SALUDAY VS PEOPLE

GR No. 215305, April 3, 2018

Carpio, J.:

FACTS: On May 5, 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down at a military
checkpoint in Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task
Force Davao of the Philippine Army, requested all male passengers to disembark from
the vehicle allowing the female to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the
presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearm or explosives, and
suspicious individuals.

SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a
small gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He
lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked
who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that Marcelo
Saluday herein petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA
Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged
and the bag revealed the following contents: 1) an improvised 30 caliber bearing
serial number 64702; 2) one magazine with three live ammunitions.; 3) one cacao-type
hand grenade; and 4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to
produced proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any,
petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for
Davao City. Having dound probable cause, the prosecutor charged him with illegal
possession of high powered firearm, ammunition and explosive under PD 866.

Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him
to be in actual or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority
or license and was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

On October 11, 2011 he filed a Notice to Appeal . On appeal, petitioner challenged

his conviction raising as grounds the alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial
court and the supposed illegality of the search.

Issue: Whether or not the inspection conducted in the bus constitutes unreasonable search.
Ruling:

The Constitutional right guaranteed by section 2, article 3 of the Constitution is not a

blanket prohibition it operates against unreasonable searched and seizures only.
Conversely, if the search is reasonable it does not apply.

Since the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures is patterned to the Fourth
Amendment of the US Constitution, in determining what qualifies as “reasonable
search” the pronouncements of the US Supreme Court which are also doctrinal in this
jurisdiction were cited to shed light in this matter.

In the seminal case of Katz vs United States, the US Supreme Court clarified that the
Fourth Amendment seeks to protect people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his home or office is not protected under the Fourth
Amendment. But what he seeks to protect as private, even accessible to public may be
constitutionally protected. Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring
opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment.
First, a person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation is
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

Hence, to determine if there exist a reasonable expectation of privacy, first the person
must show a subjective expectation that his activities and items are private and second
that his expectation of privacy is one which the society considers as reasonable.

In this case, the expectations of privacy of the passengers riding in a public

transportation were reduced. The state, in view of its police power can impose non-
intrusive security measures and filter those going in a private premise that is accessible
to public to ensure that the safety of others may be not be put at risk.

The reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason
section 2, article 3 of the Constitution finds no application in this case.