Comparative Analysis

11 Phil 332 vs. 107 Phil 651

ESCUIN VS. ESCUIN ET AL. 11 Phil. 332 , September 24, 1908

Docket Number: No. 4359

Case Title : EMILIO ESCUIN Y BATAC, plaintiff and appellee, vs. FRANCISCO ESCUIN ET AL., defendants.—
JULIA BATAC, appellant. Case Nature : APPEAL from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
(No. 3145. October 30, 1906, and August 24, 1907.)

Syllabi Class : ESTATES|APPEAL FROM COMMISSIONERS' REPORT|TRIAL IN FIRST INSTANCE

COURT|NATURAL FATHER’S RIGHTS

Syllabi:

1. ESTATES; APPEAL FROM COMMISSIONERS' REPORT; PARTITION.-

While the appeal interposed against the report and opinion of the commissioners for the appraisal of an
estate is still pending in the lower court, the partition of the hereditary funds can not be ordered,
notwithstanding the fact that the same consist of ready money, because the amount of the estate to be
divided, in order to comply with the law and the will of the testator, is not yet determined. Only after
payment of all the obligations of the estate can the net amount ‘divisible among the heirs be known.

2. ESTATES; APPEAL FROM COMMISSIONERS' REPORT; TRIAL IN FIRST INSTANCE COURT; APPEAL.-

The claim presented by an appeal interposed against the opinion of the commissioners for the appraisal
of an estate, must be tried in the same manner as any other action in the Court of First Instance, from
whose judgment appeal may be taken to this court by means of the corresponding bill of exceptions.
(Secs. 776, 777, Code of Civil Procedure.)

3. ESTATES; ; RIGHTS OF NATURAL CHILD DULY ACKNOWLEDGED.-

If a natural father dies under a duly executed will, his recognized natural son who survives him, being his
general heir, ,is only entitled to one-third of his estate, which amount constitutes his legal portion; but,
if the natural father dies intestate, his natural recognized son is entitled to the entire estate. (Arts. 807,
842, 939, Civil Code.)

4. ESTATES; TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION.-

A person may die partly testate and partly intestate.

5. ESTATES; NATURAL FATHER’S RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF NATURAL CHILD.-

The natural father has the right to freely dispose by will of two-thirds of his estate, and in case he
exceeds this right by disposing of the legal portion pertaining to his natural recognized son, or by
overlooking the right of the latter under the will, the designation of heirs or the testamentary provision
relative to the legal portion of the general heir, shall be held void; nevertheless, the other testamentary
provisions referring to legacies and gifts shall be considered valid, in so far as they are not illegal and do
not impair the legal portion of the recognized natural son, who is the general heir of the testator.

Lajom vs. Leuterio, etc., and Viola 107 Phil. 651 , April 25, 1960

Docket Number: No. L-13557

Case Title : DONATO LAJOM, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, and RAFAEL VIOLA, respondents. Case Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari with mandamus.

Syllabi Class : JUDMENTS|SUCCESSION|COLLATION OF PROPERTIES|PRETERITION OF HEIRS

Syllabi:

1. JUDMENTS; COLLATION OF PROPERTIES; PROPERTIES EMBRACED IN PREVIOUS JUDGMENT IN CASE

AT BAR.-

The decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in a previous case ordained the collation of the "properties
in question". The properties in question were described in an inventory attached to petitioner's original
complaint in case No. 8077 and did not include the riceland now being claimed by petitioner. Hence, the
same was not in question in case No. 8077, and was not covered by the decision therein rendered.

2. SUCCESSION; PRETERITION OF HEIRS; EFFECT ON THE CHARACTER OF THE ClVlL ACTION IN CASE AT
BAR.-

Petitioner contends that because he was the victim of preterition, the institution of heirs made by the
deceased became ineffective, and that civil case No. 8077 was thereby converted into an intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his estate. Held: There might have been merit in petitioner's
contention if the case were a special proceeding for the settlement of the testate estate of a deceased
person, which, in consequence of said preterition, would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding
for the settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased.
But civil case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the court having jurisdiction over
the same is limited to the properties described in the pleadings.
Case Digest:

17 SCRA 590

Aznar vs. Duncan 17 SCRA 590 , June 30, 1966

Docket Number: No. L-24365

Case Title : IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, deceased. ADOLFO
C. AZNAR, executor and appellee, vs. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee. Case Nature : APPEAL from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Davao. Cusi, Jr., J.

