CASE 1

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-
315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,
641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-
1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
 the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of
the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published
only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity
apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In
similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency
of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that
"the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that
they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does
not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To
so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation
that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require
the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as
pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I
am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For
prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential
decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to
this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative
or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find
myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code
(based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain
text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the
law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that
"most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity
or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the
period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in
the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly,
it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette,
determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of
general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does
not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To
so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation
that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require
the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as
pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I
am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For
prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential
decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to
this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative
or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find
myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code
(based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain
text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the
law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that
"most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity
or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the
period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in
the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly,
it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette,
determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of
general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Footnotes

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be recognized,
access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City
Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95
SCRA 392.

3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic
of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security
System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.

5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil.
150.

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

9 93 Phil.. 68,.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the
Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of
publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been
submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other presidential
issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec.
21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing
the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.

Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

Plana, J.:

* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of all
statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs.
Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.
CASE 2

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject
decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these
arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder
in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that
issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have
to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the
decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it
was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with
but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to
all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and
in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential
decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a
clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and
apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as
required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating
from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates
and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This
they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from
their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would
like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against
the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to
the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened
in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two
presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael
M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks
prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right
to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I
wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2
of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect
immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would
be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions
which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a
common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished
from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a
constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced
by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of
the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code
could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the
Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would
like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against
the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to
the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened
in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two
presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael
M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks
prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right
to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I
wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2
of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect
immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would
be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions
which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a
common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished
from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a
constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced
by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of
the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code
could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the
Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Footnotes

1 Rollo pp. 242-250.

2 Ibid, pp. 244-248.

3 Id, pp. 271-280.

4 Id, pp. 288-299.

5 Id, pp. 320-322.

6 136 SCRA 27,46.

7 Rollo, p. 24,6.
8 Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee. Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and Lorenzo
Relova.

9 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos, Efren 1. Plana
Serafin P. Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.

10 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

11 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.
CASE 3

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA
BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis
Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution
dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65 section
1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural
and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M.
Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9,
1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30,
1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution
of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion
for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895,
August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142
SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with
the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26,
1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective
application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the
Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule
barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the
grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986,
145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a
year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the
grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar
owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of
the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a
building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the
lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid
the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence
should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

CASE 4

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. – G.R. CV
37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract
between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered
private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne
Reyes.

As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony
on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of
consent of the parties.

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty,
herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982,
they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.

On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that
his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got
married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at
the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took
place on April 4, 1979.

Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was
contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario,
Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in
evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated
August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on
March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted
as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The
fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment
declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and
petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.1

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void
ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24,
1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the
appellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even
without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting
marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to
determine for himself – for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage
even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be
disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the
Civil Code on marriage.

xxx

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:

1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and
defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;

2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00 to
his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
 3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the Court of Appeals
erred:

I.

BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF
PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.

II

IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.

III

IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE
RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.

IV

IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases
to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null
and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The
appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that People v. Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case.
For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish
its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the
provisions of law previously obtaining.5

In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:

Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. Although decided
by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as
in the instant case.

xxx

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .6

At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent
cases of Bobis v. Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous
marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,9 under which a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage is clearly required.

Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express
provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.

Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third
marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The
Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the
existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since
the second marriage is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid
marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the
spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.

In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the right of the second wife who
entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance
of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such
nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld
the right of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.14

But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk
of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void,
since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v.
Paras.16

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a
petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her
previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:18

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).

In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration,
thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.

At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez,
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.20 Article 40 of said Code
expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his
first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is
that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),22 the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of
the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42,
44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).23

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero,
(1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge
claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got
pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since
the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the
effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel.
At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to
petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to
do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25 the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment
of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the
appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner,
he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein
petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we
find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s
allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license,
though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it
refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner
had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the
appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in
protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view,
petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage,
including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in
the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the
same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The
appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which
undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But
we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what
the CA calls "his own deceit and perfidy."

On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees. Although the appellate court admitted
1âwphi1

that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral
damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.26

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for
another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a
baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation
where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application
of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.27There are other remedies.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its
Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and
private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the
amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes
and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against
private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
See also Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582, 593 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353, 365 (1996); Son vs.
Son, 251 SCRA 556, 564 (1995); re proof of facts cited.

2
Rollo, pp. 48-52.

3
45 Phil 739 (1954).

4
100 SCRA 1033 (1957).

5
Rollo, p. 47.
6
Rollo, p. 49.

7
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000.

8
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000. In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Vitug opined that the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to
refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such
judicial declaration of nullity, in his view, should still be deemed essential when the "marriage," for instance,
is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the
marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only to
marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.

9
E.O. No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.

10
45 Phil 739 (1954).

11
100 SCRA 1033 (1957).

12
33 SCRA 614 (1970).

13
37 SCRA 315 (1971).

14
See also Lao v. Dee, 45 Phil 739 (1924) and Pisalbon v. Bejec, 74 Phil 88 (1943).

15
77 SCRA 338 (1977).

16
22 SCRA 525 (1983).

17
143 SCRA 499 (1986).

18
Id. at 501.

19
145 SCRA 229 (1986).

20
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

21
211 SCRA 7 (1992).

22
226 SCRA 572 (1993).

23
Id. at 579.

24
268 SCRA 47 (1997)

25
286 SCRA 495, 530 (1998).

26
Rollo, p. 51.

Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.1, Manila:
27

1990, p. 223.

28
Among them legal separation, or prosecution for adultery and concubinage.
CASE 5

G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue
District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or
credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of
Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the
cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real
estate industry to slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997,
respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless,
respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to
the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to
support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition
for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for
filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed
with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum
has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided,
however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of
the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis
supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or
credit commenced on that date.13

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively
have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial
claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed
731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.15

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code
did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.19

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and
April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is
clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly construed against
claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been
consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day
claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or
within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive
period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return.24 But how
should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days
regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the
specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis
supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain."28 It is
the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008.30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or
impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous
one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
Administrative Code of 1987. 1avv phi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by
the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law
and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with
the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of
12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and
the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive
period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar
months, computed as follows:

Year 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

1 month
 2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
month

4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14,
month 1998
6th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1998
month 1998

7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

month

8th calendar November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

month
9th calendar December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
month
10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
month

11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

month

12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

month
Year 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
2 month
14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
month

15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

month

16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

month

17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14,

month 1999
18th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1999
month 1999
19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
month

20th calendar November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

month

21st calendar December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

month
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
month
23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
month

24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

month

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered
to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-
Salvador and Jose C. Mendoza of the Special Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 21-25.

3Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-
Salvador and Jose C. Mendoza of the Former Special Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 26-
28.

4 Id., pp. 37-42.

5 Id., pp. 39-40.

6Id. This was the period of economic slowdown known as the "Asian (Financial) Crisis" which started in mid-
1997.

7 Id., p. 41.

8
Summary of Tax/Payments for 1997:

Creditable
Corporate
Quarter Withholding TOTAL
Income Tax
Tax
1st ₱ 3,440,082.00 ₱ 687,783.00 ₱ 4,127,865.00

2nd 15,694,502.00 633,175.00 16,327,677.00

3rd 2,419,868.81 3,154,506.51 5,574,375.32

4th 288,481.00 288,481.00

<="" td="" style="font-size: 14px;

₱
text-decoration: none; color: rgb(0, 0, ₱ 21,554,452.81 ₱ 26,318,398.32
4,763,945.51
128); font-family: arial, verdana;">

Id., p. 40.

9 Id., p. 41.
10 Id., pp. 78-79.

11 Docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6113. Id., pp. 192-199.

12Penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Judges Amancio Q. Saga
(retired) and Ramon O. de Veyra (retired). Dated December 15, 2000. Id., pp. 187-190.

13 CIR v. CA, 361 Phil. 359, 364-365 (1999).

14 The computation was as follows:

April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 ----------------------- 365 days

April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 (leap year) ---------- 366 days

TOTAL 731 days

15 Rollo, p. 190.

16 Id., p. 191.

17Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64782. Id., pp. 180-186. (This case observes the procedure in RA 1125
prior to the amendments of RA 9282.)

18Id., pp. 21-25. Under RA 9282 which took effect on April 22, 2004, decisions of the CTA are now
appealable to the Supreme Court.

19 Id., p. 24.

20 Id.

21 Id., pp. 26-28.

22 Id., p. 13.

23 Id., p. 15.

24Tax Code, Sec. 229 and supra note 12 at 367. See also ACCRA Investments Corporation v. CA., G.R. No.
96322, 20 December 1991, 204 SCRA 957. See also CIR v. Philippine American Life Insurance Co., G.R.
No. 105208, 29 May 1995, 244 SCRA 446.

25 139 Phil. 584 (1969).

26 Id., pp. 588-589 citing People v. del Rosario, 97 Phil 70, 71 (1955).

27 Executive Order

28
Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334, 335-336 (1929).

29 Section 9, Time, 74 AmJur 2d 593 citing Re Lynch's Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P2d 454.

30This is pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Civil Code which provides that "[i]n computing a period, the first day
shall be excluded, and the last day included."

Cf. Rules of Court, Rule 22, Sec. 1. The section provides:

Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this
Rules, or by the order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from
which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of
performance included.If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day. (emphasis supplied)

31Jose Jesus G. Laurel, Statutory Construction: Cases and Materials, 1999 ed., 176 citing Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th ed., 1463.

32 Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106560, 23 August 1996, 261 SCRA 17, 32.
33 David v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 127116, 08 April 1997, 271 SCRA 90, 103.

34 Supra note 25.

CASE 6

G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,

vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules)
are the April 30, 20082 and August 1, 20083 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975,
which dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the
January 28, 2008 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set
aside the Orders dated September 4, 20065 and November 16, 20066 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634.

The facts are simple and undisputed:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private complainant in
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed
against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of
Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003
Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2, 2004, Uy, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC
Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.10 When Co moved
for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the criminal cases per Order dated January 10,
2005.11The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases.12 It was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.13 Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied
on December 16, 2005.14 Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096.15 We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13,
2006.16There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20,
2006.17

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the
inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006.18 Uy opposed the motion,
contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.19In
spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion.20 When
the court subsequently denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed a petition for
certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC
Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.22 Co then filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.

According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ONTHE
GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE
CASES;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL; and

3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:

a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE

OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;

b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING
THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;

c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ARE REVIVED

IPSO FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION TO REVIVE THESE CASES.23
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He
reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a
"vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial
Act of 1998)24 and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure25 mandating that the
entire trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co
contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on
a mere motion because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.

Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also
insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court’s issuance of the order granting the revival must
be within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on
July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year
2004 was a leap year.

