Full text of "200 Years Together"

See other formats

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

200 Years Together

Russo-Jewish History

Volume 1 - The Jews before the Revolution:

Ch. 1 Before the 19th century (translated by R. Butlerand J. Harris)

Ch. 2 During th e r e ign of A le xand e r I

Ch. 3 During th e r e ign of Nicho l as I

Ch. 4 During the period of reforms

Ch. 5 After the murder of Alexander II

34

75

Ch. 6 I n th e Russian r e vo l utionary mov e m e nt

Ch. 7 Th e birth of Zionism

Gbr-8 At the turn of the 20th century

&Fk-9 During the Revo l ution of 1905

Ch. 10 During th e p e riod of Duma

Ch. 11 Th e J e wish and Russian nationa l consciousn e ss prior to Wor l d War I

€4^42 During Wor l d War I

Volume 2 - The Jews in the Soviet Union:

Ch. 13 The February Revolution 98

Ch. 14 During 1917 111

Ch. 15 Among Bo l sh e viks

Ch. 16 During the Civil War 136

Ch. 17 Emigration between the two World Wars 165

Ch. 18 In the 1920s 193

Ch. 19 In the 1930s 251

Ch. 20 In the camps of GULag 293

Ch. 21 During the Soviet-German War 302

Ch. 22 From the end of the war to Stalin's death 336

Ch. 23 Before the Six-Day War 351

Ch. 24 Breaking away from Bolshevism 369

Ch. 25 Accusing Russia 382

Ch. 26 The beginning of Exodus 399

Ch. 27 About the assimilation. Author's afterword 417

Chapter 1: Before the 19th century

From the Beginnings in Khazaria

[G13] In this book the presence of the Jews in Russia prior to 1772 will not be discus
sed in
detail. However, for a few pages we want to remember the older epochs.

One could begin, that the paths of Russians and Jews first crossed in the wars between
the
Kiev Rus and the Khazars- but that isn't completely right, since only the upper class
of the
Khazars were of Hebraic descent, the tribe itself being a branch of the Turks that ha
d
accepted the Jewish faith.

If one follows the presentation of J. D. Bruzkus, respected Jewish author of the mid 2
0 th
century, a certain part of the Jews from Persia moved across the Derbent Pass to the l
ower
Volga where Atil [west coast of Caspian on Volga delta], the capital city of the Khaza
ria n
Khanate rose up starting 724 AD. The tribal princes of the Turkish Khazars, at the tim
e still
idol-worshippers, did not want to accept either the Muslim faith - lest they should b
e
subordinated to the caliph
of Baghdad - nor to
Christianity- lestthey
come under vassalage to
the Byzantine emperor;
and so the clan went over
to the Jewish faith in 732.
But there was also a Jewish
colony in the Bosporan
Kingdom [on the Taman
Peninsula at east end of
the Crimea, separating the
Black Sea from the Sea of
Azov] to which Hadrian
had Jewish captives
brought in 137, after the
victory over Bar-Kokhba.
Later a Jewish settlement
sustained itself without
break under the Goths and Huns in the Crimea; especially Kaffa (Feodosia) remained Jew
ish.
In 933 Prince Igor [912-945, Grand Prince of Kiev, successor of Oleg, regent after dea
th of
Riurik founder of the Kiev Kingdom in 862] temporarily possessed Kerch, and his son
Sviatoslav [Grand Prince 960-972] [G14] wrested the Don region from the Khazars. The K
iev
Rus already ruled the entire Volga region including Atil in 909, and Russian ships app
eared at
Samander [south of Atil on the west coast of the Caspian]. Descendents of the Khazars
were
the Kumyks in the Caucasus. In the Crimea, on the other hand, they combined with the
Polovtsy [nomadic Turkish branch from central Asia, in the northern Black Sea area and
the
Caucasus since the 10 th century; called Cuman by western historians; see second map,
below] to form the Crimean Tatars. (But the Karaim [a jewish sect that does not follow
the
Talmud] and Jewish residents of the Crimean did not go over to the Muslim Faith.) The

The Khazar
kingdom in the
early 10th
century

HOLY
ROMAN
EMPIRE

Kl EVAN
RUS

VOLGA
BULGHARIA

Bulghar

• G u rga nj

KHWARIZM
• Bukhara

KH OR AS AN

PERSIA

•Baghdad

Khazars were finally conquered [much later] by Tamerlane [orTimur, the 14 th century
conqueror].

A few researchers however hypothesize (exact proof is absent) that the Hebrews had
wandered to some extent through the south Russian region in west and northwest directi
on.
Thus the Orientalist and Semitist Abraham Harkavy for example writes that the Jewish
congregation in the future Russia "emerged from Jews that came from the Black Sea coas
t
and from the Caucasus, where their ancestors had lived since the Assyrian and Babyloni
an
captivity." J. D. Bruzkus also leans to this perspective. (Another opinion suggests it
is the
remnant of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel.) This migration presumably ended after the
conquest of Tmutarakans [eastern shore of the Kerch straits, overlooking the eastern e
nd of
the Crimean Peninsula; the eastern flank of the old Bosporan Kingdom] (1097) by the
Polovtsy. According to Harkavy's opinion the vernacular of these Jews at least since t
he ninth
century was Slavic, and only in the 17 th century, when the Ukrainian Jews fled from t
he
pogroms of Chmelnitzki [Bogdan Chmelnitzki, Ukrainian Cossack, 1593-1657, led the
successful Cossack rebellion against Poland with help from the Crimean Tatars], did Yi
ddish
become the language of Jews in Poland.

[G15] In various manners the Jews also came to Kiev and settled there. Already under I
gor,
the lower part of the city was called "Kosary"; in 933 Igor brought Jews that had been
taken
captive in Kerch. Then in 965 Jews taken captive in the Crimea were brought there; in
969
Kosaren from Atil and Samander, in 989 from Cherson and in 1017 from Tmutarakan. In Ki
ev
western Jews also emerged.: in connection with the caravan traffic from west to east,
and
starting at the end of the eleventh century, maybe on account of the persecution in Eu
rope
during the first Crusade.

Later researchers confirm likewise that in the 11 th century, the "Jewish element" in
Kiev is to
be derived from the Khazars. Still earlier, at the turn of the 10 th century the prese
nce of a
"khazar force and a khazar garrison," was chronicled in Kiev. And already "in the firs
t half of
the 11 th century the jewish-khazar element in Kiev played "a significant roll." In th
e 9 th and
10 th century, Kiev was multinational and tolerant.

At the end of the 10 th century, in the time when Prince Vladimir [Vladimir I. Svyatos
lavich

980-1015, the Saint, Grand Prince of Kiev] was choosing a new faith for the Russians,
there
were not a few Jews in Kiev, and among them were found educated men that suggested
taking on the Jewish faith. The choice fell out otherwise than it had 250 hears earlie
r in the
Khazar Kingdom. Karamsin [1766-1826, Russian historian] relates it like this: "After h
e
(Vladimir) had listened to the Jews, he asked where their homeland was. 'In Jerusale
m,'
answered the delegates, 'but God has chased us in his angerand sent us into a foreign
land.'
'And you, whom God has punished, dare to teach others?' said Vladimir. 'We do not want
to
lose our fatherland like you have.'" After the Christianization of the Rus, according
to
Bruzkus, a portion of the Khazar Jews in Kiev also went over to Christianity and after
wards in
Novgorod perhaps one of them - Luka Zhidyata - was even one of the first bishops and
spiritual writers.

Christianity and Judaism being side-by-side in Kiev inevitably led to the learned zeal
ously
contrasting them. From that emerged the work significant to Russian literature, "Sermo
n on
Law and Grace" ([by Hilarion, first Russian Metropolitan] middle 11 th century), whic
h
4

contributed to the settling of a Christian consciousness for the Russians that lasted
for
centuries. [G16] "The polemic here is as fresh and lively as in the letters of the apo
stles." In
any case, it was the first century of Christianity in Russia. For the Russian neophyte
s of that
time, the Jews were interesting, especially in connection to their religious presentat
ion, and
even in Kiev there were opportunities for contact with them. The interest was greater
than
later in the 18 th century, when they again were physically close.

Then, for more than a century, the Jews took part in the expanded commerce of Kiev. "I
n the
new city wall (completed in 1037) there was the Jews' Gate, which closed in the Jewis
h
quarter." The Kiev Jews were not subjected to any limitations, and the princes did no
t
handle themselves hostilely, but rather indeed vouchsafed to them protection, especial
ly
Sviatopolk Iziaslavich [Prince of Novgorod 1078-1087, Grand Prince of Kiev 1093-111
3],
since the trade and enterprising spirit of the Jews brought the princes financial adva
ntage.

In 1113, Vladimir (later called "Monomakh"), out of qualms of conscience, even after t
he
death of Sviatopolk, hesitated to ascend the Kiev Throne prior to one of the Svyatosla
vich's,
and "exploiting the anarchy, rioters plundered the house of the regimental commander
Putiata and all Jews that had stood under the special protection of the greedy Sviatop
olk in
the capital city. ... One reason for the Kiev revolt was apparently the usury of the J
ews:
probably, exploiting the shortage of money of the time, they enslaved the debtors wit
h
exorbitant interest." (For example there are indications in the "Statute" of Vladimir
Monomakh that Kiev money-lenders received interest up to 50% per annum.) Karamsin
therein appeals to the Chronicles and an extrapolation by Basil Tatistcheff [1686-175
0;
student of Peter the Great, first Russian historian]. In Tatistcheff we find moreove
r:
"Afterwards they clubbed down many Jews and plundered their houses, because they had
brought about many sicknesses to Christians and commerce with them had brought about
great damage. Many of them, who had gathered in their synagogue seeking protection,
defended themselves, as well as they could, and redeemed time until Vladimir would arr
ive."
But when he had come, "the Kievites pleaded with him for retribution toward the [G17]
Jews,
because they had taken all the trades from Christians and under Sviatopolk had had muc
h
freedom and power.... They had also brought many over to their faith."

According to M. N. Pokrovski, the Kiev Pogrom of 1113 had social and not national char
acter.
(However the leaning of this "class-conscious" historian toward social interpretations
is well-
known.)

After he ascended to the Kiev throne, Vladimir answered the complainants, "Since many
[Jews] everywhere have received access to the various princely courts and have migrate
d
there, it is not appropriate for me, without the advice of the princes, and moreover c
ontrary
to right, to permit killing and plundering them. Hence I will without delay call the p
rinces to
assemble, to give counsel." In the Council a law limiting the interest was establishe
d, which
Vladimir attached to Yaroslav's "Statute." Karamsin reports, appealing to Tatistcheff,
that
Vladimir "banned all Jews" upon the conclusion of the Council, "and from that time for
th
there were none left in our fatherland." But at the same time he qualifies: "in the Ch
ronicles
in contrast it says that in 1124 the Jews in Kiev died [in a great fire]; consequentl
y, they had
not been banned." (Bruzkus explains, that it "was a whole Quarter in the best part of
the
city... at the Jew's Gate next to the Golden Gate.")

At least one Jew enjoyed the trust of Andrei Bogoliubskii [orAndrey Bogolyubsky] in
Vladimir. "Among the confidants of Andrei was a certain Ephraim Moisich, whose
patronymic Moisich or Moisievich indicates his jewish derivation," and who according t
o the
words of the Chronicle was among the instigators of the treason by which Andrei was
murdered. However there is also a notation that says that under Andrei Bogoliubskii "m
any
Bulgarians and Jews from the Volga territory came and had themselves baptized" and tha
t
after the murder of Andrei his sonGeorgi fled to a jewish Prince in Dagestan.

In any case the information on the Jews in the time of the Suzdal Rus is scanty, as th
eir
numbers were obviously small.

[G18] The "Jewish Encyclopedia" notes that in the Russian heroic songs (Bylinen) the
"Jewish
Czar" - e.g. the warrior Shidowin in the old Bylina about llya and Dobrin'a - is "a fa
vorite
general moniker for an enemy of the Christian faith." At the same time it could also b
e a
trace of memories of the struggle against the Khazars. Here, the religious basis of th
is
hostility and exclusion is made clear. On this basis, the Jews were not permitted to s
ettle in
the Muscovy Rus.

The invasion of the Tatars portended the end of the lively commerce of the Kiev Rus, a
nd
many Jews apparently went to Poland. (Also
the jewish colonization into Volhynia and
Galicia continued, where they had scarcely
suffered from the Tatar invasion.) The
Encyclopedia explains: "During the invasion
of the Tatars (1239) which destroyed Kiev,
the Jews also suffered, but in the second half
of the 13 th century they were invited by the
Grand Princes to resettle in Kiev, which
found itself under the domination of the
Tatars. On account of the special rights,
which were also granted the Jews in other
possessions of the Tatars, envy was stirred up in the town residents againstthe Kiev J
ews."
Similar happened not only in Kiev, but also in the cities of North Russia, which "unde
r the
Tatar rule, were accessible for many [Moslem? see note 1] merchants from Khoresm or
Khiva, who were long since experienced in trade and the tricks of profit-seeking. Thes
e
people bought from the Tatars the principality's right to levy Tribute, they demanded
excessive interestfrom poor people and, in case of their failure to pay, declared the
debtors
to be their slaves, and took away their freedom. The residents of Vladimir, Suzdal, an
d
Rostov finally lost their patience and rose up together at the pealing of the Bells ag
ainst
these usurers; a few were killed and the rest chased off." A punitive expedition of th
e Khan
againstthe mutineers was threatened, which however was hindered via the mediation of
Alexander Nevsky. "In the documents of the 15 th century, Kievite [G19] jewish tax-lea
sers are
mentioned, who possessed a significant fortune."

Note l.The word "Moslem" is in the German but not French translation. I am researchin
g
the Russian original.

The Judaizing Heresy

[G19] "A migration of Jews from Poland to the East, including White Russia [Belarus],
should
also be noted in the 15 th century: there were lessers of tolls and other assessments
in Minsk,
Polotsk" and in Smolensk, although no settled congregations were formed there. After t
he
short-lived banishment of jews from Lithuania (1496) the "eastward movement went fort
h
with particular energy at the beginning of the 16 th century."

The number of jews that migrated into the Muskovy Rus was insignificant although
"influential Jews at that time had no difficulties going to Moscow." Toward the end of
the
15 th century in the very center of the spiritual and administrative power of the Rus,
a change
took place that, though barely noticed, could have drawn an ominous unrest in its wak
e, and
had far-reaching consequences in the spiritual domain. It had to do with the "Judaizin
g
Heresy." Saint Joseph of Volokolamsk [1439-1515] who resisted it, observed: "Since th
e
time of Olga and Vladimir, the God-fearing Russian world has never experienced such a
seduction."

According to Kramsin it began thus: the Jew Zechariah, who in 1470 had arrived in Novg
orod
from Kiev, "figured out how to lead astray two spirituals, Dionisand Aleksei; he assur
ed
them, that only the Law of Moses was divine; the history of the Redeemer was invented;
the
Messiah was not yet born; one should not pray to icons, etc. Thus began the Judaizing
heresy." Sergey Solovyov [1820-79; great Russian historian] expands on this, that Zech
ariah
accomplished it "with the aid of five accomplices, who also were Jewish," and that thi
s
heresy "obviously was a mixture of Judaism and Christian rationalism that denied the
mystery of the holy Trinity and the divinity of Jesus Christ." "The Orthodox Priest Al
eksei
called himself Abraham, his wife he called Sarah and along with Dionis corrupted many
spirituals and lay... But it is hard to understand how Zechariah was able so easily to
increase
the number of his Novgorod pupils, since his wisdom consisted entirely and only in th
e
rejection of Christianity and the glorification of Judaism [G20]... Probably, Zecharia
h seduced
the Russians with the jewish cabbala, a teaching that captured curious ignoramuses and
in
the 15 th century was well-known, when many educated men "sought in it the solution to
all
important riddles of the human spirit. The cabbalists extol led themselves they were a
ble...
to discern all secrets of nature, explain dreams, prophecy the future, and conjure spi
rits."

J. Gessen, a jewish historian of the 20 th century represents in contrast the opinion:

"It is
certain, that jews participated neither in the introduction of the heresy... nor its s
pread" (but
with no indication of his sources). The encyclopedia of Brockhausand Efron [1890-190
6,
Russian equivalent to the 1911 Britannica] explains: "Apparently the genuinely jewish
element played no outstanding roll, limiting its contribution to a few rituals." The
"Jewish
Encyclopedia," which appeared about the same time, writes on the other hand: "today, s
ince
the publication of the 'Psalter of the Judaizers' and other memorials, the contested q
uestion
of the jewish influence on the sects must... be seen as settled in a positive sense."

"The Novgorod heretics respected an orderly exterior, appeared to fast humbly and
zealously fulfilled all the duties of Piety," they "made themselves noticed by the peo
ple and
contributed to the rapid spreading of the heresy." When after the fall of Novgorod Iva
n
Vassilyevich III [1440-1505, English name would be "John son of Basil," Grand Prince o
f
Moscoy, united the greater Russian territory under Moscow's rule] visited the city, he
was
7

impressed by their Piety and took both of the first heretics, Aleksei and Dionis, to M
oscow in
1480 and promoted them as high priests of the Assumption of Mary and the Archangel
cathedrals of the Kremlin. "With them alsothe schismwas brought over, the roots of whi
ch
remained in Novgorod. Aleksei found special favorwith the ruler and had free access to
him,
and with his Secret Teaching" enticed not only several high spirituals and officials,
but
moved the Grand Prince to appoint the archimandrite [=head abbot in Eastern Orthodox
y]
Zossima as Metropolitan, that is, the head of the entire Russian church - a man from t
he
very circle of the those he had enticed with the heresy. In addition, he enticed Helen
a to the
heresy — daughter-in-law of the Grand Prince, widow of Ivan the [G21] Younger and moth
er
of the heir to the throne, the "blessed nephew Dimitri."

The rapid success of this movement and the ease with which it spread is astonishing. T
his is
obviously to be explained through mutual interests. "When the 'Psalter of the Judaizin
g' and
other works — which could mislead the inexperienced Russian reader and were sometimes
unambiguously antichristian - were translated from Hebrew into Russian, one could hav
e
assumed that only Jews and Judaism would have been interested in them." But also "the
Russian reader was... interested in the translations of jewish religious texts" - and
this
explains the "success, which the propaganda of the 'Judaizing' had in various classes
of
society." The sharpness and liveliness of this contact reminds of that which had emerg
ed in
Kiev in the 11 th century.

The Novgorod Archbishop Gennadi uncovered the heresy in 1487, sent irrefutable proofs
of
it to Moscow, hunted the heresy out and unmasked it, until in 1490 a church Council
assembled to discuss the matter, under leadership of the just-promoted Metropolitan
Sossima. "With horror they heard the complaint of Gennadi, ... that these apostates in
sult
Christ and the mother of God, spit on the cross, call the icons idolatrous images, bit
e on
them with their teeth and throw them into impure places, believe in neither the kingdo
m of
Heaven nor the resurrection of the dead, and entice the weak, while remaining quiet in
the
presence of zealous Christians." "From the Judgment [of the Council] it is apparent, t
hat the
Judaizers did not recognize Jesus Christ as the Son of God, that they taught, the Mess
iah is
not yet appeared, that they observe the Old Testament Sabbath day rather then the
Christian Sunday." It was suggested to the Council to execute the heretics but, in acc
ordance
with the will of Ivan III, they were sentenced instead to imprisonment and the heresy
was
anathematized. "In view of the coarseness of the century and the seriousness of the mo
ral
corruption, such a punishment was [G22] extraordinarily mild." The historians unanimou
sly
explain this hesitation of Ivan in that the heresy had already spread widely under his
own
roof and was practiced by well-known, influential people," among whom was Feodor
Kuritsyn, Ivan's plenipotentiary Secretary (so to speakthe "Foreign Minister"), "famou
s on
account of his education and his capabilities." "The noteworthy liberalism of Moscow f
lowed
from the temporary 'Dictator of the heart' F. Kuritsyn. The magic of his secret salon
was
enjoyed even by the Grand Prince and his daughter-in-law... The heresy was by no means
in
abatement, but rather... prospered magnificently and spread itself out. At the Moscow
court... astrology and magic along with the attractions of a pseudo-scientific revisio
n of the
entire medieval worldview" were solidly propagated, which was "free -thinking, the app
eal of
enlightenment, and the power of fashion."

The Jewish Encyclopedia sets forth moreover that Ivan III "out of political motivation
s did not
stand against the heresy. With Zechariah's help, he hoped to strengthen his influence
in
Lithuania," and besides that he wanted to secure the favor of influential jews from th
e
Crimea: "of the princes and rulers of Taman Peninsula, ZachariasdeGhisolfi," and of th
e jew
Chozi Kokos, a confidant of the Khan Mengli Giray [orGirai].

After the Council of 1490 Sossima continued to sponsor a secret society for several ye
ars,
but then was himself discovered, and in 1494 the Grand Prince commanded him to depose
himself without process and to withdraw into a cloister, without throwing up dust and
to all
appearances willingly. "The heresy however did not abate. For a time (1498) its votari
es in
Moscow seized almost all the power, and theircharge Dmitrii, the Son of the Princess H
elena,
was coronated as Czar." Soon Ivan III reconciled himself with his wife Sophia Palaiolo
gos,
and in 1502 his son Vassili inherited the throne. (Kurizyn by this time was dead.) Of
the
heretics, after the Council of 1504, one part was burned, a second part thrown in pris
on, and
a third fled to Lithuania, "where they formally adopted the Mosaic faith."

It must be added that the overcoming of the Judaizing Heresy gave the spiritual life o
f the
Muscovy Rus at turn of the 16 th century a new impetus, and contributed to recognizing
the
need for spiritual education, for schools for the Spiritual; and the name of Archbisho
p
Gennadi is associated with the collecting and [G23] publication of the first church-sl
avic Bible,
of which there had not to that point been a consolidated text corpus in the Christian
East.
The printing press was invented, and "after80 years this Gennadi Bible... was printed
in
Ostrog (1580/82) as the first church-slavic Bible; with its appearance, it took over t
he entire
orthodox East." Even academy member S. F. Platonov gives a generalizing judgment abou
t
the phenomenon: "The movement of judaizing no doubt contained elements of the West
European rationalism... The heresy was condemned; its advocates had to suffer, but th
e
attitude of critique and skepticism produced by them over against dogma and church ord
er
remained."

Today's Jewish Encyclopedia remembers "the thesis that an extremely negative posture
toward Judaism and the Jews was unknown in the Muskovy Rus up to the beginning of the
16 th century," and derives it from this struggle against the Judaizers. Judging by th
e spiritual
and civil measures of the circumstances, that is thoroughly probable. J. Gessen howeve
r
contends: "it is significant, that such a specific coloring of the heresy as Judaizing
did not
lessen the success of the sects and in no way led to the development of a hostile stan
ce
toward the Jews."

You're in; no, you're out. Okay, you're in

[G23] Judging by its stable manner of life, it was in neighboring Poland that the bigg
est
jewish community emerged, expanded and became strong from the 13 th to the 18 th centu
ry.
It formed the basis of the future Russian jewry, which became the most important part
of
World jewry until the 20 th century. Starting in the 16 th century "a significant numb
er of
Polish and Czech Jews emigrated" into the Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania. In the
15 th
century jewish merchants traveled still unhindered from the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom
to
Moscow. But that changed under Ivan [IV] the Terrible: jewish merchants were forbidde
n

entry- When in 1550 the Polish King Sigismund August desired to permit them free entr
y
into Russia, this was denied by Ivan with these words: "We absolutely do not permit th
e
entry of the Jew into my lands, because we do not wish to see evil in our lands, but r
ather
may God grant that the people in my land may have rest from that irritation. And you,
our
brother, should not write us on account of the jews again," forthey had "alienated th
e
Russians from [G24] Christianity, brought poisonous plants into our lands and done muc
h
evil to our lands."

According to a legend, Ivan IV [the Terrible], upon the annexation of Polotsk in 156
3,
ordered all jews to be baptized in response to complaints of Russian residents "agains
t evil
things and bullying" by jews, leasers and others empowered by Polish magnates. Those t
hat
refused, apparently about 300 persons, are supposed to have been drowned in his presen
ce
in the Dvina. But careful historians, as e.g. J. I. Gessen, do not confirm this versio
n even in
moderated form and do not mention it once.

Instead of that, Gessen writes that under the False Dimitry I (1605/06) both jews and
other
foreigners "in relatively large number" were baptized in Moscow. The story goes accord
ing
to "In the Time of Troubles" [by Sergey Ivanov, regarding the 15-year period 1598-1613
of
confusion following the failed Rurik Dynasty] that the False Dimitry II (the "Thief o
f
Tushino") was "born a Jew." (The sources give contradictory information regarding the
ancestry of "the Thief of Tushino.")

[Sozhenitsyn relates that after the "Time of Troubles," jews, like Polish-Lithuanian f
olk in
general had restricted rights in Russia. [G25] There was prohibition of peddling in Mo
scow,
or to travel beyond Moscow at all. But ordinances were contradictory.

[Mikhail Feodorovich (Michael son of Theodore; 1613 became first Romanov chosen as cza
r)
did not pursue a principial policy against Jews.

[Alexis Michaelovitch (Alex son of Michael; czar 1645). No sign of discrimination agai
nst
jews in the law book; free access granted to all cities including Moscow. During the s
eizure
of Lithuania, as well as later wars, treatment of Jews in captivity was not worse than
other
foreigners.

[After the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667) (in which Smolensk, Kiev and the whole eastern b
ank
of the Dnieper River remained Russian) jews were invited to stay, and many did. Some
converted to Christianity and some of these became heads of noble families. A small nu
mber
of baptized migrated to a Cossack village on the Don and a dozen Cossackfamilies
descended from them. Samuel Collins, an Englishman residing in Moscow at the time,
related that "in a short time, the Jews have in a remarkable way spread through the ci
ty and
court, helped by the mediation of a Jewish surgeon."

10
[Feodor III, son of Alexis (Theodore, 1676 czar]. Jews not to be assessed toll on entr
y to
Moscow, because they are not allowed in, whether with or without wares. But the practi
ce
did not correspond to the theory.

[In the first year of Peter the Great, doors were opened to talented foreigners, but n
ot jews
on account of their being "rogues and deceivers." Yet there is no evidence of limitati
ons
imposed on them, nor special laws. Indeed, jews were found close to the Emperor:

• Vice-chancellor Baron Peter Shafirov

• close confidant Abram Veselovsky, later accused of thieving

• his brother, Isaac Veselovsky

• Anton de Vieira, general police master of Petersburg

• Viviere, head of secret police

and others. To A. Veselovsky, Peter wrote that what matters is competence and decenc
y,
not baptism or circumcision.

[Jewish houses in Germany inquired whether Russia would guarantee their commerce with
Persia, but never received it.

[At start of 18 th century there was increased jewish trade activity in Little Russia
(=Ukraine),
[G27] a year before Russian merchants got the right. Hetman (Ukrainian chief) Skoropad
ski
gave order several times for their expulsion but this was not obeyed and jewish presen
ce
actually increased.

[Catherine I (1724 Czarina) decreed removal of jews from Ukraine and Russian cities; b
ut
only lasted one year.

[Peter II (Czar 1727) permitted jews into Little Russia, first as "temporary visits" o
n the
ground of their usefulness for trade, then, more and more reasons found to make it
permanent. Under Anna (1730 Czarina), this right was extended to Smolensk and Slobodsk
y.
In 1734 permission was given to distil brandy, and in 1736 it was permitted to import
vodka
from Poland into Russia.

[Baltic financier Levy Lipman probably bailed out the future czarina Anna financially
while
she was living in Courland. [G28] Later, he achieved a high rank in her court in finan
cial
administration, and received various monopoly rights.]

11

Elisabeth [1741 czarina] however issued a

Ukase [imperial Russian decree] one year
after taking the throne (Dec 1742): "Jews are
forbidden to live anywhere in our realm;
now it has been made known to us, that
these jews still find themselves in our realm
and, under various pretexts, especially in
Little Russia, they prolong their stay, which is
in no way beneficial; but as we must expect
only great injuries to our loyal subjects from
such haters of the name of our Savior Jesus
Christ, [G29] we order: all jews, male and
female, along with their entire possession, to
be sent without delay from our realm, over
the border, and in the future not allowed
back in, unless it should be that one of them
should confess our Greek-Christian religion."

This was the same religious intolerance that shook Europe for centuries. The way of th
inking
of that time was not unique in any special Russian way, nor was it an exclusively jew-
hostile
attitude. Among Christians the religious intolerance was not practiced with any less c
ruelty.
Thus, the Old Believers, i.e. men of the same orthodox faith, were persecuted with fir
e and
sword.

This Ukase of Elisabeth "was made known throughout the realm. But immediately attempt
s
were made to move the Ruler to relent." The military chancellor reported to the Senate
from
the Ukraine that already 140 people were evicted, but that "the prohibition for jews t
o bring
goods in would lead to a reduction in state income." The Senate reported to the Czarin
a that
"trade had suffered great damage in Little Russia as well as the Baltic provinces by t
he Ukase
of the previous year to not allow jews into the realm, and also the state burse would
suffer
by the reduction of income from tolls." The czarina answered with the resolution: "I d
esire
no profit from the enemies of Christ."

[Sozhenitsyn discusses contradictory sources as to the number of jews that were actual
ly
evicted, ranging from almost none, to 35,000, the latter figure having questionable or
igins;
[G30] strong resistance to the edict by jews, land proprietors and the state apparatus
es
meant it was enforced almost as little as previous attempts had been.

12

[(G31) Catherine II, Czarin 1762 in consequence of a coup, and also being a neophyte t
o
Orthodoxy herself, was unwilling to start her reign opening things up for jews, though
the
Senate advised for it. Jews pressed for it and had spokesmen in Petersburg, Riga, and
Ukraine. [G32] She found a way around her own law
in permitting their entry for colonization into "New
Russia" [area between Crimea and Moldavia], which
was still a wasteland. Was organized secretly from
Riga, and the nationality of the jews was kept more
or less secret. Jews went there from Poland and
Lithuania.

[In the first Partition of Poland, 1772, Russia reacquired White Russia (Belarus) alon
g with
her 100,000 jews.]

After the 11 th century more and more jews came into Poland because princes and late
r,
kings encouraged "all active, industrious people" from western Europe to settle there.
Jews
actually received special rights, e.g. in 13 th c, from Boleslavthe Pious; in 14 th c,
from Kasimir
the Great; in 16 th c, from Sigismund I and Stephan Bathony; though this sometimes
alternated with repression, e.g. in 15 th c, by Vladislav Yagiello and Alexander, son
of Kasimir:
there were two pogroms in Krakow. In 16 th c several ghettos were constructed partly t
o
protect them. The Roman Catholic spirituals were the most continuous source of a hosti
le
stance. Nevertheless on balance it must have been a favorable environment, since in fi
rst
half of 16 th c. [G33] the jewish population increased substantially. There was a big
role for
jews in the business activity of landlords in that they became leasers of the brandy d
istilling
operations.

After the Tater devastation, Kiev in the 14 th c. came under Lithuania and/or Poland,
and in
this arrangement "more and more jews wandered from Podolia and Volhynia into the
Ukraine," in the regions of Kiev, Poltava, and Chernigov. This process accelerated whe
n a
large part of Ukraine came directly under Poland in the Union of Lublin, 1569. The mai
n
population consisted of orthodox peasants, who for a long time had had special rights
and
were free of tolls. Now began an intensive colonization of the Ukraine by the polish S
zlachta
(Polish nobility) with conjoint action by the jews. "The Cossacks were forced into imm
obility,
and obligated to perform drudgery and pay taxes... The Catholic lords burdened the
orthodox peasants with various taxes and service duties, and in this exploitation the
jews
also partly played a sad role." They leased from the lords the "propination," i.e. the
right to
distil vodka and sell it, as well as other trades. "The jewish leasers, who represente
d the
Polish lord, received - of course only to a certain degree - the power that the landho
lder
had over the peasants; and since the jewish leasers... strove to wring from the peasan
ts a
maximum profit, the rage of the peasants rose not only against the Catholic landlords
but
alsoagainstthe jewish leasers. When from this situation a bloody uprising of the Cossa
cks

13
arose in 1648 under leadership of Chmelnitsky, Jews as well as Poles were the victim
s" -
10,000 jews died.

The jews were lured in by the natural riches of the Ukraine and by polish magnates tha
t
were colonizing the land, and thus assumed an important economic role. Since they serv
ed
the interests of the landlords and the regime... the jews brought on themselves the ha
tred of
the residents." N. I. Kostomarov adds that the jews leased not only various branches o
f the
privileged industries but even the orthodox churches, gaining the right to levy a fee
for
ba ptisms.

After the uprising, the "jews, on the basis of the Treaty of BelaiaTserkov (1651) were
again
given the right to resettle in the Ukraine... The Jews were like before resident and l
easerof
the royal industries and the industries of the Szlachta, and so it was to remain."

"Going into the 18 th c. brandy distilling was practically the main profession of jew
s." "This
trade often led to conflicts with the peasants, who sometimes were drawn into the tave
rns
not so much because well-to-do, but on account of their poverty and misery."

Included among the restrictions placed on the Polish jews in response to demands of th
e
Catholic church was the prohibition against jews having Christian house-servants.

[G34] Because of the recruitment coupled with the state tax increases in neighboring R
ussia,
not a few refugees came to Poland, where they had no rights. In the debates of Catheri
ne's
commission for reworking a new Law code (1767/68), one could hear that in Poland "alre
ady
a number of Russian refugees are servants to jews."

The Kahal and Civil Rights

[G34] The jews of Poland maintained a vigorous economic relation to the surrounding
population, yet in the five centuries that they lived there, did not permit any influe
nce from
outside themselves. One century after another rolled by in post-medieval European
development, while the Polish jews remained confined to themselves, and were always a
n
anachronistic appearance. They had a fixed order within themselves. (Here it is grante
d, that
these conditions, which later remained intact also in Russia until the middle of the 1
9 th
century, were favorable for the religious and national preservation of the jews from t
he very
beginning of their Diaspora.) The whole jewish life was guided by the Kahal, which ha
d
developed from the communal life of the jews, and the Rabbis. [The Kahal, pi. Kehilot
was
the autonomous organization of the leadership of the jewish congregations in Poland.]

[Solzhenitsyn relates that the Kahal was a buffer between polish authorities and jewis
h
people; collected the taxes for example. Took care of the needy and also regulated jew
ish
commerce, approved resales, purchases, and leases. Adjudicated disputes between jews,
which could not be appealed to the secular legal system without incurring the ban (her
em).

14

What may have started as a democratic institution took on the qualities of an oligarch
y bent
on maintaining its own power. In turn, the rabbis and Kahal had a mutually exploitativ
e
relation, in that the rabbis were the executive enforcement arm of the Kahal, and the
rabbis
owed their position to appointment by the Kahal. Likewise, the Kahal owed the maintena
nce
of its power more to the secular regime than to its own people.

[Toward end of 17 th century and through 18 th century, the country was torn by strif
e; the
magnates' arbitrariness increased further. Jews became poor and demoralized, and
hardened in early Middle-age forms of life. [G35] "They became child-like or better: c
hildish
oldsters."

[16 th century jewish spiritual rulers were concentrated in German and Polish jewry. T
hey put
barriers up against contact with outsiders. The rabbinate held the jews in firm bondag
e to
the past.]

The fact that the jewish people have held themselves together in their diaspora for 2,
000
years inspires wonder and admiration. But when one examines certain periods more close
ly,
as e.g. the Polish/Russian one in the 16 th and into the middle of the 17 th century,
and how
this unity was only won by means of methods of suppression exercised by the Kehilot, t
hen
one no longer knows if it can be evaluated merely as an aspect of religious tradition.
If the
slightest trace of such isolationism were detected amongst us Russians, we would be
severely faulted.

When jewry came under the rule of the Russian state, this indigenous system remained,
in
which the hierarchy of the Kahal had a self-interest. According to J. I. Gessen, all t
he anger
that enlightened jews felt against the ossifying Talmudic tradition became stronger in
the
middle of the 19 th century: "The representatives of the ruling class of jewry staked
everything on persuading the [Russian] administration of the necessity to maintain thi
s
centuries-old institution, which reflected the interests both of the Russian power and
of the
ruling jewish class"; "the Kahal in connection with the Rabbis held all the power and
not
seldom, abused it: it misappropriated public funds, trampled the rights of the poor,
arbitrarily increased taxes and wreaked vengeance on personal enemies." At the end of
the
18 th century the Governor of one the administrative regions attached to Russia wrote
in his
report: "The rabbis, [G36] the spiritual Council and the Kahal, 'which are knitted clo
sely
together, hold all things in their hand and lord it over the conscience of the jews, a
nd in
complete isolation rule over them, without any relation to the civil order.'"

In 18th century Eastern European jewry two movements developed: the religious one of t
he
Hassidim [or Hasidim, or Chasidim] and the enlightening one favoring secularculture,
spearheaded by Moses Mendelsohn; but the Kehiloth suppressed both with all its might.
In
1781 the Rabbinate of [Lithuanian] Vilna placed the ban over the Hassidim and in 1784
the
Assembly of Rabbis in [White Russian] Mogilev declared them as "outlaws and their
15

property as without owner. Thereafter mobs laid waste to the houses of Hassidim in sev
eral
cities," i.e. it was an intra-jewish pogrom. The Hassidim were persecuted in the most
cruel
and unfair manner; their rivals did not even feel embarrassed to denounce them before
the
Russian authorities with false political charges. In turn, the officials in 1799, base
d on the
complaint of Hassidics, arrested members of the Kehilot of Vilna for embezzlement of t
ax
money. The Hassidim movement expanded, being especially successful in certain province
s.
The rabbis had hassidic books publicly burned and the Hassidim emerged as defenders of
the
people against abuses of the Kehilot. "It is apparent that in those times the religiou
s war
overshadowed other questions of
religious life."

The part of White Russia that fell to

Russia in 1772 consisted of the
Provinces of Polotsk (later Vitebsk) and
Mogilev. In a communique to those
governments in the name of Catherine
it was explained that their residents
"of whichever sex and standing they
might be" would from now on have
the right to public exercise of faith and
to own property in addition to "all
rights, freedoms and privileges which
their subjects previously enjoyed." The
jews were thus legally set as equals to Christians, which had not been the case in Pol
and. As
to the jews, it was added that their businesses "stay and remain intact with all those
rights
that they today.. .enjoy" - i.e. nothing would be taken away from Polish rights eithe
r.
Through this, the previous power of the Kehilot survived: the jews with their Kahal sy
stem
remained isolated from the rest of the population and were not immediately taken into
the
class of traders and [G37] businessmen that corresponded to their predominant occupati
ons.
In the beginning, Catherine was on her guard not only against any hostile reaction of
the
Polish nobility, from whom power threatened to slip away, but also against giving an
unfavorable impression to her Orthodox subjects. But she did extend wider rights to th
e
jews, whom she wished well and promised herself of their economic utility to the natio
n.
Already in 1778 the most recent general Russian regulation was extended to White Russi
a:
those holding up to 500 Rubles belonged to the class of trade-plying townsmen; those w
ith
more capital, to the class of merchant, endowed into one of three guilds according to
possession: both classes were free of the poll tax and paid 1% of their capital which
was
"declared according to conscience."

This regulation was of particularly great significance: it set aside the national isol
ation of
jews up to that time -Catherine wanted to end that. Further, she subverted the traditi
onal

16

Polish perspective on jews as an element standing outside the state. Moreover, she
weakened the Kahal system, the capability of the Kahal to compel. "The process began o
f
pressing jews into the civil organism... The jews availed themselves to a great extent
of the
right to be registered as merchants" - so that e.g. 10% of the jewish population in th
e
Mogilev Province declared themselves as merchants (but only 5.5% of the Christians). T
he
jewish merchants were now freed from the tax obligation to the Kahal and did not have
to
apply to the Kahal any more for permission to be temporarily absent - they had only to
deal
with the cognizant magistrate. (In 1780 the jews in Mogilev and Shklov greeted Catheri
ne
upon her arrival with odes.)

With this advance of jewish merchants the civil category "jew" ceased to exist. All ot
her jews
had now likewise to be assigned to a status, and obviously the only one left for them
was
"townsmen." But at first, few wanted to be reclassified as such, since the annual poll
tax for
townsmen at that time was 60 kopecks but only 50 kopecks for "jews." However, there wa
s
no other option. From 1783, neither the jewish townsmen [G38] nor merchants needed to
pay their taxes to the Kahal, but instead, to the magistrate, each according to his cl
ass, and
from him they also received their travel passes.

The new order had consequences for the cities, which only took status into considerati
on,
not nationality. According to this arrangement, all townsmen (thus: also all jews) had
the
right to participate in the local class governance and occupy official posts. "Corresp
onding to
the conditions of that time this meant that the jews became citizens with equal right
s... The
entry of jews as citizens with equal right into the merchant guilds and townsmen class
was
an event of great social significance," it was supposed to "transform the jews into a
n
economic power that would have to be reckoned with, and raise their morale." It also m
ade
the practical protection of their life-interests easier." At that time the classes of
traders and
tradesmen just like the municipal commonwealth had a broad self-determination. ..Thus,
a
certain administrative and judicial power was placed into the hands of jews just like
Christians, through which the jewish population held a commercial and civil influence
and
significance." Jews could now not only become mayors but also advisory delegates and
judges. At first limitations were enacted in the larger cities to ensure that no more
jews
occupied electable positions than Christians. In 1786 however "Catherine sent... to th
e
Governor General of White Russia a command written by her own hand: to actualize the
equality of jews 'in the municipal-class self-governance ... unconditionally and witho
ut any
hesitation' and 'to impose an appropriate penalty upon anyone that should hinder this
equality.'"

17

It should be pointed out that the jews thus were given equal rights not only in contra
st to
Poland, but also earlier than in France or the German states. (Under Frederick the Gre
at the
jews suffered great limitations.) Indeed: the jews in Russia had from the beginning th
e

personal freedom that the Russian peasants were only

granted 80 years later. Paradoxically, the jews gained greater
freedom than even the Russian merchants and tradesmen.
The latter had to live exclusively in the cities, while in
contrast the jewish population could "live in colonizations in
the country and distill liquor." "Although the jews dwelled in
clusters [G39] not only in the city but also in the villages,
they were accounted as part of the city contingent-
inclusive of merchant and townsmen classes." "According to
the manner of their activity and surrounded by unfree
peasantry they played an important economic roll. Rural
trade was concentrated in their hands, and they leased
various posts belonging to the landowners' privilege -
specifically, the sale of vodka in taverns - and therewith
fostered "the expansion of drunkenness." The White-Russian powers reported: "The
presence ofjewsinthe villages acts with harm upon the economic and moral condition of
the rural population, because the jews... encourage drunkenness among the local
population." "In the stance taken by the powers -that-be, it was indicated among othe
r
things that the jews led the peasants astray with drunkenness, idleness and poverty, t
hat
they had given them vodka on credit etc. [reception of pledges for vodka]." But "the b
randy
operations were an attractive source of income" for both the Polish landowners and th
e
jewish commissioners.

Granted, the gift of citizenship that the Jews received brought a danger with it: obvi
ously the
jews were also supposed to acquiesce to the general rule to cease the brandy business
in the
villages and move out. In 1783 the following was published: "The general rule requires
every
citizen to apply himself in a respectable trade and business, but not the distilling o
f schnapps
as that is not a fitting business,' and whenever the proprietor 'permits the merchan
t,
townsman or jew' to distill vodka, he will be held as a law-breaker." And thus it happ
ened:
"they began to transfer the jews from the villages to the cities to deflect them from
their
centuries-old occupation ... the leasing of distilleries and taverns."

Naturally, to the jews the threat of a complete removal from the villages naturally ap
peared
not as a uniform civil measure, but rather as one that was set up specially to oppose
their
national religion. The jewish townsmen that were supposed to be resettled into the cit
y and
unambiguously were to be robbed of a very lucrative business in the country, fell into
an
inner-city and inner-jewish competition. Indignation grew among the jews, and in 1784
a
commission of the Kehilot traveled to St Petersburg to seek [G40] the cancellation of
these
measures. (At the same time the Kehilot reasoned that they should, with the help of th
e

18

administration, regain their lost power in its full extent over the jewish populatio
n.) But the
answer of the czarina read: "As soon as the people yoked to the jewish law have ... ar
rived at
the condition of equality, the Order must be upheld in every case, so that each accord
ing to
his rank and status enjoys the benefits and rights, without distinction of belief or n
ational
origin.

But the clenched power of the Polish proprietors also had to be reckoned with. Althoug
h the
administration of White Russia forbad them in 1783 to lease the schnapps distilling "t
o
unauthorized person, 'especiallyjews'... the landlords continued to lease this industr
y to
jews. That was their right," an inheritance of centuries -old Polish custom.

The Senate did not venture to apply force against the landholders and in 1786 removed
their
jurisdiction to relocate jews into cities. For this a compromise was found: The jews w
ould be
regarded as people that had relocated to the cities, but would retain the right to tem
porary
visits to the villages. That meant that those that were living in the villages continu
ed to live
there. The Senate permission of 1786 permitted the jews to live in villages and "jews
were
allowed to lease from the landholders the right to produce and sell alcoholic beverage
s,
while Christian merchants and townsmen did not obtain these rights."

Even the efforts of the delegation of Kehilot in St Petersburg was not wholly without
success.
They did not get what they came for -the establishment of a separate jewish court for
all
contentions between jews - but in 1786 a significant part of their supervisory right w
as given
back: the supervision of jewish townsmen i.e. the majority of the jewish population. T
his
included not only the division of public benefits but also the levying of poll tax an
d
adjudicating the right to separate from the congregation. Thus, the administration
recognized its interest in not weakening the power of the Kahal.

In all Russia, the status of traders and businessmen (merchants and townsmen) did not
have
the right to choose [G41] their residences. Their members were bound to that locality
in
which they were registered, in order that the financial position of their localities w
ould not
be weakened. However, the Senate made an exception in 1782 for White Russia: The
merchants could move "as the case might be, as it was propitious for commerce" from on
e
city to another. The ruling favored especially the jewish merchants.

However, they began to exploit this right in a greater extent than had been foreseen:
"Jewish merchants began to be registered in Moscow and Smolensk." "Jews began soon
after the annexation of White Russia in 1882 to settle in Moscow.... By the end of the
18 th
century the number of jews in Moscow was considerable.... Some jews that had entered t
he
ranks of the Moscow merchant class began to practice wholesaling... other jews in cont
rast
sold foreign goods from their apartments or in the courts, or began peddling, though t
his
was at the time forbidden."

19

In 1790 the Moscow merchants submitted a complaint: "In Moscow has emerged 'a not
insignificant number of jews' from foreign countries and from White Russian who as
opportunity afforded joined the Moscow merchant guilds and then utilized forbidden
methods of business, which brought about 'very hurtful damage,' and the cheapness of t
heir
goods indicated that it involved smuggling, but moreover as is well-known they cut coi
ns: it
is possible, that they will also do this in Moscow." As amends to "their thoroughly ca
gey
findings," the Moscow merchants demanded their removal from Moscow. Thejewish
merchants appealed with "a counter-complaint... that they were not accepted into the
Smolensk and Moscow merchant guilds."

The "Council of her Majesty" heard the complaints. In accordance with the Unified Russ
ian
Order, she firmly established that the jews did not have the right "to be registered i
n the
Russian trading towns and harbors," but only in White Russia. "By no means is usefulne
ss to
be expected" from the migration of jews into Moscow . In December 1791 she promulgate
d
a highest-order Ukase, which prohibited jews "to join the merchant guilds of the inne
r
Provinces," but permitted them "for a limited time for trade reasons to enter Mosco
w."
[G42] Jews were allowed to utilize the rights of the merchant guild and townsman class
only
in White Russia. The right to permanent residency and membership in the townsman clas
s,
Catherine continued, was granted in New Russia, now accessible in the viceregencies o
f
Yekaterinoslav ["Glory of Catherine the Great"; much later, name changed to
Dnepropetrovsk] andTaurida (shortly thereafter these became the Provinces of
Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Cherson); that is, Catherine allowed jews to migrate into
the
new, expansive territories, into which Christian merchants and townsmen from the
provinces of interior Russia generally were not permitted to emigrate. When in 1796 "i
t was
made known that groups of jews [already] .... had immigrated into the Kiev, Chernigov
and
Novgorod-Syeversk Provinces," it was likewise granted there "to utilize the right of t
he
merchant guild and the townsman class."

20

The pre-Revolution Jewish Encyclopedia writes: The Ukase of 1791 "laid the groundwork
for
setting up the pale of settlement, even if it wasn't so intended. Under the conditions
of the
then-obtaining social and civic order in general, and of jewish life in particular, th
e
administration could not consider bringing about a particularly onerous situation and
conclude for them exceptional laws, which among other things would restrict the right
of
residency. In the context of its time, this Ukase did not contain that which in this r
espect
would have brought the jews into a less favorable condition than the Christians... The
Ukase
of 1791 in no way limited the rights of jews in the choice of residency, created no sp
ecial
'borders/ and 'for jews the way was opened into new regions, into which in general peo
ple
could not emigrate.' The main point of the decree was not concerned with their jewishn
ess,
but that they were traders; the question was not considered from the national or relig
ious
point of view, but only from the viewpoint of usefulness."

This Ukase of 1791, which actually privileged jewish merchants in comparison to Christ
ian
ones, was in the course of time the basis for the future "Pale of Settlement.," which
almost
until the Revolution castas it were a dark shadow over Russia.

21

By itself however the Ukase of 1791 was not so oppressive

in its outworking as to prevent "a small [jewish] colony from
emerging in St Petersburg by the end of the reign of
Catherine II." [G43] Here lived "the famous tax-leaser Abram
Peretz" and some of the merchants close to him, and also,
"while the religious struggle was in full swing, the rabbi
Avigdor Chaimovitch and his opponent, the famous hassidic
Tzadik Zalman Boruchovitch."

In 1793 and 1795 the second and third Partition of Poland

took place, and the jewish population from Lithuania,
Poldolia, and Volhynia, numbering almost a million, came
under Russia's jurisdiction. This increase in population was a
very significant event, though for a long time not recognized
as such. It later influenced the fate of both Russia and the
jewry of East Europe.
"After centuries-long wandering [jewry] came under one roof, in a single great congreg
ation."

* * * *

In the now vastly-expanded region of jewish settlement, the same questions came up as
before. The jews obtained rights of Merchant guilds and townsmen, which they had not
possessed in Poland, and they got the right to equal participation in the class-munici
pal self-
government... then had to accept the restrictions of this status: they could not migra
te into
the cities of the inner-Russian provinces, and were liable to be moved out of the vill
ages.

With the now huge extent of the jewish population, the Russian regime no longer had a
way
to veil the fact that the jews continued to live in the villages simply by modeling it
as a
"temporary visit." "A burning question .... was whether the economic condition could
tolerate so many tradesmen and traders living amongst the peasants."

In order to defuse the problem, many Shtetl were made equal to cities. Thus, the lega
l
possibility came about for jews to continue living there. But with the large number of
jews in
the country and the high population density in the cities, that was no solution.

[G43] Now it seemed to be a natural way out, that the jews would take advantage of th
e
possibility offered by Catherine to settle in the huge, scarcely-occupied New Russia.
The new
settlers were offered inducements, but this "did not succeed in setting a colonizatio
n
movement into motion. Even the freedom of the new settlers from taxes appeared not to
be
attractive enough" to induce such a migration.

Rabbi Schneui Z aim an

BORUCHOVITCH

22
Thus Catherine decided in 1794 to induce the jews to emigrate with contrary measures:
the
jews were relocated out of the villages. At the same time, she decided to assess the e
ntire
jewish population with a tax that was double that paid by the Christians. (Such a tax
had
already been paid for a long time by the Old Believers, but applied to the jews, this
law
proved to be neither effective nor of long duration.)

Those were the last regulations of Catherine. From the end of 1796 Paul I reigned. Th
e
Jewish Encyclopedia evaluates him in this way: "The time of the angry rule of Paul I p
assed
well for the jews... All edicts of Paul I concerning the jews indicate that the monarc
h was
tolerant and benevolent toward the jewish population." "When the interest of jews
conflicted with Christians, Paul I by no means automatically sided with the Christia
n." Even
when in 1797 he ordered "measures to reduce the power of the jews and the spirituals o
ver
the peasants," that was "actually not set up againstthe jews: the point was the protec
tion of
the peasants." Paul recognized also "the right of the Hassidim not to have to live in
secrecy."
He extended the right of jews to belong to the merchant- and townsmen-class even to th
e
Courland Province (which was no Polish inheritance, and later, it also did not belong
to the
"pale of settlement"). Consistent with that policy, he denied the respective petitions
of the
parishes of Kovno, Kamenez-Podolsk, Kiev and Vilna, to be permitted to move the jews o
ut
of their cities.

Paul had inherited the stubborn resistance of the Polish landholders against any chang
ing of
their rights; among these was the right over the jews and the right to hold court over
them.
They misused these rights often. Thus the Complaint of the jews of Berdychiv [Ukrain
e]
againstthe princes of Radziwill stated: "in order to hold our [G45] religious service
s, we must
first pay gold to those to whom the prince has leased our faith," and against Catherin
e's
former favorite [Simon] Zorich: "one ought not to have to pay him for the air one brea
thes."
In Poland many Shtetl and cities were the possession of nobles, and the landowners
assessed arbitrary and opportunistic levies that the residents had to pay.
Derzhavin and the Belarus famine

[G45] Since the start of the reign of Paul I there was a great famine in White Russi
a,
especially in the province of Minsk. The poet Gavrila Romanovich Derzhavin, then servi
ng as
Senator, was commissioned to go there and determine its cause and seek a solution — fo
r
which task he received no money to buy grain, but instead had the right to confiscate
possessions of negligent landowners, sell their stockpile and distribute them.

Derzhavin was not just a great poet, but also an outstanding statesman who left behin
d
unique proofs of his effectiveness which we want to delve into in the following.

23

The famine, as Derzhavin confirmed, was

unimaginable. He writes "when I arrived in White
Russia, I personally convinced myself of the great
scarcity of grain among the villagers. Due to the very
serious hunger — virtually all nourished themselves
from fermented grass, mixed with a tiny portion of
meal or pearl barley -, "the peasants were
malnourished and sallow like dead people. "In order
to remedy this, I found out which of the rich
landowners had grain in their storehouses," took it
to the town center and distributed it to the poor;
and I commanded the goods of a Polish Count "in
view of such pitiless greed" to be yielded to a
trustee. "After the nobleman was made aware of the
dire situation he awoke from his slumber or better,
from his shocking indifference toward humanity: he
used every means to feed the peasants by acquiring
grainfrom neighboring provinces and when after
two months the harvest time arrived... the famine
ended." When Derzhavin visited the provincial
government, he so pursued the noble rulers and

[G46] district police captains that the nobility "banded together together and sent th
e Czar a
scurrilous complain against Derzhavin."

Derzhavin discovered that the jewish schnapps distillers exploited the alcoholism of t
he
peasants: "After I had discovered that the jews from profit-seeking use the lure of dr
ink to
beguile grain from the peasants, convert it into brandy and therewith cause a famine.
I
commanded that they should close their distilleries in the village Liosno." "I informe
d myself
from sensible inhabitants" as well as nobles, merchants, and villagers "about the mann
er of
life of the jews, their occupations, their deceptions and all their pettifogging with
which ...
they provide the poor dumb villages with hunger; and on the other hand, by what means
one could protect them from the common pack and how to facilitate forthem an honorabl
e
and respectable way out ... to enable them to become useful citizens.

Afterwards, in the autumn months, Derzhavin described many evil practices of the Polis
h
landlords and jewish leasers in his "Memorandum on the mitigation of famine in White
Russia and on the lifestyles of the jews," which he also made known to the czar and th
e
highest officials of state. This Memorandum is a very comprehensive document that
evaluates the conditions inherited from the Poles as well as the possibilities for ove
rcoming
the poverty of the peasants, describing the peculiarities of the jewish way of life of
that time
and includes a proposal for reform in comparison to Prussia and Austria. The very expl
icit
practical presentation of the recommended measures makes this the first work of an
enlightened Russian citizen concerning jewish life in Russia, in those first years in
which
Russia acquired jews in a large mass. That makes it a work of special interest.

24

The Memorandum consists of two parts: (1) on the residence of White Russian in general
(in
reviews of the Memorandum we usually find no mention of this important part) and (2) o
n
the jews.

[1] Derzhavin begins by establishing that the agricultural economy was in shambles. Th
e
peasants there were "lazy on the job, not clever, they procrastinate every small task
and are
sluggish in [G47] field work." Year in, year out "they eat unwinnowed corn: in the spr
ing,
Kolotucha or Bolotucha from [eggs and] rye meal," in summer they content themselves wi
th
a mixture of a small amount of some grain or other with chopped and cooked grass. They
are
so weakened, that they stagger a round."

The local Polish landlords "are not good proprietors. They do not manage the propert
y.. .
themselves, but lease it out," a Polish custom. But for the lease "there are no univer
sal rules
protecting the peasants from overbearing or to keep the business aspect from falling a
part."
"Many greedy leasers... by imposing hard work and oppressive taxes bring the people in
to a
bad way and transform them... into poor, homeless peasants." This lease is all the wor
st for
being short-term, made for 1-3 years at a time so that the leaser hastens "to get his
advantage from it... without regard to the exhausting" of the estate.

The emaciation of the peasants was sometimes even worse: "several landlords that lease
the
traffic in spirits in their villages to the jews, sign stipulations that the peasants
may only buy
their necessities from these leasers [triple price]; likewise the peasants may not sel
l their
product to anyone except the jewish lease holder... cheaper than the market price." Th
us
"they plunge the villagers into misery, and especially when they distribute again thei
r horded
grain... they must finally give a double portion; whoever does not do it is punishe
d... the
villagers are robbed of every possibility to prosper and be full."

Then he develops in more detail the problem of the liquor distilling. Schnapps was dis
tilled
by the landlords, the landed nobility
[Szlachta] of the region, the priests, monks,
and jews. Of the almost million jews, 2-3,000
live in the villages and live mainly from the
liquor traffic. The peasants, "after bringing in
the harvest, are sweaty and careless in what
they spend; they drink, eat, enjoy
themselves, pay the jews for their old debts
and then, whatever they askfor drinks. For
this reason the shortage is already manifest
by winter... In every settlement there is at
least one, and in several settlements quite a
few taverns built by the landlords, where for
their advantage [G48] and that of the jewish
lease-holders, liquor is sold day and night...
There the jews trick them out of not only the
life-sustaining grain, but that which is sown
in the field, field implements, household

items, health and even their life." And all that is sharpened by the mores of the "kol
eda...

25

Jews travel especially during the harvest in autumn through the villages, and afterthe
y have
made the farmer, along with his whole family, drunk, drive them into debt and take fro
m
them every last thing needed to survive.... In that they box the drunkard's ears and p
lunder
him, the villager is plunged into the deepest misery." He lists also other reasons for
the
impoverishing of the peasants.

Doubtless, behind these fateful distilleries stand the Polish landlords. Proprietor an
d leaser
act in behalf of the owner and attend to making a profit: "to this class" Gessen asser
ts
"belonged not just jews but also Christians" especially priests. But the jews were an
irreplaceable, active and very inventive link in the chain of exploitation of these il
literate
emaciated peasants that had no rights of their own. If the White Russian settlement ha
d not
been injected with jewish tavern managers and leasers, then the wide-spread system of
exploitation would not have functioned, and removing the jewish links in the chain wou
ld
have ended it.

After this Derzhavin recommended energetic measures, as for example for the expurgatio
n
of these burdens of peasant life. The landlords would need to attend to this problem.
Only
they alone who are responsible for the peasants should be allowed to distill liquor "u
nder
their own... supervision and not from far-removed places," and to see to it, that "eve
ry year
a supply of grain for themselves and the peasants" would be on hand, and indeed as muc
h
as would be needed for good nutrition. "If the danger arises that this is not done, th
en the
property is to be confiscated for the state coffers." The schnapps distilling is to be
gin no
sooner than the middle of September and
end middle of April, i.e. the whole time of
land cultivation is to be free of liquor
consumption. In addition, the liquor is not
to be sold during worship services or at
night. The liquor stores should only be
permitted "in the main streets, near the
markets, mills and establishments where
foreigners gather." But all the superfluous
and newly-built liquor stores, "whose
number has greatly increased since the
annexation of [White Russia]... are
immediately to cease use for that
purpose: the sale of liquor in them to be
forbidden." "In villages and out-of-the-
way places there should not be any, that
the peasant not sink into drunkenness."
Jews however should "not be permitted
to sell liquor either by the glass orthe keg... nor should they be the brew masters in
the
distilleries," and "they should not be allowed to lease the liquor stores." "Koledas"
are also
to be forbidden; as well as the short-term leasing of operations. By means of exactin
g
stipulations "the leaseristo be prevented from working an operation into the ground."
Under threat of punishment is market abuse to be forbidden, by which the landlords "do
not
permit their peasants to buy what they need somewhere else," or "to sell theirsurplus
somewhere other than to their proprietor." There were still other economic proposals:
"in

26

this manner the scarcity of food can in the future be prevented in the White Russian
Province."
[2] In the second part of the Memorandum, Derzhavin, going out from the taskgiven by t
he
Senate, submitted a suggestion for the transformation of the life of the jews in the R
ussian
Kingdom- not in isolation, but rather in the context of the misery of White Russia and
with
the goal to improve the situation. But here he set himself the assignment to give a br
ief
overview of jewish history, especially the Polish period in order to explain the curre
nt
customs of the jews. Among others, he used his conversations with the Berlin-educated
enlightened jew, physician llya Frank, who put his thoughts down in writing. "The jewi
sh
popular teachers mingle 'mystic-talmudic' pseudo-exegesis of the Bible with the true s
pirit of
the teachings... They expound strict laws with the goal of isolating the jews from oth
er
peoples and to instill a deep hatred against every other religion... Instead of cultiv
ating a
universal virtue, they contrive... an empty ceremony of honoring God... The moral char
acter
of the jews has changed in the last century to their disadvantage, [G50] and in conseq
uence
they have become pernicious subjects... In order to renew the jews morally and politic
ally,
they have to be brought to the point of returning to the original purity of their reli
gion... The
jewish reform in Russia must begin with the foundation of public schools, in which th
e
Russian, German and jewish languages would be taught." What kind of prejudice is it t
o
believe that the assimilation of secular knowledge is tantamount to a betrayal of reli
gion and
folk and that working the land is not suitable for a jew? Derzhavin declined in his
Memorandum a suggestion by Nota Chaimovitsh Notkin, a major merchant from Shklov,
whom he had also met. Although Notkin demurred from the most important conclusions
and suggestions of Derzhavin that had to do with jews, he was at the same time in favo
r, if
possible, of excluding the jews from the production of liquor; and saw it as needful f
or them
to get an education and pursue a productive career, preferably working with their hand
s,
whereby he also held out the possibility of emigration "into the fruitful steppe for t
he
purpose of raising sheep and crops."

Following the explanation of Frank who rejected the power of the Kehilot, Derzhavin
proceeded from the same general consequences: "The original principles of pure worshi
p
and ethics" [of the jews] had been transformed into "false concepts," by which the sim
ple
jewish people "is misled, and constantly is so led, so much so that between them and t
hose
of other faiths a wall has been built that cannot be broken through, which has been ma
de
firm, a wall that firmly binds [the jews] together and, surrounded by darkness, separa
tes
them from their fellow citizens." Thus in raising their children "they pay plenty for
Talmud
instruction - and that without time limit... As long as the students continue in their
current
conditions, there is no prospect for a change in their ways.... They believe themselve
s to be
the true worshippers of God, and despise everyone of a different faith... There the pe
ople
are brought to a constant expectation of the Messiah... [They believe] that their Mess
iah, by
overthrowing all earthlings will rule over them in flesh and blood and restore to them
their
former kingdom, fame and glory." Of the youths he wrote: "they marry all too young,
sometimes before they reach ten years old, and though nubile, they are [G51] not stron
g
enough." Regarding the Kahal system: the inner-jewish collection of levies provides "t
o the
Kehilot every year an enviable sum of income that is incomparably higher than the stat
e
taxes that are raised from individuals in the census lists. The Kahal elders do not ex
cuse
anyone from the accounting. As a result, their poor masses find themselves in the cond
ition

27

of severe emaciation and great poverty, and there are many of them... In contrast, th
e
members of the kahal are rich, and live in superfluity; by ruling over both levers of
power,
the spiritual and secular,... they have a great power over the people. In this way the
y
hold. them ... in great poverty and fear." The Kehilot "issues to the people every pos
sible
command... which must be performed with such exactitude and speed, that one can only
wonder."
Derzhavin identified the nub of the problem thusly: "[the jews'] great numbers in Whit
e
Russia ... is itself a heavy burden for the land on account of the disproportion to th
at of the
crop farmers... This disproportion is the outstanding one of several important reasons
that
produces here a shortage of grain and other edible stores... Not one of them was a cro
p
farmer at that time, yet each possessed and gobbled up more grain than the peasant wit
h
his large family, who had harvested it by the sweat of his brow... Above all, in the v
illages
they ...are occupied in giving the peasant all their necessities on credit, at an extr
aordinary
rate of interest; and thus the peasant, who at some time or other became a debtor to t
hem,
can no longer get free of it." Arching over this are the "frivolous landlords that put
their
villages intojewish hands, not just temporarily but permanently." The landowners howev
er
are happy to be able to shift everything on to the jews: "according to their own word
s, they
regard the Jews as the sole reason for the wasting of the peasants" and the landlord o
nly
rarely acknowledges "that he, if they were removed from his holdings, would suffer no
small
loss, since he receives from them no small income from the lease."

Thus Derzhavin did not neglect to examine the matter from a variety of angles: "Infair
ness
to [the jews] we must point out [G52] also that during this grain shortage they have t
aken
care to feed not a few hungry villagers— though everyone also knows that that came wit
h a
bill: upon the harvest being brought in, they will get it back 100-fold." In a private
report to
the Attorney General, Derzhavin wrote, "It is hard not to err by putting all the blame
on one
side. The peasants booze away their grain with the jews and suffer under its shortage.
The
landholders cannot forbid drunkenness, for they owe almost all their income to the dis
tilling
of liquor. And all the blame cannot be placed even on the jews, that they take the las
t
morsel of bread away from the peasant to earn their own life sustenance."

To llya Frank, Derzhavin once said, "since the providence of this tiny scattered peopl
e has
preserved them until the present, we too must take care for their protection." And in
his
report he wrote with the uprightness of that time, "if the Most High Providence, to th
e end
of some unknown purpose, leaves (on account of His purposes) this dangerous people to
live
on the earth, then governments under whose scepter they have sought protection must
bear it... They are thus obligated extend their protection to the jews, so that they m
ay be
useful both to themselves and to the society in which they dwell."

Because of all his observations in White Russia, and of his conclusion, and of all he
wrote in
the Memorandum, and especially because of all these lines, and probably also because h
e
"praised the keen vision of the great Russian monarchs" "which forbade the immigration
and
travel of these clever robbers into their realm," is Derzhavin spoken of as "a fanatic
al enemy
of jews," a great Anti-Semite. He is accused - though unjustly, as we have seen - of
"imputing the drunkenness and poverty of the White Russian peasant exclusively to the

28

jews," and his "positive measures" were characterized as given without evidence, to se
rve
his personal ambition.

But that he was in no wise prejudiced against the jews, is indicated in that (1) his w
hole
Memorandum emerged in 1800 in response to the [G53] actual misery and hunger of the
peasants, (2) the goal was to do well by both the White Russian peasant and the jews,
(3) he
distinguished them economically and (4) his desire was to orient the jews toward a rea
l
productive activity, of whom, as Catherine planned, a part first and foremost was supp
osed
to have been relocated in territories that were not closed.

As a critical difficulty Derzhavin saw the instability and transientness of the jewis
h
population, of which scarcely 1/6 was included in the census. "Without a special,
extraordinary effort it is difficult to count them accurately, because, being in citie
s, shtetl,
manor courts, villages, and taverns, they constantly move back and forth, they do not
identify themselves as local residents, but as guests that are here from another distr
ict or
colony." Moreover, "they all look alike... and have the same name," and have no surnam
e;
and "not only that, all wear the same blackgarments: one cannot distinguish them and
misidentifies them when they are registered or identified, especially in connection wi
th
judicial complaints and investigations." Therein the Kehilot takes care not "to disclo
se the
real number, in order not unduly to burden their wealthy with taxes for the number
registered."

Derzhavin sought however a comprehensive solution "to reduce [the number of jews in th
e
White Russian villages]... without causing damage to anyone and thus to ease the feedi
ng of
the original residents; yet at the same time, for those that should remain, to provide
better
and less degrading possibilities for earning their sustenance." In addition, he probed
how to
"reduce their fanaticism and, without retreating in the slightest from the rule of tol
eration
toward different religions, to lead them by a barely-noticed way to enlightenment; and
after
expunging their hatred of people of other faiths, above all to bring them to give up t
heir
besetting intention of stealing foreign goods." The goal was to find a way to separate
the
freedom of religious conscience from freedom from punishment of evil deeds.

Thereafter he laid out by layers and explicitly the measures to be recommended, and i
n
doing so gave proof of his economic and statesmanlike competence. First, "that [the je
ws]
should have no occasion [G54] for any kind of irritation, to send them into flight or
even to
murmur quietly," they are to be reassured of protection and favor by a manifest of the
czar,
in which should be strengthened the principle of tolerance toward their faith and the
maintenance of the privileges granted by Catherine, "only with one small change to th
e
previous principles." (But those "that will not submit to these principles shall be gi
ven the
freedom to emigrate" - a demand that farexceeded in point of freedom the 20 th centur
y
Soviet Union). Immediately thereafter it states: aftera specific time interval, after
which all
new credit is temporarily forbidden, all claims of debt between jews and Christians to
be
ordered, documented, and cleared "in order to restore the earlier relation of trust so
that in
the future not the slightest obstruction should be found for the transformation of the
jews
to a different way of life... for the relocation into other districts" or in the old p
laces, "for the
assignment of a new life conditions." Free of debt, the jews are thus to be made as so
on as
possible into freemen for the Reforms." From the vantage point of the publication of t
he

29

Manifest are all dues assessed by jews "for the equalization of debt of poor people" i
s to
applied to poor jews, to deflect the payment of Kahal debts or for the furnishings fo
r
migrants. From the one group, no tax is to be levied for three years — from the other,
for six
years—, and instead, that money is to be dedicated to the setting up of factories and
work
places for these jews. Landowners must abandon obligating jews in their shtetls to set
up
various factories and instead begin on their estates to cultivate grain, "in order tha
t they
may earn their bread with their own hands," but "under no circumstance is liquor to be
sold
anywhere, secretly or openly," or these landholders would themselves lose their rights
to
the production of liquor. It was also a non-negotiable to carry out a universal, exact
census
of the population under responsibility of the Kahal elders. For those that had no prop
erty to
declare as merchant or townsman, two new classes were to be created with smaller incom
e:
village burghers and "colonist" (where "the denotation 'krestyanin' [farmer] would not
be
used because of its similarity to the word 'Christian'"). The jewish settlers would ha
ve to be
regarded as "free and not as serfs," but "under no condition or pretext may they dare
to
take Christian man- or maid-servants, they may not own a single Christian peasant, nor
to
expand themselves into the domain of magistrates and town fathers, so that they not ga
in
any special rights over Christians." "After they have declared their wish to be enroll
ed in a
particular status," then must "the necessary number of young men" be sent to Petersbur
g,
Moscow, or Riga - one group "to learn the keeping of merchant books," second to learn
a
trade, the third to attend schools "for agriculture and land management." Meanwhile "s
ome
energetic and precise jews should be selected as deputies... for all these areas where
land is
designated for colonization." (There follows minutiae on the arrangements of plans,
surveying the land, housing construction, the order to release different groups of set
tlers,
their rights in transit, the grace-period in which they would remain tax-free - all th
ese details
that Derzhavin laid out so carefully we pass by.) On the inner ordering of the jewish
congregation:: "in order to place the jews ...under the secularauthorities ...justthe
same as
everyone else, the Kehilot may not continue in any form." Together with the abolishmen
t of
the Kehilot is "likewise abolished all previous profiteering assessments, which the Ke
hilot
raised from the jewish people... and at the same time, the secular taxes are to be ass
essed. ..
as with the other subjects" (i.e. not doubled), and "the schools and synagogues must b
e
protected by laws." "The males may not marry younger than 17 nor the females than 15
years." Then there is a section on education and enlightenment of the jews. The jewis
h
schools to the 12 th year, and thereafter the general schools, are to become more like
those
of other religions; "those however that have achieved distinction in the high sciences
are to
be received in the academies and universities as honorary associates, doctors, profess
ors" -
but "they are not... to be taken into the rank of officers and staff officers," becaus
e
"although they may also be taken into the military service, they will e.g. "not take u
p arms
against the enemy on Saturday, which in fact often does happen." Presses for jewish bo
oks
are to be constructed. Along with synagogues are to be constructed jewish hospitals, p
oor
houses, and orphanages.

[G56]Thus Derzhavin concluded quite self-consciously: "thus, this cross-grained [scatt

ered]
people known as jews... in this its sad condition will observe an example of order." E
specially
regarding enlightenment: "This first point will bear fruit — if not today and immediat
ely,
definitely in the coming times, or at worst after several generations, in unnoticed wa
y," and
then the jews would become "genuine subjects of the Russian throne."

30

While Derzhavin was composing his Memorandum, he also made it known what the Kehilot
thought about it, and made it clear that he was by no means making himself their frien
d. In
the official answers their rejection was formulated cautiously. It stated, "the jews a
re not
competent for cultivating grain nor accustomed to it, and their faith is an obstacl
e... They see
no other possibilities than their current occupations, which serve their sustenance, a
nd they
do not need such, but would like to remain in their current condition." The Kehilot sa
w
moreover, that the report entailed their own obsolescence, the end of their source of
income, and so began, quietly, but stubbornly and tenaciously, to work against Derzhav
in's
whole proposal.

This opposition expressed itself, according to Derzhavin, by means of a complaint file

d by a
jewess from Liosnoto the Czar, in which she alleged that, in a liquor distillery, Derz
havin
"horrifically beat her with a club, until she, being pregnant, gave birth to a dead in
fant." The
Senate launched an investigation. Derzhavin answered: "As I was a quarter hour long in
this
factory, I not only did not strike any jewess, but indeed did not even see one." He so
ught a
personal reception by the czar. "Let me be imprisoned, but I will reveal the idiocy of
the man
that has made such claims... How can your Highness... believe such a foolish and untru
e
complaint?" (The jew that had taken the lying complaint was condemned to one yearinth
e
penitentiary, but after 2 or 3 months Derzhavin "accomplished" his being set free, thi
s being
now under the reign of Alexander I.)

Paul, murdered in May 1801, was unable to come to any resolution in connection with
Derzhavin's Memorandum. "It led [G57] at the time to small practical results, as one c
ould
have expected, since Derzhavin lost his position in the change of court."

Not until the end of 1802 was the "committee for the assimilation of the Jews" establi
shed,
to examine Derzhavin's Memorandum and prepare corresponding recommendations. The
committee consisted of two Polish magnates close to Alexander I: Prince Adam [Jerzy]
Czartoryski and Count (Graf) Severin Potocki as well as Count Valerian Subov. (Derzhav
in
observed regarding all three, that they too had great holdings in Poland, and would no
tice "a
significant loss of income" if the jews were to be removed, and that "the private inte
rests of
the above-mentioned Worthies would outweigh those of the state.") Also on the committe
e
were Interior Minister Count Kotshubey and the already-mentioned Justice Minister -th
e
first in Russian history - Derzhavin himself. Michael Speransky also worked with the
committee. The committee was charged to invite jewish delegates form the Kehiloth of
every province and these -mostly merchants of the First Guild - did come. "Besides tha
t the
committee members had the right to call enlightened and well-meaning jews of their
acquaintance." The already-known Nota Notkin, that had moved from White Russia to
Moscow and then St Petersburg; the Petersburg tax-leaser Abram Perets, who was a clos
e
friend of Speransky; [Yehuda] Leib Nevachovich and Mendel Satanaver, — both friends o
f
Perets - and others. Not all took part in the hearings, but they exercised a significa
nt
influence on the committee members. Worthy of mention: Abram Perets' son Gregory was
condemned in the Decembrist trial and exiled - probably only because he had discussed
the
Jewish Question with [Pavel] Pestel, but without suspecting anything of the Decembris
t
conspiracy - [G58] and because his grandson was the Russian Secretary of State, a very
high
position. Nevachovich, a humanist (but no cosmopolitan) who was deeply tied to Russia
n
cultural life - then a rarity among jews - published in Russian "The Crying Voice of t
he

31

Daughter of J udah" (1803) in which he urged Russian society to reflect on the restric
tions of
jewish rights, and admonished the Russians to regard jews as their countrymen, and thu
s
that they should take the jews among them into Russian society.

The committee came to an overwhelmingly-supported resolution: "[The jews] are to be

guided into the general civil life and education... To steerthem toward productive wor
k," it
should be made easierforthem to become employed in trades and commerce, the
constriction of the right of free mobility should be lessened; they must become accust
omed
to wearing ordinary apparel, for "the custom of wearing clothes that are despised
strengthens the custom to be despised." But the most acute problem was that jews, on
account of the liquor trade, dwelled in the villages. Notkin "strove to win the commit
tee to
the view of letting the jews continue to live there, and only to take measures agains
t
possible abuses on their part."

"The charter of the committee led to tumult in the Kehiloth," Gessen wrote. A special
convocation of their deputies in 1803 in Minsk resolved "to petition our czar, may his
fame
become still greater, that they (the Worthies) assume no innovations for us." They dec
ided
to send certain delegates to Petersburg, explained, that an assembly had been held for
that
purpose, and even called for a three-day jewish fast- "unrest ...gripped the whole pal
e of
settlement. Quite apart from the threatening expulsion of jews from the villages, "th
e
Kehiloth took a negative stance toward the cultural question. ..out of concern to pres
erve
their own way of life." As answer to the main points of the Recommendation "the Kehilo
th
explained that the Reform must in any case be postponed 15-20 years."

Derzhavin wrote "there were from their side various rebuttals aimed to leave everythin
g as
it was. In addition, Gurko, a White Russian landowner sent Derzhavin a letter he had
received: [G59] a jew in White Russia had written him regarding one of his plenipotent
iaries
in Petersburg. It said that they had, in the name of all Kehilot of the world, put the
cherem
([or herem,] i.e. the ban) on Derzhavin as a Persecutor, and had gathered a million to
be
used as gifts forthis situation and had forwarded it to St Petersburg. They appealed f
or all
efforts to be applied to the removal of Derzhavin as Attorney General, and if that wer
e not
possible to seek his life... However the thing they wanted to achieve was not to be fo
rbidden
to sell liquor in the village taverns.... and in order to make it easierto advance thi
s business,"
they would put together opinions from foreign regions, from different places and peopl
es,
on how the situation of the jews could be improved" - and in fact, such opinions, some
times
in French, sometimes, in German, began to be sent to the Committee.

Besides this, Nota Notkin became "the central figure that organized the little jewish
congregation of Petersburg." In 1803 "he submitted a brief to the Committee in which h
e
sought to paralyze the effect of the proposal submitted by Derzhavin." Derzhavin write
s,
"Notkin came to him one day and asked, with feigned well-wishing, that he, Derzhavin,
should not take a stand all alone against his colleagues on the Committee, who all are
on the
side of the jews; whether he would not accept 100- or, if that is too little, 200,000
rubles,
only so that he could be of one mind with all his colleagues on the committee." Derzha
vin
"decided to disclose this attempt at bribery to the czar and prove it to him with Gurk
o's
letter." He "thought such strong proofs prove effective and the czar would start to be
wary
of the people that surrounded him and protected the jews." Speransky also informed th
e

32

czar of it, but "Speransky was fully committed to the jews," and - "from the first mee
ting of
the Jewish Committee it became apparent that all members represented the view that th
e
liquor distilling should ... continue in the hands of jews as before."

Derzhavin opposed it. Alexander bore himself ever more coldly toward him and dismisse
d
his Justice Minister shortly thereafter (1803).

Beside this, Derzhavin's papers indicate that he -whether in military or civil servic
e -always
came into disfavor and was hot-headed and everywhere soon took his leave.
[G60] One has to admit, that Derzhavin foresaw much that developed in the problematic
Russo-Judaic relationship throughout the entire 19 th century, even if not in the exac
t and
unexpected form that it took in the event. He expressed himself coarsely, as was custo
mary
then, but he did not intend to oppress the jews; on the contrary, he wanted to open to
the
jews paths to a more free and productive life.

33

Chapter 4: During the period of reforms

At the moment of the ascension of Alexander II to the throne, the Peasant Question in
Russia had been overripe for a century and demanded immediate resolution. Then suddenl
y,
the Jewish Question surfaced and demanded a no less urgent solution as well. In Russi
a, the
Jewish Question was not as ancient as the deep-rooted and barbaric institution of serf
dom
and up to this time it did not seem to loom so large in the country. Yet henceforth, f
or the
rest of 19th century, and right to the very year of 1917 in the State Duma, the Jewish
and the
Peasant questions would cross over and over again; they would contend with each other
and
thus become intertwined in their competing destiny.

Alexander II had taken the throne during the difficult impasse of the Crimean War agai
nst a
united Europe. This situation demanded a difficult decision, whether to hold out or t
o
surrender.

Upon his ascension, "voices were immediately raised in defense of the Jewish populatio
n." —
After several weeks, His Majesty gave orders "to make the Jews equal with the rest of
population in respect to military duty, and to end acceptance of underage recruits."
(Soon
after, the "skill-category" draft of Jewish philistines was cancelled; this meant that
"all
classes of the Jewish population were made equal with respect to compulsory military
service. "[i]) This decision was confirmed in the Coronation Manifesto of 1856: "Jewis
h
recruits of the same age and qualities which are defined for recruits from other popul
ation
groups are to be admitted while acceptance of underage Jewish recruits was to be
abolished. "[ii] Right then the institution of military cantonists was also completely
abolished;
Jewish cantonists who were younger than 20 years of age were returned to their parent
s
even if they already had been turned into soldiers. [Cantonists were the sons of Russi
an
conscripts who, from 1721, were educated in special "canton (garrison) schools" for fu
ture
military service].

The lower ranks who had served out their full term (and their descendents) received th
e
right to live anywhere on the territory of the Russian Empire. (They usually settled w
here
they terminated their service. They could settle permanently and had often become the
founders of new Jewish communities. [iii] In a twist of fate and as a historical punis
hment,
Russia and the Romanov Dynasty got Yakov Sverdlov from the descendents of one such
cantonist settler.pv])

By the same manifesto the Jewish population "was forgiven all [considerable] back taxe
s"
from previous years. ("Yet already in the course of the next five years new tax liabil
ities
accumulated amounting to 22% of the total expected tax sum.[v])

More broadly, Alexander II expressed his intention to resolve the Jewish Question — an
d in
the most favorable manner. For this, the approach to the question was changed drastica
lly.
If during the reign of Nicholas I the government saw its task as first reforming the J
ewish

34

inner life, gradually clearing it out through productive work and education with conse
quent
removal of administrative restrictions, then during the reign of Alexander II the poli
cy was
the opposite: to begin "with the intention of integrating this population with the nat
ive
inhabitants of the country" as stated in the Imperial Decree of 1856. [vi] So the gove
rnment
had began quick removal of external constraints and restrictions not looking for possi
ble
inner causes of Jewish seclusion and morbidity; it thereby hoped that all the remainin
g
problems would then solve themselves.

To this end, still another Committee for Arranging the Jewish Way of Life was establis
hed in
1856. (This was already the seventh committee on Jewish affairs, but by no means the l
ast).
Its chairman, the above-mentioned Count Kiselyov, reported to His Majesty that "the go
al of
integrating Jews with the general population" "is hindered by various temporary restri
ctions,
which, when considered in the context of general laws, contain many contradictions an
d
beget bewilderment." In response, His Majesty ordered "a revision of all existing stat
utes on
Jews to harmonize them with the general strategy directed toward integration of this p
eople
with the native inhabitants, to the extent afforded by the moral condition of Jews"; t
hat is,
"the fanaticism and economic harmfulness ascribed to them."[vii]

No, not for nothing had Herzen struggled with his Kolokol, or Belinskyand Granovsky, o
r
Gogol! (For although not having such goals, the latter acted in the same direction as
the
former three did.) Under the shell of the austere reign of Nicholas I, the demand for
decisive
reforms and the will for them and the people to implement them were building up, and,
astonishingly, new projects were taken by the educated high governmental dignitaries m
ore
enthusiastically than by educated public in general. And this immediately impacted th
e
Jewish Question. Time after time, the ministers of Internal Affairs (first Lanskoi and
then
Valuev) and the Governors General of the Western and Southwestern Krais [administrativ
e
divisions of Tsarist Russia] shared theirsuggestions with His Majesty who was quite
interested in them. "Partial improvements in the legal situation of the Jews were enac
ted by
the government on its own initiative, yet under direct supervision by His Majesty."[vi
ii]
These changes went along with the general liberating reforms which affected Jews as we
ll as
the rest of population.
In 1858, Novorossiysk Governor General Stroganov suggested immediate, instant, and
complete equalization of the Jews in all rights — but the Committee, now under the
chairmanship of Bludov, stopped short, finding itself unprepared for such a measure. I
n 1859
it pointed out, for comparison, that "while the Western-European Jews began sending th
eir
children to public schools at the first invitation of the government, more or less tur
ning
themselves to useful occupations, the Russian government has to wrestle with Jewish
prejudices and fanaticism"; therefore, "making Jews equal in rights with the native
inhabitants cannot happen in any other way than a gradual change, following the spread
of
true enlightenment among them, changes in their inner life, and turning their activity
toward
useful occupations. "[ix]

35

The Committee also developed arguments against equal rights. It suggested that the
question being considered was not so much a Jewish question, as it was a Russian one;
that
it would be precipitous to grant equal rights to Jews before raising the educational a
nd
cultural level of Russian population whose dark masses would not be able to defend
themselves in the face of the economic pressure of Jewish solidarity; that the Jews ha
rdly
aspire toward integration with the rest of the citizens of the country, that they stri
ve toward
achieving all civil rights while retaining their isolation and cohesion which Russians
do not
possess among themselves.

However, these voices did not attain influence. One after another, restrictions had be
en
removed. In 1859 the Prohibition of 1835 was removed: it had forbidden the Jews to tak
e a
lease or manage populated landowner's lands. (And thus, the right to rule over the pea
sants;
though that prohibition was "in some cases ... secretly violated." Although after 1861
lands
remaining in the property of landowners were not formally "populated.") The new change
s
were aimed "to make it easierfor landowners to turn for help to Jews if necessary" in
case of
deterioration of in the manorial economy, but also "in order to somewhat widen the
restricted field of economic activity of the Jews." Now the Jews could lease these lan
ds and
settle on them though they could not buy them. [x] Meanwhile in the Southwestern Krai
"capital that could be turned to the purchase of land was concentrated in the hands of
some
Jews ... yet the Jews refused to credit landowners against security of the estate beca
use
estates could not be purchased by Jews." Soon afterwards Jews were granted the right t
o
buy land from landowners inside the Pale of Settlement. [xi]

With development of railroads and
s
and postal stations had declined.
introduced inl857 and 1868, which
a,
"profits on contraband trade" had
steamships, Jewish businesses such as keeping of inn
In addition, because of new liberal customs tariffs
lowered customs duties on goods imported into Russi
immediately and sharply decreased. [xii]

In 1861 the prohibition on Jews to acquire exclusive rights to some sources of revenue
from
estates was abolished. In the same year the systems of tax farming and 'wine farming'
[translator's note: concessions from the state to private entrepreneurs to sell vodka
to the
populace in particular regions] were abolished. This was a huge blow to a major Jewis
h
enterprise. "Among Jews, 'tax collector' and 'contractor' were synonyms for wealth"; n
ow
Orsha nsky writes, they could just dream about "the time of the Crimean War, when
contractors made millions, thanks to the flexible conscience and peculiarview of the
Treasury in certain circles"; "thousands of Jews lived and got rich under the benefici
al wing
of tax farming." Now the interests of the state had begun to be enforced and contracts
had
become much less profitable. And "trading in spirits" had become "far less profitable
than ...
under ... the tax farming system."[xiii] However, as the excise was introduced in the
wine
industry in place of the wine farming system, no special restrictions were laid on Jew
s and so
now they could sell and rent distillation factories on a common basis in the Pale of
Settlement provinces. [xiv] And they had so successfully exercised this right to rent
and

36
purchase over next two decades that by the 1880s between 32 % and 76 % of all distilla
tion
factories in the Jewish Pale of Settlement belonged to Jews, and almost all of them fe
ll under
category of a 'major enterprise'. [xv] By 1872, 89 % of distillation factories in the
Southwestern Krai were rented by Jews.fxvi] From 1863 Jews were permitted to run
distillation in Western and Eastern Siberia (for "the most remarkable specialists in t
he
distillation industry almost exclusively came from among the Jews"), and from 1865 th
e
Jewish distillers were permitted to reside everywhere. [xvii]

Regarding the spirits trade in the villages, about one-third of the whole Jewish popul
ation of
the Pale lived in villages at the start of 1880s, with two or three families in each v
i Mage, [xvi ii]
as remnants of the korchemstvo [from "tavern" — the state-regulated business of retai
l
spirits sale]. An official government report of 1870 stated that "the drinking busines
s in the
Western Krai is almost exclusively concentrated in the hands of Jews, and the abuses
encountered in these institutions exceed any bounds of tolerance." [xix] Thus it was
demanded of Jews to carry on the drinking business only from their own homes . The log
ic of
this demand was explained by G. B. Sliozberg: in the villages of Little Russia [Ukrain
e], that is,
outside of the legal limits of the Polish autonomy, the landowners did not have the ri
ght to
carry on trade in spirits — and this meant that the Jews could not buy spirits from
landowners for resale. Yet at the same time the Jews might not buy even a small plot o
f
peasant land; therefore, the Jews rented peasant homes and conducted the drinking
business from them. When such trade was also prohibited — the prohibition was often
evaded by using a 'front' business: a dummy patent on a spirits business was issued to
a
Christian to which a Jew supposedly only served as an 'attendant.' [xx]

Also, the 'punitive clause' (as it is worded in the Jewish Encyclopedia), that is, a p
unishment
accompanying the prohibition against Jews hiring a Christian as a personal servant, wa
s
repealed in 1865 as "incompatible with the general spirit of the official policy of to
lerance."
And so "from the end of the 1860s many Jewish families began to hire Christian
serva nts."[xxi]

Unfortunately, it is so typical for many scholars studying the history of Jewry in Rus
sia to
disregard hard-won victories: if yesterday all strength and attention were focused on
the
fight for some civil right and today that right is attained — then very quickly afterw
ards that
victory is considered a trifle. There was so much said about the "double tax" on the J
ews as
though it existed for centuries and not for very few short years, and even then it was
never
really enforced in practice. The law of 1835, which was at the time greeted by Jews wi
th a
sense of relief, was, at the threshold of 20th century dubbed by S. Dubnov as a 'Chart
er of
Arbitrariness.' To the future revolutionary Leo Deutsch, who in the 1860s was a young
and
still faithful subject, it looked like the administration "did not strictly [enforce]
some
essential ... restrictions on ... the rights" of Jews, "they turned a blind eye to ...
violations";
"in general, the life of Jews in Russia in the sixties was not bad.... Among my Jewish
peers I
did not see anyone suffering from depression, despondence, or estrangement as a result
of

37

oppression" by their Christian mates. [xxii] But then he suddenly recollects his revol
utionary
duty and calls everything given to the Jews during the reign of Alexander I as, "in es
sence,
insignificant alleviations" and, without losing a beat, mentions "the crimes of Alexan
der II" —
although, in his opinion, the Tsarshouldn't have been killed. [xxiii] And from the mid
dle of
the 20th century it already looks like for the whole of 19th century that various comm
ittees
and commissions were being created for review of Jewish legal restrictions "and they c
ame
to the conclusion that the existing legal restrictions did not achieve their aims and
should be
... abolished.... Yet not a single one of the projects worked out by the Committee
s ... was
implemented. "[xxiv]

It's rid of, forgotten, and no toasts made.

After the first Jewish reforms by Alexander II, the existence of the Pale of Settlemen
t had
become the most painful issue. "Once a hope about a possibility of future state reform
s had
emerged, and first harbingers of expected renewal of public life had barely appeared,
the
Jewish intelligentsia began contemplating the daring step of raising the question of
abolishing the Jewish Pale of Settlement altogether."[xxv] Yet still fresh in the Jewi
sh
memory was the idea of 'selectivity': to impose additional obligations on not-permanen
tly-
settled and unproductive Jews. And so in 1856 an idea to petition His Majesty appeared
in
the social strata of "Jewish merchants, citizens of St. Petersburg, and out-of-towner
s," who
"by their social standing and by the nature of their activity, more closely interacted
with the
central authorities. "[xxvi] The petition asked His Majesty "not to give privileges to
the whole
Jewish population, but only to certain categories," to the young generation "raised in
the
spirit and under the supervision of the government," "to the upper merchant class," an
d "to
the good craftsmen, who earn their bread by sweat of their brow"; so that they would b
e
"distinguished by the government with more rights than those who still exhibited nothi
ng
special about their good intentions, usefulness, and industriousness.... Our petition
is so that
the Merciful Monarch, distinguishing wheat from chaff, would be kindly disposed to gra
nt
several, however modest privileges to the worthy and cultivated among us, thus
encouraging good and praiseworthy actions. "[xxvii] (Even in all their excited hopes t
hey
could not even imagine how quickly the changes in the position of the Jews would be
implemented in practice —already in 1862 some of the authors of this petition would as
k
"about extending equal rights to all who graduate from secondary educational instituti
ons,"
for the grammar school graduates "of course, must be considered people with a Europea
n
education. "[xxviii]

And yes, "in principle, the Tsardid not mind violations of the laws concerning the Jew
ish Pale
of Settlement in favor of individual groups of the Jewish population." In 1859 Jewish
merchants of the 1st Guild were granted the right of residency in all of Russia (and t
he 2nd
Guild in Kiev from 1861; and alsofor all three guilds in Nikolayev, Sevastopol, and Ya
lta)[xxix]
with the right of arranging manufacturing businesses, contracts, and acquiring real es
tate.
Earlier, doctors and holders of masters degrees in science had already enjoyed the rig
ht of

38

universal residency (including the right to occupy posts in government service; here w
e
should note a professor of medicine G.A. Zakharyin, who in the future would pronounce
the
fatal judgment about the illness of Alexander III). From 1861 this right was granted t
o
"candidates of universities," that is, simply to university graduates, [xxx] and also
"to persons
of free professions. "[xxxi] The Pale of Settlement restrictions were now lifted even
from the
"persons, desiring to obtain higher education ... namely to persons, entering medical
academies, universities, and technical institutes. "[xxxii] Then, as a result of petit
ions from
individual ministers, governors, and influential Jewish merchants (e.g., Evzel Ginzbur
g), from
1865 the whole territory of Russia including St. Petersburg was opened to Jewish artis
ans,
though only for the period of actual professional activity. (The notion of artisans wa
s then
widened to include all kinds of technicians such as typesetters and typographic
workers. )[xxxiii]

Here it is worth keeping in mind that merchants relocated with their clerks, office wo
rkers,
various assistants, and Jewish service personnel, craftsmen, and also with apprentices
and
pupils. Taken altogether, this already made up a notable stream. Thus, a Jew with a ri
ght of
residency outside of the Pale was free to move from the Pale, and not only with his fa
mily.

Yet new relaxations were outpaced by new petitions. In 1861, immediately after grantin
g
privileges for the "candidates of universities," the Governor General of the Southwest
ern
Krai had asked to allow exit from the Pale to those who completed state professional s
chools
for the Jews, that is, incomplete high school-level establishments. He had vividly des
cribed
the condition of such graduates: "Young people graduating from such schools find
themselves completely cut off from Jewish society.... If they do not find occupations
according to their qualifications within their own circles, they get accustomed to idl
eness
and thus, by being unworthy representatives of their profession, they often discredit
the
prestige of education in the eyes of people they live among."[xxxiv]

In that same year, the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Education declared in unison
"that a
paramount cause of the disastrous condition of Jews is hidden in the abnormal share of
Jews
occupied in commerce and industry versus the rest engaged in agriculture"; and because
of
this "the peasant is unavoidably preyed upon by Jews as if he is obligated to surrende
r a part
of his income to their maintenance." Yet the internal competition between the Jews cre
ates
a "nearly impossible situation of providing for themselves by legal means." And theref
ore, it
is necessary to "grant the right of universal residence to merchants" of the 2nd and 3
rd
Guilds, and also to graduates of high or equivalent schools. [xxxv]

In 1862 the Novorossiysk Governor General again called for "complete abolition of the
Jewish Pale of Settlement" by asking "to grant the right of universal residency to the
entire
[Jewish] people." [xxxvi]

Targeted permissions for universal residency of certain Jewish groups were being issue
d at a
slower but constant rate. From 1865 acceptance of Jews as military doctors was permitt
ed,

39

and right after that (1866-1867), Jewish doctors were allowed to work in the ministrie
s of
Education and lnterior.[xxxvii] From 1879 they were permitted to serve as pharmacists
and
veterinarians; permission was also granted "to those preparing for the corresponding t
ype of
activity,"[xxxviii] and also to midwives and feldshers, and "those desiring to study m
edical
assista ntarts."[xxxix]

Finally, a decree by the Minister of Internal Affairs Makov was issued allowing reside
nce
outside the Pale to all those Jews who had already illegally settled there. [xl]

Here it is appropriate to add that in the 1860s "Jewish lawyers ... in the absence of
the
official BarCollege during that period were able to get jobs in government service wit
hout
any difficulties. "[xli]

Relaxations had also affected the Jews living in border regions. In 1856, when, accord
ing to
the Treaty of Paris, the Russian state boundary retreated close to Kishinev and Akkerm
an,
the Jews were not forced out of this newly-formed frontier zone. And in 1858 "the decr
ees
of Nicholas I, which directed Jews to abandon the fifty versts [an obsolete Russian me
asure,
a verst is slightly more than a kilometer] boundary zone, were conclusively repealed.
"[xlii]
And from 1868 movement of Jews between the western provinces of Russia and Polish
Kingdom was allowed (where previously it was formally prohibited). [xliii]

Alongside official relaxations to the legal restrictions, there were also exceptions a
nd
loopholes in regulations. For example, in the capital city of St. Petersburg "despit
e ...
prohibitions, the Jews all the same settled in for extended times"; and "with the asce
nsion of
Alexander II ...the number of Jews in St. Petersburg began to grow quickly. Jewish cap
italists
emerged who began dedicating significant attention to the organization of the Jewish
community" there; "Baron Goratsy Ginzburg, for example ... L. Rozental, AVarshavsky, a
nd
others ."[xliv] Toward the end of Alexander ll's reign, E. A. Peretz (the son of the t
ax farmer
Abram Peretz) became the Russian Secretary of State. In the 1860s "St. Petersburg star
ted to
attract quite a few members of the commercial, industrial and intellectual [circles] o
f
Jewry."[xlv]

According to the data of the Commission for Arranging the Jewish Way of Life, in 1880-
81,
6,290 Jews were officially registered in St. Petersburg,[xlvi] while according to othe
r official
figures, 8,993; and according to a local census from 1881, there were 16,826 Jews in S
t.
Petersburg, i.e., around 2% of the total city population. [xlvii]

In Moscow in 1856 the obligation of arriving Jewish merchants to exclusively reside in

the
Glebovsky Quarter was repealed; "the Jews were allowed to stay in any part of the cit
y.
During the reign of Alexander II ... the Jewish population of Moscow grew quickly"; by
1880 it
was around 16,000."[xlviii]

It was a similarsituation in Kiev. After 1861, "a quick growth of the Jewish populatio
n of Kiev
had began" (from 1,500 in 1862, to 81,000 by 1913). From the 1880s there was an influx
of

40

Jews to Kiev. "Despite frequent police round-ups, which Kiev was famous for, the numbe
rs
of Jews there considerably exceeded the official figures.... By the end of the 19th ce
ntury,
the Jews accounted for 44% of Kiev merchants."[xlix]

Yu. I. Hessen calls "the granting of the right of universal residency (1865) to artisa
ns" most
important. Yet Jews apparently did not hurry to move out of the Pale. Well, if it was
so
overcrowded in there, so constraining, and so deprived with respect to markets and ear
nings,
why then did they make "almost no use of the right to leave the Pale of Settlement?" B
y
1881, in thirty-one of the interior provinces, Jewish artisans numbered 28,000 altoget
her
(and Jews in general numbered 34,000). Hessen explains this paradox in the following w
ay:
prosperous artisans did not need to seek new places while the destitute did not have t
he
means for the move, and the middle group, "which somehow managed from day to day
without enduring any particular poverty," feared that after their departure the elders
of
their community would refuse to extend an annual passport to them for tax consideratio
ns,
or even "demand that the outgoing parties return home. "[I]
But one can strongly doubt all this statistics. We have just read that in St. Petersbu
rg alone
there were at least twice as many Jews than according to official data. Could the slo
w
Russian state apparatus really account for the mercury-quick Jewish population within
a
definite time and in all places?

And the growth of Jewish population of Russia was rapid and confident. In 1864 it amou
nted
to 1,500,000 without counting Jews in Poland. [li] And together with Poland in 1850 it
was
2,350,000; and in 1860 it was already 3,980,000. From the initial population of aroun
d
1,000,000 at the time of the first partitions of Poland, to 5,175,000 by the census of
1897 —
that is, after a century, it grew more than five times. (At the start of the 19th cent
ury Russian
Jewry amounted to 30% of the world's Jewish population, while in 1880 it was already
51%).[lii]

This was a major historical event.At the time, its significance was grasped neither by
Russian
society, nor by Russian administration.

This fast numerical growth alone, without all other peculiarities of the Jewish Questi
on, had
already put a huge state problem for Russia. And here it is necessary, as always in an
y
question, to try to understand both points of view. With such an enormous growth of
Russian Jewry, two national needs were clashing evermore strongly. On one hand was th
e
need of Jews (and a distinct feature of their dynamic 3,000-year existence) to spread
and
settle as wide as possible among non-Jews, so that a greater number of Jews would be a
ble
to engage in manufacturing, commerce, and serve as intermediaries (and to get involve
d
into the culture of the surrounding population). On the other was the need of Russian
s, as
the government understood it, to have control over their economic (and then cultural)
life,
and develop it themselves at their own pace.

41
Let's not forget that simultaneously with all these relief measures for the Jews, the
universal
liberating reforms of Alexander II were implemented one after another, and so benefiti
ng
Jews as well as all other peoples of Russia. For example, in 1863 the capitation [i.
e., poll or
head] tax from the urban population was repealed, which meant the tax relief for the m
ain
part of Jewish masses; only land taxes remained after that, which were paid from the
collected kosher tax. [liii]

Yet precisely the most important of these Alexandrian reforms, the most historically
significant turning point in the Russian history — the liberation of peasants and the
abolition
of the Serfdom in 1861 — turned out to be highly unprofitable for Russian Jews, and in
deed
ruinous for many. "The general social and economic changes resulting from the abolitio
n of
peasant servitude ... had significantly worsened the material situation of broad Jewis
h
masses during that transitional period. "[liv] The social change was such that the mul
ti-
million disenfranchised and immobile peasant class ceased to exist, reducing the relat
ive
advantage of Jewish personal freedom. And the economic change was such that "the
peasant, liberated from the servitude, ...was less in the need of services by the Je
w"; that is,
the peasant was now at liberty from the strict prohibition against trading his product
s and
purchasing goods himself — that is, through anyone other than a pre-assigned middlema
n
(in the western provinces, almost always a Jew). And now, as the landowners were depri
ved
of free serf labor, in order not to be ruined, "they were compelled to get personally
engaged
in the economy of their estates — an occupation where earlier Jews played a conspicuou
s
role as renters and middlemen in all kinds of commercial and manufacturing deals."[l
v]

It's noteworthy that the land credit introduced in those years was displacing the Jew
"as the
financial manager of the manorial economy." [Ivi] The development of consumer and cred
it
associations led to "the liberation of people from the tyranny of usury."[lvii]

An intelligent contemporary conveys to us the Jewish mood of the time. Although access
to
government service and free professions was open to the Jews and although "the industr
ial
rights of the Jews were broadened" and there were "more opportunities for education" a
nd
"on every ... corner" the "rapprochement between the Jewish and Christian populations
was
visible" and although the remaining "restrictions ... were far from being strictly enf
orced"
and "the officials now treated the Jewish population with far more respect than befor
e," yet
the situation of Jews in Russia "at the present time ... is very dismal." "Not without
reason,"
Jews "express regret ... for good old times." Everywhere in the Pale of Settlement one
could
hear "the Jewish lamentations about the past." For under serfdom an "extraordinary
development of mediation" took place; the lazy landowner could not take a step without
the
"Jewish trader or agent," and the browbeaten peasant also could not manage without hi
m;
he could only sell the harvest through him, and borrowed from him also. Before, the Je
wish
business class "derived enormous benefit from the helplessness, wastefulness, and
impracticality of landowners," but now the landowner had to do everything himself. Als
o,
the peasant became "less pliant and timid"; now he often establishes contacts with

42

wholesale traders himself and he drinks less; and this "naturally has a harmful effect
on the
trade in spirits, which an enormous number of Jews lives on." The author concludes wit
h the
wish that the Jews, as happened in Europe, "would side with the productive classes an
d
would not become redundant in the national economy."[lviii]

Now Jews had begun renting and purchasing land. The Novorossiysk Governor General
(1869) requested in a staff report to forbid Jews in his region to buy land as was alr
eady
prohibited in nine western provinces. Then in 1872 there was a memorandum by the
Governor General of the Southwestern Krai stating that "Jews rent land not for agricul
tural
occupations but only for industrial aims; they hand over the rented land to peasants,
not for
money but for a certain amount of work, which exceeds the value of the usual rent on t
hat
land, and thereby they "establish a sort of their own form of servitude." And though
"they
undoubtedly reinvigorate the countryside with their capital and commerce," the Governo
r
General "considered concentration of manufacture and agriculture in the same hands un-

conducive, since only under free competition can peasant farms and businesses avoid th
e
"burdensome subordination of their work and land to Jewish capital, which is tantamoun
t to
their inevitable and impending material and moral perdition." However, thinking to lim
it the
renting of land to Jews in his Krai, he proposed to "give the Jews an opportunity to s
ettle in
all of the Greater Russian provinces."[lix]

The memorandum was put forward to the just-created Commission for Arranging the Jewis
h
Way of Life (the eighth of the 'Jewish Commissions', according to count), which was th
en
highly sympathetic to the situation of the Jews. It received a negative review which w
as later
confirmed by the government: to forbid the Jewish rent of land would be "a complete
violation of rights" of ... landowners. Moreover, the interests of the major Jewish re
nter
"merge completely with those of other landowners.... Well, it is true, that the Jewis
h
proletarians group around the major [Jewish] renters and live off the work and means o
f the
rural population. But the same also happens in the estates managed by the landowners
themselves who to this time cannot manage without the help of the Jews."[lx]

However, in the areas inhabited by the Don Cossacks, the energetic economic advancemen
t
of the Jews was restricted by the prohibition of 1880 to own or rent the real estate.
The
provincial government found that "in view of the exclusive situation of the Don Provin
ce, the
Cossack population which is obligated to military service to a man, [this] is the only
reliable
way to save the Cossack economy from ruin, to secure the nascent manufacturing and
commerce in the area." For "a too hasty exploitation of a region's wealth and quick
development of industry ... are usually accompanied by an extremely uneven distributio
n of
capital, and the swift enrichment of some and the impoverishment of others. Meanwhil
e,
the Cossacks must prosper, since they carry out their military service on their own ho
rses
and with their own equipment."[lxi] And thus they had prevented a possible Cossack
explosion.

43

So what happened with the conscription of Jews into military service after all those
Alexandrian relief measures of 1856? For the 1860s, this was the picture: "When Jews
manage to find out about the impending Imperial Manifest about recruit enrollment befo
re
it is officially published ... all members of Jewish families fit for military service
flee from their
homes in all directions...." Because of the peculiarities of their faith and "lackof c
omradeship
and the perpetual isolation of the Jewish soldier ... the military service for the Jew
s was the
most threatening, the most ruinous, and the most burdensome of duties. "[Ixii] Althoug
h
from 1860 the Jewish service in the Guards was permitted, and from 1861promotions to
petty officer ranks and service as clerks, [Ixiii] there was still no access to office
r ranks.

I. G. Orshansky, a witness to the 1860s, certifies: "It is true, there is much data su
pporting
the opinion that in the recent years the Jews in fact had not fulfilled their conscrip
tion
obligations number-wise. They purchase old recruit discharges and present them to the
authorities"; peasants sometimes keep them without knowing their value as far back as
from
1812; so now Jewish resourcefulness puts them to use. Or, they "hire volunteers" in pl
ace of
themselves and "pay a certain sum to the treasury." "Also they try to divide their fam
ilies
into smaller units," and by this each family claims the privilege of "the only son,"
(the only
son was exempt from the military service). Yet, he notes "all the tricks for avoiding
recruitment ... are similarly encountered among the 'pure-blooded' Russians" and provi
des
comparative figures for EkaterinoslavGuberniya. I. G. Orshansky had even expressed
surprise that Russian peasants prefer "to return to the favorite occupation of the Rus
sian
people, farming," instead of wanting to remain in the highly-paid military service. [I
xiv]

In 1874 a unified regulation about universal military service had replaced the old rec
ruit
conscription obligation giving the Jews a "significant relief." "The text of the regul
ation did
not contain any articles that discriminated against Jews. "[Ixv] However, now Jews wer
e not
permitted to remain in residence in the interior provinces after completion of militar
y
service. Also, special regulations aimed "to specify the figure of male Jewish populat
ion"
were introduced, for to that day it largely remained undetermined and unaccounted."
Information about abuses of law by Jews wishing to evade military service[KMl] "[Ixvi]
was
circulated to governors. In 1876 the first "measures for ensuring the proper fulfillme
nt of
military duty by Jews" [Ixvii] were adopted. The Jewish Encyclopedia saw "a heavy net
of
repressive measures" in them. "Regulations were issued about the registration of Jews
at
conscription districts and about the replacement of Jews not fit for service by Jews w
ho
were fit"; and about verification of the validity of exemptions for family conditions:
for
violation of these regulations "conscription ... of only sons was permitted."[lxviii]

A contemporary and then influential St. Petersburg newspaper, Golos [The Voice] cites
quite
amazing figures from the official governmental "Report on the Results of Conscription
in
1880.... For all [of the Russian Empire] the shortfall of recruits was 3,309; out of t
his, the
shortfall of Jews was 3,054, which amounts to 92%."[lxix]

44

Shmakov, a prominent attorney, not well-disposed toward Jews, cites such statistics fr
om
the reference, Pravitelstvenniy Vestnik[The Government Bulletin]: for the period 1876-
1883:
"out of 282,466 Jews subject to conscription, 89,105 — that is, 31.6% — did not show u
p."
(The general shortfall for the whole Empire was 0.19%.) The Administration could not h
elp
but notice this, and a number of "steps toward the elimination of such abuse" were
introduced. This had an effect, but only short-term. In 1889 46,190 Jews were subjecte
d to
call-up, and 4,255 did not appear, that is 9.2%. But in 1891 "from a general number o
f
51,248 Jews recorded on the draft list, 7,658, or 14.94%, failed to report; at that ti
me the
percentage of Christians not reporting was barely 2.67%. In 1892, 16.38% of Jews faile
d to
report as compared with 3.18% of Christians. In 1894 6,289 Jews did not report for the
draft,
that is, 13.6%. Compare this to the Russian average of 2. 6%.[lxx]

However, the same document on the 1894 draft states that "in total, 873,143 Christian
s,
45,801 Jews, 27,424 Mohammedans, and 1,311 Pagans" were to be drafted. These are
striking figures — in Russia, there were 8.7% Muslims (according to the 1870 count) bu
t their
share in the draft was only 2.9%! The Jews were in an unfavorable position not only i
n
comparison with the Mohammedans but with the general population too: their share of th
e
draft was assigned 4.8% though they constituted only 3.2% of Russian population (in 18
70).
(The Christian share in the draft was 92% (87% of Russian population). [Ixxi]

From everything said here one should not conclude that at the time of the Russo-Turkis
h
War of 1877-1878, Jewish soldiers did not display courage and resourcefulness during
combat. In the journal Russkiy Evrei [The Russian Jew] we can find convincing examples
of
both virtues. [Ixxii] Yet during that war much irritation against Jews arose in the ar
my, mainly
because of dishonest contractor-quartermasters — and "such were almost exclusively Jew
s,
starting with the main contractors of the Horovits, Greger, and Kagan Company."[lxxii
i] The
quartermasters supplied (undoubtedly under protection of higher circles) overpriced po
or-
quality equipment including the famous "cardboard soles", due to which the feet of Rus
sian
soldiers fighting in the Shipka Pass were frostbitten.

In the Age of Alexander II, the half-century-old official drive to accustom the Jews t
o
agriculture was ending in failure.

After the repeal of disproportionate Jewish recruitment, farming had "immediately lost
all its
appeal" for Jews, or, in words of one government official, a "false interpretation of
the
Manifest by them" had occurred, "according to which they now considered themselves fre
e
of the obligation to engage in farming," and that they could now migrate freely. "The

45

petitions from the Jews about resettling with the intent to work in agriculture had en
ded
almost completely."[lxxiv]

Conditions in the existing colonies remained the same if not worse: "fields ... were p
lowed
and sowed pathetically, just for a laugh, or for appearance's sake only." For instanc
e, in 1859
"the grain yield in several colonies was even smallerthan the amount sown." In the ne
w
'paradigmatic' colonies, not only barns were lacking, there was even no overhangs or p
ens
for livestock. The Jewish colonists leased most of their land to others, to local peas
ants or
German colonists. Many asked permission to hire Christians as workers, otherwise
threatening to cut back on sowing even further — and they were granted such a right,
regardless of the size of the actual crop.[lxxv]

Of course, there were affluent Jewish farmers among the colonists. Arrival of German
colonists was very helpful too as their experience could now be adopted by Jews. And t
he
young generation born there was already more accepting toward agriculture and German
experience; they were more "convinced in the advantageousness of farming in compariso
n
to their previous life in the congestion and exasperating competition ofshtetlsand
towns." [Ixxvi]

Yet the incomparably larger majority was trying to get awayfrom agriculture. Graduall
y,
inspectors' reports became invariably monotonic: "What strikes most is the general Jew
ish
dislike for farm work and their regrets about their former artisan occupations, trade,
and
business"; they displayed "tireless zeal in any business opportunity," for example, "a
t the
very high point of field work ... they could leave the fields if they discovered that
they could
profitably buy or sell a horse, an ox, or something else, in the vicinity." [They had]
a
predilection for penny-wise trade," demanding, according to their "conviction, less wo
rk and
giving more means for living." "Making money was easierfor Jews in nearby German,
Russian, or Greek villages, where the Jewish colonist would engage in tavern-keeping a
nd
small trade." Yet more damaging for the arable land were long absences of the workers
who
left the area for distant places, leaving only one or two family members at home in th
e
colonies, while the rest went to earn money in brokerages. In the 1860s (a half-centur
y after
the founding of colonies) such departure was permitted for the entire families or man
y
family members simultaneously; in the colonies quite a few people were listed who had
never lived there. After leaving the colonies, they often evaded registering with thei
r trade
guild in the new place, and "many stayed there for several consecutive years, with fam
ily,
unregistered to any guild, and thus not subject to any kind of tax or obligation." And
in the
colonies, the houses built for them stood empty, and fell into disrepair. In 1861, Jew
s were
permitted to maintain drinking houses in the colonies. [Ixxvii]

Finally, the situation regarding Jewish agriculture had dawned on the St. Petersburg
authorities in all its stark and dismal reality. Back taxes (forgiven on numerous occa
sions,
such as an imperial marriage) grew, and each amnesty had encouraged Jews not to pay ta
xes
or repay loans from now on. (In 1857, when the ten years granted to collect past due t
axes

46

had expired, five additional years were added. But even in 1863 the debt was still no
t
collected.) So what was all that resettling, privileges and loans for? On the one han
d, the
whole 60-year epic project had temporarily provided Jews with means "of avoiding thei
r
duties before the state" while at the same time failing to instill love for agricultur
e among
the colonists." "The ends were not worthy of the means." On the other hand, "simply a
permission to live outside of the Pale, even without any privileges, attracted a huge
number
of Jewish farmers" who stopped at nothing to get there. [Ixxviii]

If in 1858 there were officially 64,000 Jewish colonists, that is, eight to ten thousa
nd families,
then by 1880 the Ministry had found only 14,000, that is, less than two thousand
families. [Ixxix] For example, in the whole Southwestern Krai in 1872 the commission
responsible for verifying whether or not the land is in use or lay unattended had foun
d fewer
than 800 families of Jewish colonists. [Ixxx]

Russian authorities had clearly seen now that the entire affairof turning Jews into fa
rmers
had failed. They no longer believed that "their cherished hope for the prosperity of c
olonies
could be realized." It was particularly difficult for the Minister Kiselyov to part wi
th this
dream, but he retired in 1856. Official documents admitted failure, one after anothe
r:
"resettlement of the Jews for agricultural occupation 'has not been accompanied by
favorable results'." Meanwhile "enormous areas of rich productive blacktopsoil remain
in
the hands of the Jews unexploited." After all, the best soil was selected and reserved
for
Jewish colonization. That portion, which was temporarily rented to those willing, gave
a
large income (Jewish colonies lived off it) as the population in the South grew and ev
eryone
asked for land. And now even the worst land from the reserve, beyond that allotted fo
r
Jewish colonization, had also quickly risen in value. [Ixxxi] The Novorossiysk Krai ha
d already
absorbed many active settlers and "no longer needed any state -promoted
colonization. "[Ixxxii]

So the Jewish colonization had become irrelevant for state purposes.

And in 1866 Alexander II had ordered and end to the enforcement of several laws aimed
at
turning Jews into farmers. Now the task was to equalize Jewish farmers with the rest o
f the
farmers of the Empire. Everywhere, Jewish colonies turned out to be incapable of
independent existence in the new free situation. So now it was necessary to provide le
gal
means for Jews to abandon agriculture, even individually and not in whole families (18
68),
so they could become artisans and merchants. They had been permitted to redeem their
parcels of land; and so they redeemed and resold their land at a profit. [Ixxxiii]
However, in the dispute over various projects in the Ministry of State Property, the q
uestion
about the reform of Jewish colonies dragged out and even stopped altogether by 1880. I
n
the meantime with a new recruit statute of 1874, Jews were stripped of their recruitin
g
privileges, and with that any vestiges of their interest in farming were conclusively
lost. By
1881 "in the colonies 'there was a preponderance of farmsteads with only one apartmen
t

47

house, around which there were no signs of settlement; that is, no fence, no housing f
or
livestock, no farm buildings, no beds for vegetables, nor even a single tree or shrub;
there
were very few exceptions. '"[Ixxxiv]

The state councilor Ivashintsev, an official with 40 years experience in agriculture,

was sent
in 1880 to investigate the situation with the colonies. He had reported that in all of
Russia
"no other peasant community enjoyed such generous benefits as had been given [to Jew
s]"
and "these benefits were not a secret from other peasants, and could not help but arou
se
hostile feelings in them." Peasants adjacent to the Jewish colonies '"were indignan
t ...
because due to a shortage of land they had to rent the land from Jews for an expensive
price,
the land which was given cheaply to the Jews by the state in amounts in fact exceeding
the
actual Jewish needs.' It was namely this circumstance which in part explained ... 'the
hostility
of peasants toward Jewish farmers, which manifested itself in the destruction of sever
al
Jewish settlements'" (in 1881-82). [Ixxxv]

In those years, there were commissions allotting land to peasants from the excess land
of
the Jewish settlements. Unused or neglected sectors were taken back by the governmen
t.
"In Volynsk, Podolsk, and Kiev guberniyas, out of 39,000 desyatins [one desyatin = 2.7
acres]
only 4,082 remained [under Jewish cultivation]."[lxxxvi] Yet several quite extensive J
ewish
farming settlements remained: Yakshitsa in the Minsk Guberniya, not known for its rich
land,
had 740 desyatins for 46 [Jewish] families;[lxxxvii] that is, an average of 16 desyati
ns per
family, something you will rarely find among peasants in Central Russia; in 1848 in An
nengof
of Mogilyov Guberniya, also not vast in land, twenty Jewish families received 20 desya
tins of
state land each, but by 1872 it was discovered that there were only ten families remai
ning,
and a large part of the land was not cultivated and was choked with weeds. [Ixxxviii]
In
Vishenki of Mogilyov Guberniya, they had 16 desyatins per family;[lxxxix] and in
Ordynovshchina of Grodno Guberniya 12 desyatins per [Jewish] family. In the more spaci
ous
southern guberniyas in the original settlements there remained: 17 desyatins per [Jewi
sh]
family in Bolshoi Nagartav; 16 desyatins per [Jewish] family in Seidemenukh; and 17
desyatins per family in Novo-Berislav. In the settlement of Roskoshnaya in Ekaterinosl
av
Guberniya they had 15 desyatins per family, but if total colony land is considered, th
en 42
desyatins per family.[xc] In Veselaya (by 1897) there were 28 desyatins per family. I
n
Sagaidak, there were 9 desyatins, which was considered a small allotment.[xci] And in
Kiev
Province's Elyuvka, there were 6 Jewish families with 400 desyatins among them, or 67
desyatins per family! And land was rented to the Germans."[xcii]

Yet from a Soviet author of the 1920s we read a categorical statement that "Tsarism ha
d
almost completely forbidden the Jews to engage in agriculture."[xciii]

On the pages which summarize his painstaking work, the researcher of Jewish agricultur
e V.
N. Nikitin concludes: "The reproaches against the Jews for having poor diligence in fa
rming,
for leaving without official permission for the cities to engage in commercial and art
isan
occupations, are entirely justified ....We by no means deny the Jewish responsibility
for such

48
a small number of them actually working in agriculture after the last 80 years." Yet h
e puts
forward several excuses forthem: "[The authorities] had no faith in Jews; the rules of
the
colonization were changed repeatedly"; sometimes "officials who knew nothing about
agriculture or who were completely indifferent to Jews were sent to regulate their liv
es....
Jews who used to be independent city dwellers were transformed into villagers without
any
preparation for life in the country." [xciv]

At around the same time, in 1884, N. S. Leskov, in a memorandum intended for yet anoth
er
governmental commission on Jewish affairs headed by Palen, had suggested that the Jewi
sh
"lack of habituation to agricultural living had developed over generations" and that i
t is "so
strong, that it is equal to the loss of ability in farming," and that the Jew would no
t become a
plowman again unless the habit is revived gradually.[xcv]

(Lev Tolstoy had allegedly pondered: who are those "confining the entire nation to th
e
squeeze of city life, and not giving it a chance to settle on the land and begin to do
the only
natural man's occupation, farming. After all, it's the same as not to give the people
airto
breathe. ... What's wrong with ... Jews settling in villages and starting to live a pu
re working
life, which, probably, this ancient, intelligent, and wonderful people has a I ready y
earned
for?..."[xcvi] — On what planet was he living? What did he know about the 80 years of
practical experience with [Jewish] agricultural colonization?)

And yet the experience of the development of Palestine where the Jewish settlers felt
themselves at home had showed their excellent ability to work the land; moreover, they
did
it in conditions much more unfavorable than in Novorossiya. Still, all the attempts t
o
persuade or compel the Jews toward arable farming in Russia (and afterwards in the USS
R)
had failed (and from that came the degrading legend that the Jews in general are incap
able
of farming).

And thus, after 80 years of effort by the Russian government it turned out that all th
at
agricultural colonization was a grandiose but empty affair; all the effort, all the ma
ssive
expenditures, the delay of the development of Novorossiya — all were for nothing. The
resulting experience shows that it shouldn't have been undertaken at all.

Generally examining Jewish commercial and industrial entrepreneurship, I. G. Orshansk

y
justly wrote at the start of the 1870s that the question about Jewish business activit
y is "the
essence of the Jewish Question," on which "fate of Jewish people in any country depend
s."
"[An entrepreneur] from the quick, mercantile, resourceful Jewish tribe" turns over a
ruble
five times "while a Russian turns it two times." There is stagnation, drowsiness, and

49

monopoly among the Russian merchants. (For example, after the expulsion of the Jews fr
om
Kiev, life there had become more expensive). The strong side of Jewish participation i
n
commercial life lies in the acceleration of capital turnover, even of the most insigni
ficant
working capital. Debunking the opinion, that so-called Jewish corporate spirit gives t
hem a
crucial advantage in any competition, that "Jewish [merchants] always support each oth
er,
having their bankers, contractors, and carriers," Orshansky attributed the Jewish corp
orate
spirit only to social and religious matters, and not to commerce, where, he claimed, J
ews
fiercely compete against each other (which is in contradiction with the Hazaka prescri
bing
separation of spheres of activity, which, according to him, "had gradually disappeare
d
following the change in legal standing of Jews"[xcvii]). He had also contested the opi
nion
that any Jewish trade does not enrich the country, that "it exclusively consists of ex
ploitation
of the productive and working classes," and that "the profit of the Jews is a pure los
s forthe
nation." He disagreed, suggesting that Jews constantly look for and find new sales mar
kets
and thereby "open new sources of earnings for the poor Christian population as wel
l."[xcviii]

Jewish commercial and industrial entrepreneurs hip in Russia had quickly recovered fro
m the
two noticeable blows of 1861, the abolition of serfdom and the abolition of wine farmi
ng.
"The financial role of Jews had become particularly significant by the 1860s, when pre
vious
activities amassed capital in their hands, while liberation of peasants and the associ
ated
impoverishment of landowners created a huge demand for money on the part of
landowners statewide. Jewish capitalists played a prominent role in organization of la
nd
banks. "[xcix] The whole economic life of the country quickly changed in many directio
ns and
the invariable Jewish determination, inventiveness, and capital were keeping pace with
the
changes and were even ahead of them. Jewish capital flowed, for example, to the sugar
industry of the Southwest (so that in 1872 one fourth of all sugar factories had a Jew
ish
owner, as well as one third of joint-stock sugarcompanies),[c] and to the flour-millin
g and
other factory industries both in the Pale of Settlement and outside. After the Crimean
War
"an intensive construction of railroads" was underway; "all kinds of industrial and
commercial enterprises, joint stock companies and banks arose" and "many Jews ... foun
d
wide application for their strengths and talents in those undertakings ...with a few o
f them
getting very rich incredibly fast."[ci]

"Jews were involved in the grain business for a long time but their role had become
particularly significant afterthe peasant liberation and from the beginning of large-s
cale
railroad construction." "Already in 1878, 60% of grain export was in the hands of Jews
and
afterwards it was almost completely controlled by Jews." And "thanks to Jewish industr
ialists,
lumber had become the second most important article of Russian export (after grain)."
Woodcutting contracts and the acquisition of forest estates by Jews were not prohibite
d
since 1835. "The lumber industry and timber trade were developed by Jews. Also, Jews h
ad
established timber export." "The timber trade is a major aspect of Jewish commerce, an
d, at
the same time, a major area of concentration of capital.... Intensive growth of the Je
wish
timber trade began in the 1860-1870s, when as a result of the abolition of serfdom,
50

landowners unloaded a great number of estates and forests on the market." "The 1870s
were the years of the first massive surge of Jews into industries" such as manufacturi
ng, flax,
foodstuff, leather, cabinetry, and furniture industries, while "tobacco industry had l
ong since
been concentrated in the hands of Jews."[cii]

In the words of Jewish authors: "In the epoch of Alexander II, the wealthy Jewish bour
geoisie
was ... completely loyal ... to the monarchy. The great wealth of the Gintsburgs, the
Polyakovs, the Brads kys, the Zaitsevs, the Balakhovskys, and the Ashkenazis was amass
ed
exactly at that time." As already mentioned, "the tax-farmer Evze I Gintsburg had foun
ded his
own bank in St. Petersburg." Samuil Polyakov had built six railroad lines; the three P
olyakov
brothers were granted hereditary nobility titles. [ciii] "Thanks to railroad construct
ion, which
was guaranteed and to a large extent subsidized by the government, the prominent capit
al
of the Polyakovs, I. Bliokh, A. Varshavsky and others were created." Needless to say,
many
more smaller fortunes were made as well, such as that of A. I. Zaks, the former assist
ant to E.
Gintsburg in tax-farming, who had moved to St. Petersburg and created the Savings and
Loan Bank there; "he arranged jobs for his and his wife's many relatives at the enterp
rises he
was in charge of." [civ]

Not just the economy, the entire public life had been transformed in the course of
Alexandrian reforms, opening new opportunities for mercurial Jewry. "In the governmen
t
resolutions permitting certain groups of Jews with higher education to enter governmen
t
service, there was no restriction in regard to movement up the job ladder. With the
attainment of the Full State Advisor rank, a Jew could be elevated to the status of he
reditary
nobility on common grounds. "[cv]

In 1864 the land reform began. It "affected all social classes and strata. Its statut
e ... did not
in any way restrict the eligibility of Jews to vote in country administrative election
s or occupy
elected country offices. In the course of twenty-six years of the statute being in eff
ect, Jews
could be seen in many places among town councilors and in the municipal executive
councils. "[cvi]

Similarly, the judicial statutes of 1864 stipulated no restrictions for Jews. As a res
ult of the
judicial reform, an independent judicial authority was created, and in place of privat
e
mediators the legal bar guild was established as an independent class with a special
corporate structure (and notably, even with the un-appealable right to refuse legal
assistance to an applicant "on the basis of moral evaluation of his person," includin
g
evaluation of his political views). And there were no restrictions on Jews entering th
is class.
Gessen wrote: "Apart from the legal profession, in which Jews had come to prominence,
we
begin noticing them in court registries among investigative officials and in the ranks
of public
prosecutors; in some places we already see Jews in the magistrate and district court o
ffices";
they also served as jurors"[cvii] without any quota restrictions (during the first dec
ades after
the reform). (Remarkably, during civil trials the Jews were taking conventional juro
r's oath
without any provision made for the Jewish religion).

51

At the same time municipal reform was being implemented. Initially it was proposed to
restrict Jewish representation among town councilors and in the municipal executive
councils by fifty percent, but because of objections by the Minister of Internal Affai
rs, the
City Statute of 1870 had reduced the maximal share to one third; further, Jews were
forbidden from occupying the post of mayor.fcviii] It was feared "that otherwise Jewis
h
internal cohesion and self-segregation would allow them to obtain a leading role in to
wn
institutions and give them an advantage in resolution of public issues. "[cix] On the
other
hand, Jews were equalized in electoral rights (earlier they could vote only as a facti
on),
which led to "the increased influence of Jews in all city governing matters (though in
the free
city of Odessa these rules were in place from the very beginning; later, it was adopte
d in
Kishinev too. "Generally speaking, in the south of Russia the social atmosphere was no
t
permeated by contempt toward Jews, unlike in Poland where it was diligently
cultivated." [cx])

Thus "perhaps ...the best period in Russian history for Jews" went on. "An access to c
ivil
service was opened for Jews.... The easing of legal restrictions and the general atmos
phere
of 'the Age of Great Reforms' had affected the spirit of the Jewish people beneficiall
y."[cxi] It
appeared that under the influence of the Age of Great Reforms "the traditional daily l
ife of
the Jewish populace had turned toward the surrounding world" and that Jewry "had begu
n
participating as faras possible in the struggle for rights and liberty.... There was n
ot a single
area in the economic, public and spiritual life of Russia unaffected by the creative e
nergies of
Russian Jews. "[cxii]

And remember that from the beginning of the century the doors of Russian general
education were opened wide for Jews, though it took a longtime for the unwilling Jews
to
enter.

Later, a well-known lawyer and public figure, Ya. L. Teytel thus recalled the Mozyr gr
ammar
school of the 1860s: "The director of the school ... often ... appealed to the Jews of
Mozyr,
telling them about the benefits of education and about the desire of government to se
e
more Jews in grammar schools. Unfortunately, such pleas had fallen on deaf ears."[cxii
i] So
they were not enthusiastic to enroll during the first years after the reform, even whe
n they
were offered free education paid for by state and when school charters (1864) declared
that
schools are open to everyone regardless confession. [cxiv] "The Ministry of National
Education ... tried to make admission of Jews into general education institutions easi
er"; it
exhibited "benevolence toward young Jewish students ."[cxv] (Here L. Deutsch had
particularly distinguished the famous surgeon N. I. Pirogov, then a trustee of the
Novorossiysk school district, suggesting that he had "strongly contributed to the alle
viation
of hostility among my tribesmen toward 'goyish' schools and sciences. "[cxvi]) Soon af
ter the
ascension of Alexander II, the Minister of Education thus formulated the government pl
an:
"It is necessary to spread, by any means, the teaching of subjects of general educatio
n, while
avoiding interference with the religious education of children, allowing parents to ta
ke care

52

of it without any restrictions or hindrances on the part of government." [cxvii] Educa

tion in
state public schools was made mandatory for children of Jewish merchants and honorary
citizens. [cxviii]

Yet all these measures, privileges and invitations, did not lead to a drastic increase
in Jewish
admissions. By 1863 the share of Jewish students in Russian schools reached 3.2%,[cxi
x] that
is, equal to their percentage in the population of the empire. Apart from the rejectio
n of
Russian education by the Jewry, there was a certain influence from Jewish public leade
rs
who now saw their task differently: "With the advent of the Age of Great Reforms, 'th
e
friends of enlightenment' had merged the question of mass education with the question
of
the legal situation of Jews," [cxx] that is, they began struggling for the immediate r
emoval of
all remaining restrictions. After the shock of the Crimean War, such a liberal possibi
lity
seemed quite realistic.