Syllabi Class : Wills|Appeals|Succession; Rights of compulsory heir

Syllabi:

1. Wills; Succession; Rights of compulsory heir; Preterition defined.-

Preterition is the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning
him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning
to him some part of the testator’s estate. Whether the testator gave a legacy to a person, whom he
characterized in the testamentary provision as not related to him, but later this person was judicially
declared to be his acknowledged natural child, the case is not a case of preterition but a case of
completion of legitime. The institution in the will would not be annulled. There would be no intestacy.

2. Wills; Right of compulsory heir, to whom testator left property less than his legitime to completion of
legitime even if he is not referred to in will as heir.-

In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited to the completion of his legitime (instead of the
annulment of the institution of heirs) it is not necessary that what has been left to him in the will “by
any title,” as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir. As successional rights are vested as of
the moment of death, the forced heir is entitled to the fruits and increments of his legitime from the
testator’s death.

3. Appeals; Substitution of heirs is not an issue where substitute heirs are not parties to the case.-

The reference to and discussion of the rights of the substitute heirs in appellant’s brief appears to be
merely for the purpose of refuting the theory advanced by appellees and not f or the purpose of having
the rights of said heirs defined insofar as, under the terms of the will, they may affect the legitime of the
oppositor-appellant. This point of course was not and could hardly have been squarely raised as an issue
inasmuch as the substitute heirs are not parties in this case.

4. Appeals; No substitution on legitime.-

The legitime must descend to the forced heir in fee simple, since the testator cannot impose on it any
burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution (Arts, 864. 872 and 904. New Civil Code).

155 SCRA 100

Acain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 155 SCRA 100 , October 27, 1987

Docket Number: No. L-72706

Case Title : CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third
Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents. Case Nature :
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Melo, J.

Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Certiorari|Succession|Preterition|meaning of|Probate of a will

Syllabi:

1. Civil Law; Succession; Preterition, meaning of; Article 854 of the Civil Code not applicable to the
surviving spouse; Adoption makes the adopted the legal heir of the adopter.-

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA [1982]. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does
not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code) However, the same thing cannot be
said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner (Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and
that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied
that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.

2. Civil Law; Succession; Preterition, meaning of; Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and creates
intestate succession but legacies and devises are valid and respected insofar as they are not inofficious.-

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance including “la portion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado, mejora o
donation” (Manresa, as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
[1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will
for they should stand valid and respected, except in so far as the legitimes are concerned.

3. Civil Law; Succession; Preterition, meaning of; Institution of petitioner and his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance totally abrogates the will.-

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal
heirs—without any other testamentary disposition in the will—amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for
inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the
will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers
and sisters. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total
intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already
stated above, be respected.

4. Civil Law; Succession; Probate of a will; Petitioner has no legal standing to petition for the probate of
the will of the deceased, hence Special Proceeding No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed.-

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in
the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who
has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is
not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary
disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive
(Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined
under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or
by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted
child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no
legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No.
591-A-CEB must be dismissed.

5. Civil Law; Succession; Probate of a will; Rule that probate Court’s authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, not inflexible and absolute; Court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
will under exceptional circumstances.-

Special Proceedings No. 591-CEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general
rule is that the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally come only after the Court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not
called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982];
Cayetano v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]); and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206
[1985]). The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situa- tion constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of
the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate
moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. The probate court acting on the motion held
that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations.

6. Civil Law; Succession; Probate of a will; Trial Court could have denied outright the probate of the will
or have passed upon its intrinsic validity where on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.-

For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when
on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense,
plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
(Cayetano v. Leonidas, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra). The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.

17 SCRA 449

Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al. 17 SCRA 449 , June 23, 1966

Docket Number: No. L-23445

Case Title : REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. FELIX NuGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID,
oppositors and appellees. Case Nature : APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, San
Diego, J.