The petition is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the meat of the controversy in Co’s
previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While the first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural
infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that "[i]n any event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our February 13, 2006
Resolution in G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res judicata between the parties. On this ground
alone, this petition should have been dismissed outright.

Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present petition, Co’s arguments are
nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:

First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence
that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the same
was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that
"‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to
speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.27 The factors to
balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it;
and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a
vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.29 "While the
Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we
cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which
prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."30

Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit:
(1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the
offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting
the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion
for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon
which was served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4,
Rule 15 of the Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal "considering
that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint."33 The importance of a prior
notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson:34

x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party
or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through
the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the
offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court
during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the
requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim
the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the
collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving
the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of
the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the
offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the
destruction or loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to
recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent
lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.35
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of the cases became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice to the offended party. When
the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance of the order
temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process; thus, said in one case:

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year
after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor
who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.36

We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the
reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually notified of the order of
provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court
should be sent to the latter at his/her given address.37 Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be made upon the latter.38

Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be
made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules.
Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may
wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court
judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could
not be expected to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the prescribed
period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their
whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.

Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive
the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private
counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not
belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent
dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.

And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year and that
the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is
equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.39 Equally so, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, a yearis composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was
our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was subsequently
reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,41 thus:

x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof
provides:

Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific
month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." It is
the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008.42

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the one-year period
reckoned from the time Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003 consisted of 24 calendar months,
computed as follows:

1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003

2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003

3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003

4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003

5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003

 6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004

7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004

8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004

9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004

10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004

11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004

12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004

In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a dilatory tactic to prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the
"Motion for Permanent Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised herein were already resolved with finality by this Court
in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque,
adopted a worthless and vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It
appears that Atty. Maglaque’s conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers
to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as
well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath also
upholds in particular:

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x. 1âw phi 1

This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of litigation is essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation,43 We said:

The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the
orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily
a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.44

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006
and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the
petitioner.

The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar C.
Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Rule on Forum Shopping.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES***

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Surnamed Yu in some parts of the records.

* Per Special Order No. 1707 dated June 17, 2014.

** Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.

*** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No.
1704 dated June 17, 2014.

2
Rollo, p. 36.

3
Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso concurring; id. at 38-40, 307-309.

4
Rollo, pp. 243-246.

5
Id. at 172-174.

6
Id. at 206.

7
Id. at 44. Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules states:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a
fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six
(6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived.

8
Rollo, p. 57.

9
Id. at 50, 58.

10
Id. at 56-58, 69-71.

11
Id. at 244.

12
Id. at 72-87.

13
Id. at 116-117, 292-293.

14
Id. at 128, 294.

15
Id. at 129-144.
16
Id. at 147-148, 295-296.

17
Id. at 297-298.

18
Id. at 149-165.

19
Id. at 166-171.

20
Id. at 172-174, 299-301.

21
Id. at 206.

22
Id. at 243-246, 302-305.

23
Id. at 12-13.

24
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial.- In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those
subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6)
months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (₱1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the
accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule22 of the Rules of Court.

25
SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.—Trial once commenced shall continue from day
to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good
cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for
continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to
ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days
from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.

26
Jacob v. Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 94, 106.

27
Id.; People v. Rama, 403 Phil. 155, 168 (2001).

28
Tan v. People of the Philippines, 604 Phil. 68, 81 (2009).

29
Id.; Jacob v. Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, supra note 26, at 106-107.

30
People v. Rama, supra note 27.

31
People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317, 370-371 (2003), as cited in Los Baños v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229
(2009).

32
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.– Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights
of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

33
See Order dated June 9, 2003 (Rollo, p. 44).

34
448 Phil. 317 (2003).

35
People v. Lacson, supra note 31, at 378-379.

36
Id. at 371.

See Sy v. Fairland Knitcraft Co., Inc., G.R. No. 182915 and G.R. No. 189658, December 12, 2011, 662
37

SCRA 67, 100 and Bello v. National Labor Relations Commission, 559 Phil. 20, 27 (2007), citing Ginete v.
Sunrise Manning Agency, 411 Phil. 953, 957-958 (2001).
38
Id.

39
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 558 Phil. 182, 189 (2007).

40
558 Phil. 182 (2007).

41
G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 422.

42
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., supra note 39.

43
533 Phil. 645 (2006).

44
Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, supra, at 669.
CASE 7

G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014

ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion) under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the decision2 dated August 23, 2012 and the resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.

The Factual Antecedents

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen
Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City,
allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV)
holder.

At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No.
18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118]5 were for sale for ₱3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise
assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed
to reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI)
Check No. 833496 for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as reservation fee.7 On August 21, 2003,
Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350,8 this time for ₱2,700,000.00 representing the remaining
balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26,
20039covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit
and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then
allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal
demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting
Suzuki to verify the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.

Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no
annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer,
through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No.
53610 and Parking Slot No. 42.11 CCT No. 18186 representing the title to the condominium unit had no existing
encumbrance, except for anannotation under Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance or
encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although
CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999 representing a mortgage in favor of
Orion for a ₱1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No.
73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in
possession of Perez.

To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 dated September 8, 2003, withthe
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then
demanded the delivery of the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the
need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.

On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that Kang
obtained another loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en
Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en
Pago, until October 15, 2003.

On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42 (covered by CCT No.
9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the parking lot’s title.

On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. At
the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:

1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;

2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
 3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;

4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged
Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;

5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and

6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.

The RTC Ruling

In its decision14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City ruled infavor of
Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.

The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over
Orion’s. The RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of the properties but he did not find
any existing encumbrance inthe titles. Although Orion claims to have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en
Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two (2) months after he bought the properties because Orion never bothered to
register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos. 18186 and 9116.

The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation and cost ofsuit. Orion timely appealed the RTC decision
with the CA.

The CA Ruling

On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld Suzuki’s
right over the properties. The CA further noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186 pertaining to the withdrawal of
investment of an SRRV only serves as a warning to an SRRV holder about the implications of a conveyance of a
property investment. It deviated from the RTC ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, expenses for litigation and cost of suit.

Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its January 25, 2013 resolution.
Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 with this Court.

The Petition and Comment

Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:15

1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;

2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner’s duplicate copies of the CCTs;

3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any conveyance or
encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and

4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.

In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal. Moreover, proof
of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the presumption of conjugal
ownership.17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection
of the law.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made is manifestly mistaken

In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally excludes a factual and evidentiary re-evaluation, and
the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform factual conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court.18 In the
present case, while the courts below both arrived at the same conclusion, there appears tobe an incongruence in
their factual findings and the legal principle they applied to the attendant factual circumstances. Thus, we are
compelled to examine certain factual issues in the exercise of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken
inference that may have been made.19

Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property

Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position,
however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle
that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.20 To consider these belated arguments would violate
basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process.

Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering
doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.

It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state
where it is located.21 The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are
part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.22

Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by what is known as the lex loci
rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from one person to another, or by which an
interest therein can be gained or lost.23 This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and
transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.24

This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter
what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is
incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where
the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.25

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law.
The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.28

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while
issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven
as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty.
It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean
Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no
showing that it was properly authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.30

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual presumption comes into
play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is
the same as Philippine Law.31

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Kang.32 In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as
they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.

We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the name of only one
spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property.33 In those cases, however, there
was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or
community properties.34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki
for the supposed lack of spousal consent.

The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the Dacion en Pago

Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code presupposes the existence of two or more duly executed
contracts of sale. In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 200335 between Suzuki and Kang was
admitted by Orion36 and was properly identified by Suzuki’s witness Ms. Mary Jane Samin (Samin).37

It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract of sale, the
seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to deliver the same to the buyer,
who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the seller.38 The execution of the notarized deed of saleand the actual
transfer of possession amounted to delivery that produced the legal effect of transferring ownership to Suzuki.39

On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under the principle of prius tempore, potior jure (i.e.,first in
time, stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence and due execution of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.

At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove the existence
of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008. Orion likewise offered in evidence the
supposed promissory note dated September 4, 2002 as Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional
₱800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied the admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in its order
dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not identified in court by any witness."40

Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a tender ofexcluded evidence,
as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For this reason alone, we are prevented from
seriously considering Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition.

Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition, the copious
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and documentary evidence of Orion, militate against the
conclusion that the Dacion en Pagowas duly executed. First, there appears to be no due and demandable obligation
when the Dacion en Pago was executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orion’s witness Perez tried to impress
upon the RTC that Kang was in default in his ₱1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination, he stated:

ATTY. CRUZAT:

Q: Okay, so this loan of ₱1.8 million, what happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?

A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest payment by Mr. Kangand...

Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]

A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank through loans and we have executed a
dacion en pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no money. So we just execute[d] the dacion en pago rather
than going through the Foreclosure proceedings.

xxxx

Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?

A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.41

A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that there was nodefault to speak of when the
supposed Dacion en Pagowas executed.

Based on the promissory note, Kang’s loan obligation wouldmature only on August 27, 2003. Neither can Orion
claim that Kang had been in default in his installment payments because the wordings of the promissory note
provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand its interest and other charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance
hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS.42 "There was thus no due and demandable loan obligation when the alleged
Dacion en Pago was executed.

Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only have a vague idea of the
transaction he supposedly prepared. During his cross-examination, he testified:

ATTY. DE CASTRO:
 Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr. witness?

A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.

xxxx

Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the penalties, interest and surcharge due from Mr.
Yung Sam Kang?

A: It’s just the principal, sir.

Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?

A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We may actually includethat but....

Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?

A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the second party and as of February 10, 2003, the
outstanding obligation which is due and demandable principal and interest and other charges included
amounts to ₱1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.

xxxx

Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest and other charges, based on this
document?

A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43

Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the ₱1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real estate mortgage.
However, no document was ever presented to prove this real estate mortgage aside from it being mentioned
in the Dacion en Pago itself.

ATTY. DE CASTRO:

Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a supplement to that Credit Line Agreement referring
to this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says that there was a subsequent collateralization
or security given by Mr. Yung [Sam]

Kang for the loan?

xxxx

A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44

Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin demanded the delivery
of the titles sometime in August 2003,and after Suzuki caused the annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim.
Records show that it was only on October 9, 2003, when Orion, through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile &
Associates first spoke of the Dacion en Pago.45 Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on October 1, 2003,
when he personally received a letter demanding the delivery of the titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter
and opted to first consult with his lawyer.46

Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material inconsistencies in its recital of facts surrounding the
execution of the Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned that "on [September 4, 2002], after paying the original
loan, [Kang] applied and was granted a new Credit Line Facility by [Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,800,000.00)." Perez, however, testified that there was "no cash movement" in
the original ₱1,000,000.00 loan. In his testimony, he said:

COURT:

xxxx

Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real estate mortgage for that first
₱1,000,000.00 loan?

A: It’s a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.

xxxx

Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this ₱1,000,000.00 loan?
 A: None sir.

Q: No payments?

A: None sir.

Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way of payment to the principal, by way
ofpayment of interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this loan?

A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.

Q: There was no actual cash?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank still extended an ₱800,000.00 additional
right?

A: Yes, sir.47

Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of theDacion en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang
remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to
take possession of the property even six (6) months after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago.
Kang was even able to transfer possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate
improvements thereon. If Orion really purchased the condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its
true owner, why did it not assert its ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why did it have to
assert its ownership only after Suzuki demanded the delivery of the titles? These gaps have remained unanswered
and unfilled.

In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent index of simulation is the complete absence of anattempt on the
part of the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the property in question. After the sale, the vendee should
have entered the land and occupied the premises. The absence of any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right
of dominion over the property allegedly soldto it is a clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding the execution of the
Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in possession of the disputed condominium unit – from the time of the execution of
the Dacion en Pagountil the property’s subsequent transfer to Suzuki – unmistakably strengthens the fictitious
nature of the Dacion en Pago.

These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of Orion’s witness,
indubitably prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en Pago.

The fact that the Dacion en Pago

is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true
conveyance

Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to be considered as containing
all the terms of the agreement.49 While a notarized document enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is
notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents."50 The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is
not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.51

In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the regularity in the execution of the Dacion en Pago
and the loan documents was challenged in the proceedings below where their prima facievalidity was overthrown by
the highly questionable circumstances surrounding their execution.52

Effect of the PRA restriction on

the validity of Suzuki’s title to the
property

Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In particular, Orion
assails the status of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in view of the express PRA restriction contained in CCT No.
18186.53

We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind, the PRA restriction cannot affect the conveyance
in favor of Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur withthe following findings of the CA:

x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who holds a Special Resident Retiree’s Visa(SRRV)
that he shall lose his visa if he disposes his property which serves as his investment in order to qualify for such
status. Section 14 of the Implementing Investment Guidelines under Rule VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the Philippine Retirement Park System Providing Funds Therefor
and For Other Purpose ( otherwise known as the Philippine Retirement Authority) states:

Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment from the Philippines, or transfer the same to another
domestic enterprise, orsell, convey or transfer his condominium unit or units to another person, natural or juridical
without the prior approval of the Authority, the Special Resident Retiree’s Visa issued to him, and/or unmarried
minor child or children[,] may be cancelled or revoked by the Philippine Government, through the appropriate
government department or agency, upon recommendation of the Authority.54

Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA
restriction. Orion knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted with Kang. Incidentally, Orion admitted
accommodating Kang’s request to cancel the mortgage annotation despite the lack of payment to circumvent the
PRA restriction. Orion, thus, is estopped from impugning the validity of the conveyance in favor of Suzuki on the
basis of the PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored and "attempted" to circumvent.

With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no reason for the
application of the rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code. Suzuki, moreover, successfully
adduced sufficient evidence to establish the validity of conveyance in his favor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings
Bank.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 8-31.

2
Id. at 35-51; penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Rosalinda
Asuncion-Vicente and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurring.

3
Id. at 53-55.

4
Records, Vol. I, pp. 257-258.

5
Id. at 259-260.

6
Id. at 250.

7
Id. at 251.

8
Id. at 252.
9
Id. at 253-254.

10
Id. at 270

11
Id. at 271.

12
Id. at 262.

13
Id. at 263-264.

14
Id. at 92-135.

15
Id. at 8-31.

16
Id. at 65-89.

17
Id.

18
Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157, 166.

19
Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 (1942). See also New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213
(2005), citing Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 401 SCRA 79,
the Supreme Court recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: "(1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion."

20
Hubert Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 368 SCRA 134, 145.

21
Agpalo, Ruben E., Conflict of Laws, 2004 Ed., p. 182.

22
Salonga, Jovito R., Private International Law, 1995 Ed., p. 132, citing Wolff 515.

23
Agpalo, Ruben E., Conflict of Laws, 2004 Ed., p. 183.

24
Id.

25
Id.

26
Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement,
the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the
celebration of the marriage and their residence.

This rule shall not apply:

(1) Where both spouses are aliens;

(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines
and executed in the country where the property is located; and

(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting
property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.

27
ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010, 632 SCRA 528, 534.

28
Id.

29
Rollo, pp. 57-58.

30
Id.
31
Supranote 26.

32
Stuart v. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083, 1084-1085 (1962); Magallon v. Montejo, 230 Phil. 366, 377 (1986).

33
Bucoy v. Paulino, 131 Phil. 790 (1968).

34
See Mendoza v. Reyes, 209 Phil. 120 (1983).

35
Records, Vol. I, pp. 213-214.

36
Id. at 291.

37
TSN, February 28, 2005, pp. 29-36.

38
NEW CIVIL CODE, Article 1458.

39
Id., Article 1496 in relation to Article 1498.

40
Records, Vol. II, p. 395.

41
TSN, June 1, 2007, pp. 32-33, emphasis supplied.

42
Records, Vol. II, p. 369. In fact, so important was the single payment arrangement that Orion only allowed
installment payments upon additional payment of Two Percent (2.00%) per annum service fee and a written
notice to Orion of not less than thirty(30) days prior to the proposed payment.

43
TSN, December 17, 2007, pp. 29-32, emphasis supplied.

44
Id. at. 22.

45
Records, Vol. II, pp. 371-372.

46
Records, Vol. I, pp. 263-267.

47
TSN, December 17, 2007, pp. 14-16, emphasis supplied.

48
321 Phil. 809, 831-832 (1995).

49
Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209, 215 (1919).

Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 707, 725 (2000);San Juan v. Offril, G.R. No. 154609, April 24,
50

2009, 586 SCRA 439, 445-446.

Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 298, 309; Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449
51

Phil. 396, 406 (2003).

52
San Juan v. Offril, supra note 50.

53
Entry No. 73321/C-10186-RESTRICTIONS: IN an instrument duly subscribed and sworn to, VERNETTE
UMALI-PACO, CESO II, Phil. Retirement Authority, states that the property described herein is subject to
the following restriction: "The sale, transfer, or encumbrance of this property is subject to the approval of the
Philippine Retirement Authority, the owner-named herein being a holder of Special Resident Retiree’s Visa
(SRRV), and is therefore, subject to the provision of Executive Order No. 1037 and it0`s implementing Rules
and Regulations." (Doc. No. 68, p. 14, Bk.XIV, s. of 2000 of Not. Pub. For Mand. *City, Eddie Fernandez,
dated June 23, 2000.) Date of Inscription-June 23, 2000-1:33 p.m.

54
Rollo, p. 47.
CASE 8

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland
on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came
home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located
at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son,
Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the
victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled
(sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their
child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
"equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the
obligor’s nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject
to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is
conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion
of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal
directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case
only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when
they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three
modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41,
whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode
of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of
law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of
a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in
relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a
definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing
the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts.
Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail
over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree
with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child.
Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the
Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she,
as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce
Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is
a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not
to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of
the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of
the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case,
it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which
was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have
no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice
is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto
the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof
access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of
violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that
the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case,
which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner
is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such,
our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts
falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which
started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted,
we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1896
dated November 28, 2014

1
Penned by Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; Annexes "A" and "B" to Petition, respectively, rollo, pp. 22-26.

2
Rollo, p. 6.

3
Id.
4
Id. at 7.

5
Annex "F" to Petition, rollo, p. 31.

6
Id. at 32.

7
Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 23-24.

8
Id. at 24.

9
Id.at 32.

10
Id.

11
Supra note 7, at 23-24.

12
Supra note 5, at 32.

13
Rollo, p. 7.

14
Id.

15
Id. at 22.

16
Id.

17
Id. at 24.

18
Id. at 8.

19
Id.

20
Id.

21
Supra note 7.

22
Id.at 24.

23
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each
other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;

(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.

24
Annex "R" to Petition, rollo, p. 102.

25
Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 25.

26
Id.

27
Rollo, p. 10.

28
G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320.

29
Id.at 332-333.

30
Supra note 23.
31
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there assuch, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

32
Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, rollo, p. 123.

33
Id. at 122.

34
Supra note 23.

35
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

36
Supra note 7, at 24.

37
Id.

38
G.R. No. L-25441, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 616.

39
Id. at 625-626. (Emphasis supplied)

40
EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. v. NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).

41
Annex "N" to Petition, rollo, p. 84.

42
399 Phil. 342 (2000).

43
Id. at 354. (Emphasis supplied)

44
Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999).

45
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

46
Rollo, p. 18.

47
Supra note 44.

48
Id.at 1296-1297. (Emphasis supplied)

49
543 Phil. 275 (2007).

50
Id.at 290.

51
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262. (Emphasis supplied)

52
Rollo, p. 15.

53
In People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 722 (2009), it was held that:

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of

acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there is only one
crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.
CASE 9

G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC
LEYSON, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991 issued by public respondent Secretary of
Labor and Employment. The November 25, 1991 Order affirmed in toto the August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter the "POEA") which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of
illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from
salaries of workers in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.

Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Philsa") is a domestic
corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private
respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees
in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents
Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson.1

After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985.
They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner.

While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985
which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits
and privileges.2 On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which
increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic
monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by
Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines.3

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their
placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner
refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the
following causes of action:

1. Illegal dismissal;

2. Payment of salary differentials;

3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;

4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and

5. Contract substitution. 4

The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05 0370.

Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving employer-employee relations arising out of
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including money claims, are
adjudicated by the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office (hereinafter the "WAAO") thru the POEA Hearing
Officers.5 On the other hand, complaints involving recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the
license of recruiting agencies are cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment Office (hereinafter the
"LRO"). 6 In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of both an employer-employee relationship case and a
recruitment regulation case, the POEA Hearing Officer shall act as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO
and both cases shall be heard simultaneously. In such cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two separate
recommendations for the two aspects of the case. 7

In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising from the employer-
employee relations and were properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the nature of
recruitment violations and may be investigated by the LRO. The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding
of salary, is both a money claim and a violation of recruitment regulations and is thus under the investigatory
jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the LRO.

Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer on the two aspects of private respondents'
complaint. During these hearings, private respondents supported their complaint with the presentation of both
documentary and testimonial evidence. When it was its turn to present its evidence, petitioner failed to do so and
consequently, private respondents filed a motion to decide the case on the basis of the evidence on record. 8
On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal
dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988 9 , the dispositive portion of which reads:

"CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent PHILSA

INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly and severally
with its principal Al-Hejailan, the following amounts, to wit:

1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,225.00) to each complainant,
representing the refund of their unpaid separation pay;

2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A. de Mesa alone, representing the salary
deduction from his March salary;

3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for R.I. Mikin and C.A.P. Leyson only, representing
their differential pay for the months of February and March, 1985; and

4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of attorney's fees.

All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in Philippine Currency equivalent to the prevailing
exchange rate according to the Central Bank at the time of payment.

