U.S. V. BULL, 15 PHIL.

7 fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910 the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
ELLIOTT, J.  Bull (Norwegian): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof
so it is not within the jurisdiction of the Philippines
FACTS:
ISSUE:
 Accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and
W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character when the
wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila,
neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time
aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head of
the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States
cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing the
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering. HELD:
 Animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and
The defendant was found guilty
allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the
deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all YES
without bedding
 Neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for  No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or
securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of
animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn
upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she
and killed. was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became
 All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the applicable.
Philippine Commission. Note: when it comes in our territory it has the discretion to prosecute
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, or not.
provides that — If it choose to prosecute must be justified.
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or  2 well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily
transporting cattle, granted to them
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands
to another, or from 1. French theory and practice-matters happening on board a
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry merchant ship which do not concern the tranquility of the port
with them, upon the or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court
vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts
provide for the suitable therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one
vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, member of the crew against another.
and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and
 2. The United States has adhered consistently to the view that
when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to
the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local
sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty
arrangements consented to waive a portion of such
jurisdiction.

 The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to

constitute the completed offense and a reasonable construction of the
language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the
port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court and the mere fact of their
disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
 The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the
information does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient"
and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint
was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable
by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according
to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the
appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not
made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure
to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."

PRINCIPLE:

Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
MABANAG VS. VITO
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J)
FACTS:
Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a
majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators
and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators
were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of
Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their
election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to
sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for
the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution
for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but
that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the
petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and
eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional
resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto,"
nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary
three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative
votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for
prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution,
as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission
on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular
Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval
of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
HELD:
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that
political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the
courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is
predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too
well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies
in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The
term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are
not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground,
on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect
to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to
be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme
intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no
logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed
to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of
expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal
then into that of ratification.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled
bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
MICHAEL F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 484 The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate
SCRA 529 (2006) divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET. This rule, however,
is not without exception. As held in Mutuc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., the
FACTS:
usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election
A Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been a valid
of Candidacy of Congressional Candidate Anna Liza C. Cabochan was filed proclamation. Where the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office
by a registered voter of Quezon City before the Commission on Elections cannot in any way affect the basic issues.
National Capital Region (COMELEC NCR), alleging that Cabochan’s
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who
certificate suffered from a serious and material defect as it was notarized by a
garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his
Notary Public whose commission had already expired. Consequently,
certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time
Cabochan withdrew her certificate of candidacy and Matias V. Defensor, Jr.
remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal. Following
filed his in substitution of Cabochan. Herein petitioner Michael F. Planas
Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensor‘s proclamation the denial of his COC
(Planas), also a candidate for the same position, filed before the Quezon City
due course was not yet final, his proclamation was valid or legal and as he in
Board of Canvassers a Petition for the Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes
fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as representative, the
in favor of Defensor who appeared to be leading the congressional race, citing
COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case.
the memorandum- recommendation of the NCR Acting Director directing that
the certificate of Cabochan be denied due course and that the substitution of
Defensor for Cabochan be accordingly declared invalid. Defensor was
proclaimed as the winning candidate for the congressional seat of the Third
District of Quezon City. On March 11, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued
the challenged Resolution ruling that the COMELEC is already ousted with
jurisdiction over the case thus, the same is already under the jurisdiction of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that the certificate
of candidacy of Cabonchan is valid, and the subsequent substitution by
Defensor is legal. Hence, the present petition of Planas.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the COMELEC was divested of its jurisdiction by

virtue of Defensor’s proclamation and assumption of office as member of the
House of Representatives.

HELD:
JAVELLANA VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 50 SCRA 30
Ponente: Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
FACTS:
The Plebiscite Case
A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines was approved on August 24, 1970 and began to perform its
functions on June 1, 1971. On September 21, 1972, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention approved
its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next
day,President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor
General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,”
upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and
effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines
for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the
question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds
for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress “ and
“there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set
for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly,
and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution and
temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of
free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”
The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding
the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which
said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially.
“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.

