The investigator provided summaries of the
interviews which she wrote from memory weeks after she had conducted them. The
investigator didn’t send copies of her summaries to the claimants for review and
approval. The investigator had already used the excuse that all six of the interviews
she had conducted in August of 2016 had been destroyed. Now, once again she is using
that same excuse for all six interviews conducted in March of 2017.
88. In confirmation of OSHA’s nefarious intent, the investigator's summaries were wholly
redacted in an FOIA disclosure provided to the Plaintiff in January of 2018. The
claimants did not request that the interviews remain confidential, yet they were
redacted. Any testimony favorable to the respondent may not be redacted according to
the OSHA Whistleblower Investigations Manual. Rossana Nardizzi, Anthony Incristi,
Angela Fisher, and others known and unknown violated 18 U.S.C. § 1519 Destruction,
Alteration, or Falsification of records for the second count if you consider each set of
six interviews to be one count.
89. There was no legitimate testimony for the employer in the OSHA case file. The truth
is that the OSHA investigator eliminated any evidence that might contradict her
objective to dismiss the case. Rossana Nardizzi, Anthony Incristi, and Angela Fisher
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1519 Destruction, Alteration, or Falsification of records.
90. Ignored Video Because it Controverted Non-Merit Finding
91. The OSHA investigator ignored the video testimony of Susie Waller, Phil Shinalt, and
Alicia Tennison who were witnesses for the employer because their testimony
conflicted with the Secretary’s Findings.
92. The OSHA investigator failed even to contact the Plaintiff before OSHA issued the
Secretary’s Findings on September 6, 2016.
93. Even though it is possible to prove the unlawful misconduct of the OSHA investigator
and other OSHA employees, the FOIA disclosure provided to the Plaintiff in January
of 2018 was unlawfully redacted to conceal the misconduct of OSHA employees,
specifically to conceal that the employees were influenced by bribery. The amount of
effort exerted by the OSHA employees to justify dismissal of the case would not make
sense in any other context. For example, all of the “so-called” summaries of the
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claimant interviews which were submitted in place of the two sets of six recorded
interviews or twelve interviews total were supposedly misplaced or inadvertently
deleted by the OSHA investigator. The “so-called” summaries were written weeks after
the actual interviews. It strains credulity enough that the investigator says she lost or
inadvertently deleted all twelve recorded interviews, but the idea that she accurately
recollected the testimony of all six claimants is not credible especially since the
summaries were never sent to the claimants for review and were never authenticated
by the signature of the claimants as accurate and authentic. That would suggest that
the investigator and other employees at OSHA have an interest in keeping these
summaries from the claimants. The fact that the summaries were wholly redacted in
the FOIA disclosure drives OSHA’s credibility over the edge in this case.
Circumstances would indicate that OSHA has a lot to hide and that OSHA employees
grossly and illegally redacted the case file in the FOIA disclosure provided to the
Plaintiff in January of 2018 to avoid incrimination.
X. SLANDER, LIBEL, AND DEFAMATION
94. Susie Waller, Alicia Waller, and Dorothy Waller engaged in an intense campaign to
destroy the Plaintiff’s reputation, his credibility, and his ability to gain meaningful
employment in his profession. Susie Waller had convinced Dorothy Waller that she
could get more money out of Dorothy’s assets by various schemes to avoid paying debts
and by misrepresenting assets. Susie also convinced Alicia that she would take care of
her and that they would divide up the Plaintiff’s share of the inheritance.
95. After Dudley Waller had sold five of his radio stations for $26 million in 2005, Susie
and Alicia thought they were rich, and the money would never end. However, in the
last quarter of 2007, Alex Dryden, an analyst for International Profit Associates,
warned Dorothy and Dudley Waller that they would be out of money by the end of
2008. The Wallers had spent almost $3 million a year for three years. It must have
been terrifying for them to think that the money might run out and they wouldn’t be
able to maintain their positions of superiority.
96. The scheme Susie and Alicia contrived to take control of Dorothy’s assets was to use
the Plaintiff as a scapegoat by convincing people that he was trying to take control of
Dorothy’s assets. While everyone was focused on the Plaintiff, Susie could take control.

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97. Susie and Alicia terrorized Dorothy by convincing her that the Plaintiff had stolen
millions of dollars and that he was going to take her last dime if she didn’t give Susie
control of her assets. She portrayed the Plaintiff as entirely depraved so that no one
would want to have anything to do with him or believe anything he had to say.
98. Susie Waller’s most exceptional talent that she has spent a lifetime cultivating is the
dark art of Character Assassination, and in this instance, she has monetized it for a
profit of $3 million, the value of Dorothy’s assets. The life of the Plaintiff was
destroyed in the process, but that’s just icing on the cake to Susie. The only thing
Susie likes more than money is watching people squirm as she crushes them.
99. Susie Waller would come to the Waller Media offices at night and rummage through
the employees’ desks, sometimes leaving disturbing and insulting notes for them.
Several times, the Plaintiff noticed that someone had tampered with the air
conditioning return vent at the bottom of the door in his engineering office. On one
occasion, he found it had been removed and was leaning up against the wall. There
was no doubt that someone had been in his office. Plaintiff believes that it was Susie
conducting a witch hunt to find something to use against him.
100. When Susie took over Waller Media, the Plaintiff was never allowed to retrieve any of
his personal belongings. His personal computer was beside his desk in the engineering
office. Susie had someone hack into the Plaintiff’s computer and then took it to her
house. She made it available to her house guests so that they could rummage through
his private and personal files. The computer’s solid-state mass storage contained ten
years of personal information including bank statements, income tax returns, credit
card statements, personal email, personal journals, personal identifying information,
and thousands of personal photographs. There were personal letters to and from the
Plaintiff’s Wife, the Plaintiff’s sister-in-law, and other acquaintances. It was extremely
embarrassing to know that his private information was the subject of her party guests.
Susie wanted so badly to hurt the Plaintiff as much as she could. She bragged that she
let Rob Gregg print out a stack of the Plaintiff’s email to carry to the U.S. Attorney.
There was absolutely nothing in the Plaintiff’s email that could have possibly been
incriminating. Susie spread rumors that the FBI was investigating the Plaintiff and
many people believed that.

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101. When Susie took over Waller Media, she tried to entrap the Waller Media employees
to have them arrested. She wanted as much drama as possible and the presence of the
police, especially if they took the employees to jail would make it look as if the rumors
she had been spreading about the Plaintiff stealing money were true. It would look
like the police had raided Waller Media to arrest the Plaintiff and his band of outlaws
for stealing millions of dollars. She left the side door open, and the employees had no
idea what was going on when they found their keys wouldn’t work in the front door.
The lock had been cranky in the past, so they didn’t know if it had finally just refused
to open. Whey they found the side door open, they entered the building. They had no
idea that Susie was hiding in a car a block away waiting to ambush them. After they
had entered the building, Susie went to the Jacksonville Police Department and
reported that the employees had all received a letter on the preceding Friday (July 29,
2016), terminating their employment and that they had now broken into the building
and were trespassing. The police were reluctant to respond, but from the lobby of the
police department, Susie called Ricky Richards on her cell phone. Four police cruisers
were immediately dispatched to the Waller Media office Building. The investigating
officer told Susie that he had read the letter which Susie said the employees had
received on Friday. He told her that her story didn’t make sense and he had read the
letter and it wasn’t a letter of termination, so none of the employees were arrested.
102. Susie had spread her rumors all over town that the Plaintiff had been stealing
millions of dollars and because of the morning traffic along the two main highways in
Jacksonville, Texas it was a perfect location for a spectacle. No doubt having the four
police cruisers present fueled the rumors. Susie had no other reason to get the police
involved except to bolster the lies she had told about the Plaintiff stealing millions of
dollars. She wanted to humiliate and embarrass the employees by having them
arrested. Susie and Phil Shinalt bragged on Facebook calling the event “SHOCK AND
AWE.”
103. Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Dorothy Waller entertained guests and had many
meetings with prospective buyers of the radio stations in which they would tell many
untrue stories that they made up about the Plaintiff, accusing him of stealing, say that
he was crazy, volatile, and dishonest. Susie invited her cohorts such as a local con-
artist, Phil Shinalt, and Charles Pribilski, a former Waller Media employee who had