But after 1874, following enactment of the new military statute which "granted militar
y
service privileges to educated individuals," almost a magical change happened with Jew
ish
education. Jews began entering public schools in mass.[cxxi] "Afterthe military reform
of
1874, even Orthodox Jewish families started sending their sons into high schools and
institutions of higher learning to reduce their term of military service. "[cxxii] Amo
ng these
privileges were not only draft deferral and easement of service but also, according to
the
recollections of Mark Aldanov, the possibility of taking the officer's examination "an
d
receiving officer rank." "Sometimes they attained titles of nobility."[cxxiii]
In the 1870s "an enormous increase in the number of Jewish students in public educatio
n
institutions" occurred, leading to creation of numerous degreed Jewish intelligentsi
a." In
1881 Jews composed around 9% of all university students; by 1887, their share increase
d to
13.5%, i.e., one out of every seven students. In some universities Jewish representati
on was
much higher: in the Department of Medicine of Kharkov University Jews comprised 42% o
f
student body; in the Department of Medicine of Odessa University — 31%, and in the Sch
ool
of Law — 41%.[cxxiv] In all schools of the country, the percentage of Jews doubled to
12%
from 1870 to 1880 (and compared to 1865, it had quadrupled). In the Odessa school dist
rict
it reached 32% by 1886, and in some schools it was 75% and even more.fcxxv] (When D.
A.
Tolstoy, the Minister of Education from 1866, had begun school reforms in 1871 by
introducing the Classical education standard with emphasis on antiquity, the ethnic Ru
ssian
intelligentsia boiled over, while Jews did not mind).

However, for a while, these educational developments affected only "the Jewish bourgeo
isie
and intelligentsia. The wide masses remained faithful ... to their cheders and yeshiva
s," as
the Russian elementary school offered nothing in the way of privileges. "[cxxvi] "The
Jewish
masses remained in isolation as before due to specific conditions of their internal an
d
outside life."[cxxvii] Propagation of modern universal culture was extremely slow and
new
things took root with great difficulty among the masses of people living in shtetls an
d towns
of the Pale of Settlement in the atmosphere of very strict religious traditions and

53

discipline. "[cxxviii] "Concentrated within the Pale of Settlement, the Jewish masses
felt no
need for the Russian language in their daily lives.... As before, the masses were stil
l confined
to the familiar hold of the primitive cheder education."[cxxix] And whoever had just l
earned
how to read had to immediately proceed to reading the Bible in Hebrew. [cxxx]

From the government's point of view, opening up general education to Jews rendered sta
te
Jewish schools unnecessary. From 1862 Jews were permitted to take posts of senior
supervisors in such schools and so "the personnel in these schools was being graduall
y
replenished with committed Jewish pedagogues, who, acting in the spirit of the time,
worked to improve mastery of Russian language and reduce teaching of specificallyJewis
h
subjects. "[cxxxi] In 1873 these specialized schools were partially abolished and part
ially
transformed, some into primary specialized Jewish schools of general standard, with 3
or 6
years study courses, and two specialized rabbinical schools in Vilna and Zhitomir wer
e
transformed into teacher training colleges. [cxxxii] The government ... sought to over
come
Jewish alienation through integrated education; however, the Commission for Arranging
the
Jewish Way of Life was receiving reports both from Jewish advocates, often high-ranke
d, and
from the opponents of reform who insisted that "Jews must never be treated ... in the
same
way as other ethnic groups of the Empire, that they should not be permitted unrestrict
ed
residence all over the country; it might be allowed only after all possible measures w
ere
tried to turn Jews into useful productive citizens in the places where they live now a
nd when
these measures would prove their success beyond any doubt."[cxxxiii]

Meanwhile, through the shock of ongoing reforms, especially of the abolition of the
burdensome recruiting obligation in 1856 (and through it the negation of the correspon
ding
power of Jewish leaders over their communities), and then of the repeal of the associa
ted
special taxation in 1863, "the administrative power of the community leaders was
significantly weakened in comparison to their almost unrestricted authority in the pas
t"
inherited from the Qahal (abolished in 1844), that omnipotent arbiter of the Jewish
life.fcxxxiv]

It was then, at the end of 1850s and during the 1860s, when the baptized Jew, Yakov
Brafman, appeared before the government and later came out publicly in an energetic
attempt at radical reformation of the Jewish way of life. He had petitioned the Tsar w
ith a
memorandum and was summoned to St. Petersburg for consultations in the Synod. He set
about exposing and explaining the Qahal system (though a little bit late, si nee the Q
ahal had
already been abolished). For that purpose he had translated into Russian the resolutio
ns of
the Minsk Qahal issued in the period between the end of the 18th and the beginning of
the
19th centuries. Initially he published the documents in parts and later (in 1869 and 1
875) as
a compilation, The Book of Qahal, which revealed the all-encompassing absoluteness of
the
personal and material powerlessness of the community member. The book "had acquired
exceptional weight in the eyes of the authorities and was accepted as an official guid
ebook;
it won recognition (often by hearsay) in wide circles of Russian society"; it was refe
rred to as

54

the "Brafman's triumph" and lauded as an "extraordinary success. "[cxxxv] (Laterthe bo

ok
was translated into French, German, and Polish. )[cxxxvi] The Book of Qahal managed t
o
instill in a great number of individuals a fanatical hatred toward Jews as the 'worldw
ide
enemy of Christians'; it had succeeded in spreading misconceptions about Jewish way o
f
life."[cxxxvii]

The 'mission' of Brafman, the collection and translation of the acts issued by the Qah
al had
"alarmed the Jewish community"; At their demand, a government commission which
included the participation of Jewish community representatives was created to verify
Brafman's work. Some "Jewish writers were quick to come forward with evidence that
Brafman distorted some of the Qahal documents and wrongly interpreted others"; one
detractor had even had doubts about their authenticity."[cxxxviii] (A century later in
1976,
The Short Jewish Encyclopedia confirmed the authenticity of Brafman's documents and th
e
good quality of his translation but blamed him for false interpretation. [cxxxix] The
Russian
Jewish Encyclopedia (1994) pointed out that "the documents published by Brafman are a
valuable source for studying the history of Jews in Russia at the end of the 18th and
the
beginning of the 19th centuries. "[cxl] (Apropos, the poet Khodasevich was the grand-
nephew of Brafman).
Brafman claimed "that governmental laws cannot destroy the malicious force lurking in
the
Jewish self-administration ... According to him, Jewish self-rule is not limited to Qa
hals ... but
allegedly involves the entire Jewish people all over the world ...and because of that
the
Christian peoples cannot get rid of Jewish exploitation until everything that enables
Jewish
self-segregation is eliminated." Further, Brafman "viewfed] the Talmud not as a nation
al and
religious code but as a 'civil and political code' going 'against the political and mo
ral
development of Christian nations"'[cxli] and creating a 'Talmudic republic'. He insist
ed that
"Jews form a nation within a nation"; that they "do not consider themselves subject t
o
national laws";[cxlii] that one of the main goals of the Jewish community is to confus
e the
Christians to turn the latter into no more than fictitious owners of their propert
y."[cxliii] On
a larger scale, he "accused the Society for the Advancement of Enlightenment among th
e
Jews of Russia and the Alliance Israelite Universelle for their role in the 'Jewish wo
rld
cons pi racy'." [cxliv] According to Yu. Gessen's opinion, "the only demand of The Boo
k of
Qahal ...was the radical extermination of Jewish self-governance" regardless of all th
eir civil
powerlessness.fcxlv]

The State Council, "having mitigated the uncompromised style of The Book of Qahal,
declared that even if administrative measures would succeed in erasing the outward
differences between Jews and the rest of population, "it will not in the least elimina
te the
attitudes of seclusion and nearly the outright hostility toward Christians which thriv
e in
Jewish communities. This Jewish separation, harmful for the country, can be destroyed,
on
one hand, through the weakening of social connections between the Jews and reduction o
f

55

the abusive power of Jewish elders to the extent possible, and, on the other hand, thr
ough
spreading of education among Jews, which is actually more important."[cxlvi]

And precisely the latter process — education — was already underway in the Jewish
community. A previous Jewish Enlightenment, the Has ka la h Movement of the 1840s, wa
s
predominantly based on German culture; they were completely ignorant of Russian cultur
e
(they were familiar with Goethe and Schiller but did not know Pushkin and
Lermontov).[cxlvii] "Until the mid-19th century, even educated Jews, with rare excepti
ons,
having mastered the German language, at the same time did not know the Russian languag
e
and literature. "[cxlviii] However, as those Maskilim sought self-enlightenment and no
t the
mass education of the Jewish people, the movement died out by the 1860s. [cxlix] "In t
he
1860s, Russian influences burst into the Jewish society. Until then Jews were not livi
ng but
rather residing in Russia, [cl] perceiving their problems as completely unconnected to
the
surrounding Russian life. Before the Crimean War the Jewish intelligentsia in Russia
acknowledged German culture exclusively but after the reforms it began gravitating tow
ard
Russian culture. Mastery of the Russian language "increases ... self-esteem."[cli] Fro
m now
on the Jewish Enlightenment developed under the strong influence of the Russian cultur
e.
"The best ... Russian Jewish intellectuals abandoned their people no longer"; they did
not
depart into the "area of exclusively personal interests", but ca red "about making the
ir
people's lot easier." Well, after all, Russian literature taught that the strong shoul
d devote
themselves to the weak.[clii]

However, this new enlightenment of the Jewish masses was greatly complicated by the
strong religiosity of said masses, which in the eyes of progressives was doubtlessly
a
regressive factor,[cliii] whereas the emerging Jewish Enlightenment movement was quit
e
secularforthat time. Secularization of the Jewish public consciousness "was particular
ly
difficult because of the exceptional role religion played in the Diaspora as the found
ation of
Jewish national consciousness over the course of the many centuries." And so "the wid
e
development of secular Jewish national consciousness" began, in essence, only at the e
nd of
the century.[cliv] "It was not because of inertia but due to a completely deliberate s
tance as
the Jew did not want risking separation from his God. "[civ]

So the Russian Jewish intelligentsia met the Russian culture at the moment of birth.
Moreover, it happened at the time when the Russian intelligentsia was also developing
expansively and at the time when Western culture gushed into Russian life (Buckle, Heg
el,
Heine, Hugo, Comte, and Spencer). It was pointed out that several prominent figures of
the
first generation of Russian Jewish intelligentsia (S. Dubnov, M. Krol, G.SIiozberg,
O.
Gruzenberg, and Saul Ginzburg) were born in that period, 1860-1866[clvi] (though thei
r
equally distinguished Jewish revolutionary peers — M. Gots, G.Gershuni, F. Dan, Azef,
and L.
Akselrod — were also born during those years and many other Jewish revolutionaries, su
ch
as P. Akselrod and L. Deych, were born still earlier, in the 1850s).

56

In St. Petersburg in 1863 the authorities permitted establishment of the Society for t
he
Spreading of Enlightenment among the Jews in Russia (SSE) supported by the wealthy Evz
el
Gintsburg and A. M. Brodsky. Initially, during the first decade of its existence, its
membership and activities were limited; the Society was preoccupied with publishing
activities and not with school education; yet still its activities caused a violent re
action on
the part of Jewish conservatives [clvii] (who also protested against publication of th
e
Pentateuch in Russian as a blasphemous encroachment on the holiness of the Torah). Fro
m
the 1870s, the SSE provided financial support to Jewish schools. Their cultural work w
as
conducted in Russian, with a concession for Hebrew, but not Yiddish, which was then
universally recognized as a 'jargon'. [clviii] In the opinion of Osip Rabinovich, a be
lletrist, the
'"spoiled jargon' used by Jews in Russia cannot 'facilitate enlightenment, because it
is not
only impossible to express abstract notions in it, but one cannot even express a decen
t
thought with it'."[clix] "Instead of mastering the wonderful Russian language, we Jews
in
Russia sticktoour spoiled, cacophonous, erratic, and poor jargon." [clx] (In their da
y, the
German Maskilim ridiculed the jargon even more sharply.)

And so "a new social force arose in Russian Jewry, which did not hesitate entering th
e
struggle against the union ... of capital and synagogue", as expressed by the liberal
Yu. I.
Gessen. That force, nascent and for the time being weak, was the Jewish periodical pre
ss in
the Russian language. [clxi]

Its first-born was the Odessa magazine Rassvet [Dawn], published for two years from 18
59
to 1861 by the above-mentioned O. Rabinovich. The magazine was positioned to serve "as
a
medium for dissemination of 'useful knowledge, true religiousness, rules of communal l
ife
and morality'; it was supposed to predispose Jews to learn the Russian language and t
o
'become friends with the national scholarship"'[clxii] Rassvet also reported on politi
cs,
expressing "love for the Fatherland" and the intention to promote "the government's
views"[clxiii] with the goal "of communal living with other peoples, participating in
their
education and sharing their successes, while at the same time preserving, developing,
and
perfecting our distinct national heritage."[clxiv] The leading Rassvetpublicist, L. Le
vanda,
defined the goal of the magazine as twofold: "to act defensively and offensively: defe
nsively
against attacks from the outside, when our human rights and confessional (religious)
interests must be defended, and offensively against our internal enemy: obscurantism,
everydayness, social life troubles, and our tribal vices and weaknesses. "[clxv]

This last direction, "to reveal the ill places of the inner Jewish life," aroused a fe
ar in Jewish
circles that it "might lead to new legislative repressions." So the existing Jewish ne
wspapers
(in Yiddish) "saw the Rassvet's direction as extremely radical." Yet these same modera
te
newspapers by their mere appearance had already shaken '"the patriarchal structure' o
f
[Jewish] community life maintained by the silence of the people. "[clxvi] Needless to
say, the
struggle between the rabbinate and Hasidic Judaism went on unabated during that perio
d
and this new 1860s' struggle of the leading publicists against the stagnant foundation
s of
57

daily life had added to it. Gessen noted that "in the 1860s, the system of repressive
measures against ideological opponents did not seem offensive even for the conscience
of
intelligent people." For example, publicist A. Kovner, 'the Jewish Pisarev' [a radical
Russian
writer and social critic], could not refrain from tipping off a Jewish newspaper to th
e
Governor General of Novorossiysk.[clxvii] (In the 1870s Pisarev "was extremely popula
r
among Jewish i nte I lectua Is ." ) [c Ixvi i i ]

M. Aldanov thinks that Jewish participation in Russian cultural and political life ha
d
effectively begun at the end of the 1870s (and possibly a decade earlier in the revolu
tionary
movement). [clxix]

In the 1870s new Jewish publicists (L. Levanda, the critic S. Vengerov, the poet N. Mi
nsky)
began working with the general Russian press. (According to G. Aronson, Minsky express
ed
his desire to goto the Russo-Turkish War to fight for his brothers Slavs). The Ministe
r of
Education Count Ignatiev then expressed his faith in Jewish loyalty to Russia. Afterth
e
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, rumors about major auspicious reforms began circulatin
g
among the Jews. In the meantime, the center of Jewish intellectual life shifted from O
dessa
to St. Petersburg, where new writers and attorneys gained prominence as leaders of pub
lic
opinion. In that hopeful atmosphere, publication of Rassvetwas resumed in St. Petersbu
rg in
1879. In the opening editorial, M. I. Kulisher wrote: "Our mission is to be an organ o
f
expression of the necessities of Russian Jews ... for promoting the awakening of the h
uge
mass of Russian Jews from mental hibernation ... it is also in the interests of Russi
a.... In that
goal the Russian Jewish intelligentsia does not separate itself from the rest of Russi
an
citizens."[clxx]
Alongside the development of the Jewish press, Jewish literature could not help but ad
vance
—first in Hebrew, then in Yiddish, and then in Russian, inspired by the best of Russia
n
literature. [clxxi] Under Alexander II, "there were quite a few Jewish authors who per
suaded
their co-religionists to study the Russian language and look at Russia as their
homeland."[clxxii]

Naturally, in the conditions of the 1860s-1870s, the Jewish educators, still few in nu
mbers
and immersed in Russian culture, could not avoid moving toward assimilation, in the sa
me
direction "which under analogous conditions led the intelligent Jews of Western Europe
to
unilateral assimilation with the dominant people. "[clxxiii] However, there was a diff
erence:
in Europe the general cultural level of the native peoples was consistently higher and
so in
Russia these Jews could not assimilate with the Russian people, still weakly touched b
y
culture, nor with the Russian ruling class (who rejected them); they could only assimi
late
with the Russian intelligentsia, which was then very small in number but already compl
etely
secular, rejecting, among other things, their God. Now Jewish educators also tore away
from
Jewish religiosity and, "being unable to find an alternative bond with their people, t
hey were
becoming completely estranged from them and spiritually considered themselves solely a
s
Russian citizens. "[clxxiv]

58

"A worldly rapprochement between the Russian and Jewish intelligentsias" was
developing. [clxxv] It was facilitated by the general revitalization of Jewish life wi
th several
categories of Jews now allowed to live outside the Pale of Settlement. Development of
railroad communications and possibilities of travel abroad — "all this contributed to
a closer
contact of the Jewish ghetto with the surrounding world." [clxxvi] Moreover, by the 18
60s
"up to one-third ... of Odessa's Jews could speak Russian."[clxxvii] The population th
ere grew
quickly, "because of massive resettlement to Odessa of both Russian and foreign Jews,
the
latter primarily from Germany and Galicia ."[clxxviii] The blossoming of Odessa by the
middle
of the 19th century presaged the prosperity of all Russian Jewry toward the end of the
19th
- to the beginning of 20th century. Free Odessa developed according to its own special
laws,
differing from the Ail-Russian statutes since the beginning of the 19th century. It us
ed to be
a free port and was even open to Turkish ships during the war with Turkey. "The main
occupation of Odessa's Jews in this period was the grain trade. Many Jews were small
traders and middlemen (mainly between the landowners and the exporters), as well as
agents of prominent foreign and local (mainly Greek) wheat trading companies. At the g
rain
exchange, Jews worked as stockbrokers, appraisers, cashiers, scalers, and loaders"; "t
he
Jews were in a dominant position in grain commerce: by 1870 most of grain export was i
n
their hands. In 1910 ... 89.2% of grain exports was under their control. "[clxxix] In
comparison
with other cities in the Pale of Settlement, more Jews of the independent professions
lived
in Odessa and they had better relations with educated Russian circles, and were favora
bly
looked upon and protected by the high administration of the city.... N. Pirogov [a pro
minent
Russian scientist and surgeon], the Trustee of the Odessa School District from 1856-18
58,
particularly patronized the Jews."[clxxx] A contemporary observer had vividly describe
d this
Odessa's clutterwith fierce competition between Jewish and Greek merchants, where "in
some years half the city, from the major bread bigwigs, to the thrift store owners, li
ved off
the sale of grain products." In Odessa, with her non-stop business commotion bonded by
the
Russian language, "it was impossible to draw a line, to separate clearly a 'wheat' mer
chant
or a banker from a man of an intellectual profession." [clxxxi]

Thus in general "among the educated Jews ... the process of adopting all things Russia
n ...
had accelerated. "[clxxxii] "European education and knowledge of the Russian language
had
become necessities"; "everyone hurried to learn the Russian language and Russian
literature; they thought only about hastening integration and complete blending with t
heir
social surroundings"; they aspired not only for the mastery of the Russian language bu
t for
"for the complete Russification and adoption of 'the Russian spirit', so that "the Jew
would
not differ from the rest of citizens in anything but religion." The contemporary obser
ver M. G.
Morgulis wrote: "Everybody had begun thinking of themselves as citizens of their homel
and;
everybody now had a new Fatherland. "[clxxxiii] "Members of the Jewish intelligentsia
believed that 'for the state and public good they had to get rid of their ethnic trait
s and ... to
merge with the dominant nationality.' A contemporary Jewish progressive wrote, that 'J
ews,
as a nation, do not exist', that they 'consider themselves Russians of the Mosaic fait
h. .."Jews
recognize that their salvation lies in the merging with the Russian people' ."[clxxxi
v]

59

It is perhaps worth naming here Veniamin Portugalov, a doctor and publicist. In his yo
uth he
harbored revolutionary sentiments and because of that he even spent some time as a
prisoner in the Peter and Paul Fortress. From 1871 he lived in Samara. He "played a
prominent role in development of rural health service and public health science. He wa
s one
of the pioneers of therapy for alcoholism and the struggle against alcohol abuse in Ru
ssia."
He also organized public lectures. "From a young age he shared the ideas of Narodniks
[a
segment of the Ruslsian intelligentsia, who left the cities and went to the people ('n
arod') in
the villages, preaching on the moral right to revolt against the established order] ab
out the
pernicious role of Jews in the economic life of the Russian peasantry. These ideas lai
d the
foundation for the dogmas of the Judeo-Christian movement of the 1880s" (The Spiritua
l
Biblical Brotherhood). Portugalov deemed it necessary to free Jewish life from rituali
sm, and
believed that "Jewry could exist and develop a culture and civilization only after bei
ng
dissolved in European peoples" (he had meant the Russian [people]). [clxxxv]

A substantial reduction in the number of Jewish conversions to Christianity was observ

ed
during the reign of Alexander II as it became unnecessary after the abolishment of th
e
institution of military cantonists and the widening of Jewish rights. [clxxxvi] And fr
om now on
the sect of Skhariya the Jew began to be professed openly too. [clxxxvi i]

Such an attitude on the part of affluent Jews, especially those living outside the Pal
e of
Settlement and those with Russian education, toward Russia as undeniably a homeland i
s
noteworthy. And so it had to be noticed and was. "In view of the great reforms, all
responsible Russian Jews were, without exaggeration, patriots and monarchists and ador
ed
Alexander II. M. N. Muravyov, then Governor General of the Northwest Krai famous for h
is
ruthless ness toward the Poles [who rebelled in 1863], patronized Jews in the pursuit
of the
sound objective of winning the loyalty of a significant portion of the Jewish populati
on to the
Russian state. "[clxxxviii] Though during the Polish uprising of 1863 Polish Jewry was
mainly
on the side of the Poles;[clxxxix] "a healthy national instinct prompted" the Jews of
the
Vilnius, Kaunas, and Grodno Guberniyas "to side with Russia because they expected mor
e
justice and humane treatment from Russians than from the Poles, who, though historical
ly
tolerating the Jews, had always treated them as a lower race."[cxc] (This is how Ya. T
eitel
described it: "The Polish Jews were always detached from the Russian Jews"; they looke
d at
Russian Jews from the Polish perspective. On the other hand, the Poles in private shar
ed
their opinion on the Russian Jews in Poland: "The best of these Jews are our real enem
y.
Russian Jews, who had infested Warsaw, Lodz, and other major centers of Poland, brough
t
with them Russian culture, which we do not like.")[cxci]

In those years, the Russification of Jews on its territory was "highly desirable" for
the Tsarist
government.fcxcii] Russian authorities recognized "socialization with Russian yout
h ... as a
sure method of re-education of the Jewish youth to eradicate their 'hostility toward
Christians'. "[cxciii]

60
Still, this newborn Russian patriotism among Jews had clear limits. The lawyer and pub
licist I .
G. Ors ha nsky specified that to accelerate the process "it was necessary to create co
nditions
for the Jews such that they could consider themselves as free citizens of a free civil
ized
country." [cxciv] The above-mentioned Lev Levanda, 'a Jewish scholar' living under th
e
jurisdiction of the Governor of Vilnius, then wrote: "I will become a Russian patriot
only
when the Jewish Question is resolved conclusively and satisfactory." A modern Jewish
author who experienced the long and bitter 20th century and then had finally emigrated
to
Israel, replied to him looking back across the chasm of a century: "Levanda does not n
otice
that one cannot lay down conditions to Motherland. She must be loved unconditionally,
without conditions or pre-conditions; she is loved simply because she is the Mother. T
his
stipulation — love under conditions — was extremely consistently maintained by the
Russian-Jewish intelligentsia for one hundred years, though in all other respects they
were
ideal Russians"[cxcv]

And yet in the described period "only small and isolated groups of Jewry became integr
ated
into 'Russian civil society; moreover, it was happening in the larger commercial and
industrial centers ... leading to the appearance of an exaggerated notion about victor
ious
advance of the Russian language deep into Jewish life," all the while "the wide Jewis
h
masses were untouched by the new trends ... isolated not only from the Russian society
but
from the Jewish intelligentsia as well."[cxcvi] In the 1860s and 1870s, the Jewish peo
ple en
masse were still unaffected by assimilation, and the danger of the Jewish intelligents
ia
breaking away from the Jewish masses was real. (In Germany, Jewish assimilation went
smoother as there were no "Jewish popular masses" there — the Jews were better off
socially and did not historically live in such crowded enclaves). [cxcvii]

However, as early as the end of the 1860s, some members of the Jewish intelligentsia b
egan
voicing opposition to such a conversion of Jewish intellectuals into simple Russian pa
triots.
Perets Smolensky was the first to speak of this in 1868: that assimilation with the Ru
ssian
character is fraught with 'national dangeK for the Jews; that although education shoul
d not
be feared, it is necessary to hold on to the Jewish historical past; that acceptance o
f the
surrounding national culture still requires perservation of the Jewish national
character[cxcviii]; and that the Jews are not a religious sect, but a nation. "[cxcix]
So if the
Jewish intelligentsia withdraws from its people, the latter would never liberate itsel
f from
administrative oppression and spiritual stupor. (The poet I. Gordon had put it this wa
y: "Be a
man on the street and a Jew at home.")

The St. Petersburg journals Rassvet (1879-1882) and RusskiyEvrei [Russian Jew] had alr
eady
followed this direction. [cc] They successfully promoted the study of Jewish history a
nd
contemporary life among Jewish youth. At the end of the 1870s and the beginning of th
e
1880s, cosmopolitan and national directions in Russian Jewry became distinct. [cci] "I
n
essence, the owners of Rassvet had already abandoned the belief in the truth of
assimilation.... Rassvet unconsciously went by the path ... of the awakening of ethnic
identity

61

... it was clearly expressing aJewish national bias.... The illusions of Russificatio
n ... were
disappearing."[ccii]

The general European situation of the latter half of the 19th century facilitated deve
lopment
of national identity. There was a violent Polish uprising, the war for the unification
of Italy,
and then of Germany, and later of the Balkan Slavs. The national idea blazed and trium
phed
everywhere. Obviously, these developments would continue among the Jewish intelligents
ia
even without the events of 1881-1882.

Meanwhile, in the 1870s, the generally favorable attitudes of Russians toward Jews, wh
ich
had developed during the Alexandrian reforms, began to change. Russian society was
concerned with Brafman's publications, which were taken quite seriously.
All this coincided with the loud creation of the Alliance Israelite Universelle in Par
is in 1860;
its goal was "to defend the interests of Jewry" all over the world; its Central Commit
tee was
headed by Adolphe Cremieux. [cciii] "Insufficiently well-informed ... about the situat
ion of
Jews in Russia," the Alliance "took interest in Russian Jewry" and soon "began consist
ently
working on behalf of Russian Jews." The Alliance did not have Russian branches and did
not
function within Russia. Apart from charitable and educational work, the Alliance, in
defending Russian Jews, several times addressed Russian government directly, though of
ten
inappropriately. (For example, in 1866 the Alliance appealed to prevent the execution
of
Itska Borodai who was convicted of politically motivated arson. However, he was not
sentenced to death at all, and other Jews implicated in the affairwere acquitted even
without the petition. In another case, Cremieux protested against the resettlement of
Jews
to the Caucasus and the Amur region — although there was no such Russian government
plan whatsoever. In 1869 he again protested, this time against the nonexistent persecu
tion
of Jews in St. Petersburg. [cciv] Cremieux had also complained to the President of the
United
States about similarly nonexistent persecutions against the Jewish religion by the Rus
sian
government). Nevertheless, according to the report of the Russian ambassador in Paris,
the
newly-formed Alliance (with the Mosaic Tablets over the Earth on its emblem) had alrea
dy
enjoyed "extraordinary influence on Jewish societies in all countries." All this alarm
ed the
Russian government as well as Russian public. Yakov Brafman actively campaigned agains
t
the Universal Jewish Alliance. He claimed that the Alliance, "like all Jewish societie
s, is
double-faced (its official documents proclaim one thing while the secret ones sayanoth
er)"
and that the task of the Alliance is "to shield the Jewry from the perilous influence
of
Christian civilization." [ccv] As a result, the Society for the Spreading of Enlighten
ment among
the Jews in Russia was also accused of having a mission "to achieve and foster univers
al
Jewish solidarity and caste-like seclusion. "[ccvi])

Fears of the Alliance were also nurtured by the very emotional opening proclamation of
its
founders "to the Jews of all nations" and by the dissemination of false Alliance docum
ents.
Regarding Jewish unity the proclamation contained the following wording: "Jews! ... If
you
believe that the Alliance is good for you, that while being the parts of different nat
ions you

62

nevertheless can have common feelings, desires, and hopes ... if you think that your
disparate efforts, good aspirations and individual ambitions could become a major forc
e
when united and moving in one direction and toward one goal ...then please support us
with your sympathy and assistance. "[ccvii]

Later in France a document surfaced containing an alleged proclamation "To Jews of th

e
Universe" byAldolphe Cremieux himself. It was very likely a forgery. Perhaps it was on
e of
the drafts of the opening proclamation not accepted by the Alliance founders. However
it
had resonated well with Brafman's accusations of the Alliance having hidden goals: "We
live
in alien lands and we cannot take an interest in the variable concerns of those nation
s until
our own moral and material interests are endangered ... the Jewish teachings must fill
the
entire world...." Heated arguments were exchanged in this regard in Russian press. I.
S.
Aksakov concluded in his newspaper Rus that "the question of the document under
discussion being ... a falsehood is rather irrelevant in this case because of veracity
of the
expressed herein Jewish views and aspirations. "[ccviii]

The pre-revolutionary Jewish Encyclopedia writes that from the 1870s "fewer voices wer
e
heard in defense of Jews" in the Russian press. "The notion of Jews allegedly united u
nder
the aegis of a powerful political organization administered by the Alliance Israelite
Universelle was taking root in Russian society." [ccix] Thus the foundation of the All
iance
produced in Russia (and possibly not only in Russia) a reaction counterproductive to t
he
goals that the Alliance had specified.
If the founders of the Alliance could have foreseen the sheerscale of condemnations ag
ainst
the idea of worldwide Jewish solidarity and even the accusations of conspiracy which h
ad
erupted after the creation of the organization, they might have refrained from followi
ng that
route, especially considering that the Alliance did not alter the course of Jewish his
tory.

After 1874, when a new military charter introducing the universal military service obl
igation
in Russia came into force, "numerous news article on draft evasion by Jews began fueli
ng
resentment against the Jews in the Russian society ."[ccx] The Alliance Israelite Univ
erselle
was accused of intending "to care about young Jews leaving Russia to escape conscripti
on
enforced by the new law" so that "using support from abroad, the Jews would have more
opportunities than other subjects to move out of the country." (This question would ar
ise
once again precisely a century later in the 1970s.) Cremieux replied that the mission
of the
Alliance was "the struggle against religious persecution" and that the Alliance had de
cided
"henceforth not to assist Jews trying to evade military obligation in Russia." Ratheri
t would
issue "an appeal to our co-religionists in Russia in order to motivate them to comply
with all
the requirements of the new law."[ccxi]

Besides crossing the border, another way to evade military service was self-mutilatio
n.
General Denikin (who was quite a liberal before and even during the revolution) descri
bed
hundreds of bitter cases of the self-mutilation he personally sawduring several years
of

63

service at the military medical examination board inVolyn Guberniya. Such numerous an
d
desperate self-injuries are all the more striking considering that it was already the
beginning
of the 20th century.[ccxii]
As previously mentioned, the influx of Jews into public schools, professional schools
and
institutions of higher learning had sharply increased after 1874 when a new military c
harter
stipulating educational privileges came into force. This increase was dramatic. While
calls to
restrict Jewish enrollment in public education institutions were heard from the
Northwestern Krai even before, in 1875, the Ministry of Public Education informed the
government that it was impossible to admit all Jews trying to enter public educationa
l
institutions without constraining the Christian population."[ccxiii]

It is worth mentioning here the G. Aronson's regretful note that even D. Mendeleev of
St.
Petersburg University "showed anti-Semitism. "[ccxiv] The Jewish Encyclopedia summariz
es
all of the 1870s period as "a turnaround in the attitudes of a part of Russian intelli
gentsia ...
which rejected the ideals of the previous decade especially in regard to ... the Jewis
h
Question. "[ccxv]

An interesting feature of that time was that it was the press (the rightist one, of co
urse) and
not governmental circles that was highly skeptical (and in no way hostile) towards th
e
project of full legal emancipation of the Jews. The following quotes are typical. How
can "all
the citizenship rights be granted to this ... stubbornly fanatical tribe, allowing the
m to occupy
the highest administrative posts? ... Only education ... and social progress can truly
bring
together Jews and Christians.... Introduce them into the universal family of civilizat
ion, and
we will be the first to say words of love and reconciliation to them." " Civilization
will
generally benefit from such a rapprochement as the intelligent and energetic tribe wil
l
contribute much to it. The Jews ... will realize that time is ripe to throw off the yo
ke of
intolerance which originates in the overly strict interpretations of the Talmud." "Unt
il
education brings the Jews to the thought that it is necessary to live not only at the
expense
of Russian society but also for the good of this society, no discussion could be held
about
granting them more rights than those they have now." "Even if it is possible to grant
the
Jews all civil rights, then in any case they cannot be allowed into any official posit
ions 'where
Christians would be subject to their authority and where they could have influence on
the
administration and legislation of a Christian country.'" [ccxvi]

The attitude of the Russian press of that time is well reflected in the words of the p
rominent
St. Petersburg newspaper Golos: "Russian Jews have no right to complain that the Russi
an
press is biased against their interests. Most Russian periodicals favor equal civil ri
ghts for
Jews;" it is understandable "that Jews strive to expand their rights toward equality w
ith the
rest of Russian citizens"; yet ... "some dark forces drive Jewish youth into the crazi
ness of
political agitation. Why is that only a few political trials do not list Jews among de
fendants,
and, importantly, among the most prominent defendants? ... That and the common Jewish
practice of evading military service are counterproductive for the cause of expanding
the

64

civil rights of Jews"; "one aspiring to achieve rights must prove beforehand his abili
ty to
fulfill the duties which come with those rights" and "avoid putting himself into an ex
tremely
unfavorable and dismal position with respect to the interests of state and society."
[ccxvii]

Yet, the Encyclopedia notes, "despite all this propaganda, bureaucratic circles were
dominated by the idea that the Jewish Question could only be resolved through
emancipation. For instance, in March 1881 a majority of the members of the Commission
for
Arranging the Jewish Way of Life tended to think that it was necessary to equalize the
Jews
in rights with the rest of the population. "[ccxviii] Raised during the two decades o
f
Alexandrian reforms, the bureaucrats of that period were in many respects taken by th
e
reforms' triumphant advances. And so proposals quite radical and favorable to Jews wer
e
put forward on several occasions by Governors General of the regions constituting the
Pale
of Settlement.
Let's not overlook the new initiatives of the influential Sir Moses Montefiore, who pa
id
another visit to Russia in 1872; and the pressure of both Benjamin Disraeli and Bismar
ck on
Russian State Chancellor Gorchakov at the Berlin Congress of 1878. Gorchakov had to
uneasily explain that Russia was not in the least against religious freedom and did gr
ant it
fully, but "religious freedom should not be confused with Jews having equal political
and civil
rights. "[ccxix]

Yet the situation in Russia developed toward emancipation. And when in 1880 the Count
Loris-Melikov was made the Minister of the Interior with exceptional powers, the hopes
of
Russian Jews for emancipation had become reallygreat and well-founded. Emancipation
seemed impending and inevitable.

And at this very moment the members of Narodnaya Volya assassinated Alexander II, thu
s
destroying in the bud many liberal developments in Russia, among them the hopes for fu
ll
Jewish civil equality.

Sliozberg noted that the Tsar was killed on the eve of Purim. After a series of attemp
ts, the
Jews were not surprised at this coincidence, but they became restless about the
future, [ccxx]

Sources:

[i] Evreyskaya Entsiklopediya [The Jewish Encyclopedia] (henceforth —EE [JE] ): V 16

T. Sankt-St. Petersburg.:
Obshchestvodlya Nauchnikh Evreyskikh Izdaniy i Izd-vo Brokrauz-Efron [Society forScien
tificJewish
Publications and Brokrauz-Efron Publishing House], 1906-1913. T 13, p. 373-374.

[i i] EE* [JE], T 3, p. 163.

[iii] I bid. Til, p. 698; Yu Gessen*. Istoriya evreyskogo naroda v Rossi i [History of
the Jewish People in Russia]
(henceforth-Yu. Gessen): V 2T. L, 1925-1927. T2, p. 160.

[iv] Kratkaya Evreyskaya Entsiklopedia [TheShort Jewish Encyclopedia] (henceforth KEE

[SJE] ): [V 10 T.]
Jerusalem, 1976-2001. T4, p. 79.
65

[v] Yu. Gessen. T2, p. 183.

[vi] M. Kovalevskiy*. Ravnopravieevreyev i ego vragi [Jewish Equal Rights and its Oppo
nents] // Shchit:
Literaturniy sbornik [Shchit: A Literary Anthology] / Under the Editorship of L. Andre
yev, M Gor'kiy, and F.
Sologub. 3rd Edition., dop. M.: RusskoeObshchestvo dly izucheniya evreyskoy zhizni [Ru
ssian Society forthe
Study of Jewish Life], 1916, p. 117-118.

[vi i ] EE [JE], Tl, p. 812-813.

[viii] Ibid. p. 808.

[ix] Ibid. p. 814-815; Yu Gessen*, T 2, p. 147-148.

[x] Yu Gessen, 12, p. 163.

[xi] Yu Gessen, T 2, p. 164.

[xii] Ibid. p. 161-162.

[xiii] I.Orshanskiy. Evrei v RossikOcherki i issledovaniya [The Jews in Russia:Essays

and Research]. Vip. 1
(henceforth— I. Orshanskiy). Sankt-St. Petersburg., 1872, p. 10-11.

[xiv] V.N. Nikitin. Evrei zemledel'tsi: Istoricheskoe, zakonodatel'noe, administrativn

oe i bitovoe polozhenie
kolonii co vremeni ikh vozniknoveniya do nashikh dney 1807-1887 [Jewish Farmers: the H
istorical, Legal,
Administrative, and Everyday Condition of the Colonies, from the Time of Their Origin
to Our Days. 1807-1887].
(henceforth— V.N. Nikitin). Sankt-St. Petersburg, 1887, p. 557.

[xv] EE [JE], T 5, p. 610-611.

[xvi] Ibid.T 13, p. 663.

[xvii] lbid*,T5, p. 622.

[xviii] Yu. Larin. Evrei i antisemitizmv SSSR [The Jews and Anti-Semitism in the USS
R]. Moscow; Leningrad: GIZ,
1929, p. 49.
[xix] I. Orshanskiy, p. 193.

[xx] G.B. Sliozberg. Dela minuvshikh dney: Zapiski russkogo evreya [Affairs ofthe Pas
t: the Notes of a Russian
Jew] (henceforth-G.B. Sliozberg): V 3T. Paris, 1933-1934. Tl, p. 95.

[xxi] EE*, Til, p. 495.

[xxii] L. Deych. Rol' evreyev v russkom revolyutsionnomdvizhenii [The Role of the Jews
in the Russian
Revolutionary Movement]. T 1. Second Edition. Moscow,; Leningrad.: GIZ, 1925, p. 14, 2
1-22.

[xxii i] Ibid. p. 28.

[xxiv] A.A. Gal'denveyzer. Pravovoe polozhenie evreyev v Rossii // [Sb.] Kniga o russk
om evreystve: Otl860-kh
godov do Revolyutsii 1917g [The Legal Position ofthe Jews in Russia // [Anthology] The
Book of Russian Jewry:
from the 1860s to the Revolution of 1917]. (henceforth — KRE-1). New York: Soyuz Russk
ikh Evreyev [Union of
Russian Jews], 1960, p. 119.

[xxv] Yu Gessen. T2, p. 143.

[xxvi] EE [JE], T 1, p. 813.

66

[xxvii] Yu.Gessen*, T2, p. 144-145;EE [JE] T 1, p. 813.

[xxviii] YuGessen, T2, p. 158.

[xxix] Yu Gessen, T 2, p. 144, 154-155.

[xxx] EE [JE], Tl, p. 817.

[xxxi] KEE [SJE], T4, p. 255.

[xxxii] Sm.: M. Kovalevskiy//Shchit, p. 118.

[xxxiii] EE [JE], T 1, p. 818; Til, p. 458-459;T14, p. 841.

[xxxiv] Yu Gessen, T2, p. 150.

[xxxv] Ibid*, p. 148.

[xxxvi] Ibid, p. 150.

[xxxvii] Ibid. p. 169.

[xxxviii] Yu Gessen, T2, p. 208.

[xxxix] EE [JE], T 15, p. 209; T 1, p. 824.

[xl] Perezhitoe: Sbornik, posvyashchenniy obshchestvennoy i kul'turnoy istorii evreyev

v Rossii [Past
Experiences: An Anthology Dedicated to the Social and Cultural History of the Jews in
Russia]. T2, Sankt-St.
Petersburg, 1910, p. 102.

[xli] G.B. Sliozberg,T 1, p. 137.

[xlii] KEE [SJE], T7, p. 327.

[xl i ii] EE [JE], T 1, p. 819.

[xliv] Also,T13, p. 943-944.

[xlv] I.M. Trotskiy. Samodeyatel'nost i samopomoshch' evreyev v Rossii [The Individual

Initiativeand Self-Help
of the Jews in Russia] (OPE, ORT, EKO, OZE, EKOPO)// KRE-1, p. 471.

[xlvi]Yu. Gessen. T2, p. 210.

[xlvii] EE [JE], T 13, p. 947; KEE [SJE], T4, p. 770.

[xlviii] KEE [SJE], T5, p. 473.

[xlix]Also,T4, p. 255.

[I] Yu Gessen. T 2, p. 159-160,210.

[I i] Also, p. 159.

[I ii] B.Ts. Dinur. Religiozno-natsional'niy oblik russkogo evreystva [The Rel igious
-National Look of Russian Jewry]
//KRE-1, p. 311-312.

[liii] EE [JE], T12, p. 640.

67
[liv] Yu Gessen, T 2, p. 161.
[Iv] Also.
[Ivi] Also.

[Ivii] Yu.Orshanskiy, p. 12.

[Iviii] I. Orshanskiy, p. 1-15.

[lix] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 224-225.

[Ix] EE [JE], T 3, p. 83-84.

[Ixi] EE* [JE], T 7, p. 301-302.

[Ixii] G.B. Sliozberg,T 2, p. 155-156.

[Ixiii] EE [JE], T3, p. 164.

[Ixiv] I. Orshanskiy, p. 65-68.

[lxv]KEE [SJE], T 7, p. 332.

[lxvi]EE [JE], T 1, p. 824.

[lxvii]Also*,T3, p. 164.

[lxviii]Also,Tl, p. 824; KEE [SJE], T7, p. 332.

[lxix]Golos [The Voice], 1881, No46, 15 (27) February, p. 1.

[Ixx] A. Shmakov. "Evreyskie" rechi ["Jewish" Questions]. Moscow, 1897, p. 101-103.

[Ixxi] Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' [Encyclopedic Dictionary]: V 82 T. Sankt-St. Peters

burg.: Brokgauz i Efron,
1890-1904. T54, p. 86.

[Ixxii] EE [JE], T3, p. 164-167.

[I xxi i i] G.B. SI i ozberg, T 1, p. 116.

[lxxiv]V.N. Nikitin*,p. 448,483, 529.

[Ixxv] Also*, p 473, 490, 501, 506-507,530-531, 537-538, 547-548, 667.

[Ixxvi] Also, p. 474-475, 502, 547.

[lxxvii]V.N. Nikitin*,p. 502-505,519,542,558,632,656,667.

[lxxviii]Also*,p.473, 510, 514,529-533,550, 572.
[Ixxix] Also, p. 447, 647.
[Ixxx] EE [JE], T7, p. 756.
[lxxxi]V.N. Nikitin*, p. 478-479,524, 529-533,550-551.
[Ixxxii] EE [JE], T 7, p. 756.

68

[Ixxxiii] V.N. Nikitin, p. 534, 540, 555, 571, 611-616, 659.

[Ixxxiv] V.N. Nikitin, p. 635, 660-666.

[lxxxv]Also*, p. 658-661.

[lxxxvi]EE[JE], T7, p. 756.

[Ixxxvii] Also,T16, p. 399.

[Ixxxviii] Also,T2, p. 596.

[Ixxxix] Also,T5, p. 650.

[xc] Also,T 13, p. 606.

[xci] Also,T 5, p. 518; T 13, p. 808.

[xcii]Also,T16,p. 251.

[xciii] Yu Larin. Evrei i antisemitizm v SSSR [The Jews and Antisemitism in the USSR],
p. 36.
[xciv]V.N. Nikitin, p. xii-xiii.

[xcv] N.S. Leskov. Evrei v RossikNeskol'kozamechaniypo evreyskomu voprosu [The Jews in

Russia:Several
Observations on the Jewish Question]. Pg., 1919 [reprint s izd. 1884], p. 61, 63.

[xcvi]L.N. Tolstoyo evreyakh / Predisl . O.Ya. Pergamenta [L.N. Tolstoy on the Jews /
Foreword O.Ya.
Pergamenta], Sankt-PeterburgSt. Petersburg.: Vremya [Time], 1908, p. 15.

[xcvii]EE[JE], T15,p. 492.

[xcviii] I. Orshanskiy, p. 71-72, 95-98, 106-107, 158-160.

[xcix] EE [JE], T13, p. 646.

[c] I.M. Dizhur. Evrei v ekonomicheskoy zhizni Rossii [TheJews inthe EconomicLife of R
ussia] // KRE-1, p. 168;
EE [JE], T 13, p.662.
[ci]L. Deych. Rol' evreyev...[The Role of the Jews..], T 1, p. 14-15.

[cii] EE [JE], T 13, p. 647, 656-658, 663-664; G.B. SI iozberg, T 3, p. 93;KEE [SJE],
T 7, p. 337.

[ciii] M.A. Aldanov. Russkie evrei v 70-80-kh godakh: Istoricheskiy etyud [The Russian
Jews in the 1870-1880s:
An Historical Essay] //KRE-1, p. 45-46.

[civ] G.B. Sliozberg, T 1, p. 141-142.

[cv] KEE [SJE], T 7, p. 328, 331.

[cvi]EE [JE], T7, p. 762.

[cvii]Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 168.

[cviii] Also, p. 168.

[cix] Also, p. 206.

69

[cx] EE [JE], T6, p. 712, 715-716.

[cxi]Also,T 13, p. 618.

[cxii] KRE-1, Predislovie [Foreword], p. iii-iv.

[cxiii] Y.L Teytel'. Iz moey zhizni za 40 let [From My Life of 40 Years]. Paris: Y. Po
volotskiy and Company, 1925, p.
15.

[cxiv] I.M. Trots kiy. Evrei v russkoy shkole [The Jews in Russian School] //KRE-1, p.
354.

[cxv] Yu. Gessen.T 2, p. 179.

[cxvi] L. Deych. Rol' evreyev..., T 1, p. 14.

[cxvii]EE[JE]*, T13, p. 48.

[cxviii] Also, p. 49.

[cxix] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 179.

[cxx] EE [JE], T13, p. 48.

[cxxi] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 208

[cxxii]KEE[SJE], T7, p. 333.

[cxxiii] M.A. Aldanov// KRE-1, p. 45.

[cxxiv] I.M. Trots kiy. Evrei v russkoy shkole [The Jews in Russian Schools] // KRE-1,
p. 355-356.
[cxxv] EE [JE], T13, p. 50.

[cxxvi] I.M. Trots kiy. Evrei v russkoy shkole [The Jews in Russian Schools] // KRE-1,
p. 355-356.
[cxxvii]EE [JE], T13, p. 618.

[cxxviii] G.Ya. Aronson. V bor'be za grazhdanskie i natsional'nieprava:Obshchestvennie

techeniya v russkom
evreystve [In the Struggle for Civil and National Rights: Social Currents in Russian J
ewry]// KRE-1, p. 207.

[cxxix] Yu. Gessen. T 2, p. 178, 180.

[cxxx]Ya.G. Frumkin. Iz istorii russkogo evreystva : Vospominaniya, materiali, dokumen

ti [From the History of
Russian Jewry: Memoirs, Materials, and Documents] // KRE-1, p. 51.

[cxxxi]Yu. Gessen, T2, p. 180.

[cxxxii]EE[JE], Tl, p. 823.

[cxxxiii] Yu Gessen*, T 2, p. 205.

[cxxxiv] Also, p. 170.

[cxxxv] Also, p. 200-201.

[cxxxvi]KEE[JEE], T 1, p. 532.

70

[cxxxvii]Yu.Gessen, T2, p. 200-201.

[cxxxviii] EE [JE], T4, p. 918.
[cxxxix]KEE [SJE], T 1, p. 532.

[cxI] Rossiyskaya Evreyskaya Entsiklopediya [The Russian Jewish Encyclopedia] (hencefo

rth REE). Moscow,
1994-...T1, p. 164.

[cxli] Yu. Gessen. T 2, p. 200-201.

[cxlii] EE [JE], T4, p. 918, 920.

[cxliii] KEE[SJE], T 1, p. 532.

[cxliv]REE [RJE], Tl, p. 164.

[cxlv] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 202.

[cxlvi]Also*,p. 202-203.

[cxlvii] S.M.SIiozberg. O russko-evreyskoy intelligentsia [On the Russo-Jewish lntelli

gentsia]//Evreyskiy mir:
Ezhegodnik na 1939g. [Jewish World:Yearbook for 1939] (henceforth — EM-1 [JW-1]). Pari
s:Ob'edinenie
russko-evreyskoy intelligentsia [Association of the Russo-Jewish Intelligentsia], p. 3
4.

[cxlviii] EE [JE], T 3, p. 334.

[cxlix] Yudl. Mark. Literatura na idish v Rossi i [Literature in Yiddish in Russia] //

KRE-1, p. 521; G.Ya. Aronson.
Russko-Evreyskaya pechat' [Russo-Jewish Press]// Also, p. 548.

[cl] B. Orlov. Ne te vi uchili alfaviti//Vremya i mi: Mezhdunarodniy zhurnal literatur

ei obshchestvennikh
problem (henceforth-VM). Tel'-Aviv, 1975, Nol, p. 130.

[cli] M. Osherovich. Russkieevrei v Soedinennikh Shtatakh Ameriki [Russian Jews in the

United States of
America] // KRE-1, p. 289-290.

[clii]S.M.SIiozberg// EM-1, p. 35.

[cliii] G.Ya. Aronson*. Vbor'be za...[lnthe Struggle for...] // KRE-1, p 210.

[cliv]S.Shvarts. Evrei vSovetskom Soyuze c nachala Vtoroy mirovoyvoyni. 1939-1965 [The

Jews inthe Soviet
Union from the Start of the Second World War. 1939-1965]. New York: Amerikanskiy evrey
skiy rabochiy
komitet [American Jewish Workers Committee], 1966, p. 290.

[civ] I.M. Bikerman. K samopoznaniyu evreya: Chem mi bili, c hem mi stali, chem mi dol
zhni bit'. [What We
Were, What We Became, and WhatWe Should Be]. Paris, 1939, p. 48.
[clvi] K. Leytes. Pamyati M.A. Krolya [The Memoirs of M.A Krol']// Evreyskiy mir [Jewi
sh World]: Anthology 2
(henceforth EM-2 [JW-2]). New York: Soyuz russkikh evreyev v N'yu Yorke [Union of Russ
ian Jews in New York],
1944, p. 408-411.

[clvii] EE [JE], T13, p. 59.

[clviii] I.M. Trotskiy.Samodeyatel'nost'... [Individual Initiative.. .]// KRE-1, p. 47

1-474.
[clix]Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 172.

71

[clx] EE [JE]*, T3, p. 335.

[clxi]Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 170.
[clxii]Also,p.l71.

[clxiii] G.Ya. Aronson*. Russko-Evreyskaya pechat' [Russo-Jewish Press]// KRE-1, p. 56

2.

[clxiv] S.M. Ginzburg* // EM-1 [JW-1], p. 36.

[clxv]Yu. Gessen*, T 2, p. 173.

[clxvi] Also*, p. 174.

[clxvii] Also, p. 174-175.

[clxviii] EE [JE], T 3, p. 480.

[clxix]M.A. Aldanov// KRE-1, p. 44.

[clxx] G.Ya. Aronson*. Russko-evreyskaya pechat' [Russo-Jewish Press] // KRE-1, p. 558

-561.

[clxxi] M. Krol'. Natsionalizm i assimilyatsiya vevreyskoy istorii [National ism and A

ssimilation in Jewish History]
//EM-1 [JW-1], p. 188-189.

[clxxii] James Parkes.The Jew and his Neighbor: a Study of the Causes of anti -Semitis
m. Paris: YMCA-Press,
1932, p. 41.
[clxxiii] Yu Gessen, T 2, p. 198.
[clxxiv] Also,
[clxxv] Also, p. 177.
[clxxvi] EE [JE], T13, p. 638.

[clxxvii] G.Ya. Aronson. Russko-Evreyskaya pechat' [Russo-Jewish Press]// KRE-1, p. 55

1.
[clxxviii] KEE[SJE], T 6, p. 117.
[clxxix] Also, p. 117-118.
[clxxx] Also, p. 118.

[clxxxi] K. Itskovich. Odessa-khlebniy gorod [Odessa— City of Bread] // Novoe russkoes

lovo [The New Russian
Word], New York, 1984, 21 March, p. 6.

[clxxxii] EE [JE], T3, p. 334-335.

[clxxxiii]Also*,T13, p. 638.

[clxxxiv] G.Ya. Aronson. V bor'be za...[lnthe Struggle for...] // KRE-1, p. 207.

[clxxxv] KEE [SJE], T 6, p. 692-693.
[clxxxvi]EE, Til, p. 894.

72

[clxxxvii] KEE [SJE], T2, p. 510.

[clxxxviii] V.S. Mandel'. Konservativnie i razrushitel'nieelemente v evreystve [Conser

vative and Destructive
Elements in Jewry] // Rossiya i evrekSb. 1 [Russia and the Jews: Anthology 1 (hencefor
th — RiE [RandJ]) /
Otechestvennoe obedinenie russkikh evreyev za granitsey [The Patriotic Union of Russia
n Jews Abroad]. Paris:
YMCA-Press, 1978 [1st Publication — Berlin: Osnova, 1924], p. 195.

[clxxxix] I.M.Trotskiy. Evrei v russkoy shkole [The Jews in Russian School s]//KRE-l,
p. 356.

[cxc]V.S. Mandel'// RiE [RandJ], p. 195.

[cxci] Ya. Teytel'. Izmoey zhizni...[From My Life...], p. 239.

[cxcii] See.: EE [JE], T 3, p. 335; and others.

[cxciii]Yu.Gessen, T2, p. 208.

[cxci v] EE [JE], T3, p. 335.

[cxcv]B. Orlov//VM, 1975, Nol, p. 132.

[cxcvi]Yu. Gessen, T2, p. 181.

[cxcvii]G.Ya.Aronson. V bor'be za...[lnthe Struggle for...]// KRE-1, p. 208-209.

[cxcviii]Yu. Gessen, T2, p. 198-199.
[cxcix] EE [JE], T 3, p. 336.
[cc]Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 232-233.

[cci] S.M. Ginzburg. Nastroeniya evreyskoy molodezhi v 80-kh godakh proshlogo stoletiy
a.// EM-2, p. 380.

[ccii] G.Ya. Aronson. Russko-evreyskaya pechat' [Russo-Jewish Press]// KRE-1, p. 561-5

62.

[cciii] EE [JE], T 1, p. 932; KEE [SJE], T 1, p. 103.

[cciv] EE [JE], Tl, p. 945-950.

[ccv] Also, p. 948-950.

[ccvi]Also*,T2, p. 742.

[ccvii]Also,Tl, p. 933-936.

[ccviii] EE [JE], T 1, p. 950-951; I.S. Aksakov.Soch. [Essays].: V7 T Moscow., 1886-18

87. T 3, p. 843-844.
[ccix] EE [JE], T2, p. 738.
[ccx] Also, p. 738-739.
[ccxi]Also,Tl, p. 948-949.

[ccxii] A.I. Den i kin. Put' russkogo ofitsera [The Path of a Russian Officer]. New Yo
rk: Publisher-named-Chekov,
1953, p. 284.

[ccxiii] EE [JE], T13, p. 50-51.

73

[ccxiv]G.Ya. Aronson. Russko-evreyskaya pechet' [Russo-Jewish Press]// KRE-1, p. 558.

[ccxv] EE [JE], T12, p. 525-526.
[ccxvi]EE [JE]*, T 2, p. 736, 740.

[ccxvii] Golos [The Voice], 1881, No46, 15 (27) February, p. 1.

[ccxviii] EE [JE], T2, p. 740.
[ccxix]Also,T4, p. 246, 594.
[ccxx] G.B. Sliozberg, T 1, p. 99.

74

Chapter 5: After the murder of Alexander II

The murder of the Tsar- Libera tor, Alexander II, shocked the people's consciousness -

something the Narodovol'tsi intended, but that has been intentionally or unintentional
ly
ignored by historians with the passing of decades. The deaths of heirs or tsars of th
e
previous century - Aleksei Petrovich, Ivan Antonovich, Peter III, and Paul - were viol
ent, but
that was unknown to the people. The murder of March 1st, 1881, caused a panic in mind
s
nationwide. For the common people, and particularly for the peasant masses it was as i
f the
very foundations of their lives were shaken. Again, as the Narodovol'tsi calculated, t
his could
not help but invite some explosion.

And an explosion did occur, but an unpredictable one: Jewish pogroms in Novorossiya an
d
Ukraine.

Six weeks after the regicide, the pogroms of Jewish shops, institutions, and homes "su
ddenly
engulfed a vast territory, with tremendous, epidemic force. "[1] "Indeed, it was rathe
r
spontaneous. ... Local people, who, for the most different reasons desired to get even
with
the Jews, posted incendiary posters and organized basic cadres of pogromists, which we
re
quickly joined by hundreds of volunteers, who joined without any exhortation, caught u
p in
the generally wild atmosphere and promise of easy money. In this there was something
spontaneous. However, ... even the crowds, fueled by alcohol, while committing theft a
nd
violence, directed their blows in one direction only: in the direction of the Jews - t
he
unruliness only stopping at the thresholds of Christian homes. "[2]

The first pogrom occurred in Elizavetgrad, on 15 April. "Disorder intensified, when pe

asants
from the neighboring settlements arrived, in order to profit off the goods of the Jew
s." At
firstthe military did not act, because of uncertainty; finally "significant cavalry fo
rces
succeeded in ending the pogrom." [3] "The arrival of fresh forces put an end to the
pogrom."[4] "There was no rape and murder in this pogrom. "[5] According to other sour
ces:
"one Jew was killed. The pogrom was put down on 17 April by troops, who fired into th
e
crowd of thugs. "[6] However, "from Elizavetgrad the stirring spread to neighboring
settlements; in the majority of cases, the disorders were confined to plundering of ta
verns."
And after a week, a pogrom occurred in the Anan'evskiy Uezd [district] of Odessa Guber
niya
[province], then in Anan'ev itself, "where it was caused by some petty bourgeois, who
spread a rumor that the Tsar was killed by Jews, and that there was an official order
for the
massacre of Jews, but the authorities were hiding this. "[7] On 23 April there was a b
rief
pogrom in Kiev, but it was soon stopped with military forces. However, in Kiev on 26 A
pril a
new pogrom broke out, and by the following day it had spread to the Kiev suburbs - and
this
was the largest pogrom in the whole chain of them; but they ended without human
fatalities."[8] (Another tome of the same Encyclopedia reports the opposite, that "sev
eral
Jews were ki Med." [9])

75

After Kiev, pogroms took place again in approximately fifty settlements in the Kiev
Guberniya, during which "property of the Jews was subjected to plunder, and in isolate
d
cases battery occurred." At the end of the same April a pogrom took place in Konotop,
"caused mainly by workers and railroad hands, accompanied by one human fatality; in
Konotop there were instances of self-defense from the Jewish side." There was still an
echo
of the Kiev Pogrom inZhmerinka, in "several settlements of Chernigov Guberniya;" at th
e
start of May, in the small town of Smel, where "it was suppressed with arriving troops
the
next day" ("an apparel store was plundered"). With echoes in the course of May, at the
start
of summer pogroms still broke out in separate areas in Ekaterinoslav and Poltava guber
niyas
(Aleksandrovsk, Romni, Nezhin, Pereyaslavl, and Borisov). Insignificant disorders took
place
somewhere in Melitopol Uezd. There were cases, when peasants immediately compensated
Jews for their losses. "[10]

"The pogrom movement in Kishinev, which began on 20 April, was nipped in the bud. "[1
1]
There were no pogroms in all of Byelorussia - not in that year, nor in the following y
ears, [12]
although in Minsk a panic started among the Jews during rumors about pogroms in the
Southwestern Krai - on account of a completely unexpected occurrence. [13]

And next in Odessa. Only Odessa already knew Jewish pogroms in the 19th Century - in 1
821,
1859, and 1871. "Those were sporadic events, caused mainly by unfriendliness toward Je
ws
on the part of the local Greek population,"[14] that is, on account of the commercial
competition of the Jews and Greeks; in 1871 there was a three-day pogrom of hundreds o
f
Jewish taverns, shops, and homes, but without human fatalities.

I.G. Orsha nskiy writes in more detail about this pogrom, and states, that Jewish prop
erty was
being intentionally destroyed: heaps of watches from the jewelers - they did not steal
them,
but carried them out to the roadway and smashed them. He agrees that the "nerve cente
r"
of the pogrom was hostility toward the Jews on the part of the Greek merchants, partic
ularly
owing to the fact, that after the Crimean War the Odessa Jews took the grocery trade a
nd
colonial commodities from the Greeks. But there was "a general dislike toward the Jews
on
the part of the Christian population of Odessa. ... This hostility manifested far mor
e
consciously and prominently among the intelligent and affluent class than among the
common working people." You see, however, that different peoples get along in Odessa;
"why then did only Jews arouse general dislike toward themselves, which sometimes turn
s
into severe hatred?" One high school teacher explained to his class: "The Jews are eng
aged
in incorrect economic relations with the rest of population." Orshanskiy objects that
such an
explanation removes "the heavy burden of moral responsibility." He sees the same reaso
n in
the psychological influence of Russian legislation, which singles out the Jews, namely
and
only to place restrictions on them. And in the attempt of Jews to break free from rest
rictions,
people see "impudence, insatiableness, and grabbing."[15]

As a result, in 1881 the Odessa administration, already having experience with pogrom
s -
which other local authorities did not have - immediately put down disorders which wer
e

76

reignited several times, and "the masses of thugs were placed in vessels and dragged a
way
from the shore"[16] - a highly resourceful method. (In contradiction to the pre -revol
utionary,
the modern Encyclopedia writes, that this time the pogrom in Odessa continued for thre
e
days). [17]

The pre-revolutionary Encyclopedia recognizes, that "the government considered it

necessary to decisively put down violent attempts againstthe Jews";[18] so it was the
new
Minister of Interior Affairs, Count N.P. Ignatiev, (who replaced Loris-Melikov in May,
1881),
who firmly suppressed the pogroms; although it was not easy to cope with rising
disturbances of "epidemic strength" - in view of the complete unexpectedness of event
s,
the extremely small number of Russian police at that time (Russia's police force was t
hen
incomparably smaller than the police forces in the West European states, much less tha
n
those in the Soviet Union), and the rare stationing of military garrisons in those are
as.
"Firearms were used for defense of the Jews against pogromists."[19] There was firing
in the
crowd, and [people] were shot dead. For example, in Borisov "soldiers shot and killed
several
peasants."[20] Also, in Nezhin "troops stopped a pogrom, by opening fire at the crowd
of
peasant pogromists; several people were killed and wounded. "[21] In Kiev 1,400 peopl
e
were arrested. [22]
All this together indicates a highly energetic picture of enforcement. But the governm
ent
acknowledged its insufficient preparedness. An official statement said that during the
Kiev
pogrom "the measures to restrain the crowds were not taken with sufficient timeliness
and
energy."[23] In a report to His Majesty in June 1881 the Director of the Police Depart
ment,
V.K. Plehve, named the fact that courts martial "treated the accused extremely lenient
ly and
in general dealt with the matter quite superficially" as "one of the reasons for the
development and insufficiently quick suppression of the disorders'" Alexander III made
a
note in the report: "This is inexcusable. "[24]

But forthwith and later it did not end without accusations, that the pogroms were arra
nged
by the government itself-a completely unsubstantiated accusation, much less absurd, si
nce
in April 1881 the same liberal reformer Loris Melikov headed the government, and all h
is
people were in power in the upper administration. After 1917, a group of researchers -
S.
Dubnov, G. Krasniy-Admoni, and S. Lozinskiy -thoroughly searched for the proof in all
the
opened government archives - and only found the opposite, beginning with the fact tha
t,
Alexander III himself demanded an energetic investigation. (But to utterly ruin Tsar
Alexander Ill's reputation a nameless someone invented the malicious slander: that the
Tsar
- unknown to anyone, when, and under what circumstances - said: "And I admit, that I
myself am happy, when they beat Jews!" And this was accepted and printed in emigre
liberation brochures, it went into liberal folklore, and even until now, after 100 yea
rs, it has
turned up in publications as historically reliable. [25] And even in the Short Jewish
Encyclopedia: "The authorities acted in close contact with the arrivals," [26] that i
s, with
outsiders. And it was 'clear' to Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana that it was "obvious": all
matters

77

were in the hands of the authorities. If "they wanted one - they could bring on a pogr
om; if
they didn't want one - there would be no pogrom. ")[27]
As a matter of fact, not only was there no incitement on the part of the government, b
ut as
Gessen points out: "the rise of numerous pogrom brigades in a short time in a vast are
a and
the very character of their actions, eliminates the thought of the presence of a singl
e
organizational center." [28]

And here is another contemporary, living testimony from a pretty much unexpected quart
er
- from The Black Repartition's Worker's Leaflet; that is, a proclamation to the peopl
e, in
June 1881. The revolutionary leaflet thus described the picture: "Not only all the gov
ernors,
but all other officials, police, troops, priests, zemstvo [elected district councils],
and
journalists - stood up for the Kulak-Jews. ..The government protects the person and pr
operty
of the Jews"; threats are announced by the governors "that the perpetrators of the rio
ts will
be dealt with according to the full extent of the law.. .The police looked for people
who were
in the crowd [of pogromists], arrested them, dragged them to the police station. ..Sol
diers
and Cossacks used the rifle butt and the whip. ..they beat the people with rifles and
whips. ..some were prosecuted and locked up in jail or sent to do hard labor, and othe
rs were
thrashed with birches on the spot by the police."[29]

Next year, in the spring of 1881, "pogroms renewed but already not in the same number
s
and not in the same scale as in the previous year."[30] "The Jews of the city of Balt
a
experienced a particularly heavy pogrom," riots also occurred in the Baltskiy Uezd and
still in
a few others. "However, according to the number of incidents, and according to their
character, the riots of 1882 were significantly inferior to the movement of 1881 - th
e
destruction of the property of Jews was not so frequent a phenomenon. "[31] The pre-
revolutionary Jewish Encyclopedia reports, that at the time of the pogrom in Balta, on
e Jew
was killed. [32]

A famous Jewish contemporary wrote: in the pogroms of the 1880s, "they robbed unlucky
Jews, and they beat them, but they did not kill them. "[33] (According to other source
s, 6-7
deaths were recorded.) At the time of the 1880 - 1890s, no one remembered mass killing
s
and rapes. However, more than a half-century passed -and many publicists, not having t
he
need to delve into the ancient [official] Russian facts, but then having an extensive
and
credulous audience, now began to write about massive and premeditated atrocities. For
example, we read in Max Raisin's frequently published book: that the pogroms of 1881 l
ed
to the "rape of women, murder, and maiming of thousands of men, women, and children. I
t
was later revealed, that these riots were inspired and thought out by the very governm
ent,
which had incited the pogromists and hindered the Jews in their self-defense."[34]

A G.B. Sliozberg, so rationally familiar with the workings of the Russian state appara
tus -
suddenly declared out-of-country in 1933, that the pogroms of 1881 originated not fro
m
below, but from above, with Minister lgnatiev(who at that time was still not Minister
-the

78

old man's memory failed him), and "there was no. ..doubt, that threads of the work of
the
pogrom could be found in the Department of Police"[35] - thus the experienced jurist
afforded himself dangerous and uglygroundlessness.

And yes, here in a serious present-day Jewish journal - from a modern Jewish author we
find
that, contrary to all the facts and without bringing in new documents: that in Odessa
in 1881
a "three-day pogrom" took place; and that in the Balta pogrom there was "direct
participation of soldiers and police"; "40 Jews were killed and seriously wounded, 170
lightly
wounded. "[36] (We just read in the old Jewish Encyclopedia: in Balta one Jew was kill
ed, and
wounded - several. But in the new Jewish Encyclopedia, after a century from the event
s, we
read: in Balta "soldiers joined the pogromists... Several Jews were killed, hundreds w
ounded,
many women were raped. "[37]) Pogroms are too savage and horrible a form of reprisal,
for
one to so lightly manipulate casualty figures.

There - spattered, basted - is it necessary to begin excavations again?

The causes of those first pogroms were persistently examined and discussed by
contemporaries. As early as 1872, after the Odessa pogrom, the General -Governor of th
e
Southwestern Krai warned in a report, that similarevents could happen in his Krai als
o, for
"here the hatred and hostility toward Jews has an historical basis, and only the mater
ial
dependence of the peasants upon Jews together with the measures of the administration
currently holds back an indignant explosion of the Russian population against the Jewi
sh
tribe." The Genera I -Governor reduced the essence of the matter to economics, as he
"reckoned and evaluated the business and manufacturing property in Jewish hands in th
e
Southwestern Krai, and pointed to the fact, that, being increasingly engaged in the re
nt of
landed estates, the Jews have re-rented and shifted this land to the peasants on very
difficult
terms." And such a causation "received wide recognition in 1881 which was full of
pogroms ."[38]

In the spring of 1881, Loris-Melikov also reported to His Majesty: "The deep hatred of
the
local population toward the Jews who enslave it lies at the foundation of the present
disorders, but ill-intentioned people have undoubtedly exploited this opportunity." [3
9]

And thus explained the newspapers of the time: "Examining the causes which provoked th
e
pogroms, only a few organs of the periodical press refer to the tribal and religious h
atred;
the rest think that the pogrom movement arose on economic grounds; in so doing, some s
ee
a protest in the unruly behaviors directed specially againstthe Jews, in light of thei
r
economic dominance over the Russian population". Yet others maintained that the mass o
f
the people, in general squeezed economically, "looked for someone to vent their anger
out
on" and the Jews fit this purpose because of their having little rights. [40] A contem
porary of
these pogroms, the cited educator, V. Portugalov, also said "In the Jewish pogroms of
the
1880s, I saw an expression of protest by the peasants and the urban poor against socia
l
injustice." [41]
79

Ten years later, Yu. I. Gessen emphasized, that "the Jewish population of the souther
n
Guberniyas" in general was able to "find sources of livelihood among the Jewish capita
lists,
while the local peasantry went through extremely difficult times" as it did not have e
nough
land, "to which the wealthy Jews contributed in part, byre-renting the landowner's lan
ds
and raising the rental fee beyond the ability of the peas ants ."[42]

Let us not leave out still another witness, known for his impartiality and thoughtful
ness,
whom no one accused of being "reactionary" or of "anti-Semitism" -Gleb Uspenskiy. At t
he
beginning of the 1980s, he wrote: "The Jews were beaten up, namely because they amasse
d
a fortune on other people's needs, other people's work, and did not make bread with th
eir
own hands"; "under canes and lashes. ..you see, the people endured the rule of the Tat
ar and
the German but when the Yid began to harass the people for a ruble - they did not tak
e
it!" [43]

But we should note that when soon after the pogroms a deputation of prominent Jews fro
m
the capital, headed by Baron G. Gintsburg, came to Alexander III at the beginning of M
ay
1881, His Majesty confidently estimated that "in the criminal disorders in the south o
f Russia,
the Jews served only as a pretext, that this business was the hand of the anarchists.
"[44] And
in those same days, the brother of the Tsar, the Grand Prince Vladimir Alexandrovich,
announced to the same Gintsburg, that: "the disorders, as is now known by the governme
nt,
have their sources not exclusively agitation against the Jews, but an aspiration to th
e work of
sedition in general." And the General-Governor of the Southwestern Krai also reported,
that
"the general excited condition of the population is the responsibility of propagandist
s. "[45]
And in this the authorities turned out to be well-informed. Such quick statements from
them
reveal that the authorities did not waste time in the investigation. But because of th
e usual
misunderstanding of the Russian administration of that time, and its incomprehension o
f the
role of publicity, they did not report the results of the investigation to the public.
Sliozberg
blames that on the central authority in that it did not even make "attempts to vindica
te itself
of accusations of permitting the pogroms. "[46] (True, but after a II, it accused the
government, as we saw, of deliberate instigation and guidance of the pogroms. It is ab
surd
to start with proof that you are not a criminal.)

Yet not everyone wanted to believe that the incitements came from the revolutionarie
s.
Here a Jewish memoirist from Minsk recalls: for Jews, Alexander II was not a "Liberato
r" - he
did not do away with the Jewish Pale of Settlement, and although the Jews sincerely
mourned his death, they did not say a single bad word against the revolutionaries; the
y
spoke with respect about them, that they were driven by heroism and purity of thought.
And
during the spring and summer pogroms of 1881, they did not in any way believe that th
e
socialists incited toward them: it was all because of the new Tsar and his government.
"The
government wished for the pogroms, it had to have a scapegoat." And now, when reliabl
e
witnesses from the South later indeed confirmed that the socialists engineered them, t
hey
continued to believe that it was the fault of the government. [47]

80

However, toward the start of the 20th Century, thorough authors admitted: "In the pres
s
there is information about the participation of separate members of the party, Narodna
ya
Vol'ya [People's Will] in the pogroms; but the extent of this participation is still n
ot clear. ...
Judging by the party organ, members of the party considered the pogroms as a sort of
revolutionary activity, suggesting that the pogroms were training the people for
revolutionary action";[48] "that the action which was easiest of all to direct against
the Jews
now, could, in its further development, come down on the nobles and officials. Accordi
ngly,
proclamations calling foran attack on the Jews were prepared." [49] Today, it is only
superficially talked about, like something generally known: "the active propaganda of
the
Narodniks (both members of Narodnaya Vol'ya and the Black Repartition was prepared to
stir rebellion to any fertile soil, including anti-Semitism. "[50]

From emigration, Tkachev, irrepressible predecessor of Lenin in conspiratorial tactic

s,
welcomed the broadening pogrom movement.

Indeed, the Narodovol'tsi (and the weaker Chemoperedel'tsi [members of Black Repartiti
on)
could not wait much longer after the murder of the Tsar which did not cause instantane
ous
mass revolution which had been predicted and expected by them. With such a state of
general bewilderment of minds after the murder of the Tsar- Libera tor, only a slight
push was
needed for the reeling minds to re-incline into any direction.

In that generally unenlightened time, that re-inclination could probably have happened
in
different ways. (For example, there was then such a popular conception, that the Tsarw
as
killed by nobles, in revenge for the liberation of the peasants.) In Ukraine, anti-Jew
ish
motives existed. Still, it is possible the first movements of spring 1881 anticipated
the plot of
the Narodovol'tsi - but right then and there they suggested which way the wind would b
low:
it went against the Jews - never lose touch with the people! A movement from the heart
of
the masses - Of course! Why not use it? Beat the Jews, and later we will get to the
landowners! And now the unsuccessful pogroms in Odessa and Ekaterinoslavwere most
likely exaggerated by the Narodniks. And the movement of the pogromists along the
railroads, and participation of the railroad workers in the pogroms - everything point
s to the
instigation of pogroms by easily mobile agitators, especially with that particularly i
nciting
rumor that "they are hiding the order of the Tsar," namely to beat the Jews for the mu
rder
of his father. (The public prosecutor of the Odessa Judicial Bureau thus emphasized,
"that, in
perpetrating the Jewish pogroms, the people were completely convinced of the legality
of
their actions, firmly believing in the existence of a Tsar's decree, allowing and eve
n
authorizing the destruction of Jewish property." [51] And according to Gessen, "the
realization that had taken root in the people, that the Jews stood outside of the law,
and
that the authorities defending the Jews could not come out against the people"[52] - h
ad
now taken effect. The Narodovol'tsi wanted to use this imaginary notion.)

A few such revolutionary leaflets are preserved for history. Such a leaflet from 30 Au
gust
1881 is signed by the Executive Committee of the Narodnaya Vol'ya and reads straight a
way

81

in Ukrainian: "Who seized the land, forests, and taverns? - The Yid - From whom, muzhi
k
[peasant], do you have to askfor access to your land, attimes hiding tears?. ..From Yi
ds. -
Wherever you look, wherever you ask- the Yids are everywhere. The Yid insults people a
nd
cheats them; drinks their blood". ..and it concludes with the appeal: "Honest working
people!
Free yourselves!. .."[53] And later, in the newspaper, Narodnaya Vol'ya, No. 6: "All a
ttention
of the defending people is now concentrated, hastily and passionately, on the merchant
s,
tavern keepers, and moneylenders; in a word, on the Jews, on this local "bourgeoisie,"
who
avariciously rob working people like nowhere else." And after, in a forward to a leafl
et of the
Narodnaya Vol'ya (already in 1883), some "corrections": "the pogroms began as a
nationwide movement, 'but not against the Jews as Jews, but against Yids; that is, exp
loiter
peoples. "'[54] And in the said leaflet, Zerno, the Chemoperedel'tsi: "The working peo
ple
cannot withstand the Jewish robbery anymore. Wherever one goes, almost everywhere he
runs into the Jew-Kulak. The Jew owns the taverns and pubs; the Jew rents land from th
e
landowners, and then re-rents it at three times higher to the peasant; he buys the who
lesale
yields of crop and engages in usury, and in the process charges such interest rates, t
hat the
people outright call them "Yiddish [rates]". .."This is our blood!" said the peasants
to the
police officials, who came to seize the Jewish property back from them." But the same
"correction" is in Zerno: "...and far from all among the Jews are wealthy.. .not all o
f them are
kulaks. ..Discard with the hostility toward differing peoples and differing faiths" -
and unite
with them "against the common enemy": the Tsar, the police, the landowners, and the
capitalists. [55]

However these "corrections" already came late. Such leaflets were later reproduced in
Elizavetgrad and other cities of the South; and in the "South Russian Worker's Soviet"
in Kiev,
where the pogroms were already over, the Narodniks tried to stirthem up again in 188
3,
hoping to renew, and through them - to spread the Russian-wide revolution.

Of course, the pogrom wave in the South was extensively covered in the contemporary pr
ess
in the capital. In the "reactionary" Moskovskiye Vedomosti, M.N. Katkov, who always
defended the Jews, branded the pogroms as originating with "malicious intriguers," "wh
o
intentionally darkened the popular consciousness, forcing people to solve the Jewish
Question, albeit not by a path of thorough study, but with the help of "raised fists.
"[56]

The articles by prominent writers stand out. I.S. Aksakov, a steadfast opponent of com
plete
civil liberty for the Jews, attempted to warn the government "against too daring step
s" on
this path, as early as the end of the 1850s. When a law came out allowing Jews with hi
gher
degrees to be employed in the administration, he objected (1862) saying that the Jews
are
"a bunch of people, who completely reject Christian teachings, the Christian ideal and
code
of morality (and, therefore, the entire foundation of Russian society), and practice a
hostile
and antagonistic faith." He was against political emancipation of the Jews, though he
did not
reject their equalization in purely civil rights, in order that the Jewish people coul
d be
provided complete freedom in daily life, self-management, development, enlightenment,

82

commerce, and even allowing them to reside in all of Russia." In 1867 he wrote, that
economically speaking "we should talk not about emancipation for Jews, but rather abou
t
the emancipation of Russians from Jews." He noted the blank indifference of the libera
l
press to the conditions of peasant's life and their needs. And now Aksakov explained t
he
wave of pogroms in 1881 as a manifestation of the popular anger against "Jewish yoke o
ver
the Russian local people"; that's why during the pogroms, there was "an absence of the
ft,"
only the destruction of property and "a kind of simple-hearted conviction in the justn
ess of
their actions"; and he repeated, that it was worth putting the question "not about Jew
s
enjoying equal rights with Christians, but about the equal rights of Christians with J
ews,
about abolishing factual inequality of the Russian population in the face of the Jews.
"[57]

On the other hand, an article by M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin was full of indignation: "The
history
has never drawn on its pages a question more difficult, more devoid of humanity, and m
ore
tortuous, than the Jewish Question. ..There is not a more inhumane and mad legend tha
n
that coming out from the dark ravines of the distant past.. .carrying the mark of disg
race,
alienation, and hatred. ..Whatever the Jew undertakes, he always remains stigmatize
d."[58]
Shchedrin did not deny, "that a significant contingent of moneylenders and exploiters
of
various kinds are enlisted from the Jews," but he asked, can we really place blame on
the
whole Jewish tribe, on account of one type?[59]

Examining the whole discussion of that time, a present-day Jewish author writes: "the
liberal,
and conditionally speaking, progressive press was defending the thugs. "[60] And the p
re-
revolutionary Jewish Encyclopedia comes to a similarconclusion: "Yet in the progressiv
e
circles, sympathies toward the woes of the Jewish people were not displayed sufficient
ly
...they looked at this catastrophe from the viewpoint of the aggressor, presenting him
as
destitute peasant, and completely ignoring the moral sufferings and material situation
of the
mobbed Jewish people." And even the radical Patriotic Notes evaluated it thus: the peo
ple
rose up against the Jews because "they took upon themselves the role of pioneers of
Capitalism, because they live according to the new truth and confidently draw their ow
n
comfortable prosperity from that new source at the expense of the surrounding communit
y,"
and therefore, "it was necessary that 'the people are protected from the Jew, and the
Jew
from the people', and for this the condition of the peasant needs to be improved. "[6
1]

In A Letter from a Christian on the Jewish Question, published in the Jewish magazine
Rassvet, D. Mordovtsev, a writer sympathetic to the Jews, pessimistically urged the Je
ws "to
emigrate to Palestine and America, seeing only in this a solution to the Jewish Questi
on in
Russia."[62]

Jewish social-political journalism and the memoirs of this period expressed grievance
because the printed publications against the Jews, both from the right and from the
revolutionary left, followed immediately after the pogroms. Soon (and all the more
energetically because of the pogroms) the government would strengthen restrictive
measures against the Jews. It is necessary to take note of and understand this insul
t.

83

It is necessary to thoroughly examine the position of the government. The general solu
tions
to the problem were being sought in discussions in government and administrative spher
es.
In a report to His Majesty, N.P. Ignatiev, the new Minister of Internal Affairs, outli
ned the
scope of the problem for the entire previous reign: "Recognizing the harm to the Chris
tian
population from the Jewish economic activity, their tribal exclusivity and religious f
anaticism,
in the last 20 years the government has tried to blend the Jews with the rest of the
population using a whole row of initiatives, and has almost made the Jews equal in rig
hts
with the native inhabitants." However, the present anti-Jewish movement "incontroverti
bly
proves, that despite all the efforts of the government, the relations between the Jews
and
the native population of these regions remain abnormal as in the past," because of th
e
economic issues: afterthe easing of civil restrictions, the Jews have not only seized
commerce and trade, but they have acquired significant landed property. "Moreover,
because of their cohesion and solidarity, they have, with few exceptions, directed all
their
efforts not toward the increase of the productive strength of the state, but primarily
toward
the exploitation of the poorest classes of the surrounding population." And now, after
we
have crushed the disorders and defended the Jews from violence, "it seems 'just and ur
gent
to adopt no less energetic measures for the elimination of these abnormal
conditions. ..between the native inhabitants and the Jews, and to protect the populati
on
from that harmful activity of the Jews. "'[63]

And in accordance with that, in November 1881, the governmental commissions, comprise
d
of "representatives of all social strata and groups (including Jewish), were establish
ed in 15
guberniyas of the Jewish Pale of Settlement, and also in Kharkov Guberniya.[64] The
commissions ought to examine the Jewish Question and propose their ideas on its
resolution."[65] It was expected that the commissions will provide answers on many fac
tual
questions, such as: "In general, which aspects of Jewish economic activity are most ha
rmful
for the way of life of the native population in the region?" Which difficulties hinder
the
enforcement of laws regulating the purchase and rental of land, trade in spirits, and
usury by
Jews? Which changes are necessary to eliminate evasion of these laws by Jews? "Which
legislative and administrative measures in general are necessary to negate the harmfu
l
influence of the Jews" in various kinds of economic activity?[66] The liberal "Palensk
aya"
inter-ministerial "High Commission" established two years laterfor the revision of law
s on
the Jews, noted that "the harm from the Jews, their bad qualities, and traits" were
somewhat recognized a priori in the program that was given to the provincial
commissions. [67]

Yet many administrators in those commissions were pretty much liberal as they were
brought up in the stormy epoch of Tsar Alexander ll's reforms, and moreover, public
delegates participated also. And Ignatiev's ministry received rather inconsistent answ
ers.
Several commissions were in favor of abolishing the Jewish Pale of Settlement. "Indivi
dual
members [of the commissions] -and they were not few" - declared that the only just
solution to the Jewish Question was the general repeal of all restrictions. [68] On th
e other

84
hand, the Vilnius Commission stated that "because of mistakenly understood notion of
universal human equality wrongly applied to Judaism to the detriment of the native peo
ple,
the Jews managed to "seize economic supremacy"; that the Jewish law permits [them] "t
o
profit from any weakness and gullibility of gentile." "Let the Jews renounce their sec
lusion
and isolation, let them reveal the secrets of their social organization allowing light
where
only darkness appeared to outsiders; and only then can one think about opening new
spheres of activity to the Jews, without fear that Jews wish to use the benefits of th
e nation,
[while] not being members of the nation, and not taking upon themselves a share of th
e
national burden. "[69]

"Regarding residence in the villages and hamlets, the commissions found it necessary t
o
restrict the rights of the Jews": to forbid them to live there altogether or to make i
t
conditional upon the agreement of the village communities. Some commissions
recommended completely depriving the Jews of the right to possess real estate outside
of
the cities and small towns, and others proposed establishing restrictions. The commiss
ions
showed the most unanimity in prohibiting any Jewish monopoly on alcohol sales in villa
ges.
The Ministry gathered the opinions of the governors, and "with rare exceptions, commen
ts
from the regional authorities were not favorable to the Jews": to protect the Christia
n
population "from so haughty a tribe as the Jews"; "one can never expect the Jewish tri
be to
dedicate its talents. ..to the benefit of the homeland"; "Talmudic morals do not place
any
obstacles before the Jews if it is a question of making money at the expense of someon
e
outside of the tribe." Yet the Kharkov Genera I -Governor did not consider it possible
to take
restrictive measures against the whole Jewish population, "without distinguishing the
lawful
from the guilty"; he proposed to "expand the right of movement for Jews and spread
enlightenment among them."[70]

That same autumn, by Ignatiev's initiative, a special "Committee on the Jews" was
established (the ninth by count already, with three permanent members, two of them
professors), with the task of analyzing the materials of the provincial commissions an
d in
order to draft a legislative bill. [71] (The previous "Commission for the Organization
of the
Life of the Jews" - that is, the eighth committee on Jews, which existed since 1872 -
was
soon abolished, "due to mismatch between its purpose and the present state of the Jewi
sh
Question.") The new Committee proceeded with the conviction that the goal of integrati
ng
the Jews with the rest of the population, toward which the government had striven for
the
last 25 years, had turned out to be unattainable. [72] Therefore, "the difficulty of r
esolving
the complicated Jewish Question compels [us] to turn for the instruction to the old ti
mes,
when various novelties did not yet penetrate neither ours, nor foreign legislations, a
nd did
not bring with them the regrettable consequences, which usually appear upon adoption o
f
new things that are contrary to the national spirit of the country." From time immemor
ial
the Jews were considered aliens, and should be considered as such. [73]

85

Gessen comments: "the reactionary could not go further". And if you were so concerned
about the national foundations then why you didn't worry about genuine emancipation o
f
the peasantry during the past 20 years?

And it was also true that Tsar Alexander ll's emancipation of the peasants proceeded i
n a
confused, unwholesome and corrupt environment.

However: "in government circles there were still people, who did not consider it possi
ble, in
general, to change the policy of the preceding reign" [74] - and they were in importan
t posts
and strong. And some ministers opposed Ignatiev's proposals. Seeing resistance, he div
ided
the proposed measures into fundamental (for which passing in the regular way required
moving through the government and the State Council) and provisional, which could by l
aw
be adopted through an accelerated and simplified process. "To convince the rural popul
ation
that the government protects them from the exploitation by Jews, the permanent residen
ce
of Jews outside of their towns and shtetls (and the "government was powerless to prote
ct
them from pogroms in the scattered villages"), and buying and renting real estate ther
e, and
also trading in spirits was prohibited. And regarding the Jews already living there: i
t granted
to the rural communities the right "to evict the Jews from the villages, based upon a
verdict
of the village meeting." But other ministers - particularly the Minister of Finance,
N. Kh.
Bunge, and the Minister of Justice, D.N. Nabokov, did not let Ignatiev implement thes
e
measures: they rejected the bill, claiming that it was impossible to adopt such extens
ive
prohibitive measures, "without debating them within the usual legislative process."[7
5]

So much for the boundless and malicious arbitrariness of the Russian autocracy.

Ignatiev's fundamental measures did not pass, and the provisional ones passed only in
a
greatly truncated form. Rejected were the provisions to evict the Jews already living
in the
villages, to forbid their trade in alcohol or their renting and buying land in village
s. And only
because of the fear that the pogroms might happen again around Easter of 1882, a
temporary measure (until passing of comprehensive legislation about the Jews) was pass
ed
which prohibited the Jews again, henceforth to take residence and enter into ownershi
p, or
make use of real estate property outside of their towns and shtetls (that is, in the v
illages),
and also forbade them "to trade on Sundays and Christian holidays. "[76] Concerning th
e
Jewish ownership of local real estate, the government acted "to suspend temporarily th
e
completion of sales and purchase agreements and loans in the name of the Jews. ..the
notarization. ..of real estate rental agreements ... and the proxy management and disp
osal of
property by them". [77] This mere relic of Ignatiev's proposed measures was approved o
n 3
May 1882, under title of Temporary Regulations (known as the May Regulations). And
Ignatiev himself went into retirement after a month and his "Committee on the Jews"
ceased its brief existence, and a new Minister of Internal Affairs, Count D.A. Tolsto
y, issued a
stern directive against possible new pogroms, placing full responsibility on the provi
ncial
authorities for the timely prevention of disorders. [78]

86

Thus, according to the Temporary Regulations of 1882, the Jews who had settled in rura
l
regions before the 3rd of May, were not evicted; their economic activity there was
essentially unrestricted. Moreover, these regulations only applied to the "guberniyas
of
permanent Jewish settlement," not to the guberniyas of the Russian interior. And thes
e
restrictions did not extend to doctors, attorneys, and engineers - i.e., individuals w
ith "the
right of universal residence according to educational requirement." These restrictions
also
did not affect any "existing Jewish colonies engaged in agriculture"; and there was st
ill a
considerable (and later growing) list of rural settlements, according to which, "in ex
ception"
to the Temporary Regulations, Jews were permitted to settle. [79]

After issuance of the "Regulations," inquiries began flowing from the regions and Sena
te
explanations were issued in response. For example: that "journeys through rural region
s,
temporary stops and even temporary stays of individuals without the right of permanen
t
residence are not prohibited by the Law of 3 May 1882"; that "only the rent of real es
tates
and agrarian lands is prohibited, while rent of all other types of real estate propert
y, such as
distillation plants, ... buildings for trade and industry, and living quarters is not
prohibited."
Also, "the Senate deems permissible the notarization of lumbering agreements with the
Jews, even if the clearing of a forest was scheduled for a prolonged period, and even
if the
buyer of the forest was allowed use of the underbrush land"; and finally, that violati
ons of
the Law of 3rd May would not be subjected to criminal prosecution. [80]

It is necessary to recognize these Senate clarifications as mitigating, and in many re

spects,
good-natured; "in the 1880s the Senate wrestled with ... the arbitrary interpretation
of the
laws. "[81] However, the regulations forbidding the Jews to settle "outside the towns
and
shtetls" and/or to own "real estate"... "extremely restricted alcohol distillation bus
iness by
Jews," as "Jewish participation in distillation before the 3rd May Regulations was ver
y
significant."[82]

It was exactly this measure to restrict the Jews in the rural wine trade (first propos
ed as early
as 1804) that stirred universal indignation at the "extraordinary severity" "of the Ma
y
Regulations," even though it was only implemented, and incompletely at that, in 1882.
The
government stood before a difficult choice: to expand the wine industry in the face o
f
peasant proneness [to drunkeness] and thus to deepen the peasant poverty, or to restri
ct
the free growth of this trade by letting the Jews already living in the villages to re
main while
stopping others from coming. And that choice - restriction - was deemed cruel.

Yet how many Jews lived in rural regions in 1882? We have already come across post-
revolutionary estimates from the state archives: one third of the entire Jewish popula
tion of
"the Pale" lived in villages, another third lived in shtetls, 29% lived in mid-size ci
ties, and 5%
in the major cities. [83] So the Regulations now prevented the "village" third from fu
rther
growth?

87

Today these May Regulations are portrayed as a decisive and irrevocably repressive
boundary of Russian history. A Jewish author writes: this was the first push toward
emigration! - first "internal" migration, then massive overseas migration. [84] -The f
irst
cause of Jewish emigration was the "Ignatiev Temporary Regulations, which violently th
rew
around one million Jews out of the hamlets and villages, and into the towns and shtetl
s of
the Jewish Pale."[85]

Wait a second, how did they throw the Jews out and an entire million at that? Didn't t
hey
apparently only prevent new arrivals? No, no! It was already picked up and sent rollin
g: that
from 1882 the Jews were not only forbidden to live in the villages everywhere, but in
all the
cities, too, except in the 13 guberniyas; that they were moved back to the shtetls of
"the
Pale" -that is why the mass emigration of Jews from Russia began![86]

Well, set the record straight. The first time the idea about Jewish emigration from Ru
ssia to
America voiced was as early as in 1869 at the Conference of the Alliance (of the Worl
d
Jewish Union) - with the thought that the first who settled there with the help of th
e
Alliance and local Jews "would become a magnet for their Russian co-religionists."[8
7]
Moreover, "the beginning of the emigration [of Jews from Russia] dates backtothe mid-
19th Century and gains significant momentum... after the pogroms of 1881. But only sin
ce
the mid-1890s does emigration become a major phenomenon of Jewish economic life,
assuming a massive scale" [88] - note that it says economic life, not political life.

From a global viewpoint Jewish immigration into the United States in the 19th Century
was
part of an enormous century-long and worldwide historical process. There were three
successive waves of Jewish emigration to America: firstthe Spanish-Portuguese (Sephard
ic)
wave, then the German wave (from Germany and Austria -Hungary), and only then from
Eastern Europe and Russia (Ashkenazik).[89] For reasons not addressed here, a major
historical movement of Jewish emigration to the U.S. took place in the 19th Century, a
nd not
only from Russia. In light of the very lengthy Jewish history, it is difficult to over
estimate the
significance of this emigration.

And from the Russian Empire "a river of Jewish emigration went from all the guberniyas
that
made up the Jewish Pale of Settlement; but Poland, Lithuania, and Byelorussia gave th
e
greatest number of emigrants";[90] meaning they did not come from Ukraine, which was
just experiencing the pogroms. The reason for this was this emigration was the same
throughout - overcrowding, which created inter-Jewish economic competition. Moreover,
relying on Russian state statistics, V.Tel'nikov turns our attention to the lasttwo de
cades of
the 19th Century; just after the pogroms of 1881 - 1882, comparing the resettlement o
f
Jews from the Western Krai, where there were no pogroms, to the Southwest, where they
were. The latter was numerically not less and was possibly more than the Jewish depart
ure
out of Russia. [91] In addition, in 1880, according to official data, 34,000 Jews live
d in the
internal guberniyas, while seventeen years later (according to the census of 1897) the
re
were already 315,000 - a nine-fold increase. [92]

88

Of course, the pogroms of 1881 - 1882 caused a shock but was it really a shock for th
e
whole of Ukraine? For example, Sliozberg writes: "The 1881 pogroms did not alarm the J
ews
in Poltava, and soon they forgot about them." In the 1880s in Poltava "the Jewish yout
h did
not know about the existence of the Jewish Question, and in general, did not feel isol
ated
from the Russian youth." [93] The pogroms of 1881 -82, in their complete suddenness, c
ould
have seemed unrepeatable, and the unchanging Jewish economic pull was prevailing: go
settle hither, where less Jews live.

But undoubtedly and inarguably, a decisive turn of progressive and educated Jewry awa
y
from the hopes of a complete integration with the nation of "Russia" and the Russian
population began in 1881. G. Aronson even concluded hastily, that "the 1871 Odessa
Pogrom" "shattered the illusions of assimilation."[94] No, it wasn't that way yet! But
if, for
example, we follow the biographies of prominent and educated Russian Jews, then aroun
d
1881 - 1882 we will note in many of them a drastic change in their attitudes toward Ru
ssia
and about possibilities of complete assimilation. By then it was already clear and no
t
contested that the pogrom wave was indubitably spontaneous without any evidence for th
e
complicity of the authorities. On the contrary, the involvement of the revolutionary
narodniks was proven. However, the Jews did not forgive the Russian Government for the
se
pogroms - and never have since. And although the pogroms originated mainly with the
Ukrainian population, the Russians have not been forgiven and the pogroms have always
been tied with the name of Russia.

"The pogroms of the 1880s ... sobered many [of the advocates] of assimilation" (but no
t all:
the idea of assimilation still remained alive). And here, other Jewish publicists move
d to the
other extreme: in general it was impossible for Jews to live among other peoples, [fo
r] they
will always be looked upon as alien. And the "Palestinian Movement... began. ..'to gro
w
quickly."'[95]

It was under the influence of the 1881 pogroms that the Odessa doctor, Lev Pinsker,
published his brochure, Auto-Emancipation. The Appeal of a Russian Jew to his Fellow
Tribesmen (in Berlin in 1882, and anonymously). "It made a huge impression on Russian
and
West European Jewry." It was an appeal about the ineradicable foreignness of Jews in e
yes
of surrounding peoples. [96] We will discuss this further in Chapter 7.

P. Aksel'rod claims that it was then that radical Jewish youths discovered that Russia
n
society would not accept them as their own and thus they began to depart from the
revolutionary movement. However, this assertion appears to be too far-fetched. In the
revolutionary circles, except the Narodnaya Vol'ya, they did always thnik of the Jews
as their
own.

However, despite the cooling of attitudes of the Jewish intelligentsia toward assimila
tion,
the government, as a result of inertia from Alexander ll's reign, for a while maintain
ed a
sympathetic attitude toward the Jewish problem and did not yet fully replace it by a h
arshly-

89

restrictive approach. After the year-long ministerial activities of Count Ignatiev, wh

o
experienced such persistent opposition on the Jewish Question from liberal forces in t
he
upper governmental spheres, an Imperial "High Commission for Revision of the Active La
ws
about the Jews in the Empire" was established in the beginning of 1883 - or as it was
named
for its chairman, Count Palen- "The Palenskaya Commission" (so that by then, it became
the
tenth such 'Jewish Committee'). It consisted of fifteen to twenty individuals from the
upper
administration, members of ministerial councils, department directors (some were membe
rs
of great families, such as Bestuzhev-Ryumin, Golytsin, and Speranskiy), and it also in
cluded
seven "Jewish experts" - influential financiers, including Baron Goratsiy Gintsburg an
d
Samuil Polyakov, and prominent public figures, such as Ya. Gal'pern, physiologist and
publicist N. Bakst ("it is highly likely that the favorable attitude of the majority o
f the
members of the Commission toward resolution of the Jewish Question was caused, to
certain degree, by the influence" of Bakst), and Rabbi A. Drabkin.[97] In large part,
it was
these Jewish experts who prepared the materials for the Commission's consideration.

The majority of the Palenskaya Commission expressed the conviction, that "the final go
al of
legislation concerning the Jews [should be] nothing other than its abolition," that "t
here is
only one outcome and only one path: the path of liberation and unification of the Jews
with
the whole population, under the protection of the same laws. "[98] (Indeed, rarely in
Russian
legislation did such complicated and contradictory laws pile up as the laws about Jews
that
accumulated over the decades: 626 statutes by 1885! And they were still added later an
d in
the Senate they constantly researched and interpreted their wording...). And even if t
he Jews
did not perform their duties as citizens in equal measure with others, nevertheless it
was
impossible to "deprive the Jew of those fundamentals, on which his existence was base
d -
his equal rights as a subject." Agreeing "that several aspects of internal Jewish life
require
reforming and that certain Jewish activities constituted exploitation of the surroundi
ng
population," the majority of the Commission condemned the system of "repressive and
exclusionary measures." The Commission set as the legislative goal "to equalize the ri
ghts of
Jews, with those of all other subjects," although it recommended "the utmost caution a
nd
gradualness" with this. [99]

Practically, however, the Commission only succeeded in carrying out a partial mitigati
on of
the restrictive laws. Its greatest efforts were directed of the Temporary Regulations
of 1882,
particularly in regard to the renting of land by Jews. The Commission made the argumen
t as
if in the defense of the landowners, not the Jews: prohibiting Jews to rent manorial l
ands not
only impedes the development of agriculture, but also leads to a situation when certai
n
types of agriculture remain incomplete idleness in the Western Krai - to the loss of t
he
landowners as there is nobody to whom they could lease them. However, the Minister of
Interior Affairs, D.A.Tolstoy, agreed with the minority of the Commission: the prohibi
tion
against new land-leasing transactions would not be repealed. [100]

90

The Palenskaya Commission lasted for five years, until 1888, and in its work the liber
al
majority always clashed with the conservative minority. From the beginning, "Count Tol
stoy
certainly had no intention to revise the laws to increase the repressive measures," an
d the 5-
year existence of the Palenskaya Commission confirms this. At that moment "His Majest
y
[also] did not wish to influence the decisions of his government on the matter of the
increase of repressions against Jews." Ascending to the throne at such a dramatic mome
nt,
Alexander III did not hasten either to replace liberal officials, norto choose a harsh
political
course: for long time he carefully examined things. "In the course of the entire reign
of
Alexander III, the question about a general revision of the legislation about the Jew
s
remained open."[101] But by 1886-87, His Majesty's view already leaned toward hardenin
g
of the partial restrictions on the Jews and so the work of the Commission did not prod
uce
any visible result.

One of the first motivations for stricter control or more constraint on the Jews than
during
his father's reign was the constant shortfall of Jewish conscripts for military servic
e; it was
particularly noticeable when compared to conscription of Christians. According to the
Charter of 1874, which abolished recruiting, compulsory military service was now laid
on all
citizens, without any difference in social standing, but with the stipulation that tho
se unfit
for service would be replaced: Christians with Christians, and Jews with Jews. In the
case of
Jews there were difficulties in implementation of that rule as there were both
straightforward emigration of conscripts and their evasion which all benefited from gr
eat
confusion and negligence in the official records on Jewish population, in the keeping
of vital
statistics, inthe reliability of information about the family situation and exact plac
e of
residence of conscripts. (The tradition of all these uncertainties stretched back to t
he times
of the Qahals (a theocratic organizational structure that originated in ancient Israel
ite
society), and was consciously maintained for easing the tax burden.) "In 1883 and 188
4,
there were many occasions when Jewish recruits, contrary to the law, were arrested sim
ply
upon suspicion that they might disappear."[102] (This method was first applied to Chri
stian
recruits, but sporadically). In some places they began to demand photographs from the
Jewish recruits - a very unusual requirement for that time. And in 1886 a "highly cons
training"
law was issued, "about several measures for providing for regular fulfillment of milit
ary
conscription by Jews," which established a "300-ruble fine from the relatives of each
Jew
who evaded military call-up."[103] "From 1887 they stopped allowing Jews to apply for
the
examination for officer rank [educated soldiers had privileges in choosing military sp
ecialty
in the course of service]. "[104] (During the reign of Alexander II, the Jews could se
rve in the
officers' ranks.) But officer positions in military medicine always remained open to J
ews.

Yet if we consider that in the same period up to 20 million other "aliens" of the Empi
re were
completely freed from compulsory military service, then wouldn't it be better to free
the
Jews of it altogether, thus offsetting their other constraints with such a privilege?
... Orwas it
the legacy of the idea of Nicholas I continuing here - to graft the Jews into Russian
society
through military service? To occupy the idle?"

91
At the same time, Jews on the whole flocked into institutions of learning. From 1876 t
o 1883,
the number of Jews in gymnasiums and gymnasium preparatory schools almost doubled,
and from 1878 to 1886 - for an 8-year period - the number of Jewish students in the
universities increased six times and reached 14.5%. [105] By the end of the reign of
Alexander II they were receiving alarming complaints from the regional authorities abo
ut
this. Thus, in 1878 the Governor of the Minsk Guberniya reported, "that being wealthie
r, the
Jews can bring up their children better than the Russians; that the material condition
of the
Jewish pupils is better than that of Christians, and therefore in order that the Jewis
h element
does not overwhelm the remaining population, it is necessary to introduce a quota syst
em
for the admission of Jews into secondary schools. "[106] Next, after disturbances in s
everal
southern gymnasiums in 1880, the Trustee of the Odessa School District publicly came o
ut
with a similar idea. And in 1883 and 1885 two successive Novorossiysk (Odessa) Genera
l -
Governors stated that an "over-filling of learning institutions with Jews" was taking
place
there, and it is either necessary "to limit the number of Jews in the gymnasiums and
gymnasium preparatory schools" to 15% "of the general number of pupils," or "to a fair
er
norm, equal to the proportion of the Jewish population to the whole." [107] (By 1881,
Jews
made up 75% of the general number of pupils in several gymnasiums of the Odessa
District.[108]) In 1886, a report was made by the Governor of Kharkov Guberniya,
"complaining about the influx of Jews to the common schools. "[109]

In all these instances, the ministers did not deem it possible to adopt general restri
ctive
solutions, and only directed the reports for consideration to the Palenskaya Commissio
n,
where they did not receive support.

From the 1870s students become primary participants in the revolutionary excitement. A
fter
the assassination of Alexander II, the general intention to put down the revolutionar
y
movement could not avoid student "revolutionary nests" (and the senior classes of the
gymnasiums were already supplying them). Within the government there arose the alarmin
g
connection that together with the increase of Jews among the students, the participati
on of
students in the revolutionary movement noticeably increased. Among the higher institut
ions
of learning, the Medical-Surgical Academy (laterthe Military-Medical Academy) was
particularly revolutionized. Jews were very eagerto enter it and the names of Jewish
students of this academy began already appearing in the court trials of the 1870s.

And so the first special restrictive measure of 1882 restricted Jewish admissions to t
he
Military-Medical Academy to an upper limit of 5%.

In 1883, a similarorder followed with respect to the Mining Institute; and in 1884 a s
imilar
quota was established at the Institute of Communications. [110] In 1885, the admission
of
Jews to the Kharkov Technological Institute was limited to 10%, and in 1886 their admi
ssion
to the Kharkov Veterinary Institute was completely discontinued, since "the city of Kh
arkov
was always a center of political agitation, and the residence of Jews there in more or
less
significant numbers is generally undesirable and even dangerous."[lll]

92

Thus, they thought to weaken the crescendo of revolutionary waves.

Sources:

[I] Evreyskaya Entsiklopediya (dalee- EE). [The Jewish Encyclopedia (from here - JE)].
V 16T. Sankt-Peterburg.:
Obshchestvodlya Nauchnikh Evreyskikh Izdaniy i Izdatel'stvo Brokgauz-Efron, 1906-1913.
T. 12, s. 611. Society
for Scientific Jewish Publicationsand Publisher Brokgauz-Efron.

[2]Yu. Gessen. Istoriya evreyskogo naroda v Rossii (dalee- Yu. Gessen): V2 T. L, 1925-
1927. T2 V s. 215-216.
History of the Jewish People of Russia (from here - Yu. Gessen).

[3] Ibid. Pages 216-217.

[4] EE, T 12, page 612.

[5] L. Prays man [Priceman]. Pogromi i samooborona. [Pogroms and Self-defense] //"22":
Obshchestvenno-

pol iticheskiy i I iteraturniy zhurnal evreyskoy intel ligentsii izSSSR v Izraile [Pub
lic -Political and Literary Journal of
the Jewish Intelligentsia from the USSR in Israel]. Tel -Aviv, 1986/87, No51, p. 174.

[6] Kratkaya Evreyskaya Entsiklopediya (dale - KEE) [The Short Jewish Encyclopedia (fr
om here - SJE)]: [V10 T.]
Jerusalem, 1976-2001. T 6, p. 562.

[7] EE [JE], T 12, p. 612.

[8] KEE [SJE], T 4, p.256.

[9] lbid.T6, p. 562.

[10] EE [JE], T 12, p 612-613.

[II] Ibid., p. 612.

[12] KEE [SJE], T 1, p. 325.

[13] S. Ginzburg. Nastroeniya evreyskoy molodezhi v 80-kh godakh proshlogo stoletiya.

[The attitudes of Jewish
Youth in the 80s Years of the Previous Century] // Evreyskiy mir [Jewish World]: Sb 2
[Anthology 2] (dalee - EM-
2) [from here - JW-2]. New York: Soyuz russkikh evreyev v N'yu Yorke [Union of Russian
Jews in New York],
1944, p. 383.

[14] EE [EJ], T 12, p 611.

[15] I. Orshanskiy. Evrei v Rossii :Ocherki i issledovaniya [The Jews in Russi a: Essa
ys and Research]. Vip. 1. Sankt-
Peterburg, 1872, p 212-222.

[16] EE [EJ] T12„ p.613.

[17] KEE [SJE], T 6, p. 562.

[18] EE [JE] Tl, p. 826.

[19] Yu. Gessen, T 12, p. 222.

[20] EE [JE], T 12, p. 613.

[21] KEE [SJE], T 6, p 562-563.

93
[22] S.M. Dubnov. Noveyshaya lstoriya:Otfrantsuzkoy revolutsii 1789 goda do mirovoyvoy
ni 1914goda [A
New Hi story: from the French Revolution of 1789 to the Fi rst World War of 1914]: V3
T. Berlin: Grani, 1923. T3
(1881-1914), p. 107.

[23] EE [JE], T6, p. 612.

[24] R. Kantor*. Aleksandr III oevreyskikh pogromakh 1881-1883 gg. [Aleksandr III on t
he Jewish Pogroms,
1881-1883]//Evreyskaya letopis' [The Jewish Chronicle]: Sb. [Anthology] 1. M.; Pg.: Pa
duga, 1923, p. 154.

[25] A. L'vov // Novaya gazeta [New Gazette], New York, 1981, No70, 5-11 September, p.
26.

[26] KEE [SJE], T 6, p. 563.

[27] Mezhdunarodnaya evreyskaya gazeta [International Jewish Gazette], 1992, March, No

6 (70), p. 7.
[28] Yu. Gessen,T 2, p. 215.

[29] Zerno: Rabochiylistok[TheTruth, (Grain of)]: Worker's Leaflet, June 1881, No3 //I
storiko-Revolyutsioniy
Sbornik(dalee-IPC) [Historical-Revolutionary Anthology (from here - HRA)] / Under the
Editorship of V.I.
Nevskiy:V3T.M.; L: GIZ, 1924-1926. T2, p. 360-361.

[30] Yu. Gessen,T 2, p. 217.

[31] EE [JE], T 12, p. 614.

[32] Ibid.T 3, p. 723.

[33] M. Krol'. Kishinevskiy pogrom 1903 goda i Kishinevskiy pogromniy protsess [The Ki
shinev Pogrom of 1903
andthe Kishinev Pogrom Process] // EM-2, p. 370.

[34] Max Raisin. A History of the Jews in Modern Times. 2nd ed., New York: Hebrew Publ
ishing Company, 1923,
p. 163.

[35] G.B. Sliozberg. Del a minuvshikh dney: Zapiski russkogo evreya [Things of Days By
gone: Notes of a Russian
Jew]: V 3T. Paris, 1933-1934. Tl, p. 118; T 3, p.53.

[36] L. Prays man// "22," 1986, No51, p. 175.

[37] KEE [SJE] T6, p. 562-563.

[38] Yu. Gessen. T 2, p. 216, 220.

[39] R. Kantor*// Evreyskaya letopis' [The Jewish Chonicle]:Sb. [Anthology] 1, M.; P

g.: Raduga,1923, p. 152.

[40] Yu. Gessen. T 2, p 218.

[41] KEE [SJE], T 6, p. 692.

[42] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p 219-220.

[43]Gleb Uspenskiy.Vlast'zemli [The Authority of the Land]. L: Khudozh. Lit., 1967, p.

67, 88.
[44] EE* [JE], Tl, p. 826.
[45] lbid*,T 12, p. 614

94

[46] G.B. Sliozberg. Dela minuvshikh dney... [Things of Days Bygone], T 1, p. 106.

[47] A. Lesin. Epizodi iz moey zhizni [Episodes from My Life] // EM-2, p. 385-387.

[48] EE [JE], T 12, p. 617-618.

[49] Yu. Gessen,T 2, p. 218.

[50] L. Praisman//"22 ( " 1986, No51, p. 173.

[51] EE [JE]*, Tl, p. 826.

[52] Yu. Gessen,T 2, p. 215.

[53] Katorga i ssilka:lstoriko-revolyutsioniyvestnik[Hard Laborand Exile: The Historic

al-Revolutionary Bulletin]
Book 48, Moscow, 1928, p. 50-52.

[54] D. Shub. Evrei v russkoy revolyutsii [Jews in the Russian Revol ution] // EM-2,
p. 129-130.
[55] IPC [IRS], T 2, p. 360-361.
[56] EE [JE], T 9, p. 381.

[57] I.S. Aksakov. Sochineniya [Essays]:V7 T. Moscow, 1886-1887.T 3, p. 690, 693, 708,
716, 717,719, 722.
[58] M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin. lyul'skoe veyanie [The July's Spirit] //Otechestvennie z
apiski [Homeland Notes],
1882, No 8.

[59] EE [JE], T 16, p. 142.

[60] Sh. Markish.Oevreyskoy nenavisti kRossii [About Jewish Hatred toward Russia] //
"22," 1984, No38, p.
216.

[61] EE [JE], T 2, p. 741.

[62] KEE [SJE], T 5, p. 463.
[63] Yu. Gessen*, T 2, p. 220-221.
[64] EE [JE], T 1, p. 827.
[65] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 221.
[66] EE [JE], T 1, p. 827.
[67] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 221.
[68] EE [JE], T 1, p. 827-828.
[69] Ibid*. T 2, p. 742-743.
[70] Ibid*, T 1, p. 827-828.
[71] lbid,T9, p. 690-691.
[72] EE [JE], T 2, p. 744.

95

[73] Yu. Gessen*, T 2, p. 222.

[74] EE [JE] T2, p. 744.
[75] Ibid.Tl, p. 829-830.

[76] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 226-227; KEE [SJE], T 7, p. 341.

[77] EE [JE], T 5, p. 815-817.

[78] Ibid. T 12, p. 616.

[79] EE* [JE], T5, p 815-817.

[80] Ibid. p. 816-819.

[81] KEE [SJE], T 7, p. 342.

[82] EE {JE], T 5, p. 610-611.

[83] Yu. Larin. Evrei i antisemitizm v SSSR [Jews and Anti-Semitism in the USSR]. M.;
L: GIZ, 1929, p. 49-50.

[84] I.M. Dizhur. Evrei v ekonomicheskoy zhizni Rossii [Jews in the Economic Life of R
ussia]// [Sankt-Peterburg.]
Kniga o russkomevreystve: Ot 1860-kh godov do Revolyutsii 1917 g. [The Book of Russian
Jewry: from the
1860s to the Revolution of 1917]. (dalee - KRE-1) [henceforth - KRE-1]. New York: Soyu
z Russkikh Evreyev
[Union of Russian Jews], 1960, p. 160.

[85] I.M. Dizhur. Itogi i perspektivi evreyskoy emigratsii [Outcomes and Perspectives
of Jewish Emigration]//
EM-2, p. 34.

[86] Yu. Larin. The Jews and Anti-Semitism in the USSR, p. 52-53.
[87] EE [JE] Tl, p. 947.
[88] Ibid. T 16, p. 264.

[89] M. Osherovich. Russkie evrei v Soedinenikh Shtatakh Ameriki [Russian Jews in the
United Statees of
America] //KRE-1, p. 287.

[90] Ya. D. Leshchinskiy. Evreyskoe naselenie Rossii i evreyskiitrud.The Jewish Popula

tion of Russia a nd Jewish
Trouble] //KRE-1, p. 190.

[91] Sbornik materia I ovob ekonomicheskom polozheniya evreyev v Rossii [An Anthology
of Materials a bout the
Economic Condition of the Jews in Russia]. Sankt-Peterburg.: Evreyskoe Kolonizatsionno
eObshchestvo [Jewish
Colonization Society], 1904. T 1. p. xxxiii-xxxv, xiv-xivi.

[92] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 210; EE [JE], T 11, p. 534-539.

[93] G.B. Sliozberg. Dela minuvshikh dney...T 1, p. 98, 105.

[94] G.Ya. Aronson. V bor'be za grazhdanskie i natsional'nieprava:Obshchestvennie tech

eniya v russkom
evreystve [In the Struggle for the Civil and National Rights:Social Currents in Russia
n Jewry] // KRE-1, p. 208.

[95] Gershon Svet. Russkie evrei v sionizmei v stroitel'stvePalestini i Izrailya [Russ

ian Jews in Zionism and in
the Buildingof Palestineand lsrael]//KRE-l, p. 241-242.

96
[96] EE [JE], T 12, p. 526.

[97] lbid.T5, p. 862,T 3, p. 700.

[98] Ibid*, T 1, p. 832-833.

[99] Yu. Gessen*, 12, p. 227-228.

[100] EE [JE], T3, p. 85.

[101] Ibid. T 1, p. 832-834.

[102] Ibid, T 3, p. 167.

[103] Ibid.T 1, p. 836.

[104] Ibid. T 3, p. 167.

[105] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 230.

[106] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 229.

[107] EE [JE], T 13, p. 51; T 1, p. 834-835.

[108] Yu. Gessen, T 2, p. 231.

[109] EE [JE], Tl, p. 835.

[110] Ibid. p. 834.

[Ill] Ibid*, T 13, p. 51.

97

Chapter 13: The February Revolution

The 123-year-old history of unequal citizenship of the Jewish people in Russia, from t
he Act
of Catherine the Great of 1791, ended with the February Revolution.

It bears looking into the atmosphere of those February days; what was the state of soc
iety
by the moment of emancipation?

There were no newspapers during the first week of the Revolutionary events in Petrogra
d.
And then they began trumpeting, not looking for the ways to rebuild the state but vyin
g with
each other in denouncing all the things of the past. In an unprecedented gesture, the
newspaper of the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), Rech, announced that from now on
"all
Russian life must be rebuilt from the roots. "[1] (A thousand-year life! — why, all of
a sudden
from "the roots"?) And the Stock- Market News announced a program of action: "Yank, ya
nk
all these weed-roots out! No need to worry that there might be some useful plants amon
g
them — it's better to weed them all even at the price of unavoidable innocent victims.
"[2]
(Was this really March 1917 or March 1937?) The new Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyuk
ov
bowed and scraped: "Up to now we blushed in front of our allies because of our
government.... Russia was a dead weight for our allies." [3]

Rarely in those beginning days was it possible to hear reasonable suggestions about
rebuilding Russia. The streets of Petrograd were in chaos, the police were non-functio
nal
and all over the city there was continuous disorderly gunfire. But everything poured i
nto a
general rejoicing, though for every concrete question, there was a mess of thoughts an
d
opinions, a cacophony of debating pens. All the press and society agreed on one thing
— the
immediate legislative enactment of Jewish equality. Fyodor Sologub eloquently wrote in
the
Birzheviye Vedomosti: "The most essential beginning of the civil freedom, without whic
h our
land cannot be blessed, the people cannot be righteous, national achievements would no
t
be sanctified ... — is the repeal of all religious and racial restrictions."

The equality of Jews advanced very quickly. The 1st of March [old calendar style], one
day
before the abdication, a few hours before the infamous "Order No. 1," which pushed th
e
army to collapse, V. Makhlakov and M. Adzhemov, two commissars of the Duma Committee
delegated to the Ministry of Justice, had issued an internal Ministry of Justice direc
tive,
ordering to enlist all Jewish-assistants to attorneys-at-law into the Guild of Judicia
l Attorneys.
"Already by the 3rd of March ... the Chairman of the State Duma, M. Rodzianko, and th
e
Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Prince G. Lvov, signed a declaration whi
ch
stated that one of the main goals of the new government is a 'repeal of all restrictio
ns based
upon religion, nationality and social class. "'[4] Then, on the 4th of March, the Defe
nse
Minister Guchkov proposed to open a path for the Jews to become military officers, and
the
Minister of Education Manuelov proposed to repeal the percentage quotas on the Jews.
Both proposals were accepted without obstacles. On the 6th of March the Minister of Tr
ade
and Manufacturing, Konovalov, started to eliminate "national restrictions in corporati
ve

98

legislation," that is, a repeal of the law forbidding purchase of land by companies wi
th Jewish
executives.

These measures were quickly put into practice. By the 8th of March in Moscow, 110 Jewi
sh
"assistants" were raised to the status of attorneys-at-law; by March 9th in Petrograd
— 124
such Jews[5]; by the 8th of March in Odessa — 60. [6] On the 9th of March the City Dum
a of
Kiev, not waiting for the upcoming elections, included in its body five Jews with voti
ng
power. [7]

And here — on March 20 the Provisional Government made a resolution, prepared by the
Minister of Justice, A. Kerensky, with the participation of members of the political b
ureau of
Jewish deputies in the 4th State Duma ... legislated an act, published on March 22, th
at
repealed "all restrictions on the rights of Russian citizens, regardless of religious
creed,
dogma or nationality." This was, in essence, the first broad legislative act of the Pr
ovisional
Government. "At the request of the political bureaus (of Jewish deputies), the Jews we
re not
specifically mentioned in the resolution."[8]
But in order to "repeal all the restrictions on Jews in all of our laws, in order to u
proot ...
completely the inequality of Jews," G.B. Sliozberg recalls, "it was necessary to make
a
complete list of all the restrictions ... and the collation of the list of laws to be
repealed
required great thoroughness and experience." (This task was undertaken by Sliozberg an
d
L.M. Bramson.)[9] The Jewish Encyclopedia says: "The Act listed the statutes of Russia
n law
that were being abolished by the Act — almost all those statutes (there were nearly 15
0)
contained some or other anti-Jewish restrictions. Subject to repeal were, in part, al
l
proscriptions connected to the Pale of Settlement; thereby its factual liquidation in
1915 was
legally validated. [10] The restrictions were removed layer by layer: travel, habitati
on,
educational institutions, participation in local self-government, the right to acquire
property
anywhere in Russia, participation in government contracts, from stock exchanges, hirin
g
servants, workers and stewards of a different religion, the right to occupy high posit
ions in
the government and military service, guardianship and trusteeship. Recalling a cancell
ation
of an agreement with the United States, they repealed similar restrictions on "foreign
ers
who are not at war with the Russian government," mainly in reference to Jews coming fr
om
the United States.

The promulgation of the Act inspired many emotional speeches. Deputy Freedman of the
State Duma asserted: "For the past thirty-five years the Jews have been subjected to
oppression and humiliation, unheard of and unprecedented even in the history of our lo
ng
suffering people.... All of it ... was the result of state -sponsored anti-Semitism."
[11] Attorney
O.O. Gruzenberg stated: "If the pre-Revolution Russian government was a vast and
monstrous prison, ... then its most stinking, terrible cell, its torture chamber was c
arted away
for us, the six-million Jewish people. And for the first time the Jewish child learne
d ... about
this usurious term 'interest' in the state school.... Like hard labor camp prisoners o
n their
way to camp, all Jews were chained together as despised aliens.... The drops of blood
of our
99

fathers and mothers, the drops of blood of our sisters and brothers fell on our souls,
there
igniting and enlivening the unextinguishable Revolutionary fire."[12]

Rosa Georgievna, the wife of Vinaver, recalls: "The events (of the March 1917 Revoluti
on)
coincided with the Jewish Passover. It looked like this was a second escape from Egyp
t. Such
a long, long path of suffering and struggle has passed, and how quickly everything ha
d
happened. A large Jewish meeting was called," at which Milyukov spoke: "At last, a sha
meful
spot has been washed away from Russia, which can now bravely step into the ranks of
civilized nations." Vinaver "proposed to the gathering to build a large Jewish public
house in
Petrograd in memory of the meeting, which will be called "The House of Freedom. "[13]

Three members of the State Duma, M. Bomash, E.Gurevich and N. Freedman published an
"open letter to the Jewish people": that now "our military misfortunes could deal grav
e
damage to the still infirm free Russia. Free Jewish warriors ... will draw new strengt
h for the
ongoing struggle, with the tenfold energy extending the great feat of arms." And here
was
the natural plan: "The Jewish people should quickly re-organize their society. The lon
g-
obsolete forms of our communal life must be renewed on the free, democratic
principles."[14]

The author-journalist David Eisman responded to the Act with an outcry: "Our Motherlan
d!
Our Fatherland! They are in trouble! With all our hearts ... we will defend our lan
d.... Not
since the defense of the Temple has there been such a sacred feat of arms."

And from the memoirs of Sliozberg: "The great fortune to have lived to see the day of
the
declaration of emancipation of Jews in Russia and the elimination of our lack of right
s —
everything I have fought for with all my strength over the course of three decades — d
id not
fill me with the joy as it should had been," because the collapse had begun right awa
y.[15]
And seventy years later one Jewish author expressed doubts too: "Did that formal legis
lative
Act really change the situation in the country, where all legal norms were precipitous
ly losing
their power?" [16]

We answer: in hindsight, from great distance, one should not downplay the significance
of
what was achieved. Then, the Act suddenly and dramatically improved the situation of t
he
Jews. As for the rest of the country, falling, with all its peoples, into an abyss — t
hat was the
unpredictable way of the history.

The most abrupt and notable change occurred in the judiciary. If earlier, the Batyushi
n's
commission on bribery investigated the business of the obvious crook D. Rubinstein, no
w the
situation became reversed: the case against Rubinstein was dropped, and Rubinstein pai
d a
visit to the Extraordinary Investigatory Commission in the Winter Palace and successfu
lly
demanded prosecution of the Batyushin's commission itself. Indeed, in March 1917 they
arrested General Batyushin, Colonel Rezanov, and other investigators. The investigatio
n of
activities of that commission began in April, and, as it turned out, the extortion of
bribes

100

from the bankers and sugarfactory owners by them was apparently significant. Then the
safes of Volga-Kama, Siberian, and Junker banks, previously sealed up by Batyushin, we
re
unsealed and all the documents returned to the banks. (Semanovich and Manus were not s
o
lucky. When Simanovich was arrested as secretary to Rasputin, he offered 15,000 rubles
to
the prison convoy guards, if they would let him make a phone call, yet "the request wa
s, of
course, turned down. "[17] As for Manus, suspected of being involved in shady dealings
with
the German agent Kolyshko, he battled the counterintelligence agents who came for him
by
shooting through his apartment's door. After his arrest, he fled the country). The sit
uation in
the Extraordinary Investigatory Commission of the Provisional Government can be
manifestly traced by records of interrogations in late March. Protopopov was asked how
he
came to be appointed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in response he mentioned
the
directive issued by him: "the residence rights of the Jews were significantly expande
d" in
Moscow. Asked about the priorities of his Ministry, he first recalled the foodstuffs a
ffair, and,
after then the progressive issue — the Jewish question...." The director of the Depart
ment of
Police, AT. Vasilyev didn't miss an opportunity to inform the interrogators that he he
lped
defend the sugarfactory owners (Jews): "Gruzenberg called me in the morning in my
apartment and thanked me for my cooperation"; "Rosenberg ... visited me to thank me fo
r
my efforts on his behalf." [18] In this way, the accused tried to get some leniency fo
r
themselves.

A notable aspect of the weeks of March was an energetic pursuit of known or suspected
Judeophobes. The first one arrested, on February 27, was the Minister of Justice
Scheglovitov. He was accused of personally giving the order to unjustly pursue the cas
e
against Beilis. In subsequent days, the Beilis's accusers, the prosecutor Vipper and S
enator
Chaplinsky, were also arrested. (However, they were not charged with anything specifi
c, and
in May 1917 Vipper was merely dismissed from his position as the chief prosecutor of t
he
Criminal Department of the Senate; his fate was sealed later, by the Bolsheviks). The
court
investigator Mashkevich was ordered to resign — for during the Beilis trial he had
sanctioned not only expert witness testimony against the argument on the ritual murde
r,
but he also allowed a second expert testimony arguing for the case of such murder. Th
e
Minister of Justice Kerens ky requested transfer of all materials of the Beilis case f
rom the
Kiev Regional Court,[19] planning a loud re-trial, but during the stormy course of 191
7 that
didn't happen. The chairman of the "Union of the Russian People," Dmitry Dubrovin, wa
s
arrested and his archive was seized; the publishers of the far-right newspapers Glinka
-
Yanchevsky and Pol uboyari nova were arrested too; the bookstores of the Monarchist Un
ion
were simply burned down.
For two weeks, they hunted for the fugitives N. Markov and Zamyslovsky, doing nightly
searches for two weeks in St. Petersburg, Kiev and Kursk. Zamislovsky was hunted for h
is
participation in the case against Beilis, and Markov, obviously, for his speeches in t
he State
Duma. At the same time, they didn't touch Purishkevich, one assumes, because of his
Revolutionary speeches in the Duma and his participation in the murder of Rasputin. An
ugly

101

rumor arose that Stolypin took part in the murder of lollos, and in Kremenchuk, a stre
et that
had previously been named after Stolypin was renamed after lollos.

Overall of Russia there were hundreds of arrests, either because of their former posit
ions or
even because of their former attitudes.

It should be noted that the announcement of Jewish equality did not cause a single pog
rom.
It is worth noticing not only for the comparison to 1905, but also because, all throug
h March
and April, all major newspapers were constantly reporting the preparation of pogroms,
and
that somewhere, the pogroms had already supposedly begun.

Rumors started on March 5, that somewhere either in Kiev or Poltava Province, Jewish
pogroms were brewing, and someone in Petrograd put up a hand-written anti-Jewish flye
r.
Asa result, the Executive Committee of Soviet Workers and Soldiers' Deputies formed a
special "visiting commission ... led by Rafes, Aleksandrovich, and Sukhanov." Their ta
sk was
to "delegate commissars to various towns, with the first priority to go into the regio
ns where
the Black Hundreds, the servants of the old regime, are trying to sow ethnic antagonis
m
among the population. "[20] In the newspaper Izvestia SRSD [Soviet Workers and Soldier
s'
Deputies] there was an article Incitement to Pogrom: "It would be a huge mistake,
tantamount to a crime, to close our eyes to a new attempt of the overthrown dynast
y..." —
because it is them [translator's note - the Monarchists] who organize the trouble....
"In Kiev
and Poltava provinces, among the underdeveloped, backwards classes of the population a
t
this moment there is incitement against Jews.... Jews are blamed for the defeats of ou
r Army,
for the revolutionary movement in Russia, and for the fall of the monarchy.... It's an
old trick,
... but all the more dangerous because of its timing.... It is necessary to quickly ta
ke decisive
measures against the pogrom instigators."[21] After this the commander of the Kiev Mil
itary
District General Khodorovich issued an order: all military units are to be on high ale
rt and be
ready to prevent possible anti-Jewish riots.

Long after this, but still in April, in various newspapers, every two or three days th
ey
published rumors of preparations for Jewish pogroms, [22] or at the very least, about
moving
of piles of "pogrom literature" by railroads. Yet the most stubborn rumors circulated
about a
coming pogrom in Kishinev — that was to happen at the end of March, right between the
Jewish and (Russian) Orthodox Passovers, as happened in 1903.