 L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon
as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three
(3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later
than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973 and set the motion for hearing “on
January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.”
While the case was being heard, the President issued Proclamation No.
1102.
“ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF
THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION
Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in
districts/wards in chartered cities. The said Citizens Assemblies were
established to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic
process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views
on important national issues.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142, as
a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and as “a class suit,
for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated against
the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and
Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their subordinates or agents from
implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in
the present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. Javellana alleged that the
President ordered “the immediate implementation of the New Constitution,
thru his Cabinet, and that the latter are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution. He construed that
the President is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve
the proposed Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and that the election held
to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.
ISSUES:
 Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or
political and therefore non-justiciable, question?
 Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance)
conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
 Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or
without valid ratification) by the people? (Acquiesced – “permission”
given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping
quiet or by not making objections.)
 Are petitioners entitled to relief?
 Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in
by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court.”
On the fourth question, 6 justices voted to DISMISS the petition.
Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that “The
effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and
ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other
than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant
and unavoidable.
On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in
force:
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4)
dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the
vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect.

HELD:

The court was severely divided on the issues raised in the petition but
when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six
members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus
upholding the 1973 Constitution.

The Court held that the issue is political and “beyond the ambit of
judicial inquiry.”

Court held that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional

Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1
of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in
an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only
by qualified and duly registered voters. However, it is conceded that the
doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of
PABLO C. SANIDAD AND PABLITO C. SANIDAD VS HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER G.R. NO. L-44640 OCTOBER 12, 1976
FACTS:
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a national referendum on October 16,
1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary
purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of
effectivity).
On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D.
1033) to specify the questions that are to be asked during the referendum on
October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law
to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed
amendments to the existing Constitution.
The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of
time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the
President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year
olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which
confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of
age and above.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to
sue, and that the issue raised is political in nature – and thus it cannot be
reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of
the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUE:
W/N the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the
constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control HELD:
of the national referendum in October 16.
YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while
Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with only 3 maintained it was of political nature and thus not justiciable.
preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting
The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and
the issue is a political one. This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly
effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
provided that the power to propose amendments to the constitution resides in
amendments to the Constitution.
the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.
Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with
After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly
preliminary injunction, asserting that the power to propose amendments or
is in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto
revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred
the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal course has not
to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the
been followed.
Constitution.
Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a
Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan
constituent assembly, the president undertook the proposal of amendments
sought to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the
through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-
forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the
Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose
procedure raises a contestable issue.
amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150 APRIL 2, 1981
FACTS:
Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a
prohibiting proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa
resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited
area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5;
Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention;
and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on
Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends
that such resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments:
ISSUE:
Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?
HELD:
In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its
amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The
1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim
National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments
similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.
2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character
as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this
contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention
will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul
the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution
based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no
moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the
present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is
no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment'
includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At
any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised
or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is
ratified by the sovereign people."
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose
amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. The
language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above
questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent
body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote
is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as
well when it has been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by
the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The
three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa
sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April
7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION VS. COMELEC The petitions were dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an
injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7,
40 SCRA 455, January 7, 1986
1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
FACTS: unconstitutional.

Facts: The events that have transpired since December 3, as the Court did not
issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from
 Eleven (11) petitions were filed for prohibition against the the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to
enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly
February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled
President. It was contended that BP 883 in conflict with the election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court
constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either
after the calling of the special election. to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
 Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional
“resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9,
Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding
of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the
regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the
President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective
only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and
qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.”
 The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the
cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually
resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the
scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos
vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

W/N BP 883 is unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court

therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD:
LAWYER’S LEAGUE VS. AQUINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 73748, May 22,
1986
Ponente: GLORIA C. PARAS
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis
of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the “new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate
HELD:
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss
the petitions for the reasons to be stated below.
On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would
pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus
oficio.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter.
It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn
to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents,
petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7
as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution,
which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he
then asks the Court “to declare and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred
to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, …”
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack
for cause of action.
Presiding from petitioner’s lack of personality to sue or to bring this
action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that this Court
assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly,
the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the
Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that
incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner’s
allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to
no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June
30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday
of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be
questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held
that:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause

of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon
C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it
is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this
Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986
in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People’s
Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino,
et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon
C. Aquino, et al.])
DE LEON VS ESGUERRA 153 SCRA 602, August 31, 1987

PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA,J Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent
with the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition
In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along
at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C.
with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores,
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and
Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated
legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines or
December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B.
the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar.
Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate
Memorandum with the same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing
the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with the other petitioners filed a
petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the
respondents from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners
maintained that OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace
them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6)
years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

ISSUE:

W/N the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?

HELD:

The designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was

declared NO LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ for Prohibition is
GRANTED enjoining respondents perpetually from ouster/take-over of
petitioners’ position subject of this petition.

