1.

Presumption is the mother of error

2. Parvus error in principio magnum est in fine
3. Being smallest in size, the beginning is most difficult to be seen. principium maxime primum ad
inveniendum, non ad cognoscendum, est difficilimum, et praecipue quod in ratione principii, et
non tantum in ratione veri cujusdam inveniatur:
4. We name first what we know first
5. We cannot think of the timeless and immaterial apart from time and bodies
6. We proceed in knowledge from the more known to the more knowable
7. What belongs to all beings is proper to being as being
8. They thought being and substance were body since their principles of being were bodies
9. Science is generated by the act of demonstrating
10. We must first understand whether or not something exists before we can know what it is.

While many universities teach philosophy, few can be said to form their students as philosophers,
and this dissertation was born out of the philosophical formation which I received as an undergraduate at
Thomas Aquinas College.

Having been students of Charles DeKoninck and Msgr. Maurice Dionne at Laval University, the
professors taught Thomas with particular attention to his teaching on the order of learning as an
indispensable, overarching principle guiding the entire life of the mind. This is seen for example in the
importance Thomas places upon manuductio, logic, and our constant dependence upon sensation. As a sign
of just how important attention to the proper order in learning was for Thomas, he begins the Summa, his
most important work, by insisting upon the order proper to the science at hand (ordo disciplinae),
something which he sees as missing in other authors. Indeed, the proper order of learning is pertinent
whenever one teaches or learns. Attention to order is indeed a mark of wisdom itself. Thomas, in fact,
begins the commentary on the Metaphysics by invoking this very principle: sapientis est ordinare.1 As
regards metaphysics, DeKonink and Dionne saw the consideration of words and their meanings in book Δ as
particularly revelatory of the order in which we come to know metaphysics. As G.K. Chesterton has said,
great minds pay attention to little things.

Later, therefore, I was confused when I found myself in graduate school, studying Thomas, and saw
that the order of learning the philosophical sciences was given short shrift. The most remarkable instance
of this is the approach to the highest philosophical science, metaphysics. There is widespread
disagreement, even among Thomists, over how metaphysics begins and what, if anything, it presupposes.
Moreover, the order in which the philosophical sciences were presented in the curriculum was at times
very random. My formation in the thought of Thomas, however, forced me to insist upon the order of
learning as a safeguard against error. Serious mistakes are made when we neglect due order in beginning.
Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine….2

Our method, therefore, is, first, to look at the text of the commentary, especially the early books,
for insights into how metaphysics is first constituted by the activity of the mind as an intellectual habit. The
reader should know from the start that our attention is predominantly, or at times even exclusively, upon
the primary texts themselves rather than upon the secondary literature. However, while our attention is
primarily focused upon the texts of Thomas and Aristotle as guides to understanding how metaphysics
begins, we also look at the historical, intellectual influences which formed and shed light upon Thomas’

1
Sententia Metaphysicae, proem.
2
De Ente et Essentia, proem.
thought. More importantly, we also look at the thought of Thomas as a whole in order to see how the
beginning of metaphysics fits into his entire philosophy. Obviously, if an interpretation of Thomas’ position
on the beginning of metaphysics does not harmonize with the rest of his philosophy, it is likely to be false.

The second, more challenging step, which assumes the successful completion of the exegetical
exercise above, is to take the teaching of Thomas as seen in the commentary with regard to the beginning of
metaphysics and compare that to the order in which we actually know things. We do this, of course, to
understand which interpretation of the beginning of metaphysics is most in accord with what we know about
science and ourselves. We intend to judge how metaphysics really begins by means of the insights gained
from the commentary

Thus, my intention here is properly philosophical rather than historical. Using the text of Aquinas’
commentary as a guide, I would like to understand how metaphysics is begun, or first learned. Our interest
is principally with things themselves and not the history of philosophy or even of Thomism. We do,
decidedly though, take Thomas and Aristotle as masterful guides in seeking to understand how metaphysics
is first learned. We follow Thomas, but we do not follow him for its own sake but, rather, for the sake of
understanding the truth. Plato is our friend but the truth more so. Still, since he is our guide in this
investigation, the much greater part of this essay is taken up with interpreting the thought of Aquinas.

not just how a certain philosopher, even the best philosopher, thought it began. However, since we
are not ourselves seasoned metaphysicians like Thomas, we must follow him as our guide.

It is for this reason that interpreting his texts, as well as those of Aristotle, are our first concern. We
intend to pay them the close attention, both linguistic and logical, they deserve, before making a judgment
about how metaphysics really begins. So we will first make a judgment about what the commentary on the
Metaphysics teaches us about the beginning of metaphysics