And there were many more such alarming press reports (one even said that the police i
n
Mogilev was preparing a pogrom near the Headquarters of Supreme High Command). Not
one of these proved true.

One need only get acquainted with the facts of those months, to immerse oneself in th
e
whole "February" atmosphere — of the defeated Right and the triumphant Left, of the
stupor and confusion of the common folk — to dismiss outright any realistic possibilit
y of
anti-Jewish pogroms. But how could ordinary Jewish residents of Kiev or Odessa forget
those

102

horrible days twelve years before? Their apprehension, their wary caution to any motio
n in
that direction was absolutely understandable.

The well-informed newspapers were a different story. The alarms raised by the newspape
rs,
by enlightened leaders of the liberal camp, and half-baked socialist intellectuals — o
ne
cannot call this anything except political provocation. Provocation, however, that for
tunately
didn't work.

One actual episode occurred at the Bessarabian bazaar in Kiev, on April 28: a girl sto
le a
piece of ribbon in a Jewish shop and ran away; the store clerk caught up to her and be
gan to
beat her. A crowd rushed to lynch the clerk and the store owner, but the police defend
ed
them. In another incident, in the Rogachevsky district, people, angered by exorbitant
prices,
smashed the stores — including Jewish ones.

Where and by whom was the Jewish emancipation met with hostility? Those were our
legendary revolutionary Finland, and our "powerful" ally, Romania. In Finland (as we l
earned
in Chapter 10 from Jabotinsky) the Jews were forbidden to reside permanently, and sinc
e
1858, only descendants of "Jewish soldiers who served here" (in Finland, during the Cr
imean
War) were allowed to settle. "The passport law of 1862 ... confirmed that Jews were
forbidden entry into Finland," and "temporary habitation [was permitted] at the discre
tion
of a local governor"; the Jews could not become Finnish citizens; in order to get marr
ied, a
Jew had to goto Russia; the rights of Jews to testify in Finnish courts were restricte
d. Several
attempts to mitigate the restriction of the civil rights of the Jews in Finland were n
ot
successful. [23] And now, with the advent of Jewish equal rights in Russia, Finland, n
ot having
yet announced its complete independence (from Russia), did not legislate Jewish equali
ty.
Moreover, they were deporting Jews who had illegally moved to Finland, and not in a da
y,
but in an hour, on the next train out. (One such case on March 16 caused quite a splas
h in
the Russian press.) But Finland was always extolled for helping the revolutionaries, a
nd
liberals and socialists stopped short of criticizing her. Only the Bund sent a wire to
very
influential Finnish socialists, reprimanding them that this "medieval" law was still n
ot
repealed. The Bund, "the party of the Jewish proletariat, expresses strong certainty t
hat you
will take out that shameful stain from free Finland. "[24] However, in this certainty,
the Bund
was mistaken.
And a huge alarm was raised in the post-February press about the persecution of Jews i
n
Romania. They wrote that in Jassy it was even forbidden to speak Yiddish at public mee
tings.
The Ail-Russian Zionist Student Congress "Gekhover" proposed "to passionately protest
this
civil inequality of Jews in Romania and Finland, which is humiliating to the world Jew
ry and
demeaning to worldwide democracy." [25] At that time Romania was weakened by major
military defeats. So the Prime Minister Bratianu was making excuses in Petrograd in Ap
ril
saying that "most of the Jews in Romania ... migrated there from Russia," and in parti
cular
that "prompted Romanian government to limit the political rights of the Jews"; he prom
ised
equality soon. [26] However, in May we read: "In fact, nothing is happening in that

103

direction."[27] (In May, the Romanian communist Rakovsky reported that "the situation
of
the Jews in Romania is ... unbearable"; the Jews were blamed for the military defeat o
f the
country; they were accused of "fraternizing" with Germans in the occupied parts of th
e
country. "If the Romanian government was not afraid [to anger their allies in the Ente
nte],
then one would fear for the very lives of the Jews.") [28]

The worldwide response among the allies of the February Revolution was expressed in a
tone of deep satisfaction, even ecstasy among many, but in this response there was als
o a
short-sighted calculation: that now Russia will become invincible in war. In Great Bri
tain and
the USA there were large meetings in support of the Revolution and the rights of the J
ews. (I
wrote about some of these responses in March 1917 in Chapters 510 and 621). From
America they offered to send a copy of the Statue of Liberty to Russia. (Yet as the si
tuation in
Russia continued to deteriorate, they never got around to the Statue). On March 9 in t
he
House of Commons of the British Parliament the Minister of Foreign Affairs was asked
a
question about the situation of the Jews in Russia: does he plan to consult with the R
ussian
government regarding guarantees to the Russian Jews forthe future and reparations for
the
past? The answershowed the full trust that the British government had forthe new Russi
an
government. [29] From Paris, the president of the International Jewish Union congratul
ated
[Russian Prime Minister] Prince Lvov, and Lvov answered: "From today onward liberated
Russia will be able to respect the faiths and customs of all of its peoples forever bo
und by a
common religion of love of their homeland." The newspapers Birzhevka, Rechand many
others reported on the sympathies of Jacob Schiff, "a well known leader of North Ameri
can
circles that are hostile to Russia." He wrote: "I was always the enemy of Russian abso
lutism,
which mercilessly persecuted my co-religionists. Now let me congratulate ...the Russia
n
people for this great act which they committed so perfectly." [30] And now he "invites
the
new Russia to conduct broad credit operations in America. "[31] Indeed, "atthe time h
e
provided substantial credit to the Kerensky government." [3 2] Later in emigration, th
e exiled
Russian right-wing press published investigative reports attempting to show that Schif
f
actively financed the Revolution itself. Perhaps Schiff shared the short-sighted Weste
rn hope
that the liberal revolution in Russia would strengthen Russia in the war. Still, the k
nown and
public acts of Schiff, who had always been hostile to Russian absolutism, had even gre
ater
effect than any possible secret assistance to such a revolution.

The February Revolution itself often consciously appealed for support to Jews, an enti
re
nation enslaved. Eye-witness testimonies that Russian Jews were very ecstatic about th
e
February Revolution are rife.

Yet there are counter-witnesses too, such as Gregory Aronson, who formed and led the
Soviet of Workers' Deputies of Vitebsk (which later had as a member Y.V. Tarle, a futu
re
historian). He wrote that on the very first day, when news of the Revolution reached V
itebsk,
the newly formed Security Council met in the city Duma, and immediately afterwards
Aronson was invited to a meeting of representatives of the Jewish community (clearly,
not
104

rank and file, but leaders). "Apparently, there was a need to consult with me as a
representative of the new dawning era, what to do further.... I felt alienation from t
hese
people, from the circle of their interests and from the tense atmosphere, which was at
that
meeting.... I had a sense that this society belonged mostly to the old world, which wa
s
retreating into the past. "[33] "We were not able to eliminate a certain mutual chill
that had
come from somewhere. The faces of the people I was working with, displayed no uplift o
r
faith. At times, it appeared that these selfless social activists perceived themselves
as
elements of the old order."[34]

That is a precise witness account. Such bewilderment, caution and wavering predominate
d
among religiously conservative Jews, one assumes, not only in Vitebsk. The sensible ol
d
Jewry, carrying a sense of many centuries of experience of hard ordeals, was apparentl
y
shocked by the sudden overthrow of the monarchy and had serious misgivings.

Yet, in the spirit of the 20th century, the dynamic masses of every nation, including
Jews,
were already secular, not chained to traditions and very eagerto build "the happy new
world."

The Jewish Encyclopedia notes "a sharp intensification of the political activity of Je
wry,
noticeable even against a background of stormy social uplift that gripped Russia afte
r
February 1917." [35]

Myself, having worked for many years on the "February" press and memoirs of the
contemporaries of the February, could not fail to noticed this "sharp strengthening,"
this
gusting. In those materials, from the most varied witnesses and participants of those
events,
there are so many Jewish names, and the Jewish theme is very loud and persistent. From
the
memories of Rodzyanko, from the town governor Balk, from General Globachyov and many
others, from the first days of the Revolution in the depths of the Tavrichesky Palace,
the
numbers of Jews jumped out at me — among the members of the commandants office, the
interrogation commissions, the pamphlet-merchants and soon. V.D.Nabokov, who was well
disposed towards Jews, wrote that on March 2 at the entrance to the Tavrichesky mini-p
ark
in front of the Duma building, there was "an unbelievable crush of people and shoutin
g; at
the entrance of the gates some young, Jewish-looking men were questioning the
bypassers."[36] According to Balk, the crowd that went on the rampage at the "Astoria"
[an
elite hotel in St. Petersburg] on the night of February 28, consisted of armed ... sol
diers,
sailors and Jews. [37] I would indulge some emigrant irritability here as they used to
say "well,
that's all the Jews"; yet the same was witnessed by another neutral observer, the Meth
odist
pastor Dr. Simons, an American who had already been in Petrograd for ten years and kne
w it
well. He was debriefed by a commission of the American Senate in 1919: "Soon after th
e
March Revolution of 1917, everywhere in Petrograd you could see groups of Jews, standi
ng
on benches, soap boxes and such, making speeches.... There had been restrictions on th
e
rights of Jews to live in Petrograd, but after the Revolution they came in droves, and
the
majority of agitators were Jews ... they were apostate Jews. [38]

105

A certain "Student Hanokh" came to Kronstadt a few days before a planned massacre of
sixty officers, who were named on a hit-list; he became the founder and chairman of th
e
Kronstadt's "Committee of the Revolutionary Movement." (The order of the Committee wa
s
to arrest and try each and all officers. "Somebody had carefully prepared and dissemin
ated
false information," triggering massacres first in Kronstadt, then in Sveaborg; it was
"because
of the uncertainty of the situation, when every fabrication was taken for a hard fac
t."[39])
The baton of the bloody Kronstadt affairwas carried by the drop-out psychoneurologist
"Dr.
Roshal." (Later, after the October coup, S.G. Roshal was appointed the Commandant of t
he
Gatchina, and from November he was the commissar of the whole Romanian Front, where
he was killed upon arrival. [40])

A certain Solomon and a Kaplun spoke on behalf of the newly-formed revolutionary milit
ia of
the Vasilievsky Island (in the future, the latter would become the bloody henchman of
Zinoviev).

The Petrograd Bar created a special "Commission for the examination of the justice of
imprisoning persons arrested during the time of the Revolution" (thousands were arrest
ed
during this time in Petrograd) — that is, to virtually decide their fate without due p
rocess
(and that of all the former gendarmes and police). This commission was headed by the
barrister Goldstein. Yet, the unique story of the petty office rTimofey Kirpichnikov,
who
triggered the street Revolution, was written in March 1917 and preserved for us by the
Jew
Jacob Markovich Fishman — a curious historical figure. (I with gratitude relied on thi
s story
in The Red Wheel.)

The Jewish Encyclopedia concludes: "Jews for the first time in Russian history had occ
upied
posts in the central and regional administrations."[41]

On the very heights, in the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldier
s'
Deputies, invisibly ruling the country in those months, two leaders distinguished them
selves:
Nakhamkis-Steklov and Gummer-Sukhanov.On the night of March 1st to March 2nd they
dictated to the complacently-blind Provisional Government a program which preemptivel
y
destroyed its power for the entire period of its existence.

Reflective contemporary G.A. Landau thus explains the active participation of the Jews
in the
revolution: "The misfortune of Russia, and the misfortune of the Russian Jewry, is tha
t the
results of the first Revolution [1905] were still not processed, not transformed into
a new
social fabric; no new generation was born, when a great and back-breaking war broke ou
t.
And when the hour of disintegration came, it came upon the generation that from the ve
ry
beginning was a kind of exhausted remnant of the previous revolution; it found the ine
rtia of
depleted spirituality, lacking an organic connection to the situation, and chained by
spiritual
stagnation to the ten-years-ago-bygone period. And so the organic Revolutionism of th
e
beginning of the 20th century [of the First Russian Revolution of 1905] had turned int
o the
mechanical' permanent Revolution' of the wartime era."[42]

106

Through many years of detailed studies I have spent much time trying to comprehend th
e
essence of the February Revolution and the Jewish role in it. I came to this conclusio
n and
can now repeat: no, the February Revolution was not something the Jews did to the Russ
ians,
but rather it was done by the Russians themselves, which I believe I amply demonstrate
d in
The Red Wheel. We committed this downfall ourselves: our anointed Tsar, the court circ
les,
the hapless high-ranking generals, obtuse administrators, and their enemies — the elit
e
intelligentsia, the Octobrist Party, the Zemstvo, the Kadets, the Revolutionary Democr
ats,
socialists and revolutionaries, and along with them, a bandit element of army reservis
ts,
distressingly confined to the Petersburg's barracks. And this is precisely why we peri
shed.
True, there were already many Jews among the intelligentsia by that time, yet that is
in no
way a basis to call it a Jewish revolution.

One may classify revolutions by their main animating forces, and then the February
Revolution must be seen as a Russian national Revolution, or more precisely, a Russia
n
ethnic Revolution. Though if one would judge it using the methodology of materialisti
c
sociologists — asking who benefited the most, or benefited most quickly, or the most s
olidly
and in the long term from the Revolution, — then it could be called otherwise, Jewish,
for
example. But then again why not German? After all, Kaiser Wilhelm initially benefited
from it.
But the remaining Russian population got nothing but harm and destruction; however, th
at
doesn't make the Revolution "non-Russian." The Jewish society got everything it fought
for
from the Revolution, and the October Revolution was altogether unnecessary for them,
except for a small slice of young cutthroat Jews, who with their Russian international
ist
brothers accumulated an explosive charge of hate for the Russian governing class and b
urst
forth to "deepen" the Revolution.

So how, having understood this, was I to move through March 1917 and then April 1917?
Describing the Revolution literally hour by hour, I frequently found the many episodes
in the
sources that had a Jewish theme. Yet would it be right to simply pour all that on the
pages of
March 1917? Then that easy and piquant temptation — to put all the blame on Jews, on
their ideas and actions, to see them as the main reason for these events — would easil
y
skew the book and overcome the readers, and divert the research awayfrom the truly mai
n
causes of the Revolution.

And so in order to avoid the self-deception of the Russians, I persistently and purpos
ely
downplayed the Jewish theme in The Red Wheel, relative to its actual coverage in the p
ress
and on the streets in those days.

The February Revolution was carried out by Russian hands and Russian foolishness. Yet
at
the same time, its ideology was permeated and dominated by the intransigent hostility
to
the historical Russian state that ordinary Russians didn't have, but the Jews — had. S
o the
Russian intelligentsia too had adopted this view. (This was discussed in Chapter 11).
This
intransigent hostility grew especially sharp after the trial of Beilis, and then after
the mass
expulsion of Jews in 1915. And so this intransigence overcame the moderation.

107

Yet the Executive Committee of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which was formed withi
n
hours of the Revolution, appears very different. This Executive Committee was in fact
a
tough shadow government that deprived the liberal Provisional Government of any real
power, while at the same time, criminally refused to accept responsibility for its pow
er
openly. By its "Order No. 1," the Executive Committee wrested the power from the milit
ary
and created support for itself in the demoralized garrison of Petrograd. It was precis
ely this
Executive Committee, and not the judiciary, not the timber industrialists, not the ban
kers,
which fast-tracked the country to her doom. In the summer of 1917, Joseph Goldenberg,
a
member of the Executive Committee explained to the French Diplomat Claude Anet: "The
Order No. 1 was not a mistake; it was a necessity.... On the day we executed the Revol
ution,
we realized that if we did not destroy the old army, it would crush the Revolution. We
had to
choose between the army and the Revolution, and we did not waver: we chose the latte
r ...
[and we inflicted,] I dare say, a brilliant blow."[43] So there you have it. The Execu
tive
Committee quite purposely destroyed the army in the middle of the war.

Is it legitimate to ask who were those successful and fatal-for-Russia leaders of the
Executive
Committee? Yes, it is legitimate, when actions of such leaders abruptly change the cou
rse of
history. And it must be said that the composition of the Executive Committee greatly
concerned the public and the newspapers in 1917, during which time many members of th
e
Committee concealed themselves behind pseudonyms from the public eye: who was ruling
Russia? No one knew.

Then, as it turned out, there was a dozen of soldiers, who were there just for show an
d
weren't very bright, they were kept out of any real power or decision making. From th
e
other thirty, though, of those who actually wielded power, more than half were Jewish
socialists. There were also Russians, Caucasians, Latvians and Poles. Less than a quar
ter were
Russians.

The moderate socialist V.B. Stankevich noted: "What really stuck out in the compositio
n of
the Committee was the large foreign element ... totally out of proportion to their par
t of the
population in Petrograd or the country in general." Stankevich asks, "Was this the unh
ealthy
scum of Russian society? Orwas this the consequence of the sins of the old regime, whi
ch by
its actions violently pushed the foreign element into the Leftist parties? Or was that
simply
the result of free competition?" And then, "there remains an open question — who bear
s
more guilt for this — the foreign born, who were there, or the Russians who could have
been
there but weren't?"[44]

For a socialist that might be a case to look for a guilty party. Yet wouldn't it bette
r for all —
for us, for you, for them — to avoid sinking into that mad dirty torrent altogether?

Sources:

[1] Rech, 1917, March 17

[2] Birzhevye Vedomosti, 1917, March 8 (here and further, the morning edition)

108

[3] ibid, March 10, page 6

[4] Abridged Jewish Encyclopedia, (heretofore AJE) Jerusalem: Society for the Research
of Jewish Community,
1994, Volume 7, Page 377

[5] Rech', March 9, 1917 Page 4: March 10, Page 5, et. al.
[6] Birzheviye Vedomosti, March 9, 1917, Page 2
[7] Ibid, March 10, Page 2
[8] AJE, Volume 7, Page 377

[9][9] G.B. Sliozberg, Del a Minuvshikh Dney:Zapiski Russkovo Yevreya: Paris, 1933-193
4, Volume 3, Page 360

[10]AJE, Volume 7, Page 377

[11] Rech', March 25, 1917, Page 6

[12] Ibid

[13] R.G. Vinaver, Memoirs (New York, 1944)// Hraneniye Guverskovo Instituta Voyni, Re
volutsiyi I Mira -
Stanford, California, Mashinopis', Page92

[14] Russkaya Volya, March 29, Page 5

[15] G.B. Slyozberg, Dela Minuvshikh Dney, Volume 3, Page 360

[16] B. Orlov, Rossiya byezYevreev (Russia withoutJews) // "22": Obshestvenno-politich
eskiy a literaturniy
zhurnal yevreyskoy intel igentsi'l izSSSRv Izrayelye. Tel -Aviv, 1988, No. 60, Page 15
7.

[17] Rech', March 17, 1917, Page 5

[18] PadeniyeTsarskovo Rezhima (Fall of the Tsarist Regime): Stenographicheskiyeotchyo

ti doprosov a
pokazani'l, dannikh v. 1917 g. v Chryezvichaynoy Sledstvennoy Kommissi'l Vremennovo Pr
avityelstva. L: GUZ,
1924, T.l. Pages 119-121,429

[19] Russkaya Volya (Russian Will), April 21, 1917, Page4

[20] Izvestiya PetrogradskovoSovieta Rabochikh I Soldatskikh Deputatov, (heretofore "I

zvestiya), March 6,
1917, Page 4

[21] Izvestiya, March 6, Page 2

[22] For example: Birzheviye Vedomosti, April 8 and 12, 1917; Russkaya Volya, April 9,
1917; Izvestiya, April 15,
and 28, 1917; et. al.

[23] Yevreyskaya Encyclopedia (Jewish Encyclopedia):Volume 16 SPB: Obshestvo dlya Nauc

hnikh Yevreskikh
Izdanni'l I Izd-Vo Brokaw-Yefron, 1906-1913. Volume 15, Page 281-284

[24] Izvyestiya, March 26, 1917 Page 2

[25] Russkaya Volya, April 15, 1917, Page 4

[26] Birzheviye Vedomosti, April 23, 1917, Page 3

109

[27] ibid, May 19, Page 1

[28] Dyen' (Day), May 10, 1917

[29] BirzheviyeVedomosti, March 11, 1917, Page 2

[30] BirzheviyeVedomosti, March 10, 1917, Page 6

[31] Rech', March 10, 1917, Page 3

[32] Encyclopedia Judaica, Jerusalem, Keter Publishing House, 1971, Volume 14, Page 96
1

[33] G.Y. Aronson, Intervyu Radiostantsi'l "Svoboda"// Vospominaniya o revolutsi'l 191

7 goda, Intervyu No. 66,
Munchen, 1966, Page 13-14

[34] G. Aronson, Revolutsionnaya Yunost': Vospominaniya, 1903-1917// Inter-University

Project on the History
of the Menshevik Movement, Paper No. 6, New York, August 1961, Page 33

[35] AJE, T. 7, Page 378

[36] V. Nabokov, Vremennoye Pravitelstvo//Arkhiv Russkoy Revolutsi'l, izdavaemiy I.V.

Gessenom. Berlin:
Slovo, 1922-1937, Vol.1, Page 15

[37] A. Balk, Posledniye pyat' dney tsarskovo Petrograda (23-28 Fevralya 1917) Dnevnik
poslednevo
Petrogradskovo Gradonachal'nika // KhranenieGuverskovo Instituta, Mashinopis', Page 1
6

[38] Oktyabrskaya revolutsiya pered sudom amerikanskikh senatorov:Ofitsialniyotchyot"o

vermenskoy
kommissiT'Senata. M.;L; GIZ, 1927 Page 5

[39] D.O. Zaslavskiy,VI.A. Kantorovich. Khronika Fevralskoy revolutsi'l, Pg.:Biloye, 1

924. Volume 1, Page 63, 65
[40] Rosskiskaya Yevreyskaya Encyclopedia, 2-eizd., ispr. I dop. M., 1995, Volume 2, P
age 502
[41] AJE, Volume 7, Page 381

[42] G.A. Landau, Revol utsionniye idyee v Yevreyskoy obshestvennosti // Rossi'l I eve
ry: Sb. 1 /
Otechestvennoye ob'yedinennie russkikh yevreyev za granitsyey. Paris:YMCA- Press, 197
8, Page 116 [1-e izd.
- Berlin:Osnova,1924]

[43] Claude Anet, La revol ution russe:Juin-Novembre 1917. Paris: Payotet C-ie, 1918,P
age61
[44] VB. Stankevich, Vospominaniya, 1914-1919, Berl in: Izd-vo I. P. Ladizhnikova, 192
0, Page 86

110
Chapter 14: During 1917

In the beginning of April 1917 the Provisional Government had discovered to its surpri
se that
Russian finances, already for some time in quite bad shape, were on the brink of compl
ete
collapse. In an attempt to mend the situation, and stirenthusiastic patriotism, the
government loudly, announced the issuance of domestic Freedom Loan bonds.

Rumors about the loan had began circulating as early as March and Minister of Finance
Tereshchenko informed the press that there were already multi-million pledges from
bankers to buy bonds, "mainly from the Jewish bankers, which is undoubtedly related to
the
abolition of religious and national restrictions. "[1] Indeed, as soon as the loan was
officially
announced, names of large Jewish subscribers began appearing in newspapers, accompanie
d
by prominent front-page appeals: "Jewish citizens! Subscribe to the Freedom Loan!" an
d
"Every Jew must have the Freedom Loan bonds!" [2] In a single subscription drive in a
Moscow synagogue 22 million rubles was collected. During the first two days, Jews in T
iflis
subscribed to 1.5 million rubles of bonds; Jews in Minsk -to half a million in the fir
st week;
the Saratov community -to 800 thousand rubles of bonds. In Kiev, the heirs of Brodsky
and
Klara Ginzburg each spent one million. The Jews abroad came forward as well: Jacob Sch
iff, 1
million; Rothschild in London, 1 million; in Paris, on the initiative of Baron Ginzbur
g, Russian
Jews participated actively and subscribed to severalmillion worth of bonds. [3] At the
same
time, the Jewish Committee in Support for Freedom Loan was established and appealed t
o
public. [4]

However, the government was very disappointed with the overall result of the first mon
th of
the subscription. For encouragement, the lists of major subscribers (who purchased bon
ds
on 25 thousand rubles or more) were published several times: in the beginning of May,
in
the beginning of June and in the end of July. "The rich who did not subscribe"[5] wer
e
shamed. What is most striking is not the sheer number of Jewish names on the lists
(assimilated Russian-Germans with their precarious situation during the Russo-German W
ar
were in the second place among bond-holders) but the near absence of the top Russian
bourgeoisie, apart from a handful of prominent Moscow entrepreneurs.

In politics, "left and center parties burgeoned and many Jews had became politically
active." [6] From the very first days after the February Revolution, central newspaper
s
published an enormous number of announcements about private meetings, assemblies and
sessions of various Jewish parties, initially mostly the Bund, but later Poale Zion, Z
ionists,
Socialist Zionists, Territorialist Zionists, and the Socialist Jewish Workers' Party
(SJWP). By
March 7 we already read about an oncoming assembly of the Ail-Russian Jewish Congress
-
finally, the pre-revolutionary idea of Dubnov had become widely accepted. However,
"because of sharp differences between Zionists and Bundists," the Congress did not
materialize in 1917 (nor did it occur in 1918 either "because of the Civil War and ant
agonism
of Bolshevik authorities"). [7] "In Petrograd, Jewish People's Group was re-establishe
d with

111

M. Vinaver at the helm. "[8] They were liberals, not socialists; initially, they hoped
to
establish an alliance with Jewish socialists. Vinaver declared: "we applaud the Bund -
the
vanguard of the revolutionary movement."[9] Yet the socialists stubbornly rejected al
l
gestures of rapprochement.

The rallying of Jewish parties in Petrograd had indirectly indicated that by the time
of
revolution the Jewish population there was already substantial and energetic. Surprisi
ngly,
despite the fact that almost no "Jewish proletariat" existed in Petrograd, the Bund wa
s very
successful there. It was extraordinarily active in Petrograd, arranging a number of me
etings
of local organization (in the lawyer's club and then on April 1 in the Tenishev's scho
ol); there
was a meeting with a concert in the Mikhailovsky Theatre; then on April 14-19 "the All
-
Russian Conference of the Bund took place, at which a demand to establish a national a
nd
cultural Jewish autonomy in Russia was brought forward again. "[10] ("After conclusion
of
speeches, all the conference participants had sung the Bund's anthem Oath, The
Internationale, and La Marseillaise."[ll]) And, as in past, Bund had to balance its na
tional
and revolutionary platforms: in 1903 it struggled for the independence from the Russia
n
Social Democratic Labor Party, and yet in 1905 it rushed headlong into the Ail-Russia
n
revolution. Likewise, now, in 1917, the Bund's representatives occupied prominent posi
tions
in the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies [a Soviet
is the
Russian term used for an elected (at least in theory) council] and later among the Soc
ial
Democrats of Kiev. "By the end of 1917 the Bund had nearly 400 sections countrywide,
totaling around 40,000 members."[12]

Developments in Poale Zion were no less amazing. In the beginning of April they also h
eld
their Ail-Russian Conference in Moscow. Among its resolutions we see on the one hand
a
motion to organize the Ail-Russian Jewish Congress and discuss the problem of emigrati
on to
Palestine. On the other hand, the Poale Zion Conference in Odessa had simultaneously
announced the party's uncompromising program of class warfare: "Through the efforts o
f
Jewish revolutionary democracy the power over destinies of the Jewish nation was ...
wrested from the dirty grasp of 'wealthy and settled' Jews despite all the resistance
of
bourgeoisie to the right and the Bund to the left.... Do not allow the bourgeois parti
es to
bring in the garbage of the old order.... Do not let the hypocrites speak - they did n
ot fight
but sweated out the rights for our people on their bended knees in the offices of anti
-Semitic
ministers; ... they did not believe in the revolutionary action of the masses." Then,
in April
1917, when the party had split the "Radical Socialist" Poale Zion moved toward the Zio
nists,
breaking away from the main "Social Democratic" Poale Zion,[13] which later would join
the
Third International. [14]

Like the two above-mentioned parties, the SJWP also held its statewide conference at w
hich
it had merged with the Socialist Zionists, forming the United Jewish Socialist Worker
s' Party
(Fareynikte) and parting with the idea "of any extraterritorial Jewish nation" with it
s own
parliament and national autonomy. "Fareynikte appealed to the Provisional Government

112

asking it to declare equality of languages and to establish a council on the affairs o

f
nationalities" which would specifically "fund Jewish schools and public agencies." At
the
same time, Fareynikte closely collaborated with the Socialist Revolutionaries. [15]

However, it was Zionism that became the most influential political force in the Jewis
h
milieu. [16] As early as the beginning of March, the resolution of Petrograd's Zionis
t
Assembly contained the following wording: "The Russian Jewry is called upon to support
the
Provisional Government in every possible way, to enthusiastic work, to national
consolidation and organization for the sake of the prosperity of Jewish national life
in Russia
and the national and political renaissance of Jewish nation in Palestine." And what a
n
inspiring historical moment it was - March 1917 -with the British troops closing on
Jerusalem right at that time! Already on March 19 the proclamation of Odessa's Zionist
s
stated: "today is the time when states rearrange themselves on national foundations. W
oe
to us if we miss this historic opportunity." In April, the Zionist movement was strong
ly
reinforced by the public announcement of Jacob Schiff, who had decided to join Zionist
s
"because of fearof Jewish assimilation as a result of Jewish civil equality in Russia.
He
believes that Palestine could become the center to spread ideals of Jewish culture all
over
the world. "[17] In the beginning of May, Zionists held a large meeting in the buildin
g of
Petrograd Stock Exchange, with Zionist hymns performed several times. In the end of Ma
y
the Ail-Russian Zionist Conference was held in the Petrograd Conservatory. It outlined
major
Zionist objectives: cultural revival of the Jewish nation, "social revolution inthe ec
onomic
structure of Jewish society to transform the 'nation of merchants and artisans into th
e
nation of farmers and workers,' an increase in emigration to Palestine and 'mobilizati
on of
Jewish capital to finance the Jewish settlers'." Both Jabotinsky's plan on creation of
a Jewish
legion in the British Army and the I. Trumpeldorf's plan for the "formation of a Jewis
h army
in Russia which would cross the Caucasus and liberate Eretz Yisrael [The land of Israe
l] from
Turkish occupation have been discussed and rejected on the basis of the neutrality of
Zionists in the World Warl."[18]

The Zionist Conference decreed to vote during the oncoming local elections for the par
ties
"not farther to the right than the People's Socialists," and even to refuse to suppor
t
Constitutional Democrats like D. Pasmanik, who later complained: "It was absolutely
meaningless -it looked like the entire Russian Jewry, with its petty and large bourgeo
isie,
are socialists."[19] His bewilderment was not unfounded.

The congress of student Zionist organization, Gekhover, with delegates from 25 cities
and all
Russian universities, had taken place inthe beginning of April in Petrograd. Their res
olution
stated that the Jews were suffering not for the sake of equality in Russia but for the
rebirth
of Jewish nation in the native Palestine. They decided to form legions in Russia to co
nquer
Palestine. Overall, "during the summer and fall of 1917 Zionism in Russia continued to
gain
strength: by September its members numbered 300,000."[20]

113

It is less known that in 1917 Jewish "orthodox movements enjoyed substantial popularit
y
second only to the Zionists and ahead of the socialist parties" (as illustrated by the
ir success
"during elections of the leadership of reorganized Jewish communities"). [21]

There were rallies ("The Jews are together with the democratic Russia in both love an
d
hatred!"), public lectures ("The Jewish Question and the Russian Revolution"), city-wi
de
"assemblies of Jewish high school students" in Petrograd and other cities (aside from
general
student meetings). In Petrograd, the Central Organ of Jewish Students was establishe
d,
though not recognized by the Bund and other leftist parties. While many provincial
committees for the assistance to the "victims of the war" (i.e., to Jewish refugees an
d
deportees) ceased to exist because at this time "democratic forces needed to engage i
n
broader social activities," and so the Central Jewish Committee for providing such aid
was
formed by April. In May the Jewish People's Union was established to facilitate consol
idation
of all Jewish forces, to prepare for the convocation of the Ail-Russian Jewish Union a
nd to
get ready for the oncoming elections to the Constituent Assembly. In the end of May th
ere
was another attempt of unification: the steering committee of the Jewish Democratic
Alliance convened the conference of all Jewish democratic organizations in Russia.
Meanwhile, lively public discussion went on regarding convocation of the Ail-Russian J
ewish
Congress: the Bund rejected it as inconsistent with their plans; the Zionists demanded
the
Congress include on their agenda the question of Palestine - and were themselves rejec
ted
by the rest; in July the Ail-Russian Conference on the Jewish Congress preparation too
k place
in Petrograd. [22] Because of social enthusiasm, Vinaver was able to declare there tha
t the
idea of united Jewish nation, dispersed among different countries, is ripe, and that f
rom now
on the Russian Jews may not be indifferent to the situation of Jews in other countrie
s, such
as Romania or Poland. The Congress date was set for December.

What an upsurge of Jewish national energy it was! Even amid the upheavals of 1917, Jew
ish
social and political activities stood out in their diversity, vigor and organization.

The "period between February and November 1917 was the time of blossoming" of Jewish
culture and healthcare. In addition to the Petrograd publication The Jews of Russia, t
he
publisher of The Jewish Week had moved to Petrograd; publication of the Petrograd-
Torgblat in Yiddish had begun; similar publications were started in other cities. The
Tarbut
and Culture League [a network of secular, Hebrew-language schools] had established
"dozens of kindergartens, secondary and high schools and pedagogic colleges" teaching
both
in Yiddish and in Hebrew. A Jewish grammar school was founded in Kiev. In April, the f
irst
Ail-Russian Congress on Jewish Culture and Education was held in Moscow. It requested
state funding for Jewish schools A conference of the Society of Admirers of Jewish Lan
guage
and Culture took place. The Habima Theatre, "the first professional theatre in Hebrew
in the
world,"[23] opened in Moscow. There were an exposition of Jewish artists and a confere
nce
of the Society on Jewish Health Care in April in Moscow.

114

These Jewish activities are all the more amazing given the state of general government
al,
administrative and cultural confusion in Russia 1917.

A major event in the Jewish life of the time was the granting of official permission f
or Jewish
youth to enlist as officers in the Russian Army. It was a large-scale move: in April,
the
headquarters of the Petrograd military district had issued an order to the commanders
of
Guards military units to immediately post all Jewish students to the training battalio
n at
Nizhny Novgorod with the purpose of their further assignment to military academies[2
4] -
that is virtually mass-scale promotion of young Jews into the officer ranks. "Already
in the
beginning of June 1917, 131 Jews graduated from the accelerated military courses at th
e
Konstantinovsky military academy in Kiev as officers; in the summer 1917 Odessa, 160
Jewish cadets were promoted into officers." [25] In June 2600 Jews were promoted to
warrant-officer rank all over Russia.

There is evidence that in some military academies Junkers [used in Tsarist Russia for
cadets
and young officers] met Jewish newcomers unkindly, as it was in the Alexandrovsky mili
tary
academy after more than 300 Jews had been posted to it. In the Mikhailovsky military
academy a group of Junkers proposed a resolution that: "Although we are not against th
e
Jews in general, we consider it inconceivable to let them into the command ranks of th
e
Russian Army." The officers of the academy dissociated themselves from this statement
and
a group of socialist Junkers (141-strong) had expressed their disapproval, "finding an
ti-
Jewish protests shameful for the revolutionary army,"[26] and the resolution did not p
ass.
When Jewish warrant officers arrived to their regiments, they often encountered mistru
st
and enmity on the part of soldiers for whom having Jews as officers was extremely unus
ual
and strange. (Yet the newly-minted officers who adopted new revolutionary style of
behavior gained popularity lightning-fast.)

On the other hand, the way Jewish Junkers from the military academy in Odessa behaved
was simply striking. In the end of March, 240 Jews had been accepted into the academ
y.
Barely three weeks later, on April 18 old style, there was a First of May parade in Od
essa and
the Jewish Junkers marched ostentatiously singing ancient Jewish songs. Did they not
understand that Russian soldiers would hardly follow such officers? What kind of offic
ers
were they going to become? It would be fine if they were being prepared for the separa
te
Jewish battalions. Yet according to General Denikin, the year 1917 saw successful form
ation
of all kinds of national regiments - Polish, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian (the Latvian un
its were
already in place for a while) - except the Jewish ones: it was "the only nationality n
ot
demanding national self-determination in military. And every time, when in response t
o
complaints about bad acceptance of Jewish officers in army formation of separate Jewis
h
regiments was suggested, such a proposal was met with a storm of indignation on the pa
rt
of Jews and the Left and with accusations of a spiteful provocation." [27] (Newspapers
had
reported that Germans also planned to form separate Jewish regiments but the project w
as
dismissed.) It appears, though, that new Jewish officers still wanted some national

115

organization in the military. In Odessa on August 18, the convention of Jewish officer
s
decided to establish a section which would be responsible for connections between diff
erent
fronts "to report on the situation of Jewish officers in the field." In August, "union
s of Jewish
warriors appeared; by October such unions were present at all fronts and in many garri
sons.
During the October 10-15, 1917 conference in Kiev, the Ail-Russian Union of Jewish War
riors
was founded."[28] (Although it was a new 'revolutionary army', some reporters still
harbored hostility toward officer corps in general and to officer's epaulettes in part
icular; for
instance, A. Alperovich whipped up emotions against officers in general in Birzhevye
Vedomosti [Stock Exchange News] as late as May 5.)[29]

Various sources indicate that Jews were not eagerto be drafted as common soldiers even
in
1917; apparently, there were instances when to avoid the draft sick individuals passed
off as
genuine conscripts at the medical examining boards, and, as a result, some district dr
aft
commissions began demanding photo-IDs from Jewish conscripts (an unusual practice in
those simple times). It immediately triggered angry protests that such a requirement g
oes
against the repulsion of national restrictions, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs f
orbade
asking for such IDs.

In the beginning of April the Provisional Government issued an order by telegraph to f

ree
without individual investigation all Jews previously exiled as suspects of espionage.
Some of
them resided in the now-occupied territories, while others could safely return home, a
nd yet
many deportees asked for permission to reside in the cities of the European part of Ru
ssia.
There was a flow of Jews into Petrograd (Jewish population of 50,000 in 1917)[30] and
a
sharp increase of Jewish population in Moscow (60,000). [31]

Russian Jews received less numerous, but highly energetic reinforcement from abroad. T
ake
those two famous trains that crossed hostile Germany without hindrance and brought to
Russia nearly 200 prominent individuals, 30 in Lenin's and 160 in Natanson-Martov's tr
ain,
with Jews comprising an absolute majority (the lists of passengers of the 'exterritori
al trains'
were for the first time published by V. Burtsev).[32] They represented almost all Jewi
sh
parties, and virtually all of them would play a substantial role in the future events
in Russia.
Hundreds of Jews returned from the United States: former emigrants, revolutionaries, a
nd
draft escapees - now they all were the 'revolutionary fighters' and 'victims of Tsaris
m'. By
order of Kerensky, the Russian embassy in the USA issued Russian passports to anyone w
ho
could provide justtwo witnesses (to testify to identity) literallyfrom the street. (Th
e
situation around Trotsky's group was peculiar. They were apprehended in Canada on
suspicion of connections with Germany. The investigation found that Trotsky travelled
not
with flimsy Russian papers, but with a solid American passport, inexplicably granted t
o him
despite his short stay in the USA, and with a substantial sum of money, the source of
which
remained a mystery.[33]) On June 26 at the exalted "Russian rally in New York City" (d
irected
by P. Rutenberg, one-time friend and then a murderer of Gapon), Abraham Kagan, the edi
tor
of Jewish newspaper Forwards, addressed Russian ambassador Bakhmetev "on behalf of tw
o

116

million Russian Jews residing in the United States of America": "We have always loved
our
motherland; we have always sensed the links of brotherhood with the entire Russian
nation.... Our hearts are loyal to the red banner of the Russian liberation and to the
national
tricolor of the free Russia." He had also claimed that the self-sacrifice of the membe
rs of
Narodnaya Volya [literally, The People's Will, a terrorist leftwing revolutionary grou
p in
Tsarist Russia, best known for its assassination of Tsar Alexander II, known as 'the T
sar
Liberator for ending serfdom] "was directly connected to the fact of increased persecu
tion of
the Jews" and that "people like Zundelevich, Deich, Gershuni, Liber and Abramovich wer
e
among the bravest." [34]

And so they had begun coming back, and not just from New York, judging by the officia
l
introduction of discounted railroad fare for 'political emigrants' travelling from Vla
divostok.
At the late July rally in Whitechapel, London, "it was found that in London alone 10,0
00 Jews
declared their willingness to return to Russia"; the final resolution had expressed pl
easure
that "Jews would go back to struggle for the new social and democratic Russia. "[35]

Destinies of many returnees, hurrying to participate in the revolution and jumping hea
dlong
into the thick of things, were outstanding. Among the returnees were the famous V.
Volodarsky, M. Uritsky, and Yu. Larin, the latter was the author of the 'War Communis
m
economy' program. It is less known that Yakov Sverdlov's brother, Veniamin, was also
among the returnees. Still, he would not manage to rise higher than the deputy Narkom
[People's Commissar] of Communications and a member of Board of the Supreme Soviet of
the National Economy. Moisei Kharitonov, Lenin's associate in emigration who returned
to
Russia in the same train with him, quickly gained notoriety by assisting the anarchist
s in their
famous robbery in April; later he was the secretary of Perm, Saratov and Sverdlov gubk
oms
[guberniya's Party committee], and the secretary of Urals Bureau of the Central Commit
tee.
Semyon Dimanshtein, a member of a Bolshevik group in Paris, would become the head of
the Jewish Commissariat at the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, and later the h
ead of
YevSek [Jewish Section] at the Ail-Russian Central Executive Committee; he would in fa
ct
supervise the entire Jewish life. Amazingly, at the age of 18 he managed "to pass
qualification test to become a rabbi" and became a member of the Russian Social
Democratic Workers' Party - all this in course of one year.[36] Similarly, members of
the
Trotsky's group had also fared well: the jeweler G. Melnichansky, the accountant Frima
n, the
typographer A. Minkin-Menson, and the decorator Gomberg-Zorin had respectively headed
Soviet trade unions, Pravda, the dispatch office of bank notes and securities, and th
e
Petrograd Revolutionary Tribunal.

Names of other returnees afterthe February Revolution are now completely forgotten, ye
t
wrongly so, as they played important roles in the revolutionary events. For example, t
he
Doctor of Biology Ivan Zalkind had actively participated in the October coup and then
in fact
ran Trotsky's People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Semyon Kogan-Semkov became th
e
"political commissar of Izhevsk weapons and steel factories" in November 1918; that is
he
117

was in charge of the vindictive actions during suppression of major uprising of Izhevs
k
workers[37] known for its large, in many thousands, victim's toll; in a single inciden
t on the
Sobornaya Square in Izhevsk 400 workers were gunned down. [38] Tobinson-Krasnoshcheko
v
later headed the entire Far East as the secretary of the Far East Bureau and the head
of local
government. Girshfeld-Stashevsky under the pseudonym "Verkhovsky" was in command of a
squad of German POWs and turncoats, that is, he laid foundation for the Bolshevik
international squads; in 1920 he was the head of clandestine intelligence at the Weste
rn
front; later, in peacetime, "he, on orders of Cheka Presidium, had organized intellige
nce
network in the Western Europe"; he was awarded the title of "Honorary Chekist."[39]

Among returnees were many who did not share Bolshevik views (at least at the time of
arrival) but they were nevertheless welcomed into the ranks of Lenin's and Trotsky's p
arty.
For instance, although Yakov Fishman, a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee
of
the October coup, had deviated from the Bolshevik mainstream by participating in the L
eft
Socialist Revolutionary insurrection in July 1918, he was later accepted into the Russ
ian
Communist party of Bolsheviks (RCPB) and entrusted with a post in the Military Intelli
gence
Administration of the Red Army. Or take Yefim Yarchuk, who had returned as an Anarchis
t
Syndicalist, but was delegated by the Petrograd Soviet to reinforce the Kronstadt Sovi
et;
during the October coup he had brought a squad of sailors to Petrograd to storm the Wi
nter
Palace. The returnee Vsevolod Volin-Eikhenbaum (the brother of the literary scholar) w
as a
consistent supporter of anarchism and the ideologist of Makhno [a Ukrainian separatist
-
anarchist] movement; he was the head of the Revolutionary Military Soviet in the Makhn
o
army. We know that Makno was more of an advantage than a detriment to Bolsheviks and
as a result Volin was later merely forced to emigrate together with a dozen of other
anarchists. [40]
The expectations of returnees were not unfounded: those were the months marked by a
notable rise to prominence for many Jews in Russia. "The Jewish Question exists no lon
ger in
Russia."[41] (Still, in the newspaper essay by D. Aizman, Sura Alperovich, the wife of
a
merchant who moved from Minsk to Petrograd, had expressed her doubts: "So there is no
more slavery and that's it?" So what about the things "that 'Nicholas of yesterday' di
d to us
in Kishinev [in regard to the Kishinev pogrom]?" [42]) In another article David Aizman
thus
elaborated his thought: "Jews must secure the gains of revolution by any means ... wit
hout
any qualms. Any necessary sacrifice must be made. Everything is on the stake here and
all
will be lost if we hesitate.... Even the most backward parts of Jewish mass understand
this."
"No one questions what would happen to Jews if the counter-revolution prevails." He wa
s
absolutely confident that if that happens there would be mass executions of Jews. Ther
efore,
"the filthy scum must be crushed even before it had any chance to develop, in embryo.
Their
very seed must be destroyed.... Jews will be able to defend their freedom."[43]

Crushed in embryo.... And even their very seed.... It was already pretty much the Bols
hevik
program, though expressed in the words of Old Testament. Yet whose seed must be

118

destroyed? Monarchists'? But they were already breathless; all their activists could b
e
counted on fingers. So it could only be those who had taken a stand against the unbrid
led,
running wild Soviets, against all kinds of committees and mad crowds; those, who wishe
d to
halt the breakdown of life in the country - prudent ordinary people, former governmen
t
officials, and first of all officers and very soon the soldier-general Kornilov. There
were Jews
among those counter-revolutionaries, but overall that movement was the Russian nationa
l
one.

What about press? In 1917, the influence of print media grew; the number of periodical
s and
associated journalists and staff was rising. Before the revolution, only a limited num
ber of
media workers qualified for draft deferral, and only those who were associated with
newspapers and printing offices which were established in the pre-war years. (They wer
e
classified as 'defense enterprises' despite their desperate fight against governmental
and
military censorship.) But now, from April, on the insistence of the publishers, press
privileges
were expanded with respect to the number of workers exempt from military service; newl
y
founded political newspapers were henceforth also covered by the exemption (sometimes
fraudulently as the only thing needed to qualify was maintaining a circulation of 30,0
00 for
at least two weeks). Draft privileges were introduced on the basis of youth, for the
'political
emigrants' and those 'released from exile' - everything that favored employment of ne
w
arrivals in the leftist newspapers. At the same time, rightist newspapers were being c
losed:
Malenkaya Gazeta [Small Newspaper] and Narodnaya Gazeta [People's Newspaper] were
shut down for accusing Bolsheviks of having links with Germans. When many newspapers
published the telegrams fraudulently attributed to the Empress and the fake was expose
d (it
was "an innocent joke of a telegraph operator lady," for which, of course, she was nev
er
disciplined) and so they had to retract their pieces, Birzhevye Vedomosti, for instanc
e, had
produced such texts: "It turned out that neither the special archive at the Main Depar
tment
of Post and Telegraph, where the royal telegrams were stored, nor the head office of
telegraph contain any evidence of this correspondence." [44] See, they presented it as
if the
telegrams were real but all traces of their existence had been skillfully erased. What
a brave
free press!

***

As early as in the beginning of March the prudent Vinaver had warned the Jewish publi
c:
"Apart from love for freedom, self-control is needed.... It is better for us to avoid
highly
visible and prominent posts.... Do not hurry to practice our rights."[45] We know tha
t
Vinaver (and also Dan, Liber and Branson) "at different times have been offered minist
er
posts, but all of them refused, believing that Jews should not be present in Russian
Government." The attorney Vinaver could not, of course, reject his sensational appoint
ment
to the Senate, where he became one of four Jewish Senators (together with G. Blumenfel
d,
O. Gruzenberg, and I. Gurevich).[46] There were no Jews among the ministers but four
influential Jews occupied posts of deputy ministers: V. Gurevich was a deputy to Avkse
ntiev,

119

the Minister of Internal Affairs; S. Lurie was in the Ministry of Trade and Industry;
S.
Schwartz and A. Ginzburg-Naumov - in the ministry of Labor; and P. Rutenberg should b
e
mentioned here too. From July, A. Galpern became the chief of the administration of th
e
Provisional Government (after V. Nabokov)[47]; the director of 1st Department in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was A. N. Mandelshtam. The assistant to the head of the Mo
scow
military district was Second Lieutenant Sher (since July 1917); from May, the head of
foreign
supply department at General Staff was A. Mikhelson; the commissar of the Provisional
Government in the field construction office was Naum Glazberg; several Jews were
incorporated by Chernov into the Central Land Committee responsible for everything rel
ated
to allotting land to peasants. Of course, most of those were not key posts, having neg
ligibly
small influence when compared to the principal role of the Executive Committee, whose
ethnic composition would soon become a hotly debated public worry.

At the August Government Conference dedicated to the disturbing situation in the count
ry,
apart from the representatives of Soviets, parties, and guilds, a separate representat
ion was
granted to the ethnic groups of Russia, with Jews represented by eight delegates, incl
uding G.
Sliozberg, M. Liber, N. Fridman, G. Landau, and O. Gruzenberg.

The favorite slogan of 1917 was "Expand the Revolution!" All socialist parties worked
to
implement it. I. O. Levin writes: "There is no doubt that Jewish representation in th
e
Bolshevik and other parties which facilitated "expanding of revolution" -Mensheviks,
Socialist Revolutionaries, etc. -with respect to both general Jewish membership and Je
wish
presence among the leaders, greatly exceeds the Jewish share in the population of Russ
ia.
This is an indisputable fact; while its reasons should be debated, its factual veracit
y is
unchallengeable and its denial is pointless"; and "a certainly convincing explanation
of this
phenomenon by Jewish inequality before the March revolution ... is still not sufficien
tly
exhaustive."[48] Members of central committees of the socialist parties are known.
Interestingly, Jewish representation in the leadership of Mensheviks, the Right and th
e Left
Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Anarchists was much greater than among the Bolshevi
k
leaders. At the Socialist Revolutionary Congress, which took place in the end of May a
nd
beginning of June 1917, 39 out of 318 delegates were Jewish, and out of 20 members of
the
Central Committee of the party elected during the Congress, 7 were Jewish. A. Gotz was
one
of the leaders of the right wing faction and M. Natanson was among the leaders of the
left
Socialist Revolutionaries."[49] (What a despicable role awaited Natanson, "the wise Ma
rk,"
one of the founder of Russian Narodnichestvo ["Populism"]! During the war, living abro
ad,
he was receiving financial aid from Germany. In May 1917 he returned in Russia in one
of the
'extraterritorial trains' across Germany; in Russia, he had immediately endorsed Lenin
and
threw his weight in support of the latter's goal of dissolving the Constituent Assembl
y;
actually, it was he who had voiced this idea first, though Lenin, of course, needed no
such
nudge.)

120

Local government elections took place in the summer. Overall, socialist parties were
victorious, and "Jews actively participated in the local and municipal work in a numbe
r of
cities and towns outside of the [former] Pale of Settlement." For instance, Socialist
Revolutionary O. Minor .became head of the Moscow City Duma; member of the Central
Committee of the Bund, A. Vainshtein (Rakhmiel),of the Minsk Duma; Menshevik I. Polons
ky,
of the Ekaterinoslav Duma, Bundist D. Chertkov, of the Saratov Duma." G. Shreider had
become the mayor of Petrograd, and A. Ginzburg-Naumov was elected a deputy mayor in
Kiev." [50]

But most of these persons were gone with the October coup and it was not they who shap
ed
the subsequent developments in Russia. It would become the lot of those who now occupi
ed
much lower posts, mostly in the Soviets; they were numerous and spread all over the
country: take, for instance, Khinchuk, head of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies,
or
Nasimovich and M. Trilisserof the Irkutsk Soviet (the latter would laterserve in the C
entral
Executive Committee of the Soviets of Siberia and become a famous Chekist).[51]

All over the provinces "Jewish socialist parties enjoyed large representation in the S
oviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. "[52] They were also prominently presented at the All
-
Russian Democratic Conference in September 1917, which annoyed Lenin so much that he
had even demanded surrounding the Alexandrinsky Theater with troops and arresting the
entire assembly. (The theater's superintendent, comrade Nashatyr, would have to act on
the
order, but Trotsky had dissuaded Lenin.) And even after the October coup, the Moscow
Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies had among its members, according to Bukharin, "dentists,
pharmacists, etc., - representatives of trades as close to the soldier's profession as
to that of
the Chinese Emperor."[53]

But above all of that, above all of Russia, from the spring to the autumn of 1917, sto
od the
power of one body - and it was not the Provisional Government. It was the powerful an
d
insular Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, and later, after June, the succes
sorto
its power, the Ail-Russian Central Executive Committee (CEC) - it was they who had in
fact
ruled over Russia. While appearing solid and determined from outside, in reality they
were
being torn apart by internal contradictions and inter-factional ideological confusion.
Initially,
the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
unanimously approved the Order No. 1, but later was doubtful about the war - whether t
o
continue destroying army or to strengthen it. (Quite unexpectedly, they declared thei
r
support for the Freedom Loan; thus they had incensed the Bolsheviks but agreed with th
e
public opinion on this issue, including the attitudes of liberal Jews.)
The Presidium of the first Ail-Russian CEC of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Dep
uties
(the first governing Soviet body) consisted of nine men. Among them were the Social
Revolutionaries (SRs) A. Gots and M. Gendelman, the Menshevik, F. Dan, and the member
of
Bund, M. Liber. (In March at the Ail-Russian Conference of the Soviets, Gendelman and
Steklov had demanded stricter conditions be imposed on the Tsar's family, which was un
der

121

house arrest, and also insisted on the arrest of all crown princes - this is how confi
dent they
were in their power.) The prominent Bolshevik, L. Kamenev, was among the members of
that Presidium. It also included the Georgian, Chkheidze; the Armenian, Saakjan; one
Krushinsky, most likely a Pole; and Nikolsky, likely a Russian -quite an impudent [eth
nic]
composition for the governing organ of Russia in such a critical time.

Apart from the CEC of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, there was also th
e All-
Russian Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, elected in the end of
May.
Of its 30 members, there were only three actual peasants - an already habitual sham of
the
pre-Bolshevik regime. Of those thirty, D. Pasmanik identified seven Jews: "a sad thing
it was,
especially considering Jewish interests"; and "they had become an eyesore to
everybody." [54] Then this peasant organ put forward a list of its candidates for the
future
Constituent Assembly. Apart from Kerensky, the list contained several Jews, such as th
e
boisterous llya Rubanovich, who had just arrived from Paris, the terrorist Abram Gots,
and
the little-known Gurevich...[55] (In the same article, there was a report on the arres
t for
desertion of warrant officer M. Golman, the head of the Mogilev Guberniya, a Peasant
Soviet.[56])

Of course, the actions of the executive committees could not be solely explained by th
eir
ethnic composition - not at all! (Many of those personalities irreversibly distanced
themselves from their native communities and had even forgotten the way to their shtet
ls.)
All of them sincerely believed that because of their talents and revolutionary spirit,
they
would have no problem arranging workers', soldiers' and peasants' matters in the best
way
possible. They would manage it better simply because of being more educated and smarte
r
than all this clumsy hoi polloi.

Yet for many Russians, from commoner toa general, this sudden, eye-striking transforma
tion
in the appearance among the directors and orators at rallies and meetings, in command
and
in government, was overwhelming.

V. Stankevich, the only officer-socialist in the Executive Committee, provided an exam

ple:
"this fact [of the abundance of Jews in the Committee] alone had enormous influence on
the
public opinion and sympathies.... Noteworthy, when Kornilov met with the Committee fo
r
the first time, he had accidently sat in the midst of Jews; in front of him sat two in
significant
and plain members of the Committee, whom I remember merely because of their
grotesquely Jewish facial features. Who knows how that affected Kornilov's attitudes t
oward
Russian revolution?" [57]

Yet the treatment of all things Russian by the new regime was very tale-telling. Here
is an
example from the "days of Kornilov" in the end of August 1918. Russia was visibly dyin
g,
losing the war, with its army corrupted and the rear in collapse. General Kornilov, cu
nningly
deceived by Kerensky, artlessly appealed to the people, almost howling with pain: "Rus
sian
people! Our great Motherland is dying. The hour of her death is nigh.... All, whose bo
soms

122

harbor a beating Russian heart, go to the temples and pray to God to grant us the grea
test
miracle of salvation for our beloved country!"[58] In response to that the ideologist
of the
February Revolution and one of the leading members of the Executive Committee, Gimmer-
Sukhanov, chuckled in amusement: "What an awkward, silly, clueless, politically illite
rate call
... what a lowbrow imitation of Suzdalshchina ['Suzdalshchina' refers to resistance in
Suzdal
to the Mongol invaders] !"[59]

Yes, it sounded pompously and awkwardly, without a clear political position. Indeed,
Kornilov was not a politician but his heart ached. And what about Sukhanov's heart - d
id he
feel any pain at all? He did not have any sense of the living land and culture, nor he
had any
urge to preserve them - he served to his ideology only, the International, seeing in K
ornilov's
words a total lack of ideological content. Yes, his response was caustic. But note tha
t he had
not only labeled Kornilov's appeal an 'imitation', he had also derogatorily referred t
o
'Suzdalshchina,' to Russian history, ancient art and sanctity. And with such disdain t
o the
entire Russian historical heritage, all that internationalist ilk - Sukhanov and his h
enchmen
from the malicious Executive Committee, steered the February Revolution.

And it was not the ethnic origin of Sukhanov and the rest; it was their anti-national,
anti-
Russian and anti-conservative attitudes. We have seen similarattitudes on the part of
the
Provisional Government too, with its task of governing the entire Russia and its quite
Russian
ethnic composition. Yet did it display a Russian worldview or represent Russian intere
sts if
only a little? Not at all! The Government's most consistent and 'patriotic' activity w
as to
guide the already unraveling country (the 'Kronstadt Republic' was not the only place
which
had "seceded from Russia" by that time) to the victory in war! To the victory at any c
ost!
With loyalty to the allies! (Sure, the allies, theirgovernments, public and financers,
put
pressure on Russia. For instance, in May, Russian newspapers cited The Morning Post fr
om
Washington: "America made it clear to the Russian government" that if [Russia] makes
a
separate peace [with Germany], the United States would "annul all financial agreement
s
with Russia." [60] Prince Lvov [Prince Georgi Lvov, led the Russian Provisional Govern
ment
during the Russian revolution's initial phase, from March 1917 until he relinquished c
ontrol
to Alexander Kerensky in July 1917] upheld the sentiment: "The country must determinat
ely
send its army to battle. "[61]) They had no concern about consequences of the ongoing
war
for Russia. And this mismatch, this loss of sense of national self-preservation, could
be
observed almost at every meeting of the Provisional Government cabinet, almost in ever
y
discussion.

There were simply ridiculous incidents. Throwing millions of rubles left and right and
always
keenly supporting "cultural needs of ethnic minorities," the Provisional Government at
its
April 6 meeting had rejected the request of the long-established "Great Russian Orches
tra of
V. V. Andreev" to continue getting paid as before, "from the funds of the former His
Majesty's Personal Chancellery" (the funds were confiscated by the Provisional Governm
ent
itself). The petition was turned down despite the fact that the requested sum, 30 thou
sand

123

rubles per year, was equivalent to the annual pay of just three minister assistants.
"Deny!"
(Why not disband your so-called "Great Russian" orchestra? - What kind of name is tha
t?)
Taken aback and believing that it was just a misunderstanding, Andreev petitioned agai
n. Yet
with an unusual for this torpid government determination, he was refused a second time
too,
at the April 27 meeting. [62]

Milyukov, a Russian historian and minister of the Provisional Government, did not utte
r a
single specifically Russian sentiment during that year. Similarly, "the key figure of
the
revolution," Alexander Kerens ky, could not be at any stage accused of possessing an e
thnic
Russian consciousness. Yet at the same time the government demonstrated constant
anxious bias against any conservative circles, and especially -against Russian conserv
atives.
Even during his last speech in the Council of the Russian Republic (Pre-Parliament) o
n
October 24, when Trotsky's troops were already seizing Petrograd building after buildi
ng,
Kerensky emphatically argued that the Bolshevik newspaper Rabochy Put (Worker's Way)
and the right-wing Novaya Rus (New Russia) - both of which Kerensky had just shut dow
n -
shared similar political views....

* * *

The "darned incognito" of the members of the Executive Committee was, of course, notic
ed
by the public. Initially it was the educated society of Petrograd that was obsessed wi
th this
question, which several times surfaced in newspapers. For two months, the Committee tr
ied
to keep the secret, but by May they had no other choice but reveal themselves and had
published the actual names of most of the pseudonym-holders (except for Steklov-
Nakhamkis and Boris Osipovich Bogdanov, the energetic permanent chair of the council;
they had managed to keep their identities secret for a while; the tatter's name confus
ed the
public by similarity with another personality, Bogdanov-Malinovsky). This odd secrecy
irritated the public, and even ordinary citizens began asking questions. It was a Irea
dy typical
in May that if, during a plenary meeting of the Soviet, someone proposed Zinovievor
Kamenev for something, the public shouted from the auditorium demanding their true
names.

Concealing true names was incomprehensible to the ordinary man of that time: only thie
ves
hide and change their names. Why is Boris Katz ashamed of his name, and instead callin
g
himself "Kamkov"? Why does Lurie hide under the alias of "Larin"? Why does Mandelshta
m
use the pseudonym "Lyadov"? Many of these had aliases that originated out of necessity
in
their past underground life, but what had compelled the likes of Shotman, the Socialis
t
Revolutionary from Tomsk, (and not him alone) to become "Danilov" in 1917?

Certainly, the goal of a revolutionary, hiding behind a pseudonym, is to outsmart some

one,
and that may include not only the police and government. In this way, ordinary people
as
well are unable to figure out who their new leaders are.

124
Intoxicated by the freedom of the first months of the February Revolution, many Jewis
h
activists and orators failed to notice that their constant fussing around presidiums a
nd rallies
produced certain bewilderment and wry glances. By the time of the February Revolution
there was no "popular anti-Semitism" in the internal regions of Russia, it was confine
d
exclusively to the areas of the Pale of Settlement. (For instance, Abraham Cogan had e
ven
stated in 1917: "We loved Russia despite all the oppression from the previous regime
because we knew that it was not the Russian people" behind it but Tsarism.[63]) But af
ter
just a few months following the February Revolution, resentment against Jews had sudde
nly
flared up among the masses of people and spread over Russia, growing stronger with eac
h
passing month. And even the official newspapers reported, for instance, on the exasper
ation
in the waiting lines in the cities. "Everything has been changed in that twinkle of th
e eye that
created a chasm between the old and the new Russia. But it is queues that have changed
the
most. Strangely, while everything has moved to the left, the food lines have moved to
the
right. If you ... would like to hear Black Hundred propaganda ... then go and spend so
me time
in a waiting line." Among other things you will find out that "there are virtually no
Jews in
the lines, they don't need it as they have enough bread hoarded." The same "gossip abo
ut
Jews who tuck away bread" rolls from another end of the line as well; "the waiting lin
es is
the most dangerous source of counterrevolution." [64] The author Ivan Nazhivin noted t
hat
in the autumn in Moscow anti-Semitic propaganda fell on ready ears in the hungry
revolutionary queues: "What rascals! ... They wormed themselves onto the very top! ...
See,
how proudly they ride in their cars.... Sure, not a single Yid can be found in the lin
es here....
Just you wait!"[65]

Any revolution releases a flood of obscenity, envy, and anger from the people. The sam
e
happened among the Russian people, with their weakened Christian spirituality. And so
the
Jews - many of whom had ascended to the top, to visibility, and, what is more, who had
not
concealed their revolutionary jubilation, nor waited in the miserable lines -increasin
gly
became a target of popular resentment.

Many instances of such resentment were documented in 1917 newspapers. Below are
several examples. When, at the Apraksin market on Sennaya Square, a hoard of goods wa
s
discovered in possession of Jewish merchants, "people began shout ... 'plunder Jewish
shops!', because 'Yids are responsible for all the troubles' ... and this word 'Yid' i
s on
everyone's lips."[66] A stockpile of flour and bacon was found in the store of a merch
ant
(likely a Jew) in Poltava. The crowd started plundering his shop and then began callin
g fora
Jewish pogrom. Later, several members of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, including
Drobnis, arrived and attempted to appease the crowd; as a result, Drobnis was beaten.
[67]
In October in Ekaterinoslav soldiers trashed small shops, shouting "Smashthe bourgeoi
s!
Smash the Yids!" In Kiev at the Vladimirsky market a boy had hit a woman, who tried to
buy
flour out her turn on the head Instantly, the crowd started yelling "the Yids are beat
ing the
Russians!" and a brawl ensued. (Note that it had happened in the same Kiev where one
could already see the streamers "Long live free Ukraine without Yids and Poles!") By t
hat

125

time "Smash the Yids!" could be heard in almost every street brawl, even in Petrograd,
and
often completely without foundation. For instance, in a Petrograd streetcar two women
"called for disbanding of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, filled, accor
ding to
them, exclusively by 'Germans and Yids'. Both were arrested and called to account." [6
8]

Newspaper Russkaya Volya (Russian Freedom) reported: "Right in front of our eyes, anti
-
Semitism, in its most primitive form ... re-arises and spreads.... It is enough to hea
r to
conversations in streetcars [in Petrograd] or in waiting lines to various shops, or in
the
countless fleeting rallies at every corner and crossroad ... they accuse Jews of polit
ical
stranglehold, of seizing parties and Soviets, and even of ruining the army ... of loot
ing and
hoarding goods. "[69]

Many Jewish socialists, agitators in the front units, enjoyed unlimited success during
the
spring months when calls for a "democratic peace" were tolerated and fighting was not
required. Then nobody blamed them for being Jewish. But in June when the policy of th
e
Executive Committee had changed toward support and even propaganda for the offensive,
calls of "smash the Yids!" began appearing and those Jewish persuaders suffered batter
ing
by unruly soldiers time and time again.

Rumors were spreading that the Executive Committee in Petrograd was "seized by Yids."
By
June this belief had taken root in the Petrograd garrison and factories; this is exact
ly what
soldiers shouted to the member of the Committee Voitinsky who had visited an infantry
regiment to dissuade the troops from the looming demonstration conceived by Bolshevik
s
on June 10.

V. D. Nabokov, hardly known for anti-Semitism, joked that the meeting of the foremen o
f
the Pre-Parliament in October 1917 "could be safely called a Sanhedrin": its majority
was
Jewish; of Russians, there were only Avksentiev, me, Peshekhonov, and Chaikovsky...."
His
attention was drawn to that fact by Mark Vishnyakwho was present there also. [70]

By autumn, the activity of Jews in power had created such an effect that even Iskry (S
parks),
the illustrated supplement to the surpassingly gentle Russkoe Slovo (Russian Word) tha
t
would until then never dare defying public opinion in such a way, had published an abr
asive
anti-Jewish caricature in the October 29 issue, that is, already during fights of the
October
coup in Moscow.

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies actively foug
ht
against anti-Semitism. (I cannot rule out that the harsh refusal to accept the well-de
served
Plekhanov into the CEC in April 1917 was a kind of revenge for his anti-Bund referral
to the
"tribe of Gad," which was mentioned in Lenin's publications. [71]lndeed, I cannot prov
ide any
other explanation.) On July 21 the 1st Ail-Russian Congress of Soviets had issued a
proclamation about a struggle against anti-Semitism ("about the only resolution approv
ed by
the Congress unanimously, without any objections or arguments"[72]). When in the end o
f
June (28th and 29th) the re-elected Bureau of the CEC had assembled, they had heard a

126

report on "the rise of anti-Semitic agitation ... mainly in the northwestern and south
western"
guberniyas; a decision was made immediately to send a delegation of 15 members of the
CEC with special powers there[73], subordinating them to the direction of the "Departm
ent
on the Struggle against Counter-Revolution."

On the other hand, Bolsheviks, who advanced their agenda under the slogan "Down with t
he
ministers-capitalists!" not only did nothing to alleviate this problem, they even fann
ed its
flames (along with the anarchists, despite the fact that the latter were headed by on
e
Bleikhman). They claimed that the Executive Committee was so exceptionally lenient tow
ard
the government only because capitalists and Jews control everything (isn'tthat reminis
cent
of Narodnaya Volya [the People's Will terrorist organization] of 1881?).

And when the Bolshevik uprising of July 3-4 broke out (itwas in fact targeted not agai
nstthe
already impotent Provisional Government but againstthe Bolshevik's true competitor -
Executive Committee), the Bolsheviks slyly exploited the anger of soldiers toward Jews
by
pointing them to that very body - see, there they are!

But when the Bolsheviks had lost their uprising, the CEC had conducted an official
investigation and many members of the commission of inquiry were Jews from the
presidium of the CEC. And because of their "socialist conscience" they dared not call
the
Bolshevik uprising a crime and deal with it accordingly. So the commission had yielded
no
result and was soon liquidated.

During the garrison meeting, arranged by the CEC on October 19, just before the decisi
ve
Bolshevik uprising, "one of representatives of 176th Infantry Regiment, a Jew," warned
that
"those people down on the streets scream that Jews are responsible for all the wrong
s."[74]
At the CEC meeting during the night of October 25, Gendelman reported that when he wa
s
giving a speech in the Peter and Paul Fortress earlier that afternoon he was taunted:
"You
are Gendelman! That is you are a Yid and a Rightist!"[75] When on October 27 Gotz and
his
delegation to Kerens ky tried to depart to Gatchina from the Baltiysky Rail Terminal,
he was
nearly killed by sailors who screamed that "the Soviets are controlled by Yids."[76] A
nd
during the 'wine pogroms' on the eve of the 'glorious Bolshevik victory,' the calls "S
laughter
Yids!" were heard also.

And yet there was not a single Jewish pogrom over the whole year of 1917. The infamou
s
outrageous pogroms inKalusha and Ternopol were in fact the work of frenzied drunken
revolutionary soldiers, retreating in disorder. They smashed everything on their way,
all
shops and stores; and because most of those were Jewish-owned, the word spread about
'Jewish pogroms'. A similar pogrom took place in Stanislavov, with its much smaller Je
wish
population, and quite reasonably it was not labeled a 'Jewish' pogrom.

Already by the mid-summer of 1917 the Jews felt threatened by the embittered populatio
n
(or drunken soldiers), but the ongoing collapse of the state was fraught with incompar
ably
greater dangers. Amazingly, it seems that both the Jewish community and the press, th
e

127

latterto a large extent identified with the former, learned nothing from the formidabl
e
experiences of 1917 in general, but narrowly looked at the "isolated manifestations o
f
pogroms." And so time after time they missed the real danger. The executive power
behaved similarly. When the Germans breached the front at Ternopol in the night of Jul
y 10,
the desperate joint meeting of the CEC of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputie
s and
the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies had taken place. They had
acknowledged that should the revolution perish, the country crumbles down (in that exa
ct
order), and then named Provisional Government a "Government for Salvation of the
Revolution," and noted in their appeal to the people that "dark forces are again prepa
red to
torment our longsuffering Motherland. They are setting backward masses upon the
Jews." [77]

On July 18 at a panel session of the State Duma, in an extremely small circle, Rep.
Maslennikov spoke against the Executive Committee and among other things spelled out t
he
real names of its members. On the very same evening at the factional meeting of the CE
C
they beat an alarm: "This is a case of counterrevolution, it must be dealt with accord
ing to
the recently issued decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs Tserete I i on suppress
ion of
counterrevolution! (The decree was issued in response to the Bolshevik uprising, thoug
h it
was never used against Bolsheviks.) In two days Maslennikov made excuses in an article
in
the newspaper Rech [Speech]: indeed, he named Steklov, Kamenev, and Trotsky but never
intended to incite anger against the entire Jewish people, and "anyway, attacking the
m, I
had absolutely no wish to make Jewish people responsible for the actions of these
individuals."[78]

Then, in mid-September, when the all gains of the February Revolution were already
irreversibly ruined, on the eve of the by now imminent Bolshevik coup, Ya. Kantorovic
h
warned in Rech about the danger that: "The dark forces and evil geniuses of Russia wil
l soon
emerge from their dens to jubilantly perform Black Masses...." Indeed, it will happen
soon.
Yet what kind of Black masses? -"...Of bestial patriotism and pogrom-loving 'truly-Rus
sian'
national identity." [79] In October in Petrograd I. Trumpeldor had organized Jewish se
lf-
defense forces for protection against pogroms, but they were never needed.

Indeed, Russian minds were confused, and so were Jewish ones.

Several years after the revolution, G. Landau, looking back with sadness, wrote: "Jewi
sh
participation in the Russian turmoil had astonishingly suicidal overtones in it; I am
referring
not only to their role in Bolshevism, but to their involvement in the whole thing. And
it is not
just about the huge number of politically active people, socialists and revolutionarie
s, who
have joined the revolution; I am talking mainly about the broad sympathy of the masses
it
was met with.... Although many harbored pessimistic expectations, in particular, an
anticipation of pogroms, they were still able to reconcile such a foreboding with an
acceptance of turmoil which unleashed countless miseries and pogroms. It resembled th
e
fatal attraction of butterflies to fire, to the annihilating fire.... It is certain th
ere were some

128

strong motives pushing the Jews into that direction, and yet those were clearly suicid
al....
Granted, Jews were not different in that from the rest of Russian intelligentsia and f
rom the
Russian society.... Yet we had to be different ... we, the ancient people of city-dwel
lers,
merchants, artisans, intellectuals ... we had to be different from the people of land
and
power, from peasants, landowners, officials."[80]

And let's not forget those who were different. We must always remember that Jewry was
and is very heterogeneous, that attitudes and actions vary greatly among the Jews. So
it was
with the Russian Jewry in 1917: in provinces and even in the capital there were circle
s with
reasonable views and they were growing as October was getting closer.

The Jewish stance toward Russian unity during the months when Russia was pulled apart
not
only by other nations, but even by Siberians, was remarkable. "All over the course of
revolution Jews, together with Great Russians, were among the most ardent champions o
f
the idea of Great Russia."[81] Now, when Jews had gotten their equal rights, what coul
d
they have in common with different peoples on the periphery of the former empire? And
yet
the disintegration of a united country would fracture Jewry. In July at the 9th Congre
ss of
Constitutional Democrats, Vinaverand Nolde openly argued against territorial partition
of
peoples and in favor of Russian unity.[82] Also in September, in the national section
of the
Democratic Conference, the Jewish socialists spoke against any federalization of Russi
a (in
that they had joined the Centralists). Today they write in an Israeli magazine that
Trumpeldor's Jewish detachments "backed the Provisional Government and had even foile
d
the Kornilov's mutiny."[83] Perhaps. However, in rigorously studying events of 1917, I
did
not encounter any such information. But I am aware of opposite instances: in early Ma
y
1917 in the thundering patriotic and essentially counter-revolutionary "Black Sea Dele
gation,"
the most successful orator calling forthe defense of Russia was Jewish sailor Batkin.

D. Pasmanik had published the letters of millionaire steamship owner Shulim Bespalovto
the
Minister of Trade and Industry Shakhovsky dated as early as September 1915: "Excessiv
e
profits made by all industrialists and traders lead our Motherland to the imminent wre
ck."
He had donated half a million rubles to the state and proposed to establish a law limi
ting all
profits by 15%. Unfortunately, these self-restricting measures were not introduced as
'rush
to freedom' progressives, such as Konovalov and Ryabushinsky, did not mind making 10
0%
war profits. When Konovalov himself became the Minister of Trade and Industry, Shulim
Bespalov wrote to him on July 5, 1917: "Excessive profits of industrialists are ruinin
g our
country, now we must take 50% of the value of their capitals and property," and added
that
he is ready to part with 50% of his own assets. Konovalov paid no heed. [84]

In August, at the Moscow Ail-Russian State Conference, O. O. Gruzenberg (a future memb

er
of the Constituent Assembly) stated: "These days the Jewish people ... are united in t
heir
allegiance to our Motherland, in unanimous aspiration to defend her integrity and
achievements of democracy" and were prepared to give for her defense "all their materi
al

129

and intellectual assets, to part with everything precious, with the flower of their pe
ople, all
their young." [85]

These words reflected the realization that the February regime was the best for the Ru
ssian
Jewry, promising economic progress as well as political and cultural prosperity. And t
hat
realization was adequate.

The closer it got to to October coup and the more apparent the Bolshevik threat, the w
ider
this realization spread among Jews, leading them to oppose Bolshevism. It was taking r
oot
even among socialist parties and during the October coup many Jewish socialists were
actively against it. Yet they were debilitated by their socialist views and their oppo
sition was
limited by negotiations and newspaper articles - until the Bolsheviks shutdown those
news pa pers.

It is necessary to state explicitly that the October coup was not carried by Jews (tho
ugh it
was under the general command of Trotsky and with energetic actions of young Grigory
Chudnovsky during the arrest of Provisional Government and the massacre of the defende
rs
of the Winter Palace). Broadly speaking, the common rebuke, that the 170-million-peopl
e
could not be pushed into Bolshevism by a small Jewish minority, is justified. Indeed,
we had
ourselves sealed our fate in 1917, through our foolishness from February to October-
December.

The October coup proved a devastating lot for Russia. Yet the state of affairs even be
fore it
promised little good to the people. We had already lost responsible statesmanship and
the
events of 1917 had proved it in excess. The best Russia could expect was an inept, fee
ble,
and disorderly pseudo-democracy, unable to rely on enough citizens with developed lega
l
consciousness and economic independence.

After October fights in Moscow, representatives of the Bund and Poale-Zion had taken p
art
in the peace negotiations - not in alliance with the Junkers or the Bolsheviks — but a
s a third
independent party. There were many Jews among Junkers of the Engineers School who
defended the Winter Palace on October 25: in the memoirs of Sinegub, a palace defende
r,
Jewish names appear regularly; I personally knew one such engineer from my prison
experience. And during the Odessa City Duma elections the Jewish block had opposed th
e
Bolsheviks and won, though only marginally.

During the Constituent Assembly elections "more than 80% of Jewish population in Russi
a
had voted" for Zionist parties. [86] Lenin wrote that 550 thousands voted for Jewish
nationalists. [87] "Most Jewish parties have formed a united national list of candidat
es; seven
deputies were elected from that list -six Zionists" and Gruzenberg. The success of Zio
nists
was facilitated by the recently published declaration of British Minister of Foreign A
ffairs
Balfour on the establishment of 'Jewish national home' in Palestine, which was "met wi
th
enthusiasm by the majority of Russian Jewry (celebratory demonstrations, rallies and
worship services took place in Moscow, Petrograd, Odessa, Kiev and many other cities).
"[88]

130

Prior to the October coup, Bolshevism was not very influential among Jews. But just be
fore
the uprising, Natanson, Kamkov, and Shteinberg on behalf of the left Socialist
Revolutionaries had signed a combat pact with Bolsheviks Trotsky and Kamenev.[89] And
some Jews distinguished themselves among the Bolsheviks in their very first victories
and
some even became famous. The commissar of the famed Latvian regiments of the 12th
Army, which did so much for the success of Bolshevik coup, was Semyon Nakhimson. "Jewi
sh
soldiers played a notable role during preparation and execution of the armed uprising
of
October 1917 in Petrograd and other cities, and also during suppression of mutinies an
d
armed resurrections against the new Soviet regime. "[90]

It is widely known that during the 'historical' session of the Congress of Soviets on
October
27 two acts, the 'Decree on Land' and the 'Decree on Peace', were passed. But it did
n't leave
a mark in history that after the 'Decree on Peace' but before the 'Decree on Land' ano
ther
resolution was passed. It declared it "a matter of honor for local Soviets to prevent
Jewish
and any other pogroms by dark forces."[91](Pogroms by 'Red forces of light' were not
anticipated.)
So even here, at the Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, the Jewish question
was
put ahead of the peasant one.

Sources:

[I] Delo Naroda, March 25, 1917, p. 3

[2] Russkaya Volya, April 14, 1917, p. 1; April 20, p. l.See alsoRech, April 16, 1917,
p. 1; April 20, p. 1.

[3] Russkaya Volya, April 23,1917,p.4.

[4] Birzhevye Vedomosti, May24, 1917, p. 2.

[5] See, forinstance, Russkaya Volya, MaylO, 1917,p. 5; Birzhevye Vedomosti, May 9, 19
17,p. 5; Birzhevye
Vedomosti, June 1, 1917, p. 6; Rech, July 29, 1917, p. 6.

[6] Kratkaya Evreiskaya Entsiklopediya [The Short Jewish Encyclopedia (henceforth— SJ

E)]. Jerusalem, 1994. v. 7,
p. 399.

[7] I bid., p. 380-381.

[8] Ibid., p. 379.

[9] G. Aronson. Evreyskaya obshchestvennost v Rossii v 1917-1918 [The Jewish Public in

Russia in 1917-1918]//
Kniga o russkomevreystve: 1917-1967 [The Book of Russian Jewry: 1917-1967 (henceforth
— BRJ-2)]. New
York: Association of Russian Jews, 1968,p. 6.

[10] SJE, v.7, p. 378.

[II] Izvestiya, April 9,1917, p. 4.

[12] SJE, v.7, p. 378-379.

[13] SJE, v.7, p. 378.

131

[14] Izvestiya, September 15, 1917, p. 2.

[15] SJE, v.6, p. 85; v.7, p. 379.
[16] SJE, v.7, p. 378.
[17] Birzhevye Vedomosti, April 12, 1917, p. 4.
[18] SJE, v.6, p. 463,464.

[19] D. Pasmanik.Chego zhe my dobivaemsya? [What are we struggl ingfor?] // Rossiya i

evrekOtechestvennoe
objedinenierusskikh evreev za granitsei [Russia and Jews: Expatriate Society of Russia
n Jews in Exile
(henceforth— RJ)]. Paris, YMCA-Press, 1978, p. 211 [The 1st Edition: Berl in, Osnova,
1924].

[20] SJE, v.7, p. 378.

[21] Ibid., p. 379.

[22] Ibid., p. 380-381.

[23] Ibid., p. 379.

[24] Rech, April 27, 1917, p. 3.

[25] SJE, v.7, p. 378.

[26] Russkaya Volya, April 25, 1917, p. 5.

[27] A. I. Denikin.Ocherki russkoi smuty.Vl: Krushenie vlasti I armii,fevral-sentyabrl

917 [Russian Turmoil .
Memoirs. VI: Collapseof Authority and Army]. Paris, 1922, p. 129-130.

[28] SJE, v.7, p. 379.

[29] Bi rzhevye Vedomosti, May 5, 1917, p. 2.

[30] SJE, v.4, p. 775.
[31] SJE, v.5, p. 475.

[32] Obshchee delo, October 14 and 16, 1917

[33] A. Sutton. Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution. Translation from English, Mo
scow, 1998, p. 14-36.
[34] Rech, June 27, 1917, p. 3; June 28, p. 2-3.
[35] Rech, August 2, 1917, p. 3.

[36] Russkaya Evreiskaya Entsiklopediya [The Russian Jewish Encyclopedia (henceforth

— RJE)]. 2nd edition,
Moscow, 1994- 1997. v. 1, p. 240,427; v. 2, p. 124; v. 3, p. 29, 179, 280.

[37] RJE, v. 1, p.473;v. 3, p. 41.

[38] Narodnoe soprotivlenie kommunismu v Rossii:Ural i Prikamye. Noyabr 1917- yanvar 1

919 [People's
Resistanceto Communism: Urals and Prikamye. November 1917 - January 1919. Redactor M.
Bernshtam. Paris:
YMCA-Press, 1982, p. 356. Volume 3 of the series Issledovaniya Noveishei Russkoi istor
ii [Studies of Modern
Russian History].

132

[39] RJE, v. 2, p.85;v. 3, p. 106.

[40] RJE, v. 3, p. 224, 505;v. 1, p. 239.

[41] Rech, June 28,1917, p. 2.

[42] Russkaya Volya, April 13,1917, p. 3.

[43] Russkaya Volya, April 9, 1917, p. 3.

[44] Birzhevye vedomosti, May 7, 1917, p. 3.

[45] G. Aronson. Evreyskaya obshchestvennost v Rossii v 1917-1918 [The Jewish Public i

n Russiain 1917-1918].
// BRJ-2, p. 7.

[46] RJE, v. 7, p. 381.

[47] Ibid.

[48] 1.0. Levin. Evrei v revolutsii [The Jews in the Revolution].// RJ, p. 124.
[49] RJE, v. 7, p. 399.

[50] G. Aronson. Evreyskaya obshchestvennostv Rossii v 1917-1918 [The Jewish Publ ic i

n Russia in 1917-1918]
//BRJ-2, p. 10. RJE, v. 7, p. 381.

[51] RJE, v. 3, p. 162, 293.

[52] G. Aronson. Evreyskaya obshchestvennostv Rossii v 1917-1918 [The Jewish Public in

Russiain 1917-1918]
// BRJ-2, p. 7.

[53] Izvestiya, November 8, 1917, p. 5.

[54] D. S. Pasmanik. Russkaya revolutsia i evreistvo: (Bolshevism i iudaizm) [Russian

Revolution and Jewry:
Bolshevism and Judaism]. Paris, 1923, p. 153-154.

[55] Rech, July 28, 1917, p. 3.

[56] I bid.; see also G. Lelevich. Oktyabr v stavke [The October in the general Headqu
arters]. Gomel, 1922, p. 13,
66-67.

[57] V. B. Stankevich. Vospominaniya, 1914-1919 [Memoirs, 1914-1919]. Berlin, publ ish

ing house of I. P.
Ladyzhnikov, 1920, p. 86-87.

[58] A. I. Denikin.Ocherki russkoi smuty.Vl: Krushenie vlasti I armii,fevral-sentyabrl

917 [Russian Turmoil .
Memoirs. VI: Collapseof Authority and Army]. Paris, 1922, p. 216.

[59] NikSukhanov. Zapiski o revolutsii [Memoirs of the Revolution]. Berlin, Publ ishin
g House of Z. I. Grzhebin,
1923, v.5, p. 287.

[60] Russkaya Volya, May 7, 1917, p. 4.

[61] Ibid., p. 6.

[62] Zhurnaly zasedanii Vremennogo Pravitelstva [Minutes ofthe meetings of the Provisi
onal Government].
Petrograd, 1917. VI: March-May; April 6 meeting (book 44, p. 5) and April 27 meeting
(book 64, p. 4).

133

[63] Rech, June 28,1917, p. 2.

[64] Rech, May 3, 1917, p. 6.

[65] Ivan Nazhivin.Zapiski o revolutsii [Notes about Revolution]. Vienna, 1921, p. 2

8.
[66] Rech, June 17, 1917, evening issue, p. 4.
[67] Rech, September 9, 1917, p. 3.
[68] Rech, August 8, 1917, p. 5.

[69] Russkaya Volyajune 17, 1917, evening issue, p. 4.

[70] V. Nabokov. Vremennoye pravitelstvo [The Provisional Government] // Archive of Ru

ssian Revolution,
published byGessen. BerlimSlovo, 1922, v. 1, p. 80.

[71] V. I. Lenin. Sochineniya [Works]. In 45 volumes, 4th Edition (henceforth — Lenin,

4th edition). Moscow,
Gospolitizdat,1941-1967,v.4, p. 311.

[72] Izvestiyajune 28, 1917, p. 5.

[73] Izvestiyajune 30, 1917, p. 10.

[74] Rech, October 20, 1917, p. 3.

[75] Izvestiya, October 26, 1917, p. 2.

[76] Delo Naroda, October 29, 1917, p. 1.

[77] Rech, July 11, 1917, p. 3.

[78] Rech, July 21, 1917, p. 4.

[79] Rech, September 16, 1917, p. 3.

[80] G. A. Landau. Revol utsionnye idei v evreiskoi obchshestvennosti [Revolutionary i

deas in Jewish society]//
RJ, p. 105, 106.

[81] D. S. Pasmanik. Russkaya revol utsia i evreistvo: (Bolshevism i iudaizm) [Russian

Revolution and Jewry:
Bolshevism and Judaism]. Paris, 1923, p. 245.

[82] Rech, July 26, 1917, p. 3.

[83] I. Eldad. Tak kto zhe nasledniki Zhabotinskogo? [So Who Are the Heirs of Jabotins
ky?]// "22":
Obshchestvenno-politicheskiy i I iteraturniy zhurnal evreyskoy i ntel I i gents i i iz
SSSR v Izraile [Social, Pol itical and
Literary Journal ofthe Jewish Intelligentsia from the USSR in Israel (henceforth - "2
2")]. Tel-Aviv, 1980,(16), p.
120.

[84] D. S. Pasmanik. Russkaya revol utsia i evreistvo: (Bolshevism i iudaizm) [Russian

Revolution and Jewry:
Bolshevism and Judaism]. Paris, 1923, p. 179-181.

[85] Rech, August 16, 1917, p. 3.

[86] V. Boguslavsky.VsachshituKunyaeva [In Defense of Kunyaev] // "22", 1980,(16), p.

169.

134
[87] Lenin, 4th edition, v. 30, p. 231.

[88] SJE, v.7, p. 381.

[89] Kh. M. Astrakhan. Bolsheviki i ikh politicheskieprotivnikivl917godu [The Bolshevi

ks andTheir Political
Adversaries in 1917]. Leningrad, 1973, p. 407.

[90] Aron Abramovich. V reshayuchshey voine: Uchastie i rol evreev SSSR v voine protiv
natsisma [In the
Deciding War: Participation and Role of Jews in the USSR in the War Against Nazism] 2n
d Edition, Tel Aviv, 1982,
v. 1, p. 45, 46.

[91] L. Trotsky. Istoriya russkoi revolutsii.T. 2: Oktyabrskaya revolutsia [TheHistory

of Russian Revolution].
Berlin, Granit, 1933, v. 2: October Revolution, Part2, p. 361.

135

Chapter 16: During the Civil War

Trotsky once boasted that during the Civil War, "even" traveling in his special
Revvoyensovet's [Revolutionary Military Council] railroad coach, he was able to find t
ime to
acquaint himself with the latest works of French literature.

Not that he realized exactly what he said. He acknowledged that he was able to find no
t just
time, but room in his heart between appeals to the "revolutionary sailors," forcibly
mobilized units of Red Army, and a thrown order to execute every tenth soldier in a un
it that
wavered in battle. Well, he usually did not stay around to supervise carrying out such
orders.

Orchestrating a bloody war on the vast plains of Russia, he was absolutely untouched b
y the
unprecedented sufferings of her inhabitants, by her pain. He soared aloft, above it al
l, on the
wings of the international intoxication of the Revolution.

The February Revolution was a Russian revolution: no matter how headlong, erroneous an
d
pernicious it was, it did not aspire to burn down the entire pre-existing life, to ann
ihilate the
whole pre-revolutionary Russia. Yet immediately after the October [Bolshevik revolutio
n],
the Revolution spilled abroad and became an international and devastating plague, feed
ing
itself by devouring and destroying social order wherever it spread — everything built
was to
be annihilated; everything cultivated — to be confiscated; whoever resisted — to be sh
ot.
The Reds were exclusively preoccupied with their grand social experiment, predestined
to be
repeated, expanded and implemented all over the world.

From an easy, quick blow, the October coup snowballed into a fierce three -year-long C
ivil
War, which brought countless bloody calamities to all the peoples of Russia.

The multinationality of the former Empire and the cannon recoil from the Great War
complicated both the inhumane Bolshevik plot and its implementation. Unlike the Frenc
h
Revolution, which unfolded on the territory of mono-national France and did not see mu
ch
foreign intervention apart from a short incursion of hostile troops, and with all its
horrors
being a national affairfrom beginning to end, the Russian Revolution was horribly
aggravated by its multinational madness. It saw the strong participation of Red Latvia
ns
(then Russian subjects), former German and Austrian prisoners of war (organized into f
ull-
blown regiments like the Hungarians), and even large numbers of Chinese. No doubt the
brunt of the fighting for the Reds was carried out by Russians; some of them were draf
ted on
pain of death while others volunteered in a mad belief they would be fighting for a ha
ppy
future for themselves. Yet the Russian Jews were not lost in all that diversity.

The politically active part of Russian Jewry, which backed the Bolshevik civic regime
in 1917,
now just as boldly stepped into the military structures of Bolsheviks. During the firs
t years
after the October Revolution in the midst of the internationalist frenzy, the power ov
er this
enormous land was effortlessly slipping into the hands of those clinging to the Bolshe
viks.
And they were overwhelmed by the newfound immensity of that power. They immediately
began using it without a backward glance or any fear of control — some, without doubt,
in
the name of higher ideals, while others — in the name of lower ones ("obstinacy of
fanaticism in some and ability to adapt in others" 1 ). At that time, nobody could ima
gine that

136

the Civil War would ignite enormous Jewish pogroms, unprecedented in their atrocity an
d
bloodshed, all over the South of Russia.

We can judge the true nature of the multi-ethnic war from the Red pogrom during the
suppression of the Kronstadt Uprising in March 1921. A well-known socialist-revolution
ary
and sociologist Pitrim Sorokin writes: "For three days, Latvian, Bashkir, Hungarian, T
atar,
Russian, Jewish and international rabble, crazed by alcohol and the smell of blood, ra
ped and
killed without restraint." 2

Or here is another recollection from ordinary witnesses. During the feast of the Epiph
any in
1918, an Orthodox Sacred Procession stirred forth from the gates of the Kremlin inTul
a -
and an "international squad" gunned it down.

Even with the ruthless international squads, the force of the "Red Guard" alone was n
o
longer sufficient. The Bolshevik regime needed a regular army. In 1918, "Lev Trotsky,
with
the help of Sklyansky and JacovSverdlov, created the Red Army." "Many Jews were fighti
ng
in its ranks. Some units were entirely Jewish, like, for example, the brigade of Jose
f
Furman." 3 The Jewish share in the command corps the Red Army become large and
influential and this trend continued for many years even after the end of the Civil Wa
r. This
Jewish involvement has been researched by several Jewish authors and encyclopedias.

In the 1980s, Israeli scholarAaron Abramovich used many Soviet sources (including The
Fifty-
Year Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, The Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, volum
es of
Directives of the Front Command of the Red Army) to compile detailed nominal rosters o
f
highly ranked Jewish commanders (exclusivelyJewish ones) in the Red Army during the
period from the Civil War up to the aftermath of Second World War.

Let's skim through the pages allocated to the Civil War. 4 This is a very extensive ro
ster; it
begins with the Revvoyensoviet, where Abramovich lists L. Trotsky, E. Sklyansky, A.
Rosengoltz, and Y. Drabkin-Gusev. Trotsky ordered the "establishment of fronts with
headquarters, and formation of new armies," and "Jews were present in almost all the
revvoyensoviets of the fronts and armies." (Abramovich lists the most prominent indivi
duals:
D. Vayman, E. Pyatnitsky, L. Glezarov, L. Pechyorsky, I. Slavin, M. Lisovsky, G. Bitke
r, Bela Kun,
Brilliant-Sokolnikov, I. Khodorovsky). Earlier, at the onset of the Civil War, the Ext
raordinary
Command Staff of the Petrograd Military District was headed by Uritsky, and among the
members of the Petrograd Committee of Revolutionary Defense were Sverdlov (the
chairman), Volodarsky, Drabkin-Gusev, Ya. Fishman (a leftist Socialist Revolutionary)
and G.
Chudnovsky. In May 1918 there were two Jews among the eleven commissars of military
districts: E. Yaroslavsky-Gubelman (Moscow District) and S. Nakhimson (Yaroslavsky Dis
trict).
During the war, several Jews were in charge of armies: M. Lashevich was in charge of t
he 3 rd
— and later, of the 7 th Army of Eastern Front; V. Lazarevich was in charge of the 3 r
d Army of
the Western Front, G. Sokolnikov led the 8 th Army of the Southern Front, N. Sorkin -t
he 9 th ,
and I. Yakir- the 14 th Army. Abramovich painstakingly lists numerous Jewish heads of
staff
and members of the revvoyensoviets in each of the twenty armies; then the commanders,
heads of staff and military commissars of divisions (the list of the latter, i.e., tho
se in charge
of the ideological branch of command, was three-times longer than the list of Jewish
commanders of divisions). In this manner Abramovich describes brigades, regiments and
separate detachments. He lists Jewish heads of political administrations and revolutio
nary

137

military tribunals at all levels, noting that "especially large percentage of Jews can
be found
among political officers at all levels of the Red Army...." "Jews played an important
role in
the provision and supply services. Let's name some of them...." "Jews occupied importa
nt
positions in military medicine as well: heads of sanitary administrations of the front
s and
armies, senior doctors of units and bodies of troops...." "Many Jews — commanders of l
arge
units and detachments — were distinguished for their courage, heroism and generalshi
p"
but "due to the synoptic character of this chapter we cannot provide detailed descript
ions of
the accomplishments of Jewish Red Army soldiers, commanders and political officers."
(Meticulously listing the commanders of armies, the researcher misses another Jew, Tik
hon
Khvesin, who happened to be in charge of the 4 th Army of the Eastern Front, then — of
the
8 th Army of the Southern Front, and later of the 1 st Army of the Turkestan Front.
5 )

The Russian Jewish Encyclopedia provides additional information about some commander
s.
(Here I would like to commend this encyclopedia (1994), for in our new free times its
authors
performed an honest choice — writing frankly about everything, including less than
honorable things.)

Drabkin-Gusev became the Head of Political Administration of the Red Army and the Chie
f of
the entire Red Army in 1921. Later he was the head of IstPart (Commission on the Histo
ry of
October Revolution and Bolshevist Party) and a big figure in the Comintern, a nd was b
uried
in the Kremlin wall [in Moscow].

Mikhail Gaskovich-Lashkevich was a member of many revvoyensoviets, and later he was i

n
charge of the Siberian Military District, and even later — the First Deputy Chairman o
f the
Revvoyensoviet of the USSR (yet he was buried merely on the Field of Mars [in St.
Petersburg]).

Israel Razgonwasthe military commissar of the Headquarters of Petrograd Military Distr

ict
and participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt Uprising; later, he was in charge
of the
Red Army of Bukhara, suppressing the uprising in Central Asia; still later he worked i
n the
Headquarters of the Black See Fleet.
Boris Goldberg was Military Commissar of the Tomskaya Guberniya, later of the Permskay
a
Guberniya, still laterof the Privolzhskiy Military District, and even later he was in
charge of
the Reserve Army and was acknowledged as one of the founders of Soviet Civil Aviatio
n.

Modest Rubenstein was Deputy Head of the Revvoyensoviet of the Special Army, and late
r
he was head of political administration of an army group.

Boris Hippo was the Head of Political Administration of the Black Sea Fleet. (Later he
worked
in the political administrations of the Baltic Sea Fleet, the Turkestan Front, was the
Head of
Political Administration of the Central-Asian Military District, and later of the Cauc
asian
Army.)

Michail Landa was a head of the political division of an army, later — Deputy Head of
Political Administration of the entire Red Army, and still later Head of Political
Administration of the Byelorussian and then of the Siberian Military Districts.

138

Lev Berlin was Commissar of the Volga Military Flotilla and laterworked in the Politic
al
Administration of the Crimean Army and still later in that of the Baltic Fleet. 5

Yet how many outstanding characters acted at lower levels?

Boris Skundin, previously a lowly apprentice of clockmaker Sverdlov, Sr., successivel

y
evolved into the military commissar of a division, commissar of army headquarters, pol
itical
inspector of front, and, finally, into Deputy Head of Political Administration of the
1 st Cavalry
Army.

Avenir Khanukaev was commander of a guerilla band who laterwas tried before the
revolutionary tribunal for crimes during the capture of Ashgabatand acquitted, and in
the
same year of 1919 was made into political plenipotentiary of the TurkCommission of the
All-
Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of People's Commissars on Kashgar,
Bukhara and Khiva.

Moses Vinnitsky ("Mishka-Yaponchik") was a member of the Jewish militia squad in Odess
a
1905, and later a gang-leader; he was freed from a hard labor camp by the February
Revolution and became a commander of a Jewish fighting brigade in Odessa, simultaneous
ly
managing the entire criminal underworld of Odessa. In 1919 he was a commander of a
special battalion and later he was in charge of an infantry regiment in the Red Army.
His unit
was "composed of anarchists and criminals." In the end he was shot by his own side.

Military commissar Isaiah Tzalkovich was in command of a composite company of the [Re
d]
cadets during the suppression of the Kronstadt Uprising. 7

We can see extraordinary Jewish women in the higher Bolshevik ranks as well.

Nadezda Ostrovskaya rose from the Head of Gubkom [Party Committee of a Guberniya, the
highest executive authority in a guberniya] of Vladimir Guberniya to the post of the H
ead of
Political Administration of the entire 10 th Army.

Revekka Plastinina headed Gubrevkom and later the Gubkom of Archangel Guberniya.

Is it proper to mention here Cecilia Zelikson-Bobrovskaya, who was a seamstress in he

r
youth, and became the Head of the Military Department of the Moscow Committee of the
Ail-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks? 8 Or take one of the Furies of the Revoluti
on
Eugenia Bosh (or her sister Elena Rozmirovich)?

Or another thing — the Soviets used the phrase "Corps of Red Cossacks." Yet those were
not
Cossacks who embraced communist ideology but plain bandits (who occasionally disguise
d
themselves as Whites for deception). Those "Cossack Corps" were made of all nationalit
ies
from Romanians to Chinese with a full-blown Latvian cavalry regiment. A Russian, Vital
y
Primakov, was in command and its Political Department was headed by I.I. Minz (by Isaa
c
Greenberg in the Second Division) and S. Turovskiy was head of the Headquarters. A.
Shilman was the head of operative section of the staff, S. Davidson managed the divisi
on
newspaper, and Ya.Rubinov was in charge of the administrative section of the staff. 9
139

Since we began particularizing let's look at the famous leaders of the Red Army, at th
ose
never-fading names: Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, Vasily Blucher, Semyon Budyonny, Klim
Voroshilov, Boris Dumenko, Pavel Dybenko, Aleksa Dundich, Dmitry Zhloba, Vasily Kikvid
ze,
Epifan Kovtukh, G ri gory Koto vsky, Philip Mi ronov, Mikhail Muravyov, Vita ly Primak
ov, Ivan
Sorokin, Semyon Timoshenko, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, leronim Uborevich, Mikhail Frunze,
Vasily Chapaev, Yefim Shchadenko, Nikolay Shchors. Why, couldn't they pull it off with
out
Jews?

Ortake hundreds and thousands of Russian generals and officers of the former Imperial
Army, who served in the Red Army, though not in the political sections (they were not
invited there), but in other significant posts. True, they had a commissar with a gun
behind
them, and many served on pain of execution of their hostage families especially in cas
e of
military failures. Yet they gave an invaluable advantage to the Reds, which actually m
ight
have been crucial for the eventual victory of Bolsheviks. Why, "just about half of the
officers
of the General Staff worked for the Bolsheviks." 10

And we should not forget that initial and fatal susceptibility of many Russian peasant
s (by no
means all of them, of course) to Bolshevik propaganda. Shulgin flatly noted: "Death to
the
Bourgeois" was so successful in Russia because the smell of blood inebriates, alas, so
many
Russians; and they get into a frenzy like wild beasts." 11

Yet let's avoid going into another unreasonable extreme, such as the following: "The m
ost
zealous executioners in Cheka were not at all the 'notorious Jews,' but the recent min
ions of
the throne, generals and officers." 12 As though they would be tolerated in there, in
the
Cheka ! They were invited there with the only one purpose — to be executed. Yet why su
ch a
quick-temper? Those Jews, who worked in the Cheka, were, of course, not the "notoriou
s
Jews," but quite young and "committed" ones, with revolutionary garbage filling their
heads.
And I deem that they served not as executioners but mostly as interrogators.
The Cheka ("Extraordinary Commission," Che-Ka) was established in December 1917. It
instantly gained strength and by the beginning of 1918 it was already filling the enti
re
populace with mortal fear. In fact, it was the Cheka that started the "Red Terror" lon
g before
its beginning was officially announced on September 5, 1918. The Cheka practiced terro
r
from the moment of its inception and continued it long after the end of the Civil War.
By
January of 1918, the Cheka was "enforcing the death penalty on the spot without
investigation and trial." Then the country saw the snatching of hundreds and later tho
usands
of absolutely innocent hostages, their mass executions at night or mass drowning in wh
ole
barges. Historian S. P. Melgunov, who himself happened to experience perilous incarcer
ation
in Cheka prisons, unforgettably reflected upon the whole epic story of the "Red Terro
r" in his
famous book "Red Terror" in Russia 1918-1923.

"There was not a single town or a district without an office of the omnipotent Ail-Rus
sian
Extraordinary Commission [that is, the Cheka], which from now on becomes the main nerv
e
of state governance and absorbs the last vestiges of law"; "there was not a single pla
ce (in
the RSFSR [Russian Federation]) without ongoing executions"; "a single verbal order of
one
man (Dzerzhinsky) doomed to immediate death many thousand people." And even when
investigation took place, the Chekists [members of the Cheka] followed their official
instructions: "Do not look for evidence incriminating a suspect in hostile speech or a
ction

140

against Soviet power. The very first question you should ask him is about the social c
lass he
belongs to, and what is his descent, upbringing, education and profession. It is thes
e
questions that should determine the suspect's fate (the words of M. Latsis in the bull
etin Red
Terror on November 1, 1918 and in Pravda on December 25, 1918)." Melgunov notes: "Lats
is
was not original here, he simply rephrased the words of Robespierre in Convent about t
he
mass terror: 'To execute the enemies of the Fatherland, it is sufficient to establish
their
identities. Not punishment but elimination is required'." Directives from the center a
re
picked up and distributed all over Russia by the Cheka Weekly and Melgunov cites the
periodical profusely: "Red Sword is published in Kiev ... in an editorial by Lev Krain
y we read:
'Old foundations of morality and humanity invented by the bourgeoisie do not and canno
t
exist for us'.... A. certain Schwartz follows: 'The proclaimed Red Terror should be
implemented in a proletarian way... If physical extermination of all servants of Tsari
sm and
capitalism is the prerequisite for the establishment of the worldwide dictatorship of
proletariat, then it wouldn't stop us.'" 13

It was a targeted, pre-designed and long-term Terror. Melgunov also provides estimates
of
the body count of that "unheard-of swing of murders" (precise numbers were practically
not
available then). "Yet, I suppose these horrors ... pale into insignificance with respe
ct to the
number of victims if compared to what happened in the South after the end of the Civil
War.
Denikin's [the general of the White army in command of the South Russian front] rule w
as
crumbling. New power was ascending, accompanied by a bloody reign of vengeful terror,
of
mere retaliation. At this point it was not a civil war, it was physical liquidation of
a former
adversary." There were waves and waves of raids, searches, new raids and arrests. "Ent
ire
wards of prisoners are escorted out and every last man is executed. Because of the lar
ge
number of victims, a machine-gun is used"; "they execute 15-16-years-old children and
60-
years-old elders." The following is a quote from a Cheka announcement in the Kuban reg
ion:
"Cossack villages and settlements, which give shelter to Whites and Greens [Ukrainian
nationalists], will be destroyed, the entire adult population — executed, and all prop
erty —
confiscated." After Wrangel [another White general] left, "Crimea was dubbed the 'All-

Russian Cemetery'" (different estimates suggest the number of murdered as between

120,000 and 150,000). "In Sevastopol people were not just shot but hanged, hanged by
dozens and even by hundreds," Nakhimov Prospect [a major street] was lined with the
corpses of the hanged ... people arrested on the streets and hastily executed without
trial."
Terror in the Crimea continued through 1921. 14
But no matter how deep we dig into the history of Cheka, special departments, special
squads, too many deeds and names will remain unknown, covered by the decomposed
remnants of witnesses and the ash of incinerated Bolshevik documents. Yet even the
remaining documents are overly eloquent. Here is a copy of a secret "Extract from the
protocol of a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All -Rus
sian
Communist Party of Bolsheviks" dated by April 18, 1919, obtained from the Trotsky arch
ive
at Columbia University.

"Attended cc. [comrades] Lenin, Krestinsky, Stalin, Trotsky.

Heard: ...3. Statement of c. Trotsky that Jews and Latvians constitute a huge percenta
ge of
officials in the front-line Chekas, front-line and rear area executive commissions and
central

141

Soviet agencies, and that their percentage in the front-line troops is relatively smal
l, and that
because of this, strong chauvinist agitation is conducted among the Red Army soldiers
with
certain success, and that, according to c. Trotsky's opinion, it is necessary to redis
tribute the
Party personnel to achieve a more uniform representation of officials of all nationali
ties
between front-line and rear areas.

Decided: To propose cc. Trotsky and Smilga to draft an appropriate Directive of the Ce
ntral
Committee to the commissions responsible for the allotment of cadres between the centr
al
and local Soviet organizations and the front." 15

Yet it is hard to believe that the meeting produced the intended effect. A contemporar
y
researcher, the first who approached "the problem of the role and place of Jews (and o
ther
ethnic minorities) in Soviet machinery," studied declassified archive documents and
concluded that "at the initial stage of activity of the punitive agencies, during the
'Red
Terror,' national minorities constituted approximately 50% of the central Cheka appara
tus,
with their representation on the major posts reaching 70%." 16 The author provides
September 25, 1918 statistical data: among the ethnic minorities — numerous Latvians a
nd
fairly numerous Poles "- the Jews are quite noticeable, especially among "major and ac
tive
Cheka officials," i.e., commissars and investigators. For instance, among the "investi
gators of
the Department of Counter-Revolutionary Activities - the most important Cheka
department - half were Jews." 17

Below are the service records of several Chekists of the very first call (from the Rus
sian
Jewish Encyclopedia). 18

Veniamin Gerson was in the Cheka from 1918, and from 1920 he was a personal referent t
o
Dzerzhinsky.

Israel Leplevsky, a former member of Bund, joined the Bolsheviks in 1917 and worked in
the
Cheka from 1918; he was the head of the State Political Directorate [formed from the C
heka
in 1922] of the Podolsk Guberniya and laterof the Special Department of Odessa. And h
e
climbed all the way up to the post of head of the OGPU [Joint State Political Director
ate, the
successorto the Cheka] of USSR! Later he occupied posts of Narkom of Internal Affairs
of
Byelorussia and Uzbekistan.

Zinovy Katznelson became a Chekist immediately after the October Revolution; later he
was
a head of special departments in several armies, and then of the entire Southern Fron
t. Still
later we can see him in the highest ranks in the Cheka headquarters, and even later a
t
different times he was in charge of the Cheka of the Archangel Guberniya, the
Transcaucasian Cheka, the North Caucasus GPU, the Kharkov GPU [another Cheka -successo
r
secret police organization]; he also was deputy to the Narkom of Internal Affairs of U
kraine
and deputy head of the entire GULag [that is, the government agency that administered
the
main Soviet penal labor camp systems].

Solomon Mogilevsky was chair of the Ivano-Voznesensk tribunal in 1917, then in charge
of
Cheka in Saratov. Later we find him again in an army tribunal; and after that he was i
n
succession: deputy head of the Bureau of Investigations of the Moscow Cheka, head of
Foreign Affairs Department of Cheka headquarters, and head of the Cheka of Transcaucas
ia .

142

Did Ignaty Vizner contemplate the scale of his actions when he investigated the case o
f
Nicolay Gumilev? Not likely- he was too busy. He served in the Special Section at the
Presidium of Cheka headquarters, he was the founder of the Bryansk Cheka, and later h
e
was an investigator in the case of the Kronstadt Uprising and a special plenipotentiar
y of the
Presidium of the Cheka-GPU on cases of special importance.

Lev Levin-Velsky, former member of the Bund [a Jewish socialist labor organization], w
as in
charge of the Cheka of the Simbirsk Guberniya in 1918-1919, later of the Special Depar
tment
of the 8 th Army, still later of the Cheka of the Astrakhan Guberniya. Beginning in 19
21, he
was an envoy plenipotentiary of the central Cheka in the Far East, and later, from 192
3, an
envoy plenipotentiary of the OGPU in Central Asia. Still later, from the beginning of
1930, he
worked in the Moscow OGPU. (And even later in his career he was deputy Narkom of
Internal Affairs of the USSR.)

Or consider Nahum (Leonid) Etington: active in the Cheka beginning in 1919, later head
of
the Cheka of the Smolensk Guberniya; still later he worked in the GPU of Bashkiria; it
was he
who orchestrated the assassination of Trotsky.

Isaak(Semyon) Schwartz: in 1918-1919 he was the very first chair of the All-Ukranian C
heka.
He was succeeded by Yakov Lifshitz who beginning in 1919 was the head of the Secret
Operations Division and simultaneously a deputy head of the Cheka of the Kiev Guberniy
a;
later he was deputy head of the Cheka of the Chernigov Guberniya, and still later — of
the
Kharkov Guberniya; and even later he was in charge of the Operative Headquarters of th
e
All-Ukrainian Cheka; still later, in 1921-1922, he ran the Cheka of the Kiev Guberniy
a.
Let's look at the famous Matvei Berman. He began his career in a districtCheka in the
North
Urals; in 1919 he was assigned as deputy dead of the Cheka of the Yekaterinburg Gubern
iya,
from 1920 - head of Cheka of Tomsk Guberniya, from 1923 - of the Buryat-Mongolian
Guberniya, from 1924- Deputy Head of the OGPU of all of Central Asia, from 1928 - head
of
the OGPU of Vladivostok, from 1932 - head of the entire GULag and simultaneously a
deputy Narkom of the NKVD [a successor organization to the Cheka, GPU and OGPU] (from
1936). (His brother Boris was in the State Intelligence Organs since 1920; in 1936 he
served
as deputy head of foreign intelligence section in the NKVD.) Boris Pozern, a commissar
of the
Petrograd Commune, substantially contributed to matching images of a Jew and that of
a
Chekistin people's minds; on September 2, 1918, he co-signed the proclamation on "Red
Terror" with Zinoviev and Dzerzhinsky. (The Encyclopedia missed one Aleksandr loselevi
ch,
secretary of the Petrograd Cheka, who had co-signed the Red Terror execution lists wit
h
Gleb Bokiy in September, 1918.)

Yet there were others, even more famous individuals. For instance, Yakov Agranov, a Ch
ekist,
phenomenally successful in conducting repressions; he invented "Tagantzev's Conspirac
y"
(through which he had killed Gumilev); he directed "cruel interrogations of participan
ts of
the Kronstadt Uprising." Or take notorious Yakov Blumkin, who participated in the
assassination of the German ambassador in 1918; he was arrested and later amnestied, a
nd
then served in Trotsky's secretariat, and later -in Mongolia, Transcaucasia, the Middl
e East,
and was shot in 1929.

143

And there were numerous personnel behind every Cheka organizer.... And hundreds and
thousands of innocents met them during interrogations, in basements and during the
executions.

There were Jews among the victims too. Those who suffered from the massive communist
onslaught on the "bourgeoisie" were mostly merchants. "In the Maloarkhangelsk Distric
t, a
merchant (Yushkevich) was placed on a red-hot cast-iron stove by members of a communis
t
squad for failure to pay taxes." (From the same source: some peasants, who defaulted o
n
the surplus appropriation system, were lowered on ropes into water wells to simulate
drowning; or, during the winter, they froze people into ice pillars for failure to pa
y
revolutionary taxes. The particular sort of punishment depended on the imagination of
the
executioners. 19 ) Similarly, Korolenko described how two millers, named Aronov and Mi
rkin,
were extrajudicially shot for not complying with absurd communist-mandated prices on
flour. 20 Or here is another example. In 1913, former Kiev Governor Sukovkin advocate
d
innocence of Beilis [during Beilis' Trial]. When the Reds came, he was arrested. Thous
ands of
Jews in Kiev signed a petition on his behalf, yet the Cheka had shot him nevertheles
s.

How then can we explain that the Russian populace generally regarded the new terror a
s
"Jewish terror"? Look how many innocent Jews were accused of that. Why was the
perception that Chekists and Jews were all but the same so widespread among both the
Reds and the Whites alike and among the people in general? Who is responsible for tha
t?
Many. And the White Army is also responsible as we discuss below. Yet not the least am
ong
these reasons is because of the Chekists themselves, who facilitated this identificati
on by
their ardent service on the highest posts in Cheka.

Today we hear bitter complaints that it was not only Jews who clung to the power, and
why
any particular clemency should be expected from the Jewish Chekists? True. These
objections, however, cannot alterthe harsh certitude: the incredibly enormous power on
an
unimaginable scale had come into the hands of those Jewish Chekists, who at that time
were
supreme, by status and rank, representatives of Russian Jewry (no matter how horribly
it
sounds). And those representatives (again, not elected by their own people) were not
capable of finding enough self-restraint and self-scrutinizing sobriety to come aroun
d, check
themselves, and opt out. It is like the Russian cautionary proverb: "Ah, do not hurry
to grab,
first blow on your fingers" And the Jewish people (who did not elect those Chekists as
their
representatives), that already numerous and active city-dwelling community (weren't th
ere
prudent elders among them?) also failed to stop them: be careful, we area small minori
ty in
this country! (Yet who listened to elders in that age?)

G. Landau writes: "Loss of affiliation with a social class overthrew the fine structur
e of Jewish
society and destroyed the inner forces of resistance and even that of stability, sendi
ng even
them under the chariot of triumphant Bolshevism." He finds that apart from the ideas o
f
socialism, separatist nationalism, and permanent revolution, "we were astonished to fi
nd
among the Jews what we never expected from them — cruelty, sadism, unbridled violence
— everything that seemed so alien to a people so detached from physical activity; thos
e who
yesterday couldn't handle a rifle, today were among the vicious cutthroats." 21

Here is more about the aforementioned Revekka Plastinina-Maizel from the Archangel
Guberniya Cheka: "Infamous for her cruelty all over the north of Russia..., [she] volu
ntarily

144

'perforated napes and foreheads'... and personally shot more than one hundred men." O
r
"about one Baka who was nicknamed 'a bloody boy' for his youth and cruelty" — first "i
n
Tomsk and then as the head of the Cheka" of the Irkutsk Guberniya. 22 (Plastinina's ca
reer
carried her up right to a seat in the Supreme Court of RSFSR which she occupied in 194
0s. 23 )
Some may recall the punitive squad of Mandelbaum in Archangel in the north of Russia,
others — the squad of "Mishka-Yaponchik" in Ukraine....

What would you expect from peasants in the Tambov Guberniya if, during the heat of th
e
suppression of the great peasant uprising in this Central-Russian black-earth region,
the
dismal den of the Tambov Gubcom was inhabited by masterminds of grain allotments,
secretaries of Gubcom P. Raividand Pinson and by the head of the propaganda departmen
t,
Eidman? (A. G. Shlikhter, whom we remember from Kiev in 1905, was there as well, this
time
as the chairman of the Executive Committee of the guberniya.) Y. Goldin was the Foodst
uffs
Commissar of the Tambov Guberniya; it was he who triggered the uprising by exorbitant
confiscations of grain, whereas one N. Margolin, commander of a grain confiscation squ
ad,
was famous for whipping the peasants who failed to provide grain. (And he murdered the
m
too.) According to Kakurin, who was the chief of staff to Tukhachevsky, a plenipotenti
ary
representative of the Cheka headquarters in the Tambov Guberniya during that period wa
s
Lev Levin. Of course, not only Jews were in it! However, when Moscow took the suppress
ion
of the uprising into her own hands in February 1921, the supreme command of the
operation was assigned to Efraim Sklyansky, the head of "Interdepartmental Anti-Bandit
ry
Commission," — and so the peasants, notified about that with leaflets, were able to dr
aw
their own conclusions.

And what should we say about the genocide on the river Don, when hundreds of thousand
s
of the flower of Don Cossacks were murdered? What should we expect from the Cossack
memories when we take into consideration all those unsettled accounts between a
revolutionary Jew and a Don Cossack?

In August 1919, the Volunteer Army took Kiev and opened several Chekas and found the
bodies of those recently executed; Shulgin composed nominal lists of victims using fun
eral
announcements published in the reopened Kievlyanin; one can't help noticing that almos
t all
names were Slavic... it was the "chosen Russians" who were shot. Materials produced by
the
Special Investigative Commission in the South of Russia provide insights into the Kiev
Cheka
and its command personnel (based on the testimony of a captured Cheka interrogator) 2
5 :
"The headcount of the 'Cheka' staff varied between 150 and 300 ... percentage -wise, t
here
was 75% Jews and 25% others, and those in charge were almost exclusively Jews." Out o
f
twenty members of the Commission, i.e., the top brass who determined people's destinie
s,
fourteen were Jews. "All detained were kept either in the 'Cheka' building or in the
Lukyanov's prison.... A special shed was fitted for executions in the building on Inst
itutskaya
St. 40, on the corner with Levashovskaya St., where the main 'Cheka' office of the gub
erniya
had moved from Ekaterininskaya St. An executioner (and sometimes 'amateur' Chekists)
escorted a completely naked victim into a shed and ordered the victim to fall facedown
on
the ground. Then he finished the victim with a shot in the back of the head. Execution
s were
performed using revolvers (typically Colts). Usually because of the short distance, th
e skull of
the executed person exploded into fragments.... The next victim was similarly escorted
inside
and laid down nearby.... When number of victims was exceeding ... the capacity of the
shed,

145

new victims were laid down right upon the dead or were shot at the entrance of the she
d....
Usually the victims went to their execution without resistance."

This is what the "people were whispering about." Ortake another incident, witnessed b
y
Remizov (whom it is hard to suspect of anti-Semitism given his revolutionary-democrati
c
past): "Recently there was a military training nearby, at the Academy, and one Red Arm
y
soldier said: 'Comrades, lets not go to the front, it is all because of Yids that we f
ight!' And
someone with a brief-case asked him: 'Which regiment are you from?' And the soldier ag
ain:
'Comrades, let's not goto the front, it is all because of Yids!' And that one with a b
riefcase
ordered: 'Shoot him!' Then two other Red Army soldiers came out and the first one trie
d to
flee. But he didn't make it to the corner as others got him and shot him - his brain s
pilled
over and there was a pool of blood." 26

The Kronstadt Uprising had distinctly anti-Jewish character (and so all the more was i
t
doomed): they destroyed portraits of Trotsky and Zinoviev [both Jewish], but not those
of
Lenin. And Zinoviev didn't have guts to goto negotiate with the rebels - he would be t
orn
into pieces. So they sent Kalinin [Russian].

There were labor strikes in Moscow in February 1921 that had the slogan: "Down with
Communists and Jews!"

We have already mentioned that during the Civil War the majority of Russian socialists
(and
there were numerous Jews among them) were, of course, on Lenin's side, not on Admiral
Kolchak's and some of them actually fought for the Bolsheviks. (For example, consider
Bund
member Solomon Schwartz: during the period of the provisional government, he was a
director of a department in a ministry; during the Civil War he volunteered to the Red
Army
though he did not indicate his rank; later he emigrated abroad where he published two
books about the Jewish situation in the USSR; we will cite him below.)

Thus it looked as though not only Bolshevik Jews, but all of Jewry had decided to take
the
Red side in the Civil War. Could we claim that their choice was completely deliberate?
No.
Could we claim that they didn't have any other choice? Again, no.

Shulgin describes the enormous exodus from Kiev on October 1, 1919 as the city was to
be
surrendered to Bolsheviks. It was an entirely Russian exodus, people were leaving on f
oot
with knapsacks, across the bridges over Dnepr river; he estimated their numbers at aro
und
60,000. "There were no Jews in this exodus: they were not noticeable among those many
thousands of Russians (men, women and children), with bundles in their hands streamin
g
across the beautiful Chain Bridge under a sorrowful net of rain." There were more tha
n
100,000 Jews in Kiev at that time, Shulgin writes. And all of those rich and very rich
Jews —
they didn't leave, they chose to stay and wait for arrival of Bolsheviks. "The Jews de
cided not
to share their fate with us. And with that they carved a new and possibly the deepest
divide
between us." 27

So it was in many other places. According to the testimony of socialist-revolutionary

S.
Maslov: "It is a fact that in towns and cities of southern Russia, especially in citie
s to the west
of the Dnepr that changed hands repeatedly, the arrival of Soviets was most celebrated
and

146

the most of hollow sympathy was expressed in the Jewish quarters, and not infrequentl
y
only in those alone." 28

A contemporary American historian (Bruce Lincoln, author of a big treatise about our C
ivil
War) "said that the entire Ukrainian Cheka was composed of almost 80% by Jews," that
"can
be explained by the fact that, prior to arrival of the Reds, cruel pogroms went on non
-stop;
indeed those were the bloodiest pogroms since the times of Bogdan Khmelnytsky [leader
of
the Cossack rebellion in Ukraine in 1648-1657]. " 29 We will discuss the pogroms soon,
though
it should be noted that the time sequence was actually the opposite: those 80% [Jews]
were
already staffing the Cheka in 1918, whereas the Petliura's [a Ukrainian publicist, wri
ter,
journalist who was head of state during the Ukrainian independence of 1918-1920] pogro
ms
only gathered momentum during 1919 (the pogroms by White Army troops began in the fal
l
of 1919).

Yet it is impossible to answer the eternal question who is the guilty party, who pushe
d it into
abyss. Of course, it is incorrect to say that the Kiev Cheka did what it did because i
t was
three-quarters Jewish. Still, this is something that Jewish people should remember an
d
reflect upon.

And yes, there were Jews then who appealed to their compatriots looking back on the
tragedy that had befallen both Russia and Russian Jewry. In their proclamation To the
Jews
of all countries!, this group wrote in 1923 that "overly zealous participation of Jewi
sh
Bolsheviks in the oppression and destruction of Russia ... is blamed upon all of u
s ... the
Soviet rule is identified with Jewish rule, and fierce hatred of Bolsheviks turns into
the
equally fierce hatred of Jews.... [We] firmly believe that Bolshevism is the worst of
all evils
possible for the Jews and all other peoples of Russia, and that to fight tooth and nai
l against
the rule of that international rabble over Russia is oursacred duty before humankind,
culture, before our Motherland and the Jewish people." 30 Yet the Jewish community
"reacted to these declarations with great indignation." 31 (We will discuss it in the
next
chapter.)
***

The Civil Warspilled over Russia's borders. Let's review that briefly (though the even
ts in
Europe are outside of the scope of this book).

The Bolsheviks invaded Poland in 1920. (At this point they had recalled and adroitly u
sed the
Russian "national longing and national enthusiasm" — as Nahamkis-Steklov put it in an
Izvestia editorial. 32 ) And it appears that Polish Jews met the Red Army very warml
y.
According to a Soviet source, whole battalions of Jewish workers participated in the f
ighting
at Minsk. 33 Reading from the Jewish Encyclopedia: "on numerous occasions, Poles accus
ed
Jews of supporting the enemy, of 'anti-Polish', 'pro-Bolshevist' and even 'pro-Ukraini
an'
attitudes." During the Soviet-Polish war many Jews "were killed [by Polish Army] on ch
arges
of spying for the Red Army." 34 However, we should be wary of possible exaggerations h
ere
as we remember similaraccusations in espionage made by Russian military authorities
during the war, in 1915.

147

The Soviets quickly formed a revolutionary "government" for Poland headed by F.

Dzerzhinsky. In it were Y. Markhlevsky and F. Kon. Of course, they were surrounded by
"blood work" specialists and ardent propagandists. (Among the latter we see a former
pharmacist from Mogilev A. I. Rotenberg. Soon after the aborted Red revolution in Pola
nd,
he, together with Bela Kun and Zalkind-Zemlyachka, went on to conduct the deadly
"cleansing" of the Crimea. In 1921 he participated in that glorious work again - this
time
"purging" Georgia, again under the direct command of Dzerzhinsky. At the end of 1920s
Rotenberg was in charge of the Moscow NKVD.)

Not only Poland but Hungary and Germany as well were affected by the Red Revolution. A
n
American researcher writes: "the intensity and tenacity of anti-Semitic prejudice in b
oth the
east and the center of Europe was significantly influenced by Jewish participation in
the
revolutionary movement." "Inthe beginning of 1919, the Soviets, under predominantly
Jewish leadership, started revolutions in Berlin and Munich," and "the share of activi
st Jews
was" disproportionately high in the German Communist Party of that period," though "th
at
party's support inthe Jewish community at large was not significant." Four out of elev
en
members of the Central Committee were Jews with a university education." In December
1918, one of them, Rosa Luxemburg, wrote: "In the name of the greatest aspirations of
humankind, our motto when we deal with our enemies is: "Finger into the eye, knee on t
he
chest!" Rebellion in Munich was led by a theater critic, Kurt Eisner, a Jew of "bohemi
an
appearance." He was killed, but the power in conservative and Catholic Bavaria was sei
zed
by "a new government made up of leftist intellectual Jews, who proclaimed the 'Bavaria
n
Soviet Republic'"(G. Landauer, E. Toller, E. Muhsam, O. Neurath) In a week the republi
c "was
overthrown by an even more radical group," which declared the "Second Bavarian Soviet
Republic" with Eugen Levine at the helm. 35 Let's read an article about him in the
Encyclopedia: born into merchant Jewish family, he used to be a socialist-revolutionar
y; he
participated in the [Russian] revolution of 1905, later became German national, joined
the
"Spartacist movement" of R. Luxemburg and K. Liebknecht, and now he became the head o
f
the Communist government in Bavaria, which also included the above mentioned E. Muhsa
m,
E. Toller and a native of Russia, M. Levin. 36 The uprising was defeated in May 1919.
"The fact
that the leaders of the suppressed Communist revolts were Jews was one of the most
important reasons for the resurrection of political anti-Semitism in contemporary
Germany." 37

"While Jews played a "quite conspicuous" role in the Russian and German communist
revolutions, their role in Hungary became central.... Out of 49 People's Commissars th
ere, 31
were Jews," Bela Kun being the most prominent of them; "the foreign minister (de-fact
o
head of government)," he would orchestrate a bloodbath in the Crimea half a year late
r.
Here we find Matyas Rakosi,TiborSzamuely, Gyorgy Lukacs. "Granted, the prime-minister
was a gentile, Sandor Garbai, but Rakosi later joked that Garbai was elected because
someone had to sign execution orders on Sabbath days." "Statues of Hungarian kings an
d
heroes were knocked off their pedestals, the national anthem outlawed, and wearing th
e
national colors criminalized." "The tragedy of the situation was escalated by the fact
that
historically Hungarian Jews were much wealthier than their Eastern-European countryme
n
and were much more successful in Hungarian society." 38

148

The direct relation between the Hungarian Soviet Republic and our Civil War becomes mo
re
clear by the virtue of the fact that special Red Army Corps were being prepared to go
to the
rescue of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, but they couldn't manage it in time and the
Republic fell (in August 1919).

***

The breakdown of the universally hated Russian Empire cost all involved dearly, includ
ing
the Jews. G. Landau writes: "In general, revolution is gruesome, risky and dangerous
business. It is especially gruesome and dangerous for a minority, which in many ways i
s alien
to the bulk of population.... To secure their wellbeing, such minority should unwaveri
ngly
cling to law and rely on unshakable continuity of social order and on the inertia of s
tatutory
power. Forces of revolutionary misalignment and permissiveness hit such a minority
particularly hard." 39

It was looming — straightforward, into the so promising future! Yet in the near futur
e,
during the Civil War, there was no law and Jewry was hit by pillages and pogroms on th
e
scale not even close to anything they experienced in days of the Tsar. And those pogro
ms
were launched not by the White side. Because of the density of the Jewish population i
n
Ukraine, it was inevitable that a third force, apart from the Reds and Whites, would i
nterfere
in the Jewish destinies — that of Ukrainian separatism.