RATIO:

The affectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when

it was signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987 Constitution was
already in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in
Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no
longer rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15,
1936
PONENTE: LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of
office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth
Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a
resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed
an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of
the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any
election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly,
the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral
Commission however denied his motion.
ISSUE:
W/N the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?
IHELD:
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that
the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests entrusted to
its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power
to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication
to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
FACTS:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved
by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed
with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
 Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
 Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
HELD:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the
scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules
cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is
the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former

President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution.
PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 97 Phil. 806, October 31,
1955 SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
FACTS:
Act. No. 2706 makes the inspection and recognition of private schools
and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction. In particular:
HELD:
 Before a school can be opened, the owner must secure a permit from
the Secretary of Education.
 There is a 1% levy on receipts of all private schools.
 The Secretary of Education has the power to regulate textbooks to be
used by private schools.
The petition assails the constitutionality of Act. No. 2706 (amended as
Act. No. 3075) and Commonwealth Act. No. 180 on the following grounds:
 They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as the parents
and teachers of liberty and property without due process of law.
 They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency.
 Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an
unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that:
 The matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting
unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions.
 Petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts.
 The Acts are constitutionally valid.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the issue is justiciable – NO.
2. Whether the securing of permit from the Secretary of Education before
opening a school is constitutional – YES.
3. Whether the acts constitute unlawful delegation of power – NO.
4. Whether the 1% levy on receipts of all private schools is constitutional
– MUST BE DECIDED BY LOWER COURTS.
5. Whether the power to regulate the textbooks to be used by private
schools constitute censorship – NO JUSTICIABLE ISSUE.
1. The issue only becomes justiciable when the petitioners will suffer, or
has suffered, an injury as a result of the statute. On that note, the
petitioners already have permits and are actually operating by virtue
of those permits. They did not show that the respondent threatened to
revoke their permits. As such, they do not need relief in the form they
are seeking to obtain.
The Court stated that if the dangers which petitioners
apprehended materialize and judicial intervention is suitably invoked,
after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the courts would not
shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional boundaries and protect
individual liberties.
2. The power of the state to regulate educational institutions is provided
for in the Constitution. Further, by virtue of a study and survey which
reported that a great majority of the private educational institutions are
money-making devices necessitates the exercise of the Government’s
police power.
3. The standards are left on the hands of the Secretary because he has the
relevant expertise and experience to do so. Further, the standards have
been in effect for 37 years without complaint.
4. This issue involves investigation and examination of relevant data and
this would still be within the jurisdiction of the Courts of First
Instance.
5. The issue is not a justiciable controversy. Further, the petitioners have
not shown that the any text has been prohibited, or that petitioners
refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger
of losing substantial privileges or rights for refusing so.
MARIANO VS COMELEC GR No 118577 07 March 1995 In Tobias vs Abalos, Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
FACTS:
city.
Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief, assailing unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (“An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati”). Petitioners contend that (1) Section 2 Article I
of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and bounds
with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with
Section 8 Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new
corporate existence of the new city will restart the term of the present
municipal elective making it favorable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay,
and (3) Section 52 Article X of RA 7854 for adding a legislative district is
unconstitutional and cannot be made by special law.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the
established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section
2 stated that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality.”

The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of

Section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must
be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
PATRICIO CUTARAN v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GR ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes on the ground that
No. 134958, 2001-01-31 the said administrative issuances are void for lack of legal basis.