Syllabi Class : Wills|Succession|Probate of will|Preterition

Syllabi:

1. Wills; Succession; Probate of will; Court’s area of inquiry is limited to extrinsic validity of will; When
Court may rule on intrinsic validity.-

In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary
capacity and the com- pliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.
2. Wills; Preterition; Omission of forced heirs in the will.-

Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line—her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply
omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective
disinheritance.

3. Wills; Preterition distinguished from disinheritance.-

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited.” (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil., 325). Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.”
(Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, “An Outline of Philippine Civil Law”, 1966 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing
cases.) Disinheritance is always “voluntary”; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
“involuntary” (Sánchez Román, Estudios de Derecho Civil, 2nd edition, Volumen 2.o, p. 1131).

4. Wills; Effects flowing from preterition and disinheritance.-

The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under
Article 854 of the New Civil Code “shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment is in toto, unless in
the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also “annul the institution
of heirs”, but only “insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited”, which last phrase was omitted
in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated
yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived.

5. Wills; When institution of heirs is void.-

Where the onesentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents
of the testatrix, and it contains no specif ic legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner,
by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

6. Wills; When legacies and devises merit consideration.-

Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing
in Article 854 of the New Civil Code suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will—void
because of preterition—would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him
bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir.

7. Wills; Institution of heirs cannot be considered a legacy.-

If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments
reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 of the old Civil Code,
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will never have
any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said articles concerning the reduction
of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article
817 of the same Code.

114 SCRA 478

Maninang vs. Court of Appeals 114 SCRA 478 , June 19, 1982

Case Title : RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S.
ASENETA, respondents.

Docket Number: No. L-57848

Civil Law; Wills and Succession; Probate; Probate of a will is mandatory; Reason.—Generally, the probate
of a Will is mandatory. The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because
unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose
of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.

Same; Same; Same; Probate of will does not look into its intrinsic validity.—Normally, the probate of a
will does not look into its intrinsic validity. “x x x The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as being
vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated x x x”

Same; Same; Preterition and disinheritance, distinguished.—“x x x Preterition ‘consists in the omission in
the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.’ (Neri vs.
Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, ‘is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law,’ (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, ‘An
Outline of Philippine Civil Law’, 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is always, ‘voluntary’,
preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be ‘involuntary’ (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho
Civil 2nd edition, Volumen 2.o, p. 1131).”

Same; Same; Same; Effects of preterition and disinheritance.—Preterition under Article 854 of the New
Civil Code ‘shall annul the institution of heir.’ This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devices or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also ‘annul the institution of heirs’, but only
‘insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited’, which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived.”

Same; Same; Will should not be denied legality based on dubious grounds.—As held in the case of Vda.
de Precilla vs. Narciso, “x x x it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not
denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will
be shaken to its foundation, x x x”

Same; Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; Act done by a probate court in excess of its
jurisdiction correctible by certiorari; Certiorari available where appeal not a speedy remedy.—Coming
now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that respondent Judge had
acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, Certiorari is a proper remedy. An act
done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari. And even assuming
the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a
petition for Certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and
adequate relief.

126 SCRA 122

Solano vs. Court of Appeals 126 SCRA 122 , November 29, 1983

Case Title : ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and
EMETERIA S. GARCIA, respondents.
Docket Number: No. L-41971

Evidence; Succession; Parent & Child; Supreme Court bound by the factual findings of the trial court that
parties at bar are all illegitimate children of the deceased.—At the outset, we should state that we are
bound by the findings of fact of both the Trial Court. and the Appellate Court, particularly, the finding
that the GARCIAS and ZONIA are, in fact, illegitimate children of the DECEDENT. The oral testimony and
the documentary evidence of record inevitably point to that conclusion, as may be gleaned from the
following background facts: SOLANO, a resident of Tabaco, Albay, married Pilar Riosa. The latter died.
On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly Gorand, who became his second wife in 1928. The union
was short-lived as she left him in 1929. In the early part of 1930, SOLANO started having amorous
relations with Juana Garcia, out of which affair was born Bienvenido Garcia on March 24, 1931 (Exhibits
"A" & "3"); and on November 3, 1935, Emeteria Garcia was born (Exhibits "B" & "2"). Their birth
certificates and baptismal certificates mention only the mother's name without the father's name. The
facts establish, however, that SOLANO during his lifetime recognized the GARCIAS as his children by acts
of support and provisions for their education.