In April 1917, when the Ukrainian Rada [upper house of parliament] assembled for the f
irst
time, "Jewry ... did not yet believe in the victory of Ukrainian Nationalism," and tha
t was
manifested in the character of their voting during municipal summer elections: Jews di
d not
have "any reason" to vote for Ukrainian separatists. 40 But already in June, when some
thing
resembling real independent Ukrainian governance was taking shape — under which
apparently the Jews would have to live from now on — the Jewish representatives entere
d
the Lesser [lower] Rada, and a Vice-Secretariat on Jewish nationality ("Jewish Ministr
y") was
established. The latter worked on the long-cherished project of "Jewish National Auton
omy"
(according to which every nationality and now - the Jewish one, creates its own nation
al
union, which can legislate according to the needs and interests of their nation and fo
r that it
receives financial support from the treasury, and a representative of the union become
s a
member of the cabinet). Initially, the formative Ukrainian government was generally
benevolent toward Jews, but by the end of 1917 the mood changed, and the bill on
autonomy was met in the Rada with laughter and contempt; nevertheless, in January 191
8,
it was passed, though with difficulties. For their part, the Jews reluctantly accepted
"the
Third Universal" (November 9, 1917, the initiation of Ukrainian independence from Russ
ia)
as now they feared anarchy, traditionally dangerous for Jewish populations, and were a
fraid
of a splitwithin Russian Jewry. Still, Jewish philistines were making fun of the Ukrai
nian
language and shop-signs, were afraid of Ukrainian nationalism, and believed in the Rus
sian
state and Russian culture. 41 Lenin wrote: Jews, like Great Russians, "ignore the sign
ificance
of the national question in Ukraine." 42

However, everything pointed toward secession and the Jewish delegates in the Rada did
not
dare to vote against the Fourth Universal (January 11, 1918, on complete secession of
Ukraine). Immediately thereafter, the Bolsheviks began an offensive against Ukraine. T
he
first "Ukrainian" Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks wa
s

149

formed in Moscow and later moved to Kharkov; it was headed by Georgiy Pyatakov and
among its members were Semyon Schwartz and Serafima Gopner. When by the end of
January 1918 they moved to Kiev, Grigory Chudnovsky took the post of the Commissar of
Kiev, Kreitzberg became a commissarof finances, D. Raikhstein" press commissar, Shapir
o
— commissar of the army. "There was no shortage of Jewish names among the top
Bolsheviks ... in such centers as Odessa and Ekaterinoslav. That was sufficient to fue
l talks
about "Bolshevik Jews" and "Jewish Bolsheviks" among the troops loyal to the Rada. Ver
bal
cursing about "traitorous Jews" became almost commonplace"; "in the very midst of stre
et
fighting [for Kiev], the Zionist fraction produced an official inquiry on the matter o
f anti-
Jewish excesses." The question turned into a "verbal skirmish between Ukrainian delega
tes
and representatives of national minorities." 43

Thus enmity split apart the Jews and the Ukrainian separatists.

"The Ukrainian government and the leaders of Ukrainian parties were evacuated to Zhito
mir,
but the Jewish representatives did not follow them," they remained under the Bolshevik
s.
And in addition, the Bolsheviks in Kiev were "supported by a sizable group of Jewish w
orkers,
who returned from England after the [February, Kerensky] revolution" and who now wholl
y
siding with the Soviet regime ... took up the posts of commissars and ... officials,"
and
created a "special Jewish squad of Red Guards." 44

Yet soon after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk [in which the Soviets ced
ed
Ukraine to the Central Powers] as the government of independent Ukraine returned to Ki
ev
under the aegis of Austrian and German bayonets in the beginning of February of 1918,
the
"haidamakas" [spontaneous, popular uprisings against Polish rule that took place in Uk
raine
in the 18th century] and "free Cossacks" began snatching and shooting any former "Jewi
sh
commissars," they could find. Yet those were not actual Jewish pogroms, and very soon
Petliura's government was replaced by the Hetman government of [Cossack leader]
Skoropadsky for the next seven months. "The command of the units of the German Army
that had occupied Kiev in the spring, treated the needs of Jewish population with
understanding." (And that population was not-insubstantial: in 1919, 21% of Kiev's
inhabitants were Jewish. 45 ) AJewish Kadet [a member of Russian Constitutional Democr
at
Party] Sergei Gutnik became the Minister of Trade and Industry in the Hetman
government. 46 Under the Hetmanate, Zionists acted without hindrance, and an independe
nt
Jewish Provisional National Assembly and a Jewish National Secretariat were elected.

Yet Hetmanate fell and in December 1918 Kiev came under the control of the Directorate
of
Ukraine led by Petliura and Vynnychenko. The Bund and Poale-Zion [a movement of Marxis
t
Jewish workers] did their best to help their fellow socialists of the Directorate and
Jewish
Secretariat and also made conciliatory moves. But Petliura saw it differently. His mou
thpiece,
the newspaper Vidrodzhennya wrote: "The birth of the Ukrainian State was not expected
by
the Jews. The Jews did not anticipate it despite having an extraordinary ability of ge
tting the
wind of any news. They ... emphasize their knowledge of Russian language and ignore th
e
fact of Ukrainian statehood ... Jewry again has joined the side of our enemy." 47 Jews
were
blamed for all the Bolshevikvictories in Ukraine. In Kiev, the Sich Riflemen plundere
d
apartments of wealthy people which in masse came over to the capital while the militar
y
and atamans [originally Cossack commanders, then used by the Ukrainian National Army]

150

robbed smallertowns and shtetls. That year, a regiment named after Petliura inaugurate
d
mass pogroms by pillaging the town of Sarny.

A Jewish deputy from the Lesser Rada attempted toward off the growing tendency toward
pogroms among Petliura's troops: "We need to warn Ukrainians that you cannot found you
r
state on anti-Semitism. Leaders of the Directorate should remember that they are deali
ng
with the world's people, which outlived many of its enemies" and threatened to start
a
struggle against such government. 48 Jewish parties quickly began to radicalize toward
the
Left, thus inevitably turning their sympathies to Bolshevism.

Arnold Margolin, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, said that the sit
uation
in Ukraine was reminiscent of the worst times of Khmelnytsky and Gonta [Cossack leade
r
against Polish occupation of Ukraine]. 49 D. Pasmanik bitterly noted that Zionists and
Jewish
nationalists supported the Directorate's government for a while even when a nti -Jewis
h
pogroms raged across Ukraine 50 : "How could Jewish socialists forget about the pogrom
ist
attitudes of Petliura and other heroes of the Ukrainian Revolution".. How could they f
orget
about the Jewish blood shed by the descendants and disciples of Khmelnytsky, Gonta an
d
Zalizniak"" 51 Between December 1918 and August 1919, Petliura's troops carried out do
zens
of pogroms, killing, according to the Commission of International Red Cross, around 5
0,000
Jews. The largest pogrom happened on February 15, 1919, in Proskurov after a failed
Bolshevik coup attempt. 52 "Jewish pogroms that went on non-stop from the very moment
of
Ukrainian independence became particularly ferocious during the period of the so-calle
d
Directorate and kept going until the Ukrainian armed forces existed." 53

S. Maslov writes: "True, in the Tsar's times Jews were killed during pogroms but they
have
never had been killed in such numbers as now and with such callous indifference";
"sometimes during anti-Jewish pogroms by rebellious peasant bands the entire shtetls w
ere
exterminated with indiscriminate slaughter of children, women and elders." 54 After th
e
pogromists finished with their business, peasants from surrounding villages usually ar
rived
on wagons to join in looting commercial goods often stored in large amounts in the tow
ns
because of the unsettled times. 55 "All over Ukraine rebels attacked passengertrains a
nd
often commanded 'communists and Jews to get out' of the coach and those who did were
shot right on the spot"; or, checking papers of passengers, "suspected Jews were order
ed to
pronounce 'kukuruza' [corn]) and those who spoke with an accent were escorted out and
executed." 56

American scholar Muller thinks that "the mass extermination of Jews in Ukraine and
Byelorussia during the Civil Warwas by no means a result of articulated policy but rat
her a
common peasant reaction." 57

Independent rebellious bands of Grigoriev, Zelyony, Sokolovsky, Struk, Angel, Tyutyuni

k,
Yatzeiko, Volynetz and Kozyr-Zirka were particularly uncontrolled and because of this
acted
with extreme atrocity. However, Nestor Makhno was different.

The raging Civil War provided fertile soil for the self-realization of Makhno's crimin
al and
rebellious personality. We are not going to recount his villainous and clinically-mad
deeds in
this work, yet it should be noted that he did not harbor anti-Jewish attitudes and tha
t his
anarchist-communist followers loudly proclaimed their "implacable hostility toward an
y

151

form of anti-Semitism." At different times, a certain Aaron Baron was his Chief of Sta
ff, Lev
Zadov-Zenkovsky was his head of counter-intelligence, Volin-Eikhenbaum was head of
Makhno's agitprop, Arshinov was his close adviser, and one Kogan headed Administration
of
Huliaipole [his "capital"]. There was even a 300-strong separate Jewish company among
his
troops, led by Taranovsky, and though atone point they betrayed Makhno, nevetheless
Taranovsky was later pardoned and even made the Makhno's Chief of Staff . "The Jewish
poor joined Makhno's army in masses" and allegedly Makhno trapped and executed ataman
Grigorievfor the latter's anti-Semitism. In March 1919 Makhno executed peasants from
Uspenovka village fora pogrom in the Jewish agricultural colony Gorkoye. However, desp
ite
his indisputable pro-Jewish stance (later in emigration in Paris "he was always in a J
ewish
milieu" until his death), his often uncontrollable troops carried out several Jewish p
ogroms,
for instance, in 1918 near Ekaterinoslav 58 or in the summer of 1919 in Aleksandrovsk,
though
Makhno and his officers rigorously protected Jewish populations and punished pogromist
s
with death." 59

To examine the anti-Jewish pogroms during the Russian Civil War, we consult a large vo
lume
Jewish Pogroms: 1918-1921 compiled by Jewish Public Committee for Aid to Victims of
Pogroms in 1923 and published later in 1926. 60 (The year of publication explains why
we find
nothing about pogroms by the Reds — the book "aims to examine the roles of Petliura's
troops, the Volunteer [White] Army, and Poles in the carnage of pogroms in the describ
ed
period.")

Regulartroops participated in pogroms in larger cities and towns as they marched, wher
eas
independent bands acted in the hinterlands, thus effectively denying the Jews safety
anywhere.

Pogroms by Petliura's troops were particularly atrocious and systematic and sometimes
even
without looting, such as, for example, pogroms inProskurov, Felsztyn andZhytomir in
February of 1919, Ovruch in March, Trostyanets, Uman and Novomirgorod in May 1919. Th
e
worst pogroms by bands were in Smila (March 1919), Elisavetgrad, Radomyshl, Vapniarka
and Slovechno in May 1919, in Dubovka (June 1919); by Denikin's troops - in Fastov
(September 1919) and Kiev (October 1919). In Byelorussia, there were pogroms by Polis
h
troops, for example, in Borisov and in the Bobruisk District, and by Polish-supported
troops
of Bulak-Balachowicz in Mazyr, Turov, Petrakov, Kapatkevitchy, Kovchitsy and Gorodyati
tchy
(in 1919, 1920, and 1921).

Ukrainian Jewry was horrified by the murderous wave of pogroms. During brief periods o
f
respite, the Jewish population fled en masse from already pillaged or threatened place
s.
There was indeed a mass exodus of Jews from shtetls and small towns into larger citie
s
nearby or toward the border with Romania in a foolish hope to find aid there, or they
simply
"aimlesslyfled in panic" as they did from Tetiivand Radomyshl. "The most populous and
flourishing communities were turned into deserts. Jewish towns and shtetls looked lik
e
gloomy cemeteries — homes burnt and streets dead and desolated. Several Jewish
townships were completely wrecked and turned into ashes — Volodarka, Boguslav,
Borshchagovka, Znamenka, Fastov, Tefiapol, Kutuzovka and other places." 61

***

152

Let us now examine the White side. At first glance it may appear counter-intuitive tha
t Jews
did not support the anti-Bolshevik movement. After all, the White forces were substant
ially
more pro-democratic then Bolsheviks (as it was with [White generals] Denikin and Wrang
el)
and included not only monarchists and all kinds of nationalists but also many liberal
groups
and all varieties of anti-Bolshevik socialists. So why didn't we see Jews who shared t
he same
political views and sympathies there?

Fateful events irredeemably separated the Jews from the White movement.

The Jewish Encyclopedia informs us that "initially many Jews of Rostov supported the W
hite
movement. On December 13, 1917 a merchant prince, A. Alperin, gave 800,000 rubles
collected by the Jews of Rostov to A. Kaledin, the leader of Don Cossacks, 'to organiz
e anti-
BolshevikCossacktroops.'" 62 Yet when General Alekseev [another White commander] was
mustering his first squadron in December 1917 in the same city of Rostov and needed fu
nds
and asked (note — asked and did not impress) the Rostov-Nakhichevan bourgeoisie (mainl
y
Jewish and Armenian) for money, they refused and he collected just a dab of money and
was
forced to march out into the winter with unequipped troops - into his Ice March. And l
ater
"all appeals by the Volunteer Army were mostly ignored, yet whenever the Bolsheviks
showed up and demanded money and valuables, the population obediently handed over
millions of rubles and whole stores of goods." 63 When former Russian prime minister
(of the
Provisional Government) prince G. E. Lvov, begging for aid abroad, visited New York an
d
Washington in 1918, he met a delegation of American Jews who heard him out but offere
d
no aid. 64

However, Pasmanik quotes a letter saying that by the end of 1918 "more than three and
half
millions rubles ... were being collected in the exclusive Jewish circle" with accompan
ying
"promises and reassurances" of goodwill toward Jews from the White authorities. Despit
e
that, Jews were officially prohibited to buy land in the Chernomorskaya Guberniya beca
use
of "vicious speculations by several Jews," though the order was revoked soon afterward
s. 65

Here is another example from my own sources: again in Rostov in February 1918 when th
e
White movement was merely nascent and seemed almost hopeless, an elderly Jewish
engineer and manufacturer A. I. Arkhangorodsky, who sincerely considered himself a Rus
sian
patriot, literally pushed his reluctant student son into joining the White youth march
ing out
into the night [February 22], embarking on their Ice March (however, his sisterdidn't
let him
go). The Jewish Encyclopedia also tells us that the "Jews of Rostov were joining Cossa
ck
guerilla squadrons and the student's battalion of [White] general L. Kornilov's army."
66

In Paris in 1975, Col. Levitin, the last surviving commander of the Kornilov Regiment,
told me
that quite a few Jewish warrant officers, who were commissioned in Kerensky's times, w
ere
loyal to Kornilov during the so-called "days of Kornilov" in August 1917. He recalled
one
Katzman, a holder of the Order of St. George from the First Kutepov Division.

Yet we know that many Whites rejected sympathetic or neutral Jews — because of the
prominent involvement of other Jews on the Red side, mistrust and anger was bred amon
g
the White forces. A modern study suggests that "during the first year of its existenc
e, the
White movement was virtually free of anti-Semitism at least in terms of major incident
s and
Jews were actually serving in the Volunteer Army. However ...the situation dramaticall
y

153

changed by 1919. First, after the Allied victory [in WWI], the widespread conviction a
mong
the Whites that Germans helped Bolsheviks was displaced by a mythos about Jews being t
he
backbone of Bolshevism. On the other hand, after the White troops occupied Ukraine, th
ey
came under influence of obsessive local anti-Semitism that facilitated their espousal
of anti-
Jewish actions." 67

The White Army "was hypnotized by Trotsky and Nakhamkis [an agent of the Bolshevik
Central Committee] and that caused the identification of Bolshevism with Jewry and led
to
pogroms." 68 The Whites perceived Russia as occupied by Jewish commissars - and they
marched to liberate her. And given considerable unaccountability of separate units of
that
nascent and poorly organized army strewn over the vast Russian territories and the gen
eral
lack of central authority in that war, it is not surprising that, unfortunately, some
White
troops carried out pogroms. "A. I. Denikin like some other leaders of the South Army
(e.g.,
V. Z. Mai-Mayevsky), endorsed Kadet [the Constitutional Democratic Party] and Socialis
t
Revolutionary views and sought to stop the outrages perpetrated by his troops. Yet tho
se
efforts were not effective." 69

Naturally, many Jews were driven by survival instinct and even if they initially expec
ted
goodwill on the part of the Volunteer Army, after pogroms by Denikin's troops they los
t any
inclination to support the White movement.

Pasmanik provides a lively case. "Aleksandrovsk was taken by the Volunteers from the
Bolsheviks. They were met by unanimous sincere joy of the citizenry.... Overnight half
of the
town was sacked and filled by the screaming and moaning of distressed Jews.... Wives w
ere
raped ... men beaten and murdered, Jewish homes were totally ransacked. The pogrom
continued for three days and three nights. Post-executive Cossack cornet Sliva dismiss
ed
complaints of the Public Administration saying 'it is always like that: we ta ke a cit
y and it
belongs to the troops for three days.'" 70 It is impossible to explain all this plunde
r and
violence by soldiers of the Volunteer Army by actions of Jewish commissars.

A top White general, A. von Lampe, claims that rumors about Jewish pogroms by the Whit
es
are "tendentiously exaggerated", that these pillaging "requisitions" were unavoidable
actions of an army without quartermaster services or regular supplies from the rear ar
eas.
He says that Jews were not targeted deliberately but that all citizens suffered and th
at Jews
"suffered more" because they were "numerous and rich." "I am absolutely confident that
in
the operational theaters of the White armies there were no Jewish pogroms, i.e., no
organized extermination and pillaging of Jews. There were robberies and even murder
s ...
which were purposefully overblown and misrepresented as a nti -Jewish pogroms by speci
al
press.... Because of these accidents, the Second Kuban Infantry Brigade and the Osseti
an
Cavalry Regiment were disbanded.... All the people, be they Christian or Jewish, suffe
red in
disorderly areas." 71 There were executions (on tip offs by locals) of those unfortuna
te
commissars and Chekists who did not manage to escape and there were quite a few Jews
among them.

Events in Fastov in September 1919 appea r differently. According to the Jewish Encycl
opedia,
Cossacks "behaved outrageously ... they killed, raped and flouted Jewish religious fee
lings
(they had broken into a synagogue during Yom Kippur, beat up the whole congregation,
raped the women and tore apart the Torah scrolls.) About one thousand were killed." 72
A

154

methodical quarter-by-quarter pillaging of Jews in Kiev after a brief return of the Wh

ite
troops in the end of October 1919 was dubbed the "quiet pogrom." Shulgin writes: "The
commanders strictly prohibited 'pogroms.' Yetthe "Yids" were really an annoyance and,
secondly, the 'heroes' were hungry.... In general, the Volunteers in large cities were
starving."
There were nights of plunder but without murder and rape. It was "the end of Deniki
n's
period ... and the beginning of the agony of the Volunteer Army." 73

"By the route of its offensive and, particularly, its retreat," during its last brutal
retreat in
November-December of 1919, the White Army carried out "a large number of Jewish
pogroms" (acknowledged by Denikin), apparently not only for plunder but also for reven
ge.
However, Bikerman says that "murders, pillage and rape of women were not faithful
companions of the White Army, unlike what is claimed by our [Jewish] National Socialis
ts
who exaggerate the horrible events to advance their own agenda." 74

Shulgin agrees: "For a true White, a massacre of unarmed civilians, the murder of wome
n
and children, and robbing someone's property are absolutely impossible things to do."
Thus,
the "true Whites" in this case are guilty of negligence. They were not sufficiently ri
gorous in
checking the scum adhering to the White movement." 75
Pasmanik concurred that "everybody understands that General Denikin did not want
pogroms but when I was in Novorossiysk and Ekaterinodar in April-May 1919, i.e., befor
e the
march to the north, I could sense a thickened and pervasive atmosphere of anti-Semitis
m
everywhere." 76 Whatever it was — negligence or revenge — it served well to ignite th
e
"White" pogroms of 1919.

Still, "by unanimous testimony of those unlucky enough to experience both types of
pogroms [those by Petliura's troops and those by White Army], it was predominantly
Petliura's troops who went for Jewish life and soul — they did the most killing." 77

"It was not the Volunteer Army that initiated Jewish pogroms in the new Russia. They b
egan
in the "reborn" Poland the day after she become a free and independent state. While i
n
Russia itself they were started by the Ukrainian troops of the Democrat Petliura a nd
the
Socialist Vynnychenko.... The Ukrainians turned pogroms into an everyday event." 78 .

The Volunteer Army did not start the pogroms but it carried on with them, being fueled
by a
false conviction that a// Jews were for Bolsheviks. "The name of L. Trotsky was partic
ularly
hated among the Whites and Petliura's soldiers and almost every pogrom went under a
slogan 'This is what you get for Trotsky.'" And even "the Kadets who in the past alway
s
denounced any expression of anti-Semitism, and all the more so the pogroms ...during t
heir
November 1919 conference in Kharkov ... demanded that Jews 'declare relentless war
against those elements of Jewry who actively participate in the Bolshevist movement.'"
At
the same time the Kadets "emphasized ... that the White authorities do everything poss
ible
to stop pogroms," namely that since the beginning of October 1919 "the leadership of t
he
[Volunteer] Army began punishing pogromists with many measures including execution" an
d
as a result "pogroms stopped for a while." Yet "during the December 1919-March 1920
retreat of the Volunteer Army from Ukraine the pogroms become particularly violent" an
d
the Jews were accused "of shooting the retreating Whites in the back." (Importantly,
"there

155
were no pogroms in Siberia by A. Kolchak's troops," as "Kolchak did not tolerate
pogroms." 79 )

D.O. Linsky, himself a former White Guard, emphatically writes: "Jewry was possibly gi
ven a
unique chance to fight so hard for the Russian land, that the slanderous claim, that f
or Jews
Russia is just geography and not Fatherland, would disappear once and for all." Actual
ly,
"there was and is no alternative: the victory of anti-Bolshevik forces will lead from
suffering
to revival of the whole country and of the Jewish people in particular.... Jewry shoul
d devote
itself to the Russian Cause entirely, to sacrifice their lives and wealth.... Through
the dark
stains on the White chasubles one should perceive the pure soul of the White Movemen
t....
In an army where many Jewish youths were enlisted, in an army relying on extensive
material support from Jewish population, anti-Semitism would suffocate and any pogromi
st
movement would be countered and checked by internal forces. Jewry should have
supported the Russian Army which went on in an immortal struggle for the Russian lan
d....
Jewry was pushed from the Russian Cause, yet Jewry had to push away the pushers." He
writes all this "after having painful personal experience of participation in the Whit
e
movement. Despite all those dark and serious problems that surfaced in the White
movement, we delightfully and with great reverence bow our uncovered heads before thi
s
one and only commendable fact of the struggle against the ignominy of Russian history,
the
so-called Russian Revolution." It was "a great movement for the unfading values of
[upholding] the human spirit." 80

Yet the White Army did not support even those Jews who volunteered for service in it.
What
a humiliation people like doctor Pasmanik had to go through (many Jews were outraged
after finding him "among the pogromists")! "The Volunteer Army persistently refused t
o
accept Jewish petty officers and cadets, even those who in October 1917 bravely fough
t
against Bolsheviks. It was a huge moral blow to Russian Jewry." "I will never forget,"
he
writes, "how eleven Jewish petty officers came to me in Simferopol complaining that th
ey
were expelled from fighting units and posted as ... cooks in the rear." 81
Shulgin writes: "If only as many Jews participated in the White Movement as did in th
e
'revolutionary democracy' or in 'constitutional democracy' before that...." Yet only a
tiny
part of Jewry joined the White Guards ... only very few individuals, whose dedication
could
not be overvalued as the anti-Semitism [among the Whites] was already clearly obvious
by
that time. Meanwhile, there were many Jews among the Reds..., there, most importantl
y,
they often occupied the 'top command positions'.... Aren't we really aware of the bitt
er
tragedy of those few Jews who joined the Volunteer Army" The lives of those Jewish
Volunteers were as endangered by the enemy's bullets as they were by the 'heroes of th
e
rear' who tried to solve the Jewish question in their own manner." 82

Yet it was not all about the "heroes of the rear." And anti-Semitic feelings had burst
into
flames among the young White officers from the intellectual families — despite all the
ir
education, tradition, and upbringing.

And this all the more doomed the White Army to isolation and perdition.

Linsky tells us that on the territories controlled by the Volunteer Army, the Jews we
re not
employable in the government services or in the OsvAg ("Information-Propaganda Agenc
y,"

156

an intelligence and counter-intelligence agency, established in the White Army by Gene

ral
A.M. Dragomirov). Yet he refutes the claim that publications of OsvAg contained anti-S
emitic
propaganda and that pogromists were not punished. No, "the command did not want Jewis
h
pogroms, yet ... it could not act against the pogromist attitudes of their troops ...
it
psychologically couldn't use severe measures.... The army was not as it used to be, an
d
requirements of the regular wartime or peacetime military charters could not be fully
applied to it," as the minds of all soldiers were already battle-scarred by the Civil
War. 83
"Although they didn't want pogroms, Denikin's government didn't dare to denounce anti-

Semitic propaganda loudly," despite the fact that the pogroms inflicted great harm on
Denikin's army. Pasmanik concludes: the Volunteer Army "generally assumed a hostile
attitude toward the entire Russian Jewry." 84 But I. Levin disagrees, saying that "the
views of
only one part of the movement, those of the active pogromists, are now attributed to t
he
whole movement," while in reality "the White Movement was quite complex, it was
composed of different factions ... with often opposite views." 85 Yet to bet on Bolshe
viks, to
walk in their shadows because of fear of pogroms, is ...obvious and evident madnes
s.... A
Jew says: either the Bolsheviks or the pogroms, whereas he should have been saying: th
e
longer the Bolsheviks hold power, the closer we are to certain death." 86 Yet the "Jud
eo-
Communists" were, in the parlance of the Whites, agitators as well.

All this was resolutely stopped by Wrangel in Crimea, where there was nothing like wha
t was
described above. (Wrangel even personally ordered Rev. Vladimir Vostokov to stop his p
ublic
anti-Jewish sermons.)

In July 1920, Shulim Bezpalov, the aforementioned Jewish millionaire, wrote from Paris
to
Wrangel in the Crimea: "We must save our Motherland. She will be saved by the children
of
the soil and industrialists. We must give away 75% of our revenue until the value of r
uble has
recovered and normal life rebuilt." 87

Yet it was already too late....

Still, a part of the Jewish population of the Crimea chose to evacuate with Wrangel's
army. 88

True, the White Movement was in desperate need of the support by the Western public
opinion, which in turn largely depended on the fate of Russian Jewry. It needed that s
upport,
yet, as we saw, it had fatally and unavoidably developed a hostility toward the Jews a
nd later
it was not able to prevent pogroms. As Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill
"was
the major advocate of the Allied intervention in Russia and military aid to the White
armies."
Because of the pogroms, Churchill appealed directly to Denikin: "my goal of securing t
he
support in the Parliament for the Russian national movement will be incomparably more
difficult," if the pogroms are not stopped. "Churchill also feared the reaction of pow
erful
Jewish circles among the British elite." 89 Jewish circles in the USA held similaropin
ions [on
the situation in Russia].

However, the pogroms were not stopped, which largely explains the extremely weak and
reluctant assistance given by the Western powers to the White armies. And calculations
by
Wall Street naturally led it to support Bolsheviks as the more likely future rulers ov
er Russia's
riches. Moreover, the climate in the US and Europe was permeated by sympathy toward

157

those who claimed to be builders of a New World, with their grandiose plans and great
social
objective.

And yet, the behavior of the former Entente of Western nations during the entire Civil
War is
striking by its greed and blind indifference toward the White Movement — the successor
of
their wartime ally, Imperial Russia. They even demanded that the Whites join the Bolsh
evik
delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference; then there was that delirious idea of p
eace
negotiations with the Bolsheviks on the Princes' Islands. The Entente, which did not
recognize any of the White governments officially, was hastily recognizing all those n
ew
national states emerging on the periphery of Russia — thus unambiguously betraying th
e
desire for its dismemberment. The British hurried to occupy the oil-rich region of Bak
u; the
Japanese claimed parts of the Far East and the Kamchatka Peninsula. The American troop
s in
Siberia were more of hindrance than a help and actually facilitated the capture of Pri
morye
by the Bolsheviks. The Allies even extorted payments for any aid they provided — in go
ld
from Kolchak; in the South of Russia, in the form of Black Sea vessels, concessions an
d future
obligations. (There were truly shameful episodes: when the British were leaving the
Archangel region in the Russian north, they took with them some of the Tsar's militar
y
equipment and ammunition. They gave some of what they couldn't take to the Reds and
sunk the rest in the sea — to prevent it from getting into the hands of the Whites!) I
n the
spring of 1920, the Entente put forward an ultimatum to the White Generals Denikin an
d
Wrangel demanding an end to their struggle against the Bolsheviks. (In the summer of 1
920
France provided some material aid to Wrangel so that he could help Poland. Yet only si
x
months later they were parsimoniously deducting Wrangel's military equipment as paymen
t
for feeding of those Russian soldiers who retreated to Gallipoli.)

We can judge about the actions of the few occupational forces actually sent by the Ent
ente
from a testimonial by Prince Grigory Trubetskoy, a serious diplomat, who observed the
French Army during its occupation of Odessa in 1919: "French policies in the South of
Russia
in general and their treatment of issues of Russian statehood in particular were strik
ingly
confused, revealing their gross misunderstanding of the situation." 90

* * *

The black streak of Jewish pogroms in Ukraine ran through the whole of 1919 and the
beginning of 1920. By their scope, scale and atrocity, these pogroms immeasurably exce
eded
all the previous historical instances discussed in this book — the pogroms of 1881-188
2,
1903, and 1905. Yu. Larin, a high-placed Soviet functionary, wrote in the 1920s that d
uring
the Civil War Ukraine saw "a very large number of massive Jewish pogroms far exceedin
g
anything from the past with respect to the number of victims and number of perpetrator
s."
Vynnychenko allegedly said that "the pogroms would stop only when the Jews would stop
being communists." 91

There is no precise estimate of the number of victims of those pogroms. Of course, no

reliable count could be performed in that situation, neither during the events, nor
immediately afterwards. In the book, Jewish Pogroms, we read: "The number of murdered
in
Ukraine and Byelorussia between 1917 and 1921 is approximately 180,000-200,000.... Th
e
number of orphans alone, 300,000, bespeaks of the enormous scale of the catastrophe."
92
158

The present-day Jewish Encyclopedia tells us that "by different estimates, from 70,000
to
180,000-200,000 Jews were killed." 94

Compiling data from different Jewish sources, a modern historian comes up with 900 mas
s
pogroms, of which: 40% by Petliura's Ukrainian Directorate troops ; 25% by the squads
of
the various Ukrainian "atamans"; 17% by Denikin's White Army troops; and 8.5% by the F
irst
Cavalry Army of Budyonny and other Red Army troops. 95

Yet how many butchered lives are behind these figures!

Already during the Civil War, national and socialist Jewish parties began merging with
the
Reds. The "Fareynikte" [the United Jewish Socialist Worker's Party] turned into the
"ComFareynikte" [Communist Jewish Socialist Worker's Party] and "adopted the communis
t
program and together with the communist wing of the Bund formed the [All -Russian]
"ComBund" inJune 1920; in Ukraine, associates and members of the Fareynikte together
with the Ukrainian ComBund formed the "ComFarband" (the Jewish Communist Union)
which later joined the Ail-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. 96 In 1919 in Kiev,
the
official Soviet press provided texts in three languages — Russian, Ukrainian and Yiddi
sh.

"The Bolsheviks used these pogroms [in Ukraine] to their enormous advantage, they
extremely skillfully exploited the pogroms in order to influence public opinion in Rus
sia and
abroad ... in many Jewish and non-Jewish circles in Europe and America." 97

Yet the Reds had the finger in the pie as well — and they were actually first ones. "I
n the
spring of 1918, units of the Red Army, retreating from Ukraine, perpetrated pogroms us
ing
the slogan 'Strike the Yids and the bourgeoisie "'; "the most atrocious pogroms were c
arried
out by the First Cavalry Army during its retreat from Poland in the end of August 192
0. " 98 Yet
historical awareness of the pogroms carried out by the Red Army during the Civil War h
as
been rather glossed over. Only a few condemning voices have spoken on the topic. Pasma
nik
wrote: "During the first winter of Bolshevik rule, the Red troops fighting under the r
ed
banner carried out several bloody pogroms, most notable of which were pogroms in Glukh
ov
and Novgorod-Siverskiy. By number of victims, deliberate brutality, torture and abuse,
those
two had eclipsed even the Kalush massacre. Retreating before the advancing Germans, th
e
Red troops were destroying Jewish settlements on their route." 99

S. Maslov is also quite clear: "The march of the Budyonny's Cavalry Army during its
relocation from the Polish to the Crimean Front was marked by thousands of murdered Je
ws,
thousands of raped women and dozens of utterly razed and looted Jewish settlements....
In
Zhytomyr, each new authority inaugurated its rule with a pogrom, and often repeatedly
after each time the city changed hands again. The feature of all those pogroms — by
Petliura's troops, the Poles, or the Soviets — was the large number of killed." 100 Th
e
Bogunskiy and Taraschanskiy regiments stood out in particular (though those two havin
g
came over to Budyonny from the Directorate); allegedly, those regiments were disarmed
because of the pogroms and the instigators were hanged.

The above-cited socialists. Schwartz concludes from his historical standpoint (1952):
"During
the revolutionary period, particularly during the Civil War, ...anti-Semitism has grow
n

159

extraordinarily ... and, especially in the South, spread extensively in the broad mass
es of the
urban and rural population." 101

Alas, the resistance of the Russian population to the Bolsheviks (without which we wou
ldn't
have a right to call ourselves a people) had faltered and took wrong turns in many way
s,
including on the Jewish issue. Meanwhile the Bolshevik regime was touting the Jews an
d
they were joining it, and the Civil Warwas more and more broadening that chasm betwee
n
Reds and Whites.

"If the revolution in general has cleared Jewry of suspicion in counter-revolutionary

attitude,
the counter-revolution has suspected all Jewry of being pro-revolutionary." And thus,
"the
Civil War became an unbearable torment for Jewry, further consolidating them on the wr
ong
revolutionary positions," and so "they failed to recognize the genuine redemptive esse
nce of
the White armies." 102

Let's not overlook the general situation during the Civil War. "It was literally a cha
os which
released unbridled anarchy across Russia.... Anybody who wanted and was able to rob an
d
kill was robbing and killing whoever he wanted.... Officers of the Russian Army were
massacred in the hundreds and thousands by bands of mutinous rabble. Entire families o
f
landowners were murdered estates ...were burned; valuable pieces of art were pilfered
and destroyed ... in some places in manors all living things including livestockwere
exterminated. Mob rule spread terror ... on the streets of cities. Owners of plants an
d
factories were driven out of their enterprises and dwellings.... Tens of thousands peo
ple all
over Russia were shot for the glory of the proletarian revolution others ... rotted i
n
stinking and vermin-infested prisons as hostages.... It was not a crime or personal ac
tions
that put a man under the axe but his affiliation with a certain social stratum or clas
s. It would
be an absolute miracle if, under conditions when whole human groups were designated fo
r
extermination, the group named 'Jews' remained exempt.... The curse of the time was th
at
... it was possible to declare an entire class ora tribe 'evil'.... So, condemning an
entire social
class to destruction ... is called revolution, yet to kill and rob Jews is called a po
grom? ... The
Jewish pogrom in the South of Russia was a component of the Ail-Russian pogrom." 103

Such was the woeful acquisition of all the peoples of Russia, including the Jews, afte
r the
successful attainment of equal rights, after the splendid Revolution of March, 1917, t
hat
both the general sympathy of Russian Jews toward the Bolsheviks and the developed
attitude of the White forces toward Jews eclipsed and erased the most important benefi
t of
a possible White victory — the sane evolution of the Russian state.
Sources:

1 T.A. /laHflay. PeBO^K)u,MOHHbie Mflen b eBpeMCKOM o6mecTBem-ioc™ // Poccma m eBpen:

C6. 1 (fla^ee — PmE) /
OTenecTBeHHoe o6-beflMHeHne pyccKMX eBpeeB 3a rpam-iu,eM. riapuHK: YMCA-Press, 1978,
c. 117 [1-e M3fl. —
BepyiMH: OcHOBa, 1924].

2 PitirimSorokin. Leaves from a Russian Diary. New York: E.F.Button & Co., 1925, p. 26
7.

3 KpaTKaa EBpeficKaa 3HU,MKnoneflHfl (fla^ee — KE3). Mepyca^nwi: KeTep, 1976. T. 1, c.

686.

4 ApoH A6paw\OBMH. B pewatomefi BOMHe: ynacTue m po^b eBpeeB CCCP b BOMHe npoTMB Hau,M
3w\a. 2-e M3fl.
Teyib-ABMB, 1982. T. 1, c. 45-61.

160

5 PoccuMCKafl EBpeMCKaa 3HU,MK^oneflHfl (flayiee — PE3). 2-emp,., ncnp. Mflon. M., 199
7. T. 3, c. 285.

6 PE3, t. 1, c. 122, 340, 404, 515; t. 2, c. 120, 126, 434, 511.

7PE3, t. 3, c. 61,278,305,503.

8 PE3, t. 1, c. 144;t. 2, c. 354, 388-389.

9 HepBOHHoe Ka3anecTBo: BocnowiMHaHna BeTepaHOB: [C6.] M.: BoeHM3flaT, 1969.

10 B.B. LUy^brnH. «Hto Haw\ b hmx He HpaBMTca...»: 06 AHTMcew\MTM3Me b Poccmm [fla^ee

— B.B. LUynbrMH].
napn>K, 1929, c. 145.

11 Tawiwe, c. 157.

12 B. Mmpckmm. HepHaa cotha // EBpeticKafl Tpn6yHa: EweHeflenbHMK, nocBameHHbiM MHTepe

cawi pyccKMX
eBpeeB. IHapuHK, 1924, 1 4>eBpa.nfl, c. 3.

13 C.n. Me^bryHOB. «KpacHbm Teppop» b Poccmm, 1918-1923. 2-e M3fl. flon. Bep^MH: BaTar
a, 1924, c. 43, 48,
57, 70-71,72-73.
14 Taw\ we, c. 50, 99, 100, 105, 109, 113.

15 Col umbia University, New York, Trotsky's Archive, bMs Russ 13 T-160, fle.no: «riap
TMMHaa nepermcKa N° 9 3a
1919 r.», c. 9.

16 /l.KD. KpMHeBCKMM. EBpeM b annapaTe BHK-Omy b 20-e roflbi // EBpeM m pyccKaa peBO^
K)u,Mfl: MaTepMa^bi m
Mcc^eflOBaHMfl / Pefl.-cocT. O.B. ByflHMU,KMM. MocKBa; Mepyca^MM: TeiuapMM, 1999, c. 3
21, 344.

17 /l.KD. KpMHeBCKMM. EBpeM b annapaTe BHK-OI~ny b 20-e roflbi // EBpeM m pyccKaa peBO
^K)u,Mfl, c. 327-329.

18 PE3, t. 1, c. 106, 124, 223, 288; t. 2, c. 22, 176, 302, 350, 393; t. 3, c. 374, 47
3.

19 C.C. MocnoB. Poccmh nocne neTbipex ;ieT peBO^(ou,MM (flayiee C.C.MacnoB). riapMw: P
yccKaa nenaTb, 1922.
Kh. 2, c. 193.

20 1X14. HerpeTOB. BJ. Kopo^eHKo: /leTonMCb >km3hm m TBopnecTBa, 1917-1921 / llofl pef
l. A.B. Xpa6poBMU,Koro.
MocKBa : KHMra, 1990, c. 151-154,232-236.

21 T.A. /laHflay. PeBo^rou,MOHHbie MfleM b eBpeficKOM o6mecTBeHHOCTM // PmE, c. 117-11

8.

22 C.C. MacnoB, c. 196.

23 PE3, t. 2, c. 388-389.

24 B.B. LUy^brMH, npM/io>KeHMfl, c. 313-318.

25 HeKMCT o HK (143 apxMBa «Oco6om CneflCTB. Kommccmm Ha KDre Poccmm») // Ha ny>KOM CT

opoHe: Mctopmko-
^MTepaTypHbie c6ophmkm / riofl pefl. C.n.Me^bryHOBa. Bep^MH: BaTara; ripara: n^awia, 1
925. T. 9, c. 111-141.

26 A/ieKceM Pew\M30B. B3BMxpeHHaa Pycb. London: Overseas Publications, 1979,c. 376-37

7.

27 B.B. LUyyibrMH, c. 95-96.

161

28 C.C. Macncm, c. 44.

29 M3^o>KeHMe 6eceflbi c E./lHHKcnbHOM cm.: B./lto6apcKMM. Hto fle^aTb, a He kto BMHOB
aT // Bpewia m Mbi:
Me>KflyHapoflHbiM >xypHa.n yii-iTepaTypbi m o6mecTBeHHbix npo6^ew\. Hbto-MopK, 1990, N
2 109, c. 134.

30 PmE, c. 6, 7.

31 T.A. /laHflay. PeBcmou.i'ioHHbie Mflen b eBpeficKofi o6mecTBeHHOc™ // PmE, c. 100.

32 KD. deK^OB. HapoflHaa o6opoHa — Hau.i-ioHa.nbHafl o6opoHa // M3BecTMfl, 1920, 18 Ma

n, c. 1.

33 KD. /lapMH. EBpen n a HTMceMMTH3M b CCCP. M.; J].: TM3, 1929, c. 31.

34 KE3, t 6, c.646;t. 1, c. 326.

35 fl>K. Mton/iep. flua^eKTMKa Tpareflnn: a HTMceMMTH3M m KOMW\yHM3M b L|eHTpa^bHOM m

Boctohhom EBpone //
"22": 06mecTBeHHO-noyiMTMHecKMM m ^MTepaTypHbiM >KypHa.n eBpeMCKOM MHTeyiyinreHL^nn M3
CCCP b I43pan.ne.
Te/ib-ABMB, 1990, N2 73, c. 96, 99-100.

36 KE3, t. 4, c. 733-734.

37 fl>K. MKxn.nep. flua^eKTMKa Tpareflnn... // "22", 1990, N2 73, c. 99.

38 Tawiwe, c. 100-101.

39 T.A. /laHflay. PeBcmou.i'ioHHbie Mflen b eBpeMCKOM o6mecTBeHHOc™ // PmE, c. 115.

40 HE. LLIexTMaH. EBpeficKaa o6mecTBeHHOCTb Ha YKpauHe (1917-1919) //KHura o pyccKOM e

BpeficTBe*, 1917-
1967(fla^ee — KPE-2). Hbio-MopK: Cokb PyccKnx EBpeeB, 1968, c. 22.

41 TaMwe, c. 29, 30,35.

42 B.I4. /leHMH. CoHMHeHMfl: B 45 t. 4-e M3fl. M.: rocno^MTM3flaT, 1941-1967. T. 30,

c. 246.

43 HE. LUexTMaH. EBpeficKaa o6mecTBeHHOCTb... //KPE-2, c. 33-34.

44 HE. LUexTMa h. EBpeficKaa o6mecTBeHHOCTb... // KPE-2, c. 35-37.

45 KE3, t. 4, c.256.

46 PE3, t. 1, c.407.

47 14. M. Tpou,KMM. EBpeMCKne norpowibi Ha YKpauHe m b Ee^opyccnn 1918-1920 rr.// KPE

-2*, c. 59.

48 TaM>xe, c. 62.

49 TaMwe.

50 fl.C. riacMa hmk. Hero >Ke Mbi flo6nBaeMCfl? // PmE, c. 211.

51 14. M. EnKepwia h. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // PmE, c. 66-67.

52 KE3, t. 6, c.570.

162

53 M.M. BuKepwia h. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // PmE, c. 65.

54 C.C. MocnoB, c. 25, 26.

55 K). /lapuH. EBpen m a HTMceMMTH3M b CCCP, c. 40, 41.

56 C.C. Macncm, c. 40.

57 fl>K. Mion-nep. flua^eKTMKa Tpareflnn... // "22", 1990, N2 73, c. 97.

58 B. /Imtbmhob. MaxHO n eBpen // "22", 1983, N2 28, c. 191-206.

59 KE3, t. 6, c.574.

60 EBpeMCKne norpowibi, 1918-1921/Coct. 3.C. Octpobckmm. M.: Aku,. o6-bo «LUKO.na m KH

nra», 1926.

61 EBpeMCKne norpowibi, 1918-1921, c. 73-74.

62 KE3, t. 7, c, 403.

63 fl.C. riacMa hmk. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,Mfl m eBpeficTBo: (EanbLiieBM3M m nyflan3w\). na

pn>K, 1923, c. 169.
64T.M. Honnep. >Kn3HeHHbm nyTb Khr3r Teoprnfl EBreHneBuna /lbBOBa. riapn>K, 1932, c. 2
74.

65 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,na m eBpeficTBO, c. 176-177.

66 KE3, t. 7, c.403.

67 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taxman no^MTMKa CTa^MHa: B^acTbM a HTMceMMTH3M. M.: MewflyHapofl

Hbie OTHOiueHMfl,
2001, c. 56-57.
68 fl.C. riacMaHMK. Hero >xe Mbi flo6nBaew\cfl? // PmE, c. 216.

69 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taxman no^MTMKa CTa^MHa,c. 56.

70 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,na m eBpeficTBO, c. 185.

71 TeH. A. 4>oh /lawine. ripMHMHbi Heyflann Boopy>Ke - HHoro BbicTyn^eHMfl 6enbix // r

ioceB, 1981, N2 3, c. 38-39
(nepenenaTKa M3: PyccKMM KoyioKon, 1929, N2 6-7).

72 KE3, t. 6, c.572.

73 B.B. LUyyibrMH, c. 97-98.

74 M.M. BuKepwia h. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // PmE, c. 64.

75 B.B. LUy^brMH. c. 86.

76 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,Mfl m eBpeMcmo, c. 186-187.

77 fl.M. BuKepwiaH. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // PmE, c. 65-66.

78 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,Mfl m eBpeMCTBO, c. 173-174.

163

79 KE3, t. 6, c. 572-574.

80 fl.O. /Imhckmm. O Hau,MOHa^bHOMcaMoco3HaHMM pyccKoroeBpea // PmE, c. 149-151.

81 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,Mfl m eBpeMcmo, c. 183.

82 B.B. LUyyibrMH, c. 55, 81, 82.

83 fl.O. /Imhckmm. O Hau,MOHa^bHOMcaMoco3HaHMM pyccKoroeBpea // PmE, c. 157, 160-161.

84 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,Mfl m eBpeMcmo, c. 181, 187.

85 14.0. /leBMH. EBpen b peB0^tou,MM // PmE, c. 136.

86 14. M. EnKepwia h. Poccmh m pyccrae eBpeficTBO // PmE, c. 81,82.

87 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,na m eBpeficTBO, c. 181.

88 KE3, t. 4, c.598.
89 Michael J.Cohen. Churchill and the Jews. London; Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1985, p. 5
6, 57.

90 Kh. Tp. H. Tpy6eu,KOM. OnepK B3a MMOOTHOiueHMM BoopyweHHbix Cv\n KDra Poccmm m ripe
flCTaBMTe^eM
cDpaHU,y3CKoro KowiaHflOBaHMfl. EKaTepMHOflap, 1919 // Kh. Tp. H.Tpy6eu,KOM. Toflbi cw
iyT m Haflewfl. MoHpea^b,
1981, c. 202.

91 KD. /lapuH. EBpen m a HTMceMMTH3M b CCCP, c. 38.

92 EBpeMCKne norpowibi, 1918-1921, c. 74.

93 Eoyibwafl CoBeTCKaa 3Huy\\u\onepy\n. 1-e M3fl. M., 1932. T. 24, c. 148.

94 KE3, t. 6, c. 569.

95 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taxman no^MTMKa Cra;iMHa,c. 56.

96 14. E. LUexTMa h. CoBeTCKaa Poccma, CMOHM3M m I43pan^b// KPE-2, c. 321; KE3, t. 6,

c. 85; t. 1, c. 560.

97 14.0. /leBMH. EBpen b peBO^KDU,MM // PmE, c. 134.

98 KE3, t. 6, 570,574.

99 14. M. EnKepwiaH. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // PmE, c. 63.

100 C.C. MacnoB, c. 26.

101 CM. LUBapu,. AHTMce/v\MTM3M b CoBeTCKOM CoK)3e. HbK)-l4opK: I43fl-B0 mm. HexoBa, 1
952, c. 14.
102A.O. /Imhckmm. O Hau,MOHayibHOM caw\oco3HaHMM pyccKoro eBpea // PmE, c. 147, 148, 1
49.
103 14. M. EMKepwia h. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeMCTBO // PmE, c. 58-60.

164

Chapter 17: Emigration between the two World Wars

As a result of the October coup and the subsequent Civil War, hundreds of thousands
Russian citizens emigrated abroad, some retreating in battles, others simply fleeing.
Among
those emigrants were the entire surviving combat personnel of the White Army, and man
y
Cossacks. They were joined by the old nobility, who were so strikingly passive during
the
fateful revolutionary years, although their wealth was precisely in land or estates. M
any
former landowners, who failed to take their valuables with them, upon arrival to Europ
e had
to become taxi drivers or waiters. There were merchants, industrialists, financiers, q
uite a
few of whom had money safely deposited abroad, and ordinary citizens too, of whom not
all
were well-educated, but who could not bear to stay under Bolshevism.

Many emigrants were Russian Jews. "Of more than 2 million emigrants from the Soviet
republics in 1918-1922 more than 200,000 were Jews. Most of them crossed the Polish an
d
Romanian borders, and later emigrated to the USA, Canada, and the countries of South
America and Western Europe. Many repatriated to Palestine."[l] The newly formed
independent Poland played an important role. It had a large Jewish population of its o
wn
before the revolution, and now a part of those who left Poland during the war were
returning there too. "Poles estimate that after the Bolshevik revolution" 200-300 thou
sand
Jews "arrived in Poland from Russia."[2] (This figure could be explained not only by
increased emigration, but also by the re-arrangement of the Russian-Polish border).
However "the majority of the Jews who left Russia in the first years after the revolut
ion
settled in Western Europe. For example, around 100,000 Russian Jews had gathered in
Germany by the end of World War I. "[3]

"While Paris was, from the beginning, the political centre and unofficial capital of R
ussia-in-
Exile., The second, so to say cultural capital of Russian emigration in Europe from th
e end of
1920 until the beginning of 1924, was Berlin (there was also an intense cultural life
in the
1920s in the Russian quarters of Prague, which became ... Russia-in-Exile's main unive
rsity
city). "[4] It was "easierto settle" in Berlin because of inflation. "On the streets o
f Berlin" you
could see "former major industrialists and merchants, bankers and manufacturers," [5]
and
many emigres had capital there. Compared to other emigrants from Russia, Jewish
emigrants had fewer problems with integration into the Diaspora life, and felt more
confident there. Jewish emigrants were more active than Russians and generally avoide
d
humiliating jobs. Mihkail Levitov, the commander of the Kornilov Regiment who had
experienced all sorts of unskilled labour after emigration, told me: "Who paid us dece
ntly in
Paris? Jews. Russian multi-millionaires treated their own miserably."

Both in Berlin and in Paris "the Jewish intelligentsia was prominent - lawyers, book
publishers, social and political activists, scholars, writers and journalists"[6]; man
y of them
were deeply assimilated, while Russian emigrants "from the capitals [Moscow and St.
Petersburg]" mostly had liberal opinions which facilitated mutual amity between the tw
o

165

groups (unlike the feeling between Jews and the Russian monarchist emigrants). The
influence of Russian Jews in the entire cultural atmosphere of Russia-in-Exile between
the
two world wars was more than palpable. (Here it is proper to mention a very interestin
g
series of collections, Jews in the Culture of Russia-in-Exile, published in Israel in
1990s and
still continuing. [7]) Some Jewish families with a comfortable income opened Russian a
rtistic
salons, clearly demonstrating Jewish attachment to and immersion in Russian culture. T
here
was a famously generous house of the Tsetlins in Paris. Many others, I. V. Gessen's (i
n Berlin),
I. I. Fondaminsky-Bunakov (tireless in his "endless, selfless cares for Russian cultur
e
a broad" [8]), Sofia Pregel, Sonya Delone, Alexander and Salomeia Gal pern, were const
antly
engaged in the burdensome business of providing assistance for impoverished writers an
d
artists. They helped many, and not just the famous, such as Bunin, Remizov, Balmont, T
effi,
but also unknown young poets and painters. (However, this help did not extend to "Whit
e"
and monarchist emigrants, with whom there was mutual antagonism). Overall, among all t
he
emigrants, Russian Jews proved themselves the most active in all forms of cultural and
social
enterprise. This was so striking that it was reflected in Mihail Osorgin's article, Ru
ssian
Loneliness, printed in the Russian Zionist magazine Rassvet [Dawn], re-established abr
oad by
V. Jabotinsky.
Osorgin wrote: "In Russia, there was not this 'Russian loneliness' neither in the soci
al nor the
revolutionary movement (I mean the depths and not just the surface); the most prominen
t
figures who gave specific flavourto the whole movement ...were Slavic Russians." But a
fter
emigration "where there is a refined spirituality, where there is deep interest in tho
ught and
art, where the calibre of man is higher, there a Russian feels national loneliness; on
the other
hand, where there are more of his kin, he feels cultural solitude. I call this tragedy
the
Russian loneliness. I am not at all an anti-Semite, but I am primarily a Russian Sla
v... My
people, Russians, are much closerto me in spirit, in language and speech, in their spe
cific
national strengths and weaknesses. For me, it is precious to have them as my fellow th
inkers
and peers, or perhaps it is just more comfortable and pleasant. Although I can respect
the
Jew, the Tatar, the Pole in the multi-ethnic and not at all "Russian" Russia, and reco
gnise
each as possessing the same right to Russia, our collective mother, as I have; yet I m
yself
belong to the Russian group, to that spiritually influential group which has shaped th
e
Russian culture." But now "Russians abroad have faded and given up and surrendered th
e
positions of power to another tribe's energy. Jews adapt easier-and good for them! I a
m
not envious, I am happy for them. I am equally willing to step aside and grant them th
e
honour of leadership in various social movements and enterprises abroad.... But there
is one
area where this 'Jewish empowerment' strikes me at the heart - charity. I do not know
who
has more money and diamonds, rich Jews or rich Russians. But I know for certain that a
ll
large charitable organizations in Paris and Berlin can help poor Russian emigra nts on
ly
because they collect the money needed from generous Jewry. My experience of organizin
g
soirees, concerts, meetings with authors has proven that appealing to rich Russians is
a
pointless and humiliating waste of time.... Just to soften the tone of such an 'anti-S
emitic'
166

article, I will add that, in my opinion, the nationally-sensitive Jew can often mistak
e national
sensitivity of a Slav for a spectre of anti-Semitism. "[9]

Osorgin's article was accompanied by the editorial (most likely written by the editor-
in-chief
Jabotinsky based on the ideas expressed and with a similarstyle) to the effect that M.
A.
Osorgin "has no reason to fearthat the reader of Rassvet would find anti-Semitic tende
ncies
[in his article]. There was once a generation that shuddered at the word 'Jew' on the
lips of a
non-Jew. One of the foreign leaders of that generation said: 'The best favour the majo
r press
can give us is to not mention us.' He was listened to, and for a long time in progress
ive
circles in Russia and Europe the word 'Jew' was regarded as an unprintable obscenity.
Thank
God, that time is over." We can assure Osorgin "of our understanding and sympathy....
However, we disagree with him on one point. He gives too much importance to the role o
f
Jews in charity among refugees. First, this prominent role is natural. Unlike Russian
s, we
were learning the art of living in Diaspora for a long time.... But there is a deeper
explanation.... We have received much that is precious from the Russian culture; we wi
ll use
it even in our future independent national art.... We, Russian Jews, are in debt to Ru
ssian
culture; we have not come close to repaying that debt. Those of us that do what they c
an to
help it survive during these hard times are doing what is right and, we hope, will con
tinue
doing so." [10]

However let us return to the years immediately after the revolution. "Political passio
ns were
still running high among Russian emigrants, and there was a desire to comprehend what
had
happened in Russia. Newspapers, magazines, book publishers sprung up. "[11] Some rich
men, usually Jews, financed this new liberal and more left-of-center Russian emigrant
press.
There were many Jews among journalists, newspaper and magazine editors, book publisher
s.
A detailed record of their contribution can be found in The Book of Russian Jewry (now
also
in Jews in the Culture of Russia-in-Exile).

Of significant historical value among these are the twenty two volumes of I. V. Gesse
n's
Archive of the Russian Revolution. Gessen himself, along with A. I. Kaminkov and V.
D.
Nabokov (and G. A. Landau after the tatter's death), published a prominent Berlin
newspaper Rul [Steering Wheel], "a kind of emigrant version of Rech [Speech]," but unl
ike
Milyukov's brainchild, Josef Gessen's position was consistently patriotic. Rul often p
ublished
articles by G. A. Landau and I. O. Levin, whom I have amply cited, and also articles b
y the
famous literary critic U. I. Aikhenvald. The political spectrum of Berlin papers range
d from
Rul on the right to the socialists on the left. A. F. Kerens ky published Dni [Days],
which
provided a platform for such personalities as A. M. Kulisher-Yunius (author "of a numb
er of
sociological works" and a Zionist from Jabotinsky's circle), S. M. Soloveichik, the fa
mous
former Socialist Revolutionary O.C. Minor (he also wrote for the Prague Volya Rossii
[Russia's Will]), and the former secretary of the Constituent Assembly M. V. Vishnyak.
In
1921 U. O. Martov and R. A. Abramovich founded the Socialist Gerald in Berlin (it late
r

167

moved to Paris and then New York). F. I. Dan, D. U. Dalin, P. A. Garvi, and G. Y. Aran
son
worked on it among others.

V. E. Jabotinsky, whose arrival in Berlin (after three years in Jerusalem) coincided w

ith the
first wave of emigration, re-established Rassvet, first in Berlin and then in Paris, a
nd also
published his own novels. In addition "many Russian Jewish journalists lived in Berlin
in
1920-1923, working in the local and international emigrant press." There we could find
I. M.
Trotsky from the defunct Russkoe Slovo [Russian Word], N. M. Volkovyssky, P. I. Zvezdi
ch
(who died at the hands of Nazis during the World War II), the Menshevik S. O. Portugei
s from
the St. Petersburg Den [Day] (he wrote under the pseudonym S. Ivanovich), the playwrit
er
Osip Dymov-Perelman, and the novelist V. Y. Iretsky.[12]

Berlin also became the capital of Russian book publishing: "In 1922 all these Russian
publishers released more Russian books and publications than there were German books
published in the whole of Germany. Most of these publishers and booksellers were
Jewish. "[13] Most notable were the publishing houses of I. P. Ladyzhnikov, owned sinc
e the
war by B. N. Rubinstein (classical, modern and popular scientific literature), of Z.
I. Grzhebin
(which had links to the Soviets, and so sold some of his works in the USSR), the publi
shing
house, Word, established as early as 1919 and run by I. V. Gessen and A. I. Kaminka
(collections of Russian classics, emigrant writers and philosophers, valuable historic
al and
biographical works), and the artistically superb issues of Zhar-Ptitsa run by A. E. Ko
gan. Also
there was Edges of A. Tsatskis, Petropolis of Y. N. Blokh, Obeliskof A. S. Kagan, Heli
con of
A.G. Vishnyak, and Scythians of I. Shteinberg. S. Dubnov's World History of the Jewish
People
was also published in Berlin in ten German volumes, and during the 1930s in Russian in
Riga.

Riga and other cities in the once again independent Baltic countries (with their subst
antial
Jewish populations) became major destinations of Jewish emigration. Moreover, "the onl
y
common language that Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians shared was Russian," and so t
he
Riga newspaper Segodnya [Today] (publishers Ya. I. Brams and B. Yu. Polyak) became "hi
ghly
influential." "A large number of Russian-Jewish journalists" worked there: the editor
M. I.
Ganfman, and after his death M. S. Milrud; Segodnya Vecherom [Today Evening] was edite
d
by B. I. Khariton (the latter two were arrested by the NKVD in 1940 and died in Soviet
camps).
V. Ziv, an economist, and M. K. Aizenshtadt (under the pen names of first Zheleznov, t
hen
Argus) wrote for the newspaper. Gershon Svet wrote from Berlin. Andrei Sedykh (Y. M.
Tsvibak) was its Paris correspondent, Volkovyssky reported from Berlin, and L. M. Nema
nov
from Geneva. [14]

From the late 1920s, Berlin started to lose its position as the centre of emigrant cul
ture
because of the economic instability and the rise of Nazism. Rul had to close in 1931.
Emigrants had dispersed with the "main wave going to France," especially to Paris whic
h was
already a major centre of emigration.

168

In Paris the main emigrant newspaper was Poslednie Novosti [Breaking News], founded "
at
the beginning of 1920 by the St. Petersburg barrister M. L. Goldstein. It was financed
by M. S.
Zalshupin," and in a year the newspaper was bought by "P. N. Milyukov.... While it was
in a
precarious position, the paper was significantly financially supported by M. M. Vinave
r."
"Milyukov's right hand" was A. A. Polyakov. Editorials and political articles were wri
tten by
Kulisher-Yunius (who was arrested in 1942 in France and died in a concentration camp).
The
international news section was run by M. Yu. Berkhin-Benedictov, an acquaintance of
Jabotinsky. The staff included the acerbic publicists. L. Polyakov-Litovtsev (who had
only
learnt "to speak and write Russian at fifteen"), B. S. Mirkin-Getsevich (who wrote as
Boris
Mirsky), the noted Kadet [Constitutional Democrat] publicist Pyotr Ryss and others.
Poslednie Novosti published the satirical articles of I. V. Dioneo-Shklovsky and the p
opular
science ofYu. Delevsky(Ya. L. Yudelevsky). The best humorists were V. Azov (V. A.
Ashkenazi), Sasha Cherny (A. M. Gliksberg), the "king of humour" Don-Aminado
(Shpolyansky). Poslednie Novosti had the widest circulation of all emigrant news paper
s. [15]
Shulgin called it "the citadel of political Jewishness and philo-Semitic Russians. "[1
6] Sedykh
regarded this opinion as an "obvious exaggeration." The political tension around the p
aper
also stemmed from the fact that immediately after the Civil War it was dedicated to
"disclosure" and sometimes outright condemnation of the Volunteer Army. Sedykh noted
that in Paris "there was not only a political divide, but also a national one"; "Milyu
kov's
editorial team included many Russian-Jewish journalists," while "Jewish names virtuall
y
never appeared on the pages of the right-wing Vozrozhdenie [Rebirth] (with the excepti
on of
I. M. Bikerman).[17] (Vozrozhdenie was founded later than the other papers and ceased
operation in 1927, when its benefactor Gukasov fired the main editor P. B. Struve.)
The leading literary-political magazine Sovremennye Zapiski [Contemporary Notes],
published in Paris from 1920 to 1940, was established and run by Socialist Revolutiona
ries, N.
D. Avksentiev, 1. 1. Fondaminsky-Bunakov, V. V. Rudnev, M. V. Vishnyakand A. I.Gukovsk
y.
Sedykh noted that "out of [its] five editors ... three were Jews. In 70 volumes of th
e
Sovremennye Zapiski we see fiction, articles on various topics and the memoirs of a la
rge
number of Jewish authors." Illyustrirovannaya Rossia [Illustrated Russia] was publishe
d by
the St. Petersburg journalist M. P. Mironov, and later by B. A. Gordon (earlierthe own
er of
Priazovsky Krai). [18] Its weekly supplement "gave the readers 52 pieces of classic o
r
contemporary emigrant literature each year." (The literary emigrant world also include
d
many prominent Russian Jews, such as Mark Aldanov, Semyon Yushkevich, the already
mentioned Jabotinsky and Yuly Aikhenvald, M. O. Tsetlin (Amari). However, the topic o
f
Russian emigrant literature cannot be examined in any detail here due to its immensene
ss.)

Here I would like to address the life of llya Fondaminsky (born in 1880). Himself from
a
prosperous merchant family and married in his youth to the granddaughter of the millio
naire
tea trader V. Y. Vysotsky, he nonetheless joined the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) a
nd
"sacrificed a large part of his wealth and his wife's inheritance to the revolution"
[19] by
buying weaponry. He worked towards the outbreak of the Ail-Russian political strike in
1905

169

and during the uprising he served in the headquarters of the SRs. He emigrated from Ru
ssia
to Paris in 1906, where he became close to D. Merezhkovsky and Z. Gippius and develope
d
an interest in Christianity. He returned to St. Petersburg in April 1917. In the summe
r of 1917
he was the commissar of the Black Sea Fleet, and later a delegate in the Constituent
Assembly, fleeing after it was disbanded. From 1919 he lived in Paris, France, during
the
period under discussion. He devoted much time and effort to Sovremennye Zapiski,
including publication of a series of articles titled The Ways of Russia. He played an
active role
in emigrant cultural life and provided all possible support to Russian writers and poe
ts. For a
while he even managed to maintain a Russian theatre in Paris. "His passion, many-sided
ness,
energy and selflessness ... were without parallel among emigrants ."[20] He estranged
himself from the SRs and joined Christian Democrats. Along with the like-minded G. P.
Fedotov and F. A. Stepun he began to publish the Christian Democratic Novy Grad [New C
ity].
"He grew ever closerto Orthodoxy during these years. "[21] "In June 1940 he fled Paris
from
the advancing German forces," but came back and was arrested in Julyl941and sent to
Compiegne camp near Paris; "by some accounts, he converted to Christianity there. In 1
942
he was deported to Auschwitz and killed."[22]

Between 1920 and 1924, the most important forum for purely Jewish issues was the Pari
s
weekly, Jewish Tribune, published in both French and Russian with the prominent
participation of M. M. Vinaver and S. B. Pozner. It published articles by many of the
aforementioned journalists from other newspapers.

Novoe RusskoeSlovo [New Russian Word] was founded in 1910 in the United States and
added its voice from across the ocean. Its publisher from 1920 was V. I. Shimkin and t
he
main editor (from 1922) was M. E. Veinbaum. Veinbaum remembered: "The newspaper was
often criticised, and not without reason. But gradually it earned the reader's
confidence."[23](lts masthead now proudly boasts: "the oldest Russian newspaper in th
e
world"; it is even two years older than Pravda. All the others have died out at variou
s times,
for various reasons.)

Right-wing or nationalist Russian newspapers appeared in Sofia, Prague, and even Suvor
in's
Novoe Vremya [New Times] continued in Belgrade as Vechernee Vremya [Evening Times],
but they all either collapsed or withered awaywithout leaving a lasting contribution.
(The
publisher of Rus in Sofia was killed.) The Paris Vozrozhdenie of Yu. Semenov "did not
shirk
from anti-Semitic outbursts" [24] (but not under Struve's short reign).

***

Those who left soon after the Bolshevik victory could not even imagine the scale of in
ferno
that broke out in Russia. It was impossible to believe in rumours. Testimonies from th
e
White camp were mostly ignored. This changed when several Russian democratic journalis
ts
(the Constitutional Democrat (Kadet) A. V. Tyrkova -Williams, the socialist E. D. Kusk
ova
(exiled from the USSR in 1922), and the escaped SR S. S. Maslov began to inform the st
unned

170

emigrant public about rapid growth of grass-root anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia:

"Judeophobia is one of the most acrid features of modern Russia. Perhaps even the mos
t
acrid. Judeophobia is everywhere: North, South, East, and West. It is shared regardles
s of
intellect, party membership, tribe, age.... Even some Jews share it."[25]

These claims were at first met with suspicion by Jews who had emigrated earlier - wha
t's
the reason for this anti-Semitism? The Jewish Tribune initially rejected these claim
s:
"generally, Russian Jewry suffered from Bolshevism perhaps more than any other ethnic
group in Russia"; as to the "familiar identification of Jews and commissars" -we all k
now
that it is the work of the [anti-Semitic] "Black Hundreds." The old view, that anti-Se
mitism
resides not in the people but inTsarism, began to transform into another, that the Rus
sian
people are themselves its carriers. Therefore, Bolsheviks should be credited for the
suppression of popular "Black Hundred" attitudes in Russia. (Others began to excuse ev
en
their capitulation at Brest [at which Russia ceded large amounts of territory to the K
aiser's
German military]. The Jewish Tribune in 1924 dusted off even such argument: "the Russi
an
revolution of 1917, when it reached Brest-Litovsk, prevented the much greater and mor
e
fateful betrayal planned by Tsarist Russia."[26])

Yet the information was gradually confirmed; moreover, a nti -Jewish sentiments spread
over
a large segment of Russian emigration. The Union for Russian Salvation (dedicated to c
rown
prince Nikolai Nikolaevich) produced leaflets for distribution in the USSR in a manner
like
this: "To the Red Army. The Jews have ruled Great Russia forseven years...." "To Russi
an
workers. You were assured that you would be the masters of the country; that it will b
e the
'dictatorship of the proletariat.' Where is it then? Who is in power in all the cities
of the
republic?" Of course, these leaflets did not reach the USSR, but they scared and offen
ded
Jewish emigrants.

S. Li tovtsev wrote: "In the beginning of 1920s, anti-Semitism among emigrants became
almost an illness, a sort of delirium tremens. "[27] But it was a broader attitude as
many in
Europe during the first years after the Bolshevik victory rejected and damned the Jew
s, so
that "the identification of Bolshevism with Judaism became a widespread part of Europe
an
thought. It is ridiculous to assert that it is only anti-Semites preach this social-po
litical
heresy."[28] But could it be that the conclusions of Dr. Pasmanikwere somehow prematur
e?
Yet this is what he wrote in 1922: "In the whole civilised world, among all nations an
d social
classes and political parties, it is the established opinion now that Jews played the
crucial
role in the appearance and in all the manifestations of Bolshevism. Personal experienc
e tells
that this is the opinion not only of downright anti-Semites, but also ... that represe
ntatives of
the democratic public ... reference these claims, i.e., to the role of Jews not only i
n Russian
Bolshevism, but also in Hungary, Germany and everywhere else it has appeared. At the s
ame
time, the downright anti-Semites care little for truth. For them all Bolsheviks are Je
ws, and
all Jews are Bolsheviks."[29]

171

Bikerman wrote a year later: "Waves of Judeophobia now roll over nations and peoples,
with
no end in sight"; "not just in Bavaria or Hungary ... not only in the nations formed f
rom the
ruins of the once great Russia ... but also in countries separated from Russia by cont
inents
and oceans and untouched by the turmoil.... Japanese academics came to Germany to get
acquainted with anti-Semitic literature: there is interest in us even on distant islan
ds where
almost no Jews live.... It is precisely Judeophobia -the fearofthe Jew-destroyer. Russ
ia's
miserable fate serves as the material evidence to frighten and enrage." [30]

In the collective declaration To the Jews of the World! the authors warn: "Never have
so
many clouds gathered above the Jewish people. "[31]

Should we conclude that these authors exaggerated, that they were too sensitive? That
they
imagined a non-existent threat? Yet doesn't the abovementioned warning about "anti-
Semitic literature in Germany" sound very scary - in retrospect, from our historical
perspective?

"The opinion that Jews created Bolshevism" was already so widespread in Europe (this w
as
the "average opinion of French and English philistines," Pasmanik notes) that it was
supported even by Plekhanov's son-in-law, George Bato, who claims in his book[32] tha
t
Jews are inherently revolutionaries: "as Judaism preaches an ideal of social justice o
n earth
... it has to support revolution." Pasmanik cites Bato: "Over the centuries ... Jews h
ave always
been against the established order.... This does not mean that Jews carried out all
revolutions, or that they were always the sole or even main instigators; they help th
e
revolutions and participate in them"; "One can responsibly claim, as many Russian patr
iots,
often from very progressive circles, do, that Russia now agonizes under the power of J
ewish
dictatorship and Jewish terror"; "Impartial analysis of the worldwide situation shows
the
rebirth of anti-Semitism, not so much against Jews as individuals, as againstthe
manifestations of the Jewish spirit."[33] The Englishman Hilaire Belloc[34] similarly
wrote
about "the Jewish character of Bolshevik revolution," or simply: "the Jewish revolutio
n in
Russia." Pasmanik adds that "anyone who has lived in England recently knows that Bello
c's
opinion is not marginal." The books of both authors (Bato and Belloc) "are enormously
popular with the public"; "journalists all over the world argue that all the destructi
ve ideas of
the past hundred years are spread by Jews, through precisely Judaism."[35]

"We must defend ourselves," Pasmanik writes, "because we cannot deny obvious fact
s....
We cannot just declare that the Jewish people are not to blame for the acts of this or
that
individual Jew.... Our goal ... is not only an argument with anti-Semites, but also a
struggle
with Bolshevism ... not only to parry blows, but to inflict them on those proclaiming
the
Kingdom of Ham.... To fight against Ham is the duty of Japheth and Shem, and of Helene
s,
and Hebrews." Where should we look for the real roots of Bolshevism? "Bolshevism is
primarily an anti-cultural force ... it is both a Russian and a global problem, and no
t the
machination of the notorious 'Elders of Zion. "'[36]

172

The Jews acutely realized the need to "defend themselves" in part because the post-wa
r
Europe and America were flooded with Protocols of the Elders of Zion, suddenly and vir
tually
instantly. These were five editions in England in 1920, several editions in both Germa
ny and
France; half a million copies in America were printed by Henry Ford. "The unheard-of s
uccess
of the Protocols, which were translated into several languages, showed how much the
Bolshevik revolution was believed to be Jewish. [37]" English researcher Norman Cohn w
rote:
"in the years immediately after the World War I, when the Protocols entered mainstrea
m
and thundered across the world, many otherwise entirely sensible people took them
completely seriously."[38] The London Times and Morning Post of that time vouched for
their authenticity, although by August 1921 the Times published a series of articles f
rom its
Istanbul correspondent, Philipp Greaves, who sensationally demonstrated the extensive
borrowing of the text inthe Protocols from Maurice Jolie's anti-Napoleon III pamphlets
(The
Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, 1864). At that time the French
police managed to confiscate every single copy of the infamous pamphlet.

The Protocols came to the West from a Russia overtaken by the Civil War.

A journalistic fraud produced in the early 20th century (in 1900 or 1901), the Protoco
ls were
first published in 1903 in St. Petersburg. The mastermind behind them is thought to be
P. I.
Rachkovsky, the 1884-1902 head of the Foreign Intelligence unit of the Police Departme
nt;
their production is attributed to Matvei Golovinsky, a secret agent from 1892 and son
of V. A.
Golovinsky, who was a member of Petrashevsky Circle. [The latter was a Russian literar
y
discussion group of progressive-minded commoner-intellectuals in St. Petersburg organi
zed
by Mikhail Petrashevsky, a follower of the French Utopian socialist Charles Fourier. A
mong
the members were writers, teachers, students, minor government officials, army officer
s.
While differing in political views, most of them were opponents of the Tsarist autocra
cy and
the Russian serfdom. Among those connected to the circle were writers Dostoyevsky]. (S
till,
new theories about the origin of the Protocols appear all the time). Although the Prot
ocols
were published and re-published in 1905, 1906, 1911, they had little success in pre-
revolutionary Russia: "they did not find broad support in Russian society.... The Cour
t did not
give support to distribution either."[39] After many failed attempts, the Protocols we
re
finally presented to Nicholas II in 1906 and he was very impressed. His notes on the m
argins
of the book included: "What a foresight!', 'What precise execution!', "It is definitel
y them
who orchestrated the [revolutionary] events of 1905!', 'There can be no doubt about th
eir
authenticity.' But when the right-wing activists suggested using the Protocols for the
defence
of the monarchy, Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin ordered a secret investigation into the
ir
origins. It showed they were a definite fabrication. The monarch was shocked by Stolyp
in's
report, but wrote firmly: "remove the Protocols from circulation. You cannot defend a
noble
cause with dirty means."[40] And since then "Russia's rulers' dismissal of the Protoco
ls of
the Elders of Zion came into force: no reference to the 'Protocols' was allowed ... ev
en
during the Beilis Trial." [41]

173

However "1918 changed everything for the Protocols. [42]" After the Bolsheviks seized
power, after the murder of the royal family and the beginning of the Civil War, the
popularity of the Protocols surged. They were printed and re-printed by the OsvAg [Whi
te
Army counter-intelligence agency in the South of Russia] in Novocherkassk, Kharkov, Ro
stov-
on-Don, Omsk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and were widely circulated among both the
Volunteer Army and the population (and later Russian emigrants, especially in Sofia an
d
Belgrade).

"After the Bolshevik victory the selling of Protocols was banned in Russia" and become
a
criminal offence, but "in Europe the Protocols brought in by the White emigration play
ed an
ominous role in the development of right-wing ideology, especially National Socialism
in
Germany." [43]

Exposure of the Protocols as forgery, and general denial of identity between Bolshevik
s and
Jews constituted a major share of liberal emigrant journalism of the 1920s and 1930s.
We
see several prominent Russians there: Milyukov, Rodichev, Burtsevand Kartashev.

A.V. Kartashev, historian of religion, Orthodox theologian and at the same time, a pub
lic
figure, wrote about the unacceptability of anti-Semitism for a Christian in the pre-
revolutionary collection Shchit [Shield], [44] which I have often cited. In 1922, in e
migration,
he wrote the foreword to Yu. Delevsky's book on the Protocols. [45] In 1937 Burtsev to
o
asked him to write a foreword for his book. Kartashev wrote in it: "A man with common
sense, good will and a little scientific discipline cannot even discuss the authentici
ty of this
police and journalistic forgery, though certainly a talented forgery, able to infect t
he
ignorant.... It's unfair to continue supporting this obvious deceit after it has been
so
unambiguously exposed. Yet it is equally unfair to do the opposite, to exploit the eas
y victory
over the Protocols authenticity to dismiss legitimate concerns.... A half-truth is a l
ie. The
whole truth is that the Jewish question is posed before the world as one of the tragi
c
questions of history. And it cannot be resolved either by savage pogroms, or by libel
and lies,
but only by honest and open efforts of all mankind. Pogroms and slander make a sensibl
e
and honest raising of the question more difficult, degrading it to outright stupidity
and
absurdity. They confuse the Jews themselves, who constantly emphasize their 'oppresse
d
innocence' and expect from everybody else nothing but sympathy and some sort of
obligatory Judeophilia." Kartashev certainly regarded debunking of this "sensational
apocrypha" as a "moral duty," but also thought that "in washing out the dust of Protoc
ols
from the eyes of the ignorant, it is unacceptable to impair their vision anew by prete
nding
that this obliterates the Jewish question itself."[46]

Indeed, the "Jewish question" cannot be removed by either books or articles. Consider
the
new reality faced in the 1920s by Jews in the Baltic countries and Poland. In Baltics,
although
"Jews managed to maintain for a while their influential position in trade and industr
y" [47]
they felt social pressure. "A good half of Russian Jewry lived in the newly independen
t
states.... New states trumpet their nationalism all the louder the less secure they fe
el. "[48]

174

There "Jews feel themselves besieged by a hostile, energetic and restless popular
environment. One day, it is demanded that there be no more Jews percentage-wise in th
e
institutions of higher learning than in the army ... the next, the airof everyday life
becomes
so tense and stressful that Jews can no longer breathe.... In the self-determined nati
ons, the
war against Jews is waged by the society itself: by students, military, political part
ies, and
ordinary people." I. Bikerman concluded that "in leading the charge for self-determina
tion,
Jews were preparing the ground for their own oppression by virtue of higher dependence
on
the alien society."[49] "The situation of Jews in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania is lit
erally tragic.
Yesterday's oppressed are today's oppressors, what is more - extremely uncouth oppress
ors,
entirely unashamed of their lack of culture. "[50]

So it transpired "that the breakup of Russia also meant the breakup of Russian Jewry"
as the
history paradoxically showed that the Jews were better off in the united Russian Empir
e
despite all the oppression. So now in these splintered border countries "Jews became t
he
faithful guardians of the Russian language, Russian culture, impatiently waiting for t
he
restoration of the great Russia. Schools that still teach in Russian became filled wit
h Jewish
children," to the exclusion of learning the languages of the newly-formed states. "In
these
tiny countries, the Russian Jew, accustomed to life in the open swathes of a great emp
ire,
feels uncomfortable, squeezed and diminished in his social status, despite all the civ
il rights
and autonomy.... Indeed our people's fate is bound up with the fate of the great Russi
a."[51]

Still, the position of Jewry in the circles of international post-war politics was str
ong,
especially in Paris, and in particular regarding Zionism. "In July 1922 the League of
Nations
recognised the World Zionist Organization as the 'Jewish Agency,'" which first and for
emost
represented the interests of Zionists, and secondly of non-Zionists, and also provide
d
support to the European Jews. [52]

Bikerman accused the Zionists of seeing a "fragmented Russia ... as an ideal. This is
why the
organization of Russian Zionists calls itself not Russian, but Russo-Ukrainian. This i
s why the
Zionists and related Jewish groups so assiduously fraternized with the Ukrainian
separatists. "[53]

***

After the Civil War, Soviet Russia sank into a heavy silence. From this point and for
decades
to follow, all independent voices were squashed and only the official line could be he
ard.
And the less was heard from Russia, the louder was the voice of emigration. All of the
m,
from anarchists to monarchists, looked back in pain and argued intensely: who and to w
hat
extent was to blame for what had happened?

Discussion developed within emigrant Jewry as well.

In 1923 Bikerman noted: "Jews answer everything with a familiargesture and fa mi liar
words:
we know, we're to blame; whenever something goes wrong, you'll look for a Jew and fin
d

175

one. Ninety percents of what is written in the contemporary Jewish press about Jews i
n
Russia is just a paraphrase of this stereotype. And because it's impossible that we're
always
to blame for everything, Jews take from this the flattering and at first glance quite
convenient conclusion that we're always and everywhere in the right."[54]

However, consider: "Before the revolution, the Jewish society passionately argued that
a
revolution would save the Jews, and we still ardently adhere to this position." When t
he
Jewish organizations gather resources in the West to aid their co-ethnics, suffering i
n the
USSR, they "denounce, belittle, and slandereverything about pre-revolutionary Russia,
including the most positive and constructive things; See, "the Bolshevik Russia has no
w
become the Promised Land," egalitarian and socialist. Many Jews who emigrated from
Russia settled in the United States, and "pro-Bolshevik attitudes spread quickly amon
g
them."[55] The general Jewish mood was that Bolshevism was better than restoration of
monarchy. It was widely believed "that the fall of Bolshevism in Russia would inevitab
ly
engender a new wave of bloody Jewish pogroms and mass extermination.... And it is on t
his
basis that Bolshevism is preferred as the lesserevil."[56]

Then, as if to confirm that Bolsheviks are changing for the better, that they can lear
n, the
NEP came! They've loosened their suffocating grip on the economy, and that made them a
ll
the more acceptable. "First NEP, then some concessions - hopefully, it'll all work out
for
us." [57]

We cannot call the entire Jewish emigration pro-Bolshevik. Yet they did not seethe
Bolshevik state as their main enemy, and many still sympathized with it.

Yet a noteworthy incident, mockingly described in Izvestiya, happened to Goryansky, a

Jewish emigrant writer.[58] In 1928, the already famous Babel (and already well-known
for
his links to the Cheka) was "temporarily residing" in Paris to muster creative inspira
tion.
While in the Cafe Rotonda he noticed his "old acquaintance," probably from Odessa, wh
o
magnanimously offered his hand to him: "Greetings, Goryansky." But Goryansky stood up
and contemptuously turned away from the offered hand.

Rise of Hitlerism in Germany naturally and for a long time reinforced the preference f
or
Bolshevism in the social mind of the European Jewry.

The First International Jewish Congress took place in Vienna in August 1936. M. Vishny
ak
disapprovingly suggested that the collective attitude toward the Bolshevik regime was
perfectly exemplified by the opinion of N. Goldman: if all sorts of freedom-loving
governments and organizations "flatter and even fawn before the Bolsheviks ...why
shouldn't supporters of Jewish ethnic and cultural independence follow the same path?
...
Only Moscow's open support for anti-Jewish violence in Palestine slightly cooled the
Congress leaders' disposition toward the Soviet state. Even then ... they only protest
ed the
banning of Hebrew ... and the banning of emigration from the USSR to Palestine, and, f
inally,
they objected to the continuing suffering of Zionists in political prisons and concent
ration

176

camps. Here N. Goldman found both the necessary words and inspiration."[59] In 1939 o
n
the eve of the World War II, S. Ivanovich noted: "It cannot be denied that among emigr
ant
Russian Jews" the mood was to "rely on the perseverance of the Soviet dictatorship" if
only
to prevent pogroms. [60]

What of Jewish Bolsheviks? I. Bikerman: "Prowess doesn't taint - that is our attitude
to
Bolsheviks who were raised among us and to their satanic evil. Or the modern version:
Jews
have the right to have their own Bolsheviks"; "I have heard this declaration a thousan
d
times"; at a meeting of Jewish emigrants in Berlin "one after the other, a respected K
adet, a
Democrat, a Zionist ascended the podium" and each "proclaimed this right of Jews to ha
ve
their own Bolsheviks ...their right to monstrosity."[61]

"Here are the consequences of these words: Jewish opinion across the world turned awa
y
from Russia and accepted the Bolsheviks"; "when a famous, old, and well respected Jewi
sh
public figure -a white crow -suggested to a high Jewish dignitary inone of the Europea
n
capitals organizing a protest against the executions of Orthodox priests in Russia [i.
e. in the
USSR], the latter, after reflecting on the idea, said that it would mean struggling ag
ainst
Bolshevism, which he considers an impossible thing to do because the collapse of Bolsh
evik
regime would lead to anti-Jewish pogroms. "[62]

But if they can live with Bolsheviks, what do they think of the White movement? When J
osef
Bikerman spoke in Berlin in November 1922 at the fifth anniversary of the founding of
the
White Army, Jewish society in general was offended and took this as a slight against t
hem.

Meanwhile, Dr. D. S. Pasmanik (who fought on the German front until February 1917, the
n in
the White Army until May 1919, when he left Russia) had already finished and in 1923
published in Paris his book Russian Revolution and Jewry: Bolshevism and Judaism (I ci
ted it
here), where he passionately argued against the commonplace explanation that Bolshevis
m
originated from the Jewish religion. "The identification of Judaism with Bolshevism is
a grave
global danger." In 1923, together with I. M. Bikerman, G. A. Landau, I. O. Levin, D.
O. Linsky
(also an ex-member of the White Army) and V. C. Mandel, Pasmanik founded the National
Union of Russian Jews Abroad. This group published an appeal To the Jews of the World!
in
the same year, and soon after published a collection Russia and the Jews in Berlin.

Here is how they describe the taskthey undertook and their feelings. Pasmaniksaid: "Th
e
unspeakable pain of the Jew and the unending sorrow of the Russian citizen" motivated
this
work. "Because of the dark events of the recent years, it was difficult to find a bala
nced
point of view on both Russian and Jewish questions. We ...attempted to merge the inter
ests
of the renewed Russia and of the afflicted Russian Jewry."[63] Linsky: "Unfathomed sor
row"
dwells in the souls of those who "realize their Jewishness while similarly identifying
as
Russians." It is much easierwhen "one of the two streams of your national consciousnes
s
dries up, leaving you only a Jew or only a Russian, thus simplifying your position tow
ard
Russia's tragic experience. ...The villainous years of the revolution killed ... the s
hoots of hope"

177

for rapprochement between Jews and Russians that had appeared just before the war; no
w
"we witness active ... Russo-Jewish divergence." [64] Levin: "It is our duty to honest
ly and
objectively examine the causes of and the extent of Jewish involvement in the revoluti
on.
This ... might have certain effect on future relations between Russians and Jews."[65]
The co-
authors of the collection rightly warned Russians not to mix up the meaning of the Feb
ruary
Revolution and Jewish involvement in it. Bikerman if anything minimised this involveme
nt
(the power balance between the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Work
ers'
Deputies and the Provisional Government was for the most part unclear to contemporarie
s).
However he thought that after the October Bolshevik coup "the Jewish right to have the
ir
Bolsheviks implies a duty to have also their right-wingers and extreme right-wingers,
the
polar opposites of the Bolsheviks."[66] Pasmanik: "In all its varieties and forms, Bol
shevik
communism ... is an evil and true foe of Jewry, as it is first of all the enemy of per
sonal
identity in general and of cultural identity in particular."[67] "Bound by a plethora
of
intimate connections to our motherland, to its political system, economy and culture,
we
cannot flourish while the country disintegrates around us."[68]

Obviously, these authors were fully aware of the significance of the Russian catastrop
he. In
describing those years, I heavily relied on the work of these people with the hope tha
t their
bitter, but not at all "self-hating," reflections can finally be understood and compre
hended
in their entirety.

Their 1923 Proclamation stated: "The National Union of Russian Jews Abroad firmly beli
eves
that the Bolsheviks epitomize the greatest evil for the Jews as well as for all other
peoples of
Russia.... It is time for the Jew to stop tremble at the thought of going against the
revolution.... Rather, the Jew should fear going against his motherland [Russia] and h
is
people [Jewish]."[69]

However, the authors of Russia and the Jews sawthe Jewish national consciousness of th
e
early 1920s as something very different from what they've thought it should have bee
n.
"Almost all circles and classes of Russian society are now engaged in grievous self-re
flections,
trying to comprehend what has happened... .Whether these self-accusations and admissio
ns
of guilt are fairor not, they at least reveal the work of thought, conscience, and ach
ing
hearts.... But it would be no exaggeration to claim that such spiritual work is the le
ast
noticeable among the Jewish intelligentsia, which is no doubt a symptom of certain
morbidity.... For an outsider it appears that a typical Jewish intellectual has no
concerns."[70] For this intellectual "everyone else is to blame - the government, the
generals, the peasants, etc. He has nothing to do with all this.... In no way did he f
orge his
own destiny and the destinies of those around him; he is just a passersby, hit on the
head by
a falling brick"; "so they were complicit in destroying [the world around them], but a
fter it
was finished they became unaware of their role in it." [71]

Jewish Bolsheviks was a particular pain for the authors. "A sin that carries the seed
of its own
nemesis, ... what greater affliction is there for a people than to see its sons debauc
hed?" [72]

178
"It is not just that the Russian upheaval needed people of a certain sort for its perp
etuation,
or that the Jewish society provided this sort of people; what is most important is tha
t they
were not rebuffed, did not meet enough opposition from within their own society."[73]
"It is
our duty to shoulder the struggle specifically against the Jewish Bolsheviks, against
all kinds
of YevSeks [the 'Jewish Section,' the name given to officials appointed by the Soviets
to deal
with Jewish affairs], and against Jewish commissars in genera I. "[74]

It should be noted that these authors were not alone in arguing that Russian (and now
emigrant) Jews should fight againstthe Bolsheviks. From the pages of the Jewish Tribun
e: "If
Bolshevism was swept from power in Russia by a wave of popular wrath, Jewry might be
held, in the eyes of the masses, responsible for prolonging Bolshevism's lifespan....
Only
active participation in the struggle to liquidate Bolshevism can secure Jews a safe po
sition in
the common cause of saving Russia."[75]

Bikerman warned: if we support the Bolsheviks "on the principle that your own shirt is
closer
to the body" then "we should not forget that we thus allow the Russian to take care of
his
own shirt that is closerto his body; that it justifies the call, 'Slaughter Yids, Save
Russia."'[76]

What of the Jewish attitudes toward the White Army? "This unworthy attitude that Jews
have towards people who have taken upon their shoulders the endlessly difficult task o
f
fighting for Russia, forthe millions of the sheepish and weak-willed, points out to th
e
complete moral disintegration, to a sort of perversion of mind...." While "all of us,
Jews and
non-Jews alike, placed ourselves obediently under the communist yoke and our backs und
er
the whip, there were some Russians, courageous and proud, who overcame all obstacles,
gathered from what remained of the breached and ripped apart fronts [of World War I],
consolidated and raised the banner of resistance.... Just that they were willing to fi
ght under
these circumstances alone immortalizes them for the history. And these people became a
n
object for abuse" on the side of so many Jews, "libeled by every loquacious tongue"; s
o
"instead of appreciation the tragedy, we see epidemic mindlessness, endless laxity of
speech,
and triumphant superficiality." And yet "the Russia forwhich the Whites fought is not
alien
to us; it is 'our shirt' too. "[77] "Jewry should have fought for the White cause as f
orthe
cause of Jewish salvation, for ... only in the restoration and swift rescue of Russian
statehood
can Jews find salvation from that death that has never been as close as in these day
s."[78]

(Death was indeed approaching, although from another direction).

Who would deny these conclusions today, after decades of Soviet regime? But at that ti
me,
only few authors, Jewish or Russian, could see so farahead. The Jewish emigrant commun
ity
as a whole rejected these thoughts. And thus they had failed the test of history. It m
ight be
objected that it did not cause Jewry a noticeable, significant harm, and certainly it
was not
the Holocaust brought by Hitlerism. Yes, it did not bring commeasurable physical harm,
but,
historically, its spiritual harm was noticeable; take, for instance, the success of Bo
lshevism in
the expulsion of the Jewish religion from the country where it had once deeply spread
its

179

sacred roots. And there was more - the Jews, by "betting on Bolshevism" influenced th
e
overall course of events in Europe.

The authors of the Russia and the Jews appealed in vain: "In the many centuries of Jew
ish
dispersion ... there has not been a political catastrophe as deeply threatening to our
national
existence as the breaking of the Russian Power, for never have the vital forces of the
Jewish
people been as united as in the bygone, living Russia. Even the breakup of the Calipha
te can
scarcely compare with the current disaster." [79] "For the united Russian Jewry the br
eakup
of Russia into separate sovereign states is a national calamity." [80] "If there is no
place for
the Jews inthe great spaces of the Russian land, inthe boundlessness of the Russiansou
l,
then there is no space [for Jews] anywhere in the world.... Woe to us, if we do not wi
se
up." [81]

Of course, by the very end of the 20th century we can easily reject these grim prophec
ies, if
only as a matter of fact -just as enough space has been found on earth for formerly Ru
ssian
Jews, so a Jewish state has been founded and secured itself, while Russia still lies i
n ruin, so
powerless and humiliated. The warnings of the authors on how Russia should be treated
already appear a great exaggeration, a failed prophecy. And now we can reflect on thes
e
words only in regard of the spiritual chord that so unexpectedly bound the two our peo
ples
together in History.

"If Russia is notour motherland, then we are foreigners and have no right to interfere
in her
national life." [82] "Russia will survive; her renaissance must become our national co
ncern,
the concern of the entire ... Russian Jewry."[83] And in conclusion: "The fate of Russ
ian
Jewry is inextricably linked to the fate of Russia; we must save Russia, if we want to
save
Jewry .... The Jews must fight the molesters of the great country shoulder to shoulder
with
all other anti-Bolshevikforces; a consolidated struggle againstthe common enemy will h
eal
the rifts and substantially reduce the current dramatic and ubiquitous growth of anti-

Semitism; only by saving Russia, can we prevent a Jewish catastrophe." [84]

Catastrophe! - this was said ten years before Hitler's ascension to power, eighteen ye
ars
before his stunning sweep across the USSR and before the start of his program of Jewis
h
extermination. Would it have been possible for Hitler to preach hatred of "Jews and
communists" in Germany so easily and successfully, to claim Jews and communists are th
e
same, if the Jews were among the most prominent and persistent opponents of the Sovie
t
regime? The spiritual search of the authors of Russia and the Jews led them to prophet
ically
sense the shadow of the impending Jewish Catastrophe, though erring in its geographica
l
origin and failing to predict other fateful developments. Yet their dreadful warning r
emained
unheard.
I am not aware of anything else close to Russia and the Jews in the history of Russian
-Jewish
relations. It shook the Jewish emigration. Imagine how hurtful it was to hear such thi
ngs
coming from Jewish lips, from within Jewry itself.

180

On the part of Russians, we must learn a lesson from this story as well. We should tak
e
Russia and the Jews as an example of how to love our own people and at the same time b
e
able to speak about our mistakes, and to do so mercilessly if necessary. And in doing
that,
we should never alienate or separate ourselves from our people. The surest path to soc
ial
truth is for each to admit their own mistakes, from each, from every side.

Having devoted much time and thought to these authors (and having dragged the reader
along with me), I would like here to leave a brief record of their lives.

Josef Menassievich Bikerman (1867-1942) came from a poor petty bourgeois family. He
attended a cheder, then a yeshiva, provided for himself from the age of fifteen; educa
ted
himself under difficult circumstances. In 1903 he graduated from the historical -philo
logical
faculty of the Imperial Novorossiya University (after a two-year-exclusion gap for
participation in student unrest). He opposed Zionism as, in his opinion, an illusory a
nd
reactionary idea. He called on Jews to unite, without relinquishing their spiritual id
entity,
with progressive forces in Russia to fight for the good of the common motherland. His
first
article was a large tract on Zionism published in the Russkoe Bogatstvo [Russian Treas
ure]
(1902, issue 7), which was noticed and debated even abroad. In 1905 he was deeply invo
lved
into the Liberation movement. He worked in several periodicals: Syn Otechestva [Son of
the
Fatherland], Russkoe Bogatstvo, Nash Den [Our day], Bodroe Slovo [Buoyant Word]. As a
n
emigrant he was printed in the Paris Vozrozhdenie, when it was run by P. B. Struve.

Daniil Samoilovich Pasmanik (1869-1930) was a son of Melamed (a teacher in a cheder).

In
1923 he graduated from the medical faculty of Zurich University and then practiced
medicine in Bulgaria for seven years. In 1899-1905 he was the freelance lecturer in th
e
medical faculty at Geneva University. He joined Zionist movement in 1900 and became on
e
of its leading theorists and publicists. He returned to Russia in 1905 and passed the
medical
license exam. He participated in the struggle for civil rights for Jews; he opposed th
e Bund
and worked on the program for Poale-Zion; in 1906-1917 he was a member of the Central
Committee of the Russian Zionist organization. He was a member of editorial boards of
Evreiskaya Zhizn [Jewish Life], and then of Rassvet. He wrote many articles for Evreis
ky Mir
[Jewish World] and the Jewish Encyclopaedia. He published his medical works in special
ized
journals in German and French. Pasmanik was in Vienna when the WWI broke out in 1914,
from where he with great difficulty managed to return to Russia; he joined the army an
d
served in field hospitals until February 1917. He joined the Kadets after the Februar
y
Revolution; he supported General Kornilov and the White movement; in 1918-1919 he was
involved in the White government of the Crimea, was elected chairman of the Union of t
he
Jewish Communities of the Crimea. In 1919 he emigrated from Russia to France. In 1920-

1922 in Paris he together with V. L. Burtsev edited the White emigre newspaper Obshche
e
Delo [The Common Cause]. Overall, he authored hundreds of articles and tens of books;
the
most notable of them include Wandering Israel: The Psychology of Jewry in Dispersion
(1910), Fates of the Jewish People: The Problems of Jewish Society (1917), The Russia
n

181

Revolution and Jewry: Bolshevism and Judaism (1923) The Revolutionary Years in Crimea
(1926), What Is Judaism? (French edition, 1930).

IsaakOsipovich Levin (1876-1944) was a historian and publicist. Before the revolution,
he
worked as a foreign affairs commentator for Russkie Vedomosti [Russian Journal] and fo
r the
P. B.Struve's magazine, Russkaya Mysl [RussianThought]. He emigrated first to Berlin.
He
was a member of the Russian Institute of Science, worked in the Rul, Russkie Zapiski a
nd in
the historical-literary almanac Na Chuzhoi Storone [In the Foreign Land]; he regularly
gave
presentations (in particular on the topic of the rise of German anti-Semitism). He mov
ed to
Paris in 1931 or 1932. He was widowed and lived in poverty. Among his works are
Emigration during the French Revolution and a book in French about Mongolia. During th
e
German occupation he registered according to his "racial origins" as was required by
authorities; he was arrested in the early 1943, for a short time was held in a concent
ration
camp near Paris, then deported; he died in a Nazi concentration camp in 1944.

Grigory (Gavriel) Adolfovich Landau (1877-1941) was son of the well-known publicist an
d
publisher A. E. Landau. He graduated from the law faculty of the St. Petersburg Univer
sity in
1902. He wrote for periodicals from 1903 (the newspapers Voskhod [Sunrise], Nash Den,
Evreiskoe Obozrenie [Jewish Observer], the magazines Bodroe Slovo, Evreisky Mir, Vestn
ik
Evropy [European Herald], Sovremennik, Severnye Zapiski [Northern Notes], the yearly
almanac Logos). He was one of the founders of the Jewish Democratic Group in 1904 and
the
Union for Equal Rights for Jews in Russia in 1905. He was an outstanding Kadet, member
of
the Central Committee of the Kadet Party. In August 1917 he participated in the Govern
ment
Conference in Moscow; from December 1917 he was a member of the Executive Committee
of the Jewish Community of Petrograd. He emigrated to Germany in 1919; from 1922 to
1931he was I. V. Gessen's deputy at Rul. Apart from Rul, he also wrote for the magazin
e,
Russkaya Mysl, the weekly, Russia and the Slavs, the collection Chisla [Dates], etc. H
e often
lectured at emigre evenings (in 1927 in the talk titled The Eurasian Delusion he criti
cised
"eurasianism" as the movement contrary to the values of Russian history and leading t
o
ideological Bolshevism). From Nazi Germany he fled for Latvia, where he worked for the
Riga
newspaper Segodnya [Today]. He was arrested by the NKVD in June 1941 and died in the
Usollag camp (near Solikamsk) in November.[85] Among his works the most influential we
re
Clownish Culture (in Nash Den, 1908), the article Twilight of Europe (Severnye Zapisk
i, 1914,
issue 12), which antedated "much of what would later bestow worldwide fame on Oswald
Spengler"[86] (and later a book with the same title (Berlin, 1923)), Polish-Jewish Rel
ations
(1915), On Overcoming Evil (in the collection book The Works of Russian Scholars Abroa
d,
Berlin, 1923), The Byzantine and the Hebrew (Russkaya Mysl, 1923, issues land 2), Thes
es
Against Dostoevsky (Chisla, volume 6, Paris, 1932), Epigraphs (Berlin, 1927). Much of
what
he wrote was dismissed by contemporaries. He was too conservative in spirit to be acce
pted
by progressive public. He was a sagacious thinker.

182

We could not find any substantial information about D. O. Linsky (he served in the Whi
te
Army during the Civil War) or V. C. Mandel (active participant in Russian political li
fe 1907-
1918, he emigrated to Berlin and died in 1931).

***

In Russia and the Jews the behavior of Jewish emigrants during 1920s was explicitly an
d
harshly admonished. The authors called on their co-ethnics to "admit their own mistake
s
and not to judge the Great Russia in which they had lived and which they had made a ho
me
for hundreds of years"; "remember how they demanded justice for themselves and how
upset they are when they are collectively accused for the acts of some individuals"[8
7]; Jews
should not be afraid "to acknowledge some responsibility for all that has happened.
"[88]
"First of all we must determine precisely our share of responsibility and so counter a
nti-
Semitic slander.. ..This is absolutely not about becoming accustomed to anti-Semitism,
as
claimed by some Jewish demagogues.... This admission is vital for us, it is our moral
duty."[89] "Jewry has to pick righteous path worthy of the great wisdom of our religio
us
teachings which will lead us to brotherly reconciliation with the Russian people.... t
o build
the Russian house and the Jewish home so they might stand for centuries to come."[90]

But "we spread storms and thunder and expect to be cradled by gentle zephyrs.... I kno
w you
will shriek that I am justifying pogroms! ... I know how much these people are worth,
who
think themselves salt of the earth, the arbiters of fate, and at the very least the be
acons of
Israel.... They, whose every whisper is about Black Hundreds and Black Hundreders, the
y
themselves are dark people, their essence is black, viri obscure indeed, they were nev
er able
to comprehend ... the power of creativity in human history...." It is imperative for u
s "to
make less of a display of our pain, to shout less about our losses. It is time we unde
rstood
that crying and wailing... is mostly [evidence] of emotional infirmity, of a lack of c
ulture of
the soul.... You are not alone in this world, and your sorrow cannot fill the entire u
niverse ...
when you put on a display only your own grief, only your own pain it shows ... disresp
ect to
others' grief, to others' sufferings. "[91]

It could have been said today, and to all of us.

These words cannot be obviated either by the millions lost in the prisons and camps of
the
GULag, nor by the millions exterminated in the Nazi death camps.

The lectures of the authors of Russia and the Jews at that year's National Union of Je
ws
"were met with great indignation" on the part of emigrant Jewry. "Even when explicitly
or
tacitly accepting the truth of the facts and the analysis, many expressed indignation
or
surprise that anyone dared to bring these into the open. See, it was not the right tim
e to
speak of Jews, to criticise them, to determine thei r revol utiona ry misdeeds and res
ponsibility,
when Jewry has just suffered so much and may suffer even more in the future."[92] The
collection's authors "were almost declared 'enemies of the [Jewish] people,' the abett
ers of
reaction and allies of the pogromists."[93]

183

The Jewish Tribune replied them from Paris a few months later: "The question of 'Jewis
h
responsibility for the Russian revolution' has hitherto only been posed by anti-Semite
s." But
now "there is a whole penitent and accusative movement," apparently "we have to 'not o
nly
blame others, but also admit our own faults'"; yet there is nothing new apart from "th
e
same old boring 'name counting' [of Jews among Bolsheviks]." "Too late ... did Mr. Lan
dau
come to love" "the old 'statehood'"; "'penitent' Jews turned reactionaries"; their "wo
rds are
incompatible with the dignity of the Jewish people ... and are completely irresponsibl
e."[94]
Especially offensive was this attempt to "separate the 'popular" anti-Semitism from th
e
'official' one", attempting to prove that "the people, the society, the country - the
entire
populace hates the Jews and considers them the true culprit responsible for all nation
al
woes"; just like those who connived the pogroms, they repeat "the old canard about th
e
'popular anger. "'[95] Sometimes it descended into the outright abuse: "this group of
Berlin
journalists and activists, which has nearly disappeared from the Jewish public life by
now ...
craves to put themselves into limelight again ... and for that they could think of no
better
way than to attack their own compatriots, Russian Jews"; this "tiny group of loyalists
Jews ...
are blinded by a desire to turn the wheel of history backwards," they write "indecenci
es,"
give "comical advice," take on themselves the "ridiculous role of healers to cure nati
onal
wounds." They should remember that "sometimes it is better to stay quiet."[96]

One sophisticated modern critic could find a better assessment for that collection tha
n a
"severe hysteria." Both that attempt "and their later journey are genuine tragedies,"
in his
opinion, and he explains this tragedy as a "self-hatred complex. "[97]

Yet was Bikerman hateful when he wrote, on his "later tragic journey," that: "The Jewi
sh
people ... is not a sect, not an order, but a whole people, dispersed over the world b
ut united
in itself; it has raised up the banner of peaceful labour and has gathered around this
banner,
as around the symbol of godly order"?[98]

However it is not true that European or emigre Jews did not at all hark to such explan
ations
or warnings. A similardiscussion had taken place a little earlier, in 1922. In the re-
established
Zionist publication Rassvetthe nationalist G. I. Shekhtman expressed his incomprehensi
on at
how the intelligentsia of other nationalities could be anything other than nationalist
ic. An
intelligentsia is invariably connected to its own nationality and feels its pains. A J
ew cannot
be a "Russian democrat", but naturally a "Jewish democrat." "I do not recognise dual
national or democratic loyalties." And if the Russian intelligentsia "does not identif
y with its
nationality" (Herzen), it is simply because until now it "has not had the opportunity
or need
to feel sharp pains over its national identity, to worry about it. But that has change
d now."
Now the Russian intelligentsia "has to cast aside its aspirations to be a universal Al
l -Russian
intelligentsia, and instead to regard itself as the Great Russian democracy." [99]

It was difficult to counter. The gauntlet was picked up by P. N. Milyukov, though not
very
confidently. We remember (see Chapter 11) that back in 1909 he had also expressed horr
or
at the unveiling of this stinging, unpleasant national question "who benefits?" But no
w this

184

new awkward situation (and not a change in Milyukov's views), when so many Russian
intellectuals in emigration suddenly realized that they lost thei r Russia, forced Mil
yukov to
amend his previous position. He replied to Shekhtman, though in a rather ambiguous
manner and not in his own (highly popular) Poslednie Novosti, but in the Jewish Tribun
e with
much smallercirculation, to the effect that a RussianJew could and had to be a "Russia
n
democrat." Milyukov treaded carefully: "but when this demand ... is fulfilled, and the
re
appears a 'new national face' of Russian Democracy (the Great Russian)," well, would
n't
Shekhtman be first to get scared at the prospect of "empowerment of ethnically conscio
us
Great Russian Democracy with imperial ambitions." Do we then need these phantoms? Is
this what we wish to ruin our relations over?[100]

The emigres lived in an atmosphere of not just verbal tension. There was a sensationa
l
murder trial in Paris in 1927 of a clock-maker Samuel Shvartsbard, who lost his whole
family
in the pogroms in Ukraine, and who killed Petliura with five bullets. [101] (Izvestiy
a
sympathetically reported on the case and printed Shvartsbard's portrait. [102]) The de
fence
raised the stakes claiming thatthe murder was a justified revenge for Petliura's pogro
ms:
"The defendant wished and felt a duty to raise the issue of anti-Semitism before the w
orld's
conscience. "[103] The defence called many witnesses to testify that during the Civil
War
Petliura had been personally responsible for pogroms in Ukraine. The prosecution sugge
sted
thatthe murder had been ordered by Cheka. "Shvartsbard, agitated, called out from his
place: '[the witness] doesn't want to admit that I acted as a Jew, and so claims I'm
a
Bolshevik."'[104] Shvartsbard was acquitted by the French court. Denikin [a leading Wh
ite
general during the Civil War] was mentioned at that trial, and Shvartsbard's lawyer
proclaimed: "If you wish to bring Denikin to trial, I am with you"; "I would have defe
nded the
one who would have taken revenge upon Denikin with the same passionate commitment as
I am here defending the man who had taken revenge upon Petliura. "[105] And as Deniki
n
lived in Paris without guards, anyone wishing to take revenge upon him had an open roa
d.
However Denikin was never put on trial. (A similar murder happened later in Moscow in
1929, when Lazar Kolenberg shot the former White general Slashchev, [who after the Civ
il
War returned to Russia and served in Soviet military], for doing nothing to stop pogro
ms in
Nikolayev. "During the investigation, the accused was found to be mentally incompetent
to
stand trial and released. "[106]) During Shvartsbard's trial the prosecutor drew a pa
rallel to
another notorious case (that of Boris Koverda): for Petliura had previously lived in P
oland,
but "you [speaking to Shvartsbard] did not attempt to kill him there, as you knew that
in
Poland you would be tried by military tribunal."[107] In 1929, a young man, Boris Kove
rda,
also "wishing to present a problem before the world's conscience," had killed the Bols
hevik
sadist Voikov; he was sentenced to ten years in jail and served his full term.

A White emigre from Revolutionary Terrorist Boris Savinkov's group, Captain V. F.

Klementiev, told me that in Warsaw at that time former Russian officers were abused a
s
"White-Guard rascals" and that they were not served in Jewish-owned shops. Such was th
e
hostility, and not just in Warsaw.

185

Russian emigres all over Europe were flattened by scarcity, poverty, hardship, and the
y
quickly tired of the showdown over "who is more to blame?" Anti-Jewish sentiments amon
g
them abated in the second half of the 1920s. During these years Vasily Shulgin wrote:
"Are
not our 'visa ordeals' remarkably similarto the oppression experienced by Jews in the
Pale
of Settlement? Aren't our Nansen passports [internationally recognized identity cards
first
issued by the League of Nations to stateless refugees], which are a sort of wolf ticke
t
obstructing movement, reminiscent of the 'Jewish religion' label, which we stamped in
Jewish passports in Russia, thereby closing many doors to them? Do we not resort to al
l
kinds of middleman jobs when we are unable to attain, because of our peculia r positio
n, a
civil servant post or a certain profession? ... Are we not gradually learning to 'work
around'
laws that are inconvenient for us, precisely as Jews did with our laws, and for which
we
criticized them?" [108]

Yet during these same years anti-Jewish sentiments were on the rise in the USSR and we
re
even reported in the Soviet press, causing distress among Jewish emigres. So in May 19
28 a
public "debate on anti-Semitism" was organized in Paris among them. A report of it wa
s
placed in the Milyukov's news pa per. [109] (Bikerman's and Pasmanik's group, already
non-
active, did not participate.)

The formal reason for the debate was "a strong rise of Judeophobia in Russia, a
phenomenon that periodically occurs there." The Socialist Revolutionary N. D. Avksenti
ev
chaired the debate, and there were "more Russians than Jews" among the public. Mark
Slonim explained that "the long oppressed Russian Jewry, having finally attained freed
om,
has dashed to secure formerly prohibited positions," and this annoys Russians. "In ess
ence,
the past fateful ly determined the present." "Bad things" of the past (Tsarist times)
"resulted
in bad consequences." S. Ivanovich stated that Jews were now tormented in the USSR,
because it has become impossible to torment "the bourgeois" tha nks to the NEP. But wh
at is
worrying is that the Russian intelligentsia in the USSR, although neutral on the Jewis
h
question, now takes the liberty to think: good, "it will begin with anti-Semitism, and
lead to
the Russian freedom. What a dangerous and foolish illusion."

Such apologetic ideas outraged the next orator, V. Grosman: "It is as if Jewry stands
accused!"
The question needs to be considered more deeply: "There is no reason to distinguish So
viet
anti-Semitism from the anti-Semitism of old Russia," that is to say there is still the
same
Black Hundredism so dear to Russian hearts. "This is not a Jewish question, but a Russ
ian
one, a question of Russian culture."

(But if it is so quintessential^ Russian, entirely Russian, inherently Russian proble

m, then
what can be done? What need then for a mutual dialogue?)

The author of the debate report, S. Litovtsev, regretted post factum that it was neces
sary to
find for the debate "several honest people, brave enough to acknowledge their anti-
Semitism and frankly explain why they are anti-Semites ... Who would say simply, witho
ut

186

evasiveness: 'I don't like this and that about Jews...' Alongside there should have be
en
several equally candid Jews who would say: 'and we don't like this and that about yo
u...'
Rest assured, such an honest and open exchange of opinions, with goodwill and a desire
for
mutual comprehension, would be really beneficial for both Jews and Russians - and for
Russia...."[110]
Shulgin replied to this: "Now, among Russian emigres, surely one needs more bravery t
o
declare oneself a philo-Semite." He extended his answer into a whole book, inserting
Litovtsev's question into the title, What we don't like about them. [Ill]

Shulgin's book was regarded as anti-Semitic, and the proposed "interexchange of view
s"
never took place. Anyway, the impending Catastrophe, coming from Germany, soon took th
e
issue of any debate off the table.

A Union of Russian-Jewish Intelligentsia was created in Paris as if in the attempt to

preserve
a link between the two cultures. Yet it soon transpired that "life in exile had create
d a chasm
between fathers and sons, and the latter no longer understand what a "Russian-Jewish
intelligentsia" is. [112] So the fathers sadly acknowledged that "the Russian Jews, wh
o used
to lead global Jewry in spiritual art and in the nation building, now virtually quit t
he
stage."[113] Before the war, the Union had managed to publish only the first issue of
collection Jewish world. During the war, those who could, fled across the ocean and
untiringly created the Union of Russian Jews in New York City, and published the secon
d
issue of the Jewish World. In the 1960s, they published the Book of Russian Jewry in t
wo
volumes, about pre- and post-revolutionary Jewish life in Russia. The bygone life in t
he
bygone Russia still attracted their minds.

In this work I cite all these books with gratitude and respect.

Sources:

[1] Kratkaja Evreiskaja Entsiklopedija [The Short Jewish Encyclopedia (henceforth —SJ
E)]. Jerusalem, 1996. v. 8,
p. 294.

[2] James Parkes. The Jew and his Neighbour: a Study of the Causes of Antisemitism. Pa
ris: YMCA-Press, 1932, p.
44.

[3] D. Kharuv. Evreiskaja emigratsija iz Rossiiskoj imperii i SovetskogoSojuza: statis

ticheskij aspect [Jewish
Emigration from the Russian Empire and Soviet Union: statistical aspect]//Russkoeevrei
stvo v zarubezhje:
Statji, publikatsii, memuary i esse [Russian Jewry in Exile: Articles, Publications, M
emoires,and Essays].
Jerusalem, 1998, v. 1 (6), p. 352.
[4] Gleb Struve. Russkaja literatura vizgnanii [Russian Literature in Exile]. The 2nd
edition. Paris, YMCA-Press,
1984, p. 24.

[5] A. Sedykh. Russkieevrei v emigrants koj literature [Russian Jews in the emigre Lit
erature] // Kniga o russkom
evrejstve: 1917-1967 [The Book of Russian Jewry: 1917-1967 (henceforth — BRJ-2)]. New
York: Association of
Russian Jews, 1968, p. 426-427.

[6] Ibid., p. 426.

187

[7] Evrei v culture Russkogo Zarubezhja:Statji, publikatsii, memuary i esse [Jews in t

he Culture of Russia -in-
Exile: Articles, Publications, Memoires, and Essays]. In 5 vol umes, Jerusalem, 1992-1
996, complied by M.
Parkhomovskij. See also Rus skoe evrei stvov zarubezhje: Statji, publikatsii, memuary
i esse [Russian Jewry in
Exile: Articles, Publications, Memoires, and Essays]. Jerusalem, 1998, compiled and ed
ited by M. Parkhomovskij.

[8] Roman Gul. Ya unes Rossiju [I HaveCarried Russiawith Me]. New York, Most, 1984, v.
2: Russia in France, p.
99.

[9] M. Osorgin. Russkoeodinochestvo [Russian Loneliness]. Publ ication of A. Razgon.

// Jews in the Culture of
Russia-in-Exile: Articles, Publications, Memoires, and Essays. V. 1, p. 15-17. (Reprin
ted from Rassvet. Paris,
January 15, 1925(7)).

[10] M. Osorgin. Russkoeodinochestvo [Russian Solitude].// Jews in the Culture of Russ

ia-in-Exile. V. 1, p. 18-
19.

[11] A. Sedykh. Russkie evrei v emigrants koj literature [Russian Jews in the emigre L
iterature] // BRJ-2, p. 427.
[12] Ibid., 429, 430.

[13] I. Levitan. Russkie izdatelstva v20-kh gg. v Berline [Russian Publishing Houses i
n Berlin in 1920s]. //BRJ-2,
p. 448.

[14] A. Sedykh. Russkie evrei v emigrants koj literature [Russian Jews in the emigre L
iterature] // BRJ-2, p. 431,
432.

[15] Ibid., p. 431, 432-434.

[16] V. V. Shulgin. "Chto nam v nikh ne nravitsya...: ob antisemitizmev Rossii" [What

we don't I ike a bout them:
on Anti-Semitism in Russia (henceforth - V. V. Shulgin]. Paris, 1929, p. 210.

[17] A. Sedykh. Russkie evrei v emigrants koj literature [Russian Jews in the emigre L
iterature] // BRJ-2, p. 432,
434.

[18] Ibid., p. 435-436.

[19] SJE, v.9, p. 253.

[20] Roman Gul. Ya unes Rossiju [I Have Carried Russia with Me]. New York, Most, 1984,
v. 2: Russia in France, p.
100.

[21] Gleb Struve. Russkaja literatura vizgnanii [Russian Literaturein Exile]. The 2nd
edition. Paris, YMCA-Press,
1984, p. 230.

[22] SJE, v.9, p. 255.

[23] A. Sedykh. Russkie evrei v emigrants koj literature [Russian Jews in the emigre L
iterature] // BRJ-2, p. 443.
[24] Ibid., p. 432.

[25] S. S. Moslov. Rossija poslechetyrekh let revolutsii [Russia After Four Years of R
evolution]. Paris: Russkaya
Pechat [Russian Press], 1922, v.2, p. 37.

[26] B. Mirsky.Chernaja sotnya [The Black Hundred]. // Evreiskaja tribuna: Ezhenedelni

k, posvyashchenny
interesam russkikh evreev [The Jewish Tribune: A Weekly Dedicated to the Interests of
Russian Jews]. Paris,
February 1, 1924, p. 3.

188
[27] S. Litovtsev. Disputob antisemitizme [Debate on Anti-Semitism]. // Poslednie Novo
sti, May 29, 1928, p. 2.

[28] D. S. Pasmanik. Russkaja revolutsia i evreistvo: (Bolshevism i iudaizm) [Russian

Revolution and Jewry:
Bolshevism and Judaism]. Paris, 1923, p. 9.

[29] Ibid.

[30] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoe evreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // Rossiy
a i evrekOtechestvennoe
objedinenierusskikh evreev za granitsei [Russia and Jews: Expatriate Society of Russia
n Jews in Exile
(henceforth— RJ)]. Paris, YMCA-Press, 1978, p. 11-12 [The IstEdition: Berlin, Osnova,
1924].

[31] To the Jews of the World!// RJ, p. 6.

[32] Georges Batault. Leproblemejuif. Sedition, Paris, 1921.

[33] D. S. Pasmanik. Russkaja revolutsia i evreistvo: (Bolshevism i iudaizm) [Russian

Revolution and Jewry:
Bolshevism and Judaism]. Paris, 1923, p. 15-16, 95.

[34] HilaireBelloc. The Jews. London, 1922.

[35] D. S. Pasmanik. Russkaja revolutsia i evreistvo: (Bolshevism i iudaizm) [Russian

Revolution and Jewry:
Bolshevism and Judaism]. Paris, 1923, p. 16, 78.

[36] Ibid., p. 11-13.

[37] M. Daursky. Ideologiya national-bolshevizma [Ideology of National Bolshevism]. Pa

ris. YMCA-Press, 1980, p.
195.

[38] Norman Cohn. Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and th
e "Protocols of the
Elders of Zion". Russian translation. Moscow, Progress, 1990, p. 24

[39] SJE, v.6, p. 846.

[40] This information was obtained by V. L. Burtsev in 1934 from General K. I. Globach
ev,the former head of St.
Petersburg Guard Department (from February 1915 until March 1917). Burtsev publ i shed
this information in
1938 in Paris in his study ofthe Protocols ofthe Elders of Zion. See V. L. Burtsev. V
pogone za provokatorami.
"Protokoly sionskikh mudretsov"- dokazanny podlog [Chasing the Provocateurs. Protocols
ofthe Elders of Zion
is a proven forgery]. Foreword by Yu. V. Davydov, annotation by L. G. Aronov. Moscow,
1991.

[41] SJE, v.6, p. 847.

[42] Ibid.

[43] SJE, v.6, p. 848.

[44] A. V. Kartashev.lzbrannyei pomilovannye [The Chosen and the Pardoned].// Sheet: L

iteraturny sbornik
[Shield: Literary Collection]. Edited by L. Andreev, M. Gorky and F. Sologub. The 3rd
Enlarged Edition. Moscow,
Russian Society on Study of Jewish Life, 1916, p. 110-115.

[45] Yu. Delevsky. Protokoly sionskikh mudretsov:istorija odnogo podloga [Protocols of

the Elders of Zion: the
History of a Forgery]. Berlin, 1923.

[46] State Archive ofthe Russian Federation,fonds 5802, catalog 1, file 31, p. 417-42
1. The foreword by A. V.
Kartashev was not published by V. L. Burtsev in 1938 but was preserved among his paper
s. We discovered the
fact of existence of this foreword from the article of O. Budnitsky "Evreiskij vopros"
v emigranskoj publitsistike

189

1920-1930-kh ["The Jewish Question" in Emigrant Journalismof 1920-1930s].//Evrei i rus

skaja revolutsia:
Materia ly i issledovanija [Jews and the Russian Revolution: Materials and Studies]. E
dited by O. V. Budnitsky;
Moscow, Jerusalem. Gesharim, 1999.

[47] I. Gar. Evrei v Pribaltijskikh stranakh pod nemetskoj okkupatsiej [Jews in the Ba
ltic countries under German
Occupation].// BRJ-2, p. 95.

[48] To the Jews of the World!// RJ, p. 6.

[49] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.

87-89.
[50] D. S. Pasmanik. Chego zhe my dobivaemsya [What Do We Want to Achieve?]. // RJ, p.
219.
[51] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.
84, 89.
[52] SJE, v.7, p. 890.

[53] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.

40.

[54] Ibid., p. 12.

[55] Ibid., p. 47, 48,72.

[56] Yu. Delevsky. Menshee I i zlo bolsheviki? [Are Bolsheviks the Lesser Evil?] // Th
e Jewish Tribune, September
19, 1922, p. 2.

[57] D. S. Pasmanik. Chego zhe my dobivaemsya [What Do We Want to Achieve?]. // RJ, p.

221.
[58] G. Ryklin.Sluchai s babel em [An Incidentwith Babel].// Izvestiya, March 16,1928,
p. 5.
[59] PoslednieNovosti. August 13, 1936.

[60] S. Ivanovich. Evrei i sovetskaya diktatura [Jews and the Soviet Dictatorship].//

[61] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.

23-24.

[62] Ibid., p. 54-55.

[63] D. S. Pasmanik. Russkaja revolutsia i evrei stvo: (Bolshevism i iudaizm) [Russian

Revolution and Jewry:
Bolshevism and Judaism]. Paris, 1923, p. 7, 14.

[64] D. O. Linsky.O natsionalnomsamosoznanii russkogo evreja [Onthe National Conscious

ness of the Russian
Jew]. //RJ, p. 141, 144-145.

[65] I.O. Levin. Evrei v revolutsii [The Jews in the Revolution].// RJ, p. 124.

[66] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.

24.

[67] D. S. Pasmanik. Chego zhe my dobivaemsya [What Do We Want to Achieve?]. // RJ, p.

215.

[68] To the Jews of the World!// RJ, p. 5.

[69] Ibid., p. 7-8.

[70] G. A. Landau. Revolutsionnye idei v evrei skoi obshchestvennosti [Revolutionary I
deas in Jewish Society]. //
RJ, p. 100.

190

[71] Ibid., p. 104.

[72] To the Jews of the World!// RJ, p. 6.

[73] G. A. Landau. Revolutsionnye idei v evreiskoi obshchestvennosti [Revolutionary Id

eas in Jewish Society]. //
RJ, p. 118.

[74] D. S. Pasmanik.Chego zhe my dobivaemsya [What Do We Want to Achieve?]. // RJ, p.

225.

[75] Yu. Delevsky. Menshee li zlo bolsheviki? [Are Bolsheviks the Lesser Evil?] //The
Jewish Tribune, September
19, 1922, p. 3.

[76] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.

78.
[77] Ibid., p. 52, 53-54.

[78] D. O. Linsky. O natsionalnom samosoznanii russkogo evreja [On the National Consci
ousness of the Russian
Jew]. //RJ, p. 149.

[79] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.

92.

[80] V. S. Mandel. Konservativnye i razrushitelnyeelementy v evreisve [Conservative an

d Subversive Forces
among Jewry]. // RJ, p. 202.

[81] D. O. Linsky. O natsionalnom samosoznanii russkogo evreja [On the National Consci
ousness of the Russian
Jew]. //RJ, p. 153, 154.

[82] D. S. Pasmanik.Chego zhe my dobivaemsya [What Do We Want to Achieve?]. // RJ, p.

227-228.

[83] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.

93.

[84] D. S. Pasmanik.Chego zhe my dobivaemsya [What Do We Want to Achieve?]. // RJ, p.

217-218.

[85] The information aboutG. A. Landau's arrestand death was taken from V. Gessen. los
if Gessemjurist,
politiki zhurnalist [Josef Gessen: an attorney, politician and journalist]. //Jews in
the Culture of Russia -in-Exile:
Articles, Publications, Memoires, and Essays. Jerusalem, 1993, v. 2, p. 543.

[86] Fyodor Stepun. Byvshee i nesbyvsheesja [What Have Been and What Might-have-been].
The 2nd Edition.
London, Overseas Publications, 1990, v. 1, p. 301.

[87] V. S. Mandel . Konservativnye i razrushitel nyeelementy v evreisve [Conservative

and Subversive Forces
among Jewry]. // RJ, p. 204.

[88] D. S. Pasmanik.Chego zhe my dobivaemsya [What Do We Want to Achieve?]. // RJ, p.

210.
[89] Ibid., p. 212, 213.

[90] D. O. Linsky. O natsionalnom samosoznanii russkogo evreja [On the National Consci
ousness of the Russian
Jew]. //RJ, p. 152.

[91] I. M. Bikerman. Rossija i russkoeevreistvo [Russia and Russian Jewry]. // RJ, p.

74-75.

[92] G. A. Landau. Revolutsionnye idei v evreiskoi obshchestvennosti [Revolutionary Id

eas in Jewish Society]. //
RJ, p. 100-101.

[93] D. S. Pasmanik. Chego zhe my dobivaemsya [What Do We Want to Achieve?]. // RJ, p.

226.

191

[94] A. Kulisher.Obotvetstvennosti i bezotvetstvennosti [On Responsibility and Irrespo

nsibility]. //The Jewish
Tribune, April 6, 1923, p. 3-4.

[95] B. Mirsky."l6 punktov" ["16 Points"]. // The Jewish Tribune, April 7, 1924, p.
2.

[96] S. Pozner. V chem zhe delo? [So What's the problem?] //The Jewish Tribune, April
7, 1924, p. 1-2.

[97] Sh. Markish. O evreiskoj nenavisti k Rossi i [Onthe Jewish Hatred Toward Russia].
//"22": Obshchestvenno-
pol itichesky i literaturny zhurnal evreyskoj intel ligentsii izSSSR v Izraile [Socia
l, Political and Literary Journal of
the Jewish Intelligentsia fromthe USSR in Israel]. Tel -Aviv, 1984, (38), p. 218.

[98] I. M. Bikerman. K samopoznaniju evreya: chem. my byli, chem. my stal i, chem. my

dolzhny stat [On the
Self-knowledge of the Jew: Who We Were, Who We Are, Who We Must Become]. Paris, 1939,
p. 25.

[99] P. N. Milyukov. Natsionalnosti natsia [Ethnicity and Nation].// The Jewish Tribun
e, September 1, 1922, p.
1-2.

[100] Ibid.

[101]PoslednieNovosti. October 14, 1927, p. 2; October 19, 1927, p. 1-2.

[102] Izvestiya, October 21, p. 3.
[103] Izvestiya, October 22, p. 1.
[104] Izvestiya, October 23, p. 1.

[105]PoslednieNovosti. October 25, 1927, p. 2; October 26, 1927, p. 1.

[106] Russian Jewish Encyclopedia. The 2nd Revised and Enlarged Edition. Moscow, 1995,
v. 2, p. 59.
[107].PoslednieNovosti. October 23,1927, p. 1.
[108]V. V. Shulgin,p. 156.
[109]PoslednieNovosti. May 29, 1928.

[110]S. Litovtsev. Disputob antisemitizme [Debate on Anti-Semitism]. // Poslednie Novo

sti, May 29, 1928, p. 2.
[111]V. V. Shulgin,p. 11.

[112]S. M. Ginzburg. O russko-evreiskoi intelligentsia [On Russian Jewish Intelligents

ia]. //JW-1, p. 33.
[113] Foreword //JW-1, p. 7.

192

Chapter 18: In the 1920s

The twenties in the Soviet Union was an epoch with a unique atmosphere - a grand socia
l
experiment which intoxicated world liberal opinion for decades. And in some places thi
s
intoxication still persists. However, almost no one remains of those who drank deeply
of its
poisonous spirit.

The uniqueness of that spirit was manifested in the ferocity of class antagonism, in t
he
promise of a never-before-seen new society, in the novelty of new forms of human
relationships, in the breakdown of the nation's economy, daily life and family structu
re. The
social and demographic changes were, in fact, colossal.

The "great exodus" of the Jewish population to the capitals began, for many reasons, d
uring
the first years of communist power. Some Jewish writers are categorical in their descr
iption:
"Thousands of Jews left their settlements and a handful of southern towns for Moscow,
Leningrad and Kiev to find "real life" (1)."

Beginning in 1917, "Jews flooded into Leningrad and Moscow" (2). According to the Jewi
sh
Encyclopedia, "hundreds of thousands of Jews moved to Moscow, Leningrad and other
major centers" (3), "in 1920, 28,000 Jews lived in Moscow - by 1923, about 86,000;
according to 1926 USSR census, 131,000 and in 1933, 226,500." (4) "Moscow became
fashionable," they used to say half-seriously in Odessa.

Lurie-Larin, a fanatical and zealous Bolshevik leader during "War Communism" writes th
at in
the first years not less than a million Jews left their settlements; in 1923 about hal
f of
Ukraine's Jews lived in large cities, pouring as well into parts of Russia formerly of
f-limits to
Jews (so called "prohibited provinces") from Ukraine and Byelorussia, into Transcaucas
ia and
Central Asia. The magnitude of this flow was half a million, and four-fifth of them se
ttled in
RSFSR. One in five of the Jewish migrants went to Moscow (5).

M. Agursky considers Larin's numbers to be substantially undercounted and points out t

hat
this demographic change affected interests important to the Russian population (6).

During "War Communism" with its ban on private trade and limitations on craftsmen and
on
those of certain "social origins" there arose a new social category - the "deprived"
(deprived
of civil rights). "Many Jews were deprived of civil rights and numbered among the
"deprived" ."Still, the "migration of the Jewish population from Byelorussia into the
interior
of the USSR, mainly to Moscow and Leningrad" did not slow (7). The new arrivals joine
d
relatives or co-ethnics who offered communal support.

According to the 1926 USSR census, 2,211,000 or 83% of the Jewish population lived in
cities
and towns. 467,000 lived in rural districts. Another 300,000 did not identify themselv
es as
Jews and these were practically all city dwellers. About five out of six Jews in the U
SSR were

193

urban dwellers, constituting up to 23% and 40% of the urban population in Ukraine and
Byelorussia respectively (8).