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been fired for attempting to steal $3,000. Neither Susie nor Alicia had significant
knowledge of Waller Media, its management structure, or what the Plaintiff did for
the company, so virtually all of what they told was made up. Susie targeted
prominent professionals in the radio broadcast industry. Her tactic was to assemble as
many of her minions as possible to corroborate her fiction about the Plaintiff. Plaintiff
would have no way of knowing about most of these meetings, but a few of the known
parties are:
a. Rob Gregg – individual investor

b. Dave Garland – Media Broker
c. Scot Rice – Engineering Consultant
d. Rick Guest – Former Waller Media Manager
e. Educational Radio Foundation of East Texas
104. Rhonda Parsons Smith, a radio announcer who works for KTBB Radio Station,
forwarded Plaintiff a text message she received from Susie that started, “I guess you
heard Bill has been stealing.” Susie barely even knows Rhonda and certainly wasn’t on
the kind of terms with her that would warrant confiding in her. When Susie decides to
cause problems for someone, she will blast out text messages and emails to everyone
in her contact list. To avoid culpability, she will use her minions as proxies to spread
her caustic calumny
105. Plaintiff began receiving calls from broadcasters outside the state such as Mark Allen
in Gulfport, Mississippi, and Scott Rice of San Diego, California, telling him that Susie
had just contacted them to release an hour-long diatribe about how Plaintiff had been
stealing, how he had been kicked out of the Marines for homosexual conduct, or how
he was going to take his mother’s last dime. Every time the Plaintiff was involved in
firing an employee at Waller Media, Susie Waller would contact them and try to stir
them to file a lawsuit against Waller Media. Susie didn’t care that a lawsuit would
cost her parent’s money, as long as it made them angry with the Plaintiff.
106. Alicia wasn’t as prolific as Susie, but she was right there with Susie giving her support
and corroborating the rumors that Susie was spreading. Alicia’s venom for the
Plaintiff was revealed when the Plaintiff tried to contact his mother after he received
the letter terminating his employment. It was customary for Alicia or Susie to answer
Dorothy’s phone because Alicia and Susie monitor and censure her communications
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with the outside world. When the Plaintiff asked Alicia why they had fired him, she
replied, “Well Bill Boy, you remember when you fired me in 2008. Well, I guess what
goes around comes around doesn’t it Bill Boy.” Those were her exact words. Susie and
Alicia were a seething cauldron of malevolence. The Plaintiff had never fired Alicia,
but she and Susie had told that lie so many times she had come to believe it.
107. Alicia met several times with Alex Dryden, an analyst for International Profit
Associates who was hired by Dorothy and Dudley Waller in 2008 to create an estate
plan with trusts and wills. After Dudley passed away on May 29, 2016, Alicia
conspired with Susie and Dorothy to conceal or destroy the IPA estate plan because it
would have prevented Susie from taking control of Dorothy’s assets. Alicia was named
as the alternate attorney-in-fact in the power of attorney document that gave Susie
control of Dorothy’s assets. Just listen to how Alicia talks about the Plaintiff in the
police video from August 1, 2016, the day that Susie took over Waller Media. She
portrayed the Plaintiff as the vilest and most despicable person who was crazy,
violent, and would do anything. She claimed they had to “secure the transmitters”
because Bill (the Plaintiff) would do anything. There was no truth to it. Alicia was
saying it to destroy the Plaintiff’s credibility and make people hate him. She wanted
revenge for something that never happened. That’s the dark nature of Susie and
Alicia. They love to hate and destroy. It is as if they have some insatiable primal need
to rip into others and chew them to pieces with manipulation and gossip.
108. Dorothy attended the many meetings and corroborated Susie’s stories. Dorothy lied
about the IPA estate plan, trusts, and wills that were never entered into probate. Most
of all, Dorothy bankrolled Susie’s character assassination plot against the Plaintiff.
Dorothy provided a $48,000 per year salary for Susie even though Susie did not work
for Waller Media. Dorothy paid for the legal fees of everyone in the family who wanted
to join in the action against the Plaintiff. In 2016, Dorothy paid for the legal fees of
Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Reid Waller in action against the Plaintiff. Dudley
Waller had wanted to make sure that Susie didn’t take over the estate when he died.
Dorothy had spent about $250,000 having an estate plan prepared by IPA that would
have prevented Susie from taking over. Dorothy conspired with Susie and helped her
conceal that estate plan after his death. Then Dorothy signed over control of Waller
Media to Susie and executed a letter terminating the Plaintiff’s employment.

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109. The Plaintiff is nothing like the person Susie and Alicia had made him out to be. The
former employees of Waller Media will testify that the Plaintiff was compassionate,
honest, and extremely diligent and hard working. None of the stories that Susie,
Alicia, Dorothy, and Ricky Richards used to destroy the Plaintiff’s reputation had even
the slightest amount of truth to them. What was true is that Susie wanted to take
control of Dorothy’s $3 million estate and she knew that the Plaintiff would oppose
her. She had to justify ejecting the Plaintiff from the family, and she had to make sure
that other family members loathed him so much that they wouldn’t want to talk to
him. Susie is very good at destroying people. She has had lots of practice.
110. Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy falsely accused Plaintiff of stealing millions of dollars from
Waller Media by both oral and written communications and they spread rumors that
he had done so. The Plaintiff has never stolen a dime from Waller Media, and there is
not one shred of evidence that he did so. The Plaintiff was the Chief Engineer and IT
Manager for Waller Media, and he did not handle money or write checks. The
company had a full-time business Manager, a Magna Cum Laude graduate of the
University of Texas with a Master of Business Administration (MBA) who managed
the financial operations of Waller Media. There was no money missing.
111. Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy falsely accused Plaintiff of bankrupting Waller Media by
both oral and written communications and they spread rumors that he had done so.
First, the Plaintiff was the Chief Engineer and IT Manager of Waller Media. That was
a 60+ hour a week job as he had replaced two employees when he took the job. Waller
Media had a full-time General Manager, Angie Dolezal. There had been at least five
other General Manager’s in the 11 years that the Plaintiff worked for Waller Media.
Second, Waller Media was nowhere, near being bankrupt or insolvent. Waller Media
had a debt/equity ratio of less than .25, which is outstanding for a radio station. The
fact that Waller Media was sold for $1.2 million in March of 2017 is unequivocal proof
that it was anything but insolvent.
112. Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy alleged and spread rumors that Plaintiff was mentally ill,
volatile, crazy and that he would do anything, yet outside Susie’s coterie of minions, no
one who has ever known the Plaintiff would believe that. The only people who would
believe anything like that didn’t get it from knowing the Plaintiff. They got it from
Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy telling one fictitious story after another to make them

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believe it. The Plaintiff has never been arrested or disciplined, and no person except
those Susie has corrupted would believe that he is anything but kind and hard-
working. Plaintiff does admit that after spending years listening to people tell him
how his Sisters have trashed his reputation and knowing that they have truly
destroyed his reputation so that he may die in poor health and poverty, that he is now
angry with them.
113. Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy spread rumors that Plaintiff had sabotaged the
transmitters and towers. That is patently absurd, and there is not one bit of evidence
that would indicate he had done so. When Susie took over Waller Media, her first act
as “manager” was to hire an engineer whom she sent out to “secure the equipment.”
His incompetent blundering rendered all four transmitters inoperable. When the
stations went off-air, cash flow came to a grinding halt and advertisers who had
planned their business activities around their spot schedules were alienated. The first
week the stations were off-air, it cost Waller Media at least $20,000 in cash receipts.
The stations remained off the air for ten months. For some unknown reason, Susie one
day just decided to dismantle all the studio equipment and pile it in the back room. It
had taken months to install all that equipment, and there were hundreds of wires in
each studio connecting all the equipment. When ETRM purchased the radio station,
they had to pay an engineering company $70,000 to repair all the damage Susie had
done. The radio stations were operating perfectly with high-quality signals when Susie
took over, and the Plaintiff never touched any of the equipment after that. It was
Susie who sabotaged the equipment, and she and Alicia dare to say that the Plaintiff
is crazy?
114. The Plaintiff had made an offer to Dorothy Waller to pay $1.165 million for the radio
stations in July of 2016 before Susie took over. The Plaintiff had calculated that
amount based on a 15% ROI over the next ten years. It was a fair price. His offer was
flatly rejected because Susie told Dorothy that the Plaintiff was trying to cheat her
and that she could get $5 million for the stations. Susie ended up selling the stations
for $1.2 million, but she fraudulently and grossly inflated the asset list to make them
appear to be more valuable than they were. The truth is that the stations had lost
about half their value by being off-air for ten months. They were realistically worth
about $600,000 or less when Susie sold them. The $1.2 million was also artificially