Pleading & Practice; Succession; Action; Jurisdiction; Waiver; The trial court did not err in rendering
judgment, in an action for recognition, declaring the substitute defendant as an illegitimate child of the
deceased original defendant, ordering the division of the decedent's estate and declaring the latter's
institution of heirship in his probated will null and void where substituted defendant did not merely act
as representative of the deceased, but asserted rights and defenses in her own capacity.—lt is true that
the action below was basically one for recognition. However, upon notice of SOLANO's death, the Trial
Court ordered his substitution by ZONIA, "the only surviving heir x x x as of now" In her "Appearance of
Substitute Defendant Zonia Ana T. Solano x x x Sole and Universal Heir", ZONIA specifically prayed that
she be "allowed to assume her duties as executrix and administratrix of the probated will and testament
of the late Dr. Meliton Solano, under Special Proceedings No. 842, which is already final and executory,
with least interference from the plaintiffs (GARCIAS) who may be classified for the moment as only
pretenders to be illegitimate children". In other words, ZONIA did not only rely upon SOLANO's Answer
already of record but asserted new rights in her capacity as sole and universal heir, "executrix and
administratrix," and challenged the right of the GARCIAS to recognition. Thus, she was not defending.
the case as a mere representative of the deceased but asserted rights and defenses in her own personal
capacity. So it was that the GARCIAS filed a "Reply to Appearance of ZONIA x x x and Supplemental
Cause of Action x x x" vigorously denying that ZONIA was SOLANO's sole and universal heir; that ZONIA
could not legally be considered as SOLANO's acknowledged natural child because of a legal impediment;
that the admission to probate of SOLANO's Will was merely conclusive as to its due execution; that the
supposed recognition under a notarial instrument of ZONIA as an acknowledged natural child was
fraudulent and a product of misrepresentation; that ZONIA's recognition in the Will as an acknowledged
natural child is subject to nullification and that at most ZONIA is, like them, an adulterous child of
SOLANO with Trinidad Tuagnon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; An action for recognition may ipso jure be converted into a contest
as to the status of the alleged daughter of the deceased defendant who asked to be substituted on the
latter's demise where the parties submitted pleadings and evidence bearing also on the substituted
defendant's status as heir.—During the trial, the GARCIAS presented evidence to prove their allegations
not only in their main complaint but also in their "Reply to Appearance and Supplemental Cause of
Action". ZONIA presented no objection to the presentation by the GARCIAS of their oral and
documentary evidence and even cross-examined their witnesses. ZONIA, for her part, presented her
own testimonial and documentary evidence, denied the relationship of the GARCIAS' to SOLANO and
presented the notarial recognition in her favor as an acknowledged natural child by SOLANO and
Trinidad Tuagnon (Exhibit "Q"). Thus, as raised by the parties in their own pleadings and pursuant to
their respective evidence during the trial, the litigation was converted into a contest between the
GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct status as heirs and their respective rights as such. No
error was committed by either the Trial Court or the Appellate Court, therefore, in resolving the issue of
ZONIA's status.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A trial court may, under the special circumstances of a case, declare the
institution of heir void and distribute the decedent's estate, in an action for recognition.—Normally, this
would be the general rule. However, a peculiar situation is thrust upon us here. It should be recalled
that SOLANO himself instituted the petition for probate of the Will during his lifetime. That proceeding
was not one to settle the estate of a deceased person that would be deemed terminated only upon the
final distribution of the residue of the hereditary estate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case
would have terminated except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO's death, continued to file
pleadings therein. Secondly, upon motion of the GARCIAS, and over the objection of ZONIA, the Trial
Court ordered the impleading of the estate of SOLANO and proceeded on that basis. In effect, therefore,
the two cases were consolidated. The records further disclose that the action for recognition (Civil Case
No, 3956) and Spec. Procs. No. 842 were pending before the same Branch of the Court and before the
same Presiding Judge. Thirdly, it is settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as to its due
execution. A probate decree is not concerned with the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of
the Will.