Most striking in the provincial capitals and major cities was the flow of Jews into th
e
apparatus of the Soviet government. Ordzhonikidze in 1927 at the 15th Communist Party
Congress reported on the "national make up of our party". By his statistics Jews const
ituted
11.8% of the Soviet government of Moscow; 22.6% in Ukraine (30.3% in Kharkov, the
capital); 30.6% in Byelorussia (38.3% in Minsk). If true, then the percentage of Jews
in urban
areas about equaled that of Jews in the government.

Solomon Schwartz, using data from the work of Lev Singer maintained that the percentag
e
of Jews in the Soviet government was about the same as their percentage of the urban
population (and it was significantly lower in the Bolshevik party itself (10)). Using
Ordzhonikidze's data, Jews at 1.82% of the population by 1926 were represented in the
Apparatus at about 6.5 times their proportion in the population at large.

Its easyto underestimate the impact of the sudden freedom from pre-revolutionary limit
s
on civil rights: "Earlier, power was not accessible to Jews at all and now they had mo
re
access to power than anyone else" according to I. Bikerman (11). This sudden change
provoked a varied reaction in all strata of society. S. Schwartz writes "from the mid-
twenties
there arose a new wave of anti-Semitism" which was "not related to the old anti-Semiti
sm,
nor a legacy of the past"". "It is an extreme exaggeration to explain it as originatin
g with
backwards workers from rural areas as anti-Semitism generally was not a fact of life i
n the
Russian countryside." No, "It was a much more dangerous phenomenon." It arose in the
middle strata of urban society and reached the highest levels of the working class whi
ch,
before the revolution, had remained practically untouched by the phenomenon. "It reach
ed
students and members of the communist party and the Komsomol and, even earlier, local
government in smaller provincial towns" where "an aggressive and active anti-Semitism
took
hold" (12).

The Jewish Encyclopedia writes that from the beginning of the 20th century "though off
icial
Soviet propaganda writes that anti-Semitism in the latter part of the 20?s was a "lega
cy of
the past", "the facts show that, it arose mainly as a result of colliding social force
s in large
cities." It was fanned by the "widely held opinion that power in the country had been
seized
by Jews who formed the nucleus of the Bolsheviks." Bikerman wrote with evident concern
in
1923 that "the Jew is in all corners and on all levels of power." "The Russian sees hi
m as a
ruler of Moscow, at the head of the capital on Neva, and at the head of the Red Army,
a
perfected death machine. He sees that St. Vladimir Prospect has been renamed Nakhimso
n
Prospect... The Russian sees the Jew as judge and hangman; he sees Jews at every turn,
not
only among the communists, but among people like himself, everywhere doing the biddin
g
of Soviet power" not surprising, the Russian, comparing present with past, is confirme
d in his
idea that power is Jewish power, that it exists for Jews and does the bidding of Jews"
(14).

194

No less visible than Jewish participation in government was the suddenly created new o
rder
in culture and education.

The new societal inequality was not so much along the lines of nationality as it was a
matter
of town versus country. The Russian reader needs no explanation of the advantages
bestowed by Soviet power from the 20's to the 80's on capital cities when compared to
the
rest of the country. One of the main advantages was the level of education and range o
f
opportunities for higher learning. Those established during the early years of Soviet
power in
capital cities assured for their children and grandchildren future decades of advantag
es, vis a
vis those in the country. The enhanced opportunities in post-secondary education and
graduate education meant increased access to the educated elite. Meanwhile, from 1918
the ethnic Russian intelligentsia was being pushed to the margins.

In the 20's students already enrolled in institutions of higher learning were expelled
based
on social origins policy. Children of the nobility, the clergy, government bureaucrat
s, military
officers, merchants, even children of petty shop keepers were expelled. Applicants fro
m
these classes and children of the intelligentsia were denied entry to institutions of
higher
learning in the years that followed. As a "nationality repressed by the Tsar's regim
e," Jews
did not receive this treatment. Despite "bourgeois origin," the Jewish youth was freel
y
accepted in institutions of higher learning. Jews were forgiven for not being proletar
ian.

According to the Jewish Encyclopedia, "with the absence of limitations based upon
nationality for entry to institutions of higher learning, Jews came to make up 15.4% o
f all
university students in the USSR, almost twice their proportion of the urban population
at
large" (15). Further, Jews "owing to a high level of motivation" quickly bypassed the
unprepared "proletarian" factory workers who had been pushed forward in the education
system, and proceeded unhindered into graduate school. In the 20's and 30's and for a
long
time after, Jews were a disproportionately large part of the intelligentsia.

According to G. Aronson, wide access to higher and specialized education led to the
formation of cadres of doctors, teachers and particularly engineers and technical work
ers
among Jews, which naturally led to university faculty posts in the expanding system o
f
higher education (16) and in the widely proliferating research institutions. In the be
ginning
of 1920's, the post of "the State Chairof Science" was occupied not by a scientist but
a
Bolshevik official, Mandelshtam-Lyadov (17).
Even sharper changes gripped the economic life of the country. Bukharin publicly annou
nced
at a Communist Party conference in 1927 that "during War Communism, we purged the
Russian petty and middle bourgeoisie along with leading capitalists." When the econom
y
was later opened up to free trade "petty and middle Jewish bourgeoisie took the place
of
the Russian bourgeoisie... and roughly the same happened with our Russian intelligents
ia
which bucked and sabotaged our efforts... Its place has been taken in some areas by th
e
Jewish intelligentsia". Moreover, Jewish bourgeousie and intelligentsia are concentrat
ed in

195

our central regions and cities, where they moved in from western provinces and souther
n
towns." Here "even in the Party ranks one often encounters anti-Semitic tendencies."
"Comrades, we must wage a fierce battle against anti-Semitism" (18).

Bukharin described a situation that was obvious to all. Unlike Russian bourgeosie, the
Jewish
bourgeoisie was not destroyed. The Jewish merchant, much less likely to be damned as
a
"man of the past," found defenders. Relatives or sympathizers in the Soviet Apparatu
s...
warned about pending arrests or seizures. And if he lost anything - it was just capita
l, not life
Cooperation was quasi-official through the Jewish Commissariat at the Sovnarkom. The J
ews
until now had been "a repressed people" and that meant, naturally, they needed help. L
arin
explained the destruction of the "Russian bourgeoisie" as a "correction of the injusti
ce that
existed under the Tsars before the Revolution" (19).

When NEP (New Economic Policy) was crushed, the blow fell with less force against Jewi
sh
NEPmen owing to connections in Soviet ruling circles.

Bukharin had been speaking in answer to a remarkable speech by Prof. Y.V. Klyutchniko
v, a
publicist and a former Kadet [Translator's note: Constitutional Democrat]. In December
1926,
the professor spoke at a "meeting on the Jewish question" at the Moscow Conservatory.
"We have isolated expressions of hooliganism... Its source is the hurt national feelin
gs of
Russians. The February Revolution established the equality of all citizens of Russia,
including
Jews. The October Revolution went further with the Russian nation proclaiming self-
renunciation. A certain imbalance has developed with respect to the proportion of the
Jewish population in the country as a whole and the positions they have temporarily
occupied in the cities. We are in our own cities and they arrive and squeeze us out. W
hen
Russians see Russian women, elders and children freezing on the street 9 to 11 hours a
day,
getting soaked by the rain in their tents at the market and when they see relatively w
arm
covered Jewish kiosks with bread and sausage they are not happy. These phenomena are
catastrophic... and must be considered... There is a terrible disproportion in the gov
ernment
structure, in daily life and in other areas... We have a housing crisis in Moscow - ma
sses of
people are crowding into areas not fit for habitation and at the same time people see
others
pouring in from other parts of the country taking up housing. These arrivals are Jews.
A
national dissatisfaction is rising and a defensiveness andfearof other nationalities.
We must
not close our eyes to that. A Russian speaking to a Russian will say things that he wi
ll not say
to a Jew. Many are saying that there are too many Jews in Moscow. This must be dealt w
ith,
but don't call it anti-Semitism" (20).

But Larin regarded Klyutchnikov's speech as a manifestation of anti-Semitism, saying

"this
speech serves as an example of the good nature of Soviet power in its battle againstan
ti-
Semitism because Klyutchnikov was roundly criticized by speakers who followed at the s
ame
meeting, but no "administrative measures" were taken against him" (21). (Here it is, t
he
frustration of the communist activist!) Agursky writes: "one would expect repression t
o
swiftly follow for such a speech in the 20's and 30's," but Klyutchnikov got off. Mayb
e he

196
received secret support from some quarters (22)? (But why look for secret causes? It w
ould
have been too much of a scandal to punish such a famous publicist, who just returned f
rom
abroad and could have harmed a reverse migration that was so important for Soviet
authorities [Translator's note: "reverse migration" - return of people who emigrated f
rom
Russia during previous period of revolutions and Civil War].)

The 20's were spoken of as the "conquest" by the Jews of Russian capital cities and in
dustrial
centers where conditions were better. As well, there was a migration to the better are
as
within the cities. G. Fedotov describes Moscow at that time: "The revolution deformed
its
soul, turning it inside out, emptying out its mansions, and filling them with a foreig
n and
alien people" (23). A Jewish joke from the era: "Even from Berdichevand even the very
old
come to Moscow: they want to die in a Jewish city" (24).

In a private letter V.I. Vernadsky [Translator's note: a prominent Russian polymath] i

n 1927
writes: "Moscow now is like Berdichev; the power of Jewry is enormous - and anti-Semit
ism
(including in communist circles) is growing unabated" (25).

Larin: "We do not hide figures that demonstrate growth of the Jewish population in urb
an
centers," it is completely unavoidable and will continue into the future." He forecast
ed the
migration from Ukraine and Byelorussia of an additional 600,000 Jews. "We can't look u
pon
this as something shameful, that the party would silence... we must create a spirit in
the
working class so that anyone who gives a speech against the arrival of Jews in Moscow
would be considered a counter-revolutionary" (26).

And for counter-revolutionaries there is nine grams of lead (27) - that much is clea
r.

But, what to do about "anti-Semitic tendencies" even in "our party circles" was a conc
ern in
the upper levels of the party.

According to official data reported in Pravda in 1922, Jews made up 5.2% of the party
(28).
M. Agursky: "But their actual influence was considerably more. In that same year at th
e 11th
Communist Party Congress Jews made up 14.6% of the voting delegates, 18.3% of the non-

voting delegates and 26% of those elected to the Central Committee at the conference"
(29).
(Sometimes one accidentally comes upon such data: a taciturn memoirist from Moscow
opens Pravda in July, 1930 and notes: "The portrait of the 25-member Presidium of the
Communist Party included 11 Russians, 8 Jews, 3 from the Caucasus, and 3 Latvians" (3
0).) In
the large cities, close to areas of the former Pale of Settlement, the following data:
In the
early 20's party organizations in Minsk, Gomel and Vitebsk in 1922 were, respectively,
35.8%,
21.1%, and 16.6% Jewish, respectively (31). Larin notes: "Jewish revolutionaries play
a bigger
part than any others in revolutionary activity" thanks to their qualities, Jewish work
ers often
find it easierto rise to positions of local leadership" (32).

In the same issue of Pravda, it is noted that Jews at5.2% of the Party were in the thi
rd place
after Russians (72%) and Ukrainians (5.9%), followed by Latvians (2.5%) and then Georg
ians,

197

Tatars, Poles and Byelorussians. Jews had the highest rate of per capita party members
hip -
7.2% of Jews were in the party versus 3.8% for Great Russians (33).

M. Agursky correctly notes that in absolute numbers the majority of communists were, o
f
course, Russians, but "the unusual role of Jews in leadership was dawning on the Russi
ans"
(34). It was just too obvious.

For instance, Zinoviev "gathered many Jews around himself in the Petersburg leadershi
p."
(Agursky suggests this was what Larin was referring to in his discussion of the photog
raph of
the Presidium of Petrograd Soviet in 1918 in his book (35)). By 1921 the preponderance
of
Jews in Petrograd CP organization... "was apparently so odious that the Politburo, ref
lecting
on the lessons of Kronshtadt and the anti-Semitic mood of Petrograd, decided to send
several ethnic Russian communists to Petrograd, though entirely for publicity purpose
s." So
Uglanovtook the place of Zorin-Homberg as head of Gubkom; Komarov replaced Trilisser
and Semyonov went to the Cheka. But Zinoviev "objected to the decision of Politboro an
d
fought the new group" - and as a result Uglanov was recalled from Petrograd and "a pur
ely
Russian opposition group formed spontaneously in the Petrograd organization," a grou
p,
"forced to counter the rest of the organization whose tone was set by Jews" (36).

But not only in Petrograd - at the 12th Communist Party Congress (1923) three out of s
ix
Politburo members were Jewish. Three out of seven were Jews in the leadership of the
Komsomol and in the Presidium of the all-Russia Conference in 1922 (37). This was not
tolerable to other leading communists and, apparently, preparations were begun for an
anti-
Jewish revolt at the 13th Party Congress (May 1924). "There is evidence that a group o
f
members of CK was planning to drive leading Jews from the Politburo, replacing them wi
th
Nogin, Troyanovsky and others and that only the death of Nogin interrupted the plot."
His
death, "literally on the eve of the Congress", resulted from an "unsuccessful and
unnecessary operation for a stomach ulcer by the same surgeon who dispatched Frunze wi
th
an equally unneeded operation a year and a half later" (38).

The Cheka-GPU had second place in terms of real power after the Party. A researcher o
f
archival material, whom we quoted in Chapter 16, reports interesting statistics on th
e
composition of the Cheka in 1920, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925 and 1927 (39). He concludes t
hat
the proportion of national minorities in the apparatus gradually fell towards the mid-
20's.
"In the OGPU as a whole, the proportion of personnel from a national minority fell to
30-
35% and to 40-45% for those in leadership." (These figures contrast with 50% and 70%
respectively during the "Red Terror.") However, "we observe a decline in the percentag
e of
Latvians and an increase in the percentage of Jews". The 20's was a period of signific
ant
influx of Jewish cadres into the organs of the OGPU". The author explains this: "Jews
strived
to utilize capabilities not needed in the pre-revolutionary period. With the increasin
g
professionalism and need for organization, Jews, better than others, were able to meet
the
needs of OGPU and the new conditions." For example, three of Dzerzhinsky's four assist
ants
were Jews - G. Yagoda, V.L. Gerson, and M.M. Lutsky (40).

198

In the 20's and 30's, the leading Chekists circled over the land like birds of prey fl
ying quickly
from cliff to cliff. From the top ranks of the Central Asian GPU off to Byelorussia an
d from
Western Siberia to the North Caucasus, from Kharkov to Orenburg and from Orel to Vinni
tza
- there was a perpetual whirlwind of movement and change. And the lonely voices of tho
se
surviving witnesses could only speak much later, without precise reference to time, of
the
executioners whose names flashed by them. The personnel, the deeds and the power of th
e
Cheka were completely secret.

For the 10th anniversary of the glorious Cheka we read in a newspaper a formal order s
igned
by the omnipresent Unshlicht (from 1921 -deputy head of Cheka, from 1923 - member of
Revvoensovet, from 1925 - Deputy Narkom of the Navy (41)). In it, Yagoda was rewarded
for
"particularly valuable service... for sacrifice in the battle with counter revolutio
n"; also given
awards were M. Trilisser (distinguished for his "devotion to the revolution and untiri
ng
persecution of its enemies") as well as 32 Chekists who had not been before the public
until
then. Each of them with the flick of a finger could destroy anyone of us! Among them w
ere
Jakov Agranov (for the work on all important political trials - and in the future he w
ill
orchestrate the trials of Zinoviev, Kamenev, the "Industrial Party Trial," and others
(42)),
Zinovy Katznelson, Matvey Berman (transferred from Central Asia to the Far East) and L
ev
Belsky (transferred from the Far East to Central Asia).

There were several new names: LevZalin, Lev Meyer, Leonid Bull (dubbed "warden of
Solovki"), Simeon Gendin, Karl Pauker. Some were already known to only a few, but now
the
people would get to know them. In this jubilee newspaper (43) issue we can find a larg
e
image of slick Menzhinsky with his faithful deputy Yagoda and a photograph of Trilisse
r.
Shortly afterward, another twenty Chekists were awarded with the order of the Red Bann
er,
and again we see a motley company of Russians, Latvians, and Jews, the latter in the s
ame
proportions -around one-third.

Some of them were avoiding publicity. Simeon Schwartz was director of the Ukrainian Ch
eka.
A colleague of his, Yevsei Shirvindt directed the transport of prisoners and convoys
throughout the USSR. Naturally, such Chekists as Grimmeril Heifetz (a spy from the end
of
the Civil War to the end of WWII) and Sergei Spigelglas (a Chekistfrom 1917 who, throu
gh
his work as a spy, rose to become director of the Foreign Department of the NKVD and
a
two-time recipient of the honorary title of "distinguished chekist") worked out of the
public
eye. Careers of others, like Albert Stromin-Stroyev, were less impressive (he "conduct
ed
interrogations of scientists during the "Academy trial" in 1929-31" (44)).

David Azbel remembers the Nakhamkins, a family of HasidicJews from Gomel. (Azbel
himself was imprisoned because of snitching by the younger family member, Lev.) "The
revolution threw the Nakhamkins onto the crest of a wave. They thirsted for the reveng
e on
everyone - aristocrats, the wealthy, Russians, few were left out. This was their path
to self-
realization. It was no accident that fate led the offspring of this glorious clan to t
he Cheka,
GPU, NKVD and the prosecutor's office. To fulfill their plans, the Bolsheviks needed
"rabid"

199

people and this is what they got with the Nakhamkins. One member of this family, Rogin
sky,
achieved "brilliant heights" as Deputy Prosecutor for the USSR "but during the Stalini
st
purges was imprisoned, as were many, and became a cheap stool pigeon... the others wer
e
not so well known. They changed their last name to one more familiarto the Russian ear
and
occupied high places in the Organs" (45).

Unshlictdid not change his name to one "more familiarto the Russian ear." See, this Sl
avic
brother became truly a "father of Russians": a warplane built with funds of farmer mut
ual
aid societies (that is, - on the last dabs of money extorted from peasants) was named
after
him. No doubt, farmers could not even pronounce his name and likely thought that this
Pole
was a Jew. Indeed, this reminds us that the Jewish issue does not explain the devastat
ion of
revolution, albeit it places a heavy hue on it. As it was also hued by many other
unpronounceable names - from Polish Dzerzhinsky and Eismontto Latvian Vatsetis. And
what if we looked into the Latvian issue? Apart from those soldiers who forced the
dissolution of the Russian Constituent Assembly and who later provided security for th
e
Bolshevik leaders during the entire Civil War, we find many high-placed Latvian Bolshe
viks.
Gekker suppressed the uprising in Yaroslavl Guberniya. Among others, there were Rudzut
ak,
Eikhe, Eikhmans from Solovki, M. Karklin, A. Kaktyn, R. Kisis, V. Knorin, A. Skundre
(one of
those who suppressed the Tambov Uprising); Chekists Petere, Latsis, and an "honorary
Chekist" Lithuanian I. Yusis. This thread can lead directly to 1991 (Pugo...) And what
if we
separate Ukrainians from Russians (as demanded by the Ukrainians these days)? We will
find
dozens of them at the highest posts of Bolshevik hierarchy, from its conception to the
very
end.

No, power was not Jewish power then. Political power was internationalist - and its ra
nks
were to the large extent Russian. But under its multi-hued internationalism it united
in an
anti-Russian front against a Russian state and Russian traditions.

In view of the anti-Russian orientation of power and the multinational makeup of the
executioners, why, in Ukraine, Central Asia and the Baltics did the people think it wa
s
Russians who had enslaved them? Because they were alien. A destroyer from one's own
nation is much closerthan a destroyer from an alien tribe. And while it is a mistake t
o
attribute the ruin and destruction to nationalist chauvinism, at the same time in Russ
ia in the
20's the inevitable question hanged in the air that was posed many year later by Leona
rd
Schapiro: why was it "highly likely that anyone unfortunate enough to fall into the ha
nds of
the Cheka would go before a Jewish interrogator or be shot by a Jew." (46)?

Yet the majority of modern writers fail to even acknowledge these questions. Often Jew
ish
authors thoughtlessly and meticulously comply and publish vast lists of Jewish leaders
hip of
the time. For example, see how proudly the article "Jews in Kremlin" (47), published i
n
journal Alef, provides a list of the highest Soviet officials - Jews for 1925. It list
ed eight out of
twelve directors of Gosbank. The same level of Jewish representation was found among t
op
trade union leaders. And it comments: "We do not fear accusations. Quite opposite - it
is

200

active Jewish participation in governing the state that helps to understand why state
affairs
were better then than now, when Jews at top positions are as rare as hen's teeth.
Unbelievably, that was written in 1989.

Regarding the army, one Israeli scholar (48) painstakingly researched and proudly publ
ished
a long list of Jewish commanders of the Red Army, during and after the Civil War. Anot
her
Israeli researcher published statistics obtained from the 1926 census to the effect th
at while
Jews made up 1.7% of the male population in the USSR, they comprised 2.1% of the comba
t
officers, 4.4% of the command staff, 10.3% of the political leadership and 18.6% of mi
litary
doctors (49).

And what did the West see? If the government apparatus could operate in secret under t
he
communist party, which maintained its conspiratorial secrecy even after coming to powe
r,
diplomats were on view everywhere in the world. At the first diplomatic conferences wi
th
Soviets in Geneva and the Hague in 1922, Europe could not help but notice that Soviet
delegations and their staff were mostly Jewish (50). Due to the injustice of history,
a long
and successful careerof Boris Yefimovich Stern is now completely forgotten (he wasn't
even
mentioned in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (GSE) of 1971). Yet he was the second most
important assistant to Chicherin during Genoa Conference, and later at Hague Conferenc
e,
and still later he led Soviet delegation during longstanding demilitarization negotiat
ions. He
was also a member of Soviet delegation at League of Nations. Stern was ambassador in I
taly
and Finland and conducted delicate negotiations with the Finns before the Soviet-Finni
sh
war. Finally, from 1946 to 1948 he was the head of the Soviet delegation at UN. And he
used
to be a longstanding lecturer at the High Diplomatic School (atone point during "anti-

cosmopolitan" purges he was fired but in 1953 he was restored at that position).

An associate of Chicherin, Leon Haikis worked for many years inthe Narkomat of the For
eign
Affairs (NKID). In 1937 he was sent to a warmer place as ambassadorto the embattled
Republican government of Spain (where he directed the Republican side during the Civi
l
War), but was arrested and removed. Fyodor Rotshtein founded the communist party in
Great Britain in 1920 and in that very year he was a member of the Soviet delegation i
n
negotiations with England! Two years later he represented RSFSR at the Hague conferenc
e
(51). (As Litvinov's right hand man he independently negotiated with ambassadors to Ru
ssia
in important matters; until 1930 he was in the Presidium of NKID and for 30 years befo
re his
death, a professor at the Moscow State University.)

And on the other side of the globe, in southern China, M. Gruzenberg-Borodin had serve
d
for 5 years when the December 1927 Canton Rebellion against the Kuomintang broke out.
It
is now recognized that the revolt was prepared by our Vice Consul, Abram Hassis, who,
at
age of 33 was killed by Chinese soldiers. Izvestia ran several articles with the obitu
aries and
the photographs of "comrades in arms" under Kuibishev, comparing the fallen comrade wi
th
highly distinguished communists like Furmanov and Frunze (52).

201
In 1922 Gorky told the academic Ipatiev that 98% of the Soviet trade mission in Berlin
was
Jewish (53) and this probably was not much of an exaggeration. A similar picture would
be
found in other Western capitals where the Soviets were ensconced. The "work" that was
performed in early Soviet trade missions is colorfully described in a book by G.A. Sol
omon
(54), the first Soviet trade representative in Tallinn, Estonia - the first European c
apital to
recognize the Bolsheviks. There are simply no words to describe the boundless theft by
the
early Bolsheviks in Russia (along with covert actions against the West) and the corrup
tion of
soul these activities brought to their effecters.

Shortly after Gorky's conversation with Ipatiev he "was criticized in the Soviet press
for an
article where he reproached the Soviet government for its placement of so many Jews i
n
positions of responsibility in government and industry. He had nothing against Jews pe
rse,
but, departing from views he expressed in 1918, he thought that Russians should be in
charge" (55). And Pravda'stwin publication DarAmos (Pravda in Yiddish) objected strong
ly:
Do they (i.e. Gorky and Shalom Ash, the interviewer) really want for Jews to refuse to
serve
in any government position? For them to get out of the way? That kind of decision coul
d
only be made by counter-revolutionaries or cowards" (56).

In Jews in the Kremlin, the author, using the 1925 Annual Report of NKID, introduces l
eading
figures and positions in the central apparatus. "In the publishing arm there is not on
e non-
Jew" and further, with evident pride, the author "examines the staff in the Soviet con
sulates
around the world and finds there is not one country in the world where the Kremlin has
not
placed a trusted Jew" (57).

If he was interested, the author of Alef could find no small number of Jews in the Sup
reme
Court of RSFSR of 1920's, in the Procurator's office and RKI. Here we can find already
familiar
A. Goikhbarg, who, after chairing the Lesser Sovnarcom, worked out the legal system fo
r the
NEP era, supervised development of Civil Code of RSFSR and was director of the Institu
te of
Soviet Law (59).

It is much harder to examine lower, provincial level authorities, and not only because
of their
lower exposure to the press but also due to their rapid fluidity, and frequent turnove
r of
cadres from post to post, from region to region. This amazing early Soviet shuffling o
f
personnel might have been caused either by an acute deficit of reliable men as in in t
he
Lenin's era or by mistrust (and the "tearing" of a functionary from the developed
connections) in Stalin's times.

Here are several such career "trajectories".

Lev Maryasin was Secretary of Gubkom of Orel Guberniya, later -chair of Sovnarkhoz of
Tatar Republic, later - head of a department of CKof Ukraine, later - chair of board o
f
directors of Gosbankof USSR, and later - Deputy Narkom of Finances of USSR. Moris
Belotsky was head of Politotdel of the First Cavalry Army (a very powerful position),

202

participated in suppression of the Kronshtadt Uprising, later- in NKID, then later- th

e First
Secretary of North Ossetian Obkom, and even later was First Secretary of CKof Kyrgyzst
an.

A versatile functionary Grigory Kaminsky was Secretary of Gubkom of Tula Guberniya, la

ter -
Secretary of CK of Azerbaijan, later -chair of Kolkhozcenter, and later-Narkom of Heal
th
Care Service.

Abram Kamensky was Narkom of State Control Commission of Donets k-Krivoy Rog Republi
c,
later -Deputy Narkom of Nationalities of RSFSR, later -Secretary of Gubkom of Donets
k,
later served in Narkomat of Agriculture, then - director of Industrial Academy, and st
ill later
he served in the Narkomat of Finances (60).

There were many Jewish leaders of the Komsomol.

Ascendant career of Efim Tzetlin began with the post of the First Chairman of CK RKSM
(fall
of 1918); after the Civil War he become Secretary of CK and Moscow Committee of RKSM,
since 1922 - a member of executive committee of KIM (Young Communist International), i
n
1923-24 - a spy in Germany, later he worked in Secretariat of Executive Committee of
Communist International, still later- in editorial office of Pravda, and even later he
was head
of Bukharin's secretariat, where this latter post eventually proved fatal for him (6
1).

The career of Isaiah Khurgin was truly amazing. In 1917 he was a member of Ukrainian R
ada
[Parliament], served both in the Central and the Lesser chambers and worked on the dra
ft of
legislation on Jewish autonomy in Ukraine. Since 1920 we see him as a member VKPb, in
1921 - he was the Trade Commissioner of Ukraine in Poland, in 1923 he represented
German-American Transport Society in USA, serving as a de facto Soviet plenipotentiar
y. He
founded and chaired Amtorg (American Trading Corporation). His future seemed incredibl
y
bright but alas at the age of 38 (in 1925) he was drowned in a lake in USA (62). What
a life he
had!

Let's glance at the economy. Moses Rukhimovitch was Deputy Chair of Supreme Soviet of
the National Economy. Ruvim Levin was a member of Presidium of Gosplan (Ministry of
Economic Planning) of USSR and Chairof Gosplan of RSFSR (later- Deputy Narkom of
Finances of USSR). Zakhary Katzenelenbaum was inventor of the governmental "Loan for
Industrialization" in 1927 (and, therefore, of all subsequent "loans"). He also was on
e of the
founders of Soviet Gosbank. Moses Frumkin was Deputy Narkom of Foreign Trade from 192
2
but in fact he was in charge of the entire Narkomat. He and A. I. Vainstein were long
-serving
members of the panel of Narkomat of Finances of USSR. Vladimirov-Sheinfinkel was Narko
m
of Provand of Ukraine, later-Narkom of Agriculture of Ukraine, and even later he serve
d as
Narkom of Finances of RSFSR and Deputy Narkom of Finances of USSR (63).

If you are building a mill, you are responsible for possible flood. A newspaper articl
e by Z.
Zangvi I describes celebratory jubilee meeting of the Gosbank board of directors in 19
27 (five
years after introduction of chervonets [a former currency of the Russian Empire and So
viet
203

Union] and explains the importance of chervonets and displays a group photograph. The
article lauds Sheinman, the chairman of the board, and Katzenelenbaum, a member of th
e
board (64). Sheinman's signature was reproduced on every Soviet chervonets and he
simultaneously held the post of Narkom of Domestic Commerce (from 1924). And hold you
r
breath, my reader! He didn't return from a foreign visit in 1929 (65)! He preferred to
live in
bloody capitalism!

Speaking of mid-level Soviet institutions, the well-known economist and professor B.

D.
Brutskus asks: "Did not the revolution open up new opportunities for the Jewish popula
tion?"
Among these opportunities would be government service, "...more than anything it is
obvious the large numbers of Jews in government, particularly in higher posts," and "m
ost of
the Jewish government employees come from the higher classes not the Jewish masses."
But, upperclass Jews, required to serve the Soviet government did not gain, but lost i
n
comparison with what they would have had in their own businesses orfreely pursuing
professions. As well, those who moved through the Soviet hierarchy had to display the
utmost of tact to avoid arousing jealousy and dissatisfaction. A large number of Jewis
h public
servants, regardless of talent and qualities, would not lessen anti-Semitism, but woul
d
strengthen it among other workers and among the intelligentsia." He maintained "there
are
many Jewish public servants particularly in the commissariats devoted to economic func
tions"
(66).

Larin put it more simply: "the Jewish intelligentsia in large numbers served the victo
rious
revolution readily" realizing "access to previously denied government service" (67).

G. Pomerantz, speaking 50 years later justified this: "history dragged Jews into the
government apparatus," ... Jews had nowhere else to go besides to government instituti
ons,"
including the Cheka (68) as we commented earlier. The Bolsheviks also "had no other pl
ace
to go - the Jewish Tribune from Paris explains "there were so many Jews in various Sov
iet
functions" because of the need for literate, sober bureaucrats" (69).
However one can read in Jewish World, a Parisian publication, that: "there is no denyi
ng that
a large percentage of Jewish youth from lower social elements — some completely hopele
ss
failures, were drawn to Bolshevism by the sudden prospect of power; for others it was
the
'world proletarian revolution' and for still others it was a mixture of adventurous id
ealism
and practical utilitarianism (70).

Of course not all were "drawn to Bolshevism." There were large numbers of peaceful Jew
s
whom the revolution crushed. However, the life in the towns of the former Pale of
Settlement was not visible to ordinary non-Jewish person. Instead the average person s
aw,
as described by M. Heifetz, "arrogant, self-confident and self-satisfied adult Jews at
ease on
'red holidays' and 'red weddings'... 'We now sit where Tsars and generals once sat, an
d they
sit beneath us'" (71).

204

These were not unwaveringly ideological Bolsheviks. The invitation to power was extend
ed
to "millions of residents from rotting shtetls, to pawn brokers, tavern owners,
contrabandists, seltzer water salesmen and those who sharpened their wills in the figh
t for
survival and their minds in evening study of the Torah and the Talmud. The authoritie
s
invited them to Moscow, Petrograd and Kiev to take into their quick nervous hands tha
t
which was falling from the soft, pampered hands of the hereditary intelligentsia - eve
rything
from the finances of a great power, nuclear physics and the secret police.

They couldn't resist the temptation of Esau, the less so since, in addition to a bowl
of potage,
they were offered the chance to build the promised land, that is, communism" (72). The
re
was "a Jewish illusion that this was their country" (73).

Many Jews did not enter the whirlwind of revolution and didn't automatically join the
Bolsheviks, but the general national inclination was one of sympathy for the Bolshevik
cause
and a feeling that life would now be incomparably better. "The majority of Jews met th
e
revolution, not with fear, but with welcome arms" (74). In the early 20's the Jews of
Byelorussia and Ukraine were a "significant source of support for the centralization o
f power
in Moscow over and against the influence of regional power" (75). Evidence of Jewish
attitudes in 1923 showed the overwhelming majority considered Bolshevism to be a lesse
r
evil and that if the Bolsheviks lost power it would be worse for them (76).

"Now, a Jew can command an army!... These gifts alone were enough to bring Jewish
support for the communists... The disorder of the Bolshevism seemed like a brilliant v
ictory
for justice and no one noticed the complete suppression of freedom" (77). Large number
of
Jews who did not leave after the revolution failed to foresee the bloodthirstiness of
the new
government, though the persecution, even of socialists, was well underway. The Soviet
government was as unjust and cruel then as it was to be in '37 and in 1950. But in the
20's it
did not raise alarm or resistance in the wider Jewish population since its force was a
imed not
at Jewry.

* * *

When Leskov, in a report for the Palensky Commission [Translator's note: a pre-revolut
ion
government commission], one by one refuted all the presumed consequences for Russians
from the removal of restrictions on Jewish settlement in Russia he couldn't have fores
een
the great degree to which Jews would be participating in governing the country and th
e
economy in the 20's.

The revolution changed the entire course of events and we don't know how things would
have developed without it.

When in 1920, Solomon Luria [Translator's note: aka Lurie], a professor of ancient his
tory in
Petrograd, found that in Soviet, internationalist and communist Russia anti-Semitism w
as
again on the rise, he was not surprised. On the contrary, "events substantiated the

205
correctness of [his] earlierconclusions" that the "cause of anti-Semitism lies with th
e Jews
themselves" and currently "with or in spite of the complete absence of legal restricti
ons on
Jews, anti-Semitism has erupted with a new strength and reached a pitch that could nev
er
have been imagined in the old regime" (78).

Russian (more precisely Little Russian) anti-Semitism of past centuries and the early
20th
century was blown away with its seeds by the winds of the October revolution. Those wh
o
joined the Union of the Russian People, those who marched with their religious standa
rds to
smash Jewish shops, those who demanded the execution of Beilis, those who defended th
e
royal throne, the urban middle class and those who were with them or who resembled the
m
or who were suspected to be like them were rounded up by the thousands and shot or
imprisoned.

Among Russian workers and peasants there was no anti-Semitism before the revolution -
this is attested to by leaders of the revolution themselves. The Russian intelligentsi
a was
actively sympathetic to the cause of the oppressed Jews and children of the post-revol
ution
years were raised only in the internationalist spirit.

Stripped of any strength, discredited and crushed completely, where did anti-Semitism
come
from?

We already described how surprising it was for Jewish-Russian emigres to learn that an
ti-
Semitism had not died. They followed the phenomenon in writings of socialists E.D. Kus
kova
and S.S. Maslov, who came from Russia in 1922.

In an article in the Jewish Tribune, Kuskova states that anti-Semitism in the USSR is
not a
figment of the imagination and that "in Russia, Bolshevism is now blending with Judais
m —
this cannot be doubted." She even met highly cultured Jews who were anti-Semites of th
e
new "Soviet type." A Jewish doctor told her: "Jewish Bolshevik administrators ruined t
he
excellent relations he had with the local population." A teacher said "children tell m
e that I
teach in a Jewish school" because we have "forbidden the teaching of The Ten
Commandments and driven off the priest." "There are only Jews in the Narkomat of
Education. In high school circles ('from radical families') there is talk about the
predominance of the Jews." "Young people, in general are more anti-Semitic than the ol
der
generation... and one hears everywhere 'they showed theirtrue colors and tortured u
s'."
"Russian life is full of this stuff today. But if you ask me who they are, these anti-
Semites,
they are most of the society." "So widespread is this thinking that the political
administration distributed a proclamation explaining why there are so many Jews in i
t:
'When the Russian proletariat needed its own new intelligentsia, mid-level intelligent
sia,
technical workers and administrative workers, not surprisingly, Jews, who, before had
been
in the opposition, came forward to meet them... the occupation by Jews of administrati
ve
posts in the new Russia is historically inevitable and would have been the natural out
come,
regardless of whether the new Russia had become KD (Constitutional Democrat), SR

206

(Socialist Revolutionary) or proletarian. Any problems with having Aaron Moiseevich

Tankelevich sitting in the place of Ivan Petrovich Ivanov need to be 'cured'."

Kuskova parries "in a Constitutional Democratic or SR Russia many administrative post

s
would have been occupied by Jews.... but neither the Kadets nor SR's would have forbid
den
teaching the Ten Commandments and wouldn't have chopped off heads... Stop Tankelevich
from doing evil and there will be no microbe of anti-Semitism" (79).

The Jewish emigre community was chilled by Maslov's findings. Here was a tested SR wit
h an
unassailable reputation who lived through the first four years of Soviet power. "Judeo
phobia
is everywhere in Russia today. It has swept areas where Jews were never before seen an
d
where the Jewish question never occurred to anyone. The same hatred for Jews is found
in
Vologda, Archangel, in the towns of Siberia and the Urals" (80). He recounts several e
pisodes
affecting the perception of the simple Russian peasants such as the Tyumen Produce
Commissar Indenbaum's order to shear sheep for the second time in the season, "becaus
e
the Republic needs wool." (This was prior to collectivization, no less; these actions
of this
commissar caused the Ishim peasant uprising.) The problem arose because it was late in
the
fall and the sheep would die without their coats from the coming winter cold. Maslovdo
es
not name the commissars who ordered the planting of millet and fried sun-flower seeds
or
issued a prohibition on planting malt, but one can conclude they did not come from ord
inary
Russian folk or from the Russian aristocracy or from "yesterday's men." From all this,
the
peasantry could only conclude that the power over them was "Jewish." So too did the
workers. Several workers' resolutions from the Urals in Feb and March of 1921 sent to
the
Kremlin "complained with outrage of the dominance of the Jews in central and local
government." "The intelligentsia, of course does not think that Soviet power is Jewis
h, but it
has noted the vastly disproportionate role of Jews in authority" when compared to thei
r
numbers in the population.

"And if a Jew approaches a group of non-Jews who are freely discussing Soviet reality,
they
almost always change the topic of conversation even if the new arrival is a personal
acquaintance" (81).

Maslov tries to understand "the cause of the widespread and bitter hatred of Jews in
modern Russia" and it seems to him to be the "identification throughout society of Sov
iet
power and Jewish power."

"The expression 'Yid Power' is often used in Russia and particularly in Ukraine and in
the
former Pale of Settlement not as a polemic, but as a completely objective definition o
f
power, its content and its politics." "Soviet power in the first place answers the wis
hes and
interests of Jews and they are its ardent supporters and in the second place, power re
sides
in Jewish hands."

Among the causes of Judeophobia Maslov notes the "tightly welded ethnic cohesion they
have formed as a result of their difficult thousands year old history". "This is parti
cularly
207

noticeable when it comes to selecting staff at institutions - if the selection process

is in the
hands of Jews, you can bet that the entire staff of responsible positions will go to J
ews, even
if it means removing the existing staff." And often that "preference for their own is
displayed
in a sharp, discourteous manner which is offensive to others." In the Jewish bureaucra
t,
Soviet power manifests more obviously its negative features... the intoxicating wine o
f
power is stronger for Jews and goes to their head... I don't know where this comes fro
m,"
perhaps because of the low cultural level of the former pharmacists and shopkeepers.
Maybe from living earlierwithout full civil rights?" (82).

The Parisian Zionist journal Sunrise wrote in 1922 that Gorky essentially said that "t
he
growth of anti-Semitism is aided by the tactless behavior of the Jewish Bolsheviks
themselves in many situations."

That is the blessed truth!

And Gorky wasn't speaking of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev - he was speaking of the
typical Jewish communist who occupies a position in the collegia, presidia and petty a
nd
mid-level Soviet institutions where he comes into contact with large swaths of the
population. Such individuals occupy leading front-line positions which naturally multi
plies
their number in the mind of the public (83).

D. Pasmanik comments: "we must admit that many Jews through their own actions provoke
acute anti-Semitism... all the impudent Jews filling the communist ranks - these pharm
acists,
shopkeepers, peddlers, dropouts and pseudo intellectuals are indeed causing much evil
to
Russia and Jewry" (84).

"Hardly ever before inside of Russia or outside of Russia have Jews been the subject o
f such
an active and concentrated hostility — it has never reached such an intensity nor been
so
widespread. This elemental hostility has been fed by the open and undeniable participa
tion
of Jews in destructive processes underway in Europe as well as by the tales and
exaggerations about such participation" (86). "A terrible anti-Semitic mood is taking
hold, fed
exclusively by Bolshevism which continues to be identified with Jewry" (86).

In 1927 Mikhail Kozakov (shot in 1930 after the "food workers' trial") wrote in a priv
ate
letter to his brother overseas about the "Judeophobic mood of the masses (among non-
party and party members)... it is no secret that the mass of workers do not love the J
ews"
(87).

And Shulgin, after his "secret" trip to the USSR in 1928 says: No one says anymore tha
t anti-
Semitism is propaganda planted by the "Tsar's government" or an infection limited to t
he
"dregs of society"... Geographically it spreads wider each day threatening to engulf a
ll of
Russia. The main center today seems to be Moscow... anti-Semitism is a new phenomenon
in
Great Russia," but is much more serious than old anti-Semitism in the South (anti-Semi
tism

208

of the South of Russia was traditionally humorous and mitigated by anecdotes about Jew
s
(88)).

Larin brings up an anti-Jewish slogan allegedly used for propaganda purposes by the Wh
ite
Guards — "Russians are sent to Narym [Translator's note: a locale in the far north] an
d Jews
to the Crimea" [Translator's note: a vacation spot] (89).

The Soviet authorities eventually became seriously concerned with the rise of anti-Sem
itism.
In 1923 the Jewish Tribunewrites, albeit with skepticism, "the Commissariat of Interna
l
Affairs has established a commission to study the question of 'protecting the Jews fro
m dark
forces' " (90).
In 1926 Kalinin (and other functionaries) received many questions about Jews in letter
s and
at meetings. As a result, Larin undertook a study of the problem in a book Jews and an
ti-
Semitism in the USSR. From his own reports, queries and interviews (taken, we can pres
ume,
from communists or communist sympathizers) he enumerates 66 questions from those the
authorities received, recording them without editing the language. Among these questio
ns
(91):

Where are the Jews in Moscow coming from?

Why is authority predominantly Jewish?
How come Jews don't wait in line?

How do Jews arriving from Berdichev and other cities immediately receive apartments?
(There is a joke that the last Jew left Berdichev and gave the keys to the city to Kal
inin.)

Why do Jews have money and own their own bakeries, etc?

Why a re Jews drawn to light work and not to physical labor?

Why do Jews in government service and in professions sticktogether and help each othe
r
while Russians do not?

They do not want to work at everyday jobs, but are concerned only with their careers.

Why do they not farm even though it is now allowed them?

Why are Jews given good land in the Crimea while Russians are given inferior land?

Why is party opposition 76% Jewish? [Translator's note: the opposition to the "general
line
of the party" within the party itself]

Why did anti-Semitism develop only against Jews and not against other nationalities?

What should a group agitprop leaderdo when he tries to counter anti-Semitic tendencies
in
his group and no one supports him?

209
Larin suspects that these questions were dreamed up and spread among the masses by an
underground organization of counter-revolutionaries (92)! As we will see later, this i
s where
some official explanations came from. But he fixates on the unexpected phenomenon and
tries to address scientifically the question "How could anti-Semitism take hold in the
USSR in
those strata of society — [factory workers, students], where, before the revolution, i
t was
little noted (93)?" His findings were:

Anti-Semitism among the intelligentsia.

"Among the intelligentsia anti-Semitism is more developed than in any other group."
However, he maintains that "dissatisfaction rises not from the large number of Jews, b
ut
from the fact that Jews presumed to enter into competition with the Russian intelligen
tsia
for government jobs."

"The obvious development of anti-Semitic attitudes among city clerks and workers by 19
28
cannot be explained by excessive numbers of Jews claiming jobs". "Among the intellectu
al
professions, anti-Semitic tendencies are felt in the medical sphere and in engineerin
g... The
army has "good political training" and there is no anti-Semitism there, even though th
e
command staff of the Red Army has a significantly higher percentage of Jews than are
present in the country as a whole" (94).

Anti-Semitism among the urban bourgeoisie.

"The root of anti-Semitism is found in urban bourgeois philistinism." But, "the battle
against
anti-Semitism among the bourgeoisie. ..it is mixed in with the question of the destruc
tion of
the bourgeoisie in general... The anti-Semitism of the bourgeoisie will disappear when
the
bourgeoisie disappears" (95).

Anti-Semitism in the countryside.

"We have almost completely pushed out the private trader of the peasant's grain, there
fore
among the peasant masses anti-Semitism is not showing itself and has even weakened
against its pre-war levels." Now it appears only in those areas where Jews have been
resettled on the land, allegedly from Kulaks and former landowners (96).

Anti-Semitism among the working class.

"Anti-Semitism among the workers has grown noticeably stronger in recent years." By 19
29
there could be no doubt of its existence. Now it occurs with more frequency and intens
ity
than a few years ago. It is particularly strong among the "backwards parts of the work
ing
class" — women and seasonal workers. However, an anti-Semitic mood can be observed
among a broad spectrum of workers," not only among the "corrupted fringe." And here
economic competition is not a factor — it arises even where there is no such competiti
on;
Jews make up only make "only 2.7%" of the working class. In the lower level profession
al
organizations they tried to paint over anti-Semitism. Difficulties arise because attem
pts to

210

"hide anti-Semitism" come from the "active proletariat" itself; indeed, anti-Semitism
originates from the "active proletariat." "In many cases Party members and members of
Komsomol demonstrate anti-Semitism. Talk of Jewish dominance is particularly widesprea
d,
and in meetings one hears complaints that the Soviet authority limits itself to battle
with the
Orthodox religion alone."

What savagery — anti-Semitism among the proletariat?!! How could this occur in the mos
t
progressive and politically aware class in the world?! La rin finds that it arose beca
use "no
other means remained for the White Guard to influence the masses besides anti-Semitis
m."
Its plan of action moves along "the rails of anti-Semitism" (97). This was a theory th
at was to
have frightening consequences.

Larin's views on the anti-Semitism of the time were to find echoes later in other auth
ors.

S. Shwartz provides his own variant on anti-Semitism as being the result of a "vulgar
perception of Jews as the main carriers of the New Economic Policy (NEP)." But he agre
es:
"The Soviet government, not without basis, saw in anti-Semitism a possible tool of th
e
counter-revolution" (98).
In 1968 the author adds: "After the civil war, anti-Semitism began to spread, gripping
layers
of society which were free of this tendency before the revolution" (99).

Against this it was necessary to engage not in academic discussion but to act energeti
cally
and forcefully. In May, 1928 the CKof the VKPb issued an Agitprop communication about
"measures to be taken in the battle with anti-Semitism." (As was often the case in
implementation of party directives, related documents were not publicized, but circula
ted
among party organizations.) The battle to create an atmosphere of intolerance of anti-

Semitism was to be taken up in educational programs, public reports, lectures, the pre
ss,
radio and school textbooks and finally, authorities were "to apply the strictest disci
plinary
measures to those found guilty of anti-Semitic practices" (100). Sharp newspaper artic
les
followed. In Pravda'sarticle by a highly connected Lev Sos novs ky, he incriminates al
l kinds of
party and educational officials in anti-Semitism: an official in Kiev "openly fires Je
ws" with
"the connivance of the local district party committee"; defamatory a nti -Jewish graff
iti is
widespread etc. From a newspaper article: "with the growing battle against anti-Semiti
sm
there are demands to solve the problem by increasing repression on those carriers of a
nti-
Semitism and on those who protect them." Clearly it was the GPU speaking through the
language of a newspaper article (101).

After Larin's report, the issue of anti-Semitism was included into various educationa
l
curricula, while Larin himself continued to research the ways to overcome anti-Semitis
m
decisively. "Until now we were too soft... allowing propaganda to spread... Locally of
ficials
often do not deal with anti-Semitism as rigorously as they should." Newspapers "should
not
fear to point attention to "the Jewish issue" (to avoid dissemination of anti-Semitis
m) as it
only interferes with the fight against counter revolutionary sabotage." "Anti-Semitism
is a

211
social pathology like alcoholism or vagrancy. Too often when dealing with communists w
e let
them off with mere censure. If a person goes to church and gets married, then we exclu
de
him without discussion — anti-Semitism is no less an evil."

"As the USSR develops towards socialism, the prognosis is good that 'Soviet' anti-Semi
tism
and the legacy of pre-Soviet relationships will be torn out by the roots. Nevertheles
s, it is
absolutely necessary to impose severe controls on intellectual anti-Semitism especiall
y in the
teaching profession and civil service" (102).

But the very spirit of the brave Twenties demands stronger language. "The nature of
modern-day anti-Jewish agitation in the USSR is political and not nationalistic." Agit
ation
againstthe Jews is directed not just againstJews, but indirectly againstthe Soviet pow
er." Or
maybe not so indirect: "anti-Semitism is a means of mobilization against Soviet powe
r." And
"those againstthe position of Soviet authorities on the Jewish question are againstth
e
working class and for the capitalists." Any talk of " 'Jewish dominance' will be rega
rded as
counterrevolutionary activity againstthe very foundation of the nationalities policy o
f the
proletarian revolution... Parts of the intelligentsia, and sometimes the White Guards
are
using anti-Semitism to transmit bourgeois ideology."

Yes, that's it - a White Guard whispering campaign, clearly there is "planned... agita
tion by
secret White Guard organizations." Behind "the philistine anti-Jewish agitation, secre
t
monarchist organizations are leading a battle against Soviet power..." And from "the c
entral
organs of anti-Soviet emigration (including Jewish bankers and Tsarist generals) an id
eology
is transmitted right into our factories proving that anti-Jewish agitation in the USSR
is class-
based, not nationality-based... It is necessary to explain to the masses that encourag
ement
of anti-Jewish feelings in essence is an attempt to lay the groundwork for counter-rev
olution.
The masses must regard anyone who shows sympathy to anti-Semitism as a secret counter-
revolutionary or the mouthpiece of a secret monarchist organization." (There are
conspiracies everywhere!) "The term 'anti-Semite' must take on the same meaning in th
e
public mind as the term 'counter-revolutionary' " (103).

The authorities had seen through everything and named everything for what it was: coun
ter-
revolution, White Guards, monarchists, White generals and "anyone suspected of being a
ny
of the above..."

For the thickheaded, the revolutionary orator elaborates: "The methods to fight anti-
Semitism are clear." At a minimum, to conduct open investigations and sessions of "peo
ple's
tribunal against anti-Semitism" at local levels under the motto "explanations for the
backward workers" and "repressions for the malicious." "There is no reason why "Leni
n's
decree" should not apply" (104))

Under "Lenin's decree" (that from July 27, 1918) active anti-Semites were to be place
d
outside of the law — that is, to be shot even for agitating for a pogrom, not just fo
r

212

participating in one (105). The law encouraged each Jew to registera complaint about a
ny
ethnic insult visited upon him.

Now some later author will object that the "July 27 Act" was ultimately not included i
n the
law and was not part of the criminal code of 1922. Though the criminal code of 1926 di
d
include an article about the "instigation of ethnic hostility and dissension," there w
ere "no
specific articles about acts of anti-Semitism." This is not convincing. Article 59-7 o
f the
Criminal Code ("propaganda or agitation intended to incite national or religious hatre
d or
dissension") was sufficient to send one to prison and the article provided for confisc
ation of
the property of perpetrators of "widespread disturbances" and, under aggravated
circumstances (for instance, class origin) - death. Article 59-7 was based on the "RSF
SR Penal
Code" of Feb 26, 1927, which widened the definition of "instigation of national hatre
d"
making it equal in seriousness to "dissemination or preparation and storing of literat
ure"
(106).

Storing books! How familiar is that proscription, contained inthe related Iaw58-10!
[Translator's note: infamous Article 58 of the Penal Code of RSFSR dealt with so-calle
d
counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet activities.]

Many brochures on anti-Semitism were published and "finally, Feb 19, 1929 Pravda devot
ed
its lead article to the matter: 'Attention to the battle with anti-Semitism' " (107).
A 1929
resolution of CK of Communist Party of Byelorussia stated that "counter-revolutionary
nature of anti-Semitic incidents is often ignored" and that organs of justice should
"intensify
the fight, prosecuting both perpetrators of the law and those who inspire them" (10
8).

The secretary of the CK of Komsomol said "most dangerous in our conditions are secret
anti-
Semites who hide their anti-Semitic attitudes" (109). Those who are familiarwith Sovie
t
language understand: it is necessary to cut off suspected ways of thinking. (This reca
lls
Grigory Landau, speaking of Jewish opponents: "They suspect or accuse other groups aro
und
them of anti-Semitism... Anyone who voices a negative opinion about Jews is accused o
f
being an open anti-Semite and others are called secret anti-Semites" (110).

In 1929, a certain I. Zilberman in Daily Soviet Jurisprudence (no. 4) writes that ther
e were too
few court trials relating to anti-Semitism in Moscow Province. In the city of Moscow a
lone
for the year there were only 34 cases (that is, every 10 days there was a trial for an
ti-
Semitism somewhere in Moscow). The Journal of Narkomyust was read as an instruction
manual for bringing such cases.

Could the most evil anti-Semite have thought up a better way to identify Jews with Sov
iet
power in the opinion of the people?

It went so far that in 1930 the Supreme Court of RSFSR ruled that Article 59-7 "should
not be
used by members of national minorities seeking redress in conflicts of a personal natu
re"

213

(111). In other words the judicial juggernaut had already been wound up and was runnin
g at
full speed.

***

If we look at life of regular, not "commanding", Jewish folk, we see desolation and de
spair in
formerly vibrant and thriving shtetls. Jewish Tribune reproduced report by a special o
fficial
who inspected towns and shtetls in the south-west of Russia in 1923, indicating that a
s the
most active inhabitants moved into cities, the remaining population of elders and fami
lies
with many children lived to large extent by relying on humanitarian and financial aid
from
America (112).

Indeed, by the end of the period of "War Communism" (1918-1920) when all trade, or an
y
buying and selling, were prohibited under threat of property confiscation and fines, t
he Jews
were helped by Jewish charities like Joint through the ail-Russian Public Committee fo
r
"assistance to victims of pogroms and destitute Jews". Several other charities protect
ed the
Jewish population later at different times, such as the SC (Society of Craftsmen, whic
h after
the revolution moved abroad), EKOPO(the Jewish committee for assistance to victims of
war) and EKO (the Jewish colonizing society). In 1921-22, Soviet-based Jewish charitie
s
functioned in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Despite intervention and obstacles from YevSe
ks
(Jewish communist organizations), "Joint provided Soviet Jews with extensive financial
and
other assistance", whereas SC "was dedicated to establishment and development of Jewis
h
industry and agriculture in the south of Ukraine" during first half of 1920's (113).

The first Soviet census provides insight into Jewish life during the liberalized NEP p
eriod.
Forty percent of Jews were classified as "active" (not dependents). Of those, 28% wer
e
public servants, 21% -craftsmen, 19% -industry workers (including apprentices), 12%-
merchants, 9%- peasants, 1%- military men, and 10% were classified as "others". Among
public servants, Jews were well represented in trade-related occupations. For instanc
e, in
Moscow business organizations 16% of the clerks were Jews, in credit and trade
organizations - 13% (30% according to the Jewish Encyclopedia (114)), in public
organizations - 19%, in fiscal organizations -9%, in Sovdeps - 10%, with virtually no
presence in police force. The percentages were correspondingly higher in the former Pa
le of
Settlement areas, up to 62% in the state trade of Byelorussia, 44%- in Ukraine (77% i
n
category of "private state servants"). The flow of Jewish workers into industry was mu
ch
slower than government wished. There were almost no Jews among railroad men and
miners' they rather preferred the professions of tailor, tanner, typographer, woodwork
er
and food-related specialties and other fields of consumer industry. To recruit Jewish
workers
into industry, special professional schools were created with predominantly foreign fu
nding
from Jewish organizations abroad (115).

It was the time of NEP, which "improved economic conditions of Jewish population withi
n a
new, Soviet framework" (116). In 1924 Moscow 75% of the perfume and pharmaceutical

214

trade was in Jewish hands, as well as 55% of the manufactured goods trade, 49% of the
jewelry trade, 39% of the small ware trade, and 36% of the wood-depots. "Starting busi
ness
in a new place, a Jew usually run down prices in private sector to attract clientele"
(117). The
first and most prominent NEPmen often were Jews. To large extent, anger against them
stemmed from the fact that they utilized the Soviet as well as the market systems: the
ir
commerce was routinely facilitated by their links and pulls in the Soviet apparatus.
Sometimes such connections were exposed by authorities as in the case of famous "Paraf
fin
Affair" (1922). During 1920's, there were abundant opportunities to buy up belongings
of
oppressed and persecuted "former" people, especially high quality or rare furniture.
S.
Ettinger noted that Jews made a majority of NEPmen and new-riches (118), which was
supported by impressive list of individuals who "failed to pay state taxes and dues" i
n
Izvestia in 1929 (119).

However, at the end of NEP, authorities launched "a nti -capita list" assault against
financiers,
merchants and manufacturers, many of whom were Jewish. As a result, many Jews turned
into "Soviet trade servants" and continued working in the same spheres of finance, cre
dit
and commerce. A steamroller of merchandise and property confiscations, outright state
robbery and social ostracizing (outclassing people into disenfranchised "lishenets" ca
tegory)
was advancing on private commerce. "Some Jewish merchants, attempting to avoid
discriminating and endlessly increasing taxation, declared themselves as having no
occupation during the census" (120). Nevertheless "virtually the entire Jewish male
population in towns and shtetls... passed through the torture chambers of GPU" during
the
campaign of gold and jewelry extortion in the beginning of 1930's (121). Such things w
ould
be regarded as an impossible nightmare in Czar's Russia. Many Jewish families, to avoi
d the
stigma of being "lishenets", moved into large cities. In the end, "only one-fifth of S
oviet Jews
lived in the traditional Jewish settlements by 1930's" (122).

"Socioeconomic experiments by the Soviet authorities including all kinds of nationaliz

ation
and socialization had not only devastated the middle classes, but also hit badly the s
mall
merchants and craftsmen" (123). "Due to general lack of merchandise and solvent
customers as well as low liquidity and exorbitant taxes, many shtetl merchants had no
other
choice but to close down their shops" and while the "most active left for cities", th
e
remaining populace has nothing else to do but "aimlessly roam decrepit streets, loudl
y
complaining about their fate, people and God". It is apparent that Jewish masses have
completely lost their economic foundations" (124). It was really like that in many sht
etls at
that time. To address the problem, even special resolution of Sovnarkom was issued in
1929.

G. Simon, a former emigrant, came to USSR in the end of 1920's as an American

businessman with a mission "to investigate shortages of Jewish craftsmen in tools". La
ter, in
Paris, he published a book with an emotional and ironic title Jews Rule Over Russia.
Describing the situation with Jewish manufacturing and trade, its oppression and destr
uction
by Soviets, he also shares his impressions. Quoting many conversations, the general mo
od of

215

populace is pretty gloomy. "Many bad things, many crimes happen in Russia these days b
ut
it's better to suppress that blinding hatred"; "they often fear that the revolution wi
ll
inevitably end in the Russian manner, i.e. by mass-murder of Jews". A local Bolshevik-
Jew
suggests that "it's only the revolution that stands between the Jews and those wishing
to
aggrandize Russia by the rape of Jewish women and spilling the blood of Jewish childre
n"
(125).

A well-known economist B. D. Brutskus, who in 1920 provided a damning analysis of the

socialist economy (he was expelled from the country in 1922 by Lenin), published an
extensive article "Jewish population under Communist power" inContemporary Notes in
1928, chronicling the NEP in the former Pale of Settlement areas of Ukraine and Byelor
ussia.

The relative importance of private enterprise was declining as even the smallest merch
ants
were deprived of their political rights (they became disenfranchised "lishenets" and c
ouldn't
vote in Soviet elections), and, thus, their civil rights. (In contrast, handcraftsmen
still enjoyed
a certain semblance of rights.) "The fight of Soviet authorities against private enter
prise and
entrepreneurs is in large part a fight against Jewish populace." Because in those days
"not
only almost the entire private city enterprise in Ukraine and Byelorussia was represen
ted by
Jews, but the Jewish participation in the small capitalist upperclass in capital citie
s of
Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kharkov had also became very substantial" (126).

Brutskus distinguished three periods during the NEP: 1921-23, 1923-25 and 1925-27.
"Development of private enterprise was least impeded by communists during first two an
d
half years when Bolsheviks were still overwhelmed by their economic debacles". "The fi
rst
communist reaction followed between the end of 1923 and the spring of 1925." Wholesal
e
and shop trade in the former Pale of Settlement was destroyed, with only small flea ma
rket
trade still permitted." Crafts were "burdened by taxation. Artisans lost their last to
ols and
materials (the latter often belonged to their peasant customers) to confiscations." "T
he
concept of Jewish equality virtually turned into fiction as two-thirds of Jews lost th
eir voting
rights."

Because YevSek (Jewish section of the communist party) "inherited specific hatred towa
rd
petty Jewish bourgeoisie cultivated by earlier Jewish socialist parties and saw their
own
purpose infighting it, its policy in the beginning of NEP was substantially different
from the
general party line". During the second part of NEP, the "YevSek attempted to complete
the
dismantling of Jewish bourgeoisie, which began with "War Communism". However,
information about bleak life of Jewish population in USSR was leaking out into Jewish
press
abroad. "YevSeks attempted to blame that on the Czar's regime which allegedly obstruct
ed
Jewish participation in productive labor, that is by communist definition, in physical
labor.
And since Jews still prefer "unproductive labor", they inevitably suffer. Soviet autho
rities has
nothing to do with it".

216

But B ruts kus objected claiming that in reality it was opposite. "The class of Jewish
craftsmen
nearly disappeared with the annihilation of petty Jewish manufacture... Indeed, profes
sional
the Jewish classes grew and become diversified while excessive numbers of petty Jewis
h
middlemen slowly decreased under the Tsar because of the gradual development of ethni
c
Russian enterprise and deepening business connections between the Pale of Settlement a
nd
inner Russia. But now the Jewish population again was turned into a mass of petty
middlemen".
During the third period of NEP, from spring of 1925 to autumn of 1926, large tax remis
sions
were made for craftsmen and street vendors and village fairs were relieved of taxation
while
activities of state financial inspectors supervising large businesses were brought "un
der the
law". The economy and well-being of the Jewish population started to recover rapidly.
It was
a boom for Jewish craftsmen and merchants specializing in agriculture. Petty manufactu
ring
grew and "successfully competed for raw materials and resources with state manufacture
in
the western provinces". At the same time, "a new decree granted political (and, theref
ore,
certain civil) rights to many Jews".

The second communist assault on private enterprise, which eventually resulted in the
dismantling of NEP, began at the end of 1926. "First, private grain trade was prohibit
ed,
followed by bans on raw skins, oil seeds and tobacco trade... Private mills, creamerie
s,
tanneries and tobacco houses were expropriated. Fixed prices on shop merchandise were
introduced in the summer of 1927. Most craftsmen couldn't work because of shortage of
raw materials" (128).

The state of affairs intheshtetls of western Russia alarmed international Jewry. For i
nstance,
Pasmanik wrote in 1922 that Jews as people are doomed to disappear under Bolsheviks an
d
that communists reduced all Russian Jewry into a crowd of paupers (128). However, the
Western public (including Jews) did not want to hear all this. The Westsawthe USSR in
good
light partly because of general left-leaning of European intelligentsia but mainly bec
ause the
world and American Jewry were now confident in bright future and security of Russian J
ews
and skillful Soviet propaganda only deepened this impression.

Benevolent public opinion was extremely instrumental for Soviet leaders in securing
Western, and especially American, financial aid, which was indispensable for economica
l
recovery aftertheir brave "WarCommunism". As Lenin saidatthe Party Congress in 1921,
"as the revolution didn't spread to other countries, we should do anything possible to
secure
assistance of big progressive capitalism and for that we are ready to pay hundreds of
millions
and even billions from our immense wealth, our vast resources, because otherwise our
recovery would take decades" (129). And the business went smoothly as progressive
capitalism showed no scruples about acquiring Russian wealth. The first Soviet interna
tional
bank, Roskombank, was founded in 1922. It was headed by the already mentioned Olof
Aschberg (who was reliably delivering aid to Lenin during entire revolutionary period)
and by
former Russian private bankers (Shlezinger, Kalashkin and Ternovsky). There was also M
ax

217

May of Morgan Guaranty Trust in the US who was of great assistance to Soviets. Now the
y
developed a scheme allowing Roskombank to directly purchase goods in US, despite the
futile protests from the Secretary of State Charles Hughes, who asserted that this kin
d of
relations meant a de-facto recognition of Soviet regime. A Roskombank Swedish advise
r,
professor G. Kassel, said that it is reckless to leave Russia with all her resources a
lone (130).

Concessioners flocked into USSR where they were very welcome. Here we see Lenin's
favorite, Armand Hammer, who in 1921 decided "to help rebuild Ural industry" and
procured a concession on asbestos mines at Alapayevsk. Lenin mentioned in 1921 that
Hammer's father will provide "two million stones of bread on very favorable terms (5%)
in
exchange for Ural jewelry to be sold in America" (131). And Hammer shamelessly exporte
d
Russian art treasures in exchange for the development of pencil manufacturing. (Later,
in the
times of Stalin and Khrushchev, Hammer frequented Moscow, continuing to export Russia
n
cultural treasures (e.g., church utensils, icons, paintings, china, etc. in huge volum
es.)

However, in 1921-22 large sums were donated by American Jewry and distributed in Russi
a
by the American Relief Administration (ARA) for assistance to the victims of "bloody
pogroms, for the rescue of towns in the South of Russia and for the peasantry of Volg
a
Region". Many ARA associates were Jews (132).

* * *

Another novel idea from the 20's - not so much an idea originating among Jews - as on
e
dreamed up to appeal to them, was Jewish colonization of agricultural land. It is said
their
history of dispersion had denied them possibilities in agriculture and forced them to
engage
in money lending, commerce and trade. Now at last Jews could occupy the land and there
by
renounce the harmful ways of the past to labor productively under Soviet skies, and th
us
putting to flight the unflattering myths which had grown up about them.

Soviet authorities turned to the idea of colonization partially to improve productivit

y, but
mostly for political reasons. This was sure to bring a swell of sympathy, but more imp
ortant,
financial aid. Brutskus writes: "the Soviet government, needing credits, searched for
support
among the foreign bourgeoisie and highly valued its relations with the foreign Jewish
bourgeoisie." However, towards 1924 the donations stopped pouring in and even "the
Jewish American Charity ('Joint Committee') was forced to halt its work in Europe. To
again
collect large amounts of money (as they had through the American Relief Administration
in
1921), they needed to create, as they say in the U.S., a 'boom'. Colonization became t
he
'boom' for Jewish charities. The grandiose project for resettling 100,000 Jewish famil
ies on
their own land was, apparently, mostly a public relations ploy (133). The committee fo
r the
"State Land Trust for Jewish Laborers" (KomZET) was founded In 1924, followed by the
"all-
Soviet Volunteer Land Society of Jewish Laborers (OZET). (I remember as school childre
n we
were made to join and pay membership dues - by bringing money from home, to ODD

218

(Society of Friends of the Children) and OZET. In many countries sisterorganizations t

o OZET
sprung up.

It was immediately clearthat "the assistance of the Soviet government in the passage o
f
poor Jews to the land" was "a matter of international significance... Through this the
foreign
proletariat could judge the "power and solidity of the Soviet government." This develo
pment
had the active participation and financial support of the powerful America Joint. The
Jewish
Chronicle of London, Oct 16,1925: "The Crimea has been offered as replacement for
Palestine. Why send Jews to Palestine which is so unproductive... and which wil I mean
so
much sacrifice and hard work... when the rich land of Ukraine and fruited fields of th
e
Crimea are smiling upon suffering Jews. Moscow will be the benefactor and defender of
Russian Jewry and will be able to seek moral support from Jews around the globe... As
well,
the plan will cost nothing, as American Jews are covering all expenses" (134)." [Trans
lator's
note: find this quote in English]

It didn't take the Russian emigre press long to recognize the Soviet maneuver. P. Stru
ve in
the Parisian journal Renaissancewrote: "this entire undertaking serves to bind Jewry -
both
Russian and international - to communist power and definitively mark Jews with the bra
nd
of communism" (135). In a lead editorial from the Berlin Rul: "It's true... the world
identifies
the Bolsheviks with the Jews. There is a need to further connect them with shared
responsibility for the fate of hundreds of thousands of poor. Then you can trick wealt
hy
American Jews with a threat: the fall of Soviet power followed by a mass pogrom which
sweeps away the Jewish societies they founded. Therefore they will support Soviet powe
r at
all costs" (136).

In a fateful irony, the Bolshevik bluff met American enterprise and the Americans fell
for it,
not knowing what was going on in the USSR (137).

Actually, the world Jewish community was excited by hope in the rehabilitation of Jewi
sh
agriculture. In September, 1925 at the all-German session... the Jewish bourgeoisie un
der
the leadership of the Director of the German National Bank, Hialmar Schacht decided t
o
support the project. Leon Blum founded the "Jewish Construction Fund" in France which
sent tractors to the settlers. The "Society for Aid for Jewish Land Colonization" was
founded
in New York. In countries around the globe, all the way to South Africa, money was col
lected
for the colonization plan from Social Democrats, anarchists, and, so they say, ordinar
y
workers.
The editors of the American magazine Morning Journal, posed the question - as did man
y
others - "Is it ethical for Russian Jews to colonize land that was expropriated?" The
Jewish
Chronicle recalled that most of the former land owners were in prison, shot or exiled.
They
were answered by the leading American jurist Louis Marshall and chairman of the World
Joint Committee who claimed the beneficent right of revolutionary expropriation (13
8).
Indeed, during the years 1919-1923 "more than 23,000 Jews had settled in former estate
s

219

near the towns and villages in the former Pale of Settlement". By spring 1923, no more
of
this land remained available and the first small groups of Jews started to form for
resettlement to the free steppe land in Southern Ukraine (139). This movement picked u
p
speed after 1925.

The international Jewish Agro-Joint was formed by Marshall with the banker Paul Warbur
g
as the director. Here our chroniclers of the history of communism decline to issue a
denunciation of class enemies, and instead, approve of their efforts.

The Agro-Joint concluded an agreement with KomZET about the contribution of tractors,
farm machinery, seed, the digging of artesian wells and professional training for Jewi
sh
youth. EKO assisted as well. At a 1926 session of OZET Kalinin spoke out forcefully ag
ainst
any plans for Jewish assimilation and, instead, proposed a wide-ranging program for Je
wish
autonomy known in the West as the "Kalinin Declaration."

The early plans called for resettlement to the south of Ukraine and northern Crimea o
f
approximately 100,000 families or 20% of the entire Jewish population of the USSR. Th
e
plans contemplated separate Jewish national regions as well. ("Many remained jobless a
nd
nevertheless declined the opportunity to work" and "only half of all Jews who agreed t
o
resettle actually took up residence in the villages they were supposed to resettle in"
(140).)
However, American Zionists objected to the OZET plan and saw in the "propaganda for th
e
project of widespread Jewish agricultural colonization in the Soviet Union a challenge
to
Zionism and its idea for the settlement of Eretz Israel." OZET falsely claimed its pla
ns did not
contradict at all the idea of colonization of Palestine (141).

Great hope was placed on Crimea. There were 455,000 hectares given over to Jewish
colonization in Ukraine and Byelorussia; 697,000 hectares set aside in Crimea for tha
t
purpose. According to the 10-Year Plan for the settlement of Jews in Crimea, the Jewis
h
proportion of the population was to grow from 8% in 1929 to 25% in 1939. (It was assum
ed
that the Jews would substantially outnumber the Tatars by that time.) "There shall be
no
obstacles to the creation in the Crimean ASSR a Northern Crimean Autonomous Jewish
Republic oroblast" (142).

The settlement of the Jews in the Crimea provoked the hostility of the Tatars ("Are th
ey
giving Crimea to the Jews?") and dissatisfaction of local landless peasants. Larin wri
tes "evil
and false rumors are circulating throughout the country about removal of land from non
-
Jews, the expulsion of non-Jews and the particularly strong support the authorities ha
ve
givento the Jewish settlers". It went sofarthat the chairman of the CIKofthe Crimean A
SSR,
Veli Ibraimov published an interview in the Simferopol paper Red Crimea (Sept 26, 192
6)
which Larin does not quote from, but which he claims was a manifestation of "evil bour
geois
chauvinism" and a call for a pogrom.

220

Ibraimov also promulgated a resolution and projects, which were "not yet ready for
publication" (also not quoted by Larin). For this, Larin denounced Ibraimov to the Cen
tral
Control Commission of CKofVKPb, recounting the incident with pride in his book. Asa re
sult
Ibraimov was "removed and then shot", after which the Jewish colonization of Crimea
gained strength.

As was typical for the communist regime, the closed trial of Ibraimov resulted in a po
litical
conviction for "connections with a Kulak bandit gang," officially, for "banditry" (14
3). A
certain Mustafa, the assistant to the chair of the CIK, was also shot with Ibraimov as
a bandit
(144).

Rumors of the effective assistance given to the Jewish settlers did not die down. The
authorities tried to counter them. A government newspaper in 1927 wrote "the generous
assistance to Jewish settlers" is coming from "Jewish community organizations" (withou
t
mentioning they were Western organizations), and not from the government as is rumore
d.
To refute the rumors, Shlikhter (that young brawler from Kiev's Duma in October, 190
5),
now Narkom of Agriculture of Ukraine, toured over the South of Ukraine. Rumors that th
e
Jews were not working the land given to them but were renting it out or hiring farm la
borers,
were met with: "we haven't observed this behavior, but the Jewish settlers must be
forbidden to rent out their land" and "the unhealthy atmosphere surrounding the Jewis
h
resettlement must be countered with the widest possible education campaign" (145).

The article allows one to judge about the scale of events. It states that 630 Jewish
households moved into Kherson Province between the end of 1925 and July of 1927 (146).
In
1927, there were 48 Jewish agricultural settlements in Ukraine with a total population
of
35,000. In Crimea, 4463 Jews lived in Jewish agricultural settlements in 1926 (147). O
ther
sources implausibly claimed that "by 1928, 220,000 Jews lived in Jewish agricultural c
olonies"
(148). Similarly, Larin mentioned 200,000 by the beginning of 1929. Where does this or
der of
magnitude discrepancy come from? Larin here contradicts himself, saying that in 1929 t
he
share of Jews in agriculture was negligible, less than 0.2% (and almost 20% among
merchants and 2% in population in general) (149).

Mayakovsky saw it differently:

"A hard toiling Jew

Tills the rocky land"

However, the program of Jewish land colonization, for all practical purposes, was a fa
ilure.
For many of the settlers there was little motivation to stay. It didn't help that the
resettlement and the building project had come from on high and the money from wester
n
organizations. A lot of government assistance for Jewish settlers didn't help. It is l
ittle known
that tractors from neighboring collective farms were ordered to till Jewish land (15
0).
Despite the flow of 2-3 thousand resettling Jewish families, by the end of five year w
ork

221

"Jewish settlements in Crimea" listed only around 5 thousand families" instead of pre-

planned 10 to 15 thousand. The reason was that settlers frequently returned to their p
lace
of origin or moved to the cities of Crimea or other parts of the country (151). This m
ass
departure of Jews from agriculture in the 1920'sand 30's resembles similar Jewish
withdrawal from agricultural colonies in the 19th century, albeit now there were many
new
occupations available in industry (and in administration, a prohibited field for Jews
in Tsarist
Russia) (152).

Eventually, collectivization arrived. Suddenly in 1930 Semyon Dimanstein, for many yea
rs the
head of the "Jewish Section of CK of VKPb," a staunch communist who bravely put up wit
h
all Soviet programs in the 20's, came out in the press against universal collectivizat
ion in the
national regions. He was attempting to protect the Jewish colony from collectivization
which
he had been "warned about" (153). However, collectivization came, not sparing the "fre
sh
shoots of Jewish land stewardship" (154). At almost the same time, the Jewish and non-

Jewish Kolkhozes were combined under the banner of "internationalism" (155) and the
program of Jewish settlement in Ukraine and Crimea was finally halted.

The principal Soviet project of Jewish colonization was at Birobidzhan, a territory "n
early the
size of Switzerland" between the 2 branches of the Amur river near the Chinese border.
It
has been described variously. In 1956 Khrushchev bragged in conversations with Canadia
n
communists that the soil was rich, the climate was southern, there was "much sun and w
ater"
and "rivers filled with fish" and "vast forests." The Socialist Vestnik described it a
s covered
with "wild taiga... swampland made up a significant portion" of the territory (156). A
ccording
the Encyclopedia Britannica: "a plain with swamps in places," but a "fertile land alon
g the
Amur" (157).

The project came about in 1927 from the KomZET (a committee of the CIK) and was
intended to: "turn a significant part of the Jewish population into a settled agricult
ural
people in one location" (Kalinin). Also the Jewish Autonomous Republic was to serve as
a
counterweight to Zionism, creating a national homeland with at least half a million
population (158). (One possible motive behind the plan which cannot be excluded: to we
dge
a loyal Soviet population into the hostile Cossack frontier.)

OZET sent a scientific expedition to Birobidzhan in 1927 and, before large settlements
of
Jews began arriving, in 1928 started preparations and building for the settlement usin
g
laborers from the local populace and wandering work crews of Chinese and Koreans.

Older residents of the area -Trans-Baikal Cossacks exiled there between the 1860's and
the
1880's and already tested by the hardships of the frontier woods - remember being
concerned about the Jewish settlement. The Cossacks needed vast tracts of land for the
ir
farming methods and feared they would be crowded out of lands they used for hunting an
d
hay harvesting. The KomZET commission report was "a preliminary plan for the possible
gradual resettlement of 35,000 families". But reality was different. The CIK of VKPb i
n 1928

222

assigned Birobidzhan for Jewish colonization and preparation of first settler trains b
egan
immediately. "For the first time ever, city dwellers (from Ukraine and Byelorussia) wi
thout
any preparation for agricultural labor were sent to farm the land." (They were lured b
y the
prospect of having the status of "lishenets" removed.) (159).

The Komsomol published the "Monthly OZET" and Pioneer delegations traveled around the
country collecting for the Birobidzhan resettlement.

The hastily dispatched Jewish families were horrified by the conditions they met upon
arrival.
They moved into barracks at the Tikhonkaya railroad station, in the future town of
Birobidzhan. "Among the inhabitants... were some who never left the barracks for the l
and,
living off the loans and credits they managed to obtain for making the move. Others le
ss
nimble, lived in abject poverty" (160).

"During the first year of work at Birobidzhan only 25 huts were built, only 125 hectar
es were
plowed and none were planted. Many did not remain in Birobidzhan; 1,000 workers arrive
d
in the Spring of 1928 and by July, 25% of all those who arrived in 1928 had left. "By
February
1929 more than half of the population had abandoned Birobidzhan" (161). From 1928 to
1933 more than 18,000 arrived, yet the Jewish population grew only by 6,000. By some
calculations "only 14% of those Jews who resettled remained in 1929" (169). They retur
ned
either to their homes or moved to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.

Larin, who devotes no small number of reasoned and impassioned pages to the building o
f
Jewish agriculture sniffs that "an unhealthy fuss... has been raised around Birobidzha
n... a
Utopian settlement of a million Jews... Resettlement was practically presented as a na
tional
obligation of Soviet Jews, Zionism turned inside out... a kind of back-to-the-provinc
e
movement". While international Jewish organizations provided no finances for Birobidzh
an,
from the beginning "considering it too expensive and riskyfor them" (163). More likely
the
western Jewish organizations, Agro-Joint, ORTand EKO could not support the distant pro
ject
beyond the Urals (164). It wasn't a "Jewish plan," but a scheme of Soviet authorities
eager to
tear down and build life anew in the country.

***
From the October revolution to the end of the 20's the lives of ordinary Jews were aff
ected
by the actions of Yevseks - members of the YevSek (The Jewish section of the CK of VKP
b.)
Besides the Jewish Commissariat, an active Jewish organization grew up in the VKPb. As
well,
from 1918, local organizations were formed in the guberniyas. They created an environm
ent
fanatically inspired with the idea and ideas of communism, even more so than was Sovie
t
authority itself and at times these organizations even opposed Soviet projects. For ex
ample,
"atthe insistence of the YevSek, the Jewish Commissariat decreed Hebrew to be a langua
ge
of 'reaction and counter-revolution' in early 1919, requiring Jewish schools to teach
in
Yiddish" (165). The Central Bureau of the YevSek was part of the CK of VKPb and local

223

YevSeks operated in the former Pale of Settlement. "The purpose of the YevSek was
communist education and Sovietization of the Jewish population in their native languag
e of
Yiddish."

From 1924 to 1928 responsibility for "all Jewish education and culture" was under the
Jewish Bureaus of the republic-level administrative bodies, but these were abolished f
or
"excesses in forced Yiddishization" and more power accrued to the YevSek (166).

The activities of the YevSek in the 20's were contradictory. "On one hand they carried
out
active agitprop work in communist education in Yiddish and mercilessly battled agains
t
Judaism, traditional Jewish education, Jewish social structures, independent Jewish
organizations, political parties and movements, Zionism and Hebrew. On the other hand
it
opposed assimilation with its support of the Yiddish language and a Yiddish culture an
d
organizations of Jewish education, Jewish scientific research and activity to improve
the
economic status of Soviet Jews. In this "the YevSek often held a more radical position
than
even the central party bodies" (167).
The anti-Zionist YevSek was made up "to a large degree" of "former Bundists and social
ist-
territoria lists" (168) who were thought of as traitors or "neophyte communists" in VK
Pb. The
purpose of the YevSek was to develop communist influence on Russian Jewry and to creat
e a
"Jewish Soviet nation" isolated from world Jewry. But at the same time its actions
paradoxically turned it from a technical apparatus urging the Jewish population to bui
ld
socialism into a focal point for Jewish life in the USSR. A split arose in the YevSek
between
supporters of "forced assimilation" and those who thought its work was a "necessary me
ans
of preservation of the Jewish people" (169).

The Book of Russian Jewry observes with sympathy that the activity of the YevSek "stil
l
carried a clearand expresslyJewish stamp under the banner of the Proletariat." For ins
tance
in 1926 using the slogan "to the countryside!," [meant to rouse interest in working in
and
propagandizing rural areas] the YevSek came up with "to the Shtetl!"

"...This activity resonated widely in Jewish circles in Poland and in the U.S." The au
thor
further calls it "a many-faceted Jewish nationalism in communist form" (170). But in 1
926
the CP halted the activity of the YevSek and turned it into the Jewish Bureau. In 1930
the
Jewish Bureau was closed along with all national sections of VKPb (171). After that th
e
activity of the YevSeks continued under the banner of communism. "Russian Jewry lost a
ll
forms of self-expression, including communistic forms" (172).

The end of the YevSek symbolized the final dissolution of the Bund movement "to allow
a
separate nationalist existence, even if it went against strict social-democratic theor
y" (171).
However, after the YevSek was abolished, many of the former Yevseksand Jewish socialis
ts
did not come to their senses and put the "building of socialism" higherthan the good o
f their
own people or any other good, staying to serve the party-government apparatus. And tha
t
overflowing service was evident more than anything.
224

Whether statistically or using a wealth of singularexamples, it is obvious that Jews p

ervaded
the Soviet power structure in those years. And all this happened in the state that per
secuted
freedom of speech, freedom of commerce and religion, not to mention its denigration o
f
human worth.

***

Bikerman and Pasmanik paint a very gloomy picture of the state of Jewish culture in th
e
USSR in 1923: "all is torn up and trampled underfoot in the field of Jewish culture"
(174). "All
foundations of a nationalist Jewish culture are shaken and all that is sacred is stomp
ed into
the mud" (175). S. Dubnov saw something similar in 1922 and wrote about "rueful wrecka
ge"
and a picture "of ruin and the progress of dark savages, destroying the last remnants
of a
bygone culture" (176).

However, Jewish historiography did not suffer destruction in the first 10 years after
the
revolution, as is attested to by the range of allowed publications. Government archive
s,
including those from the department of police, opened after the revolution have given
Jewish scholars a view on Jewish participation in the revolutionary movement, pogroms,
and
"blood libel" trials. The Jewish Historical-Ethnographical Society was founded in 1920
and
published the 2-volume Material on theHistory of a nti -Jewish Pogroms in Russia. The
Society
later came under attack from the YevSek and it was abolished in 1929. The journals, Th
e
Jewish News and The Jewish Chronicle were shut down in the mid-twenties. S. Dubnov's
Jewish Antiquity remained in publication (even after he left the USSR in 1922) but was
closed
in 1930. The Jewish Ethnographical Museum functioned from 1916, but was closed in 193
0
(177).

In the 1920's, Jewish culture had two divergent fates — one in Hebrew and one in Yiddi
sh.
Hebrew was strongly repressed and forbidden as authorities saw it as a carrier of reli
gion
and Zionism. Before the consolidation of Soviet power in the years 1917-1919 "there we
re
more than 180 books, brochures, and journals in Hebrew" (mostly in Odessa, but also in
Kiev
and Moscow). The feeling that the fate of Hebrew was connected with the fate of the
victorious communist revolution held in the early 20's "among young people attempting
to
create a 'revolutionary literary tribune, under whose banner they hoped to unite the
creative youthful strength of world Jewry'" (178). However at the insistence of the Ye
vSek,
Hebrew was declared a "reactionary language" and already in 1919 the People's
Commissariat of Education had "forbidden the teaching of Hebrew in all educational
institutions. The removal of all Hebrew books from libraries had begun" (179).

Yiddish culture fared much better. Yiddish was the language of the Jewish masses. Acco
rding
to the 1926 census, 73% of Jews listed Yiddish as their mother tongue (181) (another s
ource
cites a figure of 66% (181)) - that is the Jewish population could preserve its cultur
e in
Yiddish. Soviet authorities used this. If, in the early years of Soviet power and Bols
hevism the
opinion prevailed that Jews should discard their language and nationality, later the J
ewish

225

Commissariat at the Narkomat of Nationalities, the YevSek, and the Jewish sections of
the
republican narkomats of education began to build Soviet culture in Yiddish. In the 2
0's
Yiddish was declared one of the official languages of Byelorussia; In Odessa of the 2
0's and
even the 30'sitwasa language of many government institutions, with "Jewish hours" on t
he
radio and court proceedings in Yiddish (182).

"A rapid growth in Yiddish schools began in 1923 throughout the Soviet Union." Beginni
ng in
1923 and continuing through 1930 a program of systematic "Yiddishization" was carried
out,
even forced, upon Jewish schools in the former Pale of Settlement. Many schools were
switched to Yiddish without considering the wishes of parents. In 1923 there were 495
Yiddish schools with 70,000 Jewish children, by 1928 there were 900 schools and in 193
0
they had 160,000 children. (This can be partially explained by the fact that Ukrainian
s and
Byelorussians at this time received full cultural autonomy and saw Jewish children as
potential agents of Russification; Jewish parents didn't want their children in Ukrain
ian or
Byelorussian schools and there were no more Russian schools — they had no choice but t
o
go to Yiddish schools. They did not study Jewish history in these schools; instead the
re was
"class warand the Jews" (183). (Just as in the Russian schools there was no study of R
ussian
history, or of any history, only "social sciences".) Throughout the 20's "even those f
ew
elements of a specifically Jewish education were gradually driven out of Soviet Jewis
h
schools." By the early 30' s the autonomously functioning system of Soviet Jewish scho
ols
had been officially done away with (184).

From 1918 there were independent Jewish schools of higher education — ENU (Jewish
People's University) until 1922 in Moscow; PENU in Petrograd which became Petrograd IV
EZ
(Institute of Higher Jewish Learning, one of whose founders and later Rector was Semyo
n
Lozinsky) boasting "a number of distinguished scholars among faculty and large number
of
Jewish graduates". Supported by Joint, IVEZ functioned until 1925. Jewish divisions we
re
established at educational science departments at Byelorussian University (1922) and a
t
Second Moscow State University (1926). Central Jewish CP School teaching in Yiddish wa
s
established in 1921. Jewish educational system included special educational science
technical colleges and more than 40 industrial and agricultural training schools (18
5).

Jewish culture continued to exist and even received no small encouragement — but on th
e
terms of Soviet authorities. The depths of Jewish history were closed. This took place
on a
background of the destruction of Russian historical and philosophical sciences complet
e with
arrests of scholars.

Jewish culture of the 20's could more accurately be called a Soviet "proletarian" cult
ure in
Yiddish. And for that kind of Jewish culture the government was ready to provide
newspapers and theatre. Forty years later the Book of Russian Jewry gives a less than
gloomy assessment of the cultural situation of Jews in the USSR in the early Soviet ye
ars. In
Moscow the worldwide Jewish Telegraphic agency (ETA) continued to exist into the 40's
as
an independent unit — the only such agency in the Soviet nation that did not come unde
r

226

TASS, sending communications abroad (of course, subject to Soviet censorship). Newspap
ers
were published in Yiddish, the main one being the house organ of the YevSek, The Mosco
w
Der Amos from 1920 to 1938. According to Dimanstein there were 34 Yiddish publishers i
n
1928.

Yiddish literature was encouraged, but, naturally, with a purpose: to turn Jews away f
rom an
historical Jewish past; to show "before October" as a gloomy prologue to the epoch of
happiness and a new dawn; to smear anything religious and find in the Soviet Jew the
"new
man." Even with all this, it was so attractive to some prominent Jewish writers who ha
d left
the country that they started to return to the USSR: poets David Gofstein ("always sus
pected
of harboring nationalist sentiment") and LeibKvitko ("easily accommodated to Soviet
environment and become a prolific poet") returned in 1925; Perez Markish ("easily
understands the needs of the party") — in 1926; Moses Kulbak and Der Nistor (the real
name of the latter was Pinkhos Kaganovich, he later wrote novel Mashber Family
characterized as the most "un-Soviet and liberal work of Jewish prose in Soviet Unio
n") —
returned in 1928. David Bergelson returned in 1929, he "paid tribute to those in powe
r: 'the
revolution has a right to cruelty' (186). (Which he, Markish and Kvitko were to experi
ence
themselves in 1952.)

The "bourgeois" Hebrew culture was suppressed. A group of writers headed by H.N. Byali
k
left for Palestine in 1921. Another group "of Hebrew writers existed until the mid-3
0's,
occasionally publishing in foreign journals. Some of these authors were arrested and
disappeared without a trace while others managed to escape the Soviet Union" (187).
Regarding Jewish culture expressed in Russian language, Yevseks interpreted it as the
"result
of government-directed efforts to assimilate Jews in Tsarist Russia." Among those writ
ing in
Yiddish, a split between "proletarian" writers and "companions" developed in mid-20's,
like
in Soviet literature at large. Majority of mainstream authors then switched to Russia
n
language (188).

The Jewish Chamber Theater in Yiddish in Moscow flowered since 1921 at a high artistic
level
with government aid (in 1925 it was transformed into the State Jewish Theater, GosET).
It
traveled through Europe and became an unexpected representative of Soviet power in th
e
eyes of world Jewry. It made fun of pre-revolutionary ways and religious life of the s
htetl.
Mikhoels excelled as an actor and in 1928 became the director (189).

The history of the Hebrews theater "Gabima," which began before the revolution was muc
h
more complicated. Originally supported by Lunacharsky, Gorky and Stanislavsky it was
persecuted as a "Zionist nest" by the YevSek and it took a decision by Lenin to allow
it to
exist. "Gabima" became a government theatre. It remained the only outpost of Hebrew i
n
the USSR, though it was clear it had no future (190). (The theatre critic A. Kugel sai
d it had
departed from Jewish daily life and lost its Jewish spirit (191).) In 1926 the troupe
went on a
European tour and did not return, disappearing from history soon after (192).

227

By contrast, the government Yiddish theatre "was a real boon for Jewish theater arts i
n the
USSR." In the early 30's there were 19 professional Yiddish theater groups... with a t
raining
school atGosETin Moscow, and Jewish dramatic arts studios in Kiev, Minsk and Moscow
(193).

Here it is worth remembering the posthumous treatment of the ill-fated "Jewish Gogol"
Semen Ushkevitch. His bookEpisodes, published in 1926 "satirizes revolution-era Jewis
h
bourgeois". He died in 1927 and in 1928 the Soviet censor banned his play Simka, The R
abbit
Hearted based on his earlier book. As an anti- bourgeois work it should have been fin
e, but
"taking place in a Jewish setting and making fun of the stupidity, cowardice and greed
of its
subjects, it was banned because of fears that it would cause Judeophobic feelings" (19
4).

***

In the meantime what was the condition of Zionist organizations in the USSR? They wer
e
fundamentally incompatible with communist authority and were accused of "internationa
l
imperialism" and collaboration with the Entente. Because of their international standi
ng the
Soviets had to deal carefully with them. In 1920 the YevSek declared a "civil war on t
he
Jewish street" against the Zionist organizations. Repression of Zionism deepened with
the
ban on Hebrew. However "anti-Zionist pressure did not exist everywhere and was not
sufficiently severe" — that is "long-term imprisonment and exile were relatively rar
e." In
spring 1920 right-wing Zionists were frightened with arrests, but on May 1 were amnest
ied.

The dual policy of the Kremlin was apparent in its discussions with representatives of
the
World Zionist Organization. Chicherin did not dismiss out of hand it's the latter" s s
olicitations
as the Soviets were "not yet ready to denounce Zionism once and for all" as had the Ye
vSek.
The more so since "from the beginning of NEP, lessening government pressure gave Zioni
st
groups a breathing space" (195). Interestingly, Dzerzhinsky wrote in 1923 that "the pr
ogram
of the Zionists is not dangerous to us, on the contrary I consider it useful" and agai
n in 1924
"principally, we can be friends with Zionists" (196). The Central Zionist Bureau exist
ed in
Moscow from 1920 to 1924. In March of 1924 its members were arrested and only after
much pleading from within the country and from overseas was exile to Central Asia repl
aced
with exile abroad (197). In 1923 only two officially permitted Zionist organizations r
emained:
Poale-Zion and the "legal" portion of the youth organization Gekhaluz, whose purpose w
as
agricultural colonization of Palestine. They saw experience with collective farms in t
he USSR
as preparation for this. They published a journal from 1924 to 1926 (198). Even the le
ft-wing
of the Zionist socialist party Zirei-Zion ('Youth of Zion') adopted a sharper tone vis
a vis the
Bolsheviks, and when the arrests in 1924, though short in duration, became more
widespread they went underground. This underground movement was finally dispersed onl
y
in the late 20's.

"Jewish blood will not oil the wheels of revolution," an organizational slogan of the
movement, conveys the sense of the underground Zirei-Zion with its significant youth

228

organizations in Kiev and Odessa. Regarding the government, "they formally recognized
Soviet authority, but at the same time declared opposition to the dictatorship of the
communist party." Much of its work was directed against the YevSek. "In particular, th
ey
agitated against the Crimean resettlement plan, seeing it as disturbing their 'nationa
l
isolation'." From 1926 the party weakened and then disappeared (199).

There was a wave of arrests of Zionists from September to October of 1924. Some of tho
se
arrested were tried in secret and given sentences of 3 to 10 years in the camps. But i
n 1925
Zionist delegates were assured by the CIKofVKPb (Smidovitch) and the Sovnarkom (Ryko
v)
and the GPU that they had nothing against Zionists as long as they "did not arouse th
e
Jewish population againstSoviet power" (200).

D. Pasmanik suggested in 1924 that "Zionists, Orthodox and nationalist Jews should be
in the
front ranks of those fighting alongside Soviet power and the Bolshevik worldview" (20
1). But
there was no united front and no front rank.

In the second half of the 20's, persecution of the Zionists was renewed and the exchan
ge of
prison sentences for exile abroad was sharply curtailed. "In 1928 authorities dissolve
d, the
until then quasi-legal Poale-Zion and liquated the legal Gekhaluz, closing its farm
s... Almost
all underground Zionist organizations were destroyed at that time." Opportunities to l
eave
declined sharply after 1926. Some of the Zionists remained in prison or were exiled (2
02).

The mass attraction of young urban Jews to communist and Soviet culture and programs w
as
matched with a no less stubborn resistance from religious Jewry and older Jews from th
e
former Pale. The party used the rock of the YevSek to crush and suppress this resistan
ce.

"One only has to be in a Jewish city such as Minsk or Vitebsk to see how all that was
once
worthy in Judaism, respected and worthy of respect has been turned upside down, crushe
d
with poverty, insult, and hopelessness and how those pushed into higher places are th
e
dissolute, frivolous, arrogant and brazen" (203). Bolshevik power "become the carrier
of
terrible ruin, material and moral... in our Jewish world" (204). "The mass of Jewish B
olsheviks
on one hand and of Jewish NEPmen on the other indicate the depth of the cultural colla
pse
of Jewry. And if radical healing from Bolshevism among the Russian people is to come f
rom a
revival of religious, moral and nationalist life then the Jewish idea must work for th
at also in
their lives" (205).

And work they did, but indicators vary as to degree of intensity and success. A near
contemporary considered "Jewish society turned out either to have no rudder and no sai
l or
was confused and in this confusion spiritually turned awayfrom its sources" in contras
t to
Russian society where there was still some resistance, albeit "clumsy and unsuccessfu
l" (206).

From the end of the 20'sto the beginning of the 30's the Jews abandoned their traditio
nal
way of life on a mass scale" (207)."ln the past 20 years Russian Jewry has gone furthe
r and
further awayfrom its historical past... killing the Jewish spirit and Jewish traditio
n" (208).

229
And a few years later on the very eve of WWII "with the ascension in Russia of the Bol
shevik
dictatorship, the fight between fathers and children in the Jewish street has taken a
particularly bitter form" (209).

Taking stock a half-century later, M. Agursky reminisces in Israel, that the misfortun
es that
befell Jews after the revolution to a large degree were brought on by the renunciation
by
Jewish youth of its religion and national culture, "the singular, exclusive influence
of
communist ideology..." "The mass penetration by Jews in all areas of Russian life" and
of the
Soviet leadership in the first 20 years after the revolution turned not to be construc
tive for
Jews, but harmful (210).

Finally, an author in the 1990's writes: "Jews were the elite of the revolution and on
the
winning side. That's a peculiarfact of the Russian internationalist socialist revoluti
on. In the
course of modernizing, Jewry was politically Bolshevized and socially Sovietized: The
Jewish
community as an ethnic, religious and national structure disappeared without a trace"
(211).
Jewish youth coming to Bolshevism were intoxicated by its new role and influence. For
this,
others too would have gladly given up their nationality. But this turning from the old
ways to
internationalism and atheism was not the same as assimilation into the surrounding maj
ority,
a centuries-old Jewish fear. This was leaving the old, along with all other youth, to
come
together and form a new Soviet people. "Only a small stream was truly assimilationalis
t in
the old sense," like those people who converted to Orthodox Christianity and wished th
eir
own dissolution in the Russian culture. We find one such example in attorney Y. Gurevi
ch,
legal defender of metropolitan Venamin during his fatal trial in 1922 (212).

The Jewish Encyclopedia writes of Jewish workers inthe "party and government apparatu
s
of economic, scientific and even military organizations and institutions, that most di
d not
hide their Jewish origins, but they and their families quickly absorbed Russian cultur
e and
language and being Jewish lost its cultural content" (213).

Yes, the culture which sustained them suffered, "Soviet Man" was created, but the deca
des
which followed showed that a remnant of Jewish self-awareness was preserved and
remained. Even inthe flood of the internationalism of the 20's, mixed marriages (betwe
en
Jews and Russians or Jews and any non-Jew), as measured from 1924-1926, were only 6.
3%
of the total marriages for Jews in the USSR, including 16.8% in RSFSR, but only 2.8% i
n
Byelorussia and 4.5% in Ukraine (214) (according to another source, on average in USS
R,
8.5%; in RSFSR, 21%; in Byelorussia, 3.2%; and in Ukraine, 5% (215)). Assimilation had
only
begun.

* * *

And what was the status of the Jewish religion in the new conditions? Bolshevik power
was
hostile to all religions. During the years of the hardest blows against the Orthodox C
hurch,
Jewish religious practice was treated with restraint. "In March, 1922 Dar Amos noted t
hat
the department of agitprop of the Central Committee would not offend religious feeling
s... In

230

the 20's this tolerance did not extend to Russian Orthodoxy, which the authorities
considered one of the main enemies of the Soviet order" (216). Nevertheless, the
confiscation of church valuables extended to synagogues as well. E. Yarolslavsky wrote
in
Izvestia an article titled "What Can be Taken from a Synagogue": Often Rabbis will say
there
is nothing of value in a synagogue. Usually that is the case... The walls are usually
bare. But
menorahs are often made of silver. These must be confiscated." Three weeks before that
16
silverobjects were taken from Jewish preaching house on Spasso-Glinischevsky avenue an
d
in the neighboring choral synagogue "57 silverobjects and 2 of gold." Yaroslavsky furt
her
proposes a progressive tax on those who buy costly seats in the synagogue (217).
(Apparently, this proposal went nowhere.)

However "functionaries from the YevSek demanded of authorities that the same policy
applied towards Christianity be carried out towards Judaism" (218). In the Jewish New
Year,
1921 the YevSek orchestrated a "public trial of the Jewish religion" in Kiev. The Book
of
Russian Jewry describes this and other show trials in 1921-1922: there was a court
proceeding against a Cheder (a traditional elementary school with instruction in Hebre
w) in
Vitebsk, against a Yeshiva (a Jewish school for study of the traditional, texts, the T
almud, the
Torah, and the Rabbinical literature) in Rostov and even against Day of Atonement in O
dessa.
They were intentionally conducted in Yiddish, as the YeSsek explained, so that Jewish
Bolsheviks would "judge" Judaism.

Religious schools were closed by administrative order and in December 1920 the Jewish
section of the Narkomat of Education issued a encyclical about the liquidation of Ched
ers
and Yeshivas. "Nevetheless, large numbers of Cheders and Yeshivas continued teaching
semi-legally or completely underground for a long time afterthat" (219). "In spite of
the ban
on religious education, as a whole the 20's were rather a liberal period for Jewish re
ligious
life in the USSR" (220).

"[A]t the request of Jewish laborers," of course, there were several attempts to clos
e
synagogues, but this met with "bitter opposition from believers." Still "during the 2
0's the
central synagogues were closed in Vitebsk, Minsk, Gomel, Kharkov, Bobruisk" (221). Th
e
central Moscow synagogue on Maroseika managed stay open thanks to the efforts of Rabb
i
Maze in the face of Dzerzhinsky and Kalinin (222). In 1926, the "choral synagogue in K
iev was
closed" and children's Yiddish theatre opened in its place (223). But "the majority o
f
synagogues continued to function. In 1927, 1034 synagogues and prayer halls were
functioning in Ukraine and the number of synagogues towards the end of the 20s' exceed
ed
the number in 1917" (224).

Authorities attempted to institute "Living Synagogues" based on the model of the "Livi
ng
Church" imposed upon the Russian Orthodox Church. A "portrait of Lenin was to be hung
in
a prominent place" of such a synagogue, the authorities brought in "red Rabbis" and
"communized Rabbis." However they "failed to bring about a split among the believers"

231

(225) and the vast majority of religious Jews was decisively against the 'Living Synag
ogue',
bringing the plan of Soviet authorities to naught (226).

At the end of 1930 a group of rabbis from Minsk was arrested. They were freed after tw
o
weeks and made to sign a document prepared by the GPU agreeing that: (1) the Jewish
religion was not persecuted in the USSR and, (2) during the entire Soviet era not one
rabbi
had been shot (227).

Authorities tried to declare the day of rest to be Sunday or Monday in Jewish areas. S
chool
studies were held on the Sabbath by order of the YevSek. In 1929 authorities tried the
five-
day work week and the six-day work week with the day of rest upon the 5th or 6th day,
respectively. Christians lost Sunday and Jews lost the Sabbath. Members of the YevSek
rampaged in front of synagogues on holidays and "in Odessa broke into the Brads ky
Synagogue and demonstratively ate bread in front of those fasting and praying." They
instituted "community service" days during sacred holidays like Yom Kippur. "during ho
lidays,
especially when the synagogue was closed, they requisitioned Talles, Torah scrolls, pr
ayer
shawls and religious books... import of matzoh from abroad was sometimes allowed and
sometimes forbidden (228)... in 1929 they started taxing matzoh preparation (229). Lar
in
notes the "amazing permission" granted to bring matzoh from Konigsbergto Moscow for
Passover in 1929 (230).

In the 20's private presses still published Jewish religious literature. "In Leningra
d, Hasids
managed to print prayer books in several runs, a few thousands copies each" while
Katzenelson, a rabbi from Leningrad, was able to use the printing-house "Red Agitato
r."
During 1920's, the Jewish calendars were printed and distributed in tens of thousand c
opies
(231). The Jewish community was the only religious group in Moscow allowed to build
religious buildings. A second synagogue was built on Visheslaviz alley nearby Sushchev
sky
Embankment and a third in Cherkizov. These three synagogues stayed open throughout th
e
30's (232).

But "young Jewish writers and poets... gleefully wrote about the empty synagogues, th
e
lonely rabbi who had no one to teach and about the boys from the villages who grew up
to
become the terrible red commissars" (233). And we saw the Russian members of Komsomol
rampaging on Easter Sunday, knocking candles and holy bread out of worshippers' hand
s,
tearing the crosses from the cupolas and we saw thousands of beautiful churches broke
n
into a rubble of bricks and we remember the thousands of priests that were shot and th
e
thousands of others who were sent to the camps.

In those years, we all drove God out.

***

232

From the early Soviet years the path for Jewish intelligentsia and youth was open as w
ide as
possible in science and culture, given Soviet restrictions. (Olga Kameneva, Trotsky's
sister,
patronized high culture in the very early Soviet years.)

Already in 1919 "a large number of Jewish youth" went into moviemaking — an art praise
d
by Lenin for its ability to govern the psychology of the masses. Many of them took cha
rge of
movie studios, film schools and film crews. For example, B. Shumyatsky, one of the fou
nders
of the Mongolian Republic, and S. Dukelskywere heads of the main department of the
movie industry at different times (234). Impressive works of early Soviet motion
cinematography were certainly a Jewish contribution. The Jewish Encyclopedia lists
numerous administrators, producers, directors, actors, script writers and motion pictu
re
theorists. Producer Dziga Vertov is considered a classic figure in Soviet, cinema, mos
tly
nonfiction. His works includeLenin's Truth, Go Soviets, Symphony of Donbass [the Donet
sk
Basin], and The Three Songs about Lenin (235). (It is less known that he also orchestr
ated
desecration of the holy relics of St. Sergius of Radonezh.) In the documentary genre,
Esther
Shub, "by tendentious cutting and editing of fragments of old documentaries, produced
full-
length propaganda movies (The Fall of Romanovs (1927) and others), and later — glorify
ing
ones." Other famous Soviet names include S. Yutkevitch, G. Kozintsev and L. Trauberg
(SVD,
New Babel). F. Ermler organized the Experimental Movie Studio. Among notable others ar
e
G. Roshal (The Skotinins), Y. Raizman (Hard Labor Camps, Craving of Earth among other
s.).
By far, the largest figure of Soviet cinematography was Sergei Eisenstein. He introduc
ed "the
epic spirit and grandeur of huge crowd scenes, tempo, new techniques of editing and
emotionality" into the art of cinematography (236). However he used his gifts as order
ed.
The worldwide fame of Battleship Potemkin was a battering ram for the purposes of the
Soviets and in its irresponsibly falsified history encouraged the Soviet public to fur
ther curse
Tsarist Russia. Made-up events, such as the "massacre on Odessa Steps" scene and the
scene where a crowd of rebellious seamen is covered with tarpaulin for execution, ente
red
the world's consciousness as if they were facts. First it was necessary to serve Stali
n's
totalitarian plans and then his nationalistic idea. Eisenstein was there to help.

Though the Jewish Encyclopedia list names in the arts by nationality, I must repeat: n
ot in
the nationalism does one find the main key to the epoch of the early Soviet years, but
in the
destructive whirlwind of internationalism, estranged from any feeling of nationality o
r
traditions. And here in theater but close to authorities we see the glorious figure o
f
Meyerhold, who became the leading and most authoritarian starof the Soviet theater. H
e
had numerous impassioned admirers but wasn't universally recognized. From late
recollections of Tyrkova-Vyazemskaya, Meyerhold appears as a dictator subjugating bot
h
actors and playwrites alike to his will "by his dogmatism and dry formalism."
Komissarzhevskaya sensed "that his novelty lacks creative simplicity and ethical and
esthetical clarity." He "clipped actor's wings... paid more attention to frame than to
portrait"
(237). He was a steady adversary of Mikhail Bulgakov.

233
Of course, the time was such that artists had to pay for their privileges. Many paid,
including
Kachalov, Nemirovitch-Danchenko and A. Tairov-Kornblit, the talented producer of the
Chamber Theater and a starofthat unique early Soviet period. (In 1930, Tairov "denounc
ed"
'Prompartia' in the party newspapers.)

Artist Marc Chagall emigrated by 1923. The majority of artists in the 20's were requir
ed to
contribute to Soviet mass propaganda. There some Jewish artists distinguished themselv
es,
beginning with A. Lisitsky who greeted the revolution as "a new beginning for humanit
y." He
joined a number of various committees and commissions, made first banner of all -Russi
an
Central Executive Committee, which was displayed on the Red Square in 1918 by members
of government." He made famous poster "Strike Whites with the Red Wedge," designed
numerous Soviet expositions abroad (from 1927) and propaganda albums for the West
("USSR Builds Socialism" etc.) (238). A favorite with the authorities was Isaac Brodsk
y who
drew portraits of Lenin, Trotsky and others including Voroshilov, Frunze and Budenny.
"After
completing his portrait of Stalin he became the leading official portrait artist of th
e USSR" in
1928 and in 1934 was named director of the ail-Russian Academy of Arts (239).

During early years after revolution, Jewish musical life was particularly rich. At the
start of
century the first in the world Jewish national school of music in the entire world, wh
ich
combined both traditional Jewish and contemporary European approaches, was establishe
d.
The 1920'ssawa number of works inspired by traditional Jewish themes and stories, suc
h
asYouth of Abraham by M. Gnesin, The Song of Songs by A, Krein, and Jewish Rhapsody b
y
his brother G. Krein. In that age of restrictions, the latter and his son Yulian were
sent into
eight-years studying trip to Vienna and Paris to "perfect Yulian's performance" (240).
Jews
were traditionally talented in music and many names of future stars were for the first
time
heard during that period. Many "administrators from music" appeared also, such as Mati
as
Sokolsky-Greenberg, who was "chief inspector of music at Department of Arts of Ministr
y of
Education" and a senior editor of ideological Music and Revolution. "Later in 1930's M
oses
Greenberg, "a prominent organizer of musical performances," was director of State
Publishing House in music and chief editor of the Department of Music Broadcasting at
the
State Radio Studio (241). There was Jewish Conservatory in Odessa as well (242).

Leonid Utesov (Lazar Vaysbeyn) thundered from the stage. Many of his songs were writte
n
by A. d'Aktil. A. P. German and Y. Hayt wrote the March of Soviet Aviation (243). This
was
the origin of Soviet mass singing culture.

Year after year, the stream of Soviet culture fell more and more under the hand of th
e
government. A number of various state organizations were created such as the State
Academic Council, the monopolistic State Publishing House (which choked off many priva
te
publishing firms and even had its own political commissar, certain David Chernomordnik
ov
in 1922-23 (244), and the State Commission for Acquisition of Art Pieces (de facto pow
er
over artist livelihood). Political surveillance was established. (The case of A. K. Gl
azunov,
Rector of the Leningrad Conservatory, will be reviewed below).

234

Of course, Jews were only a part of the forward triumphal march of proletarian cultur
e. In
the heady atmosphere of the early Soviet epoch no one noticed the loss of Russian cult
ure
and that Soviet culture was driving Russian culture out along with its strangled and m
ight-
have-been names.

***

A vicious battle for the dominance within the Party was waged between Trotsky and Stal
in
from 1923 to 1927. Later Zinoviev fought for first place equally confident of his chan
ces. In
1926 Zinoviev and Kamenev, deceived by Stalin, united with Trotsky ("the United
Opposition") — that is, three of the most visible Jewish leaders turned out on one sid
e. Not
surprisingly, many of the lower rank Trotskyites were Jewish. (Agursky cites A. Chilig
a, exiled
with Trotskyites in the Urals: "indeed the Trotskyites were young Jewish intellectuals
and
technicians," particularly from Left Bundists (245).

"The opposition was viewed as principally Jewish" and this greatly alarmed Trotsky. In
March
of 1924 he complained to Bukharin that among the workers it is openly stated: "The kik
es
are rebelling!" and he claimed to have received hundreds of letters on the topic. Bukh
arin
dismissed it as trivial. Then "Trotsky tried to bring the question of anti-Semitism to
a
Politburo session but no one supported him." More than anything, Trotsky feared that S
talin
would use popular anti-Semitism against him in their battle for power. And such was
partially the case according to Uglanov, then secretary of the Moscow Committee of the
CP.
"Anti-Semitic cries were heard" during Uglanov's dispersal of a pro-Trotsky demonstrat
ion in
Moscow November 7, 1927 (246).

Maybe Stalin considered playing the anti-Jewish card against the "United Opposition,"
but
his superior political instinct led him away from that. He understood that Jews were
numerous in the party at that time and could be a powerful force against him if his ac
tions
were to unite them against him. They were also needed in order to maintain support fro
m
the West and would be of further use to him personally. He never parted from his belov
ed
assistant Lev Mekhlis — and from the Civil Warat Tsaritsyn, his faithful aid Moses
Rukhimovitch.

But as Stalin's personal power grew towards the end of the 20'sthe number ofJewsinthe
Soviet Apparatus began to fall off. It was no accident that he sent Enukidze to take
photographs "among the Jewish delegates" at a "workers and peasants" conference durin
g
the height of the struggle for party dominance (247).

Ya ros lavs ky writes in Pravda: "Incidents of anti-Semitism are the same whether they
are
used against the opposition or used by the opposition in its fight against the party."
They are
an "attempt to use any weakness, any fissures in the dictatorship of the proletaria
t... there is
"nothing more stupid or reactionary than to explainthe roots of opposition to the
dictatorship of the proletariat as related to the nationality of this or that oppositi
on group
member" (248). At the same Party Congress, the 25th, where the "united opposition" wa
s

235

decisively broken, Stalin directed Ordzhonikidze to specifically address the national

question
in his report to the Central Committee, as if in defense Jews. (Statistics from the re
port were
discussed earlier in this chapter.) "The majority of the apparatus is Russian, so any
discussion
of Jewish dominance has no basis whatever" (249). At the 26th Party Congress in 1930 S
talin
declared "Great Russian chauvinism" to be the "main danger of the national question."
Thus,
at the end of the 20's Stalin did not carry out his planned purge of the party and gov
ernment
apparatus of Jews, but encouraged their expansion in many fields, places and instituti
ons.

At the 25th Congress in December 1927, the time had come to address the looming "peasa
nt
question" — what to do with the presumptuous peasantry which had the temerity to askfo
r
manufactured goods in exchange for their grain. Molotov delivered the main report on t
his
topic and among the debaters were the murderers of the peasantry — Schlikhter and
Yakovlev-Epstein (250). A massive war against the peasantry lay ahead and Stalin could
not
afford to alienate any of his reliable allies and probably thought that in this campai
gn against
a disproportionately Slavic population it would be better to rely on Jews than on Russ
ians.
He preserved the Jewish majority in the Gosplan.The commanding heights of collectiviza
tion
and its theory included, of course, Larin. LevKritzman was director of the Agrarian In
stitute
from 1928. As Assistant to the President of the Gosplan in 1931-33 he played a fateful
role in
the persecution of Kondratev and Chayanov. Yakov Yakovlev-Epstein took charge of Peopl
e's
Commissariat of Agriculture in 1929. (Before that he worked in propaganda field: he wa
s in
charge of Head Department of Political Education since 1921, later — in the agitprop d
ivision
of Central Committee and in charge of press division of Central Committee. His career
in
agriculture began in 1923 when during the 13th Party Congress he drafted resolutions o
n
agricultural affairs (251). And thus he led the "Great Change," the imposition of
collectivization on millions of peasants with its zealous implementers on the ground.
A
contemporary writer reports: "for the firsttime ever a significant number of young Jew
ish
communists arrived in rural communities as commanders and lords over life and death. O
nly
during collectivization did the characterization of the Jew as the hated enemy of the
peasant
take hold — even in those places where Jews had never been seen before" (252).

Of course regardless of the percentage of Jews in the party and Soviet apparatus, it w
ould be
a mistake to explain the ferocious anti-peasant plan of communism as due to Jewish
participation. A Russian could have been found in the place of Yakovlev-Epstein — tha
t's
sufficiently clearfrom our post-October history.

The cause and consequences of de-Kulakization and collectivization were not only socia
l and
economic: The millions of victims of these programs were not a faceless mass, but rea
l
people with traditions and culture, cut off from their roots and spiritually killed. I
n its
essence, de-Kulakization was not a socio-economic measure, but a measure taken against
a
nationality. The strategic blow against the Russian people, who were the main obstacle
to
the victory of communism, was conceived of by Lenin, but carried out after his death.
In
those years communism with all its cruelty was directed mostly against Russians. It i
s

236

amazing that not everything has perished during those days. Collectivization, more tha
n any
other policy of the communists, gives the lie to the conception of Stalin's dictatorsh
ip as
nationalist, i.e., "Russian."
Regarding Jewish role in collectivization, it is necessary to remember that Jewish
communists participated efficiently and diligently. From a third-wave immigrant who gr
ew
up in Ukraine. "I remember my father, my mother, aunts, uncles all worked on
collectivization with great relish, completing 5-year plans in 4 years and writing nov
els about
life in factories" (253)[Translator's note: a mainstream Soviet literary genre in the
20's].

In 1927 Izvestia declared "there is no Jewish question here. The October revolution ga
ve a
categorical answer long ago. All nationalities are equal - that was the answer" (25
4).
However when the dispossessors entering the peasant huts were not just commissars but
Jewish commissars the question still glowered in the distance.

"At the end of the 20's" writes S. Ettinger, "in all the hardship of life in the USSR,
to many it
seemed that Jews were the only group which gained from the revolution. They were foun
d
in important government positions, they made up a large proportion of university stude
nts,
it was rumored that they received the best land in the Crimea and have flooded into
Moscow" (255).

Half a century later, June 1980, at a Columbia University conference about the situati
on of
Soviet Jewry, I heard scholars describe the marginalized status of Jews in the USSR an
d in
particular how Jews were offered the choice of either emigration or denying their root
s,
beliefs and culture in order to become part of a denationalized society.

Bah! That was what was required of all peoples in the 20's under the threat of the Sol
ovki
prison camp -and emigration was not an alternative.

The "golden era" of the 20's cries out for a sober appraisal.

Those years were filled with the cruelest persecution based upon class distinction, in
cluding
persecution of children on account of the former life of their parents - a life which
the
children did not even see. But Jews were not among thesechildren or parents.

The clergy, part of the Russian character, centuries in the making, was hounded to dea
th in
the 20's. Though not majority Jewish, too often the people saw Jews directing the spec
ial
"ecclesiastical departments of the GPU" which worked in this area.

A wave of trials of engineers took place from the end of the 20's through the 30's. An
entire
class of older engineers was eliminated. This group was overwhelmingly Russian with a
small
number of Germans.

Study of Russian history, archeology, and folklore were suppressed — the Russians coul
d not
have a past. No one from the persecutors would be accused having their own national

237

interest. (It must be noted that the commission which prepared the decree abolishing t
he
history and the philology departments at Russian universities was made up Jews and non
-
Jews alike — Goykhbarg, Larin, Radek and Ropstein as well as Bukharin, M. Pokrovskii,
Skvortsov-Stepanov and Fritche. It was signed into existence by Lenin in March, 1921.)
The
spirit of the decree was itself an example of nationalist hatred: It was the history a
nd
language of the Great Russians that was no longer needed. During the 20's the very
understanding of Russian history was changed — there was none! And the understanding o
f
what a Great Russian is changed — there was no such thing.

And what was most painful, we Russians ourselves walked along this suicidal path. The
very
period of the 20's was considered the dawn of liberated culture, liberated from Tsaris
mand
capitalism! Even the word "Russian," such as "I am Russian" sounded like a counter-
revolutionary cry which I well remember from my childhood. But without hesitation
everywhere was heard and printed "Russopyati"! [Translator's note: a disparaging term
for
ethnic Russians.]

Pravda published the following in a prominent place in 1925 by V. Aleksandrovsky (not

known for any other contribution):

Rus! Have you rotted, fallen and died?

Well... here's to your eternal memory...

... you shuffle, your crutches scraping along,

Your lips smeared with soot from icons,

over your vast expanses the raven caws,

You have guarded your grave dream.

Old woman — blind and stupid... (256)

V. Bloom in Moscow Evening could brazenly demand the removal of "history's garbage fro
m
[city] squares": to remove Minin-Pozharsky monument from the Red Square, to remove th
e
monument to Russia's thousand-yearanniversary in Novgorod and a statue of St. Vladimi
r
on the hill in Kiev. "Those tons of metal are needed for raw material." (The ethnic co
loring of
the new names has already been noted.)

Swept to glory by the political changes and distinguished by personal shamelessness, D

avid
Zaslavsky demanded the destruction of the studios of Igor Graybar used to restore anci
ent
Russian art, finding that "reverend artist fathers were trying again to fuse the churc
h and art"
(257).

Russia's self-mortification reflected in the Russian language with the depth, beauty a
nd
richness of meaning were replaced by an iron stamp of Soviet conformity.

238

We have not forgotten how it looked atthe height of the decade: Russian patriotism wa
s
abolished forever. But the feelings of the people will not be forgotten. Not how it fe
lt to see
the Church of the Redeemer blown up by the engineer Dzhevalkin and that the main move
r
behind this was Kaganovich who wanted to destroy St. Basil's cathedral as well. Russia
n
Orthodoxy was publicly harassed by "warrior atheists" led by Gubelman-Yaroslavsky. It
is
truthfully noted: "That Jewish communists took part in the destruction of churches wa
s
particularly offensive... No matter how offensive the participation of sons of Russia
n
peasants in the persecution of the church, the part played by each non-Russian was eve
n
more offensive" (258). This went againstthe Russian saying: "if you managed to snatch
a
room in the house, don't throw the God out".

In the words of A. Voronel, "The 20's were perceived by the Jews as a positive opportu
nity
while for the Russian people, it was a tragedy" (259).

True, the Western leftist intellectuals regarded Soviet reality even higher; their adm
iration
was not based on nationality but upon ideas of socialism. Who remembers the lightenin
g
crack of the firing squad executing 48 "food workers" for having "caused the Great Fam
ine"
(i.e., rather than Stalin): the wreckers in the meat, fish, conserves and produce trad
e?
Among these unfortunates were not less than ten Jews (260). What would it take to end
the
world's enchantment with Soviet power? Dora Shturman attentively followed the efforts
of
B. Brutskus to raise a protest among Western intellectuals. He found some who would
protest - Germans and "rightists." Albert Einstein hotheadedly signed a protest, but t
hen
withdrew his signature without embarrassment because the "Soviet Union has achieved a
great accomplishment" and "Western Europe... will soon envy you." The recent execution
by
firing squad was an "isolated incident." Also, "from this, one cannot exclude the poss
ibility
that they were guilty." Romain Rolland maintained a "noble" silence. Arnold Zweig bare
ly
stood up to the communist rampage. At least he didn't withdraw his signature, but said
this
settling of accounts was an "ancient Russian method." And, if true, what then should b
e
asked of the academic loffe in Russia who was prompting Einstein to remove his signatu
re
(261)?

No, the West never envied us and from those "isolated incidents" millions of innocents
died.
We'll never discover why this brutality was forgotten by Western opinion. It's not ver
y
readily remembered today.
Today a myth is being built about the past to the effect that under Soviet power Jews
were
always second class citizens. Or, one sometimes hears that "there was not the persecut
ion in
the 20's that was to come later."

It's very rare to hear an admission that not only did they take part, but there was a
certain
enthusiasm among Jews as they carried out the business of the barbaric young governmen
t.
"The mixture of ignorance and arrogance which Hannah calls a typical characteristic of
the
Jewish parvenu filled the government, social and cultural elite. The brazenness and ar
dor

239

with which all Bolshevik policies were carried out — whether confiscation of church pr
operty
or persecution of 'bourgeois intellectuals' gave Bolshevik power in the 20's a certain
Jewish
stamp" (263).

In the 90's another Jewish public intellectual, writing of the 20's said : "In univers
ity halls
Jews often set the tone without noticing that their banquet was happening against the
backdrop of the demise of the main nationality in the country... During the 20's Jews
were
proud of fellow Jews who had brilliant careers in the revolution, but did not think mu
ch
about how that career was connected to the real suffering of the Russian people... Mos
t
striking today is the unanimity with which my fellow Jews deny any guilt in the histor
y of
20th century Russia" (264).

How healing it would be for both nations if such lonely voices were not drowned ou
t...
because it's true, in the 20's, Jews in many ways served the Bolshevik Moloch not thin
king of
the broken land and not foreseeing the eventual consequences for themselves. Many
leading Soviet Jews lost all sense of moderation during that time, all sense of when i
t was
time to stop.
Sources:

1 M. rionoBCKMM. O Hac — co BceM MCKpeHHOCTbK) // HoBbiM awiepHKaHeu,, Hbto-MopK, 198

1, 20-26 cemndpn
(N2 84), c. 7.

2 A. /lbBOB. Tfle Tbi, Aflawi // HoBaa ra3eTa, Hbio-MopK, 1981, 28 HOfl6pa-4 fle«a6pfl
(N2 82), c. 4.

3 KpaTKaa EBpeficKaa 3HU,MKnoneflHfl (flayiee — KE3). Mepyca^MM, 1976. T. 1, c. 235.

4 Taw\ we, t. 5, c. 477-478.

5 KD. /lapMH. EBpeM m a HTMceMMTH3M b CCCP (qayiee — KD. /lapMH). M.;/l.: TM3, 1929,
c. 58-60.

6 M. ArypcKMM. Mfleo^ornfl Hau,MOHa^-6o^biueBM3Ma. riapuHC YMCA-Press, 1980, c. 265.

7 KE3, t. 1, c. 326.

8 KD. /lapMH, c. 63-64, 74.

9 M3BecTMfl, 1927, 11 fleKa6pa, c. 1.

10 CM. LLlBapu,. AHTMceMMTM3M bCobctckom CoK)3e. Hbto-MopK: M3fl-BO mm. HexoBa, 1952,
c. 44-46, 48-49 (co
ccbmKOM Ha: fl. 3nHrep. MaTepna^bi m ncc^eflOBaHMfl 06-beflMHeHHOM CTaTMCTHKO-SKOHOMMH
ecKOM kommccmm
npn L1K OPTa. M., 1927. Bbin. 1; EBpeficKoe Hace^eHne b CCCP (cTaTMCTHKO-SKOHOMMHecKUM
o63op) M.; f].:
Cou,3rn3, 1932).

11 14. M. EnKepwiaH. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // Poccma m eBpen: C6. 1 (fla^ee — Pm

E) / OTenecTBeHHoe
o6-beflMHeHne pyccKMX eBpeeB 3arpaHnu,eM. riapuHK: YMCA-Press, 1978, c. 28 [1-e M3fl.
— EepyiMH: OcHOBa,
1924].

12 CM. LLlBapu,. AHTMceMMTM3M..., c. 7, 17, 25, 29, 39.

240

13 KE3, t. 8, c. 161-162.

14 14. M. BuKepwia h. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // PmE, c. 22-23.

15 KE3, t. 8, c. 186

16 T. Apohcoh. EBpeficKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CrayiMHa // KHura o pyccKOM eBpeficTBe, 1917-

1967 (flayiee — KPE-
2). Hbio-MopK: Cok)3 PyccKMX EBpeeB, 1968, c. 137.

17 PoccuMCKaa EBpeMCKaa 3HU,MK.noneflMfl (fla.nee — PE3). 2-e M3fl., ncnp. m flon. M.,
1995. T. 2, c. 218.

18 H. EyxapuH. [floKyiafl Ha XXIV/leHMHrpaflCKOM ry6napTKOH4>epeHU,MM] // llpaBfla, 19

27, 2 4>eBpa.nfl, c. 4.

19 KD. /lapMH, c. 86.

20 KD. /lapMH*, c. 124-125 (coccbmKOM Ha CTeHorpawiMy penn KntoHHMKOBa m yKa3aHnew\, h

to nacTbee 6bi/ia
HanenaTaHa b «Pa6oneM MocKBe» 7 fleK. 1926).

21 Tawiwe, c. 127.

22 M. ArypcKMM. \Ap,eonorm Hau,MOHa.n-6o.nbLijeBM3Ma, c.223.

23 r.n. *eflOTOB. /1mu,o Poccmm: C6. CTaTeM (1918-1931). riapMw: YMCA-Press, 1967, c,
57.

24 T. Cmmoh. EBpen u,apcTByK>T b Poccmm: 143 BocnoMMHa hmm aMepMKaHU,a. napMH<: Poahm
k, 1929, c. 50.

25 riMCbwio B.I4. BepHaflCKoro 14.14. rieTpyHKeBMHy OTl4MK>Hfl 1927// HoBbiM MMp, 198
9, N2 12, c. 219.

26 KD. /la pMH, c. 61-63,86.

27 Taw\ >xe, c. 259.

28 E.C. O Hau,MOHayibHOM cocTaBePKn // llpaBfla, 1923, 21 aBrycTa, c. 5.

29 M. ArypcKMM. l4fleo.norMfl Hau,MOHa^-6o^biueBM3Ma, c. 264.

30 14.14. LUmtu,. flHeBHMK «BanMKoro nepe;ioMa>> (wiapT 1928 — aBrycrl931). riapMw: YM

CA-Press, 1991, c. 202.

31 EBpeM b KOMMyHMCTMHecKOM napTMM // EBpeMCKaa TpM6yHa, 1923, 1 mk)ha(N2 164).

32 KD. /la pMH, c. 257, 268.

33 E.C. O Hau,MOHayibHOM cocTaBePKn // ripaBfla, 1923, 21 aBrycTa, c. 5.

34 M. ArypcKMM. l4fleo.norMfl Hau,MOHa^-6o^biueBM3Ma, c.303.

35 KD. /lapMH, c. 258.

36 M. ArypcKMM. l4fleo.norMfl Hau,MOHa^-6o^biueBM3Ma, c. 238-239.

37 !43BecTMH, 1922, 17 Man, c. 4.

241

38 Bo^biueBMKM: floKywieHTbi no mctopmm 6o^biueBM3Ma c 1903 no 1916 rofl 6biBiu. Mocko

bckoto OxpaHHoro
OTfle^eHMfl / Coct. M.A. LIab^obckum, cflono^H. cnpaBKawin A.M. Cepe6peHHMKOBa. Hbto-M
opK: TeneKC, 1990,
c. 316.

39 /l.KD. KpuneBCKHM. EBpen b annapaTeBHK-Omy b 20-e roflbi // EBpen m pyccKaa peBo.nt

ou.i'ifl: MaTepna^bi m
ncc^eflOBaHMfl / Pefl.-cocT. O.B. ByflHMU,KMM. MocKBa, Mepyca^nwi: Teujapuwi, 1999, c.
330-336.

40TaM>xe, c. 340, 344-345.

41 PE3, t. 3, c.178.

42 PE3, T.l.c.21.

43 M3BecTMJi, 1927, 18 fleK., c. 1, 3, 4.

44 PE3, t. 3, c. 115-116,286, 374, 394,414.

45 fl. A36e^b. flo, bo Bpewia m nocne// Bpewifl m Mbi (fla^ee — BM): MexKflyHapoflHbm
>xypHa.n yiMTepaTypbi m
o6mecTBeHHbix npo6^ew\. Hbio-MopK, 1989, N2 105, c. 204-205.

46 Leonard Schapiro.The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revol utionary Movement // The
Slavonic and East
European Review, vol.40, London: Athlone Press, 1961-62, p. 165.

47 M. 3apy6e>KHbiM. EBpen b Kpewune // Anecf), Te/ib-ABMB, 1989, cteBpayib (N2 263),

c. 24-28.

48 ApoH A6paw\OBMH. B pewatomefi BOMHe: YnacTue m po/ib eBpeeB CCCP b BOMHe npoTMB Ha
u,M3Ma. 2 -e M3fl.
Teyib-ABMB, 1982. T. 1.
49 Mu,xaK Apafl. Xo^oKaycT: KaTacTpo4>a eBponeficKoro eBpeficTBa (1933-1945). Mepyca^M
M, 1990, c. 96.