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inflated by a $189,000 allowance for any repair work that had to be done on the
stations. So, Susie had lied when she told other family members that the Plaintiff was
trying to cheat them out of the radio stations. She also lied and committed fraud when
she presented the asset list to the new buyer. The repercussions of Susie’s lying were
that the Plaintiff was deprived of the promise his father had made to him when he
went to work for Waller Media, and the new owner got far less value than he had been
led to believe. The buyer, ETRM is now in a dire financial situation, and Plaintiff
routinely receives calls from creditors trying to collect money from them. About two
weeks ago, the electric company pulled their electric meter taking all four stations off-
air once again. Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy have hurt many people with their lies.
115. Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy conspired to conceal or destroy the Last Will of Dudley
Waller which had been created by IPA. To cover-up their deception, they started
spreading rumors that the Plaintiff was crazy and that he had fabricated or imagined
the story about the estate plan and wills created by IPA in 2008. Not only had their
calumny injured Plaintiff’s reputation and credibility, but it had also served to conceal
a violation of Tex. Penal Code § 32.47 Destruction or Concealment of a Writing. It was
not true that the Plaintiff had made up the IPA estate plan and the Plaintiff will
provide proof of that.
116. Susie, Alicia, and Dorothy spread rumors that Plaintiff had been kicked out of the
Marine Corps for homosexual conduct. It is unimaginable how they could have
justified telling such a falsehood, but some people are bound to believe it because
people love to gossip. The Plaintiff prays that the court would send a clear and
resounding message to those who would sully the image or veteran Sailors, Airmen,
Marines, and Soldiers who have guarded the freedom of this nation by their honorable
military service.
117. Defendants' conduct was outrageous, malicious, and criminal. They used defamation
as an instrument of fraud. They served their greed and gratified their need to feel the
power of destroying others and proximately caused Plaintiffs injury and emotional
distress.
XI. DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS (LIBEL AND SLANDER)

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119. The following defamatory, libelous, and slanderous statements were made adamantly
and repeatedly both orally and in writing by defendants in meetings, phone
conversations, social media, and text messages. They weren’t isolated instances, but
an intentional, concerted, and prolonged Campaign to Assassinate Plaintiff’s
Character. These statements were incorporated and became intrinsic to acts of fraud
by the defendants for personal enrichment. The following statements were entirely
false and without merit. The defendants both orally and in writing stated adamantly,
repeatedly, and maliciously.
a. that Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars from Waller Media and Dorothy
Waller;
b. that Plaintiff had a plan to take all of Dorothy’s money;
c. that Plaintiff had been kicked out of the Marine Corps for homosexual conduct;
d. that Plaintiff had lied and made up that Dudley and Dorothy Waller had
commissioned International Profit Associates to create an estate plan with trusts
and wills that would have prevented Susie from taking control of Dorothy Waller’s
assets;
e. that plaintiff was crazy, volatile, and would do anything;
f. that Plaintiff had mismanaged and bankrupted Waller Media and/or caused it to
become insolvent; and
g. that Plaintiff had made all the Waller Media employees hate Susie.
CAUSE OF ACTION
XII. LIBEL AND SLANDER
121. Defendant’s are all non-media defendants.
122. The Plaintiff is a private individual and is neither a public official nor a public figure
for any purpose.
123. The foregoing statements made and published by Defendants were statements of fact
that were false, both in their particular details and in the main point, essence, or gist
in the context in which they were made.

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124. The foregoing statements made and published by Defendants directly and/or indirectly
referred to the Plaintiff.
125. Defendant’s oral and written statements were defamatory per se because Defendants
falsely accused the Plaintiff of committing a crime.
injured Plaintiff in his or her profession and/or occupation.
injured Plaintiff’s reputation and exposed Plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule and/or financial injury.
impeached Plaintiff’s honesty, integrity, virtue and/or reputation.
129. These types of allegations make a Defendants strictly liable to the Plaintiff under
Texas law because they are defamation per se.
130. The defamatory statements require no proof of its injurious character because they
were obviously hurtful to the Plaintiff.
131. The defamatory statements require no proof of injurious character because they were
obviously hurtful to the Plaintiff.
132. The Defendants are strictly liable for the damages caused by the libel and/or slander.
133. Alternatively, Defendants knew the foregoing defamatory statements were false or
were reckless with regard to whether the statements of fact were false.
134. Alternatively, Defendants knew or should have known the defamatory statements
were false.
135. The Plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages, general damages, special
damages, and/or exemplary damages.
CAUSE OF ACTION
XIII. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

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137. The actions of Defendants constitute the necessary elements of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress. Defendants carried on a continuing course of conduct which was
intentional, reckless, extreme and outrageous and meant to harass the Plaintiff and
cause severe emotional distress and which was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's
physical demise. Susie Waller bragged, “When I get through with him, he won’t be
able to get a job greeting customers at Walmart.
138. Plaintiff continues to suffer severe emotional distress because of Defendants' extreme
and outrageous conduct. Defendants intentionally or recklessly made statements that
created a high degree of risk of harm, yet deliberately proceeded to act with conscious
disregard or indifference to the risk. Specifically, Defendants made false statements of
fact to members of a small but well-connected community of commercial radio
broadcasters which compose the entire prospective job market of the Plaintiff. The
Defendants targeted the Plaintiff’s ability to pursue a meaningful occupation.
CAUSE OF ACTION
XIV. INVASION OF PRIVACY
140. The actions of Defendants constitute the necessary elements of Invasion of Privacy.
Susie Waller had someone hack into the Plaintiff’s private mass storage to access
personal email, ten years of personal financial information including tax returns,
credit card statements, bank statements, journals, photographs, and correspondence.
141. The Plaintiff’s whole private world was hacked into and put on display for anyone and
everyone to rummage through. Susie moved the computer to her house where she gave
her house guests unrestricted access to the Plaintiff’s files. Defendants are continuing
the course of conduct which is intentional, ruthless, extreme, outrageous, meant to
harass the Plaintiff, and was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries.
XV. CIVIL CONSPIRACY

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143. Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards, Nick Peacock, Jose Sanchez, Steve
Guy, and others known and unknown acted in conspiracy with the intent to deceive
Dorothy Waller, the United States, and others, to intimidate, threaten, and coerce
Dorothy Waller to sign control of her assets over to Susie.
144. Richards and Peacock conspired with Susie and Alicia to commit deceitful and
fraudulent acts with the intent to defraud, to deprive the Plaintiff of his employment,
his ability to gain meaningful employment, his health, his reputation, his quality of
life, and his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, and
to conceal the violations of a staggering number of state and federal criminal statutes.
Obstruction of justice, bribery of federal agents, and deprivation of rights under color
of law wouldn’t have been necessary if the tortfeasors had not first escalated their
campaign of skullduggery by committing forgery and fraud.
145. Plaintiff discovered that the Defendants had intercepted and altered a federally
protected letter in violations of Tex. Penal Code §§ 32.21 Forgery (first degree), 32.46
Securing Execution of Documents by Deception, 32.53 Exploitation of elderly, 18
U.S.C. §§ 371 Conspiracy Against the United States, 1505 Obstruction of proceedings,
and 1951 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence.
146. Defendants then again escalated their illegal conduct to affect the dismissal of
complaints of retaliation under Section 11(c) of the OSH Act. In the cover-up, the
Defendants redoubled their efforts to portray Plaintiff as the vilest and most
despicable person imaginable in the second wave of federal criminal violations that
included the bribery and improper influence of federal agents and OSHA
Whistleblower Protection Programs management level employees up to and including
the Acting Director of the Directorate, Francis Yebessi.
147. The Defendants and others had conspired to commit forgery and fraud by intercepting
and altering a letter protected under Section 11(c) of the OSH Act.
148. Ricky Richards aided and abetted the fraudulent conspiracy by corroborating the
fiction of Susie Waller and Alicia Tennison. It was his false statement to Dorothy
Waller and other family members that was the “but for” proximate cause of the
Plaintiff’s termination of employment.
149. The response of Nick Peacock to OSHA contained false statements.

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150. Jose Sanchez capitulated with the position of the employer in the OSHA investigation
and refrained from, issuing a rebuttal to the employer’s response which was the “but
for” proximate cause for the OSHA investigation being dismissed.
151. Mr. Sanchez was asked to file an appeal, and let Plaintiff to believe he had filed an
appeal, but did not follow the procedure specified in the OSHA Whistleblower
Investigations Manual (WIM) and did not file an appeal, but sent a letter back to the
WPP instead of to the Directorate of Enforcement Programs as specified in the WIM.
152. The last chance for remediation was a defamation lawsuit which was sabotaged by Mr.
Sanchez and Mr. Guy at every single opportunity. The two sisters and four lawyers
had ganged up on Plaintiff to undermine, discredit, and cheat him out of his right to
due process of law under the Fifth Amendment as well as monetary remediation of the
severe injuries they had caused to Plaintiff. The conspiracy of the defendants
proximately caused injury and emotional distress to plaintiff.
153. Defendants acted together to accomplish the libel, slander, and/or tortious
interference with an existing contract. Defendants had a meeting of the minds on the
object or course of action and committed one or more of the unlawful, overt acts detailed
above.
154. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the injuries the Plaintiff suffered as a
proximate result of Defendants' wrongful actions.
XVI. RATIFICATION
156. Each Defendant ratified the libel, slander, and/or tortious interference with an
existing contract committed by all other Defendants through approving such
conduct after acquiring full knowledge of the same with the intent of giving validity to
the tortious conduct.
XVII. RETRACTION
158. Pursuant to the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, The Plaintiff requests that
Defendants correct, clarify, or retract the statements detailed above. The statements
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were defamatory by (1) injuring The Plaintiff's reputation and have exposed The
Plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and/or financial injury; (2) by
impeaching The Plaintiff's honesty, integrity, virtue, and/or reputation; (3) by
injuring The Plaintiff in his office, profession, and/or occupation; and (4) by falsely
charging The Plaintiff with the commission of crimes.
XVIII. RACKETEERING INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
160. Susie and Alicia used defamation as a primary instrument of crime. They tormented
Dorothy threatening that the Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars already and he
would take her last dime if she didn’t give control of her assets to Susie.
161. The acts of defamation proximately caused injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff
and also constituted threats against Dorothy Waller. The threats were used in
violation of the Hobbs Act to coerce Dorothy Waller into terminating Plaintiff’s
employment and giving control of her assets including Waller Media to Susie
proximately causing more and egregious injury and emotional distress to plaintiff.
162. Waller Media operated four radio stations as instruments of interstate commerce,
placing Waller Media within the jurisdiction of the Hobbs and RICO Acts.
163. A pattern of criminal activity was precipitated by attempts to cover-up previous