All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED." 10

Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision of the POEA-Adjudication Office on matters involving
money claims arising from the employer-employee relationship of overseas Filipino workers may be appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter the "NLRC)11 . Thus, as both felt aggrieved by the said POEA
Decision, petitioner and private respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the
NLRC.

In a decision dated July 26, 1989 12 , the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by
deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. These awards to private respondents were deleted by the
NLRC considering that these were not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise
stated that there was nothing in the text of the decision which would justify the award.

Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated
October 25; 1989.

Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for
review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989,
the petition was dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of
Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August
23, 1989." 13

Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents'
money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988 14 resolving the recruitment violations
aspect of private respondents' complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract
substitution, and unlawful deduction. The dispositive portion of this August 29, 1988 POEA Order reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein respondent PHILSA International Placement
and Services Corporation liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution
and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the placement fees in the amount of P2,500.00 to
Rodrigo L. Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the
salaries withheld in the amount of SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.

Moreover, respondent's license is hereby suspended for eight (8) months to take effect immediately and to
remain as such until full refund and restitution of the above-stated amounts have been effected or in lieu
thereof, it is fined the amount of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS plus restitution.

SO ORDERED."

In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner deposited the check equivalent to the claims of private
respondents and paid the corresponding fine under protest. From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated October 10, 1989.

Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license
or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and
Employment. 15 Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 21,
1988 Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991,16 public
respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed in toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.

Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner raises the following grounds for the reversal of the
questioned Orders:

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE
FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AND IN ANY EVENT, THE LAW ON WHICH THE
CONVICTION IS BASED IS VOID.

II

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PENALIZING PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN
THE PREMISES, THE CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT IMPROVED THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' EMPLOYMENT.

III.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL
DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES FOR THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY
ABSOLVED PETITIONER FROM THIS CHARGE.

With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the POEA, subsequently
affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, that it is guilty of illegal exaction committed
by collecting placement fees in excess of the amounts allowed by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact
which cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. 17 As we have previously held:

"It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively in truly
exceptional cases wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial
acts is challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is
the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not only great respect but even
finality." 18

The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents placement fees in excess of that allowed by
law is clearly a question of fact which is for public respondent POEA, as a trier of facts, to determine. As stated
above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but at
times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 19

On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that the ruling of public respondent
POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the testimonial
evidence offered by private respondents, they also presented documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued
by a duly authorized representative of petitioner which show the payment of amounts in excess of those allowed by
the POEA. In contrast, petitioner did not present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of private respondents
despite the many opportunities for them to do so.

Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11,
Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of
publication.

There is merit in the argument.

In Tañada vs. Tuvera 20 , the Court held, as follows:

"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
 directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties."

Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative
issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment
Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; 21 b) Letter of
Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies
to the national government; 22 c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic
helpers to Hong Kong; 23 d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International
Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People's Republic of China;24 and e) Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of
other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees. 25 In all these cited cases, the
administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the
National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. 26

POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register.

POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum
amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was
apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code which provides, as follows:

"ARTICLE 32. Fees to be paid by workers. — Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment
agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through
its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved
receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable
fees." (italic supplied)

It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. 27 Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or
filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative sanctions on petitioner was
based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code.

The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the
body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were
consistent in mentioning that petitioner's violation of Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for
the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held
liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the
promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and Employment. Considering that, as,
previously discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took
effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative sanctions against petitioner. Moreover, under
Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987, "(r)ules in force on the date of the effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons." Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 was never filed with the
National Administrative Register, the same cannot be used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions
against petitioner.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is not among those
requiring publication contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons and
not to the general public.

Again, there is no merit in this argument.

The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or
authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil.
Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres,29 the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an
even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong
Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or
implemented.

Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation., The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of
these exceptions.

In this regard, the Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs 30 is misplaced.
In the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication
as they were addressed to a particular class of persons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the
exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior to
a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench.

With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of the POEA regarding the
two counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a question of fact which may not be disturbed if the same is
supported by substantial evidence. A reading of the August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the
ruling that petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of prohibited contract substitution is supported by substantial
evidence. Thus:

"2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of substitution in the first count. The first
contract was duly approved by the Administration and, therefore, the parties are bound by the terms and
condition thereof until its expiration. The mere intention of respondents to increase the number of hours of
work, even if there was a corresponding increase in wage is clear violation of the contract as approved by
the Administration, and notwithstanding the same, the amendment is evidently contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy and hence, must be shunned (Art. 1306, Civil Code of the Philippines, Book III,
Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83, Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended). Moreover, it would appear that the
proposed salary increase corresponding to the increase in number of work bonus may just have been a ploy
as complainant were (sic) thereafter not paid at the increased rate.

As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was emphatically intended by respondent to be
signed by complainants which, however, was not consummated due to the adamant refusal of complainants
to sign thereon. Mere intention of the respondent to commit contract substitution for a second time should
not be left unpunished. It is the duty of this Office to repress such acts by teaching agencies a lesson to
avoid repetition of the same violation." 31

With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has
already absolved petitioner from this charge. Petitioner premises its argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989
Decision of the NLRC absolving it from private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction has already
attained finality by reason of the dismissal of private respondents' petition for certiorari of the said NLRC decision by
the Supreme Court.

Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the
money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it
is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are
distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In
fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA
Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and
independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate
Order." 32

The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction based
its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was not raised in the complaint. 33 While there may be questions
regarding such finding of the NLRC, the finality of the said NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing
the same. But the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not raised by private respondents in their complaint
will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the
suspension or cancellation of petitioner's license.

Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for
the suspension or cancellation of the license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned
therein. 34 As such, even without a written complaint from an aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings
against an erring private placement agency and, if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the
corresponding administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an employer-employee
relationship case, may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in the course of its investigation,
violations of recruitment regulations are uncovered. 35 It is thus clear that even if recruitment violations were not
included in a complaint for money claims initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take
cognizance of the same and impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants.

As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private
respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be
imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus
committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful
deduction/withholding of salary.

To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal exaction as POEA Administrative
Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions against petitioner for lack of
publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA and the Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner
should be held administratively liable for two (2) counts of contract substitution and one (1) count of withholding or
unlawful deduction of salary.

Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for each count of contract substitution
is suspension of license for two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while the penalty for withholding or unlawful
deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2) months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than
P10,000.00 plus restitution of the amount in both instances.36 Applying the said schedule on the instant case, the
license of petitioner should be suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine in the
amount of P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A.
de Mesa as restitution for the amount withheld from his salary.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and November 25, 1991 Orders of public respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private respondent Philsa
International Placement and Services Corporation is hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is
hereby ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay the amount of
SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All other monetary awards are deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur

Footnotes

1
Rollo, p. 24.

2
Rollo, p. 25.

3
Ibid.

4
Rollo, p. 87.

5 POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book VI, Rule II, Sections 2 and 4.

6 POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book II, Rule VI Section 3.

7 POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book VI, Rule VI, Section 1.

8 Rollo, p. 144.

9 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-31.

10
Rollo, p. 31.

11
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book VI, Rule V, Section 2.

12
Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 32-38.

13
Annex "F' of Comment of Private Respondents; Rollo, R. 188-189.

14
Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 39-46.

15
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985). Book II, Rule VI, Section 18.

16
Annex "D" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 47-51.

17
Building Care Corp. vs. NLRC, February 26, 1997.

18
Flores vs. NLRC, 253 SCRA 494.
 San Miguel Corp. vs. Ernesto Javate, et al., January 27, 1992; GRF Shipping Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, 190
19

SCRA 418.

20
136 SCRA 27.

Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee vs. Court of Appeals,
21

196 SCRA 263.

22
Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 726.

23
Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298.

24
Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421.

25
De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit, 294 SCRA 152.

26
Administrative Code of 1987, Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3.

27
Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Angeles, supra.

"Labor Code. Article 34. Prohibited Practices — It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee or
28

holder of authority: .

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than
actually received by him as a loan or advance."29. 212 SCRA 298.

30
180 SCRA 599.

31
Rollo, p. 44.

32
Rollo, p. 30.

33
Rollo, p. 37.

34
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985). Book II, Rule VI, Section 3.

35
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book VI, Rule VI, Section 1.

36
Rollo, p. 45.
CASE 10

G.R. No. 100335. April 7, 1993.

UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC. (now UNCIANO COLLEGES & GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC.);
MIRANDO C. UNCIANO, SR., DOMINADOR SANTOS AND EDITHA MORA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Honorable LOURDES K. TAYAO-JAGUROS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Manila; ELENA VILLEGAS thru VICTORIA VILLEGAS; and TED MAGALLANES
thru JACINTA MAGALLANES, respondents.

Bernardo P. Fernandez for petitioners.

Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE WHEN A DOCTRINE OF THE SUPREME COURT IS OVERRULED

AND A DIFFERENT VIEW IS ADOPTED. — In the case of People v. Jabinal, (G.R. No. 82499, 178 SCRA 493
[1989]), it is a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; PURPOSE. — As to the question

on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the case of Capitol Medical Center,
Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. discussed exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ: "The sole object of a
preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy
(Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his
rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil.
445). It should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg, 4 SCRA
930; Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37 SCRA 230). Inasmuch as a mandatory
injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior
to the final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue 'in
cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear
strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest
and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by
the defendant, than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the complainant when he
makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.' (Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA
235)."

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision 1 of public respondent Court of Appeals
dated February 7, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21020; and its resolution dated June 3, 1991.

The antecedent facts are, as follows:

On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers, Victoria Villegas and
Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21,
a petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners
Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. (now Unciano Colleges and General Hospital, Inc.), Mirando C. Unciano, Sr.,
Dominador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-52745.
Among other things, they alleged therein that:

"6.01. Around the latter part of July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition proposing to the school
authorities the organization of a student council in the school. They solicited support of their petition from the
studentry by asking the students to endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to get at least 180
signatures.

"6.02. On August 18, 1989, Elena Villegas and a certain student named Solomon Barroa were summoned to the
Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with the proposal because, according to her, the school
does not allow and had never allowed such an organization.

"6.03. On September 12, 1989, when news leaked out that the above-named students would be barred from
enrollment, they sought confirmation with respondent Dr. Moral, Dean of Discipline, who told them 'it's not true
unless you violate the rules and regulations of the school and if you still insist with your student council.'
"6.04. On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the Dean of Nursing, the above-named
students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they would be barred from enrollment for the
second semester because they supposedly harassed a female student, invited an outsider to the school to speak
before the students, and also because the school has an arrangement with the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports not to allow their students to put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable
Dismissal, and warned them that if she herself were to give it, it would be marked `expelled.'

"6.05. On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them that they were no longer
allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP)
and the League of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug
addicts.' The students asked for proof of these accusations but were not given any, and were told by Dr. Moral that
the school has people investigating for (sic) them but she did not disclose their identities nor provide any proof to
support her allegations.