50 06btom, b nacTHOCTM, cm.: fl.C. riacMaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,Mfl m eBpeficTBo: (Bo^b

iueBM3M m nyflan3w\).
napn>K, 1923, c. 148.

51 PE3, t. 2, c. 499-500, t. 3, c. 273, 422.

52 M3BecTMfl, 1927, 22fleKa6pfl, c. 1.

53 Vladimir N.lpatieff. The Life of a Chemist. Stanford, 1946, p. 377.

54 T.A. Co^omoh. CpeflM KpacHbix BowfleM. riapuHC MniueHb, 1930.4.2.

55 Vladimir N.lpatieff. The Life of a Chemist, p. 377.

56 EBpeMCKaa Tpn6yHa* 1922,6 mana (N° 130), c. 6.

57 M. 3apy6e>KHbiM. EBpen b Kpewune // Anecf), 1989, OeBpayib, c. 26-27.

58 M3BecTMfi, 1927, 25 aBrycTa, c. 2.

59 PE3, t. 1, c.331.

60 Taw\ we, c. 105, 536, 538, t. 2, c. 256.

242

61 PE3. t. 3, c. 311-312.

62 PE3, t. 3, c.302.

63 PE3, t.1,C. 197-198,234, 275-276, T. 2, c. 18, 140 518t. 3, c. 260.

64 M3BecTMfl, 1927, 27 HOfl6pa, c. 4.

65 PE3, t. 3, c. 383.

66 E. Epyu,Kyc. EBpeficKoe HaceneHne nofl KOMMyHMCTMHecKOM B.nacTbto // CoBpewieHHbie

3anncKM, riapn>K,
1928, kh. 36, c. 519-521.

67 KD. /lapMH, c. 73.

68 T. noMepaHU,. Coh o cnpaBeA/iMBOM B03w\e3flMM // CnHTaKcuc: ny6^nu,MCTMKa, KpnTMKa,
no^ewiMKa. riapn>K,
1980, N2 6, c. 52-53, 68.

69 B. Mmpckmm. HepHaa cothh // EBpeficKaa Tpn6yHa, 1924, 1 4>eBpa.nfl (N2 58), c. 3.

70 Ct. MBaHOBMH. EBpen m coBeTCKaa flMKTaTypa // EBpeficKMM winp: EweroflHMK Ha 1939r.

(flayiee — EM-1).
riapuHK: 06-beflMHeHne pyccKO-eBpeMCKOM MHTeyiyinreHL^nn, c. 47.

71 Muxan^ XeMc^eu,. MecTO m Bpewia (eBpeMCKne 3aw\eTKn). riapunc TpeTbfl Bc/ma, 1978,
c. 43.

72 Tawiwe, c. 44-45.

73 B. Eoryc^aBCKMM. B 3amnTy KyHaeBa // "22": 06mecTBeHHO-noyiMTMHecKMM m ^MTepaTypHbi

M >xypHa.n
eBpeMCKOM m HTeyiyi m reH u,m m M3 CCCP b l/bpamie. Te^b-ABMB, 1980, N2 16, c. 174.

74 R. Rutman. Solzhenitsyn and the Jewish Question // Soviet Jewish Affairs, 1974, Vo
l. 4, N° 2, p. 7.

75 M. ArypcKMM. \Ap,eonorm Hau,noHa^-6o^biueBM3Ma, c. 150.

76 K eBpeflM Bcex CTpa h ! // PmE, c. 7.

77 M.M. EnKepwiaH. K caw\ono3HaHMK)eBpea: Hew\ Mbi 6bmn, newi Mbi CTa^n,Hew\ Mbi flo.n
>KHbi 6biTb. riapn>K,
1939, c. 70.

78 C.fl. /lypbe. AHTMceMMTH3M BflpeBHewi winpe. Te^b-ABMB: CoBa, 1976, c. 8 [1-e M3f
l. — nr.: Ebmoe, 1922].

79 E. KycKOBa. Kto ohm m kbk 6biTb? // EBpeMCKaa Tpn6yHa, 1922, 19 OKTa6pa (N° 144),
c. 1-2.

80 C.C. MacnoB. Poccmh nocne neTbipex ;ieT peBO^K)u,nn. riapn>K: PyccKaa nenaTb, 1922.
Kh. 2, c. 41.

81 Taw\ we, c. 41,42,43, 155, 176-177.

82 Tawiwe, c. 42,44-45.

83 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,Mfl m eBpeficTBO*, c. 198-199.

84 fl.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBO^(ou,Mfl m eBpeMcmo, c. 198, 200.

243

85 T.A. /laHflay. PeB0.mou,M0HHbie Mflen b eBpeficKOM o6mecTBeHHOCTM // PmE, c. 101.

86 fl.C. riacMa hmk. Hero >xe Mbi flo6nBaew\cfl? // PmE, c. 217.

87 M. Ko3a kob. [nucbwio] // En6^MOTeKa-4)OHfl «PyccKoe3apy6e>Kbe» (EOP3). O. 1, E-60,

c. 1.

88 B.B. LUyyibrMH. «Hto Hawt b hmx He HpaBMTCfl...»: 06 AHTMceMMTH3Me b Poccmm. riapM

W, 1929, c. 41-43.

89 KD. /lapMH, c. 254.

90 T. Pmmckmm. ripaBMTenbCTBeHHbiM aHTMceMMTM3M b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm // EBpeficKaa TpM6y

Ha, 1923, 7 ceHT.
(N2 170), c. 3.

91 KD. /la pMH, c. 240-244.

92 KD. /la pMH, c. 244.

93 TaM>xe, c. 47.

94 Taw\ we, c. 35, 86, 102, 108-110, 120.

95 Ta m >Ke, c. 121,134, 135.

96 Taw\ we, c. 144, 145, 148-149.

97 KD. /lapMH, c. 238-240, 244-245, 247, 248.

98 CM. LUBapu,. AHTMcew\MTM3M..., c. 8, 39.

99 B. A/ieKcaHflpoBa. EBpeM b coBeTCKOM ^MTepaType // KPE-2, c. 290.

100 CM. LLlBapu,. AHTMcew\MTM3M..., c. 83-84.

101 /l.C Ha 6opb6y c noco6HMKaw\M KOHTppeBO^K)u,MM // ripaBfla, 1928, 17wiaa, c. 4.

102 KD. /lapMH, c. 9, 119-120, 269-270, 276-277, 280-282.

103 KD. /lapMH, c. 27, 45-46, 106, 116, 252, 254, 255, 257.
104Taw\ we, c. 138, 283, 288.

105Tawt>Ke, c. 259, 278.

106 CM. LLlBapu,. AHTMcew\MTM3M..., c. 72-73.

107TaM>xe*, c.32.

108 CM. LLlBapu,. AHTMcew\MTM3M... *, c. 88-89.

109Taw\>Ke*, c. 90-91.

110 T.A. /laHflay. PeBo^iou,MOHHbie MfleM b eBpeficKOM o6mecTBeHHOCTM //PmE, c. 101.

244

111 CM. LUBapu,. AHTMceMMTM3M...*, c. 73, 74.

112 H3n m eBpen // EBpeficKaa Tpn6yHa, 1923, 21 ceHTfl6pfl (N2 171), c. 3-4.

113 KE3, t. 8, c. 170,171.

114 KE3, t. 8, c. 186.

115 IO. /lapMH, c. 75, 77-80, 107.

116 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CrayiMHa // KPE-2,

117(0. /lapMH* c. 121-122.

118 Samuel Ettinger. Russian Society and the Jews // Bulletin on Soviet and East Europ
ean Jewish Affairs, 1970,
N2 5, p. 38-39.

119 l43Bec™fl, 1928, 22 anpeyia, c. 7.

120 KE3. t. 8, c. 187.

121Tawi we, c. 161.
122Taw\ we, c. 188.

123 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy Cra/WHa // KPE-2, c. 136.

124 H3n m eBpen // EBpeticKaa Tpn6yHa, 1923, 21 cema6pn (N2 171)-c. 3-4.

125 T. Cmmoh. EBpen u,apcTByK>T b Poccmm, c. 22, 159, 192, 217, 237.

126 6. 6pyu,Kyc. EBpeficKoe Hace^eHne nofl KOMMyHMCTMHecKOM B/iacTbK) // CoBpewieHHbie

3anncKM, 1928, kh.
36, c. 511-512.
127 6. 6pyu,Kyc. EBpeficKoe Hace^eHne nofl KOMMyHMCTMHecKOM B/iacTbio // CoBpewieHHbie
3anncKM, 1928, kh.
36, c. 513-518.

128A.C. nacwiaHMK. PyccKaa peBo^tou,na m eBpeMCTBO, c. 194,195.

129 B.M. /leHMH. floKnafl o 3awieHe pa3BepcTKM HaTypayibHbiwi Hayiorowi. 15 wiapTa 192
1// CoHMHeHna: B 45 t.
4-e M3fl. T. 32, c. 201.

130 3. CaiTOH. Yoyiyi-CTpuT m 6o^bUjeBMU,Kafl peB0^rou,na / llep. c aHrn. M., 1998, c.

64-66, 193.

131 B.M. /leHMH. no^Hoe co6paHne coHMHeHMM: B 55 t. 5-e M3fl. T. 53, c. 267.

132 6. 6pyu,Kyc. EBpeticKoe Hace^eHne nofl KOMMyHMCTMHecKOM B^acTbto// CoBpewieHHbie 3

anncKM, 1928,
kh.36, c. 525.

133Tawi>xe, c. 524-526.

134 (O. /lapMH*, c. 293, 297-298.

245

135 n. CrpyBe. ripoeKT eBpeMCKOM KO^OHM3au,nn Poccmm // Bo3po>KfleHMe, napn>«, 1925, 2

5 OKTfl6pa (N2 145),
c. 1.

136 Py;ib, BepyiMH, 1925, 1 o«Tfi6pfi (N2 1469), c. 1.

137 M. BeHeflMKTOB. EBpeficKaa KO^OHM3au,Mfl b CCCP // nocneflHi-ie hoboctm, 1925, 6 H

oa6pa (N2 1699), c. 2.

138 KD. /lapMH, c. 295,296, 300-302.

139 KE3, t. 8, c. 184.

140 KE3, t. 8, c. 185,188.

141 KE3, t. 6, c. 139-140.

142 KD. /lapMH, c. 74, 174, 175, 308.

143 Tawi we, c. 150-152, 233-234.

144 M3BecTna, 1928, 1 Man, c. 4.

145 M3BecTna, 1927, 13 vuonn, c. 4.

146Taw\ >Ke.

147 KE3, t. 2, c.552,t. 4, c. 599.

148 T. Apohcoh. EBpePicKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CrayiMHa // KPE-2, c. 137.

149 KD. /lapMH, c. 97-98, 236.

150TaM>xe, c. 206.

151 KE3, T.4, c. 600.

152 KE3, t. 2, c. 554.

153Tawi we, c. 354.

154 T. Apohcoh. EBpeficKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CrayiMHa // KPE-2, c. 137.

155 KE3, t. 2, c. 554.

156XpymeB m mm4> o Enpo6nfl>KaHe // Cou,na^MCTMHecKMM BecTHMK, Hbio-MopK, 1958, N2 7

-8, c. 142-143.

157 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., 1981, Vol. X., p. 817,clmn. 2.

158 KE3*, T. 1, c. 445-446. 159 KD. /lapMH, c. 183-184.

160 XpymeB m mmc|) o Bnpo6nfl>KaHe // Cou,na^MCTMHecKMM BecTHMK* 1958, N27-8, c. 144.

161 KD. /lapMH, c. 188,189.

246

162 KE3, t. 1, c. 448, t. 8, c. 188.

163 KD. /lapMH, c. 184, 186-189.

164 KE3, t. 8, c. 188.

165 KE3, t. 8, c. 146.

166Taw\ we, c. 165-166.
167Tawi we, c. 166.
168 KE3, t. 7, c. 947.

169 KE3, t. 2, c. 465.

170 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CrayiMHa // KPE-2, c. 137.

171 KE3, t. 2, c. 465.

172 E. Op-noB. Poccufl 6es eBpeeB // "22," 1988, N2 60, c. 161.

173 Leonard Schapiro.The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement //The
Slavonic and East
European Review, vol.40, 1961-62, p. 167.

174 K eBpeawi Bcex crpaHl // PmE, c. 5.

175 fl.C. riacMa hmk. Hero we mm flo6nBaew\cfl? // PmE, c. 214.

176 Oh we. PyccKaa peBO^K)u,Mfl m eBpeMCTBO*, c. 195.

177 KE3, t. 2, c. 439, PE3, t. 2, c. 432, E. Op^OB. Poccma 6e3 eBpeeB // "22," 1988. N
2 60, c. 161.

178 14. Cyiyu,KMM. Cyflb6a mbpmt b Poccmm // KPE-2, c. 241-242, 246.

179 KE3, t. 2, c. 422.

180 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Coto3e c Hanayia Btopom mmpobom BOMHbi (1939-1965).
Hbto-MopK: M3fl.
AwiepuKaHCKoro EBpeficKoro Pa6onero KowiMTeTa, 1966, c. 407.

181 KD. /lapMH, c. 56.

182 KE3, t. 1, c. 326, t. 2, c.465,t. 6, c. 125.

183 KD. MapK. EBpeficKaa WKO.na b CoBeTCKOM Corae // KPE-2, c. 235-238.

184 KE3, t. 8, c.175.

185 Taw\ we, c. 177-179, PE3, t. 2, c. 195-196.

186 KD. MapK. /lmepaTypa Ha Mflniu b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm // KPE-2, c. 224-229.

187 14. Cyiyu,KMM. Cyflb6a mbpmt b Poccmm // KPE-2, c. 245, 247.

247
188 KE3, t. 8, c. 174, 181-182.

189 T. CBeT. EBpeMCKMM TeaTp b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm // KPE-2, c. 266-271.

190 KE3, t. 9, c. 477.

191 KE3, t.4, c. 616.

192 T. CBeT. EBpeMCKMM TeaTp... // KPE-2, c. 273-278.

193 KE3, t. 8, c. 183.

194 B. /leBMTMHa . Ctom^o^m OKuraTb cbom xpawi...// "22," 1984, N2 34, c. 204.

195 14. E. LUexTMa h. CoBeTCKaa Poccma, cmohm3m m I43pan.nb // KPE-2. 321-323.

196 KE3, t. 8, c. 200.

197TaM>xe, c. 201.

198 KE3, t. 5, c. 476, t. 7, c. 948.

199 Muxan^ XeMc^eu,. BocnowiMHaHUM rpycTHbm cbmtok. Mepyca^MM, 1996, c. 74-79.

200 14. E. LUexTMa h. CoBeTCKaa Poccma, cmohm3m m I43pan.nb // KPE-2, c. 324-325.

201A.C. nacwiaHMK. Hero >Ke mm flo6nBaeMCfl? // PmE, c, 214.

202 KE3, t. 7, c. 948. 14. E. LUexTMa h. CoBeTCKaa Poccma, cmohm3M m I43pamib// KPE-2,
c. 325-328.

203 14. M. EnKepwia h. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // PmE, c. 92.

204Taw\ >Ke, c, 53.

205 14.0 JleBMH. EBpen b peBO^K)u,nn // PmE, c. 138.

206 T.A. /laHflay. PeBO^K)u,MOHHbie Mflen BeBpeficKofi o6mecTBeHHOc™ //PmE, c. 118.

207 KE3, t. 8, c. 199.

208 T.E. C^M036epr. fleyia MMHyBUJMX flHefi: 3anncKM pyccKoro eBpea. riapn>K, 1934. T.
3, c. 376.

209 Ct. 14 Ba hobmh. EBpen m coBeTCKaa flMKTaTypa // EM-1, c. 47.

210Jerusalem Post, 1973, April 13, 1979, October 7.

211 Sonja Margolina. Das Ende der Lugen: Rufiland und die Juden im20. Jahrhundert. Ber
l i n: Siedl er Verlag.
1992, S. 106.

212 M. ArypcKMM. V\p,eonorv\n Hau,MOHa^-6o^biueBM3Ma, c. 114.

213 KE3, t. 1, c. 235.

248

214 C. no3Hep. CcmeTCKafl Poccma*// EM-1, c. 271.

215 K). /lapMH*, c. 304.

216 KE3, t. 8, c. 194.

217 noxofl Ha CMHarorn b Cobctckom Poccmm* // EBpeMCKaa Tpn6yHa, 1922, 21 anpeyia (N2
120), c. 7.

218 KE3, t. 8, c. 196.

219 T. CBeT. EBpeMCKaa pe^Mrna b Cobctckom Poccmm // KPE-2, c. 205-207.

220 KE3, t. 8, c. 194.

221TaM>xe, c. 195.

222 T. CBeT. EBpeMCKaa penv\rv\n... // KPE-2, c. 209.

223 KE3, t.4, c. 257.

224 KE3, t. 8, c. 195.

225 T. CBeT. EBpeMCKaa pe^MTMfl... // KPE-2, c. 208.

226 KE3, t. 8, c. 197.

227 Ta/v\ >xe, c. 198.

228 T. CBeT. EBpeMCKajq pe^MrMfl... // KPE-2, c. 208-209.

229 KE3, t. 8, c. 199.

230 KD. /lapMH, c.285.

231 14. Cnyu,KMM. Cyflb6a mbpmt b Poccmm // KPE-2, c. 246.

232 CopoK copoKOB: Anb6ow\-yKa3aTe.nb Bcex mockobckmx u,ep KBeM: B 4 t. / Coct. C. 3BO
Hape - B [n. nayiawiapnyK].
riapMMK, YMCA-Press, 1988. T. 1, c. 13. C. l~lo3Hep. CoBeTCKaa Poccma // EM-1, c. 27
1.
233 M. nonoBCKMM. O Hac — co BceM MCKpeHHOCTbio // HoBbiM awiepMKaHeu,, 1981, 20-26 ce
HTfl6pa (N° 84), c. 7.

234 KE3, t. 4, c. 275, PE3, t. 3, c. 439.

235 KE3, t. 1, c. 653.

236 KE3, t.4, c. 276-277.

237 A. TbipKOBa-BM.n-bflMC. TeHM MMHyBiuero // BM, Hbio-MopK, 1990, N2 111, c. 214-21

5.

238 KE3, t.4, c. 860-862.

239 KE3, t. 1, c. 547.

249

240 KE3, t. 5, c. 541-542; PE3, t. 2, c. 86-87.

241 PE3, T.l, c. 377.

242 PE3, t. 2, c. 287.

243 PE3, T.l, c.288, 409.

244 PE3, t. 3, c. 336.

245 M. ArypcKMM. \Ap,eonorm Hau,noHa^-6o^biueBM3Ma, c. 240.

246Tawi>Ke, c. 240-242, 244.

247M3BecTMfl, 1927, 13 OKTfl6pa, c.2.

248 Em. flpocyia bckmm. ripoTMB a HTMceMMTH3Ma // ripaBfla, 1927, 12 HOfl6pa, c. 2.

249M3BecTna, 1927, 11 fleKa6pa, c. 1.

250Taw\ >Ke, 22 AeKa6pa, c. 2-4, 23 fleKa6pa, c. 4, 5.

251 PE3, t. 2, c. 93, t. 3, c. 497.

252 Sonja Margolina. Das Ende der Lugen: Rufiland und die Juden im20. Jahrhundert. S.
84.

253 M. rionoBCKMM . O Hac — co Bcefi MCKpeHHOCTbio // HoBbm awiepuKaHeu,, 1981, 20-26

ceHTfl6pa (N° 84), c. 7.

254 H. CewiawKO. EBpen Ha 3ew\.ne // l43Bec™a, 1927, 20 aBrycTa, c. 3.

255 S. Ettinger // Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs, 1970, N2 5, p.
38-39.
256npaBfla, 1925, 13 aBrycTa, c. 3.

257CopoK CopoKOB: Anb6ow\-yKa3aTe^b Bcex mockobckmx u,epKBeti. T. 1* c. 15.

258Sonja Margolina. Das Ende der Ltigen: Rufiland und dieJuden im 20. Jahrhundert. S.
79.

259 A. BopoHe^b. TpeneT nyfleticKnx 3a6oT. 2-e M3fl. PawiaT-TaH: MocKBa-Mepyca^MM, 198
1, c. 120.

260 M3BecTMfl, 1930, 22 cema6pn, c. 1, 3-4, 25 cema6pa, c. 1.

261 fl. LUTypwiaH. Ohm - Befla^n // "22," 1990, N2 73, c. 126-144.

262 14. 3yHfle^eBMH. BocxowfleHMe // "22," 1983, N2 29, c. 54.

263 Sonja Margol ina. Das Ende der Lugen: Rufiland und dieJuden im20. Jahrhundert. S.
144-145.

264 T. LUypwtaK. LUy^brnH m ero ano^oreTbi // HoBbm winp, 1994, N° 11, c. 244.

250

Chapter 19: In the 1930s

The 1930s were years of an intense industrialized spurt, which crushed the peasantry a
nd
altered the life of the entire country. Mere existence demanded adaptation and
development of new skills. But through crippling sacrifices, and despite the many absu
rdities
of the Soviet organizational system, the horrible epic somehow led to the creation of
an
industrialized power.

Yet the first and second five-year plans came into existence and were carried out not
through the miracle of spontaneous generation, nor as a result of the simple violent r
ound-
up of large masses of laborers. It demanded many technical provisions, advanced equipm
ent,
and the collaboration of specialists experienced in this technology. All this flowed p
lentifully
from the capitalist West, and most of all from the United States; not in the form of a
gift, of
course, and not in the form of generous help. The Soviet communists paid for all of th
is
abundantly with Russia's mineral wealth and timber, with concessions for raw material
s
markets, with trade areas promised to the West, and with plundered goods from the Empi
re
of the tsars. Such deals flowed with the help and approval of international financial
magnates, most of all those on Wall Street, in a persistent continuation of the first
commercial ties that the Soviet communists developed on the American stock exchanges a
s
early as during the Civil War. The new partnership was strengthened by shiploads of ts
arist
gold and treasures from the Hermitage.

But wait a second, were we not thoroughly taught by Marx that capitalists are the fier
ce
enemies of proletarian socialism and that we should not expect help from them, but rat
her a
destructive, bloody war? Well, it's not that simple: despite the official diplomatic n
on-
recognition, trade links were completely out in the open, and even written about in
Izvestiya: "American merchants are interested in broadening of economic ties with the
Soviet Union."[l] American unions came out against such an expansion (defending their
markets from the products of cheap and even slave Soviet labor). The "Russian-America
n
Chamber of Commerce," created at that time, simply did not want to hear about any
political opposition to communism, or "to mix politics with business relations. "[2]

Anthony Sutton, a modern American scholar, researched the recently-opened diplomatic

and financial archives and followed the connections of Wall Street with the Bolshevik
s; he
pointed to the amoral logic of this long and consistent relationship. From as early as
the
"Marburg" plan at the beginning of the 20th century, which was based on the vast capit
al of
Carnegie, the idea was to strengthen the authority of international finance, through g
lobal
"socialization," "for control ... and for the forced appeasement." Sutton concluded th
at:
"International financiers prefer to do business with central governments. The banking
community least of all wants a free economy and de -centralized authority." "Revolutio
n and
international finance do not quite contradict each other, if the result of revolution
should be
to establish a more centralized authority," and, therefore, to make the markets of the
se

251

countries manageable. And there was a second line of agreement: "Bolsheviks and banker
s
shared an essential common platform — internationalism. "[3]

In that light, the subsequent support of "collective enterprises and the mass destruct
ion of
individual rights by Morgan-Rockefeller" was not surprising. In justification of this
support,
they claimed in Senate hearings: "Why should a great industrial country, like America,
desire
the creation and subsequent competition of another great industrial rival?"[4] Well, t
hey
rightly believed that with such an obviously uncompetitive, centralized and totalitari
an
regime, Soviet Russia could not rival America. Another thing is that Wall Street could
not
predict further development of the Bolshevik system, nor its extraordinary ability to
control
people, working them to the very bone, which eventually led to the creation of a power
ful, if
misshapen, industry.

But how does this tie in with our basic theme? Because as we have seen, American finan
ciers
completely refused loans to pre-revolutionary Russia due to the infringement of the ri
ghts of
Jews there, even though Russia was always a profitable financial prospect. And clearl
y, if
they were prepared to sacrifice profits at that time, then now, despite all their coun
ting on
the Soviet markets, the "Morgan-Rockefeller Empire" would not assistthe Bolsheviks if
the
persecution of the Jews was looming on horizon in the USSR at the start of the 1930s.

That's just the point: for the West, the previously described Soviet oppression of th
e
traditional Jewish culture and of Zionists easily disappeared under the contemporary g
eneral
impression that the Soviet power would not oppress the Jews, but on the contrary, tha
t
many of them would remain at the levers of power.

Certain pictures of the past have the ability to conveniently rearrange in our mind in
order to
soothe our consciousness. And today a perception has formed that in the 1930s the Jew
s
were already forced out of the Soviet ruling elite and had nothing to do with the
administration of the country. In the 1980s we see assertions like this: in the Soviet
times,
the Jews in the USSR were "practically destroyed as a people; they had been turned int
o a
social group, which was settled in the large cities "as a social stratum to serve the
ruling
class."[5]

No. Not only far from "serving", the Jews were to the large extent members of the "rul
ing
class." And the "large cities," the capitals of the constituent Soviet republics, were
the very
thing the authorities bought off through improved provisioning, furnishing and mainten
ance,
while the rest of the country languished from oppression and poverty. And now, after t
he
shock of the Civil War, after the War Communism, after the NEP and the first five -yea
r plan,
it was the peace-time life of the country that was increasingly managed by the governm
ent
apparatus, in which the role of the Jews was quite conspicuous, at least until 1937-3
8.

In 1936, at the 8th Congress of Soviets of the Soviet Union, Molotov, on orders from S
talin
(perhaps to differ from Hitler in the eyes of the West) delivered this tirade: "Our br
otherly
feelings toward the Jewish people are determined by the fact that they begat the geniu
s and

252

the creator of the ideas of the communist liberation of Mankind," Karl Marx; "that th
e
Jewish people, alongside the most developed nations, brought forth countless prominen
t
scientists, engineers, and artists [that undoubtedly had already manifested itself in
the
Soviet 1930s, and will be even more manifest in the post-war years], and gave many glo
rious
heroes to the revolutionary struggle ... and in our country they gave and are still gi
ving new,
remarkable, and talented leaders and managers in all areas of development and defense
of
the Cause of Socialism. "[6]

The italics are mine. No doubt, it was said for propaganda purposes. But Molotov's
declaration was appropriate. And the "defense of the Cause of Socialism" during all th
ose
years was in the hands of the GPU, the army, diplomacy, and the ideological front. Th
e
willing participation of so many Jews in these organs continued in the early and mid-1
930s,
until 1937-38.

Here we will briefly review - according to contemporary newspapers, later publication

s, and
modern Jewish encyclopedias - the most important posts and names that had emerged
mainly in the 1930s. Of course, such a review, complicated by the fact that we know no
thing
about how our characters identified themselves in regard to nationality, may contain
mistakes in individual cases and can in no way be considered comprehensive.

After the destruction of the "Trotskyite opposition," the Jewish representation in the
party
apparatus became noticeably reduced. But that purge of the supreme party apparatus wa
s
absolutely not anti-Jewish. Lazar Kaganovich retained his extremely prominent position
in
the Politburo; he was an ominously merciless individual and, at the same time, a man o
f
notoriously low proffessional level. (Nevertheless, from the mid-1930s he was the Secr
etary
of the Central Committee, and simultaneously a member of the Organizational Bureau of
the
Central Committee — only Stalin himself held both these positions at the same time). A
nd he
placed three of his brothers in quite important posts. Mikhail Kaganovich was deputy c
hair
of the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy beginning in 1931; from 1937 he was
narkom (narodny komissar, that is, "people's commissar") of the defense industry; late
r he
simultaneously headed the aviation industry. Yuli Kaganovich, passing through the lead
ing
party posts in Nizhniy Novgorod (as all the brothers did), became deputy narkom of th
e
foreign trade. [7] (Another, absolutely untalented brother, was a "big gun" in Rostov-
on-Don.
It reminds me of a story by Saltykov-Shchedrin, where one Vooz Oshmyanskiy tried to pl
ace
his brother Lazar in a profitable post). However, both the ethnic Russian opposition f
actions,
that of Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky, and that of Syrtsov, Ryutin, and Uglanov, were
destroyed by Stalin in the beginning of the 1930s with support of the Jewish Bolshevik
s — he
drew necessary replacements from their ranks. Kaganovich was the principal and the mos
t
reliable of Stalin's supporters in the Politburo: he demanded the execution of Ryutin
(October 1932-January 1933) but even Stalin wasn't able to manage it then. [8] The pur
ge of
1930-1933 dealt with the Russian elements in the party.

253

Out of 25 members in the Presidium of the Central Control Commission after the 16th Pa
rty
Congress (1930), 10 were Jews: A. Solts, "the conscience of the Party" (in the bloodie
st years
from 1934 to 1938 was assistant to Vys hi nsky, the General Prosecutor of the USSR
[9]); Z.
Belenky (one of the three above-mentioned Belenky brothers); A. Goltsman (who supporte
d
Trotsky in the debate on trade unions); ferocious Rozaliya Zemlyachka (Zalkind); M.
Kaganovich, another of the brothers; the ChekistTrilisser; the "militant atheist" Yaro
slavsky;
B. Roizenman; and A.P. Rozengolts, the surviving assistant of Trotsky. If one compares
the
composition of the party's Central Committee in the 1920s with that in the early 1930
s, he
would find that it was almost unchanged — both in 1925 as well as afterthe 16th Party
Congress, Jews comprised around 1/6 of the membership. [10]

In the upper echelons of the communist party afterthe 17th Congress ("the congress of
the
victors") in 1934, Jews remained at 1/6 of the membership of the Central Committee; in
the
Party Control Commission — around 1/3, and a similar proportion in the Revision
Commission of the Central Committee. (It was headed for quite a while by M. Vladimirsk
y.
From 1934 Lazar Kaganovich took the reins of the Central Control Commission). Jews mad
e
up the same proportion (1/3) of the members of the Commission of the Soviet Control.
[11]
For five years filled with upheaval (1934-1939) the deputy General Prosecutor of the U
SSR
wasGrigory Leplevsky.[12]

Occupants of many crucial party posts were not even announced in Pravda. For instance,
in
autumn 1936 the Secretary of the Central Committee of Komsomol (the Union of
Communist Youth) was E. Fainberg.[13] The Department of the Press and Publishing of th
e
Central Committee - the key ideological establishment - was managed by B. Tal. Previou
sly,
the department was headed by Lev Mekhlis, who had by then shifted to managing Pravda
full-time; from 1937 Mekhlis became deputy narkom of defense and the head of Politica
l
Administration of the Red Army.

We see many Jews in the command posts in provinces: in the Central Asia Bureau, the
Eastern Siberia Krai Party Committee (kraikom), in the posts of first secretaries of t
he
obkoms [party committee of oblasts] of the Volga German Republic, the Tatar, Bashkir,
Tomsk, Kalinin, and Voronezh oblasts and in many others. For example, Mendel Khatayevi
ch
(a member of the Central Committee from 1930) was consequently secretary of Gomel,
Odessa, Tatar, and Dnepropetrovsk obkoms, secretary of the Middle Volga kraikom, and
second secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Yakov Chubin was secretary of the
Chernigov and Akmolinsk obkoms and of the Shakhtinsk district party committee; later h
e
served in several commissions of the Party Control in Moscow, Crimea, Kursk, and
Turkmenia, and from 1937 he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of
Turkmenia.[14] There is no need to list all such names, but let's not overlook the rea
l
contribution of these secretaries into the Bolshevik cause; also note their striking
geographical mobility, as in the 1920s. Reliable cadres were still in much demand and

254

indispensable. And there was no concern that they lacked knowledge of each new localit
y of
which they took charge.

Yet much more power was in the hands of the narkoms. In 1936 we see nine Jewish narkom
s
in the Government. Take the worldwide-famous narkom of foreign affairs Litvinov(in th
e
friendly cartoons in Izvestiya, he was portrayed as a knight of peace with a spearand
shield
taking a stand against foreign filth); no less remarkable, but only within the limits
of the
USSR, was the narkom of internal affairs Yagoda; the ascending and all-glorious "Iron
Narkom" of railroads, Lazar Kaganovich; foreign trade was headed by A. Rozengo Its (be
fore
that we saw him in the Central Control Commission); I.Ya. Weitser was in charge of dom
estic
trade; M. Kalmanovich was in charge of sovkhozes [state owned farms that paid wages]
(he
was the foods-commissar from the end of 1917); I.E. Lyubimov was narkom of light indus
try;
G. Kaminskiy was narkom of healthcare, his instructive articles were often published i
n
Izvestiya; and the above-mentioned Z. Belenky was the head of the Commission of the So
viet
Control. [15] In the same Government we can find many Jewish names among the deputy
narkoms in various people's commissariats: finance, communications, railroad transpor
t,
water, agriculture, the timber industry, the foodstuffs industry, education, justice.
Among
the most important deputy narkoms were: Ya. Gamarnik (defense), A. Gurevich ("he made
a
significant contribution to the creation of the metallurgical industry in the countr
y"[16]);
Semyon Ginzburg, he was deputy narkom of heavy industry, and later he became narkom o
f
construction, and even later minister of construction of military enterprises. [17]

The famous "Great Turning Point" took place place from the end of 1929 to the beginnin
g of
1931. Murderous collectivization lay ahead, and at this decisive moment Stalin assigne
d
Yakovlev-Epshtein as its sinister principal executive. His portraits and photos, and d
rawings
by I. Brodsky, were prominently reproduced in newspapers then and later, from year to
year.[18] Together with the already mentioned M. Kalmanovich, he was a member of the
very top Soviet of Labor and Defense (there was hardly anyone apart from Stalin, Molot
ov,
Mikoyan, Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov in that organ). [19] In March of 1931, at the 6th S
ession
of Soviets, Yakovlev reported on the progress of collectivization - about the developm
ent of
sovkhozes and kolkhozes (that is, the destruction of the way of life of the people).
[20] On
this 'glorious' path to the ruination of Russia, among Yakovlev's collaborators, we ca
n see
deputy narkom V.G. Feigin, members of the Board of the people's commissariat of
agriculture M.M. Volf, G.G. Roshal, and other 'experts'. The important organization, t
he
Grain Trust, was attached to the people's commissariat of agriculture to pump out grai
n
from peasants for the state; the chairman of the board of directors was M.G. Gerchiko
v, his
portraits appeared in Izvestiya, and Stalin himself sent him a telegram of
encouragement. [21] From 1932 the People's Commissariat of Sovkhozes and Kolkhozes wit
h
M. Kalmanovich at the helm was separated from the people's commissariat of
agriculture. [22] From 1934 the chairman of the national Soviet of Kolkhozes was the s
ame
Yakovlev-Epshtein. [23] The chairman of the Commission of Purveyance was I. Kleiner (w
ho
was awarded the Order of Lenin). During the most terrible months of collectivization,
M.

255

Kalmanovich was deputy narkom of agriculture. But at the end of 1930 he was transferre
d
into the People's Commissariat of Finance as deputy narkom; he also became chairman o
f
the board of the Gosbank [The State Bank], for in monetary matters a strong will was a
lso
much needed. In 1936, Lev Maryasin became chairman of the board of the Gosbank; he wa
s
replaced in that post by Solomon Krutikov in 1936. [24]

In November 1930 the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was created, and A.P.
Rozengolts served for seven years as its head. Jews comprised one-third of its board
members. Among them wasSh. Dvoylatsky, who simultaneously served in the Central
Commissions on Concessions; in 1934-1936 he became the Soviet trade representative in
France. [25] At the end of 1930 the People's Commissariat of Supply was created with
A.
Mikoyan at the helm; on its board we see M. Belenky — that is another, actually the fi
fth,
man with the surname "Belenky" encountered here; soon he himself became the narkom,
replacing Mikoyan. In general, in the People's Commisariats of Trade and Supply, the J
ewish
component was higher than in the upper party echelons — from a quarter to a half. Stil
l let's
not overlook the Tsentrosoyuz (the bureaucratic center of Soviet pseudo-cooperation).
After
Lev Khichuk in the 1920s, it was managed from 1931 to 1937 by I. A. Zelensky, whom we
met
earlier as a member of the board of the people's commissariat of foodstuffs. [26]

Let me point it out once more: all these examples are for illustrative purposes only.
They
should not be taken to create the impression that there were no members of other
nationalities on all those boards and in the presidiums; of course there were. Moreove
r, all
the above-mentioned people occupied their posts only for a while; they were routinely
transferred between various important positions.

Let's look at transport and communications. First, railroads were managed by M.

Rukhimovich (his portraits could be found in the major newspapers of the time[27]); la
ter he
became narkom of defense industry (with M. Kaganovich as his deputy), while the comman
d
over railroads was given to L. Kaganovich. [28] There were important changes in the Co
al
Trust: I. Schwartz was removed from the board and M. Deych was assigned to replace
him. [29] T. Rozenoer managed Grozneft [Grozny Oil]. YakovGugel headed the constructio
n
of the Magnitogorsk metallurgical giant; Yakov Vesnik was the director of the Krivoy R
og
Metallurgical industrial complex; and the hell of the Kuznetsk industrial complex with
its
200,000 hungry and ragged workers was supervised by S. Frankfurt, and after him by I.
Epshtein (the latter was arrested in 1938 but landed on his feet because he was sent t
o take
command over the construction of the Norilsk industrial complex). [30]

The Supreme Soviet of the National Economy still existed, but its significance waned.
After
Unshlikht, it was headed by A. Rozengolts, and then by Ordzhonikidze, with Jews compri
sing
the majority of its board. [31]

At that time, the Gosplan [state planning ministry] gathered strength. In 1931, under
the
chairmanship of Kuibyshev, Jews comprised more than half of its 18-member board. [32]

256

Let's now examine the top posts in economy during the "last burgeoning year" of Stali
n's era,
1936. In 1936 Izvestiya published[33] the complete roster of the board of the peopl
e's
commissariat of domestic trade. Those 135 individuals had essentially ruled over the e
ntire
domestic trade in the USSR (and they were hardly disinterested men). Jews comprised
almost 40% of this list, including two deputies to the narkom, several trade inspector
s,
numerous heads of food and manufactured goods trades in the oblasts, heads of consume
r
unions, restaurant trusts, cafeterias, food supplies and storage, heads of train dinin
g cars
and railroad buffets; and of course, the head of Gastronom No.l in Moscow ("Eliseyevsk
y")
was also a Jew. Naturally, all this facilitated smooth running of the industry in thos
e far from
prosperous years.

In the pages of Izvestiya one could read headlines like this: "The management of the U
nion's
Fishing Trust made major political mistakes." As a result, Moisei Frumkin was relieved
of his
post at the board of the People's Commissariat of Ddomestic Trade (we saw hi m in the
1920s as a deputy of the Narkom of Foreign Trade). Comrade Frumkin was punished with
a
stern reprimand and a warning; comrade Kleiman suffered the same punishment; and
comrade Nepryakhin was expel led from the party.[34]

Soon after that, Izvestiya published[35] an addendum to the roster of the People's
Commissariat of Heavy Industry with 215 names in it. Those wishing to can delve into i
t as
well. A present-day author thus writes about those people: by the 1930s "the children
of the
declasse Jewish petty bourgeois succeeded ... in becoming the 'commanders' of the "gre
at
construction projects." And so it appeared to those who, putting in 16 hours a day for
weeks
and months, never leaving the foundation pits, the swamps, the deserts, and taiga that
it
was "their country."[36] However, the author is wrong: it was the blackened hard-worke
rs
and yesterday's peasants, who had no respite from toiling in foundation pits and swamp
s,
while the directors only occasionally promenaded there; they mainly spent time in offi
ces
enjoying their special provision services ("the bronze foremen"). But undoubtedly, the
ir
harsh and strong-willed decisions helped to bring these construction projects to compl
etion,
building up the industrial potential of the USSR.
Thus the Soviet Jews obtained a weighty share of state, industrial, and economic power
at all
levels of government inthe USSR.

***

The personality of B. Roizenman merits particular attention. See for yourself: he rece
ived the
Order of Lenin "in recognition of his exceptional services" inthe adjustment of the st
ate
apparatus "to the objectives of the large-scale offensive for Socialism." What secret
s,
inscrutable to us, could be hidden behind this "offensive"? We can glance into some of
them
from the more direct wording: for carrying out "special missions of top state importan
ce on
the clean-up of state apparatus in the Soviet diplomatic missions abroad. "[37]

257

Now let's look at the state of affairs in diplomacy. The 1920s were examined in the
preceding chapter. Now we encounter other important people. For example, in spring of
1930, Izvestiya reported on page 1 and under a separate heading that "F.A. Rotshtein,
the
board member of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, returned from vacationa
nd
resumed his duties. "[38] (Well, didn't they only write this way about Stalin? To the
best of
my knowledge, neither Ordzhonikidze, nor Mikoyan -other very top functionaries - was
honored in such a way?) Yet very soon Rotshtein made a slip and his career ended just
two
months later, in July 1930. With the designation of Litvinov as narkom, Rotshtein was
removed from the board (even though, we may remember, he claimed credit for the
creation of the British Communist Party). In the 1930s, at the peak of Litvinov' s pow
er, anew
generation appeared. The Jewish Encyclopedia writes: "there was a notion of 'the Litvi
nov
school of diplomacy'" that included the outstanding personalities of K. Umansky, Ya. S
urits, B.
Shtein (he was already successful by the beginning of the 1920s) and E. Gnedin (son o
f
Parvus). [39] Ehrenburg added here the name of E. Rubinin. Just as in the 1920s diplom
acy
attracted a cadre of Jews, so it did through the early and mid-1930s. From the moment
the
USSR was accepted into the League of Nations, we see Litvinov, Shtein, Gnedin, and als
o
Brenner, Stashevsky, Marcus, Rozenberg, and Svanidze (a Georgian) as the senior member
s
of the Soviet delegation. It was these people who represented Soviet Russia at that fo
rum of
nations. There were Soviet plenipotentiaries in Europe of Jewish origin: in England —
Maisky; in Germany (and later in France)— Ya. Surits; in Italy— B. Shtein (after Kamen
ev); we
also see Jewish plenipotentiaries in Spain, Austria, Romania, Greece, Lithuania, Latvi
a,
Belgium, Norway, and in Asia. For example, the above-mentioned Surits represented the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan as early as the Russian Civil War; later, from 1936, B. Sk
virsky
served in Afghanistan; for many years he was was the unofficial Soviet representative
in
Washington. [40] In the early and mid-1930s, a great number of Jews successfully conti
nued
to work in Soviet trade delegations. (Here we find another Belenky, already the sixth
individual of that name, B.S.Belenky, who was the trade representative in Italy from 1
934 to
1937). [41]

Concerning the Red Army, the aforementioned Israeli researcher, Aron Abramovich, write
s
that in the 1930s "a significant number of Jewish officers served" in the army. "There
were
many of them, in particular in the Revolutionary Military Soviet, in the central
administrations of the people's commissariat of defense, in the general staff, and at
lower
levels - in the military districts, in the armies, corps, divisions, brigades, and all
military units.
The Jews still played a prominent role in the political organs." [42] The entire Centr
al Political
Administration of the Red Army came under command of the trustworthy Mekhlis after th
e
suicide of the trustworthy Gamarnik. Here are several names from the cream of the Poli
tical
Administration: Mordukh Khorosh was the deputy director of the Political Administratio
n of
the Red Army in the 1930s, and later, until his arrest, he was in charge of the Politi
cal
Administration of the Kiev military district. From 1929 through to 1937, Lazar Aronsht
am
headed the political administration of the Belorussian military district, then of the
Special Far
Eastern Army, and later -of the Moscow military district. IsaakGrinberg was the Senio
r
258

Inspector of the Political Administration of the Red Army, and later the deputy direct
or of
the Political Administration of the Leningrad district. Boris Ippo (he participated in
the
pacification of Central Asia during the Civil War as the head of the Political Adminis
tration of
the Turkestan Front and laterofthe Central-Asian district) was the head of the politic
al
administration of the Caucasus Red Army; and later the director of the Military Politi
cal
Academy. The already-mentioned Mikhail Landa from 1930 to 1937 was the chief editor o
f
Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red Star, the official newspaper of the Soviet military). Naum Ro
zovsky
was a military prosecutor since the Civil War; by 1936 he was the chief military prose
cutor of
the Red Army. [43]

Gamarnik remained the deputy to Voroshilov, the chairman of the Revolutionary Militar
y
Soviet until 1934 (when the organization was disbanded). In the 1930s, in addition to
those
named in the previous chapter, among the heads of the central administrations of the R
ed
Army, we encounter the following individuals: Abram Volp (the head of the Administrati
ve
Mobilization Administration; in the previous chapter he was identified as the chief of
staff of
the Moscow military district), Semyon Uritsky (of the Military Intelligence Administra
tion,
until 1937), Boris Feldman - the head of the Central Personnel Administration, and Leo
ntiy
Kotlyar — the head of the Central Military Engineering Administration in the pre-war y
ears.
Among the commanders of the branches of the military we find A. Goltsman, the head of
military aviation from 1932 (we already saw him in the Central Control Commission, and
as a
union activist; he died in a plane crash). Among the commanders of the military distri
cts we
again see lona Yakir (Crimean district, and later the important Kiev District), and Le
v Gordon
(Turkestan district). [44] Although we have no data on Jewish representation in the lo
wer
ranks, there is little doubt that when a structure (be it a political administration o
f the army,
a supply service, or a party or a commissariat apparatus) was headed by a Jew, it was
accompanied, as a rule, by a quite noticeable Jewish presence among its staff.

Yet service in the army is not a vice; it can be quite constructive. So what about our
good old
GPU-NKVD? A modern researcher, relying on archives, writes: "The first half of the 193
0s
was characterized by the increasingly important role of Jews in the state security app
aratus."
And "on the eve of the most massive repressions ...the ethnic composition of the supre
me
command of the NKVD ... [can be understood with the help of] the list of decorated Che
kists
on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD. The list of 407 senio
r
officials published in the central press contained 56 Jews (13.8%), and 7 Latvians (1.
7%). "[45]

When the GPU was reformed into the NKVD (1934) with Yagoda at the head, they twice
published the names of the supreme commissars of the NKVD (what a rare chance to peek
behind a usually impenetrable wall[46]!): commissars of State Security of the 1st Rank
Ya.S.
Agranov (the first deputy to Yagoda), V. A. Balitsky, T.D. Deribas, G.E. Prokovev, S.
F. Redens,
L.M. Zakovsky; of the 2nd Rank: L.N. Belskiy, K.V. Pauker (they were already decorated
in
1927 on the decennial of the Cheka), M.I. Gay, S.A. Goglidze, L.B. Zalin, Z.B. Kats ne
lson, K.M.
Karlson, I.M. Leplevsky, G.A. Molchanov, L.G. Mironov, A.A. Slutsky, A.M. Shanin, and
R.A.

259

Pillyar. Of course, not all of them were Jews but a good half were. So, the Jewish Che
kists
were still there; they didn't leave, nor were they forced out of the NKVD, the same NK
VD
which was devouring the country after the death of Kirov, and which later devoured its
elf.

A.A. Slutsky was the director of the NKVD's foreign section; that is, he was in charge
of
espionage abroad. "His deputies were Boris Berman and Sergey Shpigelglas." Paukerwas
a
barber from Budapest, who connected with the communists while he was a Russian POW in
1916. Initially, he was in charge of the Kremlin security and later became the head of
the
operations section of the NKVD. [47] Of course, due to secrecy and the non-approachabi
lity
of these highly placed individuals, it is difficult to judge them conclusively. Take,
for instance,
Naum (Leonid) Etingon, who orchestrated the murder of Trotsky and was the organizer o
f
the "Cambridge Five" espionage ring and who oversaw the nuclear espionage after the wa
r
— a true ace of espionage. [48]

Or take LevFeldbin (he used a catchy pseudonym of 'Aleksandr Orlov'). A prominent and
long-serving Chekist, he headed the economic section of the foreign department of GP
U,
that is, he supervised all foreign trade of the USSR. He was a trusted agent, of those
who
were instructed in the shroud of full secrecy on how "to extract false confessions [fr
om the
victims]." "Many [of the NKVD investigators] ended up being subordinate to him."[49] A
nd
yet he was completely hidden from the public and became famous only later, when he
defected to the West. And how many such posts were there?

Or take Mikhail Koltsov-Fridlyand ("the political advisor" to the Republican governmen

t of
Spain)[50], who took part in some of the major GPU adventures.

M. Berman was assigned as deputy to the Narkom of Internal Affairs Ezhov within three
days
after the latter was installed on September 27, 1936. Still, Berman remained the direc
tor of
the GULag.[51] And along with Ezhov, came his handymen. Mikhail Litvin, his long-time
associate in the Central Committee of the party, became the director of the personnel
department of the NKVD; by May 1937 he rose to the unmatched rank of director of the
Secret Political section of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD. In 193
1-36,
Henri kh Lyushkov was the deputy director of that section; he deserted to Japan in 193
8 and
was then killed by a Japanese bullet in 1945 - by the end of the war the Japanese did
not
want to give him back and had no option but shoot him. In this way, we can extensivel
y
describe the careers of each of them. In the same section, Aleksandr Radzivilovsky was
an
"agent for special missions." Another long-time Ezhov colleague, Isaak Shapiro, was Ez
hov's
personal assistant from 1934, and then he became the director of the NKVD Secretariat,
and
later was the director of the infamous Special Section of the Main Directorate of Stat
e
Security of the NKVD. [52]

In December 1936, among the heads of ten sections (for secrecy, designated only by
number) of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD, we see seven Jews: the
Security section (section #1)— K. Pauker; Counter-intelligence (3) — L. Mironov; Speci
al

260

section (5)— I. Leplevsky; Transport (6)— A. Shanin; Foreign section (7) — A. Slutsky;
Records
and Registration (8)— V. Tsesarsky; Prisons (10)— Ya. Veinshtok. Over the course of th
e meat-
grinding year of 1937 several other Jews occupied posts of directors of those section
s: A.
Zalpeter— Operations section (2); Ya. Agra nov, followed by M. Litvin— Secret Politica
l section
(4); A Minaev-Tsikanovsky— Counter-intelligence (3); and I. Shapiro - Special section
(9). [53]

I named the leadership of the GULag in my book, GULag Archipelago. Yes, there was a la
rge
proportion of Jews among its command. (Portraits of the directors of construction of t
he
White Sea-Baltic Canal, which I reproduced from the Soviet commemorative corpus of 193
6,
caused outrage: they claimed that I have selected the Jews only on purpose. But I did
not
select them, I've just reproduced the photographs of all the High Directors of the Bel
Baltlag
[White Sea - Baltic Canal camp administration] from that immortal book. Am I guilty th
at
they had turned out to be Jews? Who had selected them for those posts? Who is guilty?)
I
will now add information about three prominent men, whom I did not know then. Before
the BelBaltlag, one Lazar Kogan worked as the head of the GULag; Zinovy Katsnelson was
the
deputy head of the GULag from 1934 onward; Izrail Plinerwasthe head of the GULag from
1936, and later he oversaw the completion of construction of the Moscow-Volga Canal
(1937). [54]
It can't be denied that History elevated many Soviet Jews into the ranks of the arbite
rs of the
fate of all Russians.

***

Never publicized information about events of different times flows from different sour
ces:
about the regional Plenipotentiaries of GPU-NKVD in the 1930s (before 1937). The names
of
their offices fully deserved to be written in capital letters, for it was precisely th
em and not
the secretaries of the obkoms, who were the supreme masters of their oblasts, masters
of
the life and death of any inhabitant, who reported directly only to the central NKVD i
n
Moscow. The full names of some of them are known, while only initials remain from othe
rs;
and still of others, we know only their last names. They moved from post to post, betw
een
different provinces. (If we could only find the dates and details of their service! Al
as, all this
was done in secret). And in all of the 1930s, many Jews remained among those provincia
l
lords. According to the recently published data, in the regional organs of State Secur
ity, not
counting the Main Directorate of State Security, there were 1,776 Jews (7.4% of the to
tal
members serving). [55]

A few Jewish plenipotentiaries are listed here: in Belorussia - Izrail Leplevsky (brot
her of the
deputy General Prosecutor Grigory Leplevsky, we already saw him in the Cheka; later, h
e
worked in a senior post in the GPU as a Commissar of State Security of 2nd Rank; and n
ow
we see him as the Narkom of Internal Affairs of Belorussia from 1934 to 1936); in the
Western Oblast- I.M. Blat, he later worked in Chelyabinsk; in the Ukraine -Z. Katsnels
on,
we saw him in the Civil Warall around the country, from the Caspian Sea to the White S
ea.

261

Now he was the deputy head of the GULag; later we see him as Deputy Narkom of Interna
l
Affairs of Ukraine; in 1937 he was replaced by Leplevsky. We see D.M. Sokolinsky first
In
Donetsk Oblast and later in Vinnitsa Oblast; L.Ya. Faivilovich and Fridberg - in the N
orthern
Caucasus; M.G. Raev-Kaminsky and Purnis - in Azerbaijan; G. Rappoport - in Stalingrad
Oblast; P.Sh. Simanovsky - in Orlov Oblast; Livshits - in Tambov Oblast; G.Ya. Abrampo
lsky -
in Gorkov Oblast; A.S. Shiyron, supervising the round-up of the dispossessed kulaks -i
n
Arkhangel Oblast; I.Z. Ressin-inthe German Volga Republic; Zelikman - in Bashkiriya;
N.
Raysky- in Orenburg Oblast; G.I. Shklyar - in Sverdlovsk Oblast; L.B. Zalin - in Kazak
hstan;
Krukovsky - in Central Asia; Trotsky - in Eastern Siberia, and Rutkovsky - in the Nort
hern
Krai.

All these high placed NKVD officials were tossed from one oblast to another in exactly
the
same manner as the secretaries of obkoms. Take, for instance, Vladimir Tsesarsky: was
plenipotentiary of the GPU-NKVD in Odessa, Kiev and in the Far East. By 1937 he had ri
sen to
the head of the Special section of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD
(just
before Shapiro). Or look at S. Mironov-Korol: in 1933-36 he was the head of the
Dnepropetrovsk GPU-NKVD; in 1937 he was in charge of the Western Siberian NKVD; he als
o
served in the central apparatus of the GPU-NKVD. [56] In the mid-1930s, we see L. Vul
as the
head of Moscow and later of Saratov Police. The plenipotentiary in Moscow was L. Belsk
y
(after serving in Central Asia); later, he had risen to the head of the Internal Servi
ce Troops
of the NKVD. In the 1930s we see many others: Foshan was in charge of the border troop
s;
Meerson was the head of the Economic Planning section of the NKVD; L.I. Berenzon and
later L.M. Abramson headed the finance department of the GULag; and Abram Flikser
headed the personnel section of the GULag. All these are disconnected pieces of inform
ation,
not amenable to methodical anal Moreover, there were special sections in each provinci
al
office of the NKVD. Here is another isolated bit of information: Yakov Broverman was t
he
head of Secretariat of the Special Section of the NKVD in Kiev; he later worked in the
same
capacity in the central NKVD apparatus. [57]

Later, in 1940, when the Soviets occupied the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia,
the head of the Dvinsk NKVD was one Kaplan. He dealt so harshly with the people there,
that
in 1941, when the Red Army had hardly left and before the arrival of Germans, there wa
s an
explosion of public outrage against the Jews.

In the novel by D.P. Vitkovsky, Half-life, there is a phrase about the Jewish looks o
f
investigator, Yakovlev (the action is set during Khrushchev's regime). Vitovsky put it
rather
harshly so that Jews, who by the end of the 1960s were already on the way of breaking
away
from communism and in their new political orientation developed sympathy to any camp
memoirs, were nonetheless repulsed by such a description. I remember V. Gershuni aske
d
me how many other Jewish investigators did Vitovsky come across during his 30-year-lon
g
ordeal?

262

What an astonishing forgetfulness betrayed by that rather innocent slip! Would not it
have
been more appropriate to mention not the "30 years" but 50 years, or, at least, 40 yea
rs?
Indeed, Vitovsky might not have encountered many Jewish investigators during his last
thirty
years, from the end of the 1930s (though they could still be found around even in the
1960s).
Yet Vitovsky was persecuted by the Organs for forty years; he survived the Solovki cam
p; and
he apparently did not forget the time when a Russian investigator was a less frequent
sight
than a Jewish or a Latvian one.

Nevertheless, Gershuni was right in implying that all these outstanding and not so
outstanding posts were fraught with death for their occupants; the more so, the closer
it
was to 1937-38.

***

Our arbiters confidently ruled from their heights and when they were suddenly delivere
d a
blow, it must have seemed to them like the collapse of the universe, like the end of t
he
world. Wasn't there anyone among them before the onslaught who reflected on the usual
fate of revolutionaries?

Among the major communist functionaries who perished in 1937-38, the Jews comprise an
enormous percentage. For example, a modern historian writes that if "from 1 January 19
35
to 1 January 1938 the members of this nationality headed more than 50% of the main
structural units of the central apparatus of the people's commissariat of internal aff
airs, then
by 1 January 1939 they headed only 6%."[58]

Using numerous "execution lists" that were published over the recent decades, and the
biographical tomes of the modern Russian Jewish Encyclopedia, we are able to trace to
some
degree the fates of those outstanding and powerful Chekists, Red commanders, Soviet pa
rty
officials, diplomats, and others, whom we mentioned in the previous chapters of this b
ook.

Among the Chekists the destruction was particularly overwhelming (the names of those
executed are italicized):

G.Ya. Abrampolsky; L.M. Abramson, died in prison in 1939; Yakov Agranov, 1938;[59] Abr
am
Belenky, 1941; Lev Belsky-Levin, 1941; Matvey Berman, 1939; Boris Berman, 1939; losif
Blat,
1937; Ya. Veinshtok, 1939; Leonid Vul, 1938, Mark Gai-Shtoklyand, 1937; Semyon Gendi
n,
1939; Benjamin Gerson, 1941; Lev Zadov-Zinkovsky, 1938; Lev Zalin-Levin, 1940; A. Zalp
eter,
1939; Lev Zakharov-Meyer, 1937; N.Zelikman, 1937; Aleksandr loselevich, 1937, Zinovy
Katsnelson, 1938; LazarKogan, 1939; Mikhail Koltsov-Fridlyand, 1940; Georg Krukovsky,
1938; Izrail Leplevsky, 1938; Natan Margolin, 1938; A. Minaev-Tsikanovsky, 1939; Lev
Mironov-Kagan, 1938; Sergey Mironov-Korol, 1940; Karl Pauker, 1937; Izrail Pliner, 193
9;
Mikhail Raev-Kaminsky, 1939; Aleksandr Radzivilovsky, 1940; Naum Raysky-Lekhtman, 193
9;
Grigoriy Rappoport, 1938; llya Ressin, 1940; A. Rutkovsky; Pinkhus Simanovsky, 1940; A
bram
Slutsky, poisoned in 1938; David Sokol ins ky, 1940; Mikhail Trilisser; Leonid Fayvilo
vich, 1936;

263
Vladimir Tsesarsky, 1940; A. Shanin, 1937; Isaak Shapiro, 1940; Evsey Shirvindt, 193
8;
Grigoriy Shklyar; Sergey Shpigelglas, 1940; Genrikh Yagoda, 1938.

Nowadays entire directories, containing lists of the highest officials of the Central
Apparatus
of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD who fell during the Ezhov's peri
od of
executions and repressions, are published. There we see many more Jewish names. [60]

But only accidentally, thanks to the still unbridled glasnostthat began in the beginni
ng of the
1990s, we learn about several mysterious biographies formerly shrouded in secrecy. Fo
r
example, from 1937, professor Grigory Mayranovsky, a specialist in poisons, headed th
e
"Laboratory X" in the Special Section of Operations Technology of the NKVD, which carr
ied
out death sentences through injections with poisons by "the direct decision of the
government in 1937-47 and in 1950"; the executions were performed in a special prisone
r
cell at "Laboratory X" as well as abroad even in the 1960s and 1970s. [61] Mayranovsky
was
arrested only in 1951; from his cell he wrote to Beria: "Dozens of sworn enemies of th
e
Soviet Union, including all kinds of nationalists, were destroyed by my hand. "[62] An
d from
the astonishing disclosure in 1990 we learned that the famous mobile gas chambers wer
e
invented, as it turns out, not by Hitler during the World War II, but in the Soviet NK
VD in
1937 by Isai Davidovich Berg, the head of the administrative and maintenance section o
f the
NKVD of Moscow Oblast(sure, he was not alone in that enterprise, but he organized the
whole business). This is why it is also important to know who occupied middle-level po
sts. It
turns out, that I.D. Berg was entrusted with carrying out the sentences of the "troik
a" of the
NKVD of Moscow Oblast; he dutifully performed his mission, which involved s huttling
prisoners to the execution place. But when three "troikas" began to work simultaneousl
y in
the Moscow Oblast, the executioners became unable to cope with the sheer number of
executions. Then they invented a time-saving method: the victims were stripped naked,
tied,
mouths plugged, and thrown into a closed truck, outwardly disguised as a bread truck.
On
the road the exhaust fumes were redirected into the prisoner-carrying compartment, and
by
the time the van arrived to the burial ditch, the prisoners were "ready." (Well, Berg
himself
was shot in 1939, not for those evil deeds, of course, but for "the anti-Soviet conspi
racy". In
1956 he was rehabilitated without any problem, though the story of his murderous inven
tion
was kept preserved and protected in the records of his case and only recently discover
ed by
journalists)[63]

There are so many individuals with outstanding lives and careers in the list above! Be
la Kun,
the Butcher of Crimea, himself fell at that time, and with him the lives of twelve Com
missars
of the communist government of Budapest ended. [64]

However, it would be inappropriate to consider the expulsion of Jews from the punitiv
e
organs as a form of persecution. There was no anti-Jewish motif in those events.
(Notwithstanding, that if Stalin's praetorians valued not only their present benefits
and
power but also the opinion of the people whom they governed, they should have left th
e
NKVD and not have waited until they were kicked out. Still, this wouldn't have spared
many

264

of them death, but surely it would have spared them the stigma?) The notion of purpose
ful
anti-Jewish purge doesn't hold water: "according to available data, at the end of the
1930s
the Jews were one of the few national minorities, belonging to which did not constitut
e a
"crime" for an NKVD official. There were still no regulations on national and personne
l policy
in the state security agencies that was enforced ...from the end of the 1940s to the e
arly
1950s" [65]

***

Many Party activists fell under the destructive wave of 1937-1938. From 1936-37 the
composition of the Soviet of People's Commissars began to change noticeably as the pur
ges
during the pre-war years ran through the prominent figures in the people's commissaria
ts.
The main personage behind collectivization, Yakovlev, had met his bullet; the same
happened to his comrades-in-arms, Kalmanovich and Rukhimovich, and many others. The
meat-grinder devoured many old "honored" Bolsheviks, such as the long-retired Ryazanov
or
the organizer of the murder of the TsarGoloshchekin, not to mention Kamenev and
Zinovyev. (Lazar Kaganovich was spared although, he himself was the "iron broom" in
several purges during 1937-38; for example, they called his swift purge of the city of
Ivanov
the "BlackTornado.")[66]

They offer us the following interpretation: "This is a question about the victims of t
he Soviet
dictatorship; they were used by it and then mercilessly discarded when their services
became redundant." [67] What a great argument! So for twenty years these powerful Jew
s
were really used? Yet weren't they themselves the zealous cogs in the mechanism of tha
t
very dictatorship right up to the very time when their "services became redundant"? Di
d not
they make the great contribution to the destruction of religion and culture, the intel
ligentsia,
and the multi-million peasantry?

A great many Red Army commanders fell under the axe. "By the summer of 1938 without
exception all... commanders of military districts ... who occupied these posts by June
1937
disappeared without a trace." The Political Administration of the Red Army "suffered t
he
highest losses from the terror" during the massacre of 1937, after the suicide of Gama
rnik.
Of the highest political officers of the Red Army, death claimed all 17 army commissar
s, 25
out of 28 corps commissars, and 34 out of 36 brigade (divisional) commissars. [68] We
see a
significant percentage of Jews in the now-published lists of military chiefs executed
in 1937-
38.[69]

Grigory Shtern had a very special military career; he advanced along the political off
icer's
path. During the Civil War he was military commissar at regimental, brigade, and divis
ional
levels. In 1923-25 he was the head of all special detachments in the Khorezm [a short-
lived
republic after the Bolshevik revolution] troops during the suppression of rebellions i
n Central
Asia. Until 1926, he was the head of the political administration division. Later he s
tudied at
the military academy for senior military officers [and thus became eligible for proper
military

265

posts]; in 1929-34 he was a "military advisor to the Republican government in Spain"

(not to
be confused with Manfred Shtern, who also distinguished himself among the Red Spaniard
s
under the alias of "General Kleber"). Later he was the Chief of Staff of the Far Easte
rn Front
and conducted bloody battles at Lake Khasan in 1938 together with Mekhlis, at the sam
e
time conspiring against Marshall Blucher, whom he ruined and whose post of the front
commander he took over after the arrest of the latter. In March 1939, at the 18th Part
y
Congress, he made this speech: "Together we have destroyed a bunch of good-for-
nothings— the Tukhachevskys, Gamarniks, Uborevichs [former Soviet Marshallsf and simil
ar
others." Well, he himself was shot later, in autumn 1941. [70] Shtern's comrade-in-arm
s in
aviation, Yakov Smushkevich, also had a head-spinning career. He too began as a politi
cal
officer (until the mid-1930s); then he studied at the academy for top officers. In 193
6-37 he
had also fought in Spain, in aviation, and was known as "General Douglas". In 1939 he
was
commander of the aviation group at Khalkhin Gol [on the Manchurian-Mongolian border,
site of Soviet-Japanese battles won by the Russians]. Afterthat he rose to the command
er of
all air forces of the Red Army - the General Inspector of the Air Force; he was arrest
ed in
May 1941 a nd executed i n the sa me yea r. [71]

The wave of terror spared neither administrators, nor diplomats; almost all of the dip
lomats
mentioned above were executed.

Let's name those party, military, diplomatic, and managerial figures whom we mentione
d
before on these pages who now were persecuted (the names of the executed are italicize
d):

Samuil Agursky, arrested in 1938; Lazar Aronshtam, 1938; Boris Belenky, 1938; Grigory
Belenky, 1938; Zakhar Belenky,1940; Mark Belenky, 1938; Moris Belotsky, 1938; German
Bitker, 1937; Aran Vainshtein, 1938; Yakov Vesnik, 1938; Izrail Veitser, 1938; Abram V
olpe,
1937; YanGamarnik, committed suicide in 1937; Mikhail Gerchikov, 1937; Evgeny Gnedin,
arrested in 1939; Philip Goloshchekin, 1941; Ya. Goldin, 1938; Lev Gordon, arrested in
1939;
IsaakGrinberg, 1938; Yakov Gugel, 1937; Aleksandr Gurevich, 1937; Sholom Dvoilatsky,
1937; Maks Deych, 1937; Semyon Dimanshtein, 1938; Efim Dreitser, 1936; Semyon
Zhukovsky, 1940; Samuil Zaks, 1937; Zinovy Zangvil, IsaakZelensky, 1938; Grigory Zinov
yev,
1936; S. Zorin-Gomberg, 1937; Boris Ippo, 1937; Mikhail Kaganovich, committed suicide
in
expectation of arrest, 1941; Moisey Kalmanovich, 1937; LevKamenev, 1936; Abram
Kamensky, 1938; Grigoriy Kaminsky, 1938; llya Kit-Viytenko, arrested in 1937 and spent
20
years in camps; I.M. Kleiner, 1937; Evgeniya Kogan, 1938; Aleksandr Krasnoshchyokov-
Tobinson, 1937; LevKritsman, 1937; Solomon Kruglikov, 1938; Vladimir Lazarevich, 193
8;
Mikhail Landa, 1938; Ruvim Levin, 1937; Yakov Livshits, 1937; Moisey Lis ovsky, arrest
ed in
1938; Frid Markus, 1938; LevMaryasin, 1938; Grigory Melnichansky, 1937; Aleksandr
Minkin-Menson, died in camp in 1955; Nadezhda Ostrovskaya, 1937; Lev Pechersky, 1937;
I.
Pinson, 1936; losif Pyatnitsky-Tarshis, 1938; Izrail Razgon, 1937; Moisey Rafes, 1942;
Grigory
Roginsky, 1939; Marsel Rozenberg, 1938; Arkady Rozengolts, 1938; Naum Rozovsky, 1942;
Boris Royzenman, 1938; E. Rubinin, spent 15 years in camps; Yakov Rubinov, 1937; Moise
y

266

Rukhimovich, 1938; OskarRyvkin, 1937; David Ryazanov, 1938; Veniamin Sverdlov, 1939;
Boris Skvirsky, 1941; losifSlavin, 1938; Grigoriy Sokolnikov-Brilliant, killed in pris
on, 1939;
IsaakSolts, died in confinement in 1940; Naum Sokrin, 1938; Lev Sosnovsky, 1937; Artu
r
Stashevsky-Girshfeld, 1937; Yury Steklov-Nakhamkis, 1941; Nikolay Sukhanov-Gimmer, 194
0;
Boris Tal, 1938; Semyon Turovsky, 1936; Semyon Uritsky, 1937; Evgeny Fainberg, 1937;
Vladimir Feigin, 1937; Boris Feldman, 1937; Yakov Fishman, arrested in 1937; Moisey
Frumkin, 1938; Maria Frumkina-Ester, died in camp, 1943; Leon Khaikis, 1938; Avenir
Khanukaev; Moisey Kharitonov, died in camp, 1948; Mendel Khataevich, 1937; Tikhon
Khvesin, 1938; losif Khodorovsky, 1938; Mordukh Khorosh, 1937; Isay Tsa I kovich, arre
sted in
1937; Efim Tsetlin, 1937; Yakov Chubin; N. Chuzhak-Nasimovich; Lazar Shatskin, 1937; A
khiy
Shilman, 1937; lerokhim Epshtein, arrested in 1938; lona Yakir, 1937; Yakov Yakovlev-
Epshtein, 1938; Grigory Shtern, 1941.

This is indeed a commemoration roster of many top-placed Jews.

Below are the fates of some prominent Russian Jewish socialists, who did not join the
Bolsheviks or who even struggled against them.

Boris Osipovich Bogdanov (born 1884) was an Odessan, the grandson and son of lumber
suppliers. He graduated from the best commerce school in Odessa. While studying, he jo
ined
Social Democrat societies. In June 1905, he was the first civilian who got on board th
e
mutinous battleship, Potemkin, when she entered the port of Odessa; he gave a speech f
or
her crew, urging sailors to join Odessa's laborstrike; he delivered letters with appea
ls to
consulates of the European powers in Russia. He avoided punishment by departing for S
t.
Petersburg where he worked in the Social Democratic underground; he was a Menshevik. H
e
was sentenced to two 2-year-long exiles, one after another, to Solvychegodsk and to
Vologda. Before the war, he entered the elite of the Menshevik movement; he worked
legally on labor questions. In 1915 he became the secretary of the Labor Group at the
Military Industrial Committee, was arrested in January 1917 and freed by the February
Revolution. He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd, and regularly chaired its noisy sessions which attrac
ted
thousands of people. From June 1917 he was a member of the Bureau of the Ail-Russian
Central Executive Committee and persistently opposed ongoing attempts of the Bolshevik
s
to seize power. After the failed Bolshevik rebellion in July 1917 he accepted the surr
ender of
the squad of sailors besieged in the Petropavlovsk Fortress. After the October coup, i
n 1918
he was one of the organizers of a nti -Bolshevik workers movement inPetrograd. During
the
Civil War he lived in Odessa. Afterthe Civil War he tried to restart the Menshevik pol
itical
activity, but at the end of 1920 he was arrested for one year. That was the beginning
of
many years of unceasing arrests and sentences, exiles and camps, and numerous transfer
s
between different camps — the so-called "Great Road" of so many socialists in the USS
R.
And all that was just for being a Menshevik in the past and for having Menshevik convi
ctions
even though by that time he no longer engaged in politics and during brief respites si
mply

267

worked on economic posts and just wanted a quiet life; however, he was suspected of
economic "sabotage." In 1922 he requested permission to emigrate, but shortly before
departure was arrested again. First he was sent to the Solovki prison camp and later e
xiled
to the Pechora camp [in the Urals]; his sentences were repeatedly extended by three ye
ars;
he experienced solitary confinement in the Suzdal camp and was repeatedly exiled. In 1
931
they attempted to incriminate him in the case of the "All-Soviet Bureau of Menshevik
s," but
he was lucky and they left him alone. Yet he was hauled in again in 1937, imprisoned i
n the
Omsk jail (together with already-imprisoned communists), where he survived non-stop
interrogations which sometimes continued without a pause for weeks, at any time of the
day
or night (there were three shifts of investigators); he served out 7 years in the Karg
opol
camp (several other Mensheviks were shot there); later he was exiled to Syktyvkar; in
1948
he was again sentenced and exiled to Kazakhstan. In 1956 he was rehabilitated; he died
in
1960, a worn-out old man.

Boris Davidovich Kamkov-Kats (born 1885) was the son of a country doctor. From
adolescence, he was a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Exiled in 1905 to t
he
Turukhan Krai, he escaped. Abroad, he graduated from the Heidelberg University School
of
Law. He was a participant in the Zimmerwald [Switzerland] Conference of socialists (19
15).
After the February Revolution he returned to Russia. He was one of the founders of the
Left
Socialist Revolutionary Party; at the time of the October coup he entered into a coali
tion
with the Bolsheviks. He took part inthe dispersal of the Russian Constituent Assembly
in
January 1918. From April he urged breaking the alliance with the Bolsheviks; in June h
e
already urged "a revolutionary uprising against them. After the failed rebellion of th
e
Socialist Revolutionaries, he went underground. After a brief arrest in 1920, he was a
rrested
again in 1921, and exiled in 1923. Between exiles he spent two years in prison and
experienced the same "Great Road." In 1933 he was exiled to Archangel; he was arreste
d
again in 1937 and executed in 1938.

Abram Rafailovich Gots (born 1882) was the grandson of a millionaire tea merchant, V.Y
a.
Visotsky. From the age of 14, he was in the the Socialist Revolutionary movement from
the
very creation of the SR party in 1901 (his brother Mikhail was the party leader). From
1906,
he was a terrorist, a member of the militant wing of the SRs. From 1907-1915 he was in
hard
labor camps; he spent some time sitting inthe infamous Aleksandrovsky Central. He was
a
participant of the February Revolution in Irkutsk and later in Petrograd. He was a mem
ber of
the executive committees of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd
and
of the Soviet Peasant's Deputies and a member of the Presidium of the Ail-Russian Cent
ral
Executive Committee. From 25 October 1917 he headed the anti-Bolshevik Committee for
the Salvation of the Motherland and Revolution. During the Civil War he continued his
struggle against Bolsheviks. In 1920 he was arrested; at the trial of the Socialist
Revolutionaries in 1922 he was sentenced to death, commuted to 5 years of imprisonmen
t.
Later he experienced the "Great Road" of endless new prison terms and exiles. In 1939
he
was sentenced to 25 years inthe camps and died in one a year later.

268

Mikhail Yakovlevich Gendelman (bom 1881) was an attomey-at-law and a Socialist

Revolutionary from 1902. He participated in the February Revolution in Moscow, was a
member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, a
member of the Presidium of the Ail-Russian Central Executive Committee, and a member o
f
the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. On 25 October 1917, he lef
t the
meeting of the 2nd Ail-Russian Congress of the Soviets in protest againstthe Bolshevik
s. He
was elected to the Constituent Assembly and participated in its only session, on 5 Jan
uary
1918. Later in Samara he participated in the Committee of Members of the Constituent
Assemby. He was arrested in 1921; in 1922 he was sentenced to death at the trial of th
e
Socialist Revolutionaries, commuted to 5 years in prison. After numerous prison terms
and
exiles, he was shot in 1938.

Mikhail Isaakovich Liber-Goldman (born 1880) was one of the founders of the Bund (189
7), a
member of the Central Committee of the [General Jewish Labor] Bund of Lithuania, Polan
d
and Russia in Emigration; he represented the Bund atthe congresses of the Russian Soci
al
Democratic Workers' Party. He participated in the revolution of 1905-06. In 1910 he wa
s
exiled for three years to Vologda Province, fled soon thereafter and emigrated again.
He was
a steady and uncompromising opponent of Lenin. He returned to Russia after 1914, and
joined the Socialist "Defender" movement ("Defense of the Motherland in War"). After t
he
February revolution, he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Sovie
t
of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, and later he was a member of the Presidium of the
All-
Russian Central Executive Committee. (He left the latter post after the October coup).
Then
he briefly participated in the Social Democratic Workers' Party of the Mensheviks. He
worked on economic positions andwasone of the leaders of the Menshevik underground in
the USSR. His "Great Road" arrests and exiles began inl923. He was arrested again and
executed in Alma-Ata in 1937.

For many, there was a similarfate, with repeated sentences and exiles, right up to the
climax
of 1937-38.

Yet in those years purges swept all over the country, destroying the lives of countles
s
ordinary people, including Jews, people who had nothing to do with politics or authori
ty.
Here are some of the Jews who perished:

Nathan Bernshtein (born 1876) a music scholarand critic; he taught the history of musi
c and
aesthetics and wrote a number of books; arrested in 1937, he died in prison.

Matvei Bronshtein (born 1906) a talented theoretical physicist, Doctor of Science, wh

o
achieved extraordinary results. He was the husband of Lyudmila K. Chukovskaya. Arreste
d in
1937, he was executed in 1938.
Sergey Ginter (born 1870) an architect and engineer; arrested in 1934, exiled to Siber
ia,
arrested again in 1937 and executed.

269

Veniamin Zilbermints (bom 1887) a mineralogist and geochemist; specialist on rare elem
ents,
he laid the foundation for semi-conductor science; he was persecuted in 1938.

Mikhail Kokin (born 1906) an Orientalist, Sinologist and historian, arrested in 1937 a
nd
executed.

Ilya Krichevsky (born 1885) a microbiologist, immunologist (also trained in physics an

d
mathematics), Doctor of Medical Sciences, founder of a scientific school, chairman of
the
National Association of Microbiologists; arrested in 1938 and died in 1943.

Solomon Levit (born 1894), geneticist; he studied the role of heredity and environment
in
pathology. Arrested in 1938 and died in prison.

lokhiel Ravrebe (born 1883), an Orientalist, Judaist, one of the founders of the reest
ablished
Jewish Ethnographic Society in 1920. Accused of creating a Zionist organization, he wa
s
arrested in 1937 and died in prison.

Vladimir Finkelshtein (born 1896), a chemical physicist, professor, corresponding memb

er of
the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences; he had many works in applied electrical chemistry;
persecuted in 1937.

Ilya Khetsrov (born 1887), a hygienistand epidemiologist; he studied environmental hyg

iene,
protection of water resources, and community hygiene. Arrested in 1938 and executed.

Nakhum Schwartz (born 1888), a psychiatrist, studied Jewish psychology. In 1921-23 he

taught Hebrew and wrote poetry in Hebrew. Accused of Zionist activity, he was arrested
in
1937 and later died in prison.
Here are the fates of the three brothers Shpilrein from Rostov-on-Don. Jan (born 1887)
was
a mathematician; he applied mathematical methods in electrical and heat engineering, h
e
was professor at the Bauman Moscow State Technical University and later the dean of it
s
Electrical Engineering Department. He was persecuted and died in 1937. Isaak (born 189
1)
was a psychologist, Doctor of Philosophy. In 1927 he became the head of the Ail-Russia
n
Society of Psychotechnology and Applied Psychophysiology; he performed extensive
psychological analysis of professions and optimization of working environment. He was
arrested in 1935 and later executed. Emil (born 1899) was a biologist, the dean of th
e
Biology Department of Rostov University. He was shot in 1937.

Leonid Yurovsky (born 1884) Doctor of Political Economy, one of the authors of the
monetary reform of 1922-24. A close friend to A.V. Chayanov and N.D. Kondratev
[prominent Russian scientists], he was arrested in 1930, freed in 1935, then arrested
again in
1937 and executed.

***

270

Despite the overwhelming percentage of high-placed, "aristocratic" Jews, who fell unde
r
Stalin's axe, the free Western press did not perceive the events as specifically the
persecution of Jews: the Jews were massacred simply because of their abundance in the
top
tiers of the Soviet hierarchy. Indeed, we read such a stipulation in the collection of
works
Evreysky Mir [The Jewish World] (1939): "No doubt that the Jews in the USSR have
numerous opportunities, which they did not have before the revolution, and which they
do
not have even now in some democratic countries. They can become generals, ministers,
diplomats, professors, the most high-ranking and the most servile aristocrats." Opport
unities
but "in no way rights", because of the absence of such rights, "Yakir, Garmanik, Yagod
a,
Zinovyev, Radek, Trotsky" and the rest fell from their heights and lost their very liv
es. "[72]
Still, no nationality enjoyed such a right under the communist dictatorship; it was al
l about
the ability to cling to power.

The long-time devoted socialist, emigrants. Ivanovich (S.O. Portugeis), admitted: "Und
er the
Tsars, the Jews were indeed restricted in their 'right of living'; yet their 'right to
live' was
incomparably greater then than under Bolshevism." Indeed. However, at the same time,
despite being perfectly aware of collectivization, he writes that the "awkward attempt
s to
establish 'socialism' in Russia took the heaviesttoll from the Jews"; that "the scorpi
ons of
Bolshevism did not attack any other people with such brutal force as they attacked
Jews." [73]

Yet during the Great Plague of dekulakization, it was not thousands but millions of pe
asa nts
who lost both their 'right of living' and the 'right to live'. And yet all the Soviet
pens (with so
many Jews among them) kept complete silence about this cold-blooded destruction of th
e
Russian peasantry. In unison with them, the entire West was silent. Could it be really
out of
the lack of knowledge? Or was it for the sake of protecting the Soviet regime? Or was
it
simply because of indifference? Why, this is almost inconceivable: 15 million peasants
were
not simply deprived of entering the institutes of higher learning or of the right to s
tudy in
graduate school, or to occupy nice posts — no! They were dispossessed and driven like
cattle
out of their homes and sent to certain death in the taiga and tundra. And the Jews, am
ong
other passionate urban activists, enthusiastically took the reins of the collectivizat
ion into
their hands, leaving behind them persistent evil memory. And who had raised their voic
es in
defense of the peasants then? And now, in 1932-33, in Russia and Ukraine - on the ver
y
outskirts of Europe, five to six million people died from hunger! And the free press o
f the
free world maintained utter silence... And even if we take into account the extreme Le
ftist
bias of the contemporary Western press and its devotion to the socialist "experiment"
in the
USSR, it is still impossible not to be amazed at the degree to which they could go to
be blind
and insensitive to the sufferings of even tens of millions of fellow humans.

If you don't see it, your heart doesn't cry.

During the 1920s, the Ukrainian Jews departed from their pro-Russian-statehood mood o
f
1917-1920, and by the end of the 1920s "the Jews are among Ukrainian chauvinists and

271

separatists, wielding enormous influence there— but only in the cities. "[74] We can f
ind such
a conclusion: the destruction of Ukrainian-language culture in 1937 was in part aimed
against Jews, who formed "a genuine union" with Ukrainians "for the development of loc
al
culture in Ukrainian language."[75] Nevertheless, such a union in cultural circles cou
ld not
soften the attitudes of the wider Ukrainian population toward Jews. We have already se
en in
the previous chapter how in the course of collectivization "a considerable number of J
ewish
communists functioned in rural locales as commanders and lords over life and death.
"[76]
This placed a new scaron Ukrainian-Jewish relations, already tense for centuries. And
although the famine was a direct result of Stalin's policy, and not only in Ukraine (i
t brutally
swept across the Volga Region and the Urals), the suspicion widely arose among Ukraini
ans
that the entire Ukrainian famine was the work of the Jews. Such an interpretation has
long
existed (and the Ukrainian emigre press adhered to it until the 1980s). "Some Ukrainia
ns are
convinced that 1933 was the revenge of the Jews for the times of Khmelnitsky."[77] [A
17th
century Cossack leaderwho conducted bloody anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine].

Don't expect to reap wheat where the weed was sewn. The supreme authority of so many
Jews along with only a small number of Jews being touched by the grievances which affl
icted
the rest of population could lead to all sorts of interpretations.

Jewish authors who nervously kept an eye on anti-Semitism in the USSR did not notice t
his
trampled ash, however, and made rather optimistic conclusions. For instance, Solomon
Schwartz writes: "From the start of the 1930s, anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union quick
ly
abated", and "in the mid-1930s it lost the character of a mass phenomenon ...anti-Semi
tism
reached the all-time low point." He explains this, in part, as the result of the end o
f the NEP
(the New Economic Policy) and thereby the disappearance of Jewish businessmen and pett
y
Jewish merchants. Later, "forced industrialization and lightning-fast collectivizatio
n," which
he favorably compares with a kind of "shock therapy, i.e., treatment of mental disorde
rs
with electric shocks," was of much help. In addition he considers that in those years
the
ruling communist circles began to struggle with Great-Russian "chauvinism." (Well, the
y did
not begin; they just continued the policy of Lenin's intolerance). Schwartz soundly no
tes that
the authorities were "persistently silent about anti-Semitism", "in order to avoid th
e
impression that the struggle against Great-Russian chauvinism is a struggle for the Je
ws."[78]

In January 1931, first the New York Times, [79] and later the entire world press publi
shed a
sudden and ostentatious announcement by Stalin to the Jewish Telegraph Agency: "The
Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot help but be an irreconcilable and
sworn
enemy of anti-Semitism. In the USSR, anti-Semitism is strictly prosecuted by law as a
phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet order. Active anti-Semites are punished, accor
ding
to the laws of the USSR, with the death penalty."[80] See, he addressed the democrati
c
West and did not mind specifying the punishment. And it was only one nationality in th
e
USSR that was set apart by being granted such a protection. And world opinion was
completely satisfied with that.

272

But characteristically, the announcement by the Leader was not printed in the Soviet p
ress
(because of his cunning reservations); it was produced for export and he hid this posi
tion
from his own citizens; in the USSR it was only printed at the end of 1936. [81] Then S
talin
sent Molotov to make a similarannouncement at the Congress of Soviets.

A contemporary Jewish author, erroneously interpreting Molotov's speech, suggests tha

t
speaking on behalf of the government he threatened to punish "anti-Semitic feelings" w
ith
death. [82] Feelings! No, Molotov did not mention anything like that; he did not depar
t from
Stalin's policy of persecuting "active anti-Semites." We are not aware of any instance
of
death penalty in the 1930s for anti-Semitism, but people were sentenced for it accordi
ng to
the Penal Code. (People whispered that before the revolution the authorities did not p
unish
as harshly even for libels against the Tsar.)

But now S. Schwartz observes a change: "In the second half of the 1930s, these sentime
nts
[people's hostility toward Jews] became much more prevalent ... particularly in the ma
jor
centers, where the Jewish intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia were concentrated....
Here
again the legend about "Jewish domination" gradually began to come back to life, and t
hey
began to spread exaggerated notions about the role of Jews in the middle and top ranks
of
government." Well, whether or not it was really a legend, he immediately attempted to
explain it, though in a quite naive manner, suggesting the same old excuse that the Je
wish
intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia simply had almost no other source of livelihood
under
Soviet conditions except the government service. "[83]

This is so shameful to read. What oppression and despair! See, they had almost no othe
r
sources of livelihood, only privileged ones. And the rest of population was absolutely
free to
toil on kolkhoz fields, to dig pits, and to roll barrows at the great construction pro
jects of the
5-year plans...

In official policy, nothing had changed in the 1930s in the Jewish Question from the t
ime of
the revolution; no official hostility toward Jews existed. Indeed, they used to dream
and
proclaim about the impending end of all national conflicts.

And the foreign Jewish circles did not and could not sense any oppression of the Jews
in the
USSR. In the article The Jews and the Soviet Dictatorship, S. Ivanovich wrote: "Abroa
d, many
believe that there is no anti-Semitism in Russia, and on that basis they are favorabl
y
disposed toward the Soviet authorities. But in Russia they know that this is not tru
e."
However, Jews "pray for the long-life of the Soviet regime ... and are strongly afraid
of its
demise," for "Stalin protects them from pogroms and hopefully would protect them in
future." The author sympathizes with such an opinion, although he considers it flawed:
"If
the Bolshevik dictatorship falls, no doubt there will be wild anti-Semitic ravages and
violence
...The fall of the Soviet regime would be a catastrophe for the Jews, and any friend o
f the
Jewish people should reject such a prospect with horror"; yet at the same time he rema
rks

273

that "the Soviet dictatorship is already embarrassed by the Judeophilia and Jewish
dominance attributed to it." [84]

The resolution on Stalin's report at the 16th Party Congress provided the general poli
tical
direction for the 1930s, calling for an energetic struggle against chauvinism, and pri
marily
against the Great Russian chauvinism. The Party language was easily understood by all.
And
for several more years this struggle was enthusiastically carried on. Yet what kind of
Stalinist
madness was it? By that time there was no trace left of the Great Russian chauvinism.
Stalin
was not able to envision the immediate future [of WWII] - when only Russian patriotis
m
would save him from imminent doom.

Then they have already started to sound the alarm about the danger of any rebirth of
Russian patriotism. In 1939, S. Ivanovich claimed to notice a trend "of this dictators
hip
returning to some national traditions of Moscovite Russ and Imperial Russia"; he caust
ically
cited several stamps that entered popular discourse around that time such as the '"lov
e for
the Motherland', 'national pride' etc." [85]

See, this is where the mortal danger for Russia lurked then, immediately before Hitle
r's
assault-inthat ugly Russian patriotism!

This alarm did not leave the minds of Jewish publicists for the next half century, eve
n when
they looked back at that war, when mass patriotism blazed up, at the war which saved
Soviet Jewry. So in 1988 we read in an Israeli magazine: "Vivid traditions of the Blac
k
Hundreds ... were the foundation of 'vivifying Soviet patriotism', which blossomed lat
er,
during the Great Patriotic War"[86] [the official Russian designation forthe Eastern f
ront in
WWII].

Looking back at that war of 1941-1945, let's admit that this is a highly ungrateful ju
dgment.

So, even the purest and most immaculate Russian patriotism has no right to exist - not
now,
not ever?

Why is it so? And why it is that Russian patriotism is thus singled out?

An important event in Jewish life in the USSR was the closing of the YevSek atthe Cent
ral
Committee of the Ail-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1930. Though in accord w
ith
the Soviet blueprint, this act blocked any separate development of a Jewish society ha
ving
"national, cultural, and individual Jewish autonomy." From now on Jewish cultural
development lay within the Soviet mainstream. In 1937-38 the leading Yevseks -
Dimanshtein, Litvakov, Frumkina-Ester and their associates Motl Kiper, Itskhok Sudarsk
y,
AleksandrChemerissky-who, in words of Yu. Margolina, "in the service of the authoritie
s
carried out the greatest pogrom against Jewish culture,"[87] were arrested and soon
executed. Many Yevseks, "occupying governing positions in the central and local

274

departments of the Society for Settling Toiling Jews on the Land (OZET) and in the Jew
ish
community, Jewish cultural and educational structures," also fell under the juggernau
t. In
1936-39, the majority of them were persecuted." [88] The poisonous atmosphere of 1930
s
now reached these levels too. During open public meetings they began to accuse and exp
ose
prominent Jewish communists, who at some time before were members either of the Bund
or of the Zionist Socialist Party, or even of Poale-Zion, all of which were crippled u
nder the
Soviet regime. Was there anyone, whose past the Bolsheviks did not try to criminaliz
e?
"Who have you been before...?" In 1938 Der Ernes was closed also.

What about education? "Right up to 1933 the number of Jewish schools and Jewish studen
ts
in them increased despite the early (1920s) critique "of nationalistic over-zealous ne
ss'" in
the actions of the Yevseks on the 'forced transition of Jewish education into Yiddish.
"'[89]
From 1936 to 1939 a "period of accelerated decline and even more accelerated inner
impoverishment" of the schools inYiddishwas noted. [90] After 1936-37 "the number of
Jewish schools began to decline quickly even in Ukraine and Belorussia"; the desire o
f
parents to send their children to such schools had diminished. "Education in Yiddish w
as
seen as less and less prestigious; there was an effort to give children an education i
n the
Russian language." Also, from the second half of the 1930s the number of institutions
of
higher education lecturing in Yiddish began to decline rapidly"; "almost all Jewish in
stitutions
of higher education and technical schools were closed by 1937-38."[91]

At the start of 1930s the Jewish scientific institutes at the academies of science of
Ukraine
and Belorussia were closed; in Kiev 'The Institute of Jewish Proletarian Culture' fell
into
desolation." And soon after this arrests followed (Mikhail Kokin of the Leningrad Inst
itute of
Philosophy, literature and History was executed; lokhiel Rabrebe, formerly of the Petr
ograd
Institute of Higher Jewish Studies, who in the 1930s headed the Jewish Section of the
Public
Library, was sentenced to 8 years and died in the transit camp). [92]

Persecutions spread to writers in Yiddish: Moyshe Kulbak was persecuted in 1937; Zeli
k
Akselrod, in 1940; Abram Abchuk, a teacher of Yiddish and a critic, in 1937; writer Ge
rtsl
Bazov , was persecuted in 1938. Writer I. Kharik and critic Kh. Dunets were persecuted
also.
Still, "literature in Yiddish was actively published until the end of the 1930s. Jewis
h
publishers were working in Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk." Yet what kind of literature was i
t? In
the 1930s "the overwhelming majority of works were written stereotypically, in accorda
nce
with the unshakable principles of 'socialist realism. "'[93] Literature in Yiddish "fr
om the
1930s up to June 1941 ... was marked by the cult of Stalin. Unbridled flattery for Sta
lin
flowed from the bosom of Jewish poetry..." [94] Itsik Feder "managed to light up even
official
propaganda with lyrical notes. These monstrous sayings are ascribed to his pen: 'You
betrayed your father — this is great!', and 'I say 'Stalin' but envision the sun."'[9
5] Most of
these writers, who zealously tried to please Stalin, were arrested ten years later. Bu
t some of
them, as mentioned above, had already drawn this lot.

275

Similarly, "the ideological press of official communist doctrine signified for many Je
wish
artists and sculptors a complete break up, quite often tragic, with the national Jewis
h
traditions." (Still, what culture in the USSR was not touched by this?) So it comes as
little
surprise that "the overwhelming majority ... of Jewish theaters devoted much attention
to
propaganda performances." This included all 19 aforementioned professional Yiddish
theaters and "numerous independent collectives, studios, and circles. "[96]

Concerning Hebrew culture which preserved the national traditions: it was by now
conclusively banished and went underground.

It has already been mentioned that the Zionist underground was crushed by the beginnin
g of
the 1930s. Many Zionists were already rounded up, but still many others were accused o
f
"the Zionist conspiracy." Take Pinkhas Dashevsky (from Chapter 8) - in 1933 he was arr
ested
as a Zionist. Pinkhas Krasny was not a Zionist but was listed as such in his death sen
tence. He
was former Minister of Petliura's Directorate, emigrated but later returned into the U
SSR. He
was executed in 1939. Volf Averbukh, a Poale-Zionistfrom his youth, left for Israel in
1922,
where "he collaborated with the communist press." In 1930, he was sent back to the USS
R,
where he was arrested. [97]

"Most of the semi-legal cheder schools and yeshivas were shut down" around that time.
Arrests rolled on from the late 1920s in the Hasidic underground. Yakov-Zakharia Maska
lik
was arrested in 1937, Abrom-Levik Slavin was arrested in 1939. By the end of 1933, "23
7
synagogues were closed, that is, 57% of all existing in the first years of Soviet auth
ority ... In
the mid-1930s, the closure of synagogues accelerated." From 1929, "the authorities beg
an
to impose excessive tax on matzo baking." In 1937, "the Commission on the Questions o
f
Religions at the Central Executive Committee of the USSR prohibited baking matzo in Je
wish
religious communities." In 1937-38 "the majority of clergy of the Jewish religious cul
t were
persecuted. There were no rabbis in the majority of still-functioning synagogues."[98]
"In
1938 a 'hostile rabbinical nest' was discovered in the Moscow Central Synagogue; the r
abbis
and a number of parishioners were arrested." [99] The Rabbi of Moscow, Shmuel-Leib
Medalia, was arrested and executed in 1938. (His son, Moishe Medalia, was arrested at
the
same time). In 1937, the Rabbi of Saratov, losif Bogatin, was arrested. [100]

In the early 1930s, when the Jewish religion was restricted in the USSR, the closing o
f
thousands of Orthodox Christian temples and the destruction of many of them rolled alo
ng
throughout the entire country. They especially hurried to "liberate" Soviet Moscow fro
m the
church; Boris lofan was in charge of that "reconstruction." In that bitter and hungry
year of
devastating breakdown of the country, they promoted projects for a grand Palace of Sov
iets
in place of the Cathedral of Christthe Savior. Izvestiya reports: "So far, eleven proj
ects are
presented at the exhibition. Particularly interesting among them are the works of arch
itects
Fridman, B. lofan, Bronshtein, and Ladovsky."[101] Later, the arrests reached the arch
itects
as well.
276

The move toward "settling the toiling Jews on the land" gradually became irrelevant fo
r
Soviet Jews. "The percentage of Jewish settlers abandoning lands given to them remaine
d
high." In 1930-32, the activity of foreign Jewish philanthropic organizations such as
Agro-
Joint, OKG, and EKO in the USSR, had noticeably decreased." And although in 1933-38 it
had
still continued within the frameworks of new restrictive agreements, "in 1938 the acti
vity
ceased completely." "In the first half of 1938, first the OZET and then the Committee
for
Settling the Toiling Jews on the Land (KomZET) were dissolved. The overwhelming majori
ty
of remaining associates of these organizations, who were still at liberty, were persec
uted."
By 1939, "the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine decided to liquidat
e
...'the artificially' created national Jewish districts and boroughs. "[102]

Nonetheless, the idea of a Jewish colony in Birobidzhan was not abandoned in the 1930s
and
was even actively advanced by government. In order to put spirit into the masses, the
authorities staged the Second Ail-Union Congress of the OZET in Moscow in December
1930.[103] By the end of 1931, the general population of that oblast was 45,000 with o
nly
5,000 Jews among them, although whole villages with homes were built for their settlem
ent
and access roads were laid (sometimes by inmates from the camps nearby; for example, t
he
train station of Birobidzhan was constructed in this manner). [104] Yet non-Jewish
colonization of the region went faster than Jewish colonization.

In order to set matters right, in autumn of 1931 the Presidium of the Central Executiv
e
Committee of the RSFSR decreed that another 25,000 Jews should be settled in Birobidzh
an
during the next two years, after which it would be possible to declare it the Jewish
Autonomous Republic. However, in the following years the number of Jews who left
exceeded the number of Jews arriving, and by the end of 1933, after six years of colon
ization,
the number of settled Jews amounted only to 8,000; of them only 1,500 lived in rural a
reas,
i.e. worked in kolkhozes; that is, the Jews comprised less than 1/5 of all kolkhoz wor
kers
there. (There is also information that the land in the Jewish kolkhozes was fairly oft
en tilled
by hired Cossacks and Koreans). The oblast could not even provide enough agricultural
products for its own needs. [105]

Nevertheless, in May 1934, when the non-Jewish population had already reached 50,000,
Birobidzhan was loudly declared a Jewish Autonomous Oblast. (It still did not qualify
for the
status of a "republic")

Thus, there was no "national enthusiasm among the Jewish masses, which would ease the
overcoming of the enormous difficulties inherent in such colonization." There was no
industry in Birobidzhan, and "the economic and social structure" of the settlers "rese
mbled
that of contemporary Jewish towns and shtetls in Ukraine and Belorussia" This was
particularly true for the city of Birobidzhan, especially considering "the increased r
ole of the
Jews in the local administrative apparatus."[106]

277

Culture in Yiddish had certainly developed in the autonomous oblast- there were Jewis
h
newspapers, radio, schools, a theater named after Kaganovich (its director was the fut
ure
author E. Kazakevich), a library named after Sholem Aleichem, a museum of Jewish cultu
re,
and public reading facilities. Perets Markish had published the exultant article, A Pe
ople
Reborn, in the central press. "[107] (In connection with Birobidzhan, let's note the f
ate of the
demographer llya Veitsblit. His position was that "the policy of recruitment of poor u
rban
Jews in order to settle them in rural areas should end"; "there are no declasse indivi
duals
among the Jews, who could be suitable for Birobidzhan." He was arrested in 1933 and li
kely
died in prison). [108]

Yet the central authorities believed that that the colonization should be stimulated e
ven
further; and from 1934 they began a near compulsory recruitment among Jewish artisans
and workers in the western regions, that is, among the urban population without a slig
htest
knowledge of agriculture. The slogan rang out: "The entire USSR builds the Jewish
Autonomous Oblast!" - meaning that recruitment of non-Jewish cadres is needed for
quicker development. The ardent Yevsek Dimanshtein wrote that "we do not aim to create
a
Jewish majority in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast as soon as possible; ... this would
contradict to the principles of internationalism. "[109]

But despite all these measures, during the next three years only another 11,000 to eig
ht or
nine thousand Jews were added to those already living there; still, most of newcomers
preferred to stay in the oblast capital closerto its railroad station and looked for
opportunities to escape). Yet as we know, the Bolsheviks may not be defeated or dispir
ited.
So, because of dissatisfaction with the KomZET, in 1936 the "Central Executive Committ
ee of
the USSR decided to partially delegate the overseeing of Jewish resettlement in the Je
wish
Autonomous Oblast to the resettlement department of the NKVD."[110] In August of 193
6,
the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR proclaimed that "for the
first
time in the history of the Jewish people, their ardent desire to have their own homela
nd has
been realized and their own national statehood has been established. "[Ill] And now th
ey
began planning resettlement of 150,000 more Jews to Birobidzhan.

Looking back at it, the Soviet efforts to convert the Jews to agriculture suffered the
same
defeat as the Tsarist efforts a century before.

In the meantime, the year 1938 approached. KomZET was closed, OZET was disbanded, and
the main Yevseks in Moscow and the administrators of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast wer
e
arrested. Those Birobidzhan Jews who could left for the cities of the Far East or for
Moscow.
According to the 1939 Census, the general population of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast
consisted of 108,000 people; however, "the number of Jews there remained secret ... th
e
Jewish population of Birobidzhan was still low." Presumably, eighteen Jewish kolkhozes
still
existed, of 40-50 families each,[112] but in those kolkhozes ... they conversed and
corresponded with the authorities in Russian.

278
Yet what could Birobidzhan have become for Jews? Just forty-five years later, the Isra
eli
General Beni Peled emphatically explained why neither Birobidzhan nor Uganda could giv
e
the Jewish people a sense of connection with the land: "I simply feel that I am not re
ady to
die for a piece of land in Russia, Uganda, or New Jersey!. .."[113]

This sense of connection, after thousands of years of estrangement, was restored by Is

rael.

# # #

The migration of Jews to the major cities did not slowdown in the 1930s. The Jewish
Encyclopedia reports that, according to the Census of 1926, there were 131,000 Jews i
n
Moscow; in 1933, there were 226,500; and in 1939, there were 250,000 Jews. "As a resul
t of
the massive resettlement of Ukrainian Jews, their share among Moscow Jewry increased t
o
80%."[114] In the Book on the Russian Jewry (1968), we find that in the 1930s up to a
half-
million Jews "were counted among government workers, sometimes occupying prominent
posts, primarily in the economy."[115] (The author also reports, that in the 1930s "up
to a
half-million Jews became involved in industry, mainly in manual labor." On the other h
and,
Larin provides another figure, that among the industrial workers there were only 2.7%
Jews
or 200,000[116] or 2.5 times less than the first estimate). "The flow of Jews into the
ranks of
office workers grew constantly. The reason for this was the mass migration to cities,
and also
the sharp increase of the educational level, especially of Jewish youth. "[117] The Je
ws
predominantly lived in the major cities, did not experience artificial social restrict
ions, so
familiarto their Russian peers, and, it needs to be said, they studied devotedly, thu
s
preparing masses of technical cadres for the Soviet future.

Let's glance into statistical data: "in 1929 the Jews comprised 13.5% of all students
in the
higher educational institutions in the USSR; in 1933—12.2%; in 1936—13.3% of all stude
nts,
and 18% of graduate students" (with their share of the total population being only
1.8%);[118] from 1928 to 1935, "the number of Jewish students per 1,000 of the Jewish
population rose from 8.4 to 20.4 [while] per 1,000 Belorussians there were 2.4 student
s, and
per 1,000 Ukrainians - 2.0"; and by 1935 "the percentage of Jewish students exceeded t
he
percentage of Jews in the general population of the country by almost seven times, thu
s
standing out from all other peoples of the Soviet Union. "[119] G.V. Kostirchenko, wh
o
researched Stalin's policies on Jews, comments on the results of the 1939 census: "Aft
er all,
Stalin could not disregard the fact that at the start of 1939 out of every 1,000 Jews,
268 had
a high school education, and 57 out of 1,000 had higher education" (among Russians th
e
figures were, respectively, 81 and 6 per 1,000). [120] It is no secret that "highly su
ccessful
completion of higher education or doctoral studies allowed individuals to occupy socia
lly-
prestigious positions in the robustly developing Soviet economy of the 1930s."[121]

However, in The Book on Russian Jewry we find that "without exaggeration, after Ezho
v's
purges, not a single prominent Jewish figure remained at liberty in Soviet Jewish soci
ety,
journalism, culture, or even in the science."[122] Well, it was absolutely not like th
at, and it

279

is indeed a gross exaggeration. (Still, the same author, Grigory Aronson, in the same
book,
only two pages later says summarily about the 1930s, that "the Jews were not deprived
of
general civil rights ... they continued to occupy posts in the state and party apparat
us", and
"there were quite a few Jews ... in the diplomatic corps, in the general staff of the
army, and
among the professors in the institutions of higher learning. ..Thus we enter into the
year
1939." [123]

The voice of Moscow was that of the People's Artist, Yury Levitan -"the voice of the U
SSR",
that incorruptible prophet of our Truth, the main host of the radio station of the Com
intern
and a favorite of Stalin. Entire generations grew up, listening to his voice: he read
Stalin's
speeches and summaries of Sovinformburo [the Soviet Information Bureau], and the famou
s
announcements about the beginning and the end of the war.[124]

In 1936 Samuil Samosud became the main conductor of the Bolshoi Theatre and served on
that post for many years. Mikhail Gnesin continued to produce music "in the style of m
odern
European music and in the style of the so-called 'New Jewish music'"; Gnesin's sister
s
successfully ran the music school, which developed into the outstanding Musical Instit
ute.
The ballet of Aleksandr Krein was performed in the Mariinsky and Bolshoi theatres. Wel
l,
Krein distinguished himself by his symphony, Rhapsody, that is, a Stalin's speech set
to music.
Krein's brother and nephew flourished also. [125] A number of brilliant musicians rose
to
national and later to international fame: Grigory Ginzburg, Emil Gilels, YakovZak, Lev
Oborin,
David Oistrakh, Yakov Flier and many others. Many established theatre directors, theat
re
and literary critics, and music scholars continued to work without hindrance.

Examining the culture of the 1930s, it is impossible to miss the extraordinary achieve
ments
of the songwriter composers. Isaak Dunaevsky, "a founder of genres of operetta and mas
s
song in Soviet music", "composed easily digestible songs ... routinely glorifying the
Soviet
way of life (The March of Merry Lads, 1933; The Song of Kakhovka, 1935; The Song abou
t
Homeland, 1936; The Song of Stalin, 1936, etc.). Official propaganda on the arts decla
red
these songs ... the embodiment of the thoughts and feelings of millions of Soviet
people. "[126] Dunaevsky's tunes were used as the identifying melody of Moscow Radio.
He
was heavily decorated for his service: he was the first of all composers to be awarded
the
Order of the Red Banner of Labour and elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in th
e
notorious year 1937. Later he was also awarded the Order of Lenin. He used to preach t
o
composers that the Soviet people do not need symphonies. [127]

Matvey Blanterand the brothers Daniil and Dmitry Pokrass were famous for their
complacent hit song If War Strikes Tomorrow ("we will instantly crush the enemy") and
for
their earlier hit the Budyonny March. There were many other famous Jewish songwriters
and composers in 1930s and later: OskarFeltsman, Solovyev-Sedoy, llya Frenkel, Mikhai
l
Tanich, Igor Shaferan, Yan Frenkel and Vladimir Shainsky, etc. They enjoyed copy numbe
rs in
the millions, fame, royalties — come on, who dares to name those celebrities among th
e
oppressed? And after all, alongside the skillfully written songs, how much blaring Sov
iet

280

propaganda did they chum out, confusing, brainwashing, and deceiving the public and
crippling good taste and feelings?

What about movie industry? The modern Israeli Jewish Encyclopedia states that in the 1
930s
"the main role of movies was to glorify the successes of socialism; a movie's entertai
nment
value was minimal. Numerous Jewish filmmakers participated in the development of
standards of a unified and openly ideological film industry, conservative in form and
obsessively didactic. Many of them were already listed in the previous chapter; take,
for
example, D. Vertov's Symphony of the Donbass, 1931, released immediately after the
Industrial Party Trial. Here are a few of the then-celebrated names: F. Ermler (The Co
ming,
The Great Citizen, Virgin Soil Upturned), S. Yutkevich (The Coming, The Miners), the f
amous
Mikhail Romm (Lenin in October, Lenin in 1918), L. Arnshtam (Girlfriends, Friends),
I.
Trauberg (The Son of Mongolia, The Year 1919), A. Zarkhi and I. Kheifits (Hot Days,
Ambassador of the Baltic). [128] Obviously, filmmakers were not persecuted in the 1930
s,
though many cinematography, production and film distribution managers were arrested;
two high-ranking bosses of the central management of the cinema industry, B.Shumyatsk
y
and S. Dukelsky, were even shot. [129]

In the 1930s, Jews clearly comprised a majority among filmmakers. So, who was reallyth
e
victim - deceived viewers, whose souls were steamrolled with lies and rude didactics,
or the
filmmakers, who "forged documentaries, biographies and produced pseudo-historical and
essentially unimportant propaganda films," characterized by "phony monumentality and
inner emptiness"? The Jewish Encyclopedia adds sternly: "Huge numbers of Jewish
operators and directors were engaged in making popular science, educational, and
documentary films, in the most official sphere of the Soviet cinematography, where adr
oit
editing helped to produce a "genuine documentary" out of a fraud. For example, R. Karm
en,
did it regularly without scruples."[130] (He was a glorified Soviet director, producer
of many
documentaries about the civil war in Spain and the Nuremberg Trials; he made "the
anniversary-glorifying film The Great Patriotic War", Vietnam, and a film about Cuba;
he was
a recipient of three USSR State Prizes (the Stalin Prize) and the Lenin Prize; he held
the titles
of the People's Artist of the USSR and the Hero of the Socialist Labor). [131] Let's n
ot forget
filmmaker Konrad Wolf, the brother of the famous Soviet spy, Marcus Wolf.[132]

No, the official Soviet atmosphere of 1930s was absolutely free of ill will toward Jew
s. And
until the war, the overwhelming majority of Soviet Jewry sympathized with the Soviet
ideology and sided with the Soviet regime. "There was no Jewish Question indeed in th
e
USSR before the war -or almost none"; then the "open anti-Semites were not yet in char
ge
of newspapers and journals ... they did not control personnel departments" [133] (quit
e the
opposite - many such positions were occupied by Jews).

Sure, then Soviet "culture" consisted of "Soviet patriotism," i.e., of producing art i
n
accordance with directives from above. Unfortunately, many Jews were engaged in that
pseudo-cultural sphere and some of them even rose to supervise the Russian language

281

culture. In the early 1930s we see B.M. Volin-Fradkin at the head of the Main Administ
ration
for Literary and Publishing Affairs (GlavLit), the organ of official censorship, direc
ting the
development of the culture. Many of the GlavLit personnel were Jewish. For example, i
n
GlavLit, from 1932 to 1941 we see A.I. Bendik, who would become the Director of the Bo
ok
Palace during the war.[134] Emma Kaganova,the spouse of Chekist Pavel Sudoplatov was
"trusted to manage the activities of informants among the Ukrainian intelligentsia.
"[135]
After private publishers were abolished, "a significant contribution to the organizati
on and
management of Soviet government publishers was made by S. Alyansky, M. Volfson, I. lon
ov
(Bernshtein), A. Kantorovich, B. Malkin, I. Berite, B. Feldman, and many others. "[13
6] Soon
all book publishing was centralized in the State Publishing House and there was no oth
er
place for an author to get his work published.

The Jewish presence was also apparent in all branches of the printed propaganda Works
of
the clumsy caricaturist Boris Efimov could be found in the press everyday (he produce
d
extremely filthy images of Western leaders; for instance, he had portrayed Nicholas II
in a
crown carrying a rifle, trampling corpses). Every two to three days, sketches of other
dirty
satirists, like G. Riklin, the piercingly caustic D. Zaslavsky, the adroit Radek, the
persistent
Sheinin and the brothers Tur, appeared in press. A future writer L. Kassil wrote essay
s for
Izvestiya. There were many others: R. Karmen, T. Tess, Kh. Rappoport, D. Chernomordiko
v, B.
Levin, A. Kantorovich, and Ya. Perelman. These names I found in Izvestiya only, and th
ere
were two dozen more major newspapers feeding the public with blatant lies. In additio
n,
there existed a whole sea of ignoble mass propaganda brochures saturated with lies. Wh
en
they urgently needed a mass propaganda brochure devoted to the Industrial Party Trial
(such things were in acute demand for all of the 1930s), one B. Izakson knocked it out
under
the title: "Crush the viper of intervention!" Diplomat E. Gnedin, the son of Parvus, w
rote
lying articles about the "incurable wounds of Europe" and the imminent death of the We
st.
He also wrote a rebuttal article, Socialist Labor in the Forests of the Soviet North,i
n response
to Western "slanders" about the allegedly forced labor of camp inmates felling timbe
r.
When in the 1950s Gnedin returned from a camp after a long term (though, it appears, n
ot
having experienced tree felling himself), he was accepted as a venerable sufferer and
no one
reminded him of his lies in the past.

In 1929-31 Russian historical science was destroyed; the Archaeological Commission, th

e
Northern Commission, Pushkin House, the Library of the Academy of Sciences were all
abolished, traditions were smashed, and prominent Russian historians were sent to rot
in
camps. (How much did we hear about that destruction?) Third and fourth-rate Russian
historians then surged in to occupy the vacant posts and brainwash us for the next hal
f a
century. Sure, quite a few Russian slackers made their careers then, but Jewish ones d
id not
miss their chance.

Already in the 1930s, Jews played a prominent role in Soviet science, especially in th
e most
important and technologically-demanding frontiers, and their role was bound to become

282

even more important in the future. "By the end of 1920s, Jews comprised 13.6% of all
scientists in the country; by 1937 their share increased to 17.6%"; in 1939 there were
more
than 15,000 or 15.7% Jewish scientists and lecturers in the institutions of higher
learning."[137]

In physics, member of the Academy A. F. loffe nurtured a highly successful school. As

early as
1918, he founded the Physical-Technical Institute in Petrograd. Later, "fifteen affili
ated
scientific centers were created"; they were headed by loffe's disciples. "His former s
tudents
worked in many other institutes, in many ways determining the scientific and technolog
ical
potential of the Soviet Union."[138] (However, repressions did not bypass them. In 193
8, in
the Kharkov Physics-Technological Institute, six out of eight heads of departments wer
e
arrested: Vaisberg, Gorsky, Landau, Leipunsky, Obreimov, Shubnikov; a seventh— Ruema
n—
was exiled; only Slutskin remained). [139] The name of Semyon Aisikovich, the construc
tor of
Lavochkin fighter aircraft, was long unknown to the public. [140] Names of many other
personalities in military industry were kept secret as well. Even now we do not know a
ll of
them. For instance, M. Shkud "oversaw development of powerful radio stations,"[141] ye
t
there were surely others, whom we do not know, working on the development of no less
powerful jammers.)
Numerous Jewish names in technology, science and its applications prove that the flowe
r of
several Jewish generations went into these fields. Flipping through the pages of biogr
aphical
tomes of the Russian Jewish Encyclopedia, which only lists the Jews who were born or l
ived
in Russia, we see an abundance of successful and gifted people with real accomplishmen
ts
(which also means the absence of obstacles to career entry and advancement in genera
l).

Of course, scientists had to pay political tribute too. Take, for example, "the First
National
Conference for the Planning of Science" in 1931. Academician loffe stated that "moder
n
capitalism is no longer capable of a technological revolution," it is only possible as
a result of
a social revolution, which has "transformed the once barbaric and backward Russia into
the
Socialist Union of Republics." He praised the leadership of the proletariat in science
and said
that science can be free only under Soviet stewardship. "Militant philosopher" E. Ya.
Kolman
("one of main ideologists of Soviet science in the 1930s"; he fulminated against the M
oscow
school of mathematics) asserted that "we should ... introduce labor discipline in the
sciences,
adopt collective methods, socialist competition, and shock labor methods; he said tha
t
science advances "thanks to the proletarian dictatorship," and that each scientist sho
uld
study Lenin's Materialism and Empirico-criticism. Academician A.G. Goldman (Ukraine)
enthusiastically chimed in: "The academy now became the leading force in the struggle
for
the Marxist dialectic in science!"[142]

The Jewish Encyclopedia summarizes: "At the end of 1930s, the role of the Jews in the
various spheres of the Soviet life reached its apogee for the entire history of the So
viet
regime." According to the 1939 census, 40% of all economically active Jews were state
employees. Around 364,000 were categorized among the intelligentsia. Of them, 106,000

283
were engineers or technologists, representing 14% of all professionals of this categor
y
country-wide; 139,000 were managers at various levels, 7% of all administrators in the
USSR;
"39,000 doctors, or slightly less than 27% of all doctors; 38,000 teachers, or more th
an 3% of
all teachers; "more than 6,500 writers, journalists, and editors; more than 5,000 acto
rs and
filmmakers; more than 6,000 musicians; a little less than 3,000 artists and sculptors;
and
more than 5,000 lawyers ."[143]

In the opinion of the Encyclopedia, such impressive representation by a national minor

ity,
even in the context of official internationalism and brotherhood of the peoples of the
USSR,
created the prerequisites for the backlash by the state. "[144]

***

During his political career, Stalin often allied with Jewish leaders of the communist
party and
relied on many Jewish back-benchers. By the mid-1930s he saw in the example of Hitler
all
the disadvantages of being a self-declared enemy of the Jews. Yet he likely harbored h
ostility
toward them (his daughter's memoirs support this), though even his closest circle was
probably unaware of it. However, struggling against the Trotskyites, he, of course, re
alized
this aspect as well — his need to further get rid of the Jewish influence in the part
y. And,
sensing the war, he perhaps was also grasping that "proletarian internationalism" alon
e
would not be sufficient and that the notion of the "homeland," and even the "Homelan
d",
would be much needed.

S. Schwartz lamented about a nti -revolutionary transformation of the party as the

"unprecedented 'purge' of the ruling party, the virtual destruction of the old party a
nd the
establishment of a new communist party under the same name in its place - new in socia
l
composition and ideology." From 1937 he also noted a "gradual displacement of Jews fro
m
the positions of power in all spheres of public life." "Among the old Bolsheviks who w
ere
involved in the activity before the party came to power and especially among those wit
h the
pre-revolutionary involvement, the percentage of Jews was noticeably higher than in th
e
party on average; in younger generations, the Jewish representation became even smalle
r...
As a result of the purge, almost all important Jewish communists left the scene."[145]
Lazar
Kaganovich was the exception. Still, in 1939, after all the massacres, the faithful co
mmunist
Zemlyachka was made the deputy head of the Soviet of People's Commissars, and S. Dridz
o-
Lozovsky was assigned the position of Deputy to the Narkom of Foreign Affairs. [146] A
nd yet,
in the wider picture, Schwartz's observations are reasonable as was demonstrated abov
e.

S. Schwartz adds that in the second half of 1930s Jews were gradually barred from ente
ring
"institutions of higher learning, which were preparing specialists forforeign relation
s and
foreign trade, and were barred from military educational institutions. "[147] The famo
us
defector from the USSR, I.S. Guzenko, shared rumors about a secret percentage quota o
n
Jewish admissions to the institutions of higher learning which was enforced from 193
9.

284

In the 1990s they even wrote that Molotov, taking over the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1939, publicly announced during the general meeting w
ith
the personnel that he "will deal with the synagogue here," and that he began firing Je
ws on
the very same day. (Still, Litvinov was quite useful during the war in his role as Sov
iet
ambassador to the U.S. They say that upon his departure from the U.S. in 1943 he even
dared to pass a personal letter to Roosevelt suggesting that Stalin had unleashed a n
anti-
Semitic campaign in the USSR). [148]

By the mid-1930s the sympathy of European Jewry toward the USSR had further increase
d.
Trotsky explained it in 1937 on his way to Mexico: "The Jewish intelligentsia ... turn
s to the
Comintern not because they are interested in Marxism or Communism, but in search of
support against aggressive [German] anti-Semitism. "[149] Yet it was this same Cominte
rn
that approved the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the pact that dealt a mortal blow to the Ea
st
European Jewry!

"In September 1939, hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews fled from the advancing Germa
n
armies, fleeing further and further east and trying to head for the territory occupied
by the
Red Army.... For the first two months they succeeded because of the favorable attitude
of
the Soviet authorities. The Germans quite often encouraged this flight." But "at the e
nd of
November the Soviet government closed the border."[150]

In different areas of the front things took shape differently: in some areas, the Sovi
ets would
not admit Jewish refugees at all; in other places they were welcomed but later sometim
es
sent back to the Germans. Overall, it is believed that around 300,000 Jews managed to
migrate from the Western to the Eastern Poland in the first months of the war, and lat
er the
Soviets evacuated them deeper into the USSR. They demanded that Polish Jews register a
s
Soviet citizens, but many of them did not rush to accept Soviet citizenship: after al
l, they
thought, the war would soon be over, and they would return home, or goto America, or t
o
Palestine. (Yet in the eyes of the Soviet regime they thereby immediately fell under t
he
category of "suspected of espionage," especially if they tried to correspond with rela
tives in
Poland). [151] Still, we read in the Chicago Sentinel that the Soviet Union gave refug
e to 90%
of all European Jewish refugees fleeing from Hitler."[152]

According to the January 1939 census, 3,020,000 Jews lived in the USSR. Now, after
occupation of the Baltics, annexation of a part of Poland, and taking in Jewish refuge
es,
approximately two million more Jews were added, giving a total of around 5 million. [1
53]
Before 1939, the Jews were the seventh largest people in the USSR number-wise; now, af
ter
annexation of all Western areas, they became the fourth largest people of the USSR, af
ter
the three Slavic peoples, Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian. "The mutual non -Aggres
s ion
Pact of 23 August 1939 between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union evoked serious fea
r
about the future of Soviet Jewry, though the policy of the Soviet Union toward its Jew
ish
citizens was not changed." And although there were some reverse deportations, overal
l,

285

"the legal status of Jewish population remained unchanged during the 20 months of the
Soviet-Germa n col la boration." [154]

With the start of war in Poland, Jewish sympathies finally crystallized and Polish Jew
s, and
the Jewish youth in particular, met the advancing Red Army with exulting enthusiasm. T
hus,
according to many testimonies (including M. Agursky's one), Polish Jews, like their co
-ethnics
in Bessarabia, Bukovina and Lithuania, became the main pillarof the Soviet regime,
supporting it tooth and nail.

Yet how much did these East European Jews know about what was going on in the USSR?

They unerringly sensed that a catastrophe was rolling at them from Germany, though sti
ll
not fully or clearly recognized, but undoubtedly a catastrophe. And so the Soviet welc
ome
appeared to them to embody certain salvation.

Sources:

[I] Izvestiya, January 22, 1928, p. 1.

[2] Izvestiya, January 26, 1928, p. 3.

[3] A. Sutton. Wall Street and the BolshevikRevolution. Moscow, 1998; p. 210, 212.
[4] Ibid, p. 214, 215.

[5] A. Voronel // "22": Obshchestvenno-pol iticheskiy i literaturniyzhurnal evreyskoyi

ntelligentsiiizSSSRv
Izraile [Social, Political and Literary Journal of the Jewish Intel I i gents i a from
the USSR in Israel (henceforth -
"22")]. Tel-Aviv, 1986, (50), p. 160.

[6] Izvestiya, November 30, 1936, p. 2.

[7] Rossiyskaya Evreiskaya Entsiklopediya [The Russian Jewish Encyclopedia (hencefort

h— RJE)]. 2nd Ed.
Moscow, 1994. v.l, p. 527-528.

[8] Robert Conquest. Bolshoy Terror [The Great Terror]. Firenze: Edizioni Aurora, 197
4, p. 70, 73.

[9] RJE, v. 3, p. 95.

[10] Izvestiya, July 14, 1930, p. 1.

[II] Izvestiya, February 11, 1934, p. 1-2.

[12] RJE, v. 2, p. 163.

[13] RJE, v. 3, p. 189.

[14] Ibid., p. 283, 344.

[15] Izvestiya, January 18, 1936, p. 1 and February 6, 1936, p. 3.

[16] RJE, V. 1, p. 394.
[17] Ibid., p. 313.

286

[18] See, for example: Izvestiya, June 12, 1930;March 14 and 17, 1931; January 6, 193
4;January 10 and
February 21,1936.

[19] Izvestiya, December 25, 1930, p. 1.

[20] Izvestiya, March 14, 1931, p. 3-4; March 17, p. 1-2.

[21] Izvestiya, February 2, 1931, p. 4; May 30, p. 1.

[22] Izvestiya, February 20, 1936, p. 4.

[23] RJE, v. 3, p. 497.

[24] RJE, v. 2, p. 98, 256.

[25] RJE, v. 1, p. 418.

[26] Ibid., p. 483.

[27] See, for example: Izvestiya, May 17, 1931, p. 3.

[28] Izvestiya, December 9, 1936, p. 1.

[29] Izvestiya, July 7, 1930, p. 2.

[30] RJE, v.l, p. 222, 387;v. 3, p. 237, 464.

[31] Izvestiya, November 14, 1930, p. 2; November 16, p. 4.

[32] Izvestiya, February 13, 1931, p. 3.

[33] Izvestiya, April 9,1936, p. 2.

[34] Izvestiya, November 5, 1930, p. 2; November 11, p. 5.

[35] Izvestiya, June 11, 1936, p. 2.

[36] V. Boguslavskiy.Vzashchitu Kunyayeva [In Defense of Kunyayev] // "22", 1980, (1

6), p. 174.
[37] Izvestiya, April 24, 1931, p. 2.
[38] Izvestiya, May 18, 1930, p. 1.

[39] Kratkaya Evreiskaya Entsiklopediya [The Short Jewish Encyclopedia (henceforth —SJ
E)]. Jerusalem, 1976-
2001. v. 4, p. 879.

[40] RJE, v. 3, p. 58.

[41] RJE, v. 1, p. 101.

[42] Aron Abramovich. V reshayushchey voyne: Uchastie i rol evreyev SSSR v voyne proti
v natsizma [In the
Deciding War Participation and Role of Soviet Jews in the War against Nazism]. 2nd Edi
tion. Tel -Aviv, 1982. v.l,
p. 61.

[43] RJE, v. 1, p. 63, 376, 515; v. 2, p. 120, 491; v. 3, p. 300-301.

287

[44] RJE, v. 1, p. 244, 350;v. 2, p. 78; v. 3, p. 179, 206-207,493-494. See alsoAron A

bramovich.V
reshayushchey voyne. [In the Deciding War], v. 1, p. 62.

[45] LYu. Krichevsky. Evrei v apparate VChK-OGPU v 20-e gody [The Jews in the apparatu
s of the Cheka-OGPU
inthe 1920s]// Evrei i russkaya revolyutsia: Material i i issledovaniya [Jews and the
Russian Revolution:
Materials and Research] Compiled by O.V. Budnitsky. Moscow; Jerusalem: Gesharim, 1999,
p. 343-344; see also
Izvestiya, December 20, 1937, p. 2.

[46] Izvestiya, November 27, 1935, p. 1; November 29, p. 1.

[47] Robert Conquest. Bolshoyterror [The Great Terror], p. 187.
[48] RJE, v. 3, p. 473.

[49] Aleksandr Orlov. From the introduction to the book Taynaya istoriya stalinskikh p
restupleniy [The Secret
History of Stalin's Crimes] //Vremya i my: Mezhdunarodny zhurnal literatury i obshches
tvennykh problem
[Epoch and We: International Journal of Literature and Social Problems (henceforth - E
W)]. New York, 1982,
No.67, p. 202.

[50] RJE, v. 2, p. 62.

[51] Izvestiya, September 27, 1936, p. 1; September 30, p. 3. See also RJE, v. 1, p. 1
24.
[52] RJE, v. 2, p. 187, 218, 432; v. 3, p. 358.

[53] A. Kokurin, N. Petrov. NKVD: struktura, funktsii, kadry [The NKVD: Organization,
Functions, Cadres] //
Svobodnaya mysl [Free Thought], 1997, (6), p. 113-116.

[54] RJE, v. 2, p. 22, 51-52,389.

[55] A. Kokurin, N. Petrov. NKVD: struktura, funktsii, kadry [The NKVD: Organization,
Functions, Cadres] //
Svobodnaya mysl [Free Thought], 1997, (6), p. 118.

[56] RJE, v. 2, p.293;v. 3, p. 311.

[57] RJE, v. 1, p. 170.

[58] G.V. Kostirchenko. Taynaya pol itika Stal ina: Vlast i antisemitizm [Stalin's Sec
ret Pol icy: Power and Anti-
semitism]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya [International Relations], 2001, p. 21
0.

[59] The names of those executed and the year of execution are italicized throughout t
he text; in other
instances the date indicates the year of arrest;those who committed suicideon the eve
of arrestand those
who died in custody are mentioned specifically.

[60] See for example: NV. Petrov, K.V. Skorkin. Kto rukovodil NKVD: 1934-1941:Spravoch
nik [Who Ran the
NKVD: 1934-1941. Information Book]. Moscow: Zvenya, 1999.
[61] Pavel Sudoplatov.Spetsoperatsii: Lubyanka i Kreml : 1930s-1950s [Special Operatio
ns: Lubyanka [Prison]
and the Kreml in: the 1930s through the 1950s]. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 1997, p. 440-441.

[62] Izvestiya, May 16, 1992 p. 6.

[63] E. Zhirnov. "Protsedura kazni nosilaomerzitelniy kharakter" [A HorribleExecutio

n]// Komsomolskaya
Pravda, October 28, 1990, p. 2.

288

[64] Robert Conquest. Bolshoy Terror [The Great Terror], p. 797-798.

[65] LYu. Krichevsky. Evrei v apparate VChK-OGPU v 20-e gody [The Jews in the apparatu
s of the Cheka-OGPU
in the 1920s]// Evrei i russkaya revolyutsia: Material i i issledovaniya [Jews and the
Russian Revolution], p. 343,
344.

[66] Robert Conquest. Bolshoy Terror [The Great Terror], p. 459.

[67] Yu. Margol in.Tel-Avivskiy bloknot [Tel -Aviv Notebook] // Novoe RusskoeSlovo [Th
e New Russian Word],
New York, August 5, 1968.

[68] Robert Conquest. Bolshoy Terror [The Great Terror], p. 427-428, 430.

[69] See for example: O.F. Suvenirov. Tragediya RKKA: 1937-1938. [The Tragedy of the R
ed Army: 1937-1938]
Moscow, Terra, 1998.

[70] RJE, v. 3, p. 430. See also Aron Abramovich. V reshayushchey voyne. [Inthe Decidi
ng War], v. 1, p. 66. See
alsoV. Katuntsev, I. Kots. Intsident: Podopleyka Khasanskikh sobitiy [The Incident: th
e Causes of the Lake
KhasanConflict]//Rodina, 1991,(6), p. 17.

[71] RJE, v. 3, p. 82. See also Aron Abramovich, V reshayushchey voyne. [In the Decidi
ngWar] v. 1, p. 64-66.

[72] St. Ivanovich. Evrei i sovetskaya diktatura [The Jews and the Soviet Dictatorshi
p]// Evreyskiy Mir:
Ezhegodnik na 1939 [Jewish World: Yearbook for 1939]. (henceforth — JW-1). Paris:Obedi
nenierussko-
evreyskoy intelligentsii [Association of the Russo-Jewish Intelligentsia], p. 43.

[73] Ibid., p. 44-46.

[74] PismoV.I. Vernadskogo I.I. Petrunkevichu ot 14 lyunya 1927 [A letter from V.I. Ve
rnadsky to I.I.
Petrunkevich of June 14, 1927]// Novy Mir [New World],1989, (12), p. 220.