criminal acts.
FIRST RICO VIOLATION
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) Acquisition of Control - The Plaintiff will show by a preponderance
of the evidence that Susie Waller by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity
acquired or maintained an interest in, or controlled Waller Media, LLC from
approximately May of 2016 through January of 2018.
165. Waller Media is used collectively to refer to Waller Media, LLC, Waller Broadcasting,
Inc., and Waller Properties, Inc., companies owned by Dorothy Waller and registered
with the secretary of state of Texas.
166. Waller Media operated four radio stations as instruments of interstate commerce.

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167. As can be seen in the predicates list, Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards,
Nick Peacock, Jose Sanchez, and Steve Guy acted in conspiracy to assist Susie to take
control of Dorothy Waller’s assets by violations of the Hobbs Act. They terrorized
Dorothy and threatened that if she didn’t give control of her assets to Susie, that
Plaintiff would take her last dime.
168. Susie Waller took control of Waller Media on August 1, 2016, after securing the
termination of the Plaintiff. She operated the stations, continuing her conspiracy
against Plaintiff and her pattern of criminal activity until the consummation of an
Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) in January of 2017.
169. This violation of the RICO act was a “but for” proximate cause of Plaintiff’s loss of
employment on August 1, 2016.
SECOND RICO VIOLATION
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) Operation - The Plaintiff will show by a preponderance of the
evidence that Susie Waller was employed by Waller Media and in control of Waller
Media from August 1, 2016, through January of 2017.
171. Waller Media is used collectively to refer to Waller Media, LLC, Waller Broadcasting,
Inc., and Waller Properties, Inc., companies owned by Dorothy Waller and registered
with the secretary of state of Texas.
172. Waller Media operated four radio stations as instruments of interstate commerce. See
paragraph 15 under the heading, INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
173. Susie Waller knowingly and willfully conducted and participated, directly and
indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of Waller Media; and
174. She did so knowingly and willfully through a pattern of racketeering activity.
THIRD RICO VIOLATION
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) Conspiracy - The Plaintiff will show by a preponderance of the
evidence that Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, Charles Pribilski, Ricky Richards, Nick
Peacock, Jose Sanchez, Steve Guy, Rossana Nardizzi, Anthony Incristi, Angela Fisher,
and Francis Yebesi entered into a conspiracy to take over and then operate Waller
Media in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (b,c). Susie Waller and her co-conspirators

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committed more than 30 predicate acts related to the takeover, operation, or cover-up
of crimes.
XIX. RICO PREDICATES
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b-d) PREDICATE ACTS
(1) June 2016 through Present – Tex. Penal Code § 32.53 Exploitation of Elderly, to
wit: Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Jimmy Arber used brainwashing and
mind-control techniques to dominate and subjugate Dorothy Waller. Dorothy has
been sequestered in her own home as Susie Waller and Jimmy Arber have moved
in with her and helped themselves to her bank account and other assets. Any
communications with persons outside Susie Waller’s tight realm of control are
strictly monitored and controlled. Susie has a power of attorney with a waiver of
fiduciary duty which allows her to plunder Dorothy’s assets unfettered. Dorothy,
much like the hostages of the 1983 Stockholm bank robbery, has completely
trauma bonded and operantly conditioned loyalty for Susie. She is afraid to say
anything against Susie, even when Susie isn’t present for fear that she will find
out.
(2) June 1, 2016 – Tex. Penal Code § 32.47 (state jail) Destruction of Documents, to
wit: Dudley Waller’s will which had been created by International Profit
Associates in 2008.
(3) July 2016 – Tex. Penal Code § 32.46 (first degree) Securing Execution of
Documents by Deception, to wit: Susie Waller and Alicia Tennison deceived
Dorothy Waller by convincing her that the Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars
and he was going to take her last dime if she didn’t give Susie control of her
assets.
(4) July 2016 – Tex. Penal Code § 32.46 (first degree) Securing Execution of
Documents by Deception, to wit: Susie Waller and Alicia Tennison deceived
Dorothy Waller by convincing her that the Plaintiff had stolen millions of dollars
and he was going to take her last dime if she didn’t execute a new will naming
Susie as executrix and sole heir.
(5) July 27, 2016 – Tex. Penal Code § 32.21 (first degree) Forgery, to wit: Susie
Waller and Alicia Tennison intercepted and altered a letter from the employees of

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Waller Media by adding the sentence, “If you don’t turn the radio stations over to
Bill Waller by Friday at 9:00 AM, we will all quit, we will walk out.”
(6) July 29, 2016 – Tex. Penal Code § 32.46 Securing Execution of Documents by
Deception, to wit: Susie Waller and Alicia Tennison took the letter to Ricky
Richards who upon reading it declared to Dorothy Waller and other family
members, “There is no doubt in my mind this is a mastermind elaborate plan
that he has had to take all this money from your Mother.” “You have got to get
your Brother out of there.” “fire every one of them.” Ricky had no other reason
but the forged letter to believe that the Plaintiff had a plan to take Dorothy’s
money. Susie had been unable to convince Dorothy to terminate the Plaintiff’s
employment until Richards interpreted the forged letter as extortion by the
Plaintiff.
(7) July 29, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, to wit:
Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards conspired to interfere with or
obstruct a federal investigation. The letter from the employees had reported
OSHA violations and was therefore protected under Section 11(c) of the OSH Act.
The falsification of the letter from the employees was invented as a fraudulent
pretext for firing the employees and as a defense to anticipated claims of
retaliation.
(8) July 29, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1951 Interference with Interstate Commerce through
Threats or Violence, to wit: Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards
conspired to terrorize and threaten Dorothy Waller by making her believe that
the Plaintiff would take her last dime if she didn’t cede control of her assets to
Susie Waller. August 1, 2016 – 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) Judicial Review, to wit: The
employees of Waller Media arrived at work to find they had been locked out and
terminated without notice just two working days after engaging in protected
activity under the Section 11(c) of the OSH Act. The adverse action was in
response to a July 27, 2016 letter from the employees reporting OSHA violations.
(9) August 2016 – Tex. Penal Code § 71.02 Organized Crime, to wit: Susie Waller,
Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards, Nick Peacock, Jose Sanchez, and Steve Guy
entered into a conspiracy to engage in, and to cover-up the swindle of Dorothy
Waller’s assets by Susie Waller.

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(10) August 2016 – 18 U.S.C. 201 § Bribery, to wit: Circumstantial evidence will prove
that Ricky Richards bribed the OSHA WPP to affect the dismissal of retaliation
claims by former Waller Media employees.
(11) August 1, 2016, through Present – Tex. Penal Code § 33.02 (b-1)(2)(C) Breach of
Computer Security (state jail), to wit: Susie Waller and accomplices took control
of the Plaintiff’s workstation (computer system) without the consent of the owner
(Plaintiff) with the intent to obtain or use files and data stored in the computer to
defraud or harm the Plaintiff.
(12) August 1, 2016, through Present – 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)(A, B, C) and
(c)(2)(B)(ii) (imprisonment not more than 5 years) Fraud and Related Activity in
Connection with Computers, to wit: the defendants intentionally seized and
accessed the Plaintiff’s personal workstation (computer system) without
authorization and thereby obtained information from a protected computer in the
furtherance of criminal and tortious acts and in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States and the State of Texas. The National Information
Infrastructure Act of 1996 defines “protected computer” as “a computer- (B) which
is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication …” Because
Plaintiff’s computer was used to send, receive, and store email and other
communications about and related to Waller Media, an operator of FCC licensed
Radio Stations which were instruments of interstate commerce; it was a
protected computer subject to federal jurisdiction.
(13) August 23, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1001 False Statements, to wit: Nick Peacock, on
behalf of Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards submitted a response
to claims of retaliation that was not a traditional position statement, but an
emotional diatribe replete with false and misleading statements which were
material to an investigation and which were intended to cause OSHA to dismiss
the claims of retaliation and OSHA did wrongfully dismiss the claims of
retaliation.
(14) August 23, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1505 Obstruction of Proceedings Before
Departments, to wit: By making false statements to OSHA Nick Peacock
obstructed a federal investigation under Section 11(c) of the OSH Act.
(15) August 23, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1341 Frauds and Swindles, to wit: Nick Peacock
sent a fraudulent response to OSHA via the U.S. Postal Service.