FACTS: Court of Appeals[6] held that the assailed DENR Special Orders Nos.
31, 31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectively of RA 7586 known as
Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special
the National Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of
Order no. 31 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance,
no force and effect "for... pre-empting legislative prerogative" but sustained
identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the
the validity of DENR Special Order No. 25, and its implementing rules (DAO
Cordillera Administrative Region."
No. 02, series of 1993) by the appellate court on the ground that they were
The Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 25 entitled issued pursuant to the powers delegated to the DENR... petitioners filed with
"Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and this Court a petition for review of the appellate court's decision on the ground
natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Special Order No.
ancestral land claims nationwide" and Department Administrative Order no. 25 and its implementing rules.
02, containing the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no.
Petitioners seek to enjoin the respondent DENR from processing the
25.
application for certificate of ancestral land claim filed by the Heirs of Carantes.
In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives
RA 7586 does not contain the slightest implication of a grant of
of herein petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land
authority to the DENR to adjudicate or confer title over lands occupied by
claim (CALC) over the land they, respectively occupy inside the Camp John
indigenous communities.
Hay Reservation
The Solicitor-General filed memorandum in behalf of the respondent
In 1996 the applications were denied by the DENR Community
DENR praying for the affirmance of the appellate court's decision. The
Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and
respondent argues that the subject DENR special orders were issued pursuant
Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of
to the powers granted by RA 7586 to the DENR to protect the socio-economic
Baguio City.
interests of indigenous peoples.
The Heirs of Apeng Carantes filed an application for certification of
The respondents do not contest the ruling of the appellate court as
ancestral land claim over a parcel of land also within Camp John Hay and
regards the nullity of Special Order no. 31, as amended.
overlapping some portions of the land occupied by the petitioners.
From a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was
Petitioners also allege that the heirs of Carantes removed some of the
prematurely filed. There is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to
improvements they introduced within the area they actually occupy and if not
resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate court on
for the petitioner's timely resistance to such intrusions, the petitioners would
this ground.
have been totally evicted therefrom.
We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the
Hence, this petition for prohibition originally filed with the Court of
petitioners' memorandum that the alleged application for certificate of
Appeals to enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing the assailed
ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed
administrative issuances and from processing the application for certificate of
DENR special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued.
 The DENR is still processing the application of the heirs of Carantes
for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or may not grant.
It is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are
the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to
possess a common portion of a piece of land.
As the undisputed facts stand there is no justiciable controversy
between the petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent
violation of the petitioners' asserted right to possess the land by reason of the
implementation of the questioned administrative issuances.
ISSUE:
to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the
jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the
petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under
orders from the DENR. The petitioners' allegation that certain documents from
the DENR were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes to justify eviction is
vague, and it would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the
respondent DENR or its officers authorized the attempted eviction. Suffice it
to say that by the petitioners own admission that the respondents are still
processing and have not approved the application of the heirs of Carantes, the
petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent
danger of being violated, as the DENR may or may not approve Carantes'
application. Until such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they
might be evicted from the premises at some future time.

W/N DENR Special Order no. 25, series of 1993 and its implementing rules
DAO no. 02 are valid

HELD:

For lack of justiciable controversy, the decision of the appellate court

is hereby set aside.

PRINCIPLES:

A justiciable controversy has been defined as, "A definite and concrete
dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests"
which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.
Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions
and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical
cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. Subject to certain
well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of
a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed
that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its
validity.

This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners' speculation that the
DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an
actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury
MONTESCLAROS VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 152295, July 9 2002 HELD:

FACTS: The petition failed to present an actual case or controversy since

The SK is a youth organization was established through Presidential
Decree No 684 as “Kabataang “Barangay” which composed of ALL barangay
residents who were less than 18 years of age without minimum age. KB was
later on renamed to SK under Local Government Code 1991 which limited
membership to youth not younger than 15 and not older than 21.
On February 18 2002, Antionette Montesclaros sent a letter to
COMELEC demanding to push through with the May 2002 elections urging a
response within 10 days. On February 20 2002, COMELEC Chairman,
Alfredo Benipayo, wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President expressing that holding the elections of the barangay and SK
simultaneously in May 2002 was “operationally very difficult” and suggested
to go with Sen. Franklin Drilon’s proposal to hold Barangay elections on May
2002 and the SK elections on Nov 2002 instead.
petitioners acquiesced to the change of date from May to July 2002.
Moreover, a proposed bill is NOT a law. It imposes NO duty legally
enforceable by the court. Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot
restrain Congress from passing a law or interfere with its internal rules. The
petitioners’ remedy lies in the legislative department through LEGISLATION
and NOT judicial intervention since it is up to Congress to decide whether to
enact an amendatory law.
Petitioners failed to assail ANY provision in RA No. 9164 that could
be unconstitutional. Consequently, the Court cannot strike down this law
unless its unconstitutionality is properly raised.

Petitioners received COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 4763

recommending to postpone SK elections. On March 2002, the Senate and
House of Representatives passed bills postponing SK elections. On March 11
2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee reset SK elections and Banrangay
elections to July 15 2002 and lowered the SK membership age to 15 but not
more than 18 years old. On the same day, Montesclaros filed a petition for a
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer of temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction to prevent the postponement of the May 2002
elections and the reduction of the age requirement for SK membership.

The bill was later signed as law by the President.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an actual controversy in the case which

postpones the SK elections from May 2002 to July 2002 and the reduction of
age requirement for SK membership — NO.
ATLAS FERTILIZER VS SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM GR No 93100 19 June 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the aquaculture industry

utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d),
17 and 32 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), as well as the
implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order
Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. They contend that R.A.
6657, by including the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including
fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the same class or classification
as agriculture or farming violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and therefore void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by Congress on 20

February 1995 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded
from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning
the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic
with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.