[75] Mikhail Kheyfetz. Uroki proshlogo [Lessons ofthe Past]// "22", 1989,(63), p. 20
2.

[76] Sonja Margolina. Das Endeder Lugen: Russland und dieJuden im 20. Jahrhundert. Ber
lin:Siedler Verlag,
1992, S. 84.

[77] M. Tsarinnik.Ukrainsko-evreyskiydialog[Ukraino-JewishDialogue]//"22", 1984,(37),

p. 160.

[78] S.M. Schwartz. Antisemitizm v Sovetskom Soyuze [Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Unio
n]. New York: Chekov's
Publishing House, 1952, p. 8, 98-99, 107-108.

[79] New York Times, January 15, 1931, p. 9.

[80] I.V. Stalin.Sochineniya (vl3 tomakh) [Written Works (in 13 vol umes)]. M.: Gospol
itizdat, 1946-1951. v. 13,
p. 28.

[81] Izvestiya, November 30, 1936, p. 2.

[82] S. Pozner. Sovetskaya Rossiya [TheSoviet Russia] //JW-1, p. 260.

[83] S.M. Schwartz. Antisemitizm v Sovetskom Soyuze [Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Unio
n]. New York: Chekov's
Publishing House, 1952, p. 118.

[84] St. Ivanovich. Evrei i Sovetskaya diktatura [The Jews and the Soviet Dictatorshi
p] //JW-1, p. 50, 51,52.

[85] Ibid., p. 51-52.

289
[86] B. Orlov. Rossiya bezevreyev [Russia without Jews] // "22", 1988, (60), p. 160.

[87] Yu. Margolin. Tel -Avivskiybloknot[Tel-AvivNotebook] // Novoe RusskoeSlovo [The N

ew Russian Word],
New York, August 5, 1968.

[88] SJE, v. 8, p. 167.

[89] Ibid., p. 176.

[90] Yu. Mark. Evreyskaya shkola vSovetskom Soyuze [The Jewish School in the Soviet Un
ion] // Kniga o
russkomevreystve: 1917-1967 [The Book of Russian Jewry: 1917-1967 (henceforth — BRJ)].
New York:
Association ofRussian Jews, 1968, p. 239.

[91] SJE, v. 8, p. 176,177, 179.

[92] RJE, v. 2, p. 58, 432.

[93] SJE, v. 8, p. 179,181.

[94] Yu. Mark. Literatura na idish vSovetskoy Rossii [Li teraturein Yiddish inSovietRu
ssia]//BRJ, p. 216.

[95] Ibid., p. 230.

[96] SJE, v. 8, p. 182-183.

[97] RJE, v. 1, p. 15, 417; v. 2, p. 84.

[98] SJE, v. 8, p. 198-199.

[99] Gershon Svet. Evreiskaya religiya vSovetskoy Rossii [TheJewish Religion in Soviet
Russia] // BRJ, p. 209.

[100] RJE, v. 1, p. 145; v. 2, p. 260.

[101] Izvestiya, July 19, 1931, p. 2.

[102] SJE, v. 8, p. 173,190, 193.

[103] Izvestiya. December 12, 1930, p. 2.

[104] S.M. Schwartz, Birobidjan//BRJ, p. 170-171,200.

[105] Ibid., p. 177-78.

[106]S.M. Schwartz, Birobidjan//BRJ, p. 173,180.
[107] Izvestiya, October 26,1936, p. 3.
[108] RJE, v. 1, p. 214.

[109]S.M. Schwartz. Birobidjan//BRJ, p. 176.

[110] SJE, v. 8, p. 190.

[Ill] S.M. Schwartz. Birobidjan//BRJ, p. 177.

[112] Ibid., p. 178, 179.

290

[113] Beni Peled. Mi ne mozhem zhdat eshcho dve tisyachi let! [We Cannot Wait Two Thou
sand Years More!]
[Interview] 1 1 "11", 1981,(17), p. 116.

[114] SJE, v. 5, p. 477-478.

[115] G. Aronson. Evreyskiy vopros v epokhu Stalina [The Jewish Question in the Stali
n's Era]//BRJ, p. 137
[116]Yu. Larin.Evrei i anti-Semitism v SSSR [The Jews and Anti-Semitism inthe USSR].
M.; L: GIZ, 1929,p. 245.
[117] SJE, v. 8, p. 190.
[118] Ibid.

[119] S. Pozner. Sovetskaya Rossiya [The Soviet Russia] //JW-1, p. 264.

[120] G. Kostirchenko.Taynaya politika Stalina [TheSecret Policy of Stalin], p. 198.

[121] SJE, v. 8, p. 190.

[122] G. Aronson. Evreyskiy vopros v epokhu Stalina [The Jewish Question in the Stali
n's Era]// BRJ, p. 138.
[123] Ibid., p. 140-141.
[124] RJE, v. 2, p. 150.

[125]Gershon Svet. Evrei v russkoy muzikalnoyculturevsovetskiy period [The Jews in Rus

sian Musical Culture
inthe Soviet Period]// BRJ, p. 256-262.

[126] SJE, v. 2, p. 393-394.

[127] Yuriy El agin. Ukroshchenie iskusstv [Conquest of the Arts] / Introduction by M.

Rostropovich. New York:
Ermitazh, 1988, p. 340-345.
[128] SJE, v. 4, p. 277.

[129] Ibid., p. 275.

[130] Ibid., p. 277-278.

[131] SJE, v. 4, p. 116.

[132] RJE, v. 1, p. 245-246.

[133] Lev Kopelev. O pravde i terpimosti [Of Truth and Tolerance]. New York: Khronika
Press, 1982, p. 56-57.
[134] RJE, v. 1, p. 108, 238-239.

[135] Pavel Sudoplatov.Spetsoperatsii : Lubyanka i Kreml : 1930s -1950s [Special Opera

tions: Lubyanka [Prison]
and the Kremlin:the 1930s through the 1950s]. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 1997, p. 19.

[136] SJE, v. 4, p. 397.

[137] SJE, v. 8, p. 190-191.

[138] LL Mininberg. Sovetskie evrei v nauke i promishlennosti SSSR vperiod Vtoroi miro
voi voyny (1941 -1945)
[Soviet Jews inthe Soviet Scienceand Industry duringthe Second World War (1941-1945)].
Moscow, 1995, p.
16.

291

[139] Alexander Weiss berg. Conspiracy of Silence. London, 1952, p. 359-360.

[140] SJE, v. 4, p. 660.
[141] RJE, v. 3, p. 401.

[142] Izvestiya, April 7, 1931, p. 2; April 11, p. 3; April 12, p. 4. See also RJE, v.
2, p. 61-62.
[143] SJE, v. 8, p. 191.
[144] SJE, v. 8, p. 191.

[145]S.M. Schwartz. Antisemitizm v Sovetskom Soyuze [Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Unio

n]. New York:
Chekov's Publ ishing House, 1952, p. 111-112,114, 121-122.

[146] RJE, v. 1, p. 486; v. 2, p. 196.

[147] S.M. Schwartz. Evrei v Sovetskom Soyuze s nachala Vtoroi mirovoi voyny (1939-196
5) [Jews in the Soviet
Union after the Beginning of the Second World War (1939-1965)]. New York: Publication
of the American
Jewish Workers Committee, 1966, p. 410.

[148]Z. Sheinis, M.M. Litvinov. Posledniedni [The LastDays]// Sovershenno Sekretno [To
p Secret]. Moscow,
1992,(4), p. 15.

[149] Lev Trotsky. Pochemu oni kayalis [WhyThey Repented] // EW, New York, 1985, (87),
p. 226.

[150] E. Kulisher. Izgnanie i deportatsiya evreev [The Expulsion and Deportation of th

e Jews] // Evrei skiy mir
[The Jewish World], v. 2 (henceforth— JW-2). New York: Soyuz russkikh evreyev v New Yo
rke [The Union of
Russian Jews in New York], 1944, p. 259.

[151] S.M. Schwartz. Evrei v Sovetskom Soyuze s nachala Vtoroi mirovoi voyny (1939-196
5) [Jews in the Soviet
Union after the Beginning of the Second World War (1939-1965)]. New York: Publication
of the American
Jewish Workers Committee, 1966, p. 33-34.

[152]The Sentinel, Chicago, Vol. XXXXIII, (13), 1946, 27 June, p.5.

[153]G. Aronson. Evreyskiy vopros v epokhu Stalina [TheJewish Question in the Stalin's
Era]// BRJ, p. 141.

[154] I. Shekhman. Sovetskoe evreystvo v germano-sovetskoy voyne [Soviet Jewry inthe R

usso-German War]//
JW-2, p. 221-222.

292

Chapter 20: In the camps of GULag

If I haven't been there, it wouldn't be possible for me to compose this chapter.

Before the camps I thought that "one should not notice nationalities", that there are
no
nationalities, there is only humankind.

But when you are sent into the camp, you find it out: if you are of a lucky nationalit
y then
you are a fortunate man. You are provided for. You have survived! But if you are of
a common nationality -well then, no offence...

Because nationality is perhaps the most important trait that gives a prisoner a chance
to be
picked into the life-saving corps of "Idiots" [translator note: from Russian "npwflypo
K" - a
fool or idiot. This is an inmate slang term to denote other inmates who didn't do comm
on
labor but managed to obtain positions with easy duties, usually pretending to be incap
able
of doing hard work because of poor health]. Every experienced camp inmate can confirm
that ethnic proportions among Idiots were very different from those in the general cam
p
population. Indeed, there were virtually no Pribalts among Idiots, regardless of their
actual
number in the camp (and there were many of them); there were always Russians, of cours
e,
but in incomparably smaller proportion than in the camp on average (and those were oft
en
selected from orthodox members of the Party); on the other hand, some others were
noticeably concentrated - Jews, Georgians, Armenians; and Azeris also ended there in h
igher
proportions, and, to some extent, Caucasian mountaineers also.

Certainly, none of them can be blamed for that. Every nation in the Gulag did its bes
t
crawling to survival, and the smallerand nimbler it was, the easierit was to accomplis
h. And
again, Russians were the very last nation in "their own Russian camps", like they were
in the
German Kriegsgefan-genenlagers.

Yet it is not us who could have blamed them, but it is they - Armenians, Georgians,
highlanders, who would have been in their right to ask us: "Why did you establish thes
e
camps? Why do you force us to live in your state? Do not hold us and we will not land
here
and occupy these such attractive Idiotic positions! But while we are your prisoners -
a la
guerre comme a la guerre."

But what about Jews? For Fate interwove Russian and Jews, perhaps forever, which is wh
y
this book is being written.
Before that, before this very line, there will be readers who have been in the camps a
nd who
haven't been, who will be quick to contest the truth of what I say here. They will cla
i m that
many Jews were forced to take part in common labor activities. They will deny that the
re
were camps where Jews were the majority among Idiots. They will indignantly reject tha
t
nations in the camps were helping each other selectively, and, therefore, at the expen
se of
others.

Some others will not consider themselves as distinct "Jews" at all, perceiving themsel
ves as
Russians in everything. Besides, even if there was overrepresentation of Jews on key c
amp

293

positions, it was absolutely unpremeditated, wasn't it? The selection was exclusively
based
on merit and personal talents and abilities to do business. Well, who is to blame if R
ussians
lack business talents?

There will be also those who will passionately assert directly opposite: that it was J
ews who
suffered worst in the camps. This is exactly how it is understood in the West: in Sovi
et camps
nobody suffered as badly as Jews. Among the letters from readers of Ivan Denisovich th
ere
was one from an anonymous Jew: "You have met innocent Jews who languished in camps
with you, and you obviously not at once witnessed their suffering and persecution. The
y
endured double oppression: imprisonment and enmity from the rest of inmates. Tell us
about these people!"

And if I wished to generalize and state that the life of Jews in camps was especially
difficult,
then I would be allowed to do so and wouldn't be peppered with admonitions for unjust
ethnic generalizations. But in the camps, where I was imprisoned, it was the other wa
y
around - the life of Jews, to the extent of possible generalization, was easier.
Semen Badash, my campmate from Ekibastuz, recounts in his memoirs how he had managed
to settle - later, in a camp at Norilsk - in the medical unit: Max Minz asked a radiol
ogist Laslo
Newsbaum to solicit for Badash before a free head of the unit. He was accepted (1). Bu
t
Badash at least finished three years of medical school before imprisonment. Compare th
at
with other nurses - Genkin, Gorelik, Gurevich (like one of my pals, L. Kopelev from Un
zlag) -
who never before in their lives had anything to do with medicine.

Some people absolutely seriously write like this: A. Belinkov "was thrown into the mos
t
despicable category of Idiots..." (and I am tempted to inappropriately add "and langui
shes"
here, though the "Languishers" were the social antipodes of Idiots and Belinkov never
was
among the Languishers). - "To be thrown into the group of ldiots"\ - what's an express
ion!
"To be diminished by being accepted into the ranks of gentlemen"? And here goes the
justification: "To dig soil? But at the age of 23 he not only never did it - he never
saw a
shovel in his life". Well then he had no other choice but to become an Idiot.

Or read what Levitin-Krasnov wrote about one Pinsky, a literature expert, that he was
a
nurse in the camp. Which means that he, on the camp scale, has adhered well. However,
Levitin presents this as an example of the greatest humiliation possible for a profess
or of the
humanities.

Or take prisoner who survived, Lev Razgon, a journalist and not a medic at all, who wa
s
heavily published afterwards. But from his story in "Ogonek" (1988) we find that he us
ed to
be a medic in the camp's medical unit, and, moreover, an unescorted medic. (From other
his
stories we can figure out that he also worked as a senior controller at a horrible tim
ber
logging station. But there is not a single story from which we can conclude that he ev
er
participated in common labor.)

Or a story of Frank Dikler, a Jew from faraway Brazil: he was imprisoned and couldn't
speak
Russian, of course, and guess what? He had pull in the camp, and he has became a chief
of
the medical unit's kitchen - a truly magnificent treasure!
294

Or Alexandr Voronel, who was a "political youngster" when he landed in the camps, say
s
that immediately aftergetting inthe camp, he was "readily assisted... by other Jewish
inmates, who had not a slightest idea about my political views". A Jewish inmate,
responsible for running the bathhouse (a very important Idiot as well), has spotted hi
m
instantly and "ordered him to come if he needs any help"; a Jew from prisoner security
(also
an Idiot) told another Jew, a brigadier: "There are two Jewish guys, Hakim, don't allo
w them
to get in trouble". And the brigadier gave them strong protection. "Other thieves, esp
ecially
"elders", approved him: You are so right, Hakim! You support your own kin! Yet we, Rus
sians,
are like wolves to each other"" (3).

And let's not forget that even during camp imprisonment, by virtue of a common stereot
ype
regarding all Jews as businessmen, many of them were getting commercial offers,
sometimes even when they didn't actively look for such enterprises. Take, for instanc
e, M.
Hafez. He emphatically notes: "What a pity that I can't describe you those camp situat
ions.
There are so many rich, beautiful stories! However, the ethical code of a "reliable Je
w" seals
my mouth. You know even the smallest commercial secret should be kept forever. That's
the
law of the Tribe" (4).

A Lett Ane Bernstein, one of my witnesses from Archipelago, thinks that he managed to
survive in the camps only because in times of hardship he asked the Jews for help and
that
the Jews, judging by his last name and nimble manners, mistook him for their tribesma
n -
and always provided assistance. He says that in all his camps Jews always constituted
the
upper crust, and that the most important free employees were also Jews (Shulman - head
of
special department, Greenberg - head of camp station, Kegels - chief mechanic of the
factory), and, according to his recollections, they also preferred to select Jewish in
mates to
staff their units.
This particular Jewish national contract between free bosses and inmates is impossible
to
overlook. A free Jew was not so stupid to actually see an "Enemy of the People" or an
evil
character preying on "the people's property" in an imprisoned Jew (unlike what a dumb-

headed Russian saw in another Russian). He in the first place saw a suffering tribesma
n - and
I praise them for this sobriety! Those who know about terrific Jewish mutual supportiv
eness
(especially exacerbated by mass deaths of Jews under Hitler) would understand that a f
ree
Jewish boss simply could not indifferently watch Jewish prisoners flounder in starvati
on and
die, and not help. But I am unable to imagine a free Russian employee who would save a
nd
promote his fellow Russian prisoners to the privileged positions only because of thei
r
nationality. Though we have lost 15 millions during collectivization, we are still num
erous.
You can't care about everyone, and nobody would even think about it.

Sometimes, when such a team of Jewish inmates smoothly bands together and, being no
longer impeded by the ferocious struggle for survival, they can engage in extraordinar
y
activities. An engineer named Abram Zisman tells us: "In Novo-Archangelsk camp, in ou
r
spare time, [we] decided to count how many Jewish pogroms occurred over the course of
Russian history. We managed to excite the curiosity of our camp command on this questi
on
(they had a peaceful attitude toward us). JheNachlag [camp commander] was captain
Gremin (N. Gershel, a Jew, son of a tailor from Zhlobin). He sent an inquiry to the ar
chives of
the former Interior Department requesting the necessary information, and after eight

295

months we received an official reply that ... 76 Jewish pogroms occurred from 1811 to
1917
on the territory of Russia with the number of victims estimated at approximately 3,00
0"
(That is, the total number of those who suffered in anyway.) The author reminds us
that during one six-month period in medieval Spain more than twenty thousand Jews wer
e
killed (5).
A plot-like atmosphere emanates from the recollections of Josef Berger, a communist, a
bout
a highly-placed snitch Lev llyich Inzhir. A former Menshevik, arrested in 1930, he
immediately began collaborating with the GPU, fearing reprisals against his family and
the
loss of his apartment in the center of Moscow. He "helped to prepare the Menshevik tri
al"
of 1931, falsely testified against his bestfriends, was absolved and immediately appoi
nted as
a chief accountant of Belomorstroi. During the Yezhovschina he was a chief accountant
of
the GULag "enjoying the complete trust of his superiors and with connections to the ve
ry top
NKVD officials". (Inzhir recalled one "Jewish NKVD veteran who interlarded his words w
ith
aphorisms from Talmud".) He was arrested later again, this time on the wave of anti-Ye
zhov
purges. However, Inzhir' s former colleagues from the GULag favorably arranged his
imprisonment. However, atthis point he turned into an explicit "snitch and provocateu
r",
and other inmates suspected that the plentiful parcels he was receiving were not from
his
relatives but directly from the Third Department. Nevertheless, later in 1953 in the T
ayshet
camp, he was sentenced to an additional jail term, this time being accused of Trotskyi
sm and
of concealing his "sympathies for the State of Israel" from the Third Department (6).

Of worldwide infamy, BelBallag absorbed hundreds of thousands of Russian, Ukrainian an

d
Middle Asian peasants between 1931 and 1932. Opening a newspaper issue from August,
1933, dedicated to the completion of the canal [between White and Baltic seas], we fin
d a
list of awardees. Lower ranking orders and medals were awarded to concreters, steelfix
ers,
etc, but the highest degree of decoration, the Order of Lenin, was awarded to eight me
n
only, and we can see large photographs of each. Only two of them were actual engineer
s,
the rest were the chief commanders of the canal (according to Stalin's understanding o
f
personal contribution). And whom do we see here? Genrikh Yagoda, head of NKVD. Matvei
Berman, head of GULag. Semen Firin, commander of BelBaltlag (by thattime he was alread
y
the commander of Dmitlag, where the story will later repeat itself). Lazar Kogan, head
of
construction (later he will serve the same function at Volgocanal). Jacob Rapoport, de
puty
head of construction. Nafta ly Frenkel, chief manager of the labor force of Belomorstr
oi (and
the evil demon of the whole Archipelago) (7).

And all their portraits were enlarged and reprinted again in the solemnly shameful
book Belomorcanal (8) - a book of huge Scriptural size, like some revelation anticipat
ing
advent of the Millenarian Kingdom.

And then I reproduced these six portraits of villains in Archipelago, borrowing them f
rom
their own exhibition and without any prior editing, showing everybody who was original
ly
displayed. Oh my God, what a worldwide rage has surged! How dared I?! This is anti-
Semitism! lama branded and screwed anti-Semite. At best, to reproduce these portraits
was "national egotism" - i.e. Russian egotism! And they dared to say it despite what f
ollows
immediately on the next pages of Archipelago: how docilely "Kulak" lads were freezing
to
death under their barrows.

296

One wonders, where were their eyes in 1933 when it was printed for the very first
time? Why weren't they so indignant then?

Let me repeat what I professed once to the Bolsheviks: one should be ashamed of hideos
ity
not when it is disclosed to public but when it is done.

A particular conundrum exists with respect to the personality of Naftaly Frenkel, that
tireless
demon of Archipelago: how to explain his strange return from Turkey in 1920's? He
successfully got away from Russia with all his capitals afterthe first harbingers of r
evolution.
In Turkey, he attained a secure, rich and unconstrained social standing, and he never
harbored any Communist ideas. And yet he returned? To come back and become a toy for
the GPU and for Stalin, to spend several years in imprisonment himself, but in return
to
accomplish the most ruthless oppression of imprisoned engineers and the extermination
of
hundreds of thousands of the "de-Kulakized"? What could have motivated his insatiable
evil
heart? I am unable to imagine any possible reason except vengeance toward Russia. If
anyone can provide an alternative explanation, please do so (9).
What else could be revealed by someone with a thorough understanding of the structure
of
the camp command? The head of 1st Department of Belomorstroi was one Wolf; the head o
f
the Dmitrov section of Volgocanal was Bovs hover. The finance division of Belomorstroi
was
headed by L. Berenzon, his deputies were A. Dorfman, the already mentioned Inzhir,
Loevetsky, Kagner, Angert. And how many of the other humbler posts remain unmentione
d?
Is it really reasonable to suppose that Jews were digging soil with shovels and racing
their
hand-barrows and dying under those barrows from exhaustion and emaciation? Well, view
it
as you wish. A. P. Skripnikova and D. P. Vitkovsky, who were there, told me that Jews
were
ove represented among Idiots during construction of Belomorcanal, and they did not rol
l
barrows and did not die under them.

And you could find highly-placed Jewish commanders not only at BelBaltlag. Constructio
n of
the Kotlas-Vorkuta railroad was headed by Moroz (his son married Svetlana Stalina); th
e
special officer-in-charge of GULag in the Far East was Grach. These are only a few of
the
names, which resurfaced accidentally. If a former inmate Thomas Sgovio, an American
national, didn't write to me, I wouldn't be aware about the head of the Chai-Uryinsk M
ining
Administration on Kolyma between 1943-44 (at the depths of the Patriotic War): "Half-
colonel Arm was a tall black-haired Jew with a terrible reputation... His orderly man
was
selling ethanol to everybody, 50 grams for 50 rubles. Arm had his own personal tutor o
f
English -a young American, arrested in Karelia. His wife was paid a salary for an
accountant's position, but she didn't work - her job was actually performed by an inma
te in
the office" (a common practice revealing how families of GULag commanders used to hav
e
additional incomes).

Or take another case: during the age of glosnost, one Soviet newspaper published a sto
ry
about the dreadful GULag administration that built a tunnel between Sakhalin and the
mainland. It was called the "Trust of Arais" (10). Who was that comrade Arais? I have
no idea.
But how many perished in his mines and in the unfinished tunnel?

Sure, I knew a number of Jews (they were my friends) who carried all the hardships of
common labor. In Archipelago, I described a young man, Boris Gammerov, who quickly

297

found his death in the camp. (While his friend, the writer Ingal, was made an accounta
nt
from the very first day in the camp, although his knowledge of arithmetic was very poo
r.) I
knew Volodya Gershuni, an irreconcilable and incorruptible man. I knew Jog Masamed, wh
o
did common labor in the hard labor camp at Ekibastuz on principle, though he was calle
d
upon to join the Idiots. Besides, I would like to list here a teacher Tatyana Moiseevn
a Falike,
who spent 10 years drudging, she said, like a beast of burden. And I also would like t
o name
here a geneticist Vladimir Efroimson, who spent 13 out of his 36 months of imprisonmen
t
(one out of his two terms) doing common labor. He also did it on principle, though he
also
had better options. Relying on parcels from home (one cannot blame him for that), he
picked the hand-barrow precisely because there were many Jews from Moscow in that
Jezkazgan camp, and they were used to settling well, while Efroimson wanted to dispel
any
grudge toward Jews, which was naturally emerging among inmates. And what did his
brigade think about his behavior? - "He is a black sheep among Jews; would a real Jew
roll a
barrow?" He was similarly ridiculed by Jewish Idiots who felt annoyed that he "flaunte
d
himself" to reproach them. In the same vein, another Jew, Jacov Davydovich Grodzensk
y,
who also beavered in the common category, was judged by others: "Is he really a Jew?"

It is so symbolic! Both Efroimson and Grodzenskiy did those right and best things, whi
ch
could be only motivated by the noblest of Jewish appeals, to honestly share the common
lot,
and they were not understood by either side! They are always difficult and derided - t
he
paths of austerity and dedication, the only ones that can save humanity.

I try not to overlook such examples, because all my hopes depend on them.

Let's add here a valiant Gersh Keller, one of the leaders of Kengir uprising in 1954
(he was 30
years old when executed). I also read about Yitzhak Kaganov, commander of an artiller
y
squadron during the Soviet-German war. In 1948, he was sentenced to 25 years for Zioni
sm.
During 7 years of imprisonment he wrote 480 pieces of poetry in Hebrew, which he
memorized without writing them down (11).

During his third trial (July 10, 1978), after already serving two terms, Alexander Gin
sburg,
was asked a question "What is your nationality?" and replied: "Inmate!" That was a wor
thy
and serious response, and it angered the tribunal. But he deserved it for his work for
the
Russian Public Relief Fund, which provided assistance to families of political prisone
rs of all
nationalities, and by his manly vocation. This is what we are - a genuine breed of pri
soners,
regardless of nationality.

However, my camps were different, - spanning from the "great" Belomor to the tiny 121s
t
camp district of the 15th OLP of Moscow's UITLK (which left behind a not inconspicuou
s
semi-circular building at Kaluga's gate in Moscow). Out there, our entire life was dir
ected
and trampled by three leading Idiots: Solomon Solomonov, a chief accountant; David
Burstein, first an "educator" and later a work-assigning clerk; and Isaac Bershader.
(Earlier, in
exactly the same way, Solomonov and Bershader ruled over the camp at the Moscow
Highway Institute, MHI.) Note that all this happened under auspices of a Russian camp
commander, one ensign Mironov.

All three of them came up before my eyes, and to get positions for them, in each case
their
Russian predecessors were instantly removed from the posts. Solomonov was sent in firs
t;

298

he confidently seized a proper position and quickly got on the right side of the ensig
n. (I
think, using food and money from outside.) Soon after that the wretched Bershaderwas
sent in from MHI with an accompanying note "to use him only in the common labor catego
ry"
(a quite unusual situation for a domestic criminal, which probably meant substantial
delinquency). He was about fifty years old, short, fat, with a baleful glare. He walke
d
around condescendingly inspecting our living quarters, with the look of a general from
the
head department.

The senior proctor asked him: "What is your specialty?" - "Storekeeper". - "There is n
o such
specialty" - "Well, I am a storekeeper". - "Anyway, you are going to work in the commo
n
labor brigade". For two days he was sent there. Shrugging his shoulders, he went out,
and,
upon entering the work zone, he used to seat himself on a stone and rest respectably.
The
brigadier would have hit him, but he quailed - the newcomer was so self-confident, tha
t
anyone could sense power behind him. The camp's storekeeper, Sevastyanov, was
depressed as well. For two years he was in charge of the combined provision and sundr
y
store. He was firmly established and lived on good terms with the brass, but now he wa
s
chilled: everything is already settled! Bershader is a "storekeeper by specialty"!

Then the medical unit discharged Bershader from the labor duties on grounds of "poor
health" and after that he rested in the living quarters. Meanwhile, he probably got
something from outside. And within less than a week Sevastyanov was removed from his
post, and Bershaderwas made a storekeeper (with the assistance of Solomonov). Howeve
r,
at this point it was found that the physical labor of pouring grain and rearranging bo
ots,
which was done by Sevastyanov single-handedly, was also contraindicated for Bershader.
So
he was given a henchman, and Solomonov' s bookkeeping office enlisted the latter as se
rvice
personnel. But it was still not a sufficiently abundant life. The best looking proudes
t woman
of the camp, the swan-like lieutenant-sniper M. was bent to his will and forced to vis
it him in
his store-room in the evenings. After Burstein showed himself in the camp, he arranged
to
have another camp beauty, A. S., to come to his cubicle.

Is it difficult to read this? But they were by no means troubled how it looked from ou
tside. It
even seemed as if they thickened the impression on purpose. And how many such little
camps with similarestablishments were there all across the Archipelago?

And did Russian Idiots behave in the same way, unrestrained and insanely!? Yes. But wi
thin
every other nation it was perceived socially, like an eternal strain between rich and
poor,
lord and servant. However, when an alien emerges as a "master over life and death" it
further adds to the heavy resentment. It might appear strange - isn't it all the same
for a
worthless negligible, crushed, and doomed camp dweller surviving at one of his dying
stages? isn't it all the same who exactly seizes the power inside the camp and celebra
tes
crow's picnics over his trench-grave? As it turns out, it is not. These things have be
en etched
into my memory inerasably.

In my play Republic of Labor, I presented some of the events that happened in that cam
p on
Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya 30. Understanding the impossibility of depicting everything like
it was
in reality, because it would be inevitably considered as incitement of anti-Jewish sen
timent
(as if that trio of Jews was not inflaming it in real life, caring little about conseq
uences) I
withheld the abominably greedy Bershader. I concealed Burstein. I recomposed the profi
teer

299

Rosa Kalikman into an amorphous Bella of eastern origin, and retained the only Jew,
accountant Solomonov, exactly like he was in life.

So, what about my loyal Jewish friends after they perused the play? The play aroused
extraordinarily passionate protests from V. L. Teush. He read it not immediately but w
hen
Sovremennik had already decided to stage it in 1962, so the question was far from scho
la rly.
The Teushes were deeply injured by the figure of Solomonov. They thought it was dishon
est
and unjust to show such a Jew (despite that in the real life, in the camp, he was exac
tly as I
showed him) in the age of oppression of Jews. (But then, it appears to me that such ag
e
is everlasting? When have our Jews not been oppressed?) Teush was alarmed and extremel
y
agitated, and put forward an ultimatum that if I did not remove or at least soften up
the
image of Solomonov, then all our friendship will be ruined and he and his wife will no
longer
be able to keep my manuscripts. Moreover, they prophesized that my very name will be
irretrievably lost and blemished if I leave Solomonov in the play. Why not to make him
a
Russian?They were astonished. Is it so important that he be a Jew? (But if it doesn't
matter,
why did Solomonov select Jews to be Idiots?)

I took a chill pill: a sudden censorial ban, no less weighty than the official Soviet
prohibition,
had emerged from an unanticipated direction. However, the situation was soon resolved
by
the official prohibition forbidding Sovremennik to stage the piece.

And there was another objection from Teush: "Your Solomonov has anything but Jewish
personality. A Jew always behaves discreetly, cautiously, suppliantly, and even cunnin
gly, but
from where comes this pushy impudence of jubilant force? This is not true, it cannot h
appen
like this!"

However, I remember not this Solomonov alone, and it was exactly like that! I saw man
y
things in the 1920's and 1930's in Rostov-on-Don. And Frenkel acted similarly, accordi
ng to
the recollections of surviving engineers. Such a slip of a triumphant power into insol
ence and
arrogance is the most repelling thing for those around. Sure, it is usually behavior o
f the
worst and rudest - but this is what becomes imprinted in memory. (Likewise the Russia
n
image is soiled by the obscenities of our villains.)

All these blandishments and appeals to avoid writing about the things like they were -
are
undistinguishablefrom what we heard from the highest Soviet tribunes: about anti-
defamation, about socialist realism -to write like it should be, not like it was.

As ifa creator is capable of forgetting or creating hispastanew! As if the fulltruth c

an be
written in parts, including only what is pleasing, secure and popular.

And how meticulously all the Jewish characters in my books were analyzed with every
personal feature weighted on apothecary scales. But the astonishing story of Grigory
M.,
who did not deliver the order to retreat to a dying regiment because he was frightene
d
(Archipelago GULag, v. 6, Ch. 6) - was not noticed. It was passed over without a singl
e word!
And Ivan Denisovich added insult to injury: there were such sophisticated sufferers bu
t I put
forward a boor!

300

For instance, during Gorbachev's glasnost, emboldened Asir Sandler published his camp
memoirs. "After first perusal, I emphatically rejected One Day In The Life Of Ivan Den
isovich...
the main personage was Ivan Denisovich, a man with minimal spiritual needs, focused on
ly
on his mundane troubles" -and Solzhenitsyn turned him into the national image... (Exac
tly
like all well-meaning communists were grumbling at that time!) While "[Solzhenitsyn]
preferred not to notice the true intelligentsia, the determinant of domestic culture a
nd
science". Sandler was discussing this with Miron Markovich Etlis (both used to be Idio
ts in
medical unit). And Etlis added: "The story is significantly distorted, placed upside d
own".
"Solzhenitsyn failed to emphasize ...the intelligent part of our contingent"... Self-c
entered
reflections [of Ivan Denisovich] about himself... that patience... that pseudo-Christi
an
attitude toward others". And in 1964 Sandler was lucky to relieve his feelings in conv
ersation
with Ehrenburg himself. And the latter affirmatively nodded when Sandler mentioned hi
s
"extremely negative" feeling toward my novelette (12).

However, not a single Jew reproached me that Ivan Denisovich, in essence, attends to C
esar
Markovich as a servant, albeit with good feelings.

Sources:

I CewieH Eaflaw. Koyibiwia Tbi moa, Ko;ibiMa... New York: Effect Publishing Inc.. 198
6, c. 65-66.

2B./lew\nopT. 3nnv\ncb\ cyflb6bi // Bpewta m mm: Me>KflyHapoflHbiM wypnan ^MTepaTypbi

m o6mecTBeHHbix
npo6^ew\. Hbio-MopK, 1991, N2 113. c. 168.

3 f\. BopoHenb. TpeneT nyfleMCKMX 3a6oT. 2-e M3fl. PawiaT-raH: MocKBa-MepycayiMM, 198
1, c. 28-29.

4 Muxan^ XeM4>eu,. MecTO m Bpewifl (eBpeMCKne 3aw\eTKn). Ha punc TpeTbfl BO^Ha, 1978,
c. 93.

5 A. 3ncw\aH. «KHnra o pyccKOM eBpeticTBe» // HoBaa 3a pa, CaH-OpaHU,MCKO, 1960, 7 Ma

n, c. 3.

6 Mocucf) Beprep. Kpywem-ie noKcneHMa: BocnowiMHa hma / llep. c am\n. Firenze: Edizion
i Aurora. 1973, c. 148-
164.

7 M3BecTMJi, 1933. 5 aBrycTa, c. 1-2.

8 EenoMopcKO-EayiTMMCKMM KaHa.n nwieHM CTa^MHa: McTopua CTp o MTeyi bCTBa / riofl pef
l. M. ropbKoro,
ABep6axa. CI". OupuHa. [M.]: McTopua cJ)a6pnKM 3aBOflOB, 1934.

9 noflpo6Hee o OpeHKeyie — b «Apxnne.nare rv/lare».

10 T. MnpoHOBa. TyHHe^b b npoiunoe // KoMCOMO^bCKaa npaBfla, 1989, 18 anpeyia, c. 1.

II PoccMMCKaa EBpeMCKaa 3HU,MK^oneflHfl. 2-e M3fl., ncnp. m flon. M.. 1994. T. 1, c. 5

26-527; 1995. T. 2. c. 27.

12 Acup CaHfl^ep. Y3enKM Ha nawiflTb: 3anncKM pea6n^MTnpoBaHHoro. MaraflaHCKoe khm>kh.

M3fl-BO. 1988, c.
22. 62-64.

301

Chapter 21: During the Soviet-German War

After Kristallnacht (November 1938) the German Jews lost their last illusions about th
e
mortal danger they were facing. With Hitler's campaign in Poland, the deadly storm hea
ded
East. Yet nobody expected that the beginning of the Soviet-German War would move Nazi
politics to a new level, toward total physical extermination of Jews.

While they naturally expected all kinds of hardship from the German conquest, Soviet J
ews
could not envision the indiscriminate mass killings of men and women of all ages - on
e
cannot foresee such things. Thus the terrible and inescapable fate befell those who
remained in the German-occupied territories without a chance to resist. Lives ended
abruptly. But before their death, they had to pass through either initial forced reloc
ation to a
Jewish ghetto, or a forced labor camp, or to gas vans, or through digging one's own gr
ave
and stripping before execution.

The Russian Jewish Encyclopedia gives many names of the Russian Jews who fell victims
to
the Jewish Catastrophe; it names those who perished in Rostov, Simferopol, Odessa, Min
sk,
Belostok, Kaunas, and Narva. There were prominent people among them. The famous
historian S.M. Dubnov spent the entire inter-war period in exile. He left Berlin for R
iga after
Hitler took power. He was arrested during the German occupation and placed in a ghett
o;
"in December 1941 he was included into a column of those to be executed" ."From Viln
a,
historian Dina Joffe and director of the Jewish Gymnasium Joseph Yashunskiy were sent
to
concentration camps (both were killed in Treblinka in 1943). Rabbi Shmuel Bespalov, he
ad of
the Hasidim movement in Bobruisk, was shot in 1941 when the city was captured by the
Germans. Cantor Gershon Sirota, whose performance had once "caught the attention of
Nicholas II" and who performed yearly in St. Petersburg and Moscow, died in 1941 in
Warsaw. There were two brothers Paul and Vladimir Mintz: Paul, the elder, was a promin
ent
Latvian politician, "the onlyJewinthe government of Latvia". Vladimir was a surgeon, w
ho
had been entrusted with the treatment of Lenin in 1918 after the assassination attemp
t.
From 1920 he lived in Latvia. In 1940 the Soviet occupation authorities arrested Paul
Mintz
and placed him in a camp in Krasnoyarsk Krai, where he died early on. The younger brot
her
lived in Riga and was not touched. He died in 1945 at Buchenwald. Sabina Shpilreyn, a
doctor
of medicine, psychoanalyst and a close colleague of Carl Jung, returned to Russia in 1
923
after working in clinics in Zurich, Munich, Berlin and Geneva;in 1942 she was shot alo
ng with
other Jews by Germans in her native Rostov-on-Don. (In Chapter 19, we wrote about the
deaths of her three scientist brothers during Stalin's terror.)

Yet many were saved from death by evacuation in 1941 and 1942. Various Jewish wartime
and postwar sources do not doubt the dynamism of this evacuation. For example, in The
Jewish World, a book written in 1944, one can read: "The Soviet authorities were fully
aware
that the Jews were the most endangered part of the population, and despite the acute
military needs in transport, thousands of trains were provided for their evacuation.
... In
many cities ... Jews were evacuated first", although the author believes that the stat
ement of
the Jewish writer David Bergelson that "approximately 80% of Jews were successfully
evacuated" 1 is an exaggeration. Bergelson wrote: "In Chernigov, the pre-war Jewish
population was estimated at 70,000 people and only 10,000 of them remained by the tim
e
the Germans arrived. ... In Dnepropetrovsk, out of the original Jewish population of 1
00,000

302

only 30,000 remained when the Germans took the city. In Zhitomir, out of 50,000 Jews,
no
less than 44,000 left." 2 In the Summer 1946 issue of the bulletin, Hayasa E.M. Kulish
er
wrote: "There is no doubt that the Soviet authorities took special measures to evacuat
e the
Jewish population or to facilitate its unassisted flight. Along with the state personn
el and
industrial workers, Jews were given priority [in the evacuation] ... The Soviet author
ities
provided thousands of trains specifically forthe evacuation of Jews." 3 Also, as a saf
er
measure to avoid bombing raids, Jews were evacuated by thousands of haywagons, taken
from kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective farms] and driven over to railway junctions i
n the
rear. B.T. Goldberg, a son-in-law of Sholem Aleichem and then a correspondent for the
Jewish newspaper Der Tog from New York, after a 1946-1947 winter trip to the Soviet Un
ion
wrote an article about the wartime evacuation of Jews {Der Tog, February 21, 1947). Hi
s
sources in Ukraine, "Jews and Christians, the military and evacuees, all stated that t
he policy
of the authorities was to give the Jews a preference during evacuation, to save as man
y of
them as possible so that the Nazis would not destroy them." 4 And Moshe Kaganovich, a
former Soviet partisan, in his by then foreign memoirs (1948) confirms that the Sovie
t
government provided forthe evacuation of Jews all available vehicles in addition to tr
ains,
including trains of haywagons - and the orders were to evacuate "first and foremost th
e
citizens of Jewish nationality from the areas threatened by the enemy". (Note that S.
Schwartz and later researchers dispute the existence of such orders, as well as the ge
neral
policy of Soviet authorities to evacuate Jews "as such." 5 )

Nevertheless, both earlier and later sources provide fairly consistent estimates of th
e
number of Jews who were evacuated or fled without assistance from the German-occupied
territories. Official Soviet figures are not available; all researchers complain that
the
contemporaneous statistics are at best approximate. Let us rely then on the works of t
he last
decade. A demographer M. Kupovetskiy, who used formerly unavailable archival material
s
and novel techniques of analysis, offers the following assessment. According to the 19
39
census, 3,028,538 Jews lived in the USSR within its old (that is, pre-1939-1940) bound
aries.
With some corrections to this figure and taking into account the rate of natural incre
ase of
the Jewish population from September 1939 to June 1941 (he analyzed each territory
separately), this researcher suggests that at the outbreak of the war approximately
3,080,000 Jews resided within the old USSR borders. Of these, 900,000 resided in the
territories which would not be occupied by Germans, and at the beginning of the war 2,
180,
000 Jews ("Eastern Jews") 6 resided in the territories later occupied by the Germans.
"There
is no exact data regarding the number of Jews who fled or were evacuated to the East
before the German occupation. Though based on some studies we know that
approximately 1,000,000 -1,100,000 Jews managed to escape from the Eastern regions lat
er
occupied by Germans". 7

There was a different situation in the territories incorporated into the Soviet Union
only in
1939-1940, and which were rapidly captured by the Germans at the start of the "Blitzkr
eig".
The lightning-speed German attack allowed almost no chance for escape; meanwhile the
Jewish population of these "buffer" zones numbered 1,885,000 ("Western Jews") in June
1941. 8 And "only a small number of these Jews managed to escape or were evacuated. It
is
believed that the number is ... about 10-12 percent." 9

303
Thus, within the new borders of the USSR, by the most optimistic assessments,
approximately 2,226,000 Jews (2,000,000 Eastern, 226,000 Western Jews) escaped the
German occupation and 2,739,000 Jews (1,080,000 Easterners and 1,659,000 Westerners)
remained in the occupied territories.

Evacuees and refugees from the occupied and threatened territories were sent deep into
the
rear, "with the majority of Jews resettled beyond the Ural Mountains, in particular i
n
Western Siberia and also in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan". 10 The materials
of
the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (EAK) contain the following statement: "At the begin
ning
of the Patriotic War about one and half million Jews were evacuated to Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and other Central Asian Republics." 11 This figure does not include the Vol
ga, the
Ural and the Siberian regions. (However, the Jewish Encyclopedia argues that "a 1,500,
000
figure" is a great exaggeration." 12 ) Still, there was no organized evacuation into B
irobidzhan,
and no individual refugees relocated there, although, because of the collapse of Jewis
h
kolkhozes, the vacated housing there could accommodate up to 11,000 families. 13 At th
e
same time, "the Jewish colonists in the Crimea were evacuated so much ahead of time th
at
they were able to take with them all livestockand farm implements"; moreover, "it is w
ell-
known that in the spring of 1942, Jewish colonists from Ukraine established kolkhozes
in the
Volga region" How? Well, the author calls it the "irony of Nemesis": they were install
ed in
place of German colonists who were exiled from the German Republic of the Volga by Sov
iet
government order starting on August 28, 1941. 14

As already noted, all the cited wartime and postwar sources agree in recognizing the e
nergy
and the scale of the organized evacuation of Jews from the advancing German army. But
the
later sources, from the end of the 1940s, began to challenge this. For example, we rea
d in a
1960s source: "a planned evacuation of Jews as the most endangered part of the populat
ion
did not take place anywhere in Russia" (italicized as in the source). 15 And twenty ye
ars later
we read this: after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, "contrary to the rumors t
hat
the government allegedly evacuated Jews from the areas under imminent threat of Germa
n
occupation, no such measures had ever taken place. ... the Jews were abandoned to thei
r
fate. When applied to the citizen of Jewish nationality, the celebrated 'proletarian
internationalism' was a dead letter". 16 This statement is completely unfair.

Still, even those Jewish writers, who deny the "beneficence" of the government with re
spect
to Jewish evacuation, do recognize its magnitude. "Due to the specific social structur
e of the
Jewish population, the percentage of Jews among the evacuees should have been much
higher than the percentage of Jews in the urban population". 17 And indeed it was. Th
e
Evacuation Council was established on June 24, 1941, just two days after the German
invasion (Shvernik was the chairman and Kosygin and Pervukhin were his deputies) .Its
priorities were announced as the following: to evacuate first and foremost the state a
nd
party agencies with personnel, industries, and raw materials along with the workers o
f
evacuated plants and their families, and young people of conscription age. Between th
e
beginning of the war and November 1941, around 12 million people were evacuated from
the threatened areas to the rear. 18 This number included, as we have seen, 1,000,000
to
1,100,000 Eastern Jews and more than 200,000 Western Jews from the soon-to-be-occupie
d
areas. In addition, we must add to this figure a substantial number of Jews among the
people evacuated from the cities and regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialis
t

304

Republic (RSFSR, that is, Russia proper) that never fell to the Germans (in particula
r, those
from Moscow and Leningrad). Solomon Schwartz states: "The general evacuation of state
agencies and industrial enterprises with a significant portion of their staff (often w
ith
families) was in many places very extensive. Thanks to the social structure of Ukraini
an
Jewry with a significant percentages of Jews among the middle and top civil servants,
including the academic and technical intelligentsia and the substantial proportion of
Jewish
workers in Ukrainian heavy industry, the share of Jews among the evacuees was larger t
han
their share in the urban (and even more than in the total) population." 19

The same was true for Byelorussia. In the 1920s and early 1930s it was almost exclusiv
ely
Jews, both young and old, who studied at "various courses, literacy classes, in day sc
hools,
evening schools and shift schools. ... This enabled the poor from Jewish villages to j
oin the
ranks of industrial workers. Constituting only 8.9% of the population of Byelorussia,
Jews
accounted for 36% of the industrial workers of the republic in 1930. " 20

"The rise of the percentage of Jews among the evacuees", continues S. Schwartz, "was a
lso
facilitated by the fact that for many employees and workers the evacuation was not
mandatory. ... Therefore, many, mostly non-Jews, remained were they were." Thus, even
the
Jews, "who did not fit the criteria for mandatory evacuation ... had better chances t
o
evacuate". 21 However, the author also notes that "no government orders or instruction
s on
the evacuation specifically of Jews or reports about it ever appeared in the Soviet pr
ess".
"There simply were no orders regarding the evacuation of Jews specifically. It means t
hat
there was no purposeful evacuation of Jews." 22

Keeping in mind the Soviet reality, this conclusion seems ill grounded and, in any cas
e,
formalistic. Indeed, reports about mass evacuation of the Jews did not appear in the S
oviet
press. It is easy to understand why. First, after the pact with Germany, the Soviet Un
ion
suppressed information about Hitler's policies towards Jews, and when the war broke ou
t,
the bulk of the Soviet population did not know about the mortal danger the German
invasion posed for Jews. Second, and this was probably the more -important factor- Ger
man
propaganda vigorously denounced "Judeo-Bolshevism" and the Soviet leadership
undoubtedly realized that they gave a solid foundation to this propaganda during the 1
920s
and 1930s, so how could they now declare openly and loudly that the foremost governmen
t
priority must be to save Jews? This could only have been seen as playing into Hitler's
hands.

Therefore, there were no public announcements that among the evacuees "Jews were over-

represented". "The evacuation orders did not mention Jews", yet "during the evacuation
the
Jews were not discriminated" against 23 ; on the contrary they were evacuated by all a
vailable
means, but in silence, without press coverage inside the USSR. However, propaganda fo
r
foreign consumption was a different matter. For example, in December 1941, after repul
sing
the German onslaught on Moscow, Radio Moscow - not in the Russian language, of cours
e,
but "in Polish", and on "the next day, five more times in German, compared the success
ful
Russian winter counteroffensive with the Maccabean miracle" and told the German-
speaking listeners repeatedly that "precisely during Hanukkah week", the 134 th Nuremb
erg
Division, named after the city "where the racial legislation originated" was destroye
d. 24 In
1941- 42 the Soviet authorities readily permitted worshippers to overfill synagogues i
n
Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov and to openly celebrate the Jewish Passover of 1942. 2
5

305

We cannot say that the domestic Soviet press treated German atrocities with silence. I
lya
Ehrenburg and others (like the journalist Kriger) got the go-ahead to maintain and inf
lame
hatred towards Germans throughout the entire war and not without mentioning the burnin
g
topic of Jewish suffering, yet without a special stress on it. Throughout the war Ehre
nburg
thundered, that "the German is a beast by his nature", calling for "not sparing even u
nborn
Fascists" (meaning the murder of pregnant German women), and he was checked only at th
e
very end, when the war reached the territory of Germany and it became clearthat the Ar
my
had embraced only too well the party line of unbridled revenge against all Germans.

However these is no doubt that the Nazi policy of extermination of the Jews, its
predetermination and scope, was not sufficiently covered by the Soviet press, so that
even
the Jewish masses in the Soviet Union could hardly realize the extent of their danger.
Indeed,
during the entire war, there were few public statements about the fate of Jews under
German occupation. Stalin in his speech on Nov. 6, 1941 (the 24 th anniversary of the
October
Revolution) said: "The Nazis are ... as eagerto organize medieval Jewish pogroms as th
e
Tsarist regime was. The Nazi Party is the party ... of medieval reaction and the Black
-Hundred
pogroms." 26 "Asfaraswe know", an Israeli historian writes, "it was the only case duri
ng the
entire war when Stalin publicly mentioned the Jews". 27 On January 6, 1942, in a note
of the
Narkomindel [People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs] composed by Molotov and
addressed to all states that maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, th
e Jews
are mentioned as one of many suffering Soviet nationalities, and shootings of Jews in
Kiev,
Lvov, Odessa, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Mariupol, Kerch were highlighted and t
he
numbers of victims listed. "The terrible massacre and pogroms were inflicted by Germa
n
invaders in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. ... A significant number of Jews, including
women and
children, were rounded up; before the execution all of them were stripped naked and
beaten and then ... shot by sub-machine guns. Many mass murders occurred ... in other
Ukrainian cities, and these bloody executions were directed in particular against unar
med
and defenseless Jews from the working class. " 28 0n December 19, 1942, the Soviet
government issued a declaration that mentioned Hitler's "special plan for total
extermination of the Jewish population in the occupied territories of Europe" and in
Germany itself; "although relatively small, the Jewish minority of the Soviet populati
on ...
suffered particularly hard from the savage bloodthirstiness of the Nazi monsters". But
some
sources point out that this declaration was somewhat forced; it came out two days afte
r a
similardeclaration was made by the western Allies, and it was not republished in the S
oviet
press as was always done during newspaper campaigns. In 1943, out of seven reports of
the
Extraordinary State Commission for investigation of Nazi atrocities (such as extermina
tion of
Soviet prisoners of war and the destruction of cultural artifacts of our country), onl
y one
report referred to murders of Jews - in the Stavropol region, near Mineralnye Vody. 29
And in
March 1944 in Kiev, while making a speech about the suffering endured by Ukrainians un
der
occupation, Khrushchev "did not mention Jews at all" 30 .

Probably this is true. Indeed, the Soviet masses did not realize the scale of the Jewi
sh
Catastrophe. Overall, this was our common fate - to live under the impenetrable shell
of the
USSR and be ignorant of what was happening in the outside world. However, Soviet Jews
could not be all that unaware about the events in Germany. "In the mid-thirties the So
viet
Press wrote a lot about German anti-Semitism... A novel by Leon Feichtwanger The
Oppenheim Family and the movie based on the book, as well as another movie, Professor

306

Mamlock, clearly demonstrated the dangers that Jews were facing." 31 Following the
pogroms of Kristallnacht, Pravda published an editorial "The Fascist Butchers and Cann
ibals"
in which it strongly condemned the Nazis: "The whole civilized world watches with disg
ust
and indignation the vicious massacre of the defenseless Jewish population by German
fascists. ... [With the same feelings] the Soviet people watch the dirty and bloody ev
ents in
Germany. ... In the Soviet Union, along with the capitalists and landowners, all sourc
es of
anti-Semitism had been wiped out." 32 Then, throughout the whole November, Pravda
printed daily on its front pages reports such as "Jewish pogroms in Germany", "Beastl
y
vengeance on Jews", "The wave of protests around the world againstthe atrocities of th
e
fascist thugs". Protest rallies against anti-Jewish policies of Hitler were held in Mo
scow,
Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Minsk, Sverdlovsk, and Stalin. Pravda published a detailed a
ccount of
the town hall meeting of the Moscow intelligentsia in the Great Hall of the Conservato
ry,
with speeches given by A.N. Tolstoy, A. Korneychuk, L. Sobolev; People's Artists [a So
viet title
signifying prominence in the Arts] A.B. Goldenweiser and S.M. Mikhoels, and also the t
ext of
a resolution adopted at the meeting: "We, the representatives of the Moscow intelligen
tsia
... raise our voice in outrage and condemnation againstthe Nazi atrocities and inhuman
acts
of violence againstthe defenseless Jewish population of Germany. The fascists beat u
p,
maim, rape, kill and burn alive in broad daylight people who are guilty only of belong
ing to
the Jewish nation." 33 The next day, on November 29, under the headline "Soviet
intelligentsia is outraged by Jewish pogroms in Germany", Pravda produced the full cov
erage
of rallies in other Soviet cities.

However, from the moment of the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in August of 19
39,
not only criticism of Nazi policies but also any information about persecution of the
Jews in
European countries under German control vanished from the Soviet press. "A lot of
messages ...were reaching the Soviet Union through various channels - intelligence,
embassies, Soviet journalists. ... An important source of information... was Jewish re
fugees
who managed to cross the Soviet border. However, the Soviet media, including the Jewis
h
press, maintained silence." 34

"When the Soviet-German War started and the topic of Nazi anti-Semitism was raised aga
in,
many Jews considered it to be propaganda", argues a modern scholar, relying on the
testimonies of the Catastrophe survivors, gathered over a half of century. "Many Jews
relied
on their own life experience rather than on radio, books and newspapers. The image of
Germans did not change in the minds of most Jews since WWI. And back then the Jews
considered the German regime to be one of the most tolerant to them." 35 "Many Jews
remembered, that during the German occupation in 1918, the Germans treated Jews bette
r
than they treated the rest of the local population, and so the Jews were reassured." 3
6 As a
result, "in 1941, a significant number of Jews remained in the occupied territories
voluntarily". And even in 1942, "according to the stories of witnesses... the Jews in
Voronezh,
Rostov, Krasnodar, and other cities waited for the front to roll through their city an
d hoped
to continue their work as doctors and teachers, tailors and cobblers, which they belie
ved
were always needed.... The Jews could not or would not evacuate for purely material
reasons as well." 37

While the Soviet press and radio censored the information about the atrocities committ
ed
by the occupiers againstthe Jews, the Yiddish newspaper Einigkeit ("Unity"), the offic
ial

307
publication of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (EAK), was allowed to write about it
openly
from the summer of 1942. Apparently, the first step in the establishment of EAK was a
radio-
meeting in August 1941of "representatives of the Jewish people" (S. Mikhoels, P. Marqu
es, J.
Ohrenburg, S. Marshak, S. Eisenstein and other celebrities participated.) For propagan
da
purposes, it was broadcast to the US and other Allied countries. "The effect on the We
stern
public surpassed the most optimistic expectations of Moscow. ... In the Allied countri
es the
Jewish organizations sprang up to raise funds for the needs of the Red Army." Their su
ccess
prompted the Kremlin to establish a permanent Jewish Committee in the Soviet Union.
"Thus began the seven-year-long cooperation of the Soviet authorities with global
Zionism." 38

The development of the Committee was a difficult process, heavily dependent on the
attitudes of government. In September 1941, an influential former member of the Bund,
Henryk Ehrlich, was released from the prison to lead that organization. In 1917, Ehrli
ch had
been a member of the notorious and then omnipotent Executive Committee of the
Petrosoviet. Later, he emigrated to Poland where he was captured by the Soviets in 193
9. He
and his comrade, Alter, who also used to be a member of the Bund and was also a native
of
Poland, began preparing a project that aimed to mobilize international Jewish opinion,
with
heavier participation of foreign rather than Soviet Jews. "Polish Bund members were
intoxicated by their freedom... and increasingly acted audaciously. Evacuated to Kuiby
shev
[Samara] along with the metropolitan bureaucracy, they contacted Western diplomatic
representatives, who were relocated there as well,... suggesting, in particular, to fo
rm a
Jewish Legion in the USA to fight on the Soviet-German front". "The things have gone s
o far
that the members of the Polish Bund ... began planning a trip to the West on their ow
n". In
addition, both Bund activists "presumptuously assumed (and did not hide it) that they
could
liberally reform the Soviet political system". In December 1941, both overreaching lea
ders of
the Committee were arrested (Ehrlich hanged himself in prison; Alter was shot). 39

Yet during the spring of 1942, the project of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was re
vived,
and a meeting "of the representatives of Jewish people" was called forth again. ACommi
ttee
was elected, although this time exclusively from Soviet Jews. Solomon Mikhoels became
its
Chairman and Shakhno Epstein, "Stalin's eye 'in Jewish affairs' and a former fanatica
l
Bundist and later a fanatical Chekist, became its Executive Secretary". Among others,
its
members were authors David Bergelson, Peretz Markish, LeibKvitko, and DerNistor;
scientists Lina Shtern and Frumkin, a member of the Academy. Poet Itzik Fefer became t
he
Vice President. (The latter was a former Trotskyite who was pardoned because he compos
ed
odes dedicated to Stalin; he was "an important NKVD agent", and, as a "proven secret
agent", he was entrusted with a trip to the West. 41 ) The task of this Committee was
the
same: to influence international public opinion, and "to appeal to the 'Jews all over
the
world' but in practice it appealed primarily to the American Jews", 42 building up sym
pathy
and raising financial aid for the Soviet Union. (And it was the main reason for Mikhoe
ls' and
FefeKs trip to the United States in summer 1943, which coincided with the dissolution
of
Comintern. It was a roaring success, triggering rallies in 14 cities across the US: 5
0,000
people rallied in New York City alone. Mikhoels and Fefer were received by former Zion
ist
leader Chaim Weizmann and by Albert Einstein. 43 ) Yet behind the scenes the Committee
was
managed by Lozovskiy-Dridzo, the Deputy Head of the Soviet Information Bureau
(Sovinformbureau); the Committee did not have offices in the Soviet Union and could no
t act

308

independently; in fact, it was "not so much a fundraising tool for the Red Army as an
arm of
... pro-Soviet propaganda abroad." 44

Some Jewish authors argue that from the late 1930s there was a covert but persistent
removal of Jews from the highest ranks of Soviet leadership in all spheres of administ
ration.
For instance, D. Shub writes that by 1943 not a single Jew remained among the top
leadership of the NKVD, though "there were still many Jews in the Commissariat of Trad
e,
Industry and Foods. There were also quite a few Jews in the Commissariat of Public
Education and in the Foreign Office." 45 A modern researcher reaches a different concl
usion
based on archival materials that became available in 1990s: "During the 1940s, the rol
e of
Jews in punitive organs remained highly visible, coming to the end only in the postwar
years
during the campaign against cosmopolitanism." 46

However, there are no differences of opinion regarding the relatively large numbers of
Jews
in the top command positions in the Army. The Jewish World reported that "in the Red A
rmy
now [during the war], there are over a hundred Jewish generals" and it provided a "sma
ll
randomly picked list of such generals", not including "generals from the infantry". Th
ere
were 17 names (ironically, "Major-General of Engineering Service Frenkel Naftaliy Aron
ovich"
of GULag was also included). 47 A quarter of a century later, another collection of do
cuments
confirmed that there were no less than a hundred Jewish generals in the middle of the
war
and provided additional names. 48 (However, the volume unfortunately omitted the "Supe
r-
General" Lev Mekhlis -the closest and most trusted of Stalin's henchmen from 1937 to
1940; from 1941 he was the Head of Political Administration of the Red Army. Ten days
after
the start of the war, Mekhlis arrested a dozen of the highest generals of the Western
Front. 49 He is also infamous for his punitive measures during the Soviet-Finnish War
and
then later at Kerch in the Crimea.)

The Short Jewish Encyclopedia provides an additional list of fifteen Jewish generals.
Recently,
an Israeli researcher has published a list of Jewish generals and admirals (including
those
who obtained the rank during the war). Altogether, there were 270 generals and admiral
s!
This is not only "not a few" - this is an immense number indeed. He also notes four wa
rtime
narkoms (people's commissars): in addition to Kaganovich, these were Boris Vannikov
(ammunition), Semien Ginzburg (construction), Isaac Zaltzman (tank industry) and sever
al
heads of main military administrations of the Red Army; the list also contains the nam
es of
four Jewish army commanders, commanders of 23 corps, 72 divisions, and 103 brigades. 5
0
"In no army of the Allies, not even in the USA's, did Jews occupy such high positions,
as in
the Soviet Army", Dr. I. Arad writes. 51 No, "the displacement of Jews from the top po
sts"
during the war did not happen. Nor had any supplanting yet manifested itself in genera
l
aspects of Soviet life. In 1944 (in the USA) a famous Socialist Mark Vishnyak stated t
hat "not
even hardcore enemies of the USSR can say that its government cultivates anti-Semitis
m". 52
Back then - it was undoubtedly true.

According to Einigkeit (from February 24, 1945, almost atthe end of the war), "for cou
rage
and heroism in combat"... 63,374 Jews were awarded orders and medals", and 59 Jews
became the Heroes of the Soviet Union. According to the Warsaw Yiddish language

309

newspaper Volksstimme in 1963 the number of the Jews awarded military decorations in
WWII was 160,772, with 108 Heroes of the Soviet Union among them. 53 In the early 1990
s,
an Israeli author provided a list of names with dates of confirmation , in which 135 J
ews are
listed as Heroes of the Soviet Union and 12 Jews are listed as the full chevaliers of
the Order
of Glory. 54 We find similar information in the three-volume Essays on Jewish Heroism.
55 And
finally, the latest archival research (2001) provides the following figures: "througho
ut the
war 123,822 Jews were awarded military decorations" 56 ; thus, among all nationalities
of the
Soviet Union, the Jews are in fifth place among the recipients of decorations, after R
ussians,
Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Tatars.

I. Arad states that "anti-Semitism as an obstacle for Jews in their military careers,
in
promotion to higher military ranks and insignia did not exist in the Soviet Army durin
g the
war". 57 Production on the home front for the needs of the war was also highly rewarde
d. A
huge influx of Soviet Jews into science and technology during the 1930s had borne its
fruit
during the war. Many Jews worked on the design of new types of armaments and
instrumentation, in the manufacturing of warplanes, tanks, and ships, in scientific re
search,
construction and development of industrial enterprises, in power engineering, metallur
gy,
and transport. For their work from 1941 to 1945 in support of the front, 180,000 Jews
were
awarded decorations. Among them were scientists, engineers, administrators of various
managerial levels and workers, including more than two hundred who were awarded the
Order of Lenin; nearly three hundred Jews were awarded the Stalin Prize in science an
d
technology. During the war, 12 Jews became Heroes of Socialist Labor, eight Jews becam
e
full members of the Academy of Science in physics and mathematics, chemistry and
technology, and thirteen became Member-Correspondents of the Academy. 58

***

Many authors, including S. Schwartz, note that "the role of Jews in the war was
systematically concealed" along with a deliberate policy of "silence about the role of
Jews in
the war". He cites as a proof the works of prominent Soviet writers such as K. Simonov
(Days
and Nights) and V. Grossman (The People Is Immortal) where "among a vast number of
surnames of soldiers, officers, political officers and others, there is not a single J
ewish
name." 59 Of course, this was due to censoring restrictions, especially in case of Gro
ssman.
(Later, military personnel with Jewish names re-appeared in Grossman's essays.) Anothe
r
author notes that postcards depicting a distinguished submarine commander, Israel
Fisanovich, were sold widely throughout the Soviet Union. 60 Later, such publications
were
extended; and an Israeli researcher lists another 12 Jews, Heroes of the Soviet Union,
whose
portraits were mass reproduced on postal envelopes 61 .

Even through I'm a veteran of that war, I have not researched it through books much, n
or
was I collecting materials or have written anything about it. But I sawJews on the fro
nt. I
knew brave men among them. For instance, I especially want to mention two fearless
antitank fighters: one of them was my university friend Lieutenant Emanuel Mazin; anot
her
was young ex-student soldier Borya Gammerov (both were wounded in action). In my
battery among 60 people two were Jews - Sergeant llya Solomin, who fought very well
through the whole war, and Private Pugatch, who soon slipped away to the Political
Department. Among twenty officers of our division one was a Jew - Major Arzon, the hea
d
310

of the supply department. Poet Boris Sluts ky was a real soldier, he used to say: "I'm
full of
bullet holes". Major Lev Kopelev, even though he served in the Political Department of
the
Army (responsible for counter-propaganda aimed at enemy troops), he fearlessly threw
himself in every possible fighting melee. A former "Mifliyetz" Semyon Freylih, a brave
officer,
remembers: "The war began ... . So I was off to the draft board and joined the army" w
ithout
graduating from the University, as "we felt ashamed not to share the hardships of
millions". 62 Ortake Lazar Lazarev, later a well-known literary critic, who as a young
man
fought at the front for two years until both his hands were mauled: "It was our duty a
nd we
would have been ashamed to evade it. ... it was life - the only possible one under th
e
circumstances, the only decent choice for the people of my age and education". 63 Bori
s
Izrailevich Feinerman wrote in 1989 in response to an article in Book Review, that as
a 17-
year-old, he volunteered in July 1941 for an infantry regiment; in October, his both l
egs were
wounded and he was taken prisoner of war; he escaped and walked out of the enemy's
encirclement on crutches - then of course he was imprisoned for 'treason'" - but in 19
43 he
managed to get out of the camp by joining a penal platoon; he fought there and later
became a machine gunner of the assault infantry unit in a tank regiment and was wounde
d
two more times.

We can find many examples of combat sacrifice in the biographical volumes of the most
recent Russian Jewish Encyclopedia. Shik Kordonskiy, a commander of a mine and torped
o
regiment, "smashed his burning plane into the enemy cargo ship"; he was posthumously
made a Hero of the Soviet Union. Wolf Korsunsky, "navigator of the air regiment", beca
me a
Hero of the Soviet Union too. Victor Hasin, "a Hero of the Soviet Union ... squadron
commander ... participated in 257 air skirmishes, personally shot down a number of th
e
enemy's airplanes", destroyed another 10 on the ground; he was shot down over "the
enemy occupied territory, and spent several days reaching and crossing the front line
s. He
died in hospital from his wounds". One cannot express it better! The Encyclopedia cont
ains
several dozens names of Jews who died in combat.

Yet, despite these examples of unquestioned courage, a Jewish scholar bitterly notes
"the
widespread belief in the army and in the rear that Jews avoided the combat units". 54
This is a
noxious and painful spot. But, if you wish to ignore the painful spots, do not attempt
to write
a book about ordeals that were endured together.

In history, mutual national perceptions do count. "During the last war, anti-Semitism
in
Russia increased significantly. Jews were unjustly accused of evasion of military serv
ice and
in particular, of evasion of front line service." 65 "It was often said about Jews tha
t instead of
fighting, they stormed the cities of Alma-Ata and Tashkent." 66 Here is a testimony of
a Polish
Jew who fought in the Red Army: "In the army, young and old had been trying to convinc
e
me that ... there was not a single Jew on the front . 'We've got to fight for them.' I
was told
in a 'friendly' manner: 'You're crazy. All your people are safely sitting at home. How
come
you are here on the front?'" 67 1. Arad writes: "Expressions such as 'we are at the fr
ont, and
the Jews are in Tashkent', 'one never sees a Jew at the front line'could be heard amon
g
soldiers and civilians a like." 68 1 testify: Yes, one could hear this among the soldi
ers on the
front. And right after the war - who has not experienced that? - a painful feeling rem
ained
among our Slavs that our Jews could have acted in that war in a more self-sacrificing
manner,
that among the lower ranks on the front the Jews could have been more represent.

311

These feelings are easy to blame (and they are blamed indeed) on unwarranted Russian a
nti-
Semitism. (However, many sources blame that on the "German propaganda" digested by ou
r
public. What a people! They are good only to absorb propaganda - be it Stalin's or Hit
ler's -
and they are good for nothing else!) Now that it is half a century passed since then.
Isn't it
time to unscramble the issue?

There are no official data available on the ethnic composition of the Soviet Army duri
ng the
Second World War. Therefore, most studies on Jewish participation in the war provide o
nly
estimates, often without citation of sources or explanation of the methods of calculat
ion.
However, we can say that the 500,000 figure had been firmly established by 1990s: "Th
e
Jewish people supplied the Red Army with nearly 500,000 soldiers." 69 "During World Wa
r II,
550,000 Jews served in the Red Army." 70 The Short Jewish Encyclopedia notes that "onl
y in
the field force of the Soviet Army alone there were over 500,000 Jews", and "these fig
ures
do not include Jewish partisans who fought against Nazi Germany". 71 The same figures
are
cited in Essays on Jewish heroism, in Abramovich's book In the Deciding War and in oth
er
sources.

We came across only one author who attempted to justify his assessment by providing
readers with details of his reasoning. It was an Israeli researcher, I. Arad, in his t
he above
cited book on the Catastrophe.

Arad concludes that "the total number of Jews who fought in the ranks of the Soviet Ar
my
against the German Nazis was no less than 420,000-430,000". 72 He includes in this num
ber
"the thousands of Jewish partisans who fought against the German invaders in the wood
s"
(they were later incorporated into the regular army in 1944 after the liberation of We
stern
Byelorussia and Western Ukraine. At the same time, Arad believes that during the war
"approximately 25,000-30,000 Jewish partisans operated in the occupied areas of the So
viet
Union". 73 (The Israeli Encyclopedia in the article "Anti-Nazi Resistance" provides a
lower
estimate: "In the Soviet Union, more than 15,000 Jews fought against the Nazis in the
underground organizations and partisan units." 74 ) In his calculations, Arad assumes
that the
proportion of mobilized Jews was the same as the average percentage of mobilized for t
he
entire population of USSR during the war, i.e., 13.0-13.5%. This would yield 390,000-4
05,000
Eastern Jews (out of the total of slightly more than 3 million), save for the fact tha
t "in
certain areas of Ukraine and Byelorussia, the percentage of Jewish population was very
high;
these people were not mobilized because the region was quickly captured by the German
s".
However, the author assumes that in general the mobilization "shortfall" of the Easter
n Jews
was small and that before the Germans came, the majority of males of military age were
still
mobilized - and thus he settles on the number of 370,000-380,000 Eastern Jews who serv
ed
in the army. Regarding Western Jews, Arad reminds us that in 1940 in Western Byeloruss
ia
and Western Ukraine, during the mobilization of conscripts whose year of birth fell be
tween
of 1919 and 1922, approximately 30,000 Jewish youths were enlisted, but the Soviet
government considered the soldiers from the newly annexed western regions as
"unreliable"; therefore, almost all of them were transferred to the Labor Army after t
he war
began. "By the end of 1943, the process of re-mobilization of those who were previousl
y
transferred into the Labor Army began ... and there were Jews among them." The author
mentions that 6,000 to 7,000 Western Jewish refugees fought in the national Baltic div
isions.
By adding the Jewish partisans incorporated into the army in 1944, the author conclude
s:

312

"we can establish that at least 50,000 Jews from the territories annexed to the USSR,
including those mobilized before the war, served in the Red Army". Thus I. Arad comes
to
the overall number of 420,000-430,000 Jews in military service between 1941 and 1944.
75

According to Arad, the number of 500,000 soldiers commonly used in the sources would
imply a general base (500,000 conscripts taken out of the entire Jewish population) o
f
3,700,000-3,850,000 people. According to the above-mentioned sources, the maximum
estimate for the total number of Eastern and Western Jews who escaped the German
occupation was 2,226,000, and even if we were to add to this base all 1,080,000 Easter
n
Jews who remained under the occupation, as though they had had time to supply the arm
y
with all the people of military age right before the arrival of the Germans - which wa
s not
the case - the base would still lack a half-million people. It would have also meant t
hat the
success of the evacuation, discussed above, was strongly underestimated.

There is no such contradiction in Arad's assessment. And though its individual compone
nts
may require correction 76 , overall, it surprisingly well matches with the hitherto un
published
data of the Institute of the Military History, derived from the sources of the Central
Archive
of the Ministry of Defense. According to that data, the numbers of mobilized personne
l
during the Great Patriotic War were as follows:

Russians - 19,650,000
Ukrainians -5,320,000
Byelorussians -964,000
Tartars -511,000
Jews - 434,000
Kazakhs -341,000
Uzbeks - 330,000
Others - 2,500,000 77

Thus, contrary to the popular belief, the number of Jews in the Red Army in WWII was
proportional to the size of mobilization base of the Jewish population. The fraction o
f Jews
that participated in the war in general matches their proportion in the population.

So then, were the people's impressions of the war really prompted by anti-Semitic
prejudice? Of course, by the beginning of the war, a certain part of the older and mid
dle-
aged population still bore scars from the 1920s and 1930s. But a huge part of the sold
iers
were young men who were born at the turn of the revolution or after it; their percepti
on of
the world differed from that of their elders dramatically. Compare: during the First W
orld
War, in spite of the spy mania of the military authorities in 1915 against the Jews wh
o
resided near the front lines, there was no evidence of anti-Semitism in the Russian ar
my. In
1914, out of 5 million Russian Jews, 78 "by the beginning of WWI, about 400,000 Jews w
ere
inducted into the Russian Imperial Army, and by the end of war in 1917 this number rea
ched
500,000". 79 This means that at the outbreak of the war every twelfth Russian Jew foug
ht in
the war, while by the end, one out of ten. And in World War II, every eighth or sevent
h.

So, what was the matter? It can be assumed that the new disparities inside the army pl
ayed
their role with their influences growing stronger and sharper as one moved closerto th
e
deadly frontline.

313

In 1874 Jews were granted equal rights with other Russian subjects regarding universa
l
conscription, yet during WWI until the February Revolution, Tsar Alexander ll's law wh
ich
stipulated that Jews could not advance above the rank of petty officer (though it did
not
apply to military medics) was still enforced. Under the Bolsheviks, the situation had
changed
radically, and during the WWII, as the Israeli Encyclopedia summarizes, "compared to o
ther
nationalities of the Soviet Union, Jews were disproportionately represented among the
senior officers, mainly because of the higher percentage of college graduates among
them". 80 According to I. Arad's evaluation, "the number of Jews-commissars and politi
cal
officers in various units during the war was relatively higher than number of Jews on
other
Army positions"; "atthe very least, the percentage of Jews in the political leadership
of the
army" was "three times higher than the overall percentage of Jews among the population
of
the USSR during that period". 81 In addition, of course, Jews were "among the head
professionals of military medicine ... among the heads of health departments on severa
l
fronts. ... Twenty-six Jewish generals of the Medical Corps and nine generals of the
Veterinary Corps were listed in the Red Army." Thirty-three Jewish generals served in
the
Engineering Corps. 82 Of course, Jewish doctors and military engineers occupied not on
ly high
offices: "among the military medical staff... there were many Jews (doctors, nurses,
orderlies)." 83 Let us recall that in 1926 the proportion of Jews among military docto
rs was
18.6% while their proportion in the male population was 1.7% 84 , and this percentage
could
only increase during the war because of the large number of female Jewish military doc
tors:
"traditionally, a high percentage of Jews in the Soviet medicine and engineering profe
ssions
naturally contributed to their large number in the military units." 85

However undeniably important and necessary for final victory these services were, wha
t
mattered is that not everybody could survive to see it. Meanwhile an ordinary soldie
r,
glancing backfrom the frontline, sawall too clearly that even the second and thi rd ec
helons
behind the front were also considered participants in the war: all those deep-rear
headquarters, suppliers, the whole Medical Corps from medical battalion to higher leve
ls,
numerous behind-the-lines technical units and, of course, all kinds of service personn
el there,
and, in addition, the entire army propaganda machine, including touring ensembles,
entertainment troupes - they all were considered war veterans and, indeed, it was appa
rent
to everyone that the concentration of Jews was much higher there than atthe front line
s.
Some write that "among Leningrad's veteran-writers", the Jews comprised "by most
cautious and perhaps understated assessment... 31%" 86 -that is, probably more. Yet ho
w
many of them were editorial staff? As a rule, editorial offices were situated 10-15 ki
lometers
behind the frontline, and even if a correspondent happened to be atthe front during
hostilities, nobody would have forced him "to hold the position", he could leave immed
iately,
which is a completely different psychology. Many trumpeted their status as "front-line
rs",
but writers and journalists are guilty of it the most. Stories of prominent ones deser
ve a
separate dedicated analysis. Yet how many others - not prominent and not famous - fron
t-
liners settled in various newspaper publishing offices at all levels - at fronts, armi
es, corps
and divisions? Here is one episode. After graduating from the machine gun school, Seco
nd
Lieutenant Alexander Gershkowitz was sent to the front. But, after a spell atthe hospi
tal,
while "catching up with his unit, at a minor railroad station he sensed the familiarsm
ell of
printing ink, followed it - and arrived at the office of a division-level newspaper, w
hich
serendipitously was in need of a front-line correspondent". And his fate had changed.
(But
314

what about catching up with his infantry unit?) "In this new position, he traveled tho
usands
of kilometers of the war roads." 87 . Of course, military journalists perished in the
war as well.

Musician Michael Goldstein, who got "the white ticket" ("not fit") because of poor vis
ion,
writes of himself: "I always strived to be at the front, where I gave thousands of con
certs,
where I wrote a number of military songs and where I often dug trenches." 88 Often? Re
ally?
A visiting musician - and with a shovel in his hands? As a war veteran, I say - an abs
olutely
incredible picture. Or here is another amazing biography. Eugeniy Gershuni "in the sum
mer
of 1941... volunteered for a militia unit, where he soon organized a small pop ensembl
e".
Those, who know about these unarmed and even non-uniformed columns marching to
certain death, would be chilled. Ensemble, indeed! In September 1941, "Gershuni with h
is
group of artists from the militia was posted to Leningrad's Red Army Palace, where he
organized and headed a troop-entertainment circus". The story ends "on May 9, 1945, wh
en
Gershuni's circus threw a show on the steps of the Reichstag in Berlin" 89 .

Of course, the Jews fought in the infantry and on the frontline. In the middle of the
1970s, a
Soviet source provides data on the ethnic composition of two hundred infantry division
s
between January 1, 1943 and January 1, 1944 and compares it to the population share o
f
each nationality within the pre-September 1939 borders of the USSR.. During that perio
d,
Jews comprised respectively 1.5% and 1.28% in those divisions, while their proportion
in the
population in 1939 was 1.78%, Only by the middle of 1944, when mobilization began in t
he
liberated areas, did the percentage of Jews fall to 1.14% because almost all Jews in t
hose
areas were exterminated.

It should be noted here that some audacious Jews took an even more fruitful and energe
tic
part in the war outside of the front. For example, the famous "Red Orchestra" of Trepp
er
and Gurevich spied on Hitler's regime from within until the fall of 1942, passing to t
he
Soviets extremely important strategic and tactical information. (Both spies were arres
ted
and held by the Gestapo until the end of the war; then, after liberation, they were ar
rested
and imprisoned in the USSR - Trepper for 10 years and Gurevich for 15 years. 91 ) Here
is
another example: a Soviet spy, Lev Manevich, was ex-commander of a special detachment
during the Civil War and latera long-term spy in Germany, Austria, and Italy. In 1936,
he was
arrested in Italy, but he managed to communicate with Soviet intelligence even from th
e
prison. In 1943, while imprisoned in the Nazi camps under the name of Colonel Starosti
n, he
participated in the anti-fascist underground. In 1945, he was liberated by the America
ns but
died before returning to the USSR (where he could have easily faced imprisonment). Onl
y 20
years later, in 1965, was he awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumousl
y. 92
(One can also find very strange biographies, such as Mikhail Scheinman's. Since the 19
20s he
served as a provincial secretary of the Komsomol; during the most rampant years of th
e
Union of Militant Atheists he was employed at its headquarters; then he graduated from
the
Institute of Red Professors and worked in the press department of the Central Committe
e of
the VKPb. In 1941, he was captured by the Germans and survived the entire war in capti
vity
- a Jew and a high-level commissar at that! And despite categorical evidence of his
culpability from SMERSH's [Translator's note: a frontline counter-intelligence organiz
ation,
literally, "Death to Spies"] point of view, how could he possibly surviveif he was not
a
traitor? Others were imprisoned for a long time for lesser "crimes". Yet nothing happe
ned,

315

and in 1946 he was already safely employed in the Museum of the History of Religion an
d
then in the Institute of History at the Academy of Science. 93 )

Yet such anecdotal evidence cannot make up a convincing argument for either side and
there are no reliable and specific statistics norare they likely to surface in the fut
ure.

Recently, an Israeli periodical has published some interesting testimony. When a certa
in
Jonas Degen decided to volunteer for a Komsomol platoon at the beginning of the war,
another Jewish youth, Shulim Dain, whom Jonas invited to come and join him, replied "t
hat
it would be really fortunate if the Jews could just watch the battle from afarsince th
is is not
their war, though namely this war may inspire Jews and help them to rebuild Israel. Wh
en I
am conscripted to the army, I'll go to war. But to volunteer? Not a chance." 94 And Da
in was
not the only one who thought like this; in particular, older and more experienced Jews
may
have had similarthoughts. And this attitude, especially among the Jews devoted to the
eternal idea of Israel, is fully understandable. And yet it is baffling, because the a
dvancing
enemy was the arch enemy of the Jews, seeking above all else to annihilate them. How c
ould
Dain and like-minded individuals remain neutral? Did they think that the Russians had
no
other choice but to fight for their land anyway?

One modern commentator (I know him personally - he is a veteran and a former camp
inmate) concludes: "Even among the older veterans these days I have not come across
people with such clarity of thought and depth of understanding" as Shulim Dain (who
perished at Stalingrad) possessed: "two fascist monsters interlocked in deadly embrac
e".
Why should we participate in that? 95

Of course, Stalin's regime was not any better than Hitler's. But for the wartime Jews,
these
two monsters could not be equal! If that other monster won, what could then have
happened to the Soviet Jews? Wasn't this war the personal Jewish war? wasn't it their
own
Patriotic War- to cross arms with the deadliest enemy in the entire Jewish history? An
d
those Jews who perceived the war as their own and who did not separate their fate fro
m
that of Russians, those like Freylikh, Lazarevand Fainerman, whose thinking was opposi
te to
Shulim Dain's, they fought selflessly.

God forbid, I do not explain the Dain's position as "Jewish cowardice". Yes, the Jews
demonstrated survivalist prudence and caution throughout the entire history of the
Diaspora, yet it is this history that explains these qualities. And during the Six-Day
War and
other Israeli wars, the Jews have proven their outstanding military courage.

Taking all that into consideration, Dain's position can only be explained by a relaxed
feeling
of dual citizenship- the very same that back in 1922, Professor Solomon Luriefrom
Petrograd considered as one of the main sources of anti-Semitism (and its explanatio
n) - a
Jew living in a particular country belongs not only to that country, and his loyalties
become
inevitably split in two. The Jews have "always harbored nationalist attitudes, but the
object
of their nationalism was Jewry, not the country in which they lived". 96 Their interes
t in this
country is partial. After all, they - even if many of them only unconsciously - saw ah
ead
looming in the future their very own nation of Israel.

***

316

And what about the rear? Researchers are certain about the "growth of anti-Semitis
m ...
during the war." 97 "The curve of anti-Semitism in those years rose sharply again, and
anti-
Semitic manifestations ... by their intensity and prevalence dwarfed the anti-Semitism
of the
second half of the 1920s." 98 "During the war, anti-Semitism become commonplace in th
e
domestic life in the Soviet deep hinterland." 99

During evacuation, "so-called domestic anti-Semitism, which had been dormant since th
e
establishment of the Stalinist dictatorship in the early 1930s, was revived against th
e
background of general insecurity and breakdown and other hardships and deprivations,
engendered by the war." 100 This statement refers mainly to Central Asia, Uzbekistan,
and
Kazakhstan, "especially when the masses of wounded and disabled veterans rushed there
from the front", 101 and exactly there the masses of the evacuated Jews lived, includi
ng Polish
Jews, who were "torn from their traditional environment" by deportation and who had n
o
experience of Soviet kolkhozes. Here are the testimonies of Jewish evacuees to Central
Asia
recorded soon after the war: "The low labor productivity among evacuated Jews ... serv
ed in
the eyes of the locals as a proof of allegedly characteristic Jewish reluctance to eng
age in
physical labor." 102 "The intensification of [anti-Semitic] attitudes was fueled by th
e Polish
refugees' activity on the commodity markets." 103 "Soon they realized that their regul
ar
incomes from the employment in industrial enterprises, kolkhozes, and cooperative
s ...
would not save them from starvation and death. To survive, there was only one way -
trading on the market or 'speculation'"; therefore, it was the Soviet reality that dro
ve
"Polish Jews to resort to market transactions whether they liked it or not." 104 "The
non-
Jewish population of Tashkent was ill-disposed toward the Jewish evacuees from Ukrain
e.
Some said, 'Look at these Jews. They always have a lot of money.'" 105 "Then there wer
e
incidents of harassment and insults of Jews, threats against them, throwing them out o
f
bread queues." 106 "Anothergroup of RussianJews, mostly bureaucrats with a considerabl
e
amount of cash, inspired the hostility of the locals for inflating the already high ma
rket
prices.

The author proceeds confidently to explain these facts thus: "Hitler's propaganda reac
hes
even here", 108 and he is not alone in reaching such conclusions.

What a staggering revelation! How could Hitler's propaganda victoriously reach and
permeate all of Central Asia when it was barely noticeable at the front with all those
rare
and dangerous-to-touch leaflets thrown from airplanes, and when all private radio rece
iver
sets were confiscated throughout the USSR?

No, the author realizes that there "was yet another reason for the growth of anti-Semi
tic
attitudes in the districts that absorbed evacuees en masse. There, the antagonism betw
een
the general mass of the provincial population and the privileged bureaucrats from the
country's central cities manifested itself in a subtle form. Evacuation of organizatio
ns from
those centers into the hinterland provided the local population with an opportunity to
fully
appreciate the depth of social contrast." 109

***

Then there were those populations that experienced the German invasion and occupatio
n,
for instance, the Ukrainians. Here is testimony published in March 1945 in the bulleti
n of the

317

Jewish Agency for Palestine: "The Ukrainians meet returning Jews with hostility. In Kh
arkov,
a few weeks after the liberation, Jews do not dare to walk alone on the streets at nig
ht. ...
There have been many cases of beating up Jews on the local markets. ... Upon returning
to
their homes, Jews often found only a portion of their property, but when they complain
ed in
courts, Ukrainians often perjured themselves against them." 110 (The same thing happen
ed
everywhere; besides it was useless to complain in court anyway: many of the returning
non-
Jewish evacuees found their old places looted as well.) "There are many testimonies ab
out
hostile attitudes towards Jews in Ukraine after its liberation from the Germans." 111
"As a
result of the German occupation, anti-Semitism in all its forms has significantly incr
eased in
all social strata of Ukraine, Moldova and Lithuania." 112

Indeed, here, in these territories, Hitler's anti-Jewish propaganda did work well duri
ng the
years of occupation, and yet the main point was the same: that under the Soviet regime
the
Jews had merged with the ruling class - and so a secret German report from the occupie
d
territories in October 1941 states that the "animosity of the Ukrainian population aga
inst
Jews is enormous.... they view the Jews ... as informants and agents of the NKVD, whic
h
organized the terror against the Ukrainian people." 113

Generally speaking, early in the war, the "German's plan was to create an impression t
hat it
was not Germans but the local population that began extermination of the Jews"; S.
Schwartz believes that, unlike the reports of the German propaganda press, "the Germa
n
reports not intended for publication are reliable. " 114 He profusely quotes a report
by SS
Standartenfuhrer F. Shtoleker to Berlin on the activities of the SS units under his co
mmand
(operating in the Baltic states, Byelorussia and in some pa rts of the RSFSR) for the
period
between the beginning of the war in the East and October 15, 1941: "Despite facing
considerable difficulties, we were able to direct local anti-Semitic forces toward org
anization
of anti-Jewish pogroms within several hours afterarrival [of German troops]. ...It wa
s
necessary to show that ... it was a natural reaction to the years of oppression by Jew
s and
communist terror. ... It was equally important to establish for the future as an undis
puted
and provable fact that ... the local people have resorted to the most severe measures
against
Bolsheviks and Jews on their own initiative, without demonstrable evidence for any gui
dance
from the German authorities." 115

The willingness of the local population for such initiatives varied greatly in differe
nt occupied
regions. "In the tense atmosphere of the Baltics, the hatred of Jews reached a boiling
point
at the very moment of Hitler's onslaught against Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941." 115
The
Jews were accused of collaboration with the NKVD in the deportation of Baltic citizen
s. The
Israeli Encyclopedia quotes an entry from the diary of Lithuanian physician E. Budvida
yte-
Kutorgene: "All Lithuanians, with few exceptions, are unanimous in their hatred of Jew
s." 117
Yet, the Standartenfuhrer reports that "to our surprise, it was not an easy task ... t
o induce a
pogrom there". This was achieved with the help of Lithuanian partisans, who exterminat
ed
1,500 Jews in Kaunas during the night of June 26 and 2,300 more in the next few days;
they
also burned the Jewish quarter and several synagogues. 118 "Mass executions of the Jew
s
were conducted by the SS and the Lithuanian police on October 29 and November 25, 194
1."
About 19,000 of the 36,000 Jews of Kaunas were shot in the Ninth Fort. 119 "In many
Lithuanian cities and towns, all of the Jewish population was exterminated by local
Lithuanian police under German control in the autumn of 1941." 120 "It was much harder
to

318

induce the same self-cleaning operations and pogroms in Latvia", reports the
Standartenfuhrer, because there "the entire national leadership, especially in Riga, w
as
destroyed or deported by the Bolsheviks." 121 Still, on July 4, 1941, Latvian activist
s in Riga
"set fire to several synagogues into which the Jews had been herded. ... About 2,000 d
ied";
in the first days of occupation, locals assisted in executions by the Germans of sever
al
thousand Jews in the Bikernieki forest near Riga, and in late October and in early Nov
ember
in the shootings of about 27,000 Jews at a nearby railway station Rumbula. 122 In Esto
nia,
"with a small number of Jews in the country, it was not possible to induce pogroms", r
eports
the officer. 123 (Estonian Jews were destroyed without pogroms: "In Estonia, about 2,0
00
Jews remained. Almost all male Jews were executed in the first weeks of the occupation
by
the Germans and their Estonian collaborators. ... The rest were interned in the concen
tration
camp Harku nearTallinn", and by the end of 1941 all of them were killed. 124

But the German leadership was disappointed in Byelorussia. S. Schwartz: "the failure o
f the
Germans to draw sympathy from the broad masses of locals to the cause of extermination
of
Jews... is completely clearfrom secret German documents ...The population invariably a
nd
consistently refrains from any independent action against the Jews." 125 Still, accord
ing to
eyewitnesses in Gorodok in the Vitebsk oblast, when the ghetto was liquidated on Oct.
14,
1941, the "Polizei were worse than the Germans"; 125 and in Borisov, the "Russian poli
ce" (it
follows in the report that they were actually imported from Berlin) "destroyed within
two
days [October 20 and 21, 1941] 6,500 Jews. Importantly, the author of the report notes
that
the killings of Jews were not met with sympathy from the local population: 'Who ordere
d
that... How is it possible...? Now they kill the Jews, and when will be our turn? What
have
these poor Jews done? They were just workers. The really guilty ones are, of course, l
ong
gone.'" 127 And here is a report by a German "trustee", a native Byelorussian from Lat
via: "In
Byelorussia, there is no Jewish question. For them, it's a purely German business, no
t
Byelorussian... Everybody sympathizes with and pities the Jews, and they look at Germa
ns as
barbarians and murderers of the Jews [Judenhenker]: a Jew, they say, is a human being
just
like a Byelorussian." 128 In any case, S. Schwartz writes that "there were no nationa
l
Byelorussian squads affiliated with the German punitive units, though there were Latvi
an,
Lithuanian, and 'mixed' squads; the latter enlisted some Byelorussians as well." 129

The project was more successful in Ukraine. From the beginning of the war, Hitler's
propaganda incited the Ukrainian nationalists ("Bandera ?s Fighters") to take revenge
on the
Jews for the murder of Petliura by Schwa rtzbard. 130 The organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists of Bandera-Melnik (OUN) did not need to be persuaded: even before the Sov
iet-
German War, in April 1941, it adopted a resolution at its Second Congress in Krakow, i
n
which paragraph 17 states: "The Yids in the Soviet Union are the most loyal supporters
of
the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Moscow imperialism in Ukraine... The
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists considers the Yids as the pillar of the Moscow-

Bolshevik regime, while educating the masses that Moscow is the main enemy." 131 Initi
ally,
the "Bandera Fighters" allied with the Germans against the Bolsheviks. During the whol
e of
1940 and the first half of 1941, the OUN leadership was preparing for a possible war
between Germany and the USSR. "Then the main base of the OUN was the
Generalgouvernement, i.e., the Nazi-occupied Poland. ... Ukrainian militias were bein
g
created there, and lists of suspicious persons, with Jews among them, were compiled. L
ater
these lists were used by Ukrainian nationalists to exterminate Jews. ... 'Mobile unit
s' for the

319
East Ukraine were created and battalions of Ukrainian Nationalists, 'Roland' and 'Nakh
tigal',
were formed in the German Army." The OUN arrived in the East [of Ukraine] together wit
h
the frontline German troops. During the summer of 1941 "a wave of Jewish pogroms rolle
d
over Western Ukraine. ... with participation of both Melnyk's and of Bandera's troops.
As a
result of these pogroms, around 28,000 Jews were killed." 132 Among OUN documents, the
re
is a declaration by J. Stetzko (who in July 1941 was named the head of the Ukrainian
government): "The Jews help Moscow to keep Ukraine in slavery, and therefore, I suppor
t
extermination of the Yids and the need to adopt in Ukraine the German methods of
extermination of Jewry." In July, a meeting of Bandera's OUN leaders was held in Lvo
v,
where, among other topics, policies toward Jews were discussed. There were various
proposals: to build the policy "on the principles of Nazi policy before 1939. ... Ther
e were
proposals to isolate Jews in ghettoes. ... But the most radical proposal was made by S
tepan
Lenkavskiy, who stated: 'Concerning the Jews we will adopt all the measures that will
lead to
their eradication.'" 133 And until the relations between the OUN and the Germans
deteriorated (because Germany did not recognize the self-proclaimed Ukrainian
independence), there were "many cases, especially in the first year... when Ukrainian
s
directly assisted the Germans in the extermination of Jews." "Ukrainian auxiliary poli
ce,
recruited by the Germans mainly in Galicia and Volhynia," 134 played a special role.
"In Uman
in September 1941, Ukrainian city police under command of several officers and sergean
ts of
the SS shot nearly 6,000 Jews"; and in early November 6 km outside Rovno, "the SS and
Ukrainian police slaughtered 21,000 Jews from the ghetto." 135 However, S. Schwartz wr
ites:
"It is impossible to figure out which part of the Ukrainian population shared an activ
e anti-
Semitism with a predisposition toward pogroms. Probably quite a large part, particular
ly the
more cultured strata, did not share these sentiments." As for the original part of the
Soviet
Ukraine [within the pre-September 1939 Soviet borders], "no evidence for the 'spontane
ous'
pogroms by Ukrainians could be found in the secret German reports from those areas." 1
36 In
addition, "Tatar militia squads in the Crimea were exterminating Jews also." 137
Regarding indigenous Russian regions occupied by the Germans, the Germans "could not
exploit anti-Russian sentiments and the argument about Moscow's imperialism was
unsustainable; and the argument for any Judeo-Bolshevism, devoid of support in local
nationalism, largely lost its appeal"; among the local Russian population "only relati
vely few
people actively supported the Germans in their anti-Jewish policies of extermination."
138

A researcher on the fate of Soviet Jewry concludes: the Germans in Lithuania and Latvi
a "had
a tendency to mask their pogromist activities, bringing to the fore extermination squa
ds
made up of pogromists emerging under German patronage from the local population"; but
"in Byelorussia, and to a considerable extent even in Ukraine and especially in the oc
cupied
areas of the RSFSR", the Germans did not succeed as "the local population had mostly
disappointed the hopes pinned on it" - and there "the Nazi exterminators had to procee
d
openly." 139

Hitler's plan for the military campaign against the Soviet Union (Operation Barbaross
a)
included "special tasks to prepare the ground for political rule, with the character o
f these
tasks stemming from the all-out struggle between the two opposing political systems."
In

320

May and June 1941, the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht issued more specific
directives, ordering execution without trial of persons suspected of hostile action ag
ainst
Germany (and of political commissars, partisans, saboteurs and Jews in any case) in th
e
theater of Barbarossa. 140

To carry out special tasks in the territory of the USSR, four special groups (Einsatzg
ruppen)
were established within the Security Service (SS) and the Secret Police (Gestapo), tha
t had
operational units (Einsatzkommando) numerically equal to companies. The Einsatzgruppe
n
advanced along with the front units of the German Army, but reported directly to the C
hief
of Security of the Third Reich, Reinhard Heydrich.

Einsatzgruppe A (about 1000 soldiers and SS officers under the command of SS

Standartenfuhrer Dr. F. Shtoleker) of Army Group "North" operated in Lithuania, Latvi
a,
Estonia, and the Leningrad and Pskov oblasts. Group B (655 men, under the command of
Brigadenfuhrer A. Neveu) was attached to Army Group "Centre", which was advancing
through Byelorussia and the Smolensk Oblast toward Moscow. Group C (600,
Standartenfuhrer E. Rush) was attached to Army Group "South" and operated inthe
Western and Eastern Ukraine. Group D (600 men under the command of SS
Standartenfuhrer Prof. O. Ohlendorf) was attached to the 11 th Army and operated in
Southern Ukraine, the Crimea, and in the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions.

Extermination of Jews and commissars ("carriers of the Judeo-Bolshevik ideology") by t

he
Germans began from the first days of the June 1941invasion, though they did so "somewh
at
chaotically and with an extremely broad scope." 141 "In other German-occupied countrie
s,
elimination of the Jewish population proceeded gradually and thoroughly. It usually st
arted
with legal restrictions, continued with the creation of ghettos and introduction of fo
rced
labor and culminated in deportation and mass extermination. In Soviet Russia, all thes
e
elements were strangely intermingled in time and place. In each region, sometimes eve
n
within one city, various methods of harassment were used... there was no uniform or
standardized system." 142 Shooting of Jewish prisoners of war could happen sometimes r
ight
upon capture and sometimes later in the concentration camps; civilian Jews were someti
mes
first confined in ghettoes, sometimes in forced-labor camps, and in other places they
were
shot outright on the spot, and still in other places the "gas vans" were used. "As a r
ule, the
place of execution was an anti-tank ditch, or just a pit." 143

The numbers of those exterminated in the cities of the Western USSR by the winter of 1
941
(the first period of extermination) are striking: according to the documents, in Vilni
us out of
57,000 Jews who had lived there about 40,000 were killed; in Riga out of 33,000 - 27,0
00; in
Minsk out of the 100,000-strong ghetto - 24,000 were killed (there the extermination
continued until the end of occupation); in Rovno out of 27,000 Jews - 21,000 were kill
ed; in
Mogilev about 10,000 Jews were shot; in Vitebsk - up to 20,000; and near Kiselevich vi
llage
nearly 20,000 Jews from Bobruisk were killed; in Berdichev - 15,000 144 .

By late September, the Nazis staged a mass extermination of Jews in Kiev. On September
26
they distributed announcements around the city requiring all Jews, under the penalty o
f
death, to report to various assembly points. And Jews, having no other option but to s
ubmit,
gathered obediently, if not trustingly, altogether about 34,000; and on September 29 a
nd 30,
they were methodically shot at Babi Yar, putting layer upon layers of corpses in a lar
ge

321

ravine. Hence there was no need to dig any graves - a giant hecatomb! According to th
e
official German announcement, not questioned later, 33,771 Jews were shot over the cou
rse
of two days. During the next two years of the Kiev occupation, the Germans continued
shootings in their favorite and so convenient ravine. It is believed that the number o
f the
executed - not only Jews - had reached, perhaps, 100,000. 45

The executions at Babi Yar have become a symbol in world history. People shrug at the
cold-
blooded calculation, the business-like organization, so typical for the 20th century t
hat
crowns humanistic civilization: during the "savage" Middle Ages people killed each oth
er en
masse only in a fit of rage or in the heat of battle.

It should be recalled that within a few kilometers from Babi Yar, in the enormous Darn
itskiy
camp, tens of thousands Soviet prisoners of war, soldiers and officers, died during th
e same
months: yet we do not commemorate it properly, and many are not even aware of it. The
same is true about the more than two million Soviet prisoners of war who perished duri
ng
the first years of the war.

The Catastrophe persistently raked its victims from all the occupied Soviet territorie
s.
In Odessa on October 17, 1941, on the second day of occupation by German and Romanian
troops, several thousand Jewish males were killed, and later, after the bombing of th
e
Romanian Military Office, the total terror was unleashed: about 5,000 people, most of
them
Jews and thousands of others, were herded into a suburban village and executed there.
In
November, there was a mass deportation of people into the Domanevskiy District, where
"about 55,000 Jews" were shot in December and January of 1942 146 . In the first month
s of
occupation, by the end of 1941, 22,464 Jews were killed in Kherson and Nikolayev; 11,0
00 in
Dnepropetrovsk; 8,000 in Mariupol' and almost as many in Kremenchug; about 15,000 in
Kharkov's Drobytsky Yar; and more than 20,000 in Simferopol' and Western Crimea. 147

By the end of 1941, the German High Command had realized that the "blitz" had failed a
nd
that a long war loomed ahead. The needs of the war economy demanded a different
organization of the home front. In some places, the German administration slowed down
the
extermination of Jews in order to exploit their manpower and skills. "As the result, g
hettoes
survived in large cities like Riga, Vilnius, Kaunas, Baranovichi, Minsk, and in other,
smaller
ones, where many Jews worked for the needs of the German war economy." 148 Yet the
demand for labor that prolonged the existence of these large ghettoes did not prevent
resumption of mass killings in other places in the spring of 1942: in Western Byelorus
sia,
Western Ukraine, Southern Russia and the Crimea, 30,000 Jews were deported from the
Grodno region to Treblinka and Auschwitz; Jews of Polesia, Pinsk, Brest-Litovsk, and
Smolensk were eradicated. During the 1942 summer offensive, the Germans killed local J
ews
immediately upon arrival: the Jews of Kislovodsk, Pyatigorsk and Essentuki were killed
in
antitank ditches near Mineralni'ye Vody; thus died evacuees to Essentuki from Leningra
d
and Kishinev. Jews of Kerch and Stavropol were exterminated as well. In Rostov-on-Do
n,
recaptured by the Germans in late July 1942, all the remaining Jewish population was
eradicated by August 11.

In 1943, after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, the outcome of the war became clea
r.
During their retreat, the Germans decided to exterminate all remaining Jews. On June 2
1,
322

1943 Himmler ordered the liquidation of the remaining ghettoes. In June 1943, the ghet
toes
of Lvov, Ternopol, and Drohobych were liquidated. After the liberation of Eastern Gali
cia in
1944, "only 10,000 to 12,000 Jews were still alive, which constituted about 2% of all
Jews
who had remained under occupation." Able-bodied Jews from ghettoes in Minsk, Lida,and
Vilnius were transferred to concentration camps in Poland, Estonia, and Latvia, while
the
rest were shot. Later, during the summer, 1944 retreat from the Baltics, some of the J
ews in
those camps were shot, and some were moved into camps in Germany (Stutthof et al.). 14
9

Destined for extermination, Jews fought for survival: underground groups sprang up in
many
ghettoes to organize escapes. Yet after a successful breakout, a lot depended on the l
ocal
residents - that they not betray the Jews, provide them with non-Jewish papers, shelte
r and
food. In the occupied areas, Germans sentenced those helping Jews to death. 150 "But
everywhere, in all occupied territories, there were people who helped the Jews. ... Ye
t there
were few of them. They risked their lives and the lives of their families. ...There we
re
hundreds, maybe thousands of such people. But the majority of local populations just
watched from a distance." 151 In Byelorussia and the occupied territories of the RSFS
R, where
local populations were not hostile to the remaining Jews and where no pogroms ever
occurred, the local population provided still less assistance to Jews than in Europe o
r even
"in Poland, the country ... of widespread, traditional, folk anti-Semitism." 152 (Summ
aries of
many similartesti monies can be found in books by S. Schwartz and I. Arad.) They plaus
ibly
attribute this not only to the fear of execution but also to the habit of obedience t
o
authorities (developed over the years of Soviet rule) and to not meddling in the affai
rs of
others.

Yes, we have been so downtrodden, so many millions have been torn away from our midst
in previous decades, that any attempt at resistance to government power was foredoome
d,
so now Jews as well could not get the support of the population.
But even well-organized Soviet underground and guerrillas directed from Moscow did lit
tle
to save the doomed Jews. Relations with the Soviet guerrillas were a specially acute p
roblem
for the Jews in the occupied territories. Going into the woods, i.e., joining up with
a partisan
unit, was a better lot for Jewish men than waiting to be exterminated by the Germans.
Yet
hostility to the Jews was widespread and often acute among partisans, and "there were
some Russian detachments that did not accept Jews on principle. They alleged that Jew
s
cannot and do not want to fight", writes a former Jewish partisan Moshe Kaganovich. A
non-
Jewish guerilla recruit was supplied with weapons, but a Jew was required to provide h
is
own, and sometimes it was traded down. "There is pervasive enmity to Jews among
partisans. ... in some detachments anti-Semitism was so strong that the Jews felt comp
elled
to flee from such units." 153

For instance, in 1942 some two hundred Jewish boys and girls fled into the woods from
the
ghetto in the shtetl of Mir in Grodno oblast, and "there they encountered anti-Semitis
m
among Soviet guerrillas, which led to the death of many who fled; only some of them we
re
able to join guerrilla squads." 154 Oranother case: A guerrilla squad under the comman
d of
Ganzenko operated near Minsk. It was replenished "mainly with fugitives from the Mins
k
ghetto", but the "growing number of Jews in the unit triggered anti-Semitic clashes" -
and
then the Jewish part of the detachment broke away. 155 Such actions on the part of th
e

323

guerrillas were apparently spontaneous, not directed from the center. According to Mos
he
Kaganovich, from the end of 1943 "the influence of more-disciplined personnel arriving
from
the Soviet Union" had increased "and the general situation for [the Jews had] somewha
t
improved." 155 However, he complains that when a territory was liberated by the advanc
ing
regular Soviet troops and the partisans were sent to the front (which is true, and eve
rybody
was sent indiscriminately), it was primarily Jews who were sent 157 -and that is incre
dible.

However, Kaganovich writes that Jews were sometimes directly assisted by the partisan
s.
There were even "partisan attacks on small towns in order to save Jews" from ghettoes
and
[concentration] camps, and that "Russian partisan movement helped fleeing Jews to cros
s
the front lines. ... [And in this way they] smuggled across the frontline many thousan
ds of
Jews who were hiding in the forests of Western Byelorussia escaping the carnage." A
partisan force in the Chernigov region accepted "more than five hundred children from
Jewish family camps in the woods, protected them and took care of them... After the Re
d
Army liberated Sarny (on Volyn), several squads broke the front and sent Jewish childr
en to
Moscow." (S. Schwartz believes that "these reports are greatly exaggerated. [But] they
are
based on real facts, [and they] merit attention." 158 )

Jewish family camps originated among the Jewish masses fleeing into the woods and ther
e
"were many thousands of such fugitives." Purely Jewish armed squads were formed
specifically forthe protection of these camps. (Weapons were purchased through third
parties from German soldiers or policemen.) Yet how to feed them all?The only way was
to
take food as well as shoes and clothing, both male and female, by force from the peasa
nts of
surrounding villages. "The peasant was placed between the hammer and the anvil. If he
did
not carry out his assigned production minimum, the Germans burned his household and
killed him as a 'partisan'. On the other hand, guerrillas took from him by force all t
hey
needed" 159 -and this naturally caused spite among the peasants: they are robbed by
Germans and robbed by guerrillas - and now in addition even the Jews rob them? And th
e
Jews even take away clothes from their women?

In the spring of 1943, partisan Baruch Levin came to one such family camp, hoping to g
et
medicines for his sick comrades. He remembers: Tuvia Belsky "seemed like a legendary h
ero
to me. ... Coming from the people, he managed to organize a 1,200-strong unit in the w
oods.
... In the worst days when a Jew could not even feed himself, he cared forthe sick, el
derly
and for the babies born in the woods." Levin told Tuvia about Jewish partisans: "We, t
he few
survivors, no longer value life. Now the only meaning of our lives is revenge. It is o
ur duty -
to fight the Germans, wipe out all of them to the last one." I talked for a long time;
... offered
to teach Belsky's people how to work with explosives, and all other things I have myse
lf
learned. But my words, of course, could not change Tuvia's mindset... 'Baruch, I would
like
you to understand one thing. It is precisely because there are so few of us left, it i
s so
important for me that the Jews survive. And I see this as my purpose; it is the most
important thing for me.'" 160

And the very same Moshe Kaganovich, as late as in 1956, wrotein a book published in
Buenos Aires, "in peacetime, years after the devastating defeat of Nazism" - shows,
according to S. Schwartz, "a really bloodthirsty attitude toward the Germans, an attit
ude
that seems to be influenced by the Hitler plague.... he glorifies putting German priso
ners to

324

'Jewish death' by Jewish partisans according to the horrible Nazi' examples or excited
ly
recalls the speech by a commander of a [Jewish] guerrilla unit given before the villag
ers of a
Lithuanian village who were gathered and forced to kneel by partisans in the square af
ter a
punitive raid against that village whose population had actively assisted the Germans
in the
extermination of Jews (several dozen villagers were executed during that raid)." 161
S.
Schwartz writes about this with a restrained but clearcondemnation.

Yes, a lot of things happened. Predatory killings call for revenge, but each act of re
venge,
tragically, plants the seeds of new retribution in the future.

***

The different Jewish sources variously estimate the total losses among Soviet Jews dur
ing
the Second World War (within the post-war borders).

"How many Soviet Jews survived the war?", asks S. Schwartz and offers this calculatio
n:
1,810,000-1,910,000 (excluding former refugees from the Western Poland and Romania,
now repatriated ). "The calculations imply that the number of Jews by the end of the w
ar
was markedly lower than two million and much lower than the almost universally accepte
d
number of three million." 162 So, the total number of losses according to Schwarz was
2,800,000-2,900,000.

In 1990 I. Arad provided his estimate: "During the liberation of German-occupied terri
tories
... the Soviet Army met almost no Jews. Out of the 2,750,000-2,900,000 Jews who remain
ed
under the Nazi rule [in 1941] in the occupied Soviet territories, almost all died." To
this figure
Arad suggests adding "about 120,000 Jews - Soviet Army soldiers who died on the front,
and
about 80,000 shot in the POW camps", and "tens of thousands of Jews [who died] during
the
siege of Leningrad, Odessa and other cities, and in the deep rear ... because of harsh
living
conditions in the evacuation." 163

Demographer M. Kupovetskiy published several studies in the 1990s, where he used newl
y
available archival materials, made some corrections to older data and employed an
improved technique for ethnodemographic analysis. His result was that the general loss
es of
Jewish population within the postwar USSR borders in 1941-1945 amounted to 2,733,000
(1,112,000 Eastern and 1,621,000 Western Jews), or 55% of 4,965,000 - the total number
of
Jews in the USSR in June 1941. This figure, apart from the victims of Nazi exterminati
on,
includes the losses among the military and the guerrillas, among civilians nearthe fro
nt line,
during evacuation and deportation, as well as the victims of Stalin's camps during the
war.
(However, the author notes, that quantitative evaluation of each of these categories w
ithin
the overall casualty figure is yet to be done. 164 ) Apparently, the Short Jewish Ency
clopedia
agrees with this assessment as it provides the same number. 165

The currently accepted figure for the total losses of the Soviet population during the
Great
Patriotic War is 27,000,000 (if the "method of demographic balance" is used, it is
26,600,000 166 ) and this may still be underestimated.

We must not overlook what that war was for the Russians. The war rescued not only thei
r
country, not only Soviet Jewry, but also the entire social system of the Western world
from
Hitler. This war exacted such sacrifice from the Russian people that its strength and
health

325

have never since fully recovered. That war overstrained the Russian people. It was ye
t
another disasteron top of those of the Civil Warand de-kulakization - and from which t
he
Russian people have almost run dry.

***

The ruthless and unrelenting Catastrophe, which was gradually devouring Soviet Jewry i
n a
multitude of exterminating events all over the occupied lands, was part of a greater
Catastrophe designed to eradicate the entire European Jewry.

As we examine only the events in Russia, the Catastrophe as a whole is not covered in
this
book. Yet the countless miseries having befallen on both our peoples, the Jewish and t
he
Russian, in the 20 th century, and the unbearable weight of the lessons of history an
d
gnawing anxiety about the future, make it impossible not to share, if only briefly, so
me
reflections about it, reflections of mine and others, and impossible not to examine ho
w the
high Jewish minds look at the Catastrophe from the historical perspective and how the
y
attempt to encompass and comprehend it.

It is for a reason that the "Catastrophe" is always written with a capital letter. It
was an epic
event for such an ancient and historical people. It could not fail to arouse the stron
gest
feelings and a wide variety of reflections and conclusions among the Jews.
In many Jews, long ago assimilated and distanced from their own people, the Catastroph
e
reignited a more distinct and intense sense of their Jewishness. Yet "for many, the
Catastrophe became a proof that God is dead. If He had existed, He certainly would nev
er
have allowed Auschwitz." 167 Then there is an opposite reflection: "Recently, a forme
r
Auschwitz inmate said: "In the camps, we were given a new Torah, though we have not be
en
able to read it yet." 168

An Israeli author states with conviction: "The Catastrophe happened because we did no
t
follow the Covenant and did not return to our land. We had to return to our land to re
build
the Temple." 159

Still, such an understanding is achieved only by a very few, although it does permeate
the
entire Old Testament.

Some have developed and still harbor a bitter feeling: "Once, humanity turned away fro
m us.
We weren't a part of the West at the time of the Catastrophe. The West rejected us, ca
st us
away." 170 "We are as upset by the nearly absolute indifference of the world and even
of non-
European Jewry to the plight of the Jews in the fascist countries as by the Catastroph
e in
Europe itself. ... What a great guilt lies on the democracies of the world in general
and
especially on the Jews in the democratic countries! ... The pogrom in Kishinev was an
insignificant crime compared to the German atrocities, to ...the methodically implemen
ted
plan of extermination of millions of Jewish lives; and yet Kishinev pogrom triggered a
bigger
protest... Even the Beilis Trial in Kiev attracted more worldwide attention." 171

But this is unfair. After the world realized the essence and the scale of the destruct
ion, the
Jews experienced consistent and energetic support and passionate compassion from many
nations.

Some contemporary Israelis recognize this and even warn their compatriots against any
such

326
excesses: "Gradually, the memory of the Catastrophe ceased to be just a memory. It ha
s
become the ideology of the Jewish state. ... The memory of the Catastrophe turned into
a
religious devotion, into the state cult. ... The State of Israel has assumed the role
of an
apostle of the cult of the Catastrophe, the role of a priest who collects routine tith
es from
other nations. And woe to those who refuse to pay that tithe!" And in conclusion: "Th
e
worst legacy of Nazism for Jews is the Jew?s role of a super-victim." 172

Here is a similarexcerpt from yet another author: the cult of the Catastrophe has fill
ed "a
void in the souls of secular Jews," "from being a reaction to an event of the past, th
e trauma
of the Catastrophe has evolved into a new national symbol, replacing all other symbol
s." And
"this 'mentality of the Catastrophe' is growing with each passing year"; "if we do not
recover
from the trauma of Auschwitz, we will never become a normal nation." 173

Among the Jews, the sometimes painful work of re-examining the Catastrophe never cease
s.
Here is the opinion of an Israeli historian, a former inmate of a Soviet camp: "I do n
ot belong
to those Jews who are inclined to blame the evil 'goyim' for our national misfortunes
while
casting ourselves as ... poor lambs or toys in the hands of others. Anyway not in the
20 th
century! On the contrary, I fully agree with Hannah Arendt that the Jews of our centur
y were
equal participants in the historical games of the nations and the monstrous Catastroph
e that
befell them was the result of not only evil plots of the enemies of mankind, but also
of the
huge fatal miscalculations on the part of the Jewish people themselves, their leaders
and
activists." 174

Indeed, Hannah Arendt was "searching for the causes of the Catastrophe [also] inJewry
itself. ... Her main argument is that modern anti-Semitism was one of the consequences
of
the particular attitudes of the Jews towards the state and society in Europe"; the Jew
s
"turned out to be unable to evaluate power shifts in a nation state and growing socia
l
contradictions." 175

In the late 1970s, we read in Dan Levin's book: "On this issue, I agree with Prof. Bra
nover
who believes that the Catastrophe was largely a punishment for our sins, including the
sin of
leading the communist movement. There is something in it." 176

Yet no such noticeable movement can be observed among world Jewry. To a great many
contemporary Jews such conclusions appear insulting and blasphemous.

To the contrary: "The very fact of the Catastrophe served as a moral justification for
Jewish
chauvinism. Lessons of the Second World War have been learned exactly contrariwise.
...The
ideology of Jewish Nationalism has grown and strengthened on this soil. This is terrib
ly sad.
A feeling of guilt and compassion towards the nation-victim has become an indulgence,
absolving the sin unforgivable for all others. It is hence comes the moral permissibil
ity of
public appeals not to mix one's own ancient blood with the alien blood." 177

In the late 1980s, a Jewish publicist from Germany wrote: "Today, the 'moral capital'
of
Auschwitz is already spent." 178 One year later, she stated: "Solid moral capital gain
ed by the
Jews because of Auschwitz seems to be depleted"; the Jews "can no longer proceed alon
g
the old way by raising pretensions to the world. Today, the world already has the righ
t to
converse with the Jews as it does with all others"; "the struggle for the rights of Je
ws is no

327

more progressive than a struggle for the rights of all other nations. It is high time
to break
the mirror and look around - we are not alone in this world." 179
It would have been equally great for Russian minds to elevate themselves to similarly
decent
and benevolent self-criticism, especially in making judgments about Russian history of
the
20 th century - the brutality of the Revolutionary period, the cowed indifference of t
he Soviet
times and the abominable plundering of the post-Soviet age. And to do it despite the
unbearable burden of realization that it was we Russians who ruined our history - thro
ugh
our useless rulers but also through our own worthlessness - and despite the gnawing an
xiety
that this may be irredeemable - to perceive the Russian experience as possibly a punis
hment
from the Supreme Power.

Sources:

1 14. LLIexTMaH. CcmeTCKoe eBpeficTBO b repwiaHO-coBeTCKOM BOMHe // EBpeMCKMM w\np: C

6. 2 (flayiee — EM-2).
Hbto-MopK: Coto3 pyccKnx eBpeeB b Hbto-MopKe, 1944. c. 225-226.

2 A.A. ranbflLDTeMH. Cyflb6a eBpeeB b OKKynnpoBaHHOM Hew\u,aMM CoBeTCKOM Poccmm // KHu

ra o pyccKOM
eBpeMCTBe. 1917-1967 (fla.nee — KPE-2). Hbio-MopK: Cok>3 PyccKMX EBpeeB, 1968, c. 89,
92.

3 Rescue: Information Bulletin ofthe Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIA
S), July-August 1946
(Vol. Ill, N2 7-8), p. 2. — U,ht. no: C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM CoK)3e c Hanayia B
topom mmpobom BOMHbi
(1939-1965). HbKD-MopK: M3fl. AwiepuKaHCKoro EBpeficKoro Pa6onero KowiMTeTa, 1966, c.
45.

4 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Coto3e...*, c.55.

5 Moiue KaraHOBMH. flep Mflniuep omatin mh napTM3aHep6aBeryHr 4>yH CoBeT-PyccnaHfl. Pm

m, 1948, c. 188. —
U,mt. no: C. LUBapu,. CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 45-46.

6 M. KynoBeu,KMM. /lroflCKne noTepn eBpeficKoro naceneniw b nocneBoeHHbix rpam-i u,ax

CCCP b roflbi Be^MKOM
OTenecTBeHHOM BOMHbi // BecTHMK EBpeMCKoro YHMBepcuTeTa b MocKBe. 1995, N2 2(9), c. 13
7, 145, 151.

7 Mu,xaK Apafl. Xo^oKaycT: KaTacTpoiJia eBponeticKoro eBpeficTBa (1933-1945):C6. CTaTe

fi. Mepyca^nwi: flfl Ba-
LUewi, 1990(fla^ee — 14. Apafl. XoyioKaycr), c. 62.
8 M. KynoBeu,KMM. /ltoflCKne noTepn eBpeficKoro Haceyiem-ifl... // BecTHMK EBpeficKoro
YH-Ta..., 1995, N° 2(9), c.
145.

9 14. Apafl. Xo^oKaycT, c. 61.

10 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Coio3e..., c. 181.

11 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan no^MTMKa CTa/WHa: B^acTb m aHTMceMMTH3M*. M.: MewflyHapof

lHbie OTHOiueHMfl,
2001, c. 431.

12 KpaTKaa EBpeMCKaa 3HU,MKnoneflMfl (fla^ee — KE3). Mepyca^nwi: 06inecTBO no MccneflO

BaHMto eBpeficKnx
o6i4MH, 1988. T. 4, c. 167.

13 CM. LUBapu. Bnpo6nfl>KaH // KPE-2, c. 187.

14 14. LUexTMa h. CoBeTCKoe eBpeMcrao b repwiaHO-coBeTCKOM BOMHe // EM-2, c. 226,227.

15 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CrayiMHa // KPE-2, c. 144.

328

16 C. L|npK)yibHMKOB. CCCP, eBpen m Itapamib// Bpewia m Mbi: MewflyHapoflHbiM >xypHa.n

yiMTepaTypbi m
o6mecTBeHHbix npo6^ew\. Hbio-MopK, 1987, N2 96, c. 151-152.

17 M. LUexTMa h. CoBeTCKoe eBpeficTBO b repwiaHO-coBeTCKOM BOMHe // EM-2, c. 224.

18 CoBeTCKMM Tbm BnepBbm nepnofl BeyiMKOM OTenecTBeHHOM BOMHbi: [C6.]. M., 1988, c. 13
9.

19 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coto3e..., c. 53.

20 fl.fl. MnHMH6epr. CoBeTCKne eBpen b HayKe m npowibiuj^eHHOc™ CCCP b nepnofl Btopom

mmpobom BOMHbi
(1941-1945). M., 1995,c. 13.

21 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Corae..., c. 53.

22 TaM>xe, c. 46, 53.

23 H. Apafl. OTHOiueHMe coBeTCKoro pyKOBOflCTBa k XoyioKocry // BecTHMK EBpeticKoro YH

-Ta..., 1995, N2 2(9),
23.

24 M. LUexTMa h. CoBeTCKoe eBpeficTBO b repwiaHO-coBeTCKOM BOMHe // EM-2, c. 238.

25 TaM>xe, c. 237.

26 flohcnafl npeflceflaTe^a TocyflapcTBeHHoro KowiMTeTa 06opoHbi tob. M.B. CrayiMHa Ha

TopwecTBeHHOM
3aceflaHMM MocKOBCKoro CoBeTa flenyiaTOB Tpyflami-ixcfl 6 non6pn 1941 rofla // ripaBfl
a, 1941,7 noa6pa, c. 1
2.

27 M. Apafl. OTHOiiieHne coBeTCKoro pyKOBOflCTBa k XoyioKocry // BecTHMK EBpeficKoro Y

H-Ta..., 1995, N2 2(9),
17.

28 M3BecTMfl, 1942, 7 flHBapa, c. 1-2.

29 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Corae...*, c. 138-145.

30 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CTa^MHa // KPE-2, c. 146.

31 C. LUBeM6niu. 3BaKyau.ua m coBeTCKne eBpen b roflbi KaTacTpoc|)bi // BecTHMK EBpefi

cKoro YH-Ta..., 1995, N2
2(9), c. 47.

32 npaBfla, 1938, 18 HOfl6pa, c. 1.

33 npaBfla, 1938,28 HOfl6pa, c. 2-3.

34 M. Apafl. OTHOiueHMe coBeTCKoro pyKOBOflcma k XcnoKocry // BecTHMK EBpeficKoro YH-T

a... , 1995, N2 2(9),
15-16.

35 C. LUBeM6niu. 3BaKyau.ua m coBeTCKne eBpen b roflbi KaTacTpoc|)bi // BecTHMK EBpefi

cKoro YH-Ta..., 1995, N2
2(9), c. 47-48.

36 KE3, t. 8, c.223.

37 Tawiwe, c. 49.

38 B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan no^MTMKa CTa^MHa,c. 231.

39 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan no^MTMKa Cra.nMHa,c. 233-235.

329
40 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy Cra/WHa // KPE-2, c. 148.

41 naBe^ Cyflon^aTOB. Cneu,onepau,nn: /ly6flH«a m Kpewvib: 1930-1950 roflbi. M.: O/lMA

-ripecc, 1997, c. 465,
470.

42 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Corae..., c. 239.

43 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. TaMHaa no^MTMKa Cra.ni'iHa, c. 237-239.

44 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 166-170.

45 fl. LUy6. EBpen b pyccKOM peBO^K)u,nn // EM-2, c. 145.

46/l.KD. KpuneBCKHM. EBpen b annapaTe BHK-OnTy b 20-e roflbi // EBpen m pyccKaa peBon
\ou,v\n: MaTepna^bi m
ncc^eflOBaHMfl / Pefl.-cocT. O.B. EyflHnu,KMM. MocKBa; Mepyca^nwi: TeiiiapuM, 1999, c.
344.

47 E. CTayiMHCKMM. EBpen b KpacHOM apwinn // EM-2, c. 243-245.

48 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy Cra.ni'iHa //KPE-2, c. 143.

49 B. Ahc|)m^ob. KaK «onpaBfla.ncfl» Cra/iiiH // PoflMHa, 1991, N2 6-7, c. 31; PoccuMC

Kaa EBpeficKaa
3HU,MK^oneflMJi (flayiee — PE3). 2-e M3fl., ncnp. m flon. M., 1995. T. 2, c. 276-277.

50 ApoH A6pawioBMH. B pewatomeM BOMHe: ynacTue m po.nb eBpeeB CCCP b BOMHe npoTMB Hau,
M3w\a.Te^b-ABMB,
1992. T. 2, c. 536-578.

51 M. Apafl. XcnoKaycT, c. 93.

52 M. Bmluhak. MewflyHapoflHaa KOHBeHU,mi npoTMB a HTMceMMTH3Ma // EM-2, c. 98.

53 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CrayiMHa // KPE-2, c. 143.

54 A. A6pawi0BMH. B pewaiomeM BOMHe. T. 2, c. 548-555.

55 OnepKM eBpeficKoro repon3w\a: B 3t. / Coct. I~.C. LUannpo, CJ1. ABep6yx. KneB; Tenb
-ABMB, 1994-1997.

56 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan no^MTMKa Cra.ni'iHa, c. 245 (coccbmKOM Ha 6biBW. U,empa.n

bHbm napTMMHbiM
apxnB npn l_|K KnCC, Hbme PrACrM 4>. 17, on. 125, efl. xp. 127,-n. 220).

57 M. Apafl. Xo.noKaycT, c. 128.

58 J] J]. MnHMH6epr. CoBeTCKne eBpen b HayKe m npowibiuj^eHHOc™..., c. 18, 444-445,45
2, 474-475.

59 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coio3e..., c. 154-156.

60 E. dayiMHCKHM. EBpen b KpacHOM apwinn // EM-2, c. 250.

61 A. A6pawi0BMH. B peiuaroifleM BOMHe. T. 2, c. 562.

58 J] J]. MnHMH6epr. CoBeTCKne eBpen b HayKe m npoMbiLuneHHOc™..., c. 18, 444-445,452,

474-475.

59 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coio3e..., c. 154-156.

60 E. CTayiMHCKMM. EBpen b KpacHOM apwinn // EM-2, c. 250.

61 A. A6paw\OBMH. B peiuaroifleM BOMHe. T. 2, c. 562.

330

62 C. cDpeM^nx. McTopua oflHoro 6on // KMHOcu,eHapnn, M., 1990, N2 3, c. 132.

63 H. /la3apeB. 3anncKM nowKnoro ne^oBeKa // 3Hawifl, 2001, N2 6, c. 167.

64 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coto3e..., c. 154.

65 Dr. Jerzy Gliks man. Jewish Exiles in Soviet Russia (1939-1943). Part 2, July 1947,
p. 17// ApxnB
AwiepuKaHCKoro EBpeficKoro KowiMTeTa b Hbto-MopKe. — U,mt no: C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBe
TCKOM Coto3e..., c.
157.

66 KE3, t. 8, c.223.

67 Rachel Erlich. Summary Report on Eighteen Intensive Interviews with Jewish DP's fro
m Poland and the
Soviet Union. October 1948, p. 27 // ApxnB AwiepuKaHCKoro EBpeficKoro KowiMTeTa b Hbio
-MopKe. — U,mt no:

CM. LUBapu,. AHTMCeMMTM3M..., c. 192.

68 14. Apafl. Xo^oKaycT, c. 128.

69 E. dayiMHCKHM. EBpen b KpacHOM apwinn // EM-2, c. 240.

70 A. BopoHe^b. J~\\opy\ Ha BOMHe, v\nv\ eifle pa3 06 yHMKayibHOCTM I43pan.nfl // "2
2": 06iflecTBeHHO-
noyiMTMHecKMM m yiMTepaTypHbiM >KypHayi eBpeMCKOM MHTeyiyinreHU,MM M3 CCCP b I43pan.n
e. Te^b-ABMB, 1984, N2
34, c. 146.

71 KE3, t. 1, CTaTbfl «BoeHHaa cny>x6a», c. 690; t. 4, ct. «KaTacTpo4>a», c. 159. B c

t. «CoBeTCKMM Cok>3» (t. 8, c.
224) KE3 flaeT u,mt>py 450 Tbic. eBpeeB b cocTaBe Co BeTC kom apwinn, m eifle 25-30 Tb
ic. b napTM3aHCKMX OTpaflax.

72 14. Apafl. Xo^oKaycT, c. 102.

73 14. Apafl. Xo^oKaycT, c. 86.

74 KE3, t. 8, c. 441.

75 14. Apafl. Xo.noKaycT, c. 98-102.

76 CKaweM, Hawi npeflCTaByiaeTCfl, hto HMC.no «boctohhmkob», KOTopbix ycnenn Mo6n^M30B

aTb flo npuxofla
Hewiu,eB, 6bmo HecKO/ibKO wieHbwe, 3aTocpeflHMM npou,eHT apwietiu,eB ot Bcero HaceneHM
fl CCCP, 6bm,

B03MO>KHO, HeCKO/lbKO Bblllje, HeM paCCHMTaHHbIM 14. ApaflOM.

77 B Hbme BbixoflflifleM BoeHHOM 3HU,MKnoneflnn eflBa sua He BnepBbie npuBefleHbi CBef

leHMfl 06 o6iflewi HMcne
w\o6n^M30BaHHbix b roflbi BeyiMKOM OTenecTBeHHOM BoMHbi — 30 MnyiyinoHOB. Cm.: BoeHHaa
3HU,MK^oneflMfl: B
8 t. M.: BoeHM3flaT, 2001. T. 5. c. 182.

78 KE3, t. 7, c.385.

79 KE3, t. 1, c.686.

80 Tawiwe, c. 686-687.

81 14. Apafl. Xo/ioKaycT, c. 118.

82 A. A6paMOBMH. B pewatoLflefi BOMHe. T. 2, c 531-532.

83 KE3, t. 8, c.232.

84 14. Apafl. Xo^oKaycT, c. 96.

331
85 Tawiwe, c. 126.

86 KD. Ko^Kep. [Peu,eH3Mfl Ha cnpaBOHHMK «/leHMHrpaflCKne nucaTenn-^poHTOBMKM. 1941-19

45»/Coct. B.
BaxTMH. J].: Cob. rmcaTanb, [1985]// CTpaHa m winp: 06mecTB.-no^MTMHecKHM, BKOHOMMHecK
MM m Ky^bTypHO-
4>m^oco4)ckmm >xypHa.n. MioHxeH, 1987, N2 5, c. 138.