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(16) August 23, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1349 Attempt and Conspiracy, to wit: Nick
Peacock, Ricky Richards, Susie Waller, and Alicia Tennison conspired to use the
U.S. Postal Service to influence a federal investigation by deceit.
(17) August 29, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1001 False Statements, to wit: Attorney Jose
Sanchez, at the behest of Ricky Richards made false statements to an OSHA
regional investigator stating that “Bill Waller’s problem was not with OSHA,”
meaning that his claim of retaliation was not meritorious. Mr. Sanchez knew
very well that this was not the position of his client. Mr. Sanchez had been
retained by the Plaintiff to represent him in his claim of retaliation. To blatantly
betray his client in such a fashion could only be a result of collusion and
conspiracy with the opposition. There is just no other explanation.
(18) September 2, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1505 Obstruction of Proceedings Before
Departments, to wit: Jose Sanchez knowingly and with malicious intent
capitulated to the position of the employer and then refrained from issuing a
rebuttal to the employer’s response.
(19) September 2, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, to
wit: Jose Sanchez, at the behest of Ricky Richards, Susie Waller, and Alicia
Tennison, capitulated to the position of the employer and failed to issue a
rebuttal to the employer’s response.
(20) September 6, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 243 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law,
to wit: The OSHA investigator dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation
without ever accomplishing her first obligation under the OSHA Whistleblower
Investigations Manual which was to interview the claimant and take his
testimony.
(21) September 6, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 241 Conspiracy Against Rights, to wit: Susie
Waller, Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards, Nick Peacock, Jose Sanchez, and
Rossana Nardizzi participated in a conspiracy to deprive the Plaintiff of his Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law.
(22) September 6, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1341 Frauds and Swindles, to wit: Ms. Nardizzi
caused the fraudulent Secretary’s Findings to be sent via the U.S. Postal Service
to the attorneys of record for the claimants and the employer.
(23) September 6, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1349 Attempt and Conspiracy, to wit: Susie

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Rossana Nardizzi conspired to use the U.S. Postal Service in the commission of
fraud.
(24) September 6, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 3 Accessory After the Fact, to wit: Ricky
Richards and Nick Peacock assisted Susie Waller and Alicia Tennison in the
cover-up of forgery and fraud. Jose Sanchez and Steve Guy helped Susie Waller,
Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards, and Nick Peacock in the cover-up of forgery and
fraud. Jose Sanchez made sure that the Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation was
dismissed by OSHA. Steve Guy made sure that the Plaintiff’s defamation lawsuit
was impotent.
(25) September 6, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 4 Misprision, to wit: the Plaintiff had made Mr.
Sanchez and Mr. Guy aware of the fraud, forgery, and false statements of the
Defendants, but refused to confront Mr. Peadcock. Mr. Sanchez told Mr. Waller
that he had issued a rebuttal to Nick Peacock’s fraudulent response to OSHA, but
an FOIA disclosure indicated that he did not. Both Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Guy did
everything possible to protect Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards, and
Nick Peacock.
(26) September 20, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States,
to wit: the Plaintiff had asked Jose Sanchez to file an appeal to the OSHA
decision. Mr. Sanchez informed Mr. Waller that he had filed the appeal. Mr.
Sanchez did not file an appeal but sent a letter to the OSHA DWPP requesting
that the case be returned to the same investigator for review. Mr. Sanchez
circumvented the standard procedures available for contesting a decision to avoid
the scrutiny of OSHA employees who were not corrupt.
(27) September 20, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1505 Obstruction of Proceedings Before
Departments, to wit: Jose Sanchez did not follow adequate procedures for
initiating an appeal, but circumvented the normal appeal process by making a
very odd request that the matter be returned to the same investigator for review.
(28) September 20, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1341 Frauds and Swindles, to wit: Mr.
Sanchez’s circumvention of the accepted process of the OSHA WPP was
fraudulent, and he sent the request by the U.S. Postal Service.
(29) September 20, 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1349 Attempt and Conspiracy, to wit: Susie

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Rossana Nardizzi conspired to use the U.S. Postal Service to perpetrate fraud
against the United States.
(30) February 2016 – 18 U.S.C. 1001 False Statements, to wit: Nick Peacock and Jose
Sanchez made false statements to the NLRB claiming that Waller Media was
insolvent. The deceitful intent of doing so was to limit the awards to the former
employees in settlement of their claims of retaliation under the NLRA. Jose
Sanchez knew very well that the Plaintiff’s position was that Waller Media was
not even close to being insolvent. That was one more confirmation of Mr.
Sanchez’s collusion with the opposition.
(31) February 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, to wit:
Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards, Nick Peacock, and Jose Sanchez
conspired to interfere with or obstruct a federal investigation of retaliation under
Section 11(c) of the OSH Act.
(32) February 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1505 Obstruction of Proceedings Before
Departments, to wit: Susie Waller, Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards, Nick
Peacock, and Jose Sanchez conspired to minimize the awards under a settlement
agreement with between the employees and Waller Media pursuant to a finding
by NLRB that Waller Media had acted in retaliation against the employees. Mr.
Sanchez capitulated and agreed with the fraudulent position of Nick Peacock
that Waller Media was insolvent and therefore unable to pay the employees a fair
settlement. In March of 2017, a buyer (East Texas Results Media) agreed to pay
$1.2 million for Waller Media proving unequivocally that the statements of Mr.
Sanchez and Mr. Peacock were both false and fraudulent.
(33) February 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1341 Frauds and Swindles, to wit: Mr. Sanchez and
Mr. Peacock used the U.S. Postal Service to send and receive correspondence
regarding the fraudulent settlement between Waller Media, the former
employees, and the NLRB.
(34) February 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1349 Attempt and Conspiracy, to wit: Susie Waller,
Alicia Tennison, Ricky Richards, Nick Peacock, and Jose Sanchez conspired to
use the U.S. Postal Service to perpetrate fraud against the United States.
(35) March 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1001 False Statements, to wit: The false statements of
Nick Peacock in his response to OSHA were propagated by Rossana Nardizzi into
her allegation summary and then to OSHA management personnel, and

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eventually to the Secretary’s findings. Mr. Peacock’s knowingly false and
misleading statements were material to a federal investigation.
(36) March 2016 – 18 U.S.C. § 1519 Destruction, Alteration, or Falsification of
Evidence, to wit: The OSHA regional investigator (RI), Rossana Nardizzi
conducted six interviews with the Waller Media claimants in August of 2016.
Those recordings were destroyed before they were uploaded to the case file in
OSHA’s IMIS database. The RI was asked to conduct the interviews a second
time by William T. White, a manager at OSHA. The investigator said she
inadvertently lost or destroyed the second round of interviews and instead
submitted summaries which she wrote from memory weeks after she had taken
the interviews. The interview summaries were never verified by the claimants
and therefore not admissible in the administrative investigation process.
177. The Plaintiff suffered actual damages which resulted from egregious criminal conduct,
fraud, malice, and gross negligence of the Defendants exceeding the threshold of
178. The Plaintiff asserts exclusion of the Limitations on the Amount of Recovery under
violated Tex. Penal Code §§ 32.21, 32.46, and 32.47, which resulted in the injuries for
which the Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages.
I. TEXAS PENAL CODE CHAPTER 31 – THEFT
180. Texas Penal Code § 31.03 states that “(a) A person commits an offense if he unlawfully
appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property. (b) Appropriation
of property is unlawful if (1) it is without the owner's effective consent; or (3) Consent
is not effective if it is (A) induced by deception or coercion; or (E) given by a person
who by reason of advanced age is known by the actor to have a diminished capacity to
make informed and rational decisions about the reasonable disposition of property. “
Id. 31.01(4) defines “Appropriate” as “(A) to bring about a transfer or purported
transfer of title to or other nonpossessory interest in property, whether to the actor or
another; or (B) to acquire or otherwise exercise control over property other than real