"6.06. On November 13, 1989, a few days after petitioners retained the services of counsel FREE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE GROUP (FLAG), counsel sent a letter to Mr. Mirando Unciano, President of the College, demanding
that the constitutional requirements of due process be complied with prior to unilaterally dismissing the students,
and requesting that a conference be held prior to 17 November 1989, as the enrollment deadline was fast
approaching . . .:

"6.07. On 17 November 1989, acceding to the demand, a meeting was held, attended by Dr. Moral, Dean Vitug, Mr.
Rustico Lopez, the students, and their counsel. Due, however, to the inability of Dr. Moral to resolve the problem in
the absence of the College President and their legal counsel, the meeting was reset to November 22, 1989 upon Dr.
Moral's request. However, notice was sent to the students' counsel from Unciano Paramedical College resetting the
meeting to November 27, 1989 stating that the President will attend personally therein . . .

"6.08. On 27 November 1989, due to the absence of the school's legal counsel and the President who allegedly just
arrived from the United States, Dr. Moral again requested that the meeting be reset. A verbal altercation occurred
between the parties due to the delaying tactics of the school officials and the failure to resolve the problem by their
continuous refusal to discuss the merits of the accusations against the students. The meeting, attended by Dr.
Moral, Dean Vitug and Dean Dominador Santos, ended with the school officials' request that it be reset for 29
November 19B9 and that the students bring their parents or guardian with them at said meeting. The students
agreed to this request and their counsel prepared a written summary of the matters discussed and agreed during
the meeting. The school officials refused to sign it, however . . .

"6.09. On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had unilaterally refused to allow them
to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to the school officials to change their decision. Mrs.
Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school officials to request that their children be allowed to
enroll . . . Dr. Moral informed them that the Board of Trustees will have to decide on these requests.

"6.10. On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of Trustees had refused to grant the
parents' request." 2

On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner
school from not enrolling private respondents in its College of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990. 3

Petitioners filed an opposition to the prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction on the ground that private
respondents are not entitled thereto and have no clear legal right to the relief demanded. On the same date, the trial
court issued an order, the pertinent parts of which, read:

"xxx xxx xxx

"It is the opinion of the Court that there will be irreparable injury to the petitioners if they are not allowed to enroll. At
least they will miss another semester.

"On the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr. Unciano, in particular the withdrawal of the other students and the
school will lose money if the petitioners are allowed to enroll is still a speculation, and may not take place.

"In view thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering
the respondents to allow petitioners to enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-1991, upon filing by
petitioners of a bond in the amount of P2,000.00 each.

"xxx xxx xxx

"SO ORDERED." 4

On June 11. 1990, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. 5

On June 13, 1990, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Order of June 4, 1990 was denied. 6
Elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
same was dismissed on February 7, 1991 for lack of merit. 7 Said the court:

"The arguments advanced in support of the petition are mainly anchored on the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of ALCUAZ, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., L-
76353, May 2, 1988; 161 SCRA 7 where it was held that —

'It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is
provided in Paragraph 137 (of the) Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers
in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that
the 'written contracts' required for college teachers are for 'one semester.' It is thus evident that after the close of the
first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening
teachers . . .

"However, in the more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, et al., G.R. No. 89317, May 20,
1990 (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its decision in Alcuaz and declared thus:

The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the 'termination of contract' theory. But it must be repeatedly
emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory
and regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV, Secs. 1-2, 4(1).]

'Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
School which provides that '(w)hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester for collegiate courses,' which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to
a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.

'The 'termination of contract' theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a
college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and
paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance
before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has
stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is
given his credentials for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and
Other Fees, which in its totality provides:

'137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year for
elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A student who transfers or
otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has already paid the
pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than one month may be charged ten per
cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within
the second week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. The student may be
charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week of classes. However, if the transfer
or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to and including
the last month of attendance.'

'Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for only one
semester, and that after the semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the
school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire
period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:

'Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific requirement and
reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to his (sic)
complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.'

'This 'presumption' has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the 'Education Act of 1982.'
Section 9 of this act provides:

'SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law
and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:

xxx xxx xxx

12. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up
to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.' " 8

On June 3, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied, again, for lack of merit. 9 Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners raise this lone issue:

"WHETHER OR NOT THE NON DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO GOVERN AND
INVALIDATE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO ITS ADOPTION AND
WHICH INCIDENTS WERE PROPER AND VALID UNDER THE ALCUAZ DOCTRINE PREVAILING AT THE TIME
SAID INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE." 10

Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the
contract between them and private respondents was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school
year 1989-1990. Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was
promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of the contract between them had long become
fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on
the faith thereof, conformably with the case of People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 55 SCRA 607 (1974). Thus, the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion.

We agree with the arguments of petitioners.

The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its promulgation on
May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to
petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2,
1988, which recognized the termination of contract theory. We had an opportunity to resolve a similar issue in
National Service Corporation, et al. v. NLRC. 11 In this case, petitioner claimed that as a government corporation
(by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation, a subsidiary wholly
owned by the Philippine National Bank, which in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms and conditions
of employment of its employees are governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations. In support thereof,
petitioner cited the ruling in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 12 that employees of government owned or
controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations, we rejected this claim of
petitioner and held that:

"It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given retroactive effect, that is,
to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and
other employees similarly situated, because under the same 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in National
Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of
the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in government-owned
or controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO)." 13

In addition, We reiterate Our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Jabinal, supra, that it is a settled rule
that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Coming now to the question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the case
of Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. 14 discussed exhaustively the purpose in issuing
said writ:

"The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the
controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or
protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs.
Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs.
Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930; Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37 SCRA 230).

Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to
issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil.
433). It may, however, issue 'in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of
relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's
right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one and where the effect of the mandatory
injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties, recently and
arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the
complainant when he makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.' (Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel,
et al., 19 SCRA 235.)." 15

In the present case, the contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of
school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to allow private respondents "to enroll
for the first semester of school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore
the status quo but will go a step backward, then restore the condition preceding the status quo. Private respondents
do not possess any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re-admit them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1991 and
its resolution dated June 3, 1991 are SET ASIDE. The orders of the trial court dated June 4, 1990 and June 13,
1990 and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction are likewise SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Justice Arturo B. Buena with the concurrence of Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Justice
Cancio C. Garcia.

2. Pp. 47-51, Rollo.

3. P. 55, Rollo.

4. Pp. 63-64, Rollo.

5. P. 75, Rollo.

6. Pp. 76-77, Rollo.

7. P. 41, Rollo.

8. Pp. 37-41, Rollo.

9. P. 45, Rollo.

10. P. 238, Rollo.

11. G.R. No. 69870, 168 SCRA 122 (1988).

12. G.R. No. 64313, 134 SCRA 172 (1985).

13. At pp. 132-133.

14. G.R. No. 82499, 178 SCRA 493 (1989).

15. At pp. 503-504.

16. P. 75, Rollo.

CASE 11

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY,Defendant-

Appellee.

G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.

E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.: chanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint,
with costs against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for
insufficiency of proof thereon. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

In the language of the decision appealed from:

The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the
agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary
evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before
the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant
University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the
College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff
finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first
semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was
studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the
mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the
defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies
in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle
Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant
and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of
Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled
for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university.
Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was
awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition
fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff
to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to
and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the
fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos
University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to
take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts.
The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which
defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum
under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant
in this case.
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated,
he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement: chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby

waive my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the
University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.

(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued
Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship,"
addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:

1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some
schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students - for excellence
in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements
to poor but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate the
condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned
continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of
these scholarships. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that

such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other
fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged
to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to
another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have
enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer
to other schools since their credentials would not be released unless they
would pay the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the
Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this
ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer.

that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff

asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to
secure the transcript of his record in defendant University, without being
required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools
upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and
that, this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records,
unless said refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it
issue a written order directing the defendant to release said transcript of
record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action." As
above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under
protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar
examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of
said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary
damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of
Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are
valid and binding and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and
void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and
P3,000 as attorney's fees. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract
between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to
transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved this question in
the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the
Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are
advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual
provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he
wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in
its brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private
Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority to issue it, and
because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department head
nor published in the official gazette. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did,

the question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from
defendant University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue
before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personal equations and
demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do
we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38,
for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid
memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the
Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the
defendant,

There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the
contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10,
1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust
and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In
determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of
the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of
government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office
to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but
courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the four factors
in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in
America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as
applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be
prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter
vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811;
Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly the
real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to
issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract
of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our
Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private
Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic
honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec.
6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against public
policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to
be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent
with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security
of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is
sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of
that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase
the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals?
Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted
principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and
keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of
social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section
5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free
scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So
also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which
our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions
scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school
for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom
society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one
shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954,
date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing
defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.chan roblesv irtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De

Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.
CASE 12

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v.
Mapa.1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German
Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was
accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from
Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective
agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of
Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal
cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby
appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as
soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those
generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this
province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood
that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic
cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the
right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath
of office and filing the original thereof with us.

Very
truly
yours,

(Sgd.)
FELICI
ANO
LEVIS
TE
Provinc
ial
 Govern
or

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

Kind: — ROHM-Revolver

Make: — German

SN: — 64

Cal:— .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential
Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives
and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection
with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal
protection while in the performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial
court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively,
with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its
decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the
ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and
abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the
accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa,
supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was
shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had
an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that
under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a
necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.
In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the
judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in
the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative
Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ...
.

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down
by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the
aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis
of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly
recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this
is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws,
where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite
of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

CASE 13

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S.
FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA,
MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;

LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA,
ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;

SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;

LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA,
GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;

DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA,
ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;

EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.

Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.

Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16,
1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex),
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result
of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation
of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:

xxx xxx xxx

9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless
negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due
protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws
and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which
seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting
tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date,
at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water,
accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a
matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and
carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping
within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding
paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;

10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said
date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7
days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left
mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still
alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's
decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in
the premises;
 xxx xxx xxx

13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their
Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men
working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact
that it had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating
income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual
Report for the year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00
as of December 31, 1966;

xxx xxx xxx

(pp. 42-44, rec.)

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based
on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended
by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an
opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, particularly:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

(b) Art. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and
2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.

After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing
the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered
and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to
reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners.

On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance
with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction
over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective
of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected
deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional
compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
A

In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since
the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201
and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges
gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the
lives of its employees working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in
the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.

In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction
between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based
on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability
for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or
disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code
which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence
resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of
Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.—The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ...

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...

Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of
workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment shall be
investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court.

Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the exclusive
character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides an
additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to
prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the
payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted
that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President
of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of
the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan
Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda.

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:

Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under
the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or
his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by
virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker, or the
heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code
provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected
injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty.
Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death
have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue
in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter.
Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided
for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by
filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978,
WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other
petitioners in this case.

WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation
Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five
thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to
entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died
from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and
reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence
of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in
ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for
damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint
(Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).

In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The
alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute
a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of
breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read:

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.

In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by the court.

The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving
damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the
existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99
C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his
family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery
under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).

In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income,
as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due
to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as
a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained
injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).

The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the
defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is
work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs.
GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).

The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now
Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's
Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the
Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six
thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when
incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the
complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other
precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the
amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and which cannot be granted by the Commission.

Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who
suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors
outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of
contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or
workmen. It is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident
causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively
of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition
for damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured
worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation
Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously.

In Pacaña WE said:

In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the
regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured
worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and
thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as
against an ordinary action.

As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the
respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission)
was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for
petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be deemed
incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover
from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of
proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of
having to establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to
establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded
from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation
Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker
Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the
compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.

Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said
rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.

Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the
resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the
court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza,
Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of
the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino
Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by
herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower
court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they
learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal
negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then
Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such
may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact
that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission
which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may
be decreed in their favor.

B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court
merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article
11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as
implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.

To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:

Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).

Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and
in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).

The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and
security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health,
housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of
living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations
between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of
work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973
Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:

Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
(emphasis supplied).

The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code
cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article
173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a
subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice
enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code
seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the
Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.

The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements
of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia
State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code
and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees.

Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated
on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and
all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."

Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act provided:
 Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis
supplied).

Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment; and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section
shall be presumed to include such agreement.

Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside
the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the
employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).

Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil
Code, because said Article 173 provides:

Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered
Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as
amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely
(emphasis supplied).

As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No.
4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or
SSS).

Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not
even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.

It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by
Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered
by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government
Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land.

Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs.
Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured
employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the
Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article
1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of
Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma
(104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.

Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor
impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article
173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra
aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice
guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution,
nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American
decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our
own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to
Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.

The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to life is
guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the
death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of
his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased
worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to
his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or
wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the
protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-
Christian.

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the
provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.

It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.

The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the
rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the
obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's
Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the
Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's
cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to
life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the
benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to
Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's
keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley
vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of
economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries
continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because
the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for
"employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE
only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can
imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected
to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much
hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.

"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man's
survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C

It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.

That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "

Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the
court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of
the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may
apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American Constitution
foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the
ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.

'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of
the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937
ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs.
American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).

Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall
pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs.
Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is
what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9,
1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower.
He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113).
In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge"
(U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and
Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert
pages of the Constitution and all statute books."

It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article
173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault
on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned
by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the
life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay
compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has
faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the
employee.

The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the
law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip
was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo
warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its
efficacy. ... Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common
Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).

Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary
undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to
molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of
Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even
the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme
to the other. x x x. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they
must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.

To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is
to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles
of policy shall prevail.

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do
not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in
certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as
dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black,
Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl
Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-
between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the
courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise
to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual
welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.

On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding
the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda
vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which
guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed
of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These
rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme
Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by American
judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs.
Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both
provisions, the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first
or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by judicial
decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).

Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to
the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of
Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the
same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and
public buses.

De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.

Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a
conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to
property rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had
been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights
as against human rights or social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was
invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-
79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of
guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave
for women employees.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have
been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman
vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate concurring
opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of
judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the
power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There
are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political
questions and invoking American precedents.

Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme
Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act.

WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND
THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under
the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the
complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:

COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR

ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.

Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice
J.B.L. Reyes had said:

Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on words. The
term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for
damages suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of
employment. ...

By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint
involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's
Compensation

Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the majority rules,
both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other.
The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have
already received compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's
Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction".

There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue
under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already
become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a "finished
transaction".

In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first
election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At
the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes
the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in
the case before the Court.

B.

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took effect on June
10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.

Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the law
were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii,
1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under the Act is
exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.

Sec. 112. Hawaii

Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and
employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
 Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or
another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)

When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)

2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature
worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee

by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation

shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer

under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making
body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved
usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot
presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.
(Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]

3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)

The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to
exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.

4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself.
Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:

SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is
due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person
for damages, in accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)

If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer
under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according
to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an
employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.

5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under
the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the
employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of
Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so.
That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.

(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be
presumed to include such agreement).

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the elimination of the
underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph:
 Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
them. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so
desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the
option to sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured employee
without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The compensation is deemed
an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).

In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation, caused by
negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the employer was not negligent.
Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A
increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer. That
additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence
on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.

On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the
opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably
legislating.

It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a
radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure
from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the
legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a
provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation.

Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the
industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.

Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his
employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker,
and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating
the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses available to him as well. The worker was supposed to
know what he entered into when he accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M.
& W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an
obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that
he should discover and guard against himself.

The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle
of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the
need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising
from employment in order to be compensated.

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made compulsory and where
the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious.
Another objective was to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of
industrial accidents could more readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in
the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the
workmen's compensation.

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In return for the
near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer
to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre-
determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation.
The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil
suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the
program. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire
working class.

The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:

An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the

acts and the cases interpreting them.

By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable
and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who
was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was
avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered
some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a
substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the
finger of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the
facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were
torn between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the
employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to
accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent
fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial
damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents.
The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.

xxx xxx xxx

Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the
product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost
of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the
product. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to
broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is
expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase
price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a
given industry is uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.

In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is
essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not
disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and
moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. ....

Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on
the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable according to a
definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work these two
major changes, irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.

Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a
compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of
more importance both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise
would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full
damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by
compensation.

The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The

statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of weekly
compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation
statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established
in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted
to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In
this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the
laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much
of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various
jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation American
Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid
by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all
been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system whose parts must
mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system
without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am personally against
stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable
when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's compensation can arise if
workmen, whom the law allows to receive employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for
industrial accidents. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which
reads:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. ...

Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:

ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents.

I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If
employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits
or get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us is more far reaching than the
interests of the poor victims and their families. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers
who employ covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am
constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under
the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the
complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:

COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR

ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.

Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice
J.B.L. Reyes had said:

Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on words. The
term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for
damages suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of
employment. ...

By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint
involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's
Compensation

Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the majority rules,
both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other.
The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have
already received compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's
Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue
under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already
become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a "finished
transaction".

In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first
election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At
the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes
the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in
the case before the Court.

B.

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took effect on June
10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.

Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the law
were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii,
1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under the Act is
exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.

Sec. 112. Hawaii

Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and
employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)

Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or
another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)

When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)

2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature
worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee

by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation

shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer

under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making
body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved
usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot
presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.
(Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]

3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)

The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to
exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself.
Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:

SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is
due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person
for damages, in accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)

If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer
under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according
to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an
employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.

5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under
the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the
employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of
Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so.
That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.

(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be
presumed to include such agreement).

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the elimination of the
underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph:

Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
them. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so
desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the
option to sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured employee
without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The compensation is deemed
an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).

In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation, caused by
negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the employer was not negligent.
Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A
increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer. That
additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence
on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.

On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the
opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably
legislating.

It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a
radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure
from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the
legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a
provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation.

Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the
industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his
employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker,
and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating
the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses available to him as well. The worker was supposed to
know what he entered into when he accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M.
& W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an
obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that
he should discover and guard against himself.

The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle
of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the
need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising
from employment in order to be compensated.

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made compulsory and where
the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious.
Another objective was to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of
industrial accidents could more readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in
the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the
workmen's compensation.

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In return for the
near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer
to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre-
determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation.
The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil
suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the
program. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire
working class.

The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:

An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the

acts and the cases interpreting them.

By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable
and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who
was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was
avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered
some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a
substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the
finger of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the
facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were
torn between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the
employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to
accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent
fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial
damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents.
The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.

xxx xxx xxx

Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the
product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost
of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the
product. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to
broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is
expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase
price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a
given industry is uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.
 In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is
essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not
disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and
moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. ....

Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on
the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable according to a
definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work these two
major changes, irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.

Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a
compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of
more importance both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise
would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full
damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by
compensation.

The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The

statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of weekly
compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation
statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established
in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted
to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In
this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the
laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much
of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various
jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation American
Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).

The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid
by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all
been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system whose parts must
mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system
without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am personally against
stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable
when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's compensation can arise if
workmen, whom the law allows to receive employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for
industrial accidents. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which
reads:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. ...

Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:

ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents.

I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If
employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits
or get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us is more far reaching than the
interests of the poor victims and their families. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers
who employ covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am
constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

Footnotes

1 SEC. 4-A. Right to additional compensation.- In case of the employee's death, injury or sickness
due to the failure of the to comply with any law, or with any order, rule or regulation of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission or the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the employer
violate the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred seventy-nine and its amendments or
fail to install and maintain safety appliances, or take other precautions for the prevention of accidents
or occupational disease, he shall be liable to pay an additional compensation equal to fifty per
centum of the compensation fixed in this Act.
CASE 14

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil
Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short),
is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However,
when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically,
then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would
be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within
the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred
by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving
his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of
the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

 2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).

2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).

3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.

4 p. 98, Rollo.

5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga,
Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."
CASE 15

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil
Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short),
is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However,
when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically,
then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would
be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within
the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred
by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving
his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of
the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

 2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).

2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).

3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.

4 p. 98, Rollo.

5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga,
Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."
CASE 16

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary
E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased
him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äw phï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is
a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict
of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose
to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen
to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for
his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositors-
appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after
paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow
him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
CASE 17

G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-

RECIO,, Petitioner, v.REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,

provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws
to any and/or both parties.3 cräläwvirtua lib räry

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a

Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian
government. 6 Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City. 7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
single and Filipino. 8
cräläwvirt ualib räry

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia,
their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 9 cräläwvirt ualib räry

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed
to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. 11He contended
that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; 12thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the
suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure
a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. 13 cräläwvirt ualib räry

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the

ground that it stated no cause of action. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General
agreed with respondent. 15 The court marked and admitted the documentary
evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted their respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution. 17 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of
the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.
Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more
marital union to nullify or annul.

Hence, this Petition. 18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in
Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha
Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present

a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code
in this case.
 4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21,
35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained
by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts.19 cräläwvirtua lib räry

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be
legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two,
there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between

respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 20petitioner
argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the
foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place
where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code
requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the
marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the
marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points
for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it. 21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and
17 23 of the Civil Code. 24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 26 A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it
is consistent with their respective national laws. 27 cräläwvirt ualib räry

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 28 Therefore, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. 29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it

must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and
52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local
civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;

xxx

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married,
the applicant shall be required to

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married,
the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x
x x.

ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of
the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their
persons.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a
public document -- a written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given

presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. 31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
cräläwvirtua lib räry

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested 33 by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 34
cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an

authentic one issued by an Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is
not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989
was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after
he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging
to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls
upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she
had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action. 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the divorce was a defense raised
by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. 43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed
to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly
admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law.

Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorcemeans

the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional

or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation
from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse
of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. 46cräläwvirt ualib räry

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which
was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47 cräläwvirt ualib räry

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads:

1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes

absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.48 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent
may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to
remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of
the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on
Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of

the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a
marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by

the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21
of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50
cräläwvirt ualib räry

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents

legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court
shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit B Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit
C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit
D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records; 54 and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio; 55 (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended
Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; 59 and
Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.
Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. 60 cräläwvirtua lib räry

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was
then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status;
or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent

null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under
Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result
of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE , in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,

we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and
failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy,
as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur .

Endnotes:
1
Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.

2 Rollo, p. 10.

3 Ibid., p. 9.

4 Rollo, p. 37.

5 Ibid., p. 47.

6 Id., p. 44.

7 Id., p. 36.

8 Annex 1; temporary rollo, p. 9.

9 The couple secured an Australian Statutory Declaration of their legal separation and division of conjugal assets.

See Annexes 3 and 4 of Respondents Comment; rollo, p. 48.

10 Id., pp. 33-35.

11 Id., p. 39.

12 Amended Answer, p. 2; rollo, p. 39.

13 Id., pp. 77-78.

14 Id., p. 43.

15
Rollo, pp. 48-51.

16 TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8; records, pp. 172-179.

17 RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.

18The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon this Courts receipt of the Memorandum for petitioner, signed by
Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and Associates, had been filed on
December 10, 1999.

[19 Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo , pp. 242-243.

20 43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.

21Ruben F. Balane, Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence in Family Law, Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 1st &
2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.

22
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

23
ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.

xxx

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

24
Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7, 1933.

25Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38.
(71a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by EO
227, prom. July 27, 1987)

26
Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30, 1989.
27
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.

28 Ibid., p. 143.
29
For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295-300. See also Jose C. Vitug, Compendium
of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16;

30 SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.

xxx.

31 Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; 3, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself.

32 SEC. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.

xxx.

33 Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court.

34 Sec. 24. Proof of official record.The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6, 1988.

35The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original copies of the divorce decrees were presented in court (TSN, December 16,
1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only photocopies of the same documents were attached to the records (Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).

36 TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.

37 TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.

38 People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November 10, 1908; People v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504,
516, April 18, 1997; De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14, 1998; Maunlad Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, GR No. 114942, November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.

39 Art. 15, Civil Code.

40 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 566.

41 Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines, second edition, p. 382.

42 Ibid., p. 384.

43 Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 6, 2000, p. 7.

44 Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 Phil. 839, December 29, 1959.

45 27A CJS, 15-17, 1.

46 Ibid., p. 611-613, 161.

47 27A CJS, 625, 162.

48 Rollo, p. 36.

49
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

50 In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for procuring
a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a
marriage license issued without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria
Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.)
CASE 18

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as
co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo")
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957.3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo
Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left
blank.9

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s
salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador
M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed
of by and among themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;

"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."17

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix
of his estate.18

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.20

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate
in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary.24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition
in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is
also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free
portion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such
let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory
of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges
on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just
account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and
to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED."27

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
estate.30

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared
as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.

"SO ORDERED."32

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.33

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.35

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce
from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
1ªwph!1

possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It
can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no
showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul
and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she
and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
(underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
"family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered
by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that
the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of
the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
In CA-G. R. SP. No. 17446, promulgated on July 31, 1995, Lipana-Reyes+, J., ponente, Torres, Jr. and
Hofilena, JJ., concurring.

2
In Spec. Proc. No. IR-755 (In the Matter of the Probate and Allowance of the Last Will and Testament of
Lorenzo N. Llorente, Lorenzo N. Llorente, Petitioner) and Spec. Proc. No. IR-888 (Petition for the Grant of
Letters of Administration for the Estate of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Paula T. Llorente, Petitioner), dated May 18,
1987, Judge Esteban B. Abonal, presiding.

3
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51.

4
Exh. "B", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.

5
Ibid.

6
This was issued pursuant to Lorenzo’s petition, Petition No. 4708849, filed with the U.S. Court. Exhs. "H"
and "H-3" Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 157, 159.

7
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51; Exh. "B", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.

8
Ibid.

9
Exh. "A", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 60.

10
Exh. "B-1" Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 62.

11
Exh. "D", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 63-64.

12
Exh. "E", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 69.

13
Exh. "F", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.

14
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.

15
Comment, Rollo, p. 147.

16
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
17
Exh. "A", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 3-4; Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.

18
Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-755.

19
Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 37.

20
Ibid.

21
Ibid.

22
Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-888.

23
Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 38.

24
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.

25
Ibid., pp. 52-53.

26
Ibid., p. 53.

27
RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 37.

28
Order, Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. Nos. IR-755 and 888, Rollo, p. 46.

29
Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code, which states, "The following cannot adopt: xxx

(3) a married person, without the consent of the other spouse; xxx", the trial court reasoned that
since the divorce obtained by Lorenzo did not dissolve his first marriage with Paula, then the
adoption of Raul and Luz was void, as Paula did not give her consent to it.

30
Order, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, p. 47.

31
Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 17446.

32
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 56.

On August 31, 1995, petitioner also filed with this Court a verified complaint against the members of the
33

Special Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr., Celia Lipana-Reyes +
and Hector Hofilena for "gross ignorance of the law, manifest incompetence and extreme bias (Rollo, p.
15)."

Again with Associate Justice Celia Lipana-Reyes+, ponente, concurred in by Associate Justices Justo P.
34

Torres, Jr. and Hector Hofilena (Former Special Thirteenth Division).

35
Filed on May 10, 1996, Rollo, pp. 9-36.

Petitioner alleges (1) That the Court of Appeals lost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the
36

resolution denying the motion for reconsideration; (2) That Art. 144 of the Civil Case has been repealed by
Arts. 253 and 147 of the Family Code and (3) That Alicia and her children not are entitled to any share in the
estate of the deceased (Rollo, p. 19).

37
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110 Phil. 686 (1961).

38
Joint Record on Appeal, p. 255; Rollo, p. 40.

39
In Re: Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v. Helen Garcia, 117 Phil. 96 (1963).

40
139 SCRA 139 (1985).

41
300 SCRA 406 (1998).

42
174 SCRA 653 (1989).

The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752 [1965]) that provides that "a foreign divorce
43

between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present civil code is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction" is NOT applicable in the case at bar as Lorenzo was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce.
44
Article 15, Civil Code provides "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
(Underscoring ours)

45
Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).
CASE 19

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by
a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on
what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.
He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No.
83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime
in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went
to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua,
her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave
due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate
the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-
52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for
the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review
then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The
same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter
entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being
considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The
petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner,
does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his
filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing
the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435.
Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for
review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary
Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file
the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by
the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power
to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of
the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action
be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time
he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby
have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the
rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that
the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here
alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended
to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear
that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a
formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can
still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to
stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said
declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and
within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite
would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign
divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate
of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably
filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of
the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the
Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in
Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge
with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with
others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the
woman of the same privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between
the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status
and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme
Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for
then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned
but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a
Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned
that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to
comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently
since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the
Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing
before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was
an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is
concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the
Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in
Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge
with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with
others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the
woman of the same privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between
the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status
and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme
Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for
then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned
but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a
Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned
that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to
comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently
since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the
Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing
before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was
an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is
concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 5, 29.

2 Ibid., 6, 29.

3 Ibid., 7.

4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.

5 Ibid., 7, 178.

6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.

7 Ibid., 8-9, 178.

8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.

9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.

10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.

11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.

12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.

13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id.

14 Ibid, 105.

15 Ibid., 11.

16 Ibid., 311-313.

17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.

18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565, 569 (1971);
People vs. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988.

19 Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980).

20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 (1984).

21 Rollo, 289.

22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37 p. 1099;
State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.

23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956).

24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985).

25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, effective on August 3, 1988),
Article 26 whereof provides that "(w)here marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to re under
Philippine law.

26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).

27 Footnote 20, ante.

CASE 20

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25,
1990, stating that:

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the
same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with
Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the
14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel)
measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the
victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby
crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin
which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety
lock.1

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the
widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT

UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
  THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED
FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3

Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled
otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.

The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge,
that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to
written, as well as oral statements.6

The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by
cross-examination.8

The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in official records. Section 44,
Rule 130 provides:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the
requisites for admissibility under the above rule:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not
present.

The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court.
In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report
also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the
truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the
officer who executed the report.

x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the
portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and
conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties
based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been
included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered
as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus
be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:

"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances
were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of
Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who
made the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in
said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying
reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.

The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The
public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed
 from official sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be
found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering
deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many
others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their
duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the
nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In
that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court
would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned
third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed
to qualify as "official information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to
give the statements for record.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.

In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal knowledge
suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s
remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed
that the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to
bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the
lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17

What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform
was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion.
Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19

Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The
effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the
person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.20

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or
injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s
part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself,
or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the
control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care,
there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.21

One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not
available.22

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence
in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured
person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that
under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant
 to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond
plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that
the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party
to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while
he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within
the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a
carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any
accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On
the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule
of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.

No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res
ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human
resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,]
the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased
husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.24

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the
accident which befell respondent’s husband."

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s
negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to
explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not
for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by
the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established. 1âwphi1.nêt

In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police
investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and
regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain
block before allowing its use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private
respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement for
being hearsay.

Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence
under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this
sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the
affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any
more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not
cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the
Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil
Code.

Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents.
The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as
 amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight
hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other
agencies of the government.

The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that:

Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.

Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil
Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining
Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation.
Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against
Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.

Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the
rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a
right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they
may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled
that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher
damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]

Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code
despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968
before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr.,
Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional
Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967,
except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the
lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the
Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only
after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government
rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of
the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
[Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation
vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the
Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The
Court said:

In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further
claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants
may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation
under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception
 is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted
for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating
that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in
the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as
November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her sworn
statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim,
and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case
and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating procedure for
police investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is
mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6,
1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the
public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who
were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no
reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be
imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first
payment therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991
may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s
Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the
victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the
records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more
inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied
for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the
exception held in the Floresca ruling.35

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:

x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her educational
attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of her husband; and
that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36

Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that
her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an
issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."

Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as
November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the
action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient
evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her
receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also
knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the
ECC.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final
and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other
party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to
mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for
their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double
redress for a single wrong.38

The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that
a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action
under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to
assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or
of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis
 upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence.40

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.

Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that
she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with
raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages
2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial
court.

Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the rights
pertaining to a choice of remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that
served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent
purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it
was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over
which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It
appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on
November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is
dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her
behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the
ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the
Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling
in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be
deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or
her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total amount
private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85
as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly
pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether
the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages
awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such
determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received
by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent
with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award
decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that
awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnote

1
Exhibit "A," Records, pp. 60-61.

2
Rollo, pp. 79-80.

3
Id., at 19.

4
Sec. 36, Rule 130.

5 People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312 (1983).

631A C.J.S. Evidence § 194. See also Philippine Home Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA
479 (1996).

75 J. H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 3

(3rdEd.).

8 San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138 (1991).

9 See Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 37-47.

10
16 SCRA 448 (1966). See also People vs. San Gabriel, 253 SCRA 84 (1996).

11
273 SCRA 607 (1997).

12
TSN, December 20, 1991, p. 9.

13
Id., at 28; TSN, January 6, 1992, p. 29.

14
Id., at 29; Ibid.

15
Id., at 33.

16
Id., at 34.

17
Id., at 24 and 28.

18
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 49-50.

19
Id., Sec. 48.

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 (1988). See also Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals,
20

258 SCRA 334 (1996); Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 657
(1986).

21
57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 1819.

22
Id., at 1824.

23
Id., at 1914.

24
Rollo, pp. 87-88.

Whether the doctrine raises a presumption or merely an inference is subject to debate. See 57B Am Jur
25

2d, Negligence §§ 1925-1928.

26
Id., at 1920.

27
Id., at 1947.

28
People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); People vs. Quidato, 297 SCRA 1 (1998).

29
People vs. Ramos, supra.

30
136 SCRA 141 (1985).

31
Justices Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, and Gutierrez dissented.
32
151 SCRA 333 (1987).

33
157 SCRA 446 (1988).

34
164 SCRA 317 (1988).

35
Rollo, pp. 90-91. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.

36
Id., at 90. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.

37
Id., at § 5.

38
Id., at § 2.

39
Castro vs. Del Rosario, et al., 19 SCRA 196 (1967).

40
28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 202.

41
Records, pp. 17-18.

42
I Tolentino, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 19 (1995).

43
Records, p. 100.
CASE 21

[G.R. NO. 144054 : June 30, 2006]

NIEVES A. SAGUIGUIT, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 dated June
28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22180, affirming the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City convicting herein petitioner Nieves Saguiguit of violation (eight [8] counts) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

The facts:

In eight (8) separate informations filed with the RTC of Angeles City, thereat docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 94-03-226 to
94-03-233, petitioner was charged with violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. All containing identical allegations as to the
elements of the offense charged and differing only as regards the respective amounts and due dates of the check involved in
each case, the eight (8) informations uniformly alleged:

"That on or about the 1st week of April, 1991, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw and issue to the complainant
MR. ELMER EVANGELISTA a Traders Royal Bank Check No._________________, in the amount of _________________,
dated _________________, 1991, well knowing and without informing the complainant that she has no sufficient funds with
the drawee bank, which check when deposited for payment was dishonored for reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and demand
notwithstanding for more than five (5) days from notice of dishonor, the accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to redeem the said check to the damage and prejudice of the complainant ELMER EVANGELISTA in the afore-mentioned
amount of ________________, Philippine Currency".

After trial, the RTC, in a decision dated March 16, 1998, adjudged petitioner guilty as charged in each information and
accordingly sentenced her to suffer imprisonment and pay fine and to indemnify private complainant, thus:

1. In Crim. Case No. 94-03-226, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P26,500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, to indemnify the complainant the amount of P26,500.00 and to pay the cost;

2. In Crim. Case No. 94-03-227, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P28,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, to indemnify the complainant the amount of P28,000.00 and to pay the cost;

3. In Crim. Case No. 94-03-228, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P21,500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, to indemnify the complainant the amount of P21,500.00 and to pay the cost;

4. In Crim. Case No. 94-03-229, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, to indemnify the complainant the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the cost;

5. In Crim. Case No. 94-03-230, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P21,500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, to indemnify the complainant the amount of P21,500.00 and to pay the cost;

6. In Crim. Case No. 94-03-231, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P21,500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, to indemnify the complainant the amount of P21,500.00 and to pay the cost;

7. In Crim. Case No. 94-03-232, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P21,500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, to indemnify the complainant the amount of P21,500.00 and to pay the cost; and cralawlib rary

8. In Crim. Case No. 94-03-233, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P22,500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, to indemnify the complainant the amount of P22,500.00 and to pay the cost.2

Unable to accept the verdict of guilt, petitioner went on appeal to the CA whereat her appellate recourse was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR NO. 22180. In the herein assailed Decision dated June 28, 2000, the appellate court affirmed that of the trial
court:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 16, 1998 rendered by the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with
costs against the appellant (herein petitioner).

SO ORDERED.3

Undaunted, petitioner interposed the instant recourse urging the Court not only to review the factual determinations of the
CA, but also to reexamine extant jurisprudence on the Bouncing Checks Law. As the petitioner would put it:

The instant case calls for a reexamination and modification, if not abandonment, of rulings to the effect that the mere
issuance of a check which is subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for violation of BP Blg. 22 regardless of the
intent of the parties '. Petitioner respectfully submits that it was not the intention of the lawmaking body, - to make the
issuance of a bum check ipso facto a criminal offense already; there must be an intent to commit the prohibited act, and
subject check should be issued to apply on account or for value.
This case also calls for a review of the findings of the facts of the CA, as and by way of exception to the rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 '. Petitioner humbly submits that the CA's findings of
fact are not supported by evidence and differ from those of the [RTC]. xxx 4 (Underscoring in the original; citation omitted.)

The petition is devoid of merit.

At its most basic, what the petitioner asks is for the Court to delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P.
Blg. 22, which, under the doctrine of separation of powers, it cannot do, matters of legislative wisdom being within the
domain of Congress.5 Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the law and cannot, despite
doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers,
as long as it has not been shown that they have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret
laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are proven to be infirm, this solemn
power and duty do not include the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.6

Here, petitioner makes no attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law. At bottom, then,
petitioner's last and only remaining remedy is to seek an amendment of the law in question, a matter which should be
addressed to Congress no less. For at the end of the day, the legislature is the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law.7

xxx Under our system of government where powers are allocated to the three (3) great branches, only the Legislature can
remedy such deficiency [in the law], if any, by proper amendment'.8 (Words in bracket added).

Petitioner likewise calls for "modification, if not abandonment" of the rulings that hold issuers of bad checks liable under the
Bouncing Checks Law regardless of intent.9

The call must fall.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.10Stare decisis et non
quieta movere. Let the decision stand and disturb not what is already settled. The doctrine of stare decisis is a salutary and
necessary rule. When the Court lays down a principle of law applicable to a certain set of facts, it must adhere to such
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts in issue are substantially the same.11 Else, the ideal of a stable
jurisprudential system can never be achieved.

Specifically, the principle underlying the concept of mala prohibita is the stare decisis governing a long history of cases
involving violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.

xxx [T]he gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon
its presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. '. The law was designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor. Such practice is deemed
a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, is covered by B.P.
22. It is a crime classified as malum prohibitum. xxx. crvll

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties '. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial
papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. xxx.'

xxx

It bears stressing that, whether a person is an accommodation party is a question of intent. When the intent of the parties
does not appear on the face of the check, it must be ascertained in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Invariably, the tests applied are the purpose test and the proceeds test. xxx. What the law punishes is the issuance itself of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere
act of issuing a worthless check, whether merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the agreement
surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner. xxx.12

Neither can the Court grant petitioner's "call for review of the findings of the facts of the CA." 13
We need not belabor the
basic rule that the Court is not a trier of facts.

Moreover, granting arguendo that petitioner's version of the facts is true - that her transaction was only with a certain
Bernadette Montes and not with private complainant Elmer Evangelista - the hard fact remains that she issued eight (8)
bouncing checks that went into circulation. In net effect, what she did was to borrow from Ruiz, to pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injuring the banking system, and eventually hurting the welfare of society and the public interest.

Finally, while we affirm petitioner's conviction, we deem it proper to modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and
effectively sustained by the CA, pursuant to the policy established under Supreme Court (SC) Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 dated November 21, 2000, on the subject: PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF [BP] Blg. 22, as clarified in SC Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001 dated February 14, 2001, pertinently reading as follows:

SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 - imposes the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1)
year OR a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no case exceed
P200,000, OR both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

In its decision in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656, 664) the Supreme
Court - modified the sentence imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing
only the penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court said:
Petitioner are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy.
Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade
a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by
'1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check
involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.

In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines - the Supreme Court En Banc, applying Vaca also deleted the
penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22,
xxx..14

SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither
does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P.
Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake
of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the
Judge.15 Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.16

It is, therefore, understood that:

1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of
each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to
impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice; 17

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of
the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.

While the decisions of the trial court and that of the CA dated March 16, 1998 and June 28, 2000, respectively, were
promulgated before SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 and its subsequent clarificatory circular took effect, there is no
legal impediment to their application under the premises, favorable as they are to the accused. What is more, the pleadings
before us contain no indication that petitioner was a habitual delinquent or recidivist, a circumstance strongly arguing for the
application, as we did in Young v. Court of Appeals,18 of the latest stare decisis towards modifying the penalties imposable
herein. In an earlier case likewise on all fours with this case, the Court held:

However, in view of [SC] Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001,
establishing a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22; and the recommendation of
the Solicitor General in its Comment that the policy laid down in Vaca v. Court of Appeals,19 and Lim v. People,20 of
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, be
considered in favor of petitioner who is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a recidivist, we find that the penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals should be modified by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine of
xxx.21

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner Nieves Saguiguit is hereby '

1) Sentenced to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in each of Criminal Cases Nos. 94-03-226
to 94-03-233 with subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed six (6) months in each of said cases in the event of insolvency,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code; and cralawlib rary

2) Indemnify the private complainant with the total amount of the subject checks plus six percent (6%) interest from date of
filing of the informations until finality of this Decision, the amount of which, inclusive the interest, is subject to twelve
percent (12%) interest per annum until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1
Penned by former Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria with Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (ret), and Jose L.
Sabio, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 22-25.
2
RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 78-85.

3
Id. at 22-25.

4
Petition, p. 2.

5
Paloma v. Mora, G.R. No. 157783, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 711, 722.

6
Agote v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 142675, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 60, 76.

7
Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 129546, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 436, 468.

8
Agote v. Lorenzo, supra.

9
Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 9.

10
Civil Code, Article 8.

11
Ladanga v. Aseneta, G.R. No. 145874, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 381, 388.

12
Ruiz v. People, G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476, 489-491; citing Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-
63419, December 18, 1986, 146 SCRA 323.

13
Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 9.

14
Josef v. People, G.R. No. 146424, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 417, 423-424.

15
Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 451, 462.

16
Josef v. People, G.R. No. 146424, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 417, 424-425.

17
Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 451, 462.

18
G.R. No. 140425, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 109.

19
G.R. No. 131714, November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 656.

20
G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, 340 SCRA 497.

21
Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455, 476-477.