Succession; Preterition of compulsory heir makes institution of heirship void, but not the legacies made
in the Will—As provided in the foregoing provision, the disposition in the Will giving the usufruct in favor
of Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, is a legacy, recognized in
Article 563 of the Civil Code, and should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious.

Same; Same; The omission of a compulsory heir in the Will and resulting invalidity of the institution of an
heir therein would not necessarily result in an intestacy, but only to the extent that the legitime of
omitted compulsory heirs is impaired.—So also did the Trial Court have jurisdiction in resolving the issue
of the hereditary shares of the GARCIAS and ZONIA. However, contrary to the conclusions of the Courts
below, holding that the entire Will is void and intestacy ensues, the preterition of the GARCIAS should
annul the institution of ZONIA as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The
Will, therefore, is valid subject to that limitation. It is plain that the intention of the testator was to favor
ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which, under the law, he had a right to dispose of by Will, so
that the disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half (½) portion of the property that the
testator could freely dispose of. Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists of one-half (1/2) of
the hereditary estate, the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to participation therein in the
proportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA's hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6
of the estate, while the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the
estate.

Jurisdiction; Succession; Voluntary submission to jurisdiction of court bars right to contest same after
receiving an adverse decision.—Lastly, it should be pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court
and the Appellate Court was never questioned before either Court. ZONIA herself had gone, without
objection, to trial on the issues raised and as defined by the Trial Court. Neither had ZONIA assigned lack
of jurisdiction of the Trial Court as an error before the Appellate Court. She should now be held
estopped to repudiate that jurisdiction to which she had voluntarily submitted, after she had received
an unfavorable judgment.

Teehankee, J., concurring:

Pleadings and Practice; The two cases, the action for recognition and the testate proceedings, can be
deemed to have been tried jointly as they were pending before the same judge.—The record shows that
the probate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. 842) was not one for settlement of estate of deceased but one
instituted by the testator himself, Dr. Meliton Solano, for the allowance of the will during his lifetime
under Article 838 of the Civil Code. Such allowance was granted and this terminated the proceeding,
although as noted in the Court's opinion, the parties continued to file some pleadings therein after Dr.
Solano's death. But the issues between the parties as to their status and hereditary shares in view of the
probated will naming petitioner as sole heir were expressly delineated, tried and determined in the
action for recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) filed by respondents Garcias against their father Dr. Solano
who was substituted by petitioner as defendant (and sole heir of the estate under the probated will)
after his death. In effect, therefore, the two cases (assuming that the probate proceeding could be
deemed as having continued notwithstanding its termination with the allowance in vitam of Dr. Solano's
will) which were pending before the same judge and the same branch of the trial court could be
correctly said to have been consolidated. Finally, petitioner is now estopped, after getting an adverse
verdict, from repudiating belatedly the jurisdiction of the trial and appellate courts to which she had
submitted without question her cause.
45 Phil 216

Pecson vs. Coronel 45 Phil. 216 , October 11, 1923

Docket Number: No. 20374

Case Title : In re will of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON, applicant and appellee, vs.
AGUSTIN CORONEL ET AL., opponents and appellants. Case Nature : APPEAL from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Guevara, J.

Syllabi Class : WILLS|CONTEST OF|NAMING OF HEIR|His APPOINTMENT AS EXECUTOR|ATTESTATION

CLAUSE|CLERICAL OR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS

Syllabi:

1. WILLS; FREEDOM TO MAKE A WILL.-

Although family ties in this country are very strongly knit, the exclusion of relatives, who are not forced
heirs, from the inheritance is not an exceptional case. The inhabitants of the Archipelago do not appear
to be averse to the freedom to make a will enshrined by article 783 of the Civil Code, which has been in
force in the Philippines since the year 1889. But even if the appointment of a beneficiary do not seem to
be the most usual and ordinary because the beneficiary is not a relative of the testatrix who has
relatives by blood, this alone will not render the appointment void per se.