166
property.” Id. 31.03(e)(7) states that the offense is a felony of the first degree if the
value of the property stolen is $300,000 or more.
181. Susan Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Ricky Richards deceived, tormented, and
threatened Dorothy Waller by convincing her that the Plaintiff had stolen millions of
dollars from Waller Media and Dorothy, and that Plaintiff had an elaborate
mastermind plan to take all Dorothy’s money if Dorothy didn’t give control of her
assets to Susan.
182. Susan Waller appropriated Dorothy Waller’s assets by a durable general power of
attorney (DPA) with express permission for self-dealing and permission to loan
Dorothy’s money to herself or anyone else at 0% APR in perpetuity, which is a
violation of the Internal Revenue Code, 29 U.S.C. § 7201 if exercised.
183. Susan Waller sold Waller Media for $1.2 million on March 12, 2018. As Dorothy’s
attorney-in-fact, under the DPA, Susie has unrestricted access to the proceeds of the
sale with no obligation under the DPA to act in Dorothy’s best interest.
184. The theft of Dorothy’s assets was a critical element in the chain of causation which led
to the Plaintiff’s damages.
185. The Plaintiff suffered actual damages which resulted from egregious criminal conduct,
fraud, malice, and gross negligence of the Defendants exceeding the threshold of
II. TEXAS UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
Susan Took Ownership of Dorothy’s Homes
188. Defendants have violated the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Tex. Bus. &
Comm. Code 24.001 by the transfer of two homes, one on 1200 Kirkwood St. in
Jacksonville, Texas and the other at 1228 Canada St. in Jacksonville Texas into an
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irrevocable trust under which Dorothy will be allowed to possess, benefit, and use the
properties until her death at which time title will pass to Susan Waller. The Cherokee
County Appraisal District appraised the value of these homes in 2018 at $432,520.00,
which is believed to be below their true value. The Defendant-debtor made said
transfer after Plaintiff-creditor had notified Defendant of claims against them. The
deed is fraudulent because it lists as consideration, “Cash and other good and valuable
considerations, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,” and
Susie Waller did not possess sufficient assets to purchase those homes, the fair market
value of which is estimated to be more than $500,000. The Defendants made the
transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiff. A copy of the deed is
attached to this petition as Exhibit J.
XX. ONGOING DAMAGE
190. The incidents of August 1, 2016, and subsequently attracted media attention and had
been publicized by numerous entities. Plaintiff asserts that changes in technology, the
increasing role of the internet as a news source, the permanency of digital information
and the never-ending repercussions of this cyber smear of the Plaintiff by these
Defendants gives rise to repeating and recurring damages to this Plaintiff. For
example, every news article quoting the Defendants is still available online via the
internet and remains part of the searchable Archives of websites as the result of the
conduct of the Defendants.
XXI. AIDING AND ABETTING
192. Each Defendant has committed the foregoing torts of libel, slander, and/or tortious
interference with an existing contract. Each Defendant had knowledge that each Co-
defendant's conduct constituted libel, slander, and/or tortious interference with an
existing contract. Each Defendant intended to assist and did assist and/or encourage
each Co-defendant in committing the libel, slander, and/or tortious interference with
an existing contract. Each Defendants' assistance and/or encouragement was a

168
substantial factor in causing the libel, slander, and/or tortious interference with an
existing contract.
193. Each Defendant has committed the foregoing torts of libel, slander, and/or tortious
interference with an existing contract. Each Defendant provided substantial
assistance to each co-defendant in committing the libel, slander, invasion of privacy, or
civil conspiracy. Each Defendants' participation was a substantial factor in causing
the libel, slander, and/or tortious interference with an existing contract.
XXII. FAILURE TO WITHDRAW DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS
195. The failure of Defendants to withdraw these statements even after being advised of
the falsity creates a new, independent event of defamation both per quod and per se.
The defamatory statements and rumors spread by Susie Waller and Alicia Tennison
have been propagated to East Texas Results Media by Charles Pribilski whom Susie
had solicited into her conspiracy and who aided and abetted Susie to convince Dorothy
Waller and other family members that the Plaintiff was stealing from the company.
See letter to Paul Coates dated February 18, 2018.
196. According to Jose Sanchez, when the Defendant’s lawyers were asked to consider a
retraction, they refused and claimed, “We don’t know that Bill wasn’t stealing.” That is
nothing more than a disrespectful logic trick. Ricky Richards has an attitude of being
untouchable and above the law that has emboldened the Defendants to continue their
sport to this day of wantonly destroying an innocent person’s life so that they can
enjoy the unjust enrichment of their criminal enterprise. Let the jury send a strong
message, not only to the Defendants, but to anyone else contemplating such an
outrageous, brutal, and uncalled for attack on another human being
XXIII. EXPANSION OF THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENT REPRESENTATION
198. Plaintiff asserts the expansion of the theory of Negligent Representation in Texas
Jurisprudence to be applied to this matter because although Plaintiff did not rely upon

169
the false representations of the Defendants, others did to the detriment, harm and
damage of Plaintiff.
XXIV. RECOVER FROM DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
200. Plaintiff seeks to recover of and from Defendants, jointly and severally, all his actual,
special and exemplary damages as well as his attorney fees, costs of court, along with
pre and post-judgment interest and all other relief to which he is entitled, including
but not limited to the equitable relief of Defendants' being ordered to retract their
falsehoods and each of them being temporarily and permanently enjoined from again
asserting in any format or any forum other than this court, that the Plaintiff has
committed a crime; that he has stolen or misappropriated money from Waller Media;
that he had stolen millions of dollars; that he had an unlawful or improper plan or
scheme to take over Waller Media; that he was using the business equipment of
Waller Media for his personal use or gain; that he had been kicked out of the U.S.
Marines for homosexual conduct; and/or that he had bankrupted Waller Media or any
other person or entity. The Character Assassination Campaign was conducted covertly
for many years. It was brutal, malicious, criminal, and possibly lethal.
XXV. REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS
202. Plaintiff further requests the Defendants be enjoined from the destruction or deletion
of any documents, evidence or record, whether electronic or otherwise, that relates to
any of the matters implicated by this lawsuit or pertaining to the Plaintiff, including
but not limited to all hard drives, backups, archives, and other possible sources of
stored metadata or information.
XXVI. REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE

170
the information, and material described in Rule 194.2 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.
XXVII. DAMAGES
206. The Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages, general damages, and actual damages
for Defendants' libel and slander, including compensation for injury to his reputation,
loss of ability to gain meaningful employment, estrangement from his family, and
mental anguish.
XXVIII. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
negligence of the Defendants. Their conduct was outrageous, untenable, and
reprehensible. They blatantly flouted State and Federal laws with such utter impunity
as to constitute a danger to the population. They have far exceeded the threshold of
XXIX. CLAIM
212. Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff is seeking relief
over $1,000,000.00.
$25,000,000.00.
XXX. JURY DEMAND

171
214. Plaintiff DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY and submits the appropriate fee.
XXXI. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
XXXII. PRAYER
a. Actual Damages,
b. Special Damages,
c. Presumed Damages,
d. Punitive Damages,
e. Nominal damages,
f. Exemplary damages,
g. Prejudgment interest,
h. Postjudgment interest,
i. Court costs, and
j. Such further relief, both general and special, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff
217. The Plaintiff further demands judgment for all the other relief to which the Plaintiff
deems himself entitled.
Respectfully submitted.

Pro Se
11652 CR 2210
Tyler, TX 75707
Cell: (903) 253-5555
Email: bill@wallertec.com

172
PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION
I hereby certify that I have forwarded a true and correct copy of the foregoing to all
counsel of record on December 4, 2018.
William D. Waller Jr. (Bill Waller)
R.W. Richards
Richards & Penn
PO Box 1309
516 E. Commerce
John D. Sloan Jr.

Bagley, Hatcher & Perry
PO Box 2909
101 E Whaley St
Longview, TX 75606
Nicholas Summers Peacock

Ament & Peacock
406 E Commerce
PO Box 751

173
Bk Vol P,
00669534 OR 2423 483
EXHIBIT J
Deed
Date: March 13, 2018
Grantor: Dorothy Waller, Individually and as Executrix of

the Estate of William Dudley Waller
1228 Canada Street
Jacksonville, Texas 75766
Grantee: Susan Waller

1228 Canada Street
Jacksonville, Texas 75766
Consideration:
Cash and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are
hereby acknowledged.
Property (including any improvements):
BEING three tracts ofland in the Jose Pineda Survey, A-41, City of Jacksonville, Cherokee
County, Texas, consisting of a 2.23 acre tract and the West 2 feet of a 2.58 acre tract, being
same property conveyed by W. Dudley Waller to Waller Properties, Inc. by deed dated April
30, 2004, recorded in Volume 1654, Page 484, Official Records of Cherokee County, Texas,
reference to which is made for descriptive purposes, and a 2.01 acre tract of land in the Jose
Pineda Survey, A-41, City of Jacksonville, Cherokee County, Texas described as Tract. No.
Two (2) in Deed of Trust from Waller Properties, Inc. to Trustee for the benefit of First State
Bank, Frankston, Texas dated April 8, 2004, recorded in Volume 1654, Page 488, Official
Records of Cherokee County, Texas, reference to which is made for descriptive purposes.
Reservations from Conveyance:

For Grantor and Grantee's assigns, this conveyance includes a reservation offull possession, benefit,
and use of the property for the remainder of the life of the Grantor, as a life estate. Upon the death
of the Grantor, full record title shall be vested to Grantee.
Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty:
None
Grantor, for the Consideration and subject to the Reservations from Conveyance and the
age
174
Bk ijol pg
00669534 DR 2423 484
Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty, grants, sells, and conveys to Grantee her interest in the
Property, together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in any way belonging,
to have and to hold it to Grantee and Grantee's heirs, successors, and assigns forever. Grantor binds
Grantor and Grantor's heirs and successors to warrant and forever defend all and singular the
Property to Grantee and Grantee's heirs, successors, and assigns against every person whomsoever
lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof when the claim is by, through, or under
Grantor but not otherwise, except as to the Reservations from Conveyance and the Exceptions to
Conveyance and Warranty.
GRANTEE IS TAKING THE PROPERTY IN AN ARM'S-LENGTH AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THE CONSIDERATION WAS BARGAINED ON THE BASIS OF
AN "AS IS, WHERE IS" TRANSACTION AND REFLECTS THE AGREEMENT OF THE
PARTIES THAT THERE ARE NO REPRESENTATIONS OR EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTIES. GRANTEE HAS NOT RELIED ON ANY INFORMATION OTHER THAN
GRANTEE'S INSPECTION.
When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns include the plural.
This instrument was prepared based on information furnished by the parties, and no
independent title search has been made.
~ a)~
DorothyWaller
STATE OF TEXAS )
COUNTY OF {!Ju~ )
This instrument was acknowledged before me on __~__/_3___,, 2018,
_-_hO........,,__aJlM
by Dorothy Waller. L--
~'' V'il''~"" CATHY SMITH

tt"~f\Notarv Public, State of Texas
i'-1._"~.t": Comm. Expires 013-14·2021
~ ~·· ~·;.,:~
~,,~,·Of·~~-:- Notary ID 2636286
flliil~
175
Bk Vol Ps
00669534 OR 2423 485
Filed for Record in:

Official Public Records
Cherokee Count!!
On: Mar 14,2018 at 03:12P
As a
Recordinss
Oocu1ent Hu1ber: 00669534
8!1t
Erika Chancellor,
De11ut!I
STATE OF TEXAS COUHTY Of CHEROKEE
I herebY certify that this instru1ent
was filed on the date and ti•e sta•Ped
hereon by 1e and was duly recorded in
the volu1e and page of the nued
records of:
Cherokee Count!!
as sta1Ped hereon by 1e.
Nor 14,2018
HONORABLE Laverne Lusk, COUNTY CLERK

Cherokee Count!!
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176
Filed 4/2/2019 11:35 AM
Alison Dotson
District Clerk
Chelsey Dupree
Cause No. 2016-11-0772

§
§
SUSAN J. WALLER, ALICIA G. §
WALLER TENNISON and §
DOROTHY REID WALLER § 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants, Susan J. Waller, Alicia G. Waller Tennison and Dorothy Reid
Waller, move for a conventional and no-evidence summary judgment and show:
PLAINTIFF’S OPERATIVE PLEADINGS:
1. Plaintiff’s operative pleadings are his “Sixth Amended Original Petition”
filed herein on or about March 4, 2019. On March 29, 2019, the Court ruled on the
Defendants’ Special Exceptions to that pleading.1 That Order is incorporated by
reference, for all intents and purposes, as though set forth herein verbatim.
2. As a result of the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Special Exceptions, the
following are the only paragraphs remaining in Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition:
(a) ¶ 1, which asserts a discovery control level;
1
Defendants note that on the day of the hearing of Defendants’ Special Exceptions,
plaintiff vomited 198 pages into the Clerk’s record, denominating same, “Plaintiffs (sic) Exhibits”.
Some of these pages were blank, e.g., page 198. This was not denominated as a response to the
Special Exceptions. And it was not organized in a way that would allow anyone to know what, if
anything, these “exhibits” are supposed to prove. In any event, the “Exhibits” are not a proper
response to Special Exceptions, since those Exceptions are addressed to the face of plaintiff’s
operative pleadings.
177
(b) ¶¶ 2 – 5 name the parties to the suit;
© ¶¶ 6 – 7 address jurisdiction and venue;
(d) ¶ 8 states: “Pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure § 47 Claims for Relief:”
(e) ¶¶ 8(b)–(d) state that the damages sought are within the jurisdictional limits
of the court, that plaintiff seeks monetary relief over $1,000,000 and that
plaintiff demands judgment for all other relief “to which the plaintiff deems
himself entitled;”
(f) ¶¶ 9a – 9l are plaintiff’s designation of “aliases, pseudonyms and definitions”;
(g) ¶ 10 is plaintiff’s “general denial” of defendants’ allegations;
(h) ¶ 11 is an allegation, without any stated facts or dates, that defendants engaged
in a conspiracy to “assassinate plaintiff’s character” and to destroy his
“professional reputation”;
(I) ¶ 26 merely states that all previous allegations are incorporated by reference;
(j) ¶ 27 states that plaintiff is a private individual and not a public official or a
public figure;
(k) ¶ 28 states that defendants are all non-media defendants;
(l) ¶ 44 is a Request for Disclosure;
(m) ¶¶ 45 – 47 are allegations of damages;
(n) ¶¶ 54 – 55 relate to exemplary damages;
(o) ¶ 56 is plaintiff’s maximum claim of damages;
(p) ¶ 57 is a jury demand;
178
(q) ¶ 58 is an allegation regarding conditions precedent having been met; and
® is the prayer.
3. Those remaining paragraphs do not assert any cause of action and do
not allege any facts that would support any causes of action. The Court denied
plaintiff leave to file another amended pleading.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY:
LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MSJ:
4. The granting of Motions for Summary Judgment is governed by the
following legal principles.
“The function of the summary judgment is not to deprive a litigant of

his right to trial by jury, but to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims
and untenable defenses.”
Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952).
“The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits, if
any, on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before
judgment with permission of the court, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other
response.”
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tex.
1979) (bold emphasis supplied).
“The standard for appellate review of a summary judgment for a

defendant is whether the summary judgment proof establishes, as a
matter of law, that there is no genuine issue of fact as to one or
more of the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of
action. Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827,
179
828 (Tex. 1970). The movant has the burden to show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Company,
690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). Evidence favorable to the
non-movant will be taken as true in deciding whether there is a
disputed material fact issue that precludes summary judgment. Id.
Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the
non-movants and any doubts resolved in their favor. Montgomery
v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. 1984). A summary
judgment for the defendant, disposing of the entire case, is proper only
if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not succeed upon any theory
pleaded. Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983).”
Owen Electric Supply, Inc. v. Brite Day Construction, Inc., 821 S.W.2d
283, 285-86 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, error denied) (bold emphasis
supplied).
5. As a direct, proximate result of this Court’s rulings on Defendants’
Special Exceptions to Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition, plaintiff’s operative
pleadings stand devoid of any stated causes of action against the Defendants or of
any factual allegations that would support a cause of action against the Defendants.
Defendants are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment that plaintiff take nothing
by his lawsuit against the Defendants.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR A NO-EVIDENCE MSJ:
6. In the alternative, Defendants assert that they are entitled to a no-
evidence summary judgment.
7. Under Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter
adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment evidence
may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or
180
more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have
the burden of proof at trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(l). Adequate time for discovery has
passed.
8. In a no-evidence motion for summary judgment under Rule 166a(i),
once the movant alleges that there is no evidence on one or more elements of the
nonmovant’s daim, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a “genuine issue of
material fact’ on each element challenged in the no-evidence motion. Sudan v.
Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006); Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d
237, 242 (Tex. 2001). A “genuine issue of material fact” exists if more than a scintilla
of evidence establishing the existence of the challenged element is produced which
would enable reasonable jurors to differ in their conclusions. Ford Motor Co. v.
Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,
118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). Unless the nonmovant meets its burden of
producing summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to
each challenged element, the Court must grant the no-evidence motion. TEX. R. CIV.
P. 166a(i); Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam);
W. Investments, Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547,550 (Tex. 2005).
9. As there are no claims advanced against Defendants, plaintiff cannot
raise a “genuine issue of material fact” on anything relating to Defendants and they
are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment that plaintiff take nothing by his
lawsuit against the Defendants.
181
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER:
10. As set forth above, Plaintiff has asserted no claims against any of the
Defendants; ’s claim lack legal merit; accordingly there is no evidence to support any
of Plaintiff’s putative claims. Plaintiff has failed to bring viable causes of action, has
no evidence for the putative claims that he has asserted and Defendants are entitled
to a summary judgment that Plaintiff take nothing by his claims.
11. Defendants pray that the Court grant their motion for summary
judgment. Defendants pray for general relief.