2. WILLS; CONTEST OF; BURDEN OF PROOF.-

Where the will is contested on the ground that the person who read the will to the testator, following
instructions from the heir named therein, read one thing for another, the party alleging such a fraud is
bound to present said person as witness for the purpose of proving the alleged fraud, and the omission
not accounted for of said proof gives rise to a presumption that, if it were presented, it would have been
adverse to said party.

3. WILLS; NAMING OF HEIR; His APPOINTMENT AS EXECUTOR; FUNCTIONS OF EXECUTOR.-

The fact that the only heir named in the will is appointed executor is no proof that the testator's
intention was that said executor should distribute the estate among the relatives of the testator, and
not that said executor, named as sole heir, should get all the estate; for to be an heir is not incompatible
with being an executor, inasmuch as the function of an executor is not limited merely to distributing the
inheritance, but he has other duties and powers, such as to preserve, defend, and liquidate the
inheritance until it is delivered to the person entitled to it.

4. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; CLERICAL OR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS; THE EVIDENT INTENTION

PREVAILS.-
Clerical or grammatical errors are ordinarily not considered of vital importance where the intention is
manifest. Thus the expression "cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de otros" (each of us
signed in the presence of others), which appears to be ambiguous on account of the article "los" (the)
being lacking before "otros" (others), will not vitiate the attestation clause where it is evident that its
omission was due to carelessness of the clerk orto lack of mastery of the language, and that what was
meant is that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other.

160 SCRA 810

Ventura vs. Ventura 160 SCRA 810 , April 27, 1988

Docket Number: No. L-26306

Case Title : TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA: MARIA VENTURA, executrix-appellant,
MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants, vs. GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND,
EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.
Case Nature : APPEAL from the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Guimba, Br. V.

Syllabi Class : Civil Procedure|Civil Law|Will|Institution of Heirs

Syllabi:

1. Civil Procedure; Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 became final and executory upon the
finality of the order approving the partition directed in the questioned decision.+

2. Civil Law; Will; Institution of Heirs; The previous appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix rendered
moot and academic.-

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, “the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul and institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious,” and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous appointment of
Maria Venura as executrix moot and academic. This would now necessitate the appointment of another
administrator.

3. Civil Law; Will; Intestacy, Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides the order of preference in
the appointment of another administrator.-

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: “When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve.”

4. Civil Law; Will; Next of Kin: meaning.-

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the
next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The “next of kin” has
been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s
property (Cooper vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620,88 NE 341). It is generally said that “the nearest of kin,
whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among
members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As
between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."'

5. Civil Law; Will; Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura having been declared legitimate children ofGregorio
Ventura and his wife the late Paulina Simpliciano are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children
Maria and Miguel Ventura.-

AB decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are
the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the
nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona
and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court. in order to represent both interests.

21 SCRA 1369

Sumilang vs. Ramagosa 21 SCRA 1369 , December 26, 1967

Docket Number: No. L-23135

Case Title : TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA.MARIANO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee, vs.

SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA,ENRIQUE PABELLA,LICERIA FABELLA and ANDREA
RAVALO, oppositors-appellants. Case Nature : APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon.

Syllabi Class : Remedial law|Appeals

Syllabi:

1. Remedial law; Probate of wills.-

In petitions for probate, the Court’s area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, as the
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law
are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions thereof or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.

2. Remedial law; Implied revocation does not warrant dismissal of petition for probate.-

An alleged disposal by testator prior to his death of the properties involved in his will is no ground for
the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary
provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of
the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

3. Remedial law; Lack of interest bars opposition to probate.-

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding, he must have an interest in
the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, L-17091, Sept. 30, 1963) and an interested party is on who
would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor (Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, March 26, 1965). Where oppositors do not take issue with the
probate court’s finding that they are totally strangers to the deceased, or do not attempt to show that
they have some interest in the estate which must be protected, the order striking out their opposition
and all other pleadings pertinent thereto must be affirmed.

4. Remedial law; Appeals; Order striking out opposition to probate not interlocutory.-

An order striking out an opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that the oppositors have no
personality to intervene in the case is final, and therefore appealable insofar as they are concerned.