_____________________________
L.T. Bradt #02841600
(281) 201-0700
Fax: (281) 201-1202
ltbradt@flash.net
R.W. (Ricky) Richards rwr@richardspenn.com

on April 2, 2019.
182
L.T. Bradt
183
CAUSE NO. 2016-11-0772
§
v. §
SUSAN J. WALLER, §
Defendants §
PLAINTIFF’S SIXTH AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION AND AUTHORITIES

POST EVISCERO
Plaintiff William D. Waller Jr. submits this Sixth Amended Original Petition and complaining
of Defendants Susan J. Waller; Alicia G. Tennison; and Dorothy Reid Waller, Defendants
(collectively known as Defendants) and for cause would show as follows.
1. Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery under Level 3.
II. PARTIES
County, Texas. Plaintiff may be served at 11652 CR 2210, Tyler, Texas 75707 or by
email at bill@wallertec.com.
3. Susan (Susan) Waller - Ms. Waller is an individual residing in Cherokee County

Texas. Ms. Waller may be served through her attorney of record, John Sloan.


III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

184
IV. RULE 47 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
a. The Plaintiff brings causes of action for
1) Libel and Slander (Defamation) per se and per quod,

2) Invasion of Privacy (Public disclosure of private facts),
3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and
b. The damages sought by the Plaintiff are within the jurisdictional limits of the
court.
c. Plaintiff is seeking:
5) monetary relief over $1,000,000.00 and
d. Plaintiff demands judgment for all the other relief to which the Plaintiff deems
himself entitled.
V. DEFINITIONS
9. Aliases, Pseudonyms, and Definitions
a. Alicia – Alicia G. Tennison

b. Dorothy – Dorothy Waller
c. Susan – Susan Waller
d. Defendants – all three defendants including Susan J. Waller, Alicia G. Tennison,
and Dorothy Reid Waller
e. Defamation – Libel and/or slander
f. DPA – Durable General Power of Attorney
g. JPD – Jacksonville Police Department
h. JPD Video – AXON Body 2 Vest Camera video recorded on August 1, 2016, by
Officers of the Jacksonville Police Department at the Waller Media Offices and in

185
the south driveway of Dorothy Waller’s home.
i. JPD-02, JPD-04, JPD-05, JPD-06, JPD-07 – JPD Video files and transcripts
j. Media Event – an event intended primarily to attract publicity.
k. Entities – Waller Media, LLC or the collection of business entities owned by
Properties, Inc.
l. Waller Media – Waller Media, LLC or the collection of business entities owned by
Properties, Inc.
VI. FACTUAL SUMMARY
General Denial of Defendant’s Allegations
10. The defendant’s allegations of criminal misconduct against the Plaintiff are
preposterous, vague, non-specific, unsubstantiated, baseless, utterly false, contrived
with malicious intent, for the purpose of the defendants enriching themselves, and for
their sadistic pleasure. The Plaintiff’s scope of responsibilities, privileges, and control
within the framework of Waller Media’s structure and organization were not
consistent with the misappropriation or theft of which he has been accused. The
Plaintiff did not handle money or write checks, and the Waller Media double-entry
accrual accounting systems were competently maintained by the Waller Media
Business Manager according to GAAP (non-standard procedures may represent an
attempt to conceal fraud), bank statements were reconciled monthly, all transactions
were properly described, and that there was no money missing from Waller Media.
The Plaintiff absolutely and unequivocally denies any and all allegations that he has
stolen, misappropriated, mismanaged, had a plan to take his mother’s money, made
death threats against anyone, got kicked out of the Marine Corps, or did anything else
but provided Waller Media with honest, diligent, and competent service.
The Gist of The Defamatory Conduct
11. Susan Waller, Alicia Tennison, and Dorothy Waller participated in a conspiracy to
brutally, viciously, criminally, and with focused intent, to assassinate the Plaintiff’s
character and destroy his professional reputation in the radio broadcast industry in
which the Plaintiff had invested and served honorably for almost 40 years.
186
15. Among the defamatory statements circulated by the Defendants was that the Plaintiff
VII. CAUSES OF ACTION
26. All previous allegations are incorporated herein by reference
A. CAUSE OF ACTION - LIBEL AND SLANDER
27. The Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., is a private individual and is neither a public
official nor a public figure for any purpose.
28. Defendants are all non-media defendants.
B. CAUSE OF ACTION – CIVIL CONSPIRACY

C. CAUSE OF ACTION - INVASION OF PRIVACY
Public Disclosure of Private Information
D. CAUSE OF ACTION - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS
VIII. REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE
IX. DAMAGES
46. Plaintiff respectfully requests the following damages to be considered separately and
individually to determine the sum of money that will fairly and reasonably
compensate him:
a. The loss of reputation and character the Plaintiff has suffered in the past and will
continue to suffer in the future;
b. The mental anguish Plaintiff has suffered in the past and will continue to suffer in
the future; and
c. The loss of any earnings sustained by Plaintiff in the past, and in the loss or
reduction of Plaintiff’s earning capacity in the future;

187
Respondeat Superior
Corporate Disregard
Recover From Defendants Jointly and Severally
Exemplary Damages
negligence of the Defendants. The defendants have exceeded the threshold of
55. The Plaintiff asserts the exclusion of the Limitations on the Amount of Recovery under
violated Tex. Penal Code §§ 32.21 Forgery (first degree), and 32.46 Securing execution
of documents by deception (first degree) which resulted in the injuries for which the
Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages.
X. CLAIM
$25,000,000.00.
XI. JURY DEMAND
57. Plaintiff DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY and has submitted the appropriate fee.
XII. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
XIII. PRAYER
a. Actual Damages,
b. Special Damages,
c. Exemplary damages,
d. Prejudgment interest,
e. Postjudgment interest,
188
f. Court costs, and
g. Such further relief, both general and special, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff

______________________________________
Pro Se
11652 CR 2210
Tyler, TX 75707
bill@wallertec.com
Cell: (903) 253-5555

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Waller v. Waller - Sworn Account - Motion For New Trial

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bill@wallertec.

com Bill Waller, 11652 CR 2210, Tyler, TX 75707 (903) 253-5555

June 28, 2019

Dear Mrs. Dotson,

Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.

/s/ William D. Waller, Jr.

Cause No. Date Document Pg.

My name is William D. Waller, Jr., my date of birth is August 28,

Executed in Smith County, State of Texas, on June 28, 2019.

See Bookmarks in Acrobat for more detailed listing.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

2. Plaintiff, William D. Waller, Jr., sued defendants, Susan J. Waller,

3. Defendants, Susan J. Waller, Dorothy Reid Waller, and Waller

Motion for New Trial Page 1 of 34

ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES

5. Under Texas law, a defendant who moves for summary judgment

elements of the affirmative defense as a matter of law. The non-

element of their affirmative defense. The non-movant is not

6. The defendants’ affirmative defense of res judicata fails because it

Tex. R. Civ. P. 65 provides that a superseded instrument shall no longer

Motion for New Trial Page 2 of 34

7. In paragraph 8 of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

Motion for New Trial Page 3 of 34

If taken literally, this definition of the rule would require

Motion for New Trial Page 4 of 34

9. Paragraph 9 of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment

Motion for New Trial Page 5 of 34

9. Following Barr, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adoption of the

Under this approach, a judgment in an earlier suit “precludes a second

Getty Oil Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 845 S.W.2d

10. The Supreme Court of Texas is exceedingly clear in Barr v.

The definition of res judicata in Gracia and Crow Iron Works is

Motion for New Trial Page 6 of 34

*631 The Restatement of Judgments also takes the transactional

We conclude that the transactional approach to claims preclusion of the

We reaffirm the "transactional" approach to res judicata. A subsequent

11. Under the Restatement of Judgments § 24, the determination of

Motion for New Trial Page 7 of 34

a. Cause No. 2016-11-0772 was an action in tort. The

Restatement of Judgments § 24(1). A "transaction" under the

12. The defendant's affirmative defense of collateral estoppel fails

Motion for New Trial Page 8 of 34

“Collateral estoppel bars a claim only if

13. Instead of relying on his acuity of mind, his ability to comprehend

14. Adding, omitting, resequencing, taking words out of context, or

Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct

Motion for New Trial Page 9 of 34

Texas Code of Judicial Conduct

15. In paragraph 12 of their MSJ, the defendant quoted words the

A trial court has no "discretion" in determining what the

12. As shown by his Fourth Amended Petition, plaintiff had every

Motion for New Trial Page 10 of 34

17. The defendant’s paragraph 12 in his motion for summary judgment

18. The defendant’s paragraph 12 in his motion for summary

We reaffirm the "transactional" approach to res judicata. A subsequent

Motion for New Trial Page 11 of 34

19. The defendant’s paragraph 12 in his motion for summary

20. The defendant failed to prove or even address the element of

Motion for New Trial Page 12 of 34

23. A claim is a legal assertion demanding compensation, payment, or

24. The defendant failed to identify or address the elements of res

Motion for New Trial Page 13 of 34

25. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction by applying the defendant’s