87 C. HepTOK // PyccKaa Mbicnb, 1992, 1 Man, c. 18.

88 M. royibflLUTeMH // PyccKaa Mbicnb, 1968,1 aBrycTa,c. 10.

89 PE3, t. 1, c. 296-297.

90 A.n. ApTewibeB. BpaTCKMM 6oeBOM cok>3 HapoflOB CCCP b BeyiMKOM OTenecTBeHHOM BOMHe.
M.: Mbicnb, 1975,
c. 58-59.

91 KE3, t. 8, c. 1051; n. Cyflon^aTOB. Cneu,onepau,nn, c. 217-228.

92 KE3, t. 5, c. 83; OnepKM eBpeficKoro repon3w\a. T. 1, c. 405-430.

93 PE3, t. 3, c.383.

94 B. KaraH. ripaBM^bHoe peiueHne* // "22". Hoa6pb 1990-flHBapb 1991, N2 74, c. 252.

(3to — peu,eH3Mfl Ha
KHury: 14. flereH. 143 flowia pa6cTBa. Teyib-ABMB: Mopua, 1986.)

95 Tawiwe, c. 252.

96 Cfl. /lypbe. AHTMceMMTH3M b flpeBHewi winpe. Te^b-ABMB: CoBa, 1976, c. 77 [1-e M3f
l. — nr.: Ebmoe, 1922].

97 B. AneKcaHflpoBa. EBpen b coBeTCKOM ^MTepaType // KPE-2, c. 297.

98 CM. LLlBapu,. AHTMceMMTM3M..., c. 197.

99 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Coio3e..., c. 6.

100 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taxman no.n htm «a CrayiMHa, c. 242.

101 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coto3e..., c. 157.

102 Dr. Jerzy Gl iks man. Jewish Exiles in Soviet Russia (1939-1943). Part 2, July 194
7, p. 6// ApxnB
AwiepuKaHCKoro EBpeficKoro KowiMTeTa b Hbto-MopKe. — U,mt. no:C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b CoB
eTCKOM Coto3e..., c.
157.

103 CM. LUBapU,. AHTMCeMMTM3M..., c. 191.

104 Rachel Erl ich. Summary Report on Eighteen Intensive Interviews with Jewish DP's f
rom Poland and the
Soviet Union. October 1948, p. 9f // ApxnB AwiepuKaHCKoro EBpeficKoro KowiMTeTa b Hbto
-MopK — U,mt. no: C.

LUBapU,. AHTMCeMMTM3M..., c. 192.

105Taw\>Ke, p. 26. — U,mt. no: CM. LLlBapu,. AHTMceMMTH3M..., c. 194.

106 Dr. Jerzy Gliksman. Jewish Exiles..., p. 17. — LLht. no: CLUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCK
OM CoK>3e..., c. 159.
107Tawi >Ke, p. 15. — U,mt. no: CLUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Coto3e... , c. 159.
108 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM CoK>3e..., c. 157.

332

109TaM>xe, c. 158.

110 Bulletin of the Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. March 1945,
p. 2-3. — U,mt. no:
C.LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 160.

111C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Coto3e..., c. 184.

112/1. LUannpo. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Pocchh nocne CTa^MHa // KPE-2, c. 359.

113 Trial ofthe MajorWarCriminalsbeforethe International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg.

14 November
1945-1 October 1946. — Nuremberg, 1949, Vol . 38, p. 292-293, Doc. 102-R. — U,mt. no:
C.LUBapu,. EBpen b
CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 101.

114 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 88.

115Trial ofthe MajorWarCriminals...Vol.37,p. 672-683, Doc. 180-L. — U,mt. no: C. LUBap

u,. EBpen b
CoBeTCKOM CoK)3e..., c. 89.

116 14. Tap. EBpen b npn6a^TMMCKnx CTpaHax nofl HeMeu,KOM OKKynau,neti // KPE-2, c. 9
7.
117 KE3, t. 8, c. 218.

118Trial ofthe Major War Criminals... Vol. 37, p. 672-683, Doc. 180-L. LJ,mt. no: C.LU
Bapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM
CoK)3e..., c. 89-90.

119 KE3, t. 8, c. 218.

120 KE3, t. 8, c. 218.

121Trial ofthe MajorWarCriminals...Vol.37,p. 672-683, Doc. 180-L. — LJ,mt. no:C. LUBap

u. Espen b
COBeTCKOM Coto3e..., c. 90.

122 KE3, t. 8, c. 218.

123 Trial ofthe Major War Criminals. ..Vol. 37, p. 672-683, Doc. 180-L. — LJ,mt. no:
C. LUBapu,. EBpen b
CoBeTCKOM CoK)3e..., c. 89-90.

124 YHMHTOKeHMe eBpeeB CCCP b roflbi HeMeu,KOM OKKynau,nn (1941-1944): C6. flOKyMeHTOB
m MaTepna^oB/
nofl pefl. 14. Apafla. Mepyca^MM: flfl Ba-LUeM, 1991, c. 12.

125 Trial ofthe Major WarCriminals... Vol. 37,p. 672-683, Doc. 180-L. — LJ,mt. no:C. L
UBapu. EBpen b
CoBeTCKOM CoK)3e..., c. 91-92.

126 KE3, t. 8, c. 218.

127 CM. LUBapu,. AHTnceMHTH3M...*, c. 134-135.

128TaM we*, c. 132.

129 TaM >xe*, c.93.

130 14. LUexTMaH. CoBeTCKoe eBpeMCTBO b repMa HO-coBeTCKOM BOMHe // EM-2, c. 235-236.

131 A. BaMC. OTHOiueHMe HeKOTopbix KpyroB yKpanHCKoro Hau,MOHa^bHoro flBMweHMfl k eBpe

aM b nepnofl

BTOpOM MMpOBOM BOMHbl* // BeCTHMK EBpeMCKOTO YH-Ta..., 1995, N2 2(9), c. 106.

333
132 A. BaPic. OTHOiiieHne HeKcrropbix KpyroB yKpanHCKoro Hau,MOHa^bHoro p,BV\»ieHV\n k
eBpeawi b nepnofl
BTOpOM MMpOBOM BOMHbl* // BeCTHMK EBpetfcKoro YH-Ta..., 1995, N° 2(9), c. 105-106, 10
7.

133Taw\>Ke, c. 106-107.

134 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom CoK>3e..., c. 98, 101.

135 KE3, t. 8, c. 218.

136 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 99.

137 A.A. To^bfliuTeMH. Cyflb6a eBpeeB b OKKynnpoBaHHOM HeMU,aw\n CoBeTCKOM Poccmm// KP

E-2, c. 74.
138 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom CoK>3e..., c. 102.

139Tawi >Ke, c. 74, 90.

140 yHMHTOKeHne eBpeeB CCCP b roflbi Hew\eu,KOM OKKynau,nn*, c. 4.

141 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 65.

142 14. LUexTMa h. CoBeTCKoe eBpeficTBO b repwiaHO-coBeTCKOM BOMHe // EM-2, c. 229.

143 KE3*, t. 8, c. 218.

144 OT MCTOHHMKa K MCTOHHMKy U,MC|)pbl HeCKO/lbKO pa3HflTCfl. CTaTMCTMKy 3TMX MCTpe6yi

eHMM, BepOflTHO,
HeB03MO>KHO yCT3 HOBMTb TOHHO. Cm. y>Ke U,MTMpOBaHHyK) CT3TbK) AA. To^bfllilTeMHa B «
KHure O PyCCKOM

EBpeticTBe» (1968); c6opHMK 14. Apafla «yHMHTO>KeHMe eBpeeB CCCP b roflbi Hew\eu,KOM O
KKynau,nn» (1991);

CTaTbK) «COBeTCKMM COK)3» B KE3, T. 8 (1996).

145 KE3, t. 1, c. 275.

146 KE3, t. 6, c. 125-126.

147 YHMHTOMKeHne eBpeeB CCCP b roflbi Hew\eu,KOM OKKynau,nn, c. 16.

148Tawi >Ke, c. 17.

149Tawi >Ke, c. 26-27.

150 KE3, t. 8, c. 222.

151 yHMHTOHceHne eBpeeB CCCP b roflbi Hew\eu,KOM OKKynau,nn, c. 24.

152 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b Cobctckom CoK>3e..., c. 108.
153TaM>xe*, c. 121-124.

154 KE3, t. 5, c. 366.

155 PE3, t. 1, c. 499.

156 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Corae...*, c. 127.

157 Tawi >Ke*, c. 129.

158 C. LUBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Corae...*, c. 125-126.

334

159TaM>xe*, c. 121, 128.

160 YHMHTOMKeHMe eBpeeB CCCP b roflbi Hew\eu,KOM OKKynau,nn, c. 386-387.

161 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coto3e...*, c. 132.

162Taw\>Ke, c. 171-173.

163 14. Apafl. Xo^oKaycT, c. 91.

164 M. KynoBeu,KMM. /ltoflCKMe noTepn eBpeficKoro Hace^eHMfl... // BecTHMK EBpeficKoro

1/H-Ta..., 1995, N2 2(9),
c. 134-155.

165 KE3, t. 8, c. 299.

166 E.M. AHflpeeB, /I.E. LLapcKMM, T./I. XapbKOBa. Hace^eHne CoBCTCKoro CoK)3a, 1922-1
991. M., 1993, c. 78.

167 KE3, T.4, c. 175.

168 M. KaraHCKan. Mucf) npoTMB pea^bHoc™ // "22", 1988, N2 58, c. 144.

169 H. TyTMHa. OpneHTau,Mfl Ha Xpawi// Taw\ >xe, c. 191.

170 M. KaraHCKaa. Mmc|) npoTMB peayibHoc™ // Taw\ >xe, c. 141 -142.

171 A. MeHec. KaTacrpo4>a m B03po>KfleHMe // EM-2, c. 111.

172EeH-Eapyx. TeHb // "22", 1988, N2 58, c. 197-198, 200.
173 Ypn ABHepn. nocneflHflfl wiecTb Aao;ib4>a rmviepa // "22", 1993, N° 85, c. 132, 13
4, 139.

174 M. XeM4>eu,. Hto Haflo BbiacHMTb bo BpewieHM // "22", 1989, N° 64, c. 218-219.

175 Sonja Margolina. Das Ende der Lugen: Rudland und die Juden im20. Jahrhundert. Berl
in:Siedler Verlag,
1992, pp. 137-138.

176flaH^eBMH. Ha Kpaio co6.na3Ha: [MHTepBbio] // "22", 1978, N2 1, c.55.

177fl. XMeyibHMU,KMM. riofl 3bohkmm ro/ioc KpoBM, v\j\v\ c ca wioco3Ha Huewi Ha nepeBe
c 1 1 "22", 1992, N2 80, c.
175.

178 C. Mapro^MHa. repwiaHMJi m eBpen: BTopaa nonbiTKa // CTpaHa m w\np, 1991, N2 3, c.

142.
179 Sonja Margolina. Das Ende der Lugen..., pp. 150-151.

335

Chapter 22: From the end of the war to Stalin's death

At the beginning of the 1920s the authors of a collection of articles titled Russia an
d the Jews
foresaw that "all these bright perspectives" (for the Jews in the USSR) looked so brig
ht only
"if one supposes that the Bolsheviks would want to protect us. But would they? Can we
assume that the people who in their struggle for power betrayed everything, from the
Motherland to Communism, would remain faithful to us even when it stops benefiting
them?"(l)

However, during so favorable a time to them as the 1920s and 1930s the great majority
of
Soviet Jews chose to ignore this sober warning or simply did not hear it.

Yet the Jews with their contribution to the Russian Revolution should have expected th
at
one day the inevitable recoil of revolution would hit even them, at least during its e
bb.

The postwar period became "the years of deep disappointments" (2) and adversity for So
viet
Jews. During Stalin's last eight years, Soviet Jewry was tested by persecutions of th
e
"cosmopolitans," the loss of positions in science, arts and press, the crushing of the
Jewish
Anti-Fascist Committee (EAK) with the execution of its leadership and, finally, by th
e
"Doctors' Plot."

By the nature of a totalitarian regime, only Stalin himself could initiate the campaig
n aimed
at weakening the Jewish presence and influence in the Soviet system. Only he could mak
e
the first move.

Yet because of the rigidity of Soviet propaganda and Stalin's craftiness, not a single
sound
could be uttered nor a single step made in the open. We have seen already that Soviet
propaganda did not raise any alarm about the annihilation of Jews in Germany during th
e
war; indeed it covered up those things, obviously being afraid of appearing pro-Jewish
in the
eyes of its own citizens.

The disposition of the Soviet authorities towards Jews could evolve for years without
ever
really surfacing at the level of official propaganda. The first changes and shuffles i
n the
bureaucracy began quite inconspicuously at the time of growing rapprochement between
Stalin and Hitler in 1939. By then Litvinov, a Jewish Minister of Foreign Affairs, was
replaced
by Molotov (an ethnic Russian) and a 'cleansing' of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (N
KID) was
underway. Simultaneously, Jews were barred from entrance into diplomatic schools and
military academies. Still, it took many more years before the disappearance of Jews fr
om the
NKID and the sharp decline of their influence in the Ministry of Foreign Trade became
apparent.

Because of the intrinsic secrecy of all Soviet inner party moves, only very few were a
ware of
the presence of the subtle anti-Jewish undercurrents in the Agitprop apparatus by the
end of
1942 that aimed to push out Jews from the major art centers such as the Bolshoi Theatr
e,
the Moscow Conservatory, and the Moscow Philarmonic, where, according to the note
which Alexandrov, Head of Agitprop, presented to the Central Committee in the summer o
f
1942, 'everything was almost completely in the hands of non-Russians' and 'Russians ha
d
336

become an ethnic minority' (accompanied by a detailed table to convey particulars)

(3).
Later, there had been attempts to "begin national regulation of cadres... from the top
down,
which essentially meant primarily pushing out Jews from the managerial positions" (4).
By
and large, Stalin regulated this process by either supporting or checking such effort
s
depending on the circumstances.

The wartime tension in the attitudes toward Jews was also manifested during post-war r
e-
evacuation. In Siberia and Central Asia, wartime Jewish refugees were not welcomed by
the
local populace, so after the war they mostly settled in the capitals of Central Asian
republics,
except for those who moved back, not to their old shtetls and towns, but into the larg
er
cities (5).

The largest returning stream of refugees fled to Ukraine where they were met with host
ility
by the local population, especially because of the return of Soviet officials and the
owners of
desirable residential property. This reaction in the formerly occupied territories was
also
fueled by Hitler's incendiary propaganda during the Nazi occupation. Khrushchev, the H
ead
of Ukraine from 1943 (when he was First Secretary of the Communist Party and at the sa
me
time Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine), not only said nothing
on
this topic in his public speeches, treating the fate of Jews during the occupation wit
h silence,
but he also upheld the secret instruction throughout Ukraine not to employ Jews in pos
itions
of authority.

According to the tale of an old Jewish Communist Ruzha-Godes, who survived the entire
Nazi
occupation under a guise of being a Pole named Khelminskaya and was later denied
employment by the long-awaited Communists because of her Jewishness, Khrushchev state
d
clearly and with his peculiar frankness: "In the past, the Jews committed many sins ag
ainst
the Ukrainian people. People hate them for that. We don't need Jews in our Ukraine. I
t
would be better if they didn't return here. They would better goto Birobidzhan. This i
s
Ukraine. And, we don't want Ukrainian people to infer that the return of Soviet author
ity
means the return of Jews" (6).

"In the early September 1945 a Jewish major of the NKVD was brutally beaten in Kiev by
two
members of the military. He shot both of them dead. This incident caused a large-scal
e
massacre of Jews with five fatalities" (7). There are documented sources of other simi
lar
cases (8).

Sotsialistichesky Vestnik wrote that the Jewish "national feelings (which were exacerb
ated
during the war) overreacted to the numerous manifestations of anti-Semitism and to th
e
even more common indifference to anti-Semitism" (9).

This motif is so typical — almost as much as anti-Semitism itself: the indifference to

anti-
Semitism was likely to cause outrage. Yes, preoccupied by their own miseries, people a
nd
nations often lose compassion for the troubles of others. And the Jews are not an exce
ption
here. A modern author justly notes: "I hope that I, as a Jew who found her roots and p
lace in
Israel, would not be accused of apostasy if I point out that in the years of our terri
ble
disasters, the Jewish intellectuals did not raise their voices in defense of the depor
ted
nations of Crimea and the Caucasus" (10).

337

After the liberation of Crimea by the Red Army in 1943, "talks started among circles o
f the
Jewish elite in Moscow about a rebirth of the Crimean project of 1920s," i.e., about
resettling Jews in Crimea. The Soviet government did not discourage these aspiration
s,
hoping that "American Jews would be more generous in their donations for the Red Arm
y."
It is quite possible that Mikhoels and Feffer [heads of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Commit
tee,
EAK], based on a verbal agreement with Molotov, negotiated with American Zionists abou
t
financial support of the project for Jewish relocation to Crimea during their triumpha
l tour of
the USA in summer of 1943. The idea of a Crimean Jewish Republic was also backed by
Lozovsky, the then-powerful Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs (11).

The EAK had yet another project for a
f the
former Volga German Autonomous Soviet
previous chapters, Jewish settlements
e
Germans). Ester Markish, widow of EAK
d
a letter "concerning transferring the
Jewish Republic — to establish it in the place o
Socialist Republic (where, as we have seen in
were established in the wake of the exile of th
member Perets Markish, confirms that he presente
former German Republic to the Jews" (12).

In the Politburo, "Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov were the most positively dispose
d to
the EAK" (13). And, "according to rumors, some members of the Politburo... were inclin
ed to
support this [Crimean] idea" (14). On February 15, 1944, Stalin was forwarded a
memorandum about that plan which was signed by Mikhoels, Feffer and Epshtein.
(According to P. Sudoplatov, although the decision to expel the Tatars from Crimea had
been
made by Stalin earlier, the order to carry it out reached Beria on February 14 (15), s
o the
memorandum was quite timely.)

That was the high point of Jewish hopes. G. V. Kostirenko, a researcher of this perio
d, writes:
the leaders of the EAK "plunged into euphoria. They imagined (especially after Mikhoel
s' and
Feffer" s trip to the West) that with the necessary pressure, they could influence and
steer
their government's policy in the interests of the Soviet Jews, just like the American
Jewish
elite does it" (16).

But Stalin did not approve the Crimean project - it did not appeal to him because of t
he
strategic importance of the Crimea. The Soviet leaders expected a war with America an
d
probably thought that in such case the entire Jewish population of Crimea would sympat
hize
with the enemy. (It is reported that at the beginning of the 1950s some Jews were arre
sted
and told by their MGB [Ministry for State Security, a predecessor of KGB] investigator
s: "You
are not going to stand against America, are you? So you are our enemies.") Khrushchev
shared those doubts and 10 years later he stated to a delegation of the Canadian Commu
nist
party that was expressing particular interest in the Jewish question in the USSR: Crim
ea
"should not be a center of Jewish colonization, because in case of war it will become
the
enemy's bridgehead" (17). Indeed, the petitions about Jewish settlement in Crimea wer
e
very soon used as a proof of the "state treason" on the part of the members of the EA
K.

By the end of WWII the authorities again revived the idea of Jewish resettlement in
Birobidzhan, particularly Ukrainian Jews. From 1946 to 1947 several organized echelons
and
a number of independent families were sent there, totaling up to 5-6 thousand persons
(18).
However, quite a few returned disillusioned. This relocation movement withered by 194
8.
Later, with a general turn of Stalin's politics, arrests among the few Birobidjan Jewi
sh
activists started. (They were accused of artificial inculcation of Jewish culture into
the non-

338

Jewish population and, of course, espionage and of having planned Birobidzhan's secess
ion
in order to ally with Japan). This was the de facto end of the history of Jewish colon
ization in
Birobidzhan. At the end of the 1920s there were plans to re-settle 60,000 Jews there b
y the
end of the first 5-year planning period. By 1959 there were only 14,000 Jews in Birobi
dzhan,
less than 9% of the population of the region (19).

However, in Ukraine the situation had markedly changed in favor of Jews. The governmen
t
was engaged in the fierce struggle with Bandera's separatist fighters and no longer ca
tered
to the national feelings of Ukrainians. At the end of 1946, the Communist Party "start
ed a
covert campaign against anti-Semitism, gradually conditioning the population to the
presence of Jews among authorities in different spheres of the national economy." At t
he
same time, in the beginning of 1947, Kaganovich took over for Khrushchev as the offici
a I
leader of Ukrainian Communist Party. The Jews were promoted in the party as well, "of
which a particular example was the appointment of a Jew ... the Secretary... of Zhitom
ir
Obkom" (20).

However, the attitudes of many Jews towards this government and its new policies were
justifiably cautious. Soon after the end of the war, when the former Polish citizens b
egan
returning to Poland, many non-Polish Jews "hastily seized this opportunity" and reloca
ted
there (21). (What happened after that in Poland is yet another story: a great
overrepresentation of Jews occurred inthe post-war puppet Polish government, among
managerial elites and in the Polish KGB, which would again result in miserable consequ
ences
for the Jews of Poland. After the war, other countries of Eastern Europe sawsimilarcon
flicts:
"the Jews had played a huge role in economic life of all these countries," and though
they
lost their possessions under Hitler, after the war, when "the restitution laws were
introduced... (they) affected very large numbers of new owners." Upon their return Jew
s
demanded the restoration of their property and enterprises that were not nationalized
by
Communists and this created a new wave of hostility towards them (22).)

Meanwhile, during these very years the biggest event in world Jewish history was happe
ning
— the state of Israel was coming into existence. In 1946-47, when the Zionists were at
odds
with Britain, Stalin, perhaps out of anti-British calculation and or opportunistically
hoping to
get a foothold there, took the side of the former. During all of 1947 Stalin, acting t
hrough
Gromyko inthe UN, actively supported the idea of the creation of an independent Jewis
h
state in Palestine and supplied the Zionists with a critical supply of Czechoslovak-ma
de
weapons. In May 1948, only two days after the Israeli declaration of nationhood, the U
SSR
officially recognized that country and condemned hostile actions of Arabs.

However, Stalin miscalculated to what extent this support would reinvigorate the natio
nal
spirit of Soviet Jews. Some of them implored the EAKto organize a fundraiser for the I
sraeli
military, others wished to enlist as volunteers, while still others wanted to form a s
pecial
Jewish military division (23).

Amid this burgeoning enthusiasm, Golda Meir arrived to Moscow in September of 1948 as
the first ambassador of Israel and was met with unprecedented joy in Moscow's synagogu
es
and by Moscow's Jewish population in general. Immediately, as the national spirit of S
oviet
Jews rose and grew tremendously because of the Catastrophe, many of them began applyin
g
for relocation to Israel. Apparently, Stalin had expected that. Yet it turned out that
many of

339

his citizens wished to run away en masse into, by all accounts, the pro-Western State
of
Israel. There, the influence and prestige of the United States grew, while the USSR wa
s at the
same time losing support of Arab countries. (Nevertheless, "the cooling of relations
[with
Israel] was mutual. Israel more and more often turned towards American Jewry which
became its main support" (24).)

Probably because he was frightened by such a schism in the Jewish national feelings, S
talin
drastically changed policies regarding Jews from the end of 1948 and for the rest of h
is
remaining years. He began acting in his typical style — quietly but with determinatio
n, he
struck to the core, but with only tiny movements visible on the surface.

Nevertheless, while the visible tiny ripples hardly mattered, Jewish leaders had many
reasons to be concerned, as they felt the fear hanging in the air. The then editor of
the
Polish-Jewish newspaper Folkshtimme, Girsh Smolyar, recalled the "panic that seized So
viet
communist Jews after the war." Emmanuel Kazakevitch and other Jewish writers were
distressed. Smolyar had seen on Ehrenburg's table "a mountain of letters — literally s
cream
of pain about current anti-Jewish attitudes throughout the country" (25).
Yet Ehrenburg knew his job very well and carried it out. (As became known much later,
it
was exactly then that the pre-publication copy of the Black Book compiled by I. Ehrenb
urg
and B. Grossman, which described the mass killings and suffering of the Soviet Jews du
ring
the Soviet-German war, was destroyed.) In addition, on September 21, 1948, as a
counterbalance to Golda Meir's triumphal arrival, Pravda published a large article
commissioned by Ehrenburg which stated that the Jews are not a nation at all and that
they
are doomed to assimilate (26). This article created dismay not only among Soviet Jews,
but
also in America. With the start of the Cold War, "the discrimination against the Jews
in the
Soviet Union "became one of the main anti-Soviet trump cards of the West. (As was the
inclination in the West towards various ethnic separatist movements in the USSR, a
sympathy that had never previously gained support among Soviet Jews).

However, the EAK, which had been created to address war-time issues, continued gainin
g
influence. By that time it listed approximately 70 members, had its own administrativ
e
apparatus, a newspaper and a publishing house. It functioned as a kind of spiritual an
d
physical agent of all Soviet Jews before the CK (Central Committee) oftheVKPb (ail-Rus
sian
Communist Party of Bolsheviks), as well as before the West. "EAK executives were allow
ed
to do and to have a lot — a decent salary, an opportunity to publish and collect royal
ties
abroad, to receive and to redistribute gifts from abroad and, finally, to travel abroa
d." EAK
became the crystallization center of an initially elitist and upper-echelon and then o
f a
broadly growing Jewish national movement" (27), a burgeoning symbol of Jewish nationa
l
autonomy. For Stalin, the EAK become a problem which had to be dealt with.

He started with the most important figure, the Head of the Soviet Information Bureau
(Sovinformburo), Lozovsky, who, according to Feffer (who was vice-chairman of EAK sinc
e
July 1945), was "the spiritual leader of the EAK... knew all about its activities and
was its
head for all practical purposes." In the summer of 1946, a special auditing commission
from
Agitprop of the CK [of the VKPb] inspected Sovinformburo and found that "the apparatus
is
polluted ... [there is] an intolerable concentration of Jews." Lozovsky was ejected fr
om his
340

post of Assistant Ministerof Foreign Affairs (just as Litvinovand Maisky had been) and
in
summer of 1947 he also lost his post as of Head of the Sovinformburo (28).

After that, the fate of the EAK was sealed. In September of 1946, the auditing commiss
ion
from the Central Committee concluded that the EAK, instead of "leading a rigorous offe
nsive
ideological war against the Western and above all Zionist propaganda... supports the
position of bourgeois Zionists and the Bund and in reality... it fights for the reacti
onary idea
of a United Jewish nation." In 1947, the Central Committee stated, that "the work amon
g
the Jewish population of the Soviet Union is not a responsibility" of the EAK. "The EA
K's job
was to focus on the "decisive struggle against aggression by international reactionari
es and
their Zionist agents" (29).

However, these events coincided with the pro-Israel stance of the USSR and the EAK was
not
dissolved. On the other hand, EAK Chairman Mikhoels who was "the informal leader of
Soviet Jewry, had to shed his illusions about the possibility of influencing the Kreml
in's
national policy via influencing the Dictator's relatives." Here, the suspicion fell mo
stly on
Stalin's son— in-law Grigory Morozov. However, the most active help to the EAK was
provided by Molotov's wife, P.S. Zhemchyzhina, who was arrested in the beginning of 19
49,
and Voroshilov's wife, "Ekaterina Davidovna (Golda Gorbman), a fanatic Bolshevik, who
had
been expelled from the synagogue in her youth." Abakumov reported that Mikhoels was
suspected of "gathering private information about the Leader" (30). Overall, according
to the
MGB he "demonstrated excessive interest in the private life of the Head of the Soviet
Government," while leaders of the EAK "gathered materials about the personal life of
J.
Stalin and his family at the behest of US Intelligence" (31). However, Sta lin could n
ot risk an
open trial of the tremendously influential Mikhoels, so Mikhoels was murdered in Janua
ry
1948 under the guise of an accident. Soviet Jewry was shocked and terrified by the dem
ise of
their spiritual leader.

The EAK was gradually dismantled after that. By the end of 1948 its premises were lock
ed up,
all documents were taken to Lubyanka, and its newspaper and the publishing house were
closed. Fefferand Zuskin, the key EAK figures, were secretly arrested soon afterwards
and
these arrests were denied for a longtime. In January 1949 Lozovsky was arrested, follo
wed
by the arrests of a number of other notable members of the EAK in February. They were
intensively interrogated during 1949, but in 1950 the investigation stalled. (All this
coincided
[in accord with Stalin's understanding of balance] with the annihilation of the Russia
n
nationalist tendencies in the leadership of the Leningrad government — the so-called
"anti-
party group of Kuznetsov-Rodionov-Popkov," but those developments, their repression an
d
the significance of those events were largely overlooked by historians even though "ab
out
two thousand party functionaries were arrested and subsequently executed" (32) in 1950
in
connection with the "Leningrad Affair").

In January 1948, Stalin ordered Jews to be pushed out of Soviet culture. In his usual
subtle
and devious manner, the "order" came through a prominent editorial in Pravda, seemingl
y
dealing with a petty issue, "about one anti-Party group of theatrical critics" (33).
(A more
assertive article in Kultura iZhizn followed on the next day (34)). The key point was
the
"decoding" of Russian the Russian pen-names of Jewish celebrities. In the USSR, "many
Jews

341

camouflage their Jewish origins with such artifice," so that "it is impossible to figu
re out their
real names" explains the editor of a modern Jewish journal (35).

This article in Pravda had a long but obscure pre-history. In 1946 reports of the Cent
ral
Committee it was already noted "that out of twenty-eight highly publicized theatrical
critics,
only six are Russians. It implied that the majority of the rest were Jews." Smelling t
rouble,
but still "supposing themselves to be vested with the highest trust of the Party, som
e
theatrical critics, confident of victory, openly confronted Fadeev" in November 1946
(36).
Fadeev was the all-powerful Head of the Union of Soviet Writers and Stalin's favorite.
And so
they suffered a defeat. Then the case stalled for a long time and only resurfaced in 1
949.

The campaign rolled on through the newspapers and party meetings. G. Aronson,
researching Jewish life "in Stalin's era" writes: "The goal of this campaign was to di
splace
Jewish intellectuals from all niches of Soviet life. Informers were gloatingly reveali
ng their
pen-names. It turned out that E. Kholodov is actually Meyerovich, Jakovlev is Kholtsma
n,
Melnikov is Millman, Jasny is Finkelstein, Vickorov is Zlochevsky, Svetov is Sheidman
and so
on. Literaturnaya Gazeta worked diligently on these disclosures" (37).

Undeniably, Stalin hit the worst-offending spot, the one that highly annoyed the publi
c.
However, Stalin was not so simple as to just blurt out "the Jews." From the first push
at the
"groups of theatrical critics" flowed a broad and sustained campaign against the
"cosmopolitans" (with their Soviet inertia I dim-wittedness they overused this innocen
t term
and spoiled it). "Without exception, all 'cosmopolitans' under attack were Jews. They
were
being discovered everywhere. Because all of them were loyal Soviet citizens never susp
ected
of anything anti-Soviet, they survived the great purges by Yezhov and Yagoda. Some wer
e
very experienced and influential people, sometimes eminent in their fields of expertis
e" (38).
The exposure of "cosmopolitans" then turned into a ridiculous, even idiotic glorificat
ion of
Russian "primacy" in all and every area of science, technology and culture.

Yet the "cosmopolitans" usually were not being arrested but instead were publicly
humiliated, fired from publishing houses, ideological and cultural organizations, from
TASS,
from Glavlit, from literature schools, theaters, orchestras; some were expelled from t
he
party and publication of their works was often discouraged.
And the public campaign was expanding, spreading into new fields and compromising new
names. Anti-Jewish cleansing of "cosmopolitans" was conducted in the research institut
es of
the Academy of Science: Institute of Philosophy (with its long history of internecine
feuding
between different cliques), the institutes of Economy, Law, in the Academy of Social
Sciences at the CKof the VKPb, in the School of Law (and then spread to the office of
Public
Prosecutor).

Thus, in the Department of History atMGU (Moscow State University), even a long-standi
ng
faithful communist and falsifier, 1. 1. Minz, member of the Academy, who enjoyed Stali
n's
personal trust and was awarded with Stalin Prizes and concurrently chaired historical
departments in several universities, was labeled "the head of cosmopolitans in Histori
cal
Science." After that numerous scientific posts at MGU were 'liberated' from his forme
r
students and other Jewish professors (39).

342

Purges of Jews from technical fields and the natural sciences were gradually gaining
momentum. "The end of 1945 and all of 1946 were relatively peaceful for the Jews of th
is
particular social group." L. Mininberg studied Jewish contributions in Soviet science
and
industry during the war: "In 1946, the first serious blow since the end of the war was
dealt to
the administration and a big 'case' was fabricated. Its principal victims were mainly
Russians. ..there were no Jews among them," though "investigation reports contained
testaments against Israel Solomonovitch Levin, director of the Saratov Aviation Plant.
He was
accused on the charge that during the Battle for Stalingrad, two aviation regiments we
re not
able to take off because of manufacturing defects in the planes produced by the plant.
The
charge was real, not made-up by the investigators. However, Levin was neither fired no
r
arrested." In 1946, "B.L. Vannikov, L.M. Kaganovich, S.Z. Ginzburg, L.Z. Mekhlis all k
ept their
Ministry posts in the newly formed government... Almost all Jewish former deputy minis
ters
also retained their positions as assistants to ministers." The first victims among the
Jewish
technical elite appeared only in 1947 (40).

In 1950, academic A. F. loffe "was forced to retire from the post of Director of the P
hysical -
Engineering Institute, which he organized and headed since its inception in 1918." In
1951,
34 directors and 31 principal engineers of aviation plants had been fired. "This list
contained
mostly Jews." If in 1942 there were nearly forty Jewish directors and principal engine
ers in
the Ministry of General Machine-Building (Ministry of Mortar Artillery) then only thre
e
remained by 1953. In the Soviet Army, "the Soviet authorities persecuted not only Jewi
sh
generals, but lower ranking officers working on the development of military technology
and
weaponry were also removed" (41).

Thus, the "purging campaigns" spread over to the defense, airplane construction, and
automobile industries (though they did not affect the nuclear branch), primarily remov
ing
Jews from administrative, directorial and principal engineering positions; later purgi
ng was
expanded onto various bureaucracies. Yet the genuine, ethnic denominator was never
mentioned in the formal paperwork. Instead, the sacked officials faced charges of econ
omic
crimes or having relatives abroad at a time when conflict with the USA was expected, o
r
other excuses were used. The purging campaigns rolled over the central cities and acro
ss the
provinces. The methods of these campaigns were notoriously Soviet, in the spirit of 19
30s: a
victim was inundated in a vicious atmosphere of terror and as a result often tried to
deflect
the threat to himself by accusing others.

By repeating the tide of 1937, albeit in a milder form, the display of Soviet Power re
minded
the Jews that they had never become truly integrated and could be pushed aside at any
moment. "We do not have indispensable people!" (However, "Lavrentiy Beria was toleran
t
of Jews. At least, in appointments to positions in government" (42).)

"'Pushing' Jews out of prestigious occupations that were crucial for the ruling elite
in the
spheres of manufacturing, administration, cultural and ideological activities, as well
as
limiting or completely barring the entrance of Jews into certain institutions of highe
r
education gained enormous momentum in 1948-1953. ...Positions of any importance in th
e
KGB, party apparatus, and military were closed to the Jews, and quotas were in place f
or
admission into certain educational institutions and cultural and scientific establishm
ents"
(43). Through its "fifth item" [i.e., the question about nationality] Soviet Jews wer
e

343

oppressed by the very same method used in the Proletarian Questionnaire, other items o
f
which were so instrumental in crushing the Russian nobility, clergy, intellectuals and
all the
rest of the "former people" since the 1920s.

"Although the highest echelon of the Jewish political elite suffered from administrati
ve
perturbations, surprisingly it was not as bad as it seemed," — concludes G. V. Kostyrc
henko.
"The main blow fell on the middle and the most numerous stratum of the Jewish elite —
officials... and also journalists, professors and other members of the creative intell
igentsia. ...
It was these, so to say, nominal Jews — the individuals with nearly complete lack of e
thnic
ties — who suffered the brunt of the cleansing of bureaucracies after the war" (44).

However, speaking of scientific cadres, the statistics are these: "at the end of the 1
920s
there were 13.6% Jews among scientific researchers in the country, in 1937 — 17.5%" (4
5),
and by 1950 their proportion slightly decreased to 15.4% (25,125 Jews among 162,508
Soviet researchers) (46). S. Margolina, looking back from the end of the 1980s conclud
es that,
despite the scale of the campaign, afterthe war, "the number of highly educated Jews i
n
high positions always remained disproportionally high. But, in contrast with the forme
r
"times of happiness," it certainly had decreased" (47). A.M. Kheifetz recalls "a memoi
r article
of a member of the Academy, Budker, one of the fathers of the Soviet A-bomb" where he
described how they were building the first Soviet A-bomb — being exhausted from the la
ck
of sleep and fainting from stress and overwork — and it is precisely those days of
persecution of "cosmopolitans" that were "the most inspired and the happiest" in his l
ife
(48).

In 1949 "among Stalin Prize laureates no less than 13% were Jews, just like in the pre
vious
years." By 1952 there were only 6% (49). Data on the number of Jewish students in USS
R
were not published for nearly a quarter of century, from the pre-war years until 1963.
We
will examine those in the next chapter.

The genuine Jewish culture that had been slowly reviving after the war was curtailed a
nd
suppressed in 1948-1951. Jewish theatres were no longer subsidized and the few remaini
ng
ones were closed, along with book publishing houses, newspapers and bookstores (50). I
n
1949, the international radio broadcasting in Yiddish was also discontinued (51).

In the military, "by 1953 almost all Jewish generals" and "approximately 300 colonels
and
lieutenant colonels were forced to resign from their positions" (52).

***

As the incarcerated Jewish leaders remained jailed in Lubyanka for over three years, S
talin
slowly and with great caution proceeded in dismantling the EAK. He was very well awar
e
what kind of international storm would be triggered by using force. (Luckily, though,
he
acquired his first H-bomb in 1949.) On the other hand, he fully appreciated the signif
icance
of unbreakable ties between world Jewry and America, his enemy since his rejection of
the
Marshall Plan.

Investigation of EAK activities was reopened in January 1952. The accused were charge
d
with connections to the "Jewish nationalist organizations in America," with providing

344
"information regarding the economy of the USSR" to those organizations... and also wit
h
"plans of repopulating Crimea and creating a Jewish Republic there" (53). Thirteen
defendants were found guilty and sentenced to death: S. A. Lozovsky, I. S. Ysefovich,
B. A.
Shimeliovich, V. L. Zuskin, leading Jewish writers D.R. Bergelson, P. D. Marshik, L.
M. Kvitko, I.
S. Feffer, D. N. Gofshtein, and also L. Y. Talmi, I. S. Vatenberg, C. S. Vatenberg — O
strovsky,
and E. I.Teumin (54). They were secretly executed in August. (Ehrenburg, who was also
a
member of the EAK, was not even arrested. (He assumed it was pure luck.) Similarly, th
e
crafty David Zaslavsky survived also. And even after the execution of the Jewish write
rs,
Ehrenburg continued to reassure the West that those writers were still alive and writi
ng (55).
The annihilation of the Jewish Antifascist Committee went along with similarsecret
"daughter" cases; 110 people were arrested, 10 of them were executed and 5 died durin
g
the investigation (56).

In autumn of 1952 Stalin went into the open as arrests among Jews began, such as arres
ts of
Jewish professors of medicine and among members of literary circles in Kiev in October
1952.
This information immediately spread among Soviet Jews and throughout the entire worl
d.
On October 17th, Voice of America broadcast about "mass repressions" among Soviet Jew
s
(57). Soviet "Jews were frozen by mortal fear" (58).

Soon afterwards in November in Prague, a show trial ofSlansky, the Jewish First Secret
ary of
the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and several other top state and party leaders took p
lace
in a typically loud and populist Stalinist-type entourage. The trial was openly anti-J
ewish with
naming "world leading" Jews such as Ben Gurion and Morgenthau, and placing them in
league with American leaders Truman and Acheson. The outcome was that eleven were
hanged, eight Jews among them. Summing up the official version, K. Gotwald said: "Thi
s
investigation and court trial ... disclosed a new channel through which treason and es
pionage
permeated the Communist Party. This is Zionism" (59).

At the same time, since summer of 1951, the development of the "Doctors' Plot" was
gaining momentum. The case included the accusation of prominent physicians, doctors t
o
the Soviet leadership, for the criminal treatment of state leaders. For the secret ser
vices
such an accusation was nothing new, as similaraccusations had been made against
Professor D. D. Pletnev and physicians L. G. Levin and I. N. Kazakov already during th
e
"Bukharin trial" in 1937. At that time, the gullible Soviet public gasped at such utte
rly evil
plots. No one had any qualms about repeating the same old scenario.

Now we know much more about the "Doctors' Plot." Initially it was not entirely an anti
-
Jewish action; the prosecution list contained the names of several prominent Russian
physicians as well. In essence, the affairwas fueled by Stalin's generally psychotic s
tate of
mind, with his fear of plots and mistrust of the doctors, especially as his health det
eriorated.
By September 1952 prominent doctors were arrested in groups. Investigations unfolded w
ith
cruel beatings of suspects and wild accusations; slowly it turned into aversion of "sp
ying-
terroristic plot connected with foreign intelligence organizations," "American hirelin
gs,"
"saboteurs in white coats," "bourgeois nationalism" — all indicating that it was prima
ry
aimed at Jews. (Robert Conquest in The Great Terror follows this particular tragic lin
e of
involvement of highly placed doctors. In 1935, the false death certificate of Kuibyshe
v was
signed by doctors G. Kaminsky, I. Khodorovsky, and L. Levin. In 1937 they signed a sim
ilarly

345

false death certificate of Ordzhonikidze. They knew so many deadly secrets — could the
y
expect anything but their own death? Conquest writes that Dr. Levin had cooperated wit
h
the Cheka since 1920. "Working with Dzerzhinsky, Menzhinsky, and Yagoda. ... [he] was
trusted by the head of such an organization. ... It is factually correct to consider L
evin... a
member of Yagoda's circle in the NKVD." Further, we read something sententious: "Amon
g
those outstanding doctors who [in 1937] moved against [Professor of Medicine] Pletnev
and
who had signed fierce accusative resolutions against him, we find the names of M. Vovs
i, B.
Kogan and V. Zelenin, who in their turn... were subjected to torture by the MGB in 195
2-53
in connection with "the case of doctor-saboteurs," "as well as two other doctors, N.
Shereshevky and V. Vinogradov who provided a pre-specified death certificate of
Menzhinsky" (60).)

On January 3, 1953 Pravda and Izvestiya published an announcement by TASS about the
arrest of a "group of doctors-saboteurs." The accusation sounded like a grave threat f
or
Soviet Jewry, and, at the same time, by a degrading Soviet custom, prominent Soviet Je
ws
were forced to sign a letter to Pravda with the most severe condemnation of the wiles
of the
Jewish "bourgeois nationalists" and their approval of Stalin's government. Several doz
en
signed the letter. (Among them were Mikhail Romm, D. Oistrakh, S. Marshak, L. Landau,
B.
Grossman, E. Gilels, I. Dunayevsky and others. Initially Ehrenburg did not sign it — h
e found
the courage to write a letter to Stalin: "to ask your advice." His resourcefulness wa
s
unsurpassed indeed. To Ehrenburg, it was clear that "there is no such thing as the Jew
ish
nation" and that assimilation is the only way and that Jewish nationalism "inevitably
leads to
betrayal." Yet that the letter that was offered to him to sign could be invidiously in
ferred by
the "enemies of our country." He concluded that "I myself cannot resolve these questio
ns,"
but if "leading comrades will let me know ... [that my signature] is desired ... [and]
useful for
protecting our homeland and for peace in the world, I will sign it immediately" (6
1).)

The draft of that statement of loyalty was painstakingly prepared in the administratio
n of
the Central Committee and eventually its style became softer and more respectful. Howe
ver,
this letter never appeared in the press. Possibly because of the international outrag
e, the
"Doctors' Plot" apparently began to slow down in the last days of Stalin (62).

After the public announcement, the '"Doctors' Plot' created a huge wave of repression
of
Jewish physicians all over the country. In many cities and towns, the offices of State
Security
began fabricating criminal cases against Jewish doctors. They were afraid to even goto
work,
and their patients were afraid to be treated by them" (63).

After the "cosmopolitan" campaign, the menacing growl of "people's anger" in reaction
to
the "Doctors' Plot" utterly terrified many Soviet Jews, and a rumor arose (and then go
t
rooted in the popular mind) that Stalin was planning a mass eviction of Jews to the re
mote
parts of Siberia and North — a fear reinforced by the examples of postwar deportation
of
entire peoples. In his latest work G. Kostyrchenko, a historian and a scrupulous resea
rcher of
Stalin's "Jewish" policies, very thoroughly refutes this "myth of deportation," provin
g that it
had never been confirmed, either then or subsequently by any facts, and even in princi
ple
such a deportation would not have been possible (64).

But it is amazing how bewildered were those circles of Soviet Jews, who were unfailing
ly
loyal to the Soviet-Communist ideology. Many years later, S. K. told me: "There is no
single

346

action in my life that I am as ashamed of as my belief in the genuineness of the "Doct

ors'
Plot" of 1953! — that they, perhaps involuntarily, were involved a foreign conspirac
y..."

An article from the 1960s states that "in spite of a pronounced anti-Semitism of Stali
n's rule
... many [Jews] prayed that Stalin stayed alive, as they knew through experience that
any
period of weak power means a slaughter of Jews. We were well aware of the quite rowdy
mood of the 'fraternal nations' toward us" (65).

On February 9th a bomb exploded at the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv. On February 11, 195
3
the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. The conflict surrounding the "Doc
tors'
Plot" intensified due to these events.

And then Stalin went wrong, and not for the first time, right? He did not understand h
ow the
thickening of the plot could threaten him personally, even within the secure quarters
of his
inaccessible political Olympus. The explosion of international angercoincided with the
rapid
action of internal forces, which could possibly have done away with Stalin. It could h
ave
happened through Beria (for example, according to Avtorhanov's version (66).)

After a public communique about the "Doctors' Plot" Stalin lived only 51 days. "The re
lease
from custody and the acquittal of the doctors without trial were perceived by the olde
r
generation of Soviet Jews as a repetition of the Purim miracle": Stalin had perished o
n the
day of Purim, when Esther saved the Jews of Persia from Haman (67).

On April 3 all the surviving accused in the "Doctors' Plot" were released. It was publ
icly
announced the next day.

And yet again it was the Jews who pushed the frozen history forward.

Sources:

1 14. M. BuKepwiaH. Poccma m pyccKoe eBpeficTBO // Poccma m eBpen: C6. 1 / OTenecTBeHH

oe o6"beflMHeHne
pyccKnx eBpeeB 3a rpaHMU,eM. riapuHK: YMCA-Press, 1978, c. 80 [1-e M3fl. — Bep^MH: OcH
OBa, 1924].

2 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b Cobetckom Coto3e c Hanayia Btopom mmpobom BOMHbi (1939-1965). H

bto-MopK: I43fl.
AwiepuKaHCKoro EBpeficKoro Pa6onero KoMMTeTa, 1966, c. 198.

3 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan no^MTMKa CrayiMHa: B^acTbM a HTMceMMTH3M. M.: MewflyHapofl

Hbie OTHOweHMH,
2001, c. 259-260.

4 Tawt we, c. 310.

5 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 181-182, 195.

6 XpymeB m eBpeMCKMM Bonpoc // Cou.na^MCTMHecKMM BecTHMK*, Hbio-MopK, 1961, N2 1, c. 1

9.

7 KpaTKaa EBpeMCKaa 3HU,MKnoneflHfl (fla^ee — KE3). Mepyca^nwi: 06mecTBO no ncc^eflOBa

Huro eBpeMCKMX
o6immh, 1996. T. 8, c. 236.
347

8 CoL^MByincTMHecKMM BecTHMK, 1961, N2 1, c. 19-20; KHura o pyccKOM eBpeficTBe, 1917-

1967 (flayiee — KPE-2).
Hbto-MopK: Coto3 PyccKnx EBpeeB, 1968, c. 146.

9 XpymeB m mm4> o Bnpo6nfl>KaHe // Cou,na^MCTMHecKMM BecTHMK, 1958, N2 7-8, c. 145.

10 M. ByiMHKOBa. 3HaHne m MHeHne // Crpeyieu,, Jersey City, 1988, N2 12, c. 12.

11 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. TaMHaa no^MTMKa CTa/ii-iHa, c. 428-429.

12 3. MapKMiu. KaKnxy6nBa^n // "22": 06mecTBeHHO-no^MTMHecKHM m ^MTepaTypHbm ncypHa^ e

BpeficKOM
MHTeyiyinreHL^MM M3 CCCP b l/bpamie. Te^b-ABMB, 1982, N2 25, c. 203.

13 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taxman no^MTMKa CrayiMHa, c. 430.

14 KE3, t. 4, c.602.

15 riaBeyi CyflonyiaTOB. Cneu,onepau,MM: Zly6flHKa m Kpewi^b: 1930-1950 roflbi. M.: O/

lMA-ripecc, 1997, c. 466-
467.

16 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taxman no^MTMKa CTayii-iHa, c. 435.

17 KpbiMCKoe fle.no // CoL^nayincTMHecKUM bccthmk, 1957, N2 5, c. 98.

18 CM. LLlBapu,. Bnpo6nfl>KaH // KPE-2, c. 189.

19 Ta m >Ke, c. 192,195-196.

20 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM CoK)3e..., c. 185-186.

21 Tawiwe, c. 130.

22 TaMwe, c. 217-218.

23 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. TaMHaa no^MTMKa CTa^MHa,c. 403-404.

24 C. LJ,npto^bHMKOB. CCCP, eBpen m M3pan^b// Bpewifl m mm (fla.nee — BM): MeHKflyHapo

flHbm >xypHa.n
^MTepaTypbi m o6iflecTBeHHbix npo6^ew\. Hbio-MopK, 1987, N2 96, c. 156.
25 C. LLnpKxnbHMKOB. CCCP, eBpen v\ Itapamib// BM, Hbio-MopK, 1987, N2 96, c. 150.

26 14. 3peH6ypr. no ncmofly oflHoro nucbwia // ripaBfla, 1948, 21 cemn6pa, c. 3.

27 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan ncwimviKa CTa^MHa,c. 353, 398.

28 Taw\ >xe*, c. 361, 363-364.

29 Tawiwe, c. 366,369.

30 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. TaftHafl no.ni/miKa CrayiMHa, c. 376, 379, 404.

31 KE3, t. 8, c.243.

32 Tawi >xe, c. 248.

348

33 ripaBfla, 1949,28 aHBapa, c. 3.

34 Ha nywflbix no3nu,Mflx: (O nponcKaxa HTunaTpnoTMHecKOM rpynnbi TeaTpa^bHbix kpmtmko

b) // KynbTypa m
>KM3Hb, 1949, 30 flHBapa, c. 2-3.

35 B. riepe.nbMaH. ...BuHOBaTbi cawin eBpen // BM, Te^b-ABMB, 1977, N2 23, c. 216.

36 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. TaMHaa no^MTMKa Cra.ni'iHa, c. 321, 323.

37 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CrayiMHa // KPE-2, c. 150.

38 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy Cra.ni'iHa // KPE-2, c. 150.

39 A. HeKpuH. rioxoflnpoTMB "Kocwiono^MTOB" bMW // KoHTMHeHT: /luTepaTypHbm, o6mecTB.

-no^MTMHecKHM
m pe^nrno3Hbm >xypHa.n. riapn>K, 1981, N2 28, c. 301-320.

40 fl.fl. MnHMH6epr. CoBeTCKne eBpen b HayKe m npoMbiLLLneHHOc™ CCCP b nepnofl Btopom

mmpobom BOMHbi
(1941-1945). M., 1995, c. 413, 414,415.

41 Ta m >Ke, c. 416, 417, 427, 430.

42 fl.fl. MnHMH6epr. CoBeTCKne eBpen b HayKe m npowibiuj^eHHOCTM... c. 442.

43 KE3, t. 6, c.855.

44 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan no^MTMKa CTayii-iHa, c. 515, 518.

45 KE3, t. 8, c. 190.

46 14. flowia^-bCKHM. TexHo^orna HeHa bmctm* // BM, Te^b-ABMB, 1978, N2 25, c. 120.

47 Sonja Margolina. Das Ende der LAgen : Rulland und die Juden im 20. Jahrhundert. Ber
lin: Siedler Verlag, 1992,
S. 86.

48 Muxan^ XeMc^eu,. MecTO m Bpewia (eBpeMCKne 3aw\eTKn). riapuHC TpeTba BO^Ha, 1978,
c. 68-69.

49 CM. LUBapu,. AHTMceMMTM3M b CoBeTCKOM CoK)3e. HbK)-MopK: M3fl-BO mm. HexoBa, 1952,2
25-226. 229.

50 C. LUBapu,. EBpen BCoBeTCKOM Coto3e..., c. 161-163;/1. LUannpo. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM P

occmm nocne Cra/WHa
//KPE-2, c.373.

51 KE3, t. 8, c.245.

52 KE3, t. 1, c.687.

53 KE3, t. 8, c.251.

54 r.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan no/in™ Ka CTa^MHa, c. 473.

55 T. Apohcoh. EBpeficKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CTa^MHa //KPE-2, c. 155-156.

56 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taiwan no^MTMKa CTa^MHa,c. 507.

349

57 T. Apohcoh. EBpeMCKMM Bonpoc b snoxy CTa^MHa // KPE-2, c. 152.

58 B. Eorycna bckmm. y mctokob // "22/' 1986, N2 47, c. 102.

59 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taxman no^MTMKa CTa^MHa*, c. 504.

60 Po6epT KoHKBecT. EanbwoM Teppop / llep. c a h nn . Firenze: Edizioni Aurora, 1974,

c. 168, 353, 738-739,754,
756-757.

61 «ripoTMB nonbiTOK BOCKpecnTb eBpeMCKMM Hau,noHayiM3M." 06pameHne 14. 1". 3peH6ypra

k 14. B. Cra/WHy//
Mctohhmk: floKywieHTbi pyccKOM mctopmm. M., 1997, N2 1, c. 141-146.

62 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Taxman no^MTMKa Cra.ni'iHa, c. 682, 693.

63 KE3, t. 8, c. 254, 255.

64 T.B. KocTbipneHKO. Takmaa no^MTMKa Cra/n-ma, c. 671-685.

65 H. LUannpo. Oiobo paflOBoro coBeTCKoro eepea // PyccKMM a HTMceMMTH3M m eBpen. C6.

/loHflOH, 1968, c, 50.

66 A. ABTopxa hob. 3araflKa cwiepTM CrayiMHa: (3aroBop Eepua). 0paHK4>ypT-Ha-MaMHe: ri

oceB, 1976, c. 231-239.

67 fl. LUTypwiaH. Hm MHe wiefla TBoero, hm yKyca TBoero // "22," 1985, N2 42, c. 140-1
41.

350

Chapter 23: Before the Six-Day War

On the next day after Stalin's death, on March 6, the MGB (Ministry of State Securit
y)
"ceased to exist", albeit only formally, as Beria had incorporated it into his own Min
istry of
Interior Affairs (MVD). This move allowed him "to disclose the abuses" by the MGB,
including those of the still publicly unanounced MGB Minister, Ignatiev (who secretly
replaced Abakumov). It seems that after 1952 Beria was losing Stalin's trust and had b
een
gradually pushed out by Ignatiev-Ryumin during the 'Doctors' Plot'. Thus, by force of
circumstances, Beria became a magnet for the new anti-Stalin opposition. And now, on A
pril
4, just a month after Stalin's death, he enjoyed enough power to dismiss the "Doctors'
Plot"
and accuse Ryumin of its fabrication. Then three months later the diplomatic relations
with
Israel were restored.

All this reinvigorated hope among the Soviet Jews, as the rise of Beria could be very
promising for them. However, Beria was soon ousted.

Yet because of the usual Soviet inertia, "with the death of Stalin ... many previously
fired
Jews were reinstalled in their former positions"; "during the period called the "tha
w", many
old Zionists ... were released from the camps"; "during the post-Stalin period, the fi
rst Zionist
groups started to emerge - initially at local levels." 1

Yet once again the things began to turn unfavorably for the Jews. In March 1954, the S
oviet
Union vetoed the UN Security Council attempt to open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships.
At the
end of 1955, Khrushchev declared a pro-Arab, anti-Israel turn of Soviet foreign polic
y. In
February 1956, in his famous report at the 20 th Party Congress, Khrushchev, while spe
aking
profusely about the massacres of 1937-1938, did not point any attention to the fact th
at
there were so many Jews among the victims; he did not name Jewish leaders executed in
1952; and when speaking of the "Doctors' Plot," he did not stress that it was specific
ally
directed against the Jews. "It is easy to imagine the bitter feelings this aroused amo
ng the
Jews," they "swept the Jewish communist circles abroad and even the leadership of thos
e
Communist parties, where Jews constituted a significant percentage of members (such as
in
the Canadian and US Communist parties)." 2 In April 1956 in Warsaw, under the communis
t
regime (though with heavy Jewish influence), the Jewish newspaper Volksstimme publishe
d
a sensational article, listing the names of Jewish cultural and social celebrities who
perished
from 1937-1938 and from 1948-1952. Yet at the same time the article also condemned th
e
"capitalist enemies", "Beria's period" and welcomed the return of "Leninist national p
olicy."
"The article in Volksstimme had unleashed a storm." 3

International communist organizations and Jewish social circles loudly began to demand
an
explanation from the Soviet leaders. "Throughout 1956, foreign visitors to the Soviet
Union
openly asked about Jewish situation there, and particularly why the Soviet government
has
not yet abandoned the dark legacy of Stalinism on the Jewish question?" 4 It became a
recurrent theme for the foreign correspondents and visiting delegations of "fraternal
communist parties". (Actually, that could be the reason for the loud denouncement in t
he
Soviet press of the "betrayal" of Communism by Howard Fast, an American writer and
former enthusiastic champion of Communism. Meanwhile, "hundreds of Soviet Jews from
different cities in one form or another participated in meetings of resurgent Zionist
groups

351

and coteries"; "old Zionists with connections to relatives or friends in Israel were a
ctive in
those groups." 5

In May 1956, a delegation from the French Socialist Party arrived in Moscow. "Particul
ar
attention was paid to the situation of Jews in the Soviet Union." 5 Khrushchev found h
imself
in a hot corner - now he could not afford to ignore the questions, yet he knew, especi
ally
after experiencing postwar Ukraine, that the Jews are not likely to be returned to the
ir [high]
social standing like in 1920s and 1930s. He replied: "In the beginning of the revoluti
on, we
had many Jews in executive bodies of party and government .... After that, we have
developed new cadres .... If Jews wanted to occupy positions of leadership in our repu
blics
today, it would obviously cause discontent among the local people .... If a Jew, appoi
nted to
a high office, surrounds himself with Jewish colleagues, it naturally provokes envy an
d
hostility toward all Jews." (The French publication Socialist Herald calls "strange" a
nd "false"
the Khrushchev's point about "surrounding himself with Jewish colleagues".) In the sam
e
discussion, when Jewish culture and schools were addressed, Khrushchev explained that
"if
Jewish schools were established, there probably would not be many prospective student
s.
The Jews are scattered all over the country ....If the Jews were required to attend a
Jewish
school, it certainly would cause outrage. It would be understood as a kind of a ghett
o." 7

Three months later, in August 1956, a delegation of the Canadian Communist Party visit
ed
the USSR - and it stated outright that it had "a special mission to achieve clarity on
the
Jewish question". Thus, in the postwar years, the Jewish question was becoming a centr
al
concern of the western communists. "Khrushchev rejected all accusations of anti-Semiti
sm
as a slanderagainst him and the party." He named a number of Soviet Jews to important
posts, "he even mentioned his Jewish daughter-in-law," but then he "quite suddenl
y ...
switched to the issue of "good and bad features of each nation" and pointed out "sever
al
negative features of Jews", among which he mentioned "their political unreliability."
Yet he
neither mentioned any of their positive traits, nor did he talk about other nations.
8

In the same conversation, Khrushchev expressed his agreement with Stalin's decision ag
ainst
establishing a Crimean Jewish Republic, stating that such [Jewish] colonization of the
Crimea
would be a strategic military risk for the Soviet Union. This statement was particular
ly hurtful
to the Jewish community. The Canadian delegation insisted on publication of a specifi
c
statement by the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union about the
sufferings of Jews, "but it was met with firm refusal" as "other nations and republic
s, which
alsosuffered from Beria's crimes against their culture and intelligentsia, would askwi
th
astonishment why this statement covers only Jews?" (S. Schwartz dismissively comment
s:
"The pettiness of this argumentation is striking." 9 )

Yet it did not end at that. "Secretly, influential foreign Jewish communists tried" to
obtain
"explanations about the fate of the Jewish cultural elite", and in October of the same
year,
twenty-six Western "progressive Jewish leaders and writers" appealed publicly to Prime
-
Minister Bulganin and "President" Voroshilov, asking them to issue "a public statemen
t
about injustices committed [against Jews] and the measures the goverment had designed
to
restore the Jewish cultural institutions." 10

352

Yet during both the "interregnum" of 1953-1957 and then in Khrushchev's period, the So
viet
policies toward Jews were inconsistent, wary, circumspect and ambivalent, thus sendin
g
signals in all directions.

In particular, the summer of 1956, which was filled with all kinds of social expectati
ons in
general, had also became the apogee of Jewish hopes. One Surkov, the head of the Union
of
Writers, in a conversation with a communist publisher from New York City mentioned pla
ns
to establish a new Jewish publishing house, theater, newspaper and quarterly literary
magazine; there were also plans to organize a countrywide conference of Jewish writers
and
cultural celebrities. It also noted that a commission for reviving the Jewish literatu
re in
Yiddish had been already established. In 1956, "many Jewish writers and journalists ga
thered
in Moscow again." 11 The Jewish activists later recalled that "the optimism inspired i
n all of us
by the events of 1956 did not quickly fade away." 12

Yet the Soviet government continued with its meaningless and aimless policies, discour
aging
any development of an independent Jewish culture. It is likely that Khrushchev himself
was
strongly opposed to it.

And then came new developments - the Suez Crisis, where Israel, Britain and France all
ied in
attacking Egypt ("Israel is heading to suicide," formidably warned the Soviet press),
and the
Hungarian Uprising, with its anti-Jewish streak, nearly completely concealed by histor
y, 13
(resulting, perhaps, from the overrepresentation of Jews in the Hungarian KGB). (Could
this
be also one of the reasons, even if a minor one, for the complete absence of Western
support for the rebellion? Of course, at this time the West was preoccupied with the
Suez Crisis. And yet wasn't it a signal to the Soviets suggesting that it would be bet
ter if the
Jewish theme be kept hushed?)

Then, a year later, Khrushchev finally overpowered his highly placed enemies within th
e
party and, among others, Kaganovitch was cast down.

Could it really be such a big deal? The latter was not the only one ousted and even th
en, he
was not the principal figure among the dethroned; and he was definitely not thrown ou
t
because of his Jewishness. Yet "from the Jewish point of view, his departure symbolize
d the
end of an era". Some looked around and counted - "the Jews disappeared not only from t
he
ruling sections of the party, but also from the leading governmental circles." 14

It was time to pause and ponder thoroughly - what did the Jews really think about such
new
authorities?

David Burg, who emigrated from the USSR in 1956, came upon a formula on how the Jews
should treat the Soviet rule. (It proved quite useful for the authorities): "To some,
the
danger of anti-Semitism 'from below' seems greater than the danger of anti-Semitism 'f
rom
above'"; "though the government oppresses us, it nevertherless allows us to exist. I
f,
however, a revolutionary change comes, then during the inevitable anarchy of the trans
ition
period we will simply be exterminated. Therefore, let's hold on to the government no m
atter
how bad it is." 15

353

We repeatedly encountered similarconcerns in the 1930s - that the Jews should support
the
Bolshevik power in the USSR because without it their fate would be even worse. And no
w,
even though the Soviet power had further deteriorated, the Jews had no other choice bu
t
hold on to it as before.

The Western world and particularly the United States always heeded such recommendation
s,
even during the most strained years of the Cold War. In addition, socialist Israel was
still full
of communist sympathizers and could forgive the Soviet Union a lot for its role in the
defeat
of Hitler. Yet how then could Soviet anti-Semitism be interpreted? In this aspect, th
e
recommendation of D. Burg stood up to the acute "social demand" - to move emphasis fro
m
the anti-Semitism of the Soviet government to the "anti-Semitism of the Russian peopl
e" -
that ever-present curse.

So now some Jews have even fondly recalled the long-disbanded YevSek [the "Jewish
Section" of the Central Committee, dismantled in 1930 when Dimanshtein and its other
leaders were shot]. Even though back in the 1920s it seemed overly pro-Communist, the
YevSek was "to certain extent a guardian of Jewish national interests ... an organ tha
t
produced some positive work as well." 16

In the meantime, Khrushchev's policy remained equivocal; it is reasonable to assume th

at
though Khrushchev himself did not like Jews, he did not want to fight againstthem, rea
lizing
the international political counter-productivity of such an effort. In 1957-1958, Jewi
sh
musical performances and public literary clubs were authorized and appeared in many ci
ties
countrywide. (For example, "in 1961, Jewish literary soirees and Jewish song performan
ces
were attended by about 300,000 people." 17 ) Yet at the same time, the circulation of
Warsaw's Vol ksstim me was discontinued in the Soviet Union, thus cutting the Soviet J
ews off
from an outside source of Jewish information. 18 In 1954, after a long break, Sholom
Aleichem's The Adventures ofMottel was again published in Russian, followed by severa
l
editions of his other books and their translations into other languages; in 1959 a lar
ge
edition of his collected works was produced as well. In 1961 in Moscow, the Yiddish
magazine Sovetish Heymland was established (though it strictly followed the official p
olicy
line). Publications of books by Jewish authors, who were executed in Stalin's times, w
ere
resumed in Yiddish and Russian, and one even could hear Jewish tunes on the broadcasts
of
the All-Soviet Union radio. 19 By 1966, "about one hundred Jewish authors were writing
in
Yiddish in the Soviet Union," and "almost all of the named authors simultaneously work
ed as
Russian language journalists and translators," and "many of them worked as teachers in
the
Russian schools." 20 However, the Jewish theater did not re-open until 1966. In 1966,
S.
Schwartz defined the Jewish situation [in the USSR] as "cultural orphanhood." 21 Yet a
nother
author bitterly remarks: "The general lack of enthusiasm and interest ... from the wid
er
Jewish population ... toward those cultural undertakings ... cannot be explained solel
y by
official policies "With rare exceptions, during those years the Jewish actors performe
d in
half-empty halls. Books of Jewish writers were not selling well." 22

Similarly ambivalent, but more hostile policies of the Soviet authorities in Khrushche
v's
period were implemented against the Jewish religion. It was a part of Khrushchev's gen
eral
anti-religious assault; it is well known how devastating it was for the Russian Orthod
ox
Church. Since the 1930s, not a single theological school functioned in the USSR. In 19
57 a

354

yes hiva - a school for training rabbis - opened in Moscow. It accommodated only 35
students, and even those were being consistently pushed out under various pretexts suc
h as
withdrawal of residence registration in Moscow. Printing of prayer books and manufactu
ring
of religious accessories was hindered. Up to 1956, before the Jewish Passover matzah w
as
baked by state-owned bakeries and then sold in stores. Beginning in 1957, however, bak
ing
of matzah was obstructed and since 1961 it was banned outright almost everywhere. One
day, the authorities would not interfere with receiving parcels with matzah from abroa
d,
another day, they stopped the parcels at the customs, and even demanded recipients to
express in the press their outrage against the senders. 23 In many places, synagogues
were
closed down. "In 1966, only 62 synagogues were functioning in the entire Soviet Unio
n." 24
Yet the authorities did not dare to shut down the synagogues in Moscow, Leningrad, Kie
v
and in the capitals of the republics. In the 1960s, there used to be extensive worship
services
on holidays with large crowds of 10,000 to 15,000 on the streets around synagogues. 25
C.
Schwartz notes that in the 1960s Jewish religious life was in severe decline, yet he l
arge-
mindedly reminds us that it was the result of the long process of secularization that
began in
Russian Jewry in the late 19 th Century. (The process, which, he adds, has also succee
ded in
extremely non-communist Poland between the First and Second World Wars. 26 ) Judaism i
n
the Soviet Union lacked a united control center; yet when the Soviet authorities wante
d to
squeeze out a political show from the leading rabbis for foreign policy purposes, be i
t about
the well-being of Judaism in the USSR or outrage against the nuclear war, the governme
nt
was perfectly able to stage it. 27 "The Soviet authorities had repeatedly used Jewish
religious
leaders for foreign policy goals." For example, "in November 1956 a group of rabbis is
sued a
protest against" the actions of Israel during the Suez War. 28

Another factor, which aggravated the status of Judaism in the USSR after the Suez War,
was
the growing fashionability of what was termed the "struggle against Zionism." Zionism,
being,
strictly speaking, a form of socialism, should naturally had been seen as a true broth
er to the
party of Marx and Lenin. Yet after the mid-1950s, the decision to secure the friendshi
p of the
Arabs drove the Soviet leaders toward persecution of Zionism. However, for the Soviet
masses Zionism was a distant, unfamiliar and abstract phenomenon. Therefore, to flesh
out
this struggle, to give it a distinct embodiment, the Soviet government presented Zioni
sm as a
caricature composed of the characteristic and eternal Jewish images. The books and
pamphlets allegedly aimed againstZionism also contained explicit anti-Judaic and anti-

Jewish messages. If in the Soviet Union of 1920-1930s Judaism was not as brutally
persecuted as the Russian Orthodox Christianity, then in 1957 a foreign socialist
commentator noted how that year signified "a decisive intensification of the struggle
against
Judaism," the "turning point in the struggle against the Jewish religion," and that "t
he
character of struggle betrays that it is directed not only against Judaism, but agains
tthe Jews
in general." 29 There was one stirring episode: in 1963 in Kiev, the Ukrainian Academy
of
Sciences published 12,000 copies of a brochure Unadorned Judaism in Ukrainian, yet it
was
filled with such blatant anti-Jewish caricatures that it provoked a large-scale intern
ational
outcry, joined even by the communist "friends" (who were financially supported by Mosc
ow),
such as the leaders of the American and British communist parties, newspapers L'Humani
te,
L'Unita, as well as a pro-Chinese communist newspaper from Brussels, and many others.
The
UN Human Rights Commission demanded an explanation from its Ukrainian representative.
The World Jewish Cultural Association called for the prosecution of the author and th
e
cartoonist. The Soviet side held on for awhile, insisting that except for the drawing
s, "the

355

book deserves a generally positive assessment." Finally, even Pravda had to admit that
it
was indeed "an ill-prepared ... brochure" with "erroneous statements ... and illustrat
ions that
may offend feelings of religious people or be interpreted as anti-Semitic," a phenomen
on
that, "as is universally known, does not and cannot exist in our country." 31 Yet at t
he same
time Izvestia stated that although there were certain drawbacks to the brochure, "its
main
idea ... is no doubt right." 32

There were even several arrests of religious Jews from Moscow and Leningrad - accused
of
"espionage [conversations during personal meetings in synagogues] for a capitalistic s
tate
[Israel]" with synagogues allegedly used as "fronts for various criminal activities" 3
3 -to scare
others more effectively.

Although there were already no longer any Jews in the most prominent positions, many s
till
occupied influential and important second-tier posts (though there were exceptions: fo
r
example, Veniamin Dymshits smoothly ran Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) from
1962, while being at the same time the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
USSR
and a member of Central Committee from 1961 to 198 6 34 ). Why, at one time the Jews w
ere
joining "NKVD and the MVD ... in such numbers that even now, after all purges of the v
ery
Jewish spirit, a few individuals miraculously remained, such as the famous Captain Jof
fe in a
camp in Mordovia." 35

According to the USSR Census of 1959, 2,268,000 Jews lived in the Soviet Union. (Yet t
here
were caveats regarding this figure: "Everybody knows ... that there are more Jews in t
he
Soviet Union than the Census showed," as on the Census day, a Jew states his nationali
ty not
according to his passport, but any nationality he wishes. 36 ) Of those, 2,162,000 Jew
s lived in
the cities, i.e., 95,3% of total population - much more than 82% in 1926 or 87% in 193
9. 37
And if we glance forward into the 1970 Census, the observed "increase in the number o
f
Jews in Moscow and Leningrad is apparently caused not by natural growth but by migrati
on
from other cities (in spite of all the residential restrictions)." Over these 11 year
s, "at least
several thousand Jews relocated to Kiev. The concentration of Jews in the large cities
had
been increasing for many decades." 38

These figures are very telling for those who know about the differences in living stan
dards
between the urban and the rural populations in the Soviet Union. G. Rosenblum, the edi
tor
of the prominent Israeli newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, recalls an almost anecdotal stor
y by
Israeli Ambassador to Moscow Dr. Harel about his tour of the USSR in the mid-1960s. In
a
large kolkhoz near Kishinev he was told that "the Jews who work here want to meet [hi
m].
[The Israeli] was very happy that there were Jews in the kolkhoz" (love of agricultur
e - a
good sign for Israel). He recounts: "Three Jews came to meet me ... one was a cashie
r,
another - editor of the kolkhoz's wall newspaper and the third one was a kind of econo
mic
manager. I couldn't find any other. So, what the Jews used to do [i.e. before], they a
re still
doing." G. Rosenblum confirms this: "Indeed, the Soviet Jews in their masses did not t
ake to
the physical work." 39 L. Shapiro concludes, "Conversion of Jews to agriculture ended
in
failure despite all the efforts ... of public Jewish organizations and ... the assista
nce of the

356
In Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev -the cities enjoying the highest living and cultural sta
ndards
in the country, the Jews, according to the 1959 Census, constituted 3.9%, 5.8%, and 1
3.9 %
of the population, respectively, which is quite a lot, considering that they accounted
only for
1.1% of the entire population of the USSR. 41

So it was that this extremely high concentration of Jews in urban areas -95% of all So
viet
Jews lived in the cities - that made "the system of prohibitions and restrictions" par
ticularly
painful for them. (As we mentioned in the previous chapter, this system was outlined b
ack in
the early 1940s.) And "although the restrictive rules have never been officially ackno
wledged
and officials stoutly denied their existence, these rules and restrictions very effect
ively
barred the Jews from many spheres of action, professions and positions." 42

Some recall a disturbing rumor circulating then among the Jews: allegedly, Khrushchev
said
in one of his unpublished speeches that "as many Jews will be accepted into the instit
utions
of higher education as work in the coal mines." 43 Perhaps, he really just blurted it
out in his
usual manner, because such "balancing" was never carried out. Yet by the beginning of
1960s, while the absolute number of Jewish students increased, their relative share
decreased substantially when compared to the pre-war period: if in 1936 the share of J
ews
among students was 7.5 times higher than that in the total population 44 , then by 196
0s it
was only 2.7 times higher. These new data on the distribution of students in higher an
d
secondary education by nationality were published for the first time (in the post-war
period)
in 1963 in the statistical annual report, The National Economy of the USSR, 45 and a s
imilar
table was annually produced up to 1972. In terms of the absolute number of students i
n
institutions of higher education and technical schools in the 1962-1963 academic year,
Jews
were fourth after the three Slavic nations (Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians), with
79,300
Jewish students in institutions of higher education out of a total 2,943,700 students
(2.69%).
In the next academic year 1963-1964, the number of Jewish students increased to 82,60
0,
while the total number of students in the USSR reached 3,260,700 (2.53%). This share
remained almost constant until the 1969-1970 academic year; 101,000 Jewish students ou
t
of total 4,549,900. Then the Jewish share began to decline and in 1972-1973 it was 1.9
1%:
88,500 Jewish students out of total 4,630,246. (This decline coincided with the beginn
ing of
the Jewish immigration to Israel.)

The relative number of Jewish scientists also declined in 1960s, from 9.5% in 1960 to
6.1% in
1973. 47 During those same years, "there were tens of thousands Jewish names in the So
viet
art and literature," 48 including 8.5% of writers and journalists, 7.7% of actors and
artists,
more than 10% of judges and attorneys, and about 15% doctors. 49 Traditionally, there
were
always many Jews in medicine, yet consider the accursed "Soviet psychiatry," which in
those
years began locking up healthy people in mental institutions. And who were those
psychiatrists? Listing the "Jewish occupations," M.I. Heifets writes: "'Psychiatry is
a Jewish
monopoly,' a friend, a Jewish psychiatrist, told me, just before [my] arrest; 'we bega
n to get
Russians only recently and even then as the result of an order'" [translator's note: a
dmission
into medical residency training was regulated at local and central levels; here autho
r
indicates that admission of ethnically Russian doctors into advanced psychiatry traini
ng was
mandated from the higher levels]. He provides examples: the Head Psychiatrist of Lenin
grad,
Professor Averbukh, provides his expertise for the KGB in the "Big House"; in Moscow t
here
was famous Luntz; in the Kaluga Hospital there was Lifshitz and "his Jewish gang." Whe
n

357

Heifetz was arrested, and his wife began looking for a lawyer with a "clearance," that
is, with
a permission from the KGB to work on political cases, she "did not find a single Russi
an"
among them as all such lawyers were Jews 50 ).
In 1956, Furtseva, then the First Secretary of Moscow Gorkom (the City's Party Committ
ee),
complained that in some offices Jews constitute more than half of the staff. 51 (I hav
e to note
for balance that in those years the presence of Jews in the Soviet apparatus was not
detrimental. The Soviet legal machinery was in its essence stubbornly and hardheartedl
y
anti-human, skewed against any man in need, be it a petitioner or just a visitor. So i
t often
happened that the Russian officials in Soviet offices, petrified by their power, looke
d for any
excuse to triumphantly turn away a visitor; in contrast, one could find much more
understanding in a Jewish official and resolve an issue in a more humane way). L. Shap
iro
provides examples of complaints that in the national republics, the Jews were pushed o
ut
and displaced from the bureaucratic apparatus by native intelligentsia 52 -yet it was
a
common and officially-mandated system of preferences in the ethnic republics [to affir
m the
local cadres], and Russians were displaced just as well.

This reminds me of an example from contemporary American life. In 1965, the New York
Division of the American Jewish Committee had conducted a four-months-long unofficial
interview of more than a thousand top officials in New York City banks. Based on its r
esults,
the American Jewish Committee mounted a protest because less than 3% of those surveye
d
were Jews, though they constituted one quarter of the population of - that is, the
Committee demanded proportional representation. Then the chairman of the Association o
f
Banks of New York responded that banks, according to law, do not hire on the basis of
"race,
creed, color or national origin" and do not keep records of such categories (that woul
d be
our accursed "fifth article" [the requirement in the Soviet internal passport - "natio
nality"]!).
(Interestingly, the same American Jewish Committee had conducted a similarstudy about
the ethnic composition of management of the fifty largest U.S. public utility services
two
years before, and in 1964 it in similarvein it studied industrial enterprises in the P
hiladelphia
region.) 53

Yet let us return to the Soviet Jews. Many Jewish emigrants loudly advertised their fo
rmer
activity in the periodical-publishing and film-making industries back in the USSR. In
particular,
we learn from a Jewish author that "it was due to his [Syrokomskiy's] support that all
top
positions in Literaturnaya Gazeta became occupied by Jews." 54

Yet twenty years later we read a different assessment of the time: "The new anti-Semit
ism
grew stronger ... and by the second half of the 1960s it already amounted to a develop
ed
system of discreditation, humiliation and isolation of the entire people." 55

So how can we reconcile such conflicting views? How can we reach a calm and balanced
assessment?

Then from the high spheres inhabited by economic barons there came alarming signals,
signals that made the Jews nervous. "To a certain extent, Jewish activity in the Sovie
t Union
concentrated in the specific fields of economy along a characteristic pattern, well-kn
own to
Jewish sociologists." 56 By then, atthe end of 1950s, Nikita [Khrushchev] suddenly rea
lized
that the key spheres of the Soviet economy are plagued by rampant theft and fraud.

358

"In 1961, an explicitly anti-Semitic campaign was initiated against the ?theft of soci
alist
property." 57 Beginning in 1961, a number of punitive decrees of the Supreme Soviet of
the
USSR were passed. The first one dealt with "foreign currency speculations," another -
with
bribes, and still another later introduced capital punishment for the aforementioned c
rimes,
at the same time lawlessly applying the death penalty retroactively, for the crimes
committed before those decrees were issued (as, for example, the case of J. Rokotov an
d B.
Faybishenko). Executions started in the very first year. During the first nine trials,
eleven
individuals were sentenced to death -among them were "perhaps, six Jews." 58 The Jewis
h
Encyclopedia states it more specifically, "In 1961-1964, thirty-nine Jews were execute
d for
economic crimes in the RSFSR and seventy-nine - in Ukraine," and forty-three Jews in o
ther
republics. 59 In these trials, "the vast majority of defendants were Jews." (The publi
city was
such that the court reports indicated the names and patronymics of the defendants, whi
ch
was the normal order of pleadings, yet it was getting "absolutely clear from that that
they
were Jews." 60 )

Next, in a large court trial in Frunze in 1962, nineteen out of forty-six defendants w
ere
apparently Jewish. "There is no reason to think that this new policy was conceived as
a
system of anti-Jewish measures. Yet immediately upon enforcement, the new laws acquire
d
distinct anti-Jewish flavor," - the author of the quote obviously points out to the pu
blication
of the full names of defendants, including Jewish ones; other than that, neither the c
ourts,
nor the government, nor the media made any generalizations or direct accusations again
st
the Jews. And even when Sovetskaya Kyrgizia wrote that "they occupied different posts,
but
they were closely linked to each other," it never clarified the begged question "how w
ere
they linked?" The newspaper treated this issue with silence, thus pushing the reader t
o the
thought that the nucleus of the criminal organization was composed of the "closely lin
ked"
individuals. Yet "closely linked by" what? By their Jewishness. So the newspaper
"emphasized the Jews in this case." 61 ... Yet people can be "closely linked" by any i
llegal
transaction, greed, swindling or fraud. And, amazingly, nobody argued that those indiv
iduals
could be innocent (though they could have been innocent). Yet to name them was equal t
o
Jew-baiti ng.

Next, in January 1962, came the Vilnius case of speculators in foreign currency. All e
ight
defendants were Jews (during the trial, non-Jewish members of the political establishm
ent
involved in the case escaped public naming - a usual Soviet trick). This time, there w
as an
explicit anti-Jewish sentiment from the prosecution: "The deals were struck in a synag
ogue,
and the arguments were settled with the help of wine." 62

S. Schwartz is absolutely convinced that this legal and economic harassment was nothin
g
else but rampant anti-Semitism, yet he completely disregards "the tendency of Jews to
concentrate their activity in the specific spheres of economy." Similarly, the entire
Western
media interpreted this as a brutal campaign against Jews, the humiliation and isolatio
n of the
entire people; Bertrand Russell sent a letterof protest to Khrushchev and got a person
al
response from the Soviet leader. 63 However, after that, the Soviet authorities appare
ntly had
second thoughts when they handled the Jews.

In the West, the official Soviet anti-Semitism began to be referred to as "the most pr
essing
issue" in the USSR (ignoring any more acute issues) and "the most proscribed subjec
t."

359

(Though there were numerous other proscribed issues such as forced collectivization or
the
surrender of three million Red Army soldiers in the year of 1941 alone, or the murdero
us
nuclear "experimentation" on our own Soviet troops on the Totskoye range in 1954.) Of
course, after Stalin's death, the Communist Party avoided explicit anti-Jewish stateme
nts.
Perhaps, they practiced incendiary "invitation-only meetings" and "briefings" -that wo
uld
have been very much in the Soviet style. Solomon Schwartz rightly concludes: "Soviet a
nti-
Jewish policy does not have any sound or rational foundation," the strangulation of th
e
Jewish cultural life "appears puzzling. How can such bizarre policy be explained?" 64

Still, when all living things in the country were being choked, could one really expec
t that
such vigorous and agile people would escape a similar lot? To that, the Soviet foreign
policy
agendas of 1960s added their weight: the USSR was designing an anti-Israel campaign. T
hus,
they came up with a convenient, ambiguous and indefinite term of "anti-Zionism," whic
h
became "a sword of Damocles hanging above the entire Jewish population of the countr
y." 65
Campaigning against "Zionism" in the press became a sort of impenetrable shield as it
s
obvious anti-Semitic nature became unprovable. Moreover, it sounded menacing and
dangerous - "Zionism is the instrument of the American imperialism." So the "Jews had
to
prove their loyalty in one way or other, to somehow convince the people around them th
at
they had no connection to their own Jewishness, especially toZionism." 66

The feelings of ordinary Jews in the Soviet Union became the feelings of the oppressed
as
vividly expressed by one of them: "Over the years of persecutions and vilifications, t
he Jews
developed a certain psychological complex of suspicion to any contact coming from non-

Jews. In everything they are ready to see implicit or explicit hints on their national
ity .... The
Jews can never publicly declare their Jewishness, and it is formally accepted that thi
s should
be kept silent, as if it was a vice, or a past crime." 67

An incident in Malakhovka in October 1959 added substantially to that atmosphere. On t

he
night of October 4, in Malakhovka, a settlement "half an hour from Moscow ... with 30,
000
inhabitants, about 10% of whom are Jews the roof of the synagogue caught fire along
with ... the house of the Jewish cemetery keeper ... [and] the wife of the keeper died
in the
fire. On the same night, leaflets were scattered and posted across Malakhovka: 'Away w
ith
the Jews in commerce! ... We saved them from the Germans ... yet they became arrogant
so
fastthatthe Russian people do not understand any longer... who's living on whose lan
d.'" 68

Growing depression drove some Jews to such an extreme state of mind as that described
by
D. Shturman: some "Jewish philistines developed a hatred toward Israel, believing it t
o be
the generator of anti-Semitism in the Soviet politics. I remember the words of one suc
cesful
Jewish teacher: 'One good bomb dropped on Israel would make our life much easier.'" 6
9

Yet that was an ugly exception indeed. In general, the rampant anti-Zionist campaign
triggered a "consolidation of the sense of Jewishness in people and the growth of symp
athy
towards Israel as the outpost of the Jewish nation." 70

There is yet another explanation of the social situation in those years: yes, under Kh
rushchev,
"fears for their lives had become the things of the past for the Soviet Jews," but "th
e
foundations of new anti-Semitism had been laid," as the young generation of political
establishment fought for caste privileges, "seeking to occupy the leading positions in
arts,

360

science, commerce, finance, etc. There the new Soviet aristocracy encountered Jews, wh
ose
share in those fields was traditionally high." The "social structure of the Jewish pop
ulation,
which was mainly concentrated in the major centers of the country, reminded the rulin
g
elite of their own class structure." 71

Doubtless, such encounter did take place; it was an epic "crew change" in the Soviet r
uling
establishment, switching from the Jewish elite to the Russian one. It had clearly resu
lted in
antagonism and I remember those conversations among the Jews during Khrushchev's era -

they were full of not only ridicule, but also of bad insults with the ex -villagers,
"muzhiks,"
who have infiltrated the establishment.

Yet altogether all the various social influences combined with the great prudence of t
he
Soviet authorities led to dramatic alleviation of "prevalence and acuteness of modern
Soviet
anti-Semitism" by 1965, which became far inferior to what had been observed "during th
e
war and the first post-war years," and it appears that "a marked attenuation, maybe ev
en a
complete dying out of 'the percentage quote' is happening." 72 Overall, in the 1960s t
he
Jewish worldview was rather positive. This is what we consistently hear from differen
t
authors. (Contrast this to what we just read, that "the new anti-Semitism grew in stre
ngth in
the 1960s.") The same opinion was expressed again twenty years later - "Khrushchev's e
ra
was one of the most peaceful periods of the Soviet history for the Jews." 73

"In 1956-1957, many new Zionist societies sprang up in the USSR, bringing together you
ng
Jews who previously did not show much interest in Jewish national problems or Zionism.
An
important impetus for the awakening of national consciousness among Soviet Jews and fo
r
the development of a sense of solidarity with the State of Israel was the Suez Crisis
[1956]."
Later, "The International Youth Festival [Moscow, 1957] became a catalyst for the revi
val of
the Zionist movement in the USSR among a certain portion of Soviet Jews ... Between th
e
festival and the Six-Day War [1967], Zionist activity in the Soviet Union was graduall
y
expanding. Contacts of Soviet Jews with the Israeli Embassy became more frequent and l
ess
dangerous." Also, "the importance of Jewish Samizdat increased dramatically." 74

During the so-called Khrushchev's "thaw" period (the end of 1950s to the beginning of
the
1960s), Soviet Jews were spiritually re-energized; they shook off the fears and distre
ss of the
previous age of the "Doctors' Plot" and the persecution of "cosmopolitan." It "even be
came
fashionable" in the metropolitan society "to be a Jew"; the Jewish motif entered Samiz
dat
and poetic soirees then so popular among the young. Rimma Kazakova even ventured to
declare her Jewish identity from the stage. Yevtushenko quickly caught the airand expr
essed
it in 1961 in his Babi Yar 75 , proclaiming himself a Jew in spirit. His poem (and the
courage of
Literaturnaya Gazeta) was a literary trumpet call for all of Soviet and world Jewry.
Yevtushenko recited his poem during a huge number of poetic soirees, always accompanie
d
by a roar of applause. After a while, Shostakovich, who often ventured into Jewish the
mes,
set Yevtushenko' s poem into his 13th Symphony. Yet its public performance was limited
by
the authorities. Babi Yar spread among Soviet and foreign Jewries as a reinvigorating
and
healing blast of air, a truly "revolutionary act ... in the development of the social
consciousness in the Soviet Union"; "it became the most significant event since the di
smissal
of the "Doctors' Plot.'" 75

361

In 1964-65 Jewish themes returned into popular literature; take, for example, Summer i
n
Sosnyaki by Anatoliy Rybakov or the diary of Masha Rolnik 77 ("written apparently unde
r
heavy influence of Diary of Anne Frank" 78 ).

"After the ousting of Khrushchev from all his posts, the official policy towards Jews
was
softened somewhat. The struggle against Judaism abated and nearly all restrictions on
baking matzah were abolished ....Gradually, the campaign against economic crimes fade
d
away too ...."Yet "the Soviet press unleashed a propaganda campaign against Zionist
activities among the Soviet Jews and their connections to the Israeli Embassy." 79

All these political fluctuations and changes in the Jewish policies in the Soviet Unio
n did not
pass unnoticed but served to awaken the Jews.

In the 1959 Census, only 21% Jews named Yiddish as their first language (in 1926 -7
2%). 80
Even in 1970s they used to say that "Russian Jewry, which was [in the past] the most J
ewish
Jewry in the world, became the least Jewish." 81 "The current state of Soviet society
is fraught
with destruction of Jewish spiritual and intellectual potential." 82 Or as another aut
hor put it:
the Jews in the Soviet Union were neither "allowed to assimilate," norwere they "allow
ed to
be Jews." 83

Yet Jewish identity was never subdued during the entire Soviet period.

In 1966 the official mouthpiece Sovetish Heymland claimed that "even assimilated Russi
an-
speaking Jews still retain their unique character, distinct from that of any other seg
ment of
population." 84 Not to mention the Jews of Odessa, Kiev, and Kharkov, who "sometimes w
ere
even snooty about their Jewishness -to the extent that they did not want to befriend
a
goy." 85

Scientist Leo Tumerman ( already in Israel in 1977) recalls the early Soviet period, w
hen he
used to "reject any nationalism." Yet now, looking back at those years: "I am surprise
d to
notice what I had overlooked then: despite what appeared to be my full assimilation in
to the
Russian life, the entire circle of my close and intimate friends atthat time was Jewis
h." 86

The sincerity of his statement is certain -the picture is clear. Such things were wide
spread
and I witnessed similarsituations quite a few times, and Russians people did not mind
such
behavior at all.

Another Jewish author notes: in the USSR "non-religious Jews of all walks of life hand
in
hand defended the principle of 'racial purity.'" He adds: "Nothing could be more natur
al.
People for whom the Jewishness is just an empty word are very rare, especially among t
he
unassimilated [Jews]." 87

Natan Sharansky's testimonial, given shortly after his immigration to Israel, is also
typical:
"Much of my Jewishness was instilled into me by my family. Although our family was an
assimilated one, it nevertheless was Jewish." "My father, an ordinary Soviet journalis
t, was
so fascinated with the revolutionary ideas of 'happiness for all' and not just for the
Jews,
that he became an absolutely loyal Soviet citizen." Yet in 1967 after the Six-Day War
and
later in 1968 after Czechoslovakia, "I suddenly realized an obvious difference betwee
n

362

myself and non-Jews around me ... a kind of a sense of the fundamental difference betw
een
my Jewish consciousness and the national consciousness of the Russians." 88

And here is another very thoughtful testimonial (1975): "The efforts spent over the la
st
hundred years by Jewish intellectuals to reincarnate themselves into the Russian natio
nal
form were truly titanic. Yet it did not give them balance of mind; on the contrary, it
rather
made them to feel the bitterness of their bi-national existence more acutely." And "th
ey
have an answer to the tragic question of Aleksandr Blok: 'My Russia, my life, are we t
o
drudge through life together?' To that question, to which a Russian as a rule gives a
n
unambiguous answer, a member of Russian-Jewish intelligentsia used to reply (sometime
s
after self-reflection): 'No, not together. For the time being, yes, side by side, but
not
together'... A duty is no substitute for Motherland." And so "the Jews felt free from
obligations at all sharp turns of Russian history." 89

Fair enough. One can only hope for all Russian Jews to get such clarity and acknowledg
e this
dilemma.

Yet usually the problem in its entirety is blamed on "anti-Semitism": "Excluding us fr

om
everything genuinely Russian, their anti-Semitism simultaneously barred us from all th
ings
Jewish .... Anti-Semitism is terrible not because of what it does to the Jews (by impo
sing
restrictions on them), but because of what it does with the Jews by turning them into
neurotic, depressed, stressed, and defective human beings." 90

Still, those Jews, who had fully woken up to their identity, were very quickly, comple
tely, and
reliably cured from such a morbid condition.

Jewish identity in the Soviet Union grew stronger as they went through the historical
ordeals
predestined for Jewry by the 20 th Century. First, it was the Jewish Catastrophe durin
g the
Second World War. (Through the efforts of official Soviet muffling and obscuring, Sovi
et
Jewry only comprehended its full scope later.)

Another push was given by the campaign against "cosmopolitans" in 1949-1950.

Then there was a very serious threat of a massacre by Stalin, eliminated by his timely
death.

And with Khrushchev's "thaw" and after it, later in the 1960s, Soviet Jewry quickly aw
oke
spiritually, already sensing its unique identity.

During the second half of the 1950s, "the growing sense of bitterness, spread over lar
ge
segments of Soviet Jewry", lead to "consolidation of the sense of national solidarit
y." 91
But "only in the late 1960s did a very small but committed group of scientists (note,
they
were not humanitarians; the most colorful figure among them was Alexander Voronel) beg
in
rebuilding of Jewish national consciousness in Russia." 92

And then against the nascent national consciousness of Soviet Jews, the Six-Day War
suddenly broke out and instantly ended in what might have seemed a miraculous victor
y.

363

Israel has ascended in their minds and Soviet Jews awoke to their spiritual and
consanguineous kinship [with Israel].

But the Soviet authorities, furious at Nasser's disgraceful defeat, immediately attack
ed
Soviet Jews with the thundering campaign against the "Judeo-Zionist-Fascism," insinuat
ing
that all the Jews were "Zionists" and claiming that the "global conspiracy" of Zionism
"is the
expected and inevitable product of the entirety of Jewish history, Jewish religion, an
d the
resultant Jewish national character" and "because of the consistent pursuit of the ide
ology
of racial supremacy and apartheid, Judaism turned out to be a very convenient religion
for
securing world dominance." 93

The campaign on TV and in the press was accompanied by a dramatic break of diplomatic
relations with Israel. The Soviet Jews had many reasons to fear: "It looked like it wa
s going to
come to calls for a pogrom." 94

But underneath this scare a new and already unstoppable explosion of Jewish national
consciousness was growing and developing.

"Bitterness, resentment, anger, and the sense of social insecurity were accruing for a
final
break up which would lead to complete severing of all ties with [this] country and [th
is]
society - to emigration.

"The victory of the Israeli Army contributed to the awakening of national consciousnes
s
among the many thousands of almost completely assimilated Soviet Jews .... The process
of
national revival has began .... The activity of Zionist groups in cities all across th
e country
surged .... In 1969, there were attempts to create a united Zionist Organization [in t
he USSR]
.... An increasing number of Jews applied to emigrate to Israel." 96

And the numerous refusals to grant exit visas led to the failed attempt to hijack an a
irplane
on June 15, 1970. The following "Dymshits-Kuznetsov hijacking affair" can be considere
d a
historic landmark in the fate of Soviet Jewry.

Sources:

1 KpaTKaa EBpeticKafl 3HU,MKnoneflHfl (fla^ee — KE3). Mepyca^nwi: 06mecTBO no MccneflO

BaHmo eBpeMCKMX
o6immh, 1996. T. 8, c. 256.

2 C. Ill Bap u,. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Cotc>3e c Hanayia Btopom mmpobom BOMHbi (1939-196
5). Hbto-MopK: M3fl.
AwiepuKaHCKoro EBpeficKoro Pa6onero KoMMTeTa, 1966, c. 247.

3 Taw\ we, c. 247-248.

4 XpymeB m eBpeMCKMM Bonpoc // Cou,na^MCTMHecKMM BecTHMK, Hbio-MopK, 1961, N2 1, c. 2

0.

5 KE3, t. 8, c. 257.

6 XpymeB m eBpeticKMM Bonpoc // CoL^nayincTMHecKUM BecTHMK, 1961, N° 1, c. 20.

7 CnoBa H.C. XpymeBa npuBefleHbi b OTHeTe nepeBOflHMKa <t>paHU,y3CKOM fle^erau,nn ribe

pa /lowaKa: Realites,
Paris, Mai 1957, p. 64-67, 101-104. — Mbi u,MTnpyeM mx b o6paTHOM nepeBOfle «Cou,na^MC
TMHecKoro
BecTHMKa » (1961, N2 1, c. 21).

364

8J.B. Sals berg, Talks with Soviet Leaders on the Jewish Question // Jewish Life, Feb
r. 1957. — U,mt. b nepeBOfle
«Cou,. BecTHMKa » (1961, N2 1, c. 20).
9 C. LUBapu,. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Corae...*, c. 250.

10TaM>xe*, c. 249-251.

11 Tawiwe, c. 241,272.

12 KD. LUTepH. CnTyau,Mfl HeycTOMHMBa m noTowiy onacHa: [MHTepBbto] // "22": 06mecTBeH

HO-noyiMTMHecKMM m
yiMTepaTypHbiM >xypHa.n eBpeficKOM MHTeyiyinreHL^nn M3 CCCP b M3pan^e. Te^b-ABMB, 198
4, N2 38, c. 132.

13 Andrew Handler. Where Familiarity with Jews Breeds Contempt // Red Star, Blue Star:
The Lives and Times
of Jewish Students in Communist Hungary (1948-1956). New-York: Columbia University Pre
ss, 1997, p. 36-37.

14 H. LUannpo. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm nocne CrayiMHa // Km-ira o pyccKOM eBpeficTBe,

1917-1967 (flayiee
— KPE-2). Hbio-MopK: Cok>3 PyccKMX EBpeeB, 1968, c. 360-361.

15 David Burg. Die Judenfrage in Der Sowjetunion // Der Anti-kommunist, Miinchen,Juli-

Augustl957, N° 12,
S.35.

16 C. LUBapu,. EBpeM b Cobctckom Coto3e...*, c. 238.

17 Taw\ >Ke, c. 283-287; KE3, t. 8, c. 258.

18 C. LUBapu,. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 281.

19 3. c^nHKeyrbLUTeMH. EBpeM bCCCP: riyTb b flBaflu.aTb nepBbm BeK // CrpaHa m w\np: 0

6mecTB.-no^MTMHecKHM,
3KOHOMMHecKMM m Ky.nbTypHO-4>M.nococ|)CKMM >xypHa.n. MtOHXeH, 1989, N2 1, c. 65-66.

20 fl. LUannpo. EBpeM b Cobctckom Poccmm nocne Cra/iMHa // KPE-2, c. 379-380.

21 C. LUBapu,. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Coio3e..., c. 280, 288.

22 3. cj3MHKeyi"bLUTeMH. EBpeM b CCCP: riyTb b flBaflu.aTb nepBbiM BeK // CrpaHa m mm

p, 1989, N2 1, c. 66.

23 C. LUBapu,. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 304-308.

24 KE3, t. 8, c.259.

25 J]. LUanMpo. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm nocne Cra/iMHa // KPE-2, c. 358.

26 C. LUBapu,. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Corae..., c. 290.

27 Ta m >Ke, c. 294-296.

28 KE3, t. 8, c.258.

29 AHTMcewiMTCKMM naMcJxneT b Cobctckom Coto3e // Cou,Ma^MCTMHecKMM BecTHMK, 1965, N2

4, c. 67.

30 AHTMcewiMTCKMM naMcJxneT b Cobctckom Coto3e // Cou,Ma^MCTMHecKMM BecTHMK*, 1965, N2

4, c. 68-73.

31 B Mfleo^orMHecKOM kommccmm npM U,K KnCC // ripaBfla, 1964,4 anpe.nfl, c. 4.

32 06oflHOM HenoHATHOM ujyMMxe //M3BecTMfl, 1964, 4 anpeyia, c. 4.

33 C. LUBapu,. EBpeM b Cobctckom Corae..., c. 303.

365

34 Poccmmckba EBpeficKafl 3HU,MK.noneAMfl. 2-en3fl v ncnp. Mflon. M., 1994. T. 1, c. 4

48.

35 P. PyTMaH. Koyibup o6nfl // HoBbm >xypHa.n, Hbto-MopK. 1974. N2 117, c. 185.

36 14. flowia^bCKMM. TexHo^ornfl Heina bmctm // Bpewifl m Mbi (fla.nee — BM): MewflyHa
poflHbiM >xypHa.n
^MTepaTypbi m o6mecTBeHHbix npo6^ew\. Te.nb-ABMB. 1978, N2 26, c. 113-114.

37 KE3, t. 8, c. 298, 300.

38 M./lflCT. A/wn M3 CCCP — Aewiorpa^MHecKne nporH03bi// "22", 1981, N° 21, c. 112-11

3.

39 T. Po3eH6^toM, B. nepeyib/waH. KpyiueHne Hyfla: npunnHbi m cneflCTBMH*: [Becefla]

// BM, Te.nb-ABMB, 1977,
N2 24, c. 120.

40 fl. Illannpo. EBpeM b Cobctckom Poccmm nocne CrayiMHa // KPE-2, c. 346.

41 KE3, t. 8, c. 300.

42 3. OnHKeyibiuTeMH. EBpeM b CCCP... // CTpaHa m mmp, 1989, N2 1, c. 65.

43 H. Illannpo. C/iobo paflOBoro coBeTCKoro eBpea // PyccKMM a HTMceMMTH3M m eBpen: C6

opHMK. /loHflOH,
1968, c. 55.

44 KE3, t. 8, c. 190.
45 HapoflHoe xo3amctbo CCCP b 1963 rofly: CTaTMCTMHecKMM eweroflHMK. M.: CraTMCTMKa, 1
965, c. 579.

46 HapoflHoe xo3amctbo CCCP b 1969 ro/jy. M., 1970, c. 690;HapoflHoe xo3amctbo CCCP b
1972 rofly. M., 1972,
c. 651.

47 14. flowia^bCKMM. TexHo^ornfl HeHa bmctm // BM, Te^b-ABMB, 1978, N225, c. 120.

48 3. OMHKeyrbLUTeMH. EBpeM b CCCP... // CTpaHa m mmp, 1989, N2 1, c. 66.

49 A. Hob, >Kfl. HbioT. EBpeMCKoe Hace^eHMe CCCP: flew\orpac()MHecKoe pa3BMTMe m npo^e

ccMOHa^bHaa
3a HflTOCTb// EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm (1917-1967). M3paM^b: BM6^MOTeKa «A/iMfi», 197
5, c. 180.

50 Mmxb v\n XeM^eu,. MecTO m BpeMH (eBpeMCKMe 3aw\eTKM>*. napMH<: TpeTbfl BO^Ha, 1978,
c. 63-65, 67, 70.

51 fl. LLIanMpo. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm nocne Cra/iMHa // KPE-2, c. 363.

52 TaM>xe.

53 New York Times, 1965, October 21, p. 47.

54 B. riepe.nbMaH. O ;iM6epa.nax b coBeTCKMX Bepxax // BM, Hbto-MopK, 1985, N2 87, c.

147.

55 3. OMHKeyrbLUTeMH. EBpeM b CCCP... // CTpaHa m mmp, 1989, N2 1, c. 66.

56 fl. LLIanMpo. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm nocne Cra/iMHa // KPE-2, c. 362.

57 KE3, t. 8, c.261.

58 C. LUBapu,. EBpeM b CoBeTCKOM CoK>3e..., c. 326-327,329.

59 KE3, t. 8, c.261.

366

60 H. LLIannpo. Oiobo paflOBoro coBeTCKoro espen // PyccKMM a HTMceMMTH3M m eBpen, c.

55.

61 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Corae..., c. 330-333.

62 Tawiwe, c. 333-334.

63 06w\eH nucbMawiM wiewfly B. Paccenowi m H.C. XpymeBbiM // ripaBfla, 1963, 1 wiapTa,

c. 1.

64 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coto3e..., c. 421-422.

65 3. OnHKeyibiuTeMH. EBpen b CCCP... // CTpaHa m w\np. 1989, N2 1, c. 65.

66 3. OnHKeyibiuTeMH. EBpen b CCCP... // CTpaHa m winp, 1989, I\l2 1, c. 66-67.

67 H. LUannpo. Oiobo paflOBoro ccmeTCKoro eBpea // PyccKMM a HTMceMMTH3M m eBpen, c. 4

8,55.

68 CoL^nayiMCTMHecKMM BecTHMK, 1959, N° 12, c. 240-241.

69 fl. LUrypwia h. CoBeTCKMM a HTMceMMTH3M — npunnHbi m nporH03bi: [CewiMHap] // "22",

1978, N° 3, c. 180.

70 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coio3e..., c. 395.

71 3. <t>MHKeyi"biuTeMH. EBpen b CCCP... // CTpaHa m winp, 1989, N2 1, c. 64-65.

72 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b Cobetckom Corae..., c. 372, 409.

73 Mnxan.n Xefi4>eu,. HoBaa «apncTOKpaTMfl»? // TpaHn: HtypHa/i yiMTepaTypbi, MCKyccTB

a, HayKM m o6m.-
noyiMTMHecKOM Mbic^n. OpaHK4)ypT-Ha-MaMHe, 1987, N2 146, c. 189.

74 KE3, t. 8, c. 262-263.

75 R. Rutman // Soviet Jewish Affairs, London, 1974, Vol. 4, N2 2, p. 11.

76 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b Cobctckom Coio3e..., c. 371.

77 CooTBeTCTBeH ho : HoBbiM w\np, 1964, N2 12; Mapua PoyibHMKaMTe. f\ flo.n>KHa paccKa

3aTb//3Be3fla, 1965, N2
2 m N2 3.

78 C. LLlBapu,. EBpen b Cobctckom CoK)3e..., c. 373.

79 KE3, t. 8, c. 262, 264.

80 Tawiwe, c. 295,302.

81 T. Po3eH6^K)M. KpyiueHne Hyfla...: [Eecefla c B. nepeyrbwiaHOM] // BM, Teyib-ABMB,

1977, N224, c. 120.
82 H. LJ,nre^bMaH-flbiMepcKafl. CoBeTCKMM a HTMceMMTH3M — npunnHbi m nporH03bi: [CewiM
Hap] // "22", 1978,
N23, c. 175.

83 K). LUTepH. CnTyau,Mfl HeycTOMHMBa...: [MHTepBbio] 1 1 "11", 1984, N2 38, c. 135.

84 J]. LUannpo. EBpen b CoBeTCKOM Poccmm nocne CTa^MHa // KPE-2, c. 379.

85 KD. LUTepH. flBOMHaa OTBeTCTBeH h ocTb : [MHTepBbio] 1 1 "11", 1981, N2 21, c. 12

7.

86 "22"*, 1978, N2 1, c. 204.

367

87 A. 3TepwiaH. McTMHa c 6^M3Koro paccTOAHMfl // "22", 1987, N° 52, c. 112.

88 A. LU,apaHCKM«. [MHTepBbio] // "22", 1986, N2 49. c. 111-112.

89 B. Op/iOB. He Te Bbi ynn^n a^4>aBMTbi // BM, Tanb-ABMB, 1975, N° 1, c. 129, 132-13

3.

90 B. Eorycna bckmm. Ta^yTy — c HaflewflOki // "22", 1985, N2 40, c. 133, 134.

91 C. LUBapu,. EBpen bCobetckom Coio3e..., c.415.

92 T. Oa mh. B pani-i BbicoKoon^aHMBaewibix ujBeMU,apoB // BM, Tenb-ABMB. 1976, N° 12.

c. 133-134.

93 P. HyfleyibMaH. CoBeTCKMM a HTMceMMTH3M — npunnHbi m nporH03bi: [CewiMHap] // "22",

1978, N° 3, c. 144.

94 3. 0MHKeyibLUTeMH. EBpen b CCCP... // CTpaHa m w\np, 1989, N° 1, c. 67.

95 Taw\ >Ke.

96 KE3, t. 8. c.267.

368

Chapter 24: Breaking away from Bolshevism

At the beginning of the 20 th century, Europe imagined itself to be on the threshold o
f
worldwide enlightenment. No one could have predicted the strength with which nationali
sm
would explode in that very century among all nations of the world. One hundred years l
ater
it seems nationalist feelings are not about to die soon (the very message that interna
tional
socialists have been trying to drum into our heads for the whole century), but instead
are
gaining strength.

Yet, does not the multi-national nature of humanity provide variety and wealth? Erosio
n of
nations surely would be an impoverishment for humanity, the entropy of the spirit. (An
d
centuries of the histories of national cultures would then turn into irredeemably dead
and
useless antics.) The logic that it would be easierto manage such a uniform mankind fai
ls by
its petty reductionism.

However, the propaganda in the Soviet empire harped non-stop in an importunately-

triumphant manner about the imminent withering away and amalgamation of nations,
proclaiming that no "national question" exists in our country, and that there is certa
inly no
"Jewish question."

Yet why should not the Jewish question exist — the question of the unprecedented three
-
thousand-year-old existence of the nation, scattered all over the Earth, yet spiritula
lly
soldered together despite all notions of the state and territoriality, and at the same
time
influencing the entire world history in the most lively and powerful way? Why should t
here
not be a "Jewish question" given that all national questions come up at one time or ot
her,
even the "Gagauz question" [a small Christian Turkic people, who live in the Balkans a
nd
Eastern Europe]?

Of course, no such silly doubt could ever arise, if the Jewish question were not the f
ocus of
many different political games.
The same was true for Russia too. In pre-revolutionary Russian society, as we saw, it
was the
omission of the Jewish question that was considered "anti-Semitic." In fact, in the mi
nd of
the Russian public the Jewish question — understood as the question of civil rights or
civil
equality — developed into perhaps the central question of the whole Russian public lif
e of
that period, and certainly into the central node of the conscience of every individua
l, its acid
test.

With the growth of European socialism, all national issues were increasingly recognize
d as
merely regrettable obstacles to that great doctrine; all the more was the Jewish quest
ion
(directly attributed to capitalism by Marx) considered a bloated hindrance. Mommsen wr
ote
that in the circles of "Western-Russian socialist Jewry," as he put it, even the sligh
test
attempt to discuss the Jewish question was branded as "reactionary" and "anti-Semitic"
(this
was even before the Bund).

Such was the iron standard of socialism inherited by the USSR. From 1918 the communist
s
forbade (under threat of imprisonment or death) any separate treatment or consideratio
n of

369

the Jewish question (except sympathy for their suffering under the Tsars and positive
attitudes for their active role in communism). The intellectual class voluntarily and
willingly
adhered to the new canon while others were required to follow it.

This cast of thought persisted even through the Soviet-German war as if, even then, th
ere
was not any particular Jewish question. And even up to the demise of the USSR under
Gorbachev, the authorities used to repeat hard-headedly: no, there is no Jewish questi
on, no,
no, no! (It was replaced by the "Zionist question.")

Yet already by the end of the World War II, when the extent of the destruction of the
Jews
under Hitler had dawned on the Soviet Jews, and then through Stalin's "anti-cosmopolit
an"
campaign of the late 1940s, the Soviet intelligentsia realized that the Jewish questio
n in the
USSR does exist! And the pre-revolutionary understanding — that it is central to Russi
an
society and to the conscience of every individual and that it is the "true measure of
humanity" 1 — was also restored.

In the West it was only the leaders of Zionism who confidently talked from the late 19
th
century about the historical uniqueness and everlasting relevance of the Jewish questi
on
(and some of them at the same time maintained robust links with diehard European
socialism).

And then the emergence of the state of Israel and the consequent storms around it adde
d to
the confusion of naive socialist minds of Europeans.

Here I offer two small but at the time quite stirring and typical examples. In one epi
sode of
so-called "the dialogue between the East and the West" show (a clever Cold-War-period
programme, where Western debaters were opposed by Eastern-European officials or
novices who played off official nonsense for their own sincere convictions) in the beg
inning
of 1967, a Slovak writer, Ladislav Mnacko, properly representing the socialist East, w
ittily
noted that he never in his life had any conflict with the Communist authorities, excep
t one
case when his driver's license was suspended for a traffic violation. His French oppon
ent
angrily said that at least in one other case, surely Mnacko should be in the oppositio
n: when
the uprising in neighboring Hungary was drowned in blood. But no, the suppression of
Hungarian Uprising neither violated the peace of Mnacko's mind, nor did it force him t
o say
anything sharp or impudent. Then, a few months passed afterthe "dialogue" and the Six-
Day
War broke out. At that point the Czechoslovak Government of Novotny, all loyal Communi
sts,
accused Israel of aggression and severed diplomatic relations with it. And what happen
ed
next? Mnacko — a Slovak married to a Jew — who had calmly disregarded the suppression
of Hungary before, now was so outraged and agitated that he left his homeland and as
a
protest went to live in Israel.

The second example comes from the same year. A famous French socialist, Daniel Meyer,
at
the moment of the Six-Day War had written in Le Monde, that henceforth heis:l) ashame
d
to be a socialist — because of the fact that the Soviet Union calls itself a socialist
country
(well, when the Soviet Union was exterminating not only its own people but also other
socialists — he was not ashamed); 2) ashamed of being a French (obviously due to the w
rong
political position of de Gaulle); and, 3) ashamed to be a human (wasn't that too muc
h?), and
ashamed of all except being a Jew. 2

370

We are ready to accept both Mnacko's outrage and Meyer's anger, yet we would like to
point out at the extreme intensity of their feelings — given the long history of thei
r
obsequious condoning of communism. Surely, the intensity of their feelings is also an
aspect
of the Jewish question in the 20 th century.

So in what way "did the Jewish question not exist"?

If one listened to American radio broadcasts aimed at the Soviet Union from 1950 to th
e
1980s, one might conclude that there was no other issue in the Soviet Union as importa
nt as
the Jewish question. (At the same time in the United States, where the Jews "can be
described as ...the most privileged minority" and where they "gained an unprecedented
status, the majority of [American Jews] still claimed that hatred and discrimination b
y their
Christian compatriots was a grim fact of the modern life" 3 ; yet because it would sou
nd
incredible if stated aloud, then the Jewish question does not exist, and to notice it
and talk
about it is unnecessary and improper.)

We have to get used to talking about Jewish question not in a hush and fearfully, but
clearly,
articulately and firmly. We should do so not overflowing with passion, but sympathetic
ally
aware of both the unusual and difficult Jewish world history and centuries of our Russ
ian
history that are also full of significant suffering. Then the mutual prejudices, somet
imes very
intense, would disappearand calm reason would reign.

Working on this book, I can't help but notice that the Jewish question has been omnipr
esent
in world history and it never was a national question in the narrow sense like all oth
er
national questions, but was always — maybe because of the nature of Judaism? —
interwoven into something much bigger.

* * *

When in the late 1960s I mused about the fate of the communist regime and felt that ye
s, it
is doomed, my impression was strongly supported by the observation that so many Jews h
ad
already abandoned it.

There was a period when they persistently and in unison supported the Soviet regime, a
nd
at that time the future definitely belonged to it. Yet now the Jews started to defect
from it,
first the thinking individuals and later the Jewish masses. Was this not a sure sign t
hat the
years of the Soviet rule are numbered? Yes, it was.

So when exactly did it happen that the Jews, once such a reliable backbone of the regi
me,
turned into almost its greatest adversary?

Can we say that the Jews always struggled for freedom? No, for too many of them were t
he
most zealous communists. Yet now they turned their backs on it. And without them, the
ageing Bolshevist fanaticism had not only lost some of its fervor, it actually ceased
to be
fanatical at all, rather it became lazy in the Russian way.

After the Soviet-German War, the Jews became disappointed by Communist power: it
turned out that they were worse off than before. Wesawthe main stages of this split.

371

Initially, the support of the newborn state of Israel by the USSR had inspired the Sov
iet Jews.
Then came the persecution of the "cosmopolitans" and the mainly Jewish intelligentsia
(not
the philistine masses yet) began to worry: communism pushes the Jews aside? oppresses
them? The terrible threat of massacre by Stalin overwhelmed them as well — but it was
short-lived and miraculously disappeared very soon. During the "interregnum," [followi
ng
Stalin's death] and then under Khrushchev, Jewish hopes were replaced by dissatisfacti
on
and the promised stable improvement failed to materialize.

And then the Six-Day War broke out with truly biblical force, rocking both Soviet and
world
Jewry, and the Jewish national consciousness began to grow like an avalanche. After th
e Six-
Day War, "much was changed ... the action acquired momentum. Letters and petitions
began to flood Soviet and international organizations. National life was revived: duri
ng the
holidays it became difficult to get into a synagogue, underground societies sprang up
to
study Jewish history, culture and Hebrew." 4

And then there was that rising campaign against "Zionism," already linked to "imperial
ism,"
and so the resentment grew among the Jews toward that increasingly alien and abominabl
e
and dull Bolshevism — where did such a monster come from?

Indeed, for many educated Jews the departure from communism was painful as it is alway
s
difficult to part with an ideal — after all, was not it a "great, and perhaps inevitab
le,
planetary experiment initiated in Russia in 1917; an experiment, based on ancient attr
active
and obviously high ideas, not all of which were faulty and many still retain their ben
eficial
effect to this day.... Marxism requires educated minds." 5

Many Jewish political writers strongly favored the term "Stalinism" — a convenient for
m to
justify the earlierSoviet regime. It is difficult to part with the old familiarand swe
et things, if
it is really possible at all.

There have been attempts to increase the influence of intellectuals on the ruling elit
e. Such
was the Letter to the XXIII Congress (of the Communist Party) by G. Pomerants (1966).
The
letter asked the Communist Party to trust the "scientific and creative intelligentsi
a," that
"desires not anarchy but the rule of law ... that wants not to destroy the existing sy
stem but
to make it more flexible, more rational, more humane" and proposed to establish an
advisory think tank, which would generally consult the executive leadership of the cou
ntry. 6
The offer remained unanswered.

And many souls long ached for such a wasted opportunity with such a "glorious" past.

But there was no longer any choice . And so the Soviet Jews split away from communis
m.
And now, while deserting it, they turned against it. And that was such a perfect oppor
tunity
— they could themselves, with expurgatory repentance, acknowledge their formerly activ
e
and cruel role in the triumph of communism in Russia.

Yet almost none of them did (I discuss the few exceptions below). The above-mentioned
collection of essays, Russia and the Jews, so heartfelt, so much needed and so timely
when
published in 1924 was fiercely denounced by Jewry. And even today, according to the
opinion of the erudite scholar, Shimon Markish: "these days, nobody dares to defend th
ose

372

hook-nosed and burry commissars because of fear of being branded pro-Soviet, a Chekis
t, a
God-knows-what else.... Yet let me say in no uncertain terms: the behavior of those Je
wish
youths who joined the Reds is a thousand times more understandable than the reasons o
f
the authors of that collection of works." 7

Still, some Jewish authors began to recognize certain things of the pastas they really
were,
though in the most cautious terms: "It was the end of the role of the 'Russian-Jewish
intelligentsia' that developed in the prewar and early postwar years and that was — to
some
degree sincerely — a bearer of Marxist ideology and that professed, however timidly an
d
implicitly and contrary to actual practice, the ideals of liberalism, internationalism
and
humanism." 8 A bearer of Marxist ideology? — Yes, of course. The ideals of internation
alism?
— Sure. Yet liberalism and humanism? — True, but only after Stalin's death, while comi
ng to
senses.

However, very different things can be inferred from the writings of the majority of Je
wish
publicists in the late Soviet Union. Looking back to the very year of 1917, they find
that
under communism there was nothing but Jewish suffering! "Among the many nationalities
of the Soviet Union, the Jews have always been stigmatized as the least 'reliable' ele
ment." 9

What incredibly short memory one should have to state such things in 1983? Always*. An
d
what about the 1920s? And the 1930s? To assert that they were then considered the leas
t
reliable?*. Is it really possible to forget everything so completely?

"If ... one takes a bird's-eye view of the entire history of the Soviet era, then the
latter
appears as one gradual process of destruction of the Jews." Note — the entire history!
We
investigated this in the previous chapters and saw that even without taking into accou
nt
Jewish over-representation in the top Soviet circles, there had been a period of well-
being
for many Jews with mass migration to cities, open access to higher education and the
blossoming of Jewish culture. The author proceeds with a reservation: "Although there
were
... certain 'fluctuations', the overall trend continued ... Soviet power, destroying a
ll
nationalities, generally dealt with the Jews in the most brutal way." 10

Another author considers a disastereven the early period when Lenin and the Communist
Party called upon the Jews to help with state governance, and the call was heard, and
the
great masses of Jews from the shtetls of the hated Pale moved into the capital and the
big
cities, closerto the avant-garde [of the Revolution]"; he states that the "... formati
on of the
Bolshevik regime that had turned the greater part of Jews into 'declasse', impoverishe
d and
exiled them and destroyed their families" was a catastrophe for the "majority of the J
ewish
population." (Well, that depends on one'spoint of view. And the author himself later n
otes:
in the 1920s and 1930s, the "children of declasse Jewish petty bourgeois were able to
graduate from ...the technical institutes and metropolitan universities and to become
'commanders' of the 'great developments.'") Then his reasoning becomes vague: "in the
beginning of the century the main feature of Jewish activity was ... a fascination ...
with the
idea of building a new fair society"- yet the army of revolution "consisted of plain r
abble —
all those 'who were nothing,' [a quote from The Internationale]." Then, "after the
consolidation of the regime" that rabble "decided to implement their motto and to 'bec
ome
all' [also a quote from The Internationale], and finished off their own leaders.... An
d so the
kingdom of rabble — unlimited totalitarianism — was established." (And, in this contex
t, the

373

Jews had nothing to do with it, except that they were among the victimized leaders.) A
nd the
purge continued "for four decades" until the "mid-1950s"; then the last "bitter pil
l ...
according to the scenario of disappointments" was prescribd to the remaining "'charme
d'
Jews." 11 Again we see the same angle: the entire Soviet history was one of unending
oppression and exclusion of the Jews.

Yet now they wail in protest in unison: "We did not elect this regime!"

Or even "it is not possible to cultivate a loyal Soviet elite among them [the Jews]."
12
Oh my God, was not this method working flawlesslyfor30 years, and only latercoming
undone? So where did all those glorious and famous names — whom we've seen in such
numbers — came from?

And why were their eyes kept so tightly shut that they couldn't see the essence of Sov
iet
rule for thirty to forty years? How is that that their eyes were opened only now? And
what
opened them?

Well, it was mostly because of the fact that now that power had suddenly turned aroun
d
and began pushing the Jews not only out of its ruling and administrative circles, but
out of
cultural and scientific establishements also. "The disappointment was so fresh and sor
e, that
we did not have the strength, nor the courage to tell even our children about it. And
what
about the children? ... For the great majority of them the main motivation was the sam
e —
graduate school, career, and soon." 13

Yet soon they would have to examine their situation more closely.

***

In the 1970s we see examples of rather amazing agreement of opinions, unthinkable for
the
past half a century.

For instance, Shulgin wrote in 1929: "We must acknowledge our past. The flat denia
l ...
claiming that the Jews are to blame for nothing — neither for the Russian Revolution,
nor for
the consolidation of Bolshevism, nor for the horrors of the communism — is the worst w
ay
possible.... It would be a great step forward if this groundless tendency to blame all
the
troubles of Russia on the Jews could be somewhat differentiated. It would be already g
reat if
any 'contrasts' could be found." 14

Fortunately, such contrasts, and even more — comprehension, and even remorse — were
voiced by some Jews. And, combined with the honest mind and rich life experience, the
y
were quite clear. And this brings hope.

Here's Dan Levin, an American intellectual who immigrated to Israel: "It is no acciden
t, that
none of the American writers who attempted to describe and explain what happened to
Soviet Jewry, has touched this important issue — the [Jewish] responsibility for the
communism.... In Russia, the people's anti-Semitism is largely due to the fact that th
e
Russians perceive the Jews as the cause of all the evil of the revolution. Yet America
n writers
— Jews and ex-Communists ... do not want to resurrect the ghosts of the past. Howeve
r,
oblivion is a terrible thing." 15

374

Simultaneously, another Jewish writer, an emigre from the Soviet Union, published: th
e
experience of the Russian (Soviet) Jewry, in contrast to that of the European Jewry, w
hose
historical background "is the experience of a collision with the forces of outer evi
l ... requires
a look not from inside out but rather of introspection and ... inner self-examinatio
n." "In this
reality we saw only one Jewish spirituality — that of the Commissar — and its name wa
s
Marxism." Or he writes about "our young Zionists who demonstrate so much contempt
toward Russia, her rudeness and savagery, contrasting all this with [the worthiness o
f] the
ancient Jewish nation." "I saw pretty clearly, that those who today sing hosanna to Je
wry,
glorifying it in its entiriety (without the slightest sense of guilt or the slightest
potential to
look inside), yesterday were saying: 'I wouldn't be against the Soviet regime, if it w
as not
anti-Semitic,' and two days ago they beat their breasts in ecstasy: 'Long live the gre
at
brotherhood of nations! Eternal Glory to the Father and Friend, the genius Comrade
Stalin!'" 16

But today, when it is clear how many Jews were in the iron Bolshevik leadership, and h
ow
many more took part in the ideological guidance of a great country to the wrong track
—
should the question not arise [among modern Jews] as to some sense of responsibility f
or
the actions of those [Jews]? It should be asked in general: shouldn't there be a kind
of moral
responsibility — not a joint liability, yet the responsibility to remember and to ackn
owledge?
For example, modern Germans accept liability to Jews directly, both morally and materi
ally,
as perpetrators are liable to the victims: for many years they have paid compensation
to
Israel and personal compensation to surviving victims.

So what about Jews? When Mikhail Kheifets, whom I repeatedly cite in this work, after
having been through labor camps, expressed the grandeur of his character by repenting
on
behalf of his people for the evil committed by the Jews in the Soviet Union in the nam
e of
communism — he was bitterly ridiculed.

The whole educated society, the cultured circle, had genuinely failed to notice any Ru
ssian
grievances in the 1920s and 1930s; they didn't even assume that such could exist — yet
they
instantly recognized the Jewish grievances as soon as those emerged. Take, for exampl
e,
Victor Perelman, who after emigrating published an anti-Soviet Jewish journal Epoch an
d We
and who served the regime in the filthiest place, in Chakovsky's Literaturnaya Gazeta
— until
the Jewish question had entered his life. Then he opted out....

At a higher level, they generalized it as "the crash of ... illusions about the integr
ation [of
Jewry] into the Russian social movements, about making any change in Russia." 17

Thus, as soon as the Jews recognized their explicit antagonism to the Soviet regime, t
hey
turned into its intellectual opposition — in accord to their social role. Of course, i
t was not
them who rioted in Novocherkassk, or created unrest in Krasnodar, Alexandrov, Murom, o
r
Kostroma. Yet the filmmaker Mikhail Romm plucked up his heart and, during a public spe
ech,
unambiguously denounced the "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign — and that became one of
the first Samizdat documents (and Romm himself, who in so timely a manner rid himself
of
his ideological impediments, became a kind of spiritual leader for the Soviet Jewry, d
espite
his films Lenin in October (1937), Lenin in 1918 (1939), and despite being a fivefold
winner of
the Stalin Prize). And after that the Jews had become reliable supporters and intrepi
d
members of the "democratic" and "dissident" movements.

375

Looking back from Israel at the din of Moscow, another witness reflected: "A large par
t of
Russian democrats (if not the majority) are of Jewish origin.... Yet they do not ident
ify
[themselves] as Jews and do not realize that their audience is also mostly Jewish."" 1
8

And so the Jews had once again become the Russian revolutionaries, shouldering the soc
ial
duty of the Russian intelligentsia, which the Jewish Bolsheviks so zealously helped t
o
exterminate during the first decade after the revolution; they had become the true an
d
genuine nucleus of the new public opposition. And so yet again no progressive movemen
t
was possible without Jews.

Who had halted the torrent of false political (and often semi-closed) court trials? Al
exander
Ginzburg, and then Pavel Litvinov and Larisa Bogorazdid. I would not exaggerate if I c
laim
that their appeal "To world public opinion" in January 1968, delivered not through unr
eliable
Samizdat, but handed fearlessly to the West in front of Cheka cameras, had been a
milestone of Soviet ideological history. Who were those seven brave souls who dragged
their
leaden feet to Lobnoye Mesto [a stone platform in Red Square] on Aug. 25, 1968? They d
id it
not for the greater success of their protest, but to wash the name of Russia from the
Czechoslovak disgrace by their sacrifice. Four out of the seven were Jews. (Remember,
that
the percentage of Jews in the population of the country then was less than 1%) We shou
ld
also remember Semyon Gluzman, who sacrificed his freedom in the struggle against the
"nuthouses" [dissidents were sometimes incarcerated in psychiatric clinics]. Many Jewi
sh
intellectuals from Moscow were among the first punished by the Soviet regime.

Yet very few dissidents ever regretted the past of their Jewish fathers. P. Litvinov n
ever
mentioned his grandfather's role inSoviet propaganda. Neither would we hearfrom V.
Belotserkovsky how many innocents were slaughtered by his Mauser-toting father.
Communist Raisa Lert, who became a dissident late in life, was proud of her membership
in
that party even after The Gulag Archipelago; the party "she had joined in good faith a
nd
enthusiastically" in her youth; the party to which she had "wholly devoted herself" an
d from
which she herself had suffered, yet nowadays it is "not the same" party anymore. 19
Apparenty she did not realize how appealing the early Soviet terror was for her.

After the events of 1968, Sakha rov joined the dissident movement without a backward
glance. Among his new dissident preoccupations were many individual cases; in particul
ar,
personal cases of Jewish refuseniks [those, overwhelming Jewish, dissidents who reques
ted,
but were refused the right to emigrate from the Soviet Union]. Yet when he tried to ex
pand
the business (as he had innocently confided to me, not realizing all the glaring signi
ficance of
what he said), Gelfand, a member of the Academy of Science, told him that "we are tire
d of
helping these people to resolve their problems," while another member, Zeldovich, sai
d:
"I'm not going to sign any petition on behalf of victims of any injustice — I want to
retain the
ability to protect those who suffer for their nationality." Which means — to protect t
he Jews
only.

There was also a purely Jewish dissident movement, which was concerned only with the
oppression of the Jews and Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union (more about it — la
ter).

***

376

A trasformation in public consciousness often pushes forward outstanding individuals a

s
representatives, symbols and spokesmen of the age. So in the 1960s Alexander Galich
became such a typical and accurate representative of the processes and attitudes in th
e
Soviet intellectual circles. ("'Galich' is a pen name, explains N. Rubinstein. It is m
ade of
syllables of his real name — Ginsburg Alexander Arkadiev/'cfr. Choosing a pen name is
a
serious thing." 20 Actually, I assume that the author was aware that, apart from being
"just a
combination of syllables," "Galich" is also the name of the ancient Russian city from
the very
heart of Slavic history.) Galich enjoyed the general support of Soviet intelligentsia;
tape
recordings of his guitar performances were widely disseminated; and they have almost
become the symbol of the social revival of the 1960s expressing it powerfully and
vehemently. The opinion of the cultural circle was unanimous: "the most popular peopl
e's
poet," the "bard of modern Russia."

Galich was 22 when the Soviet-German War broke out. He says that he was exempt from
military service because of poor health; he then moved to Grozny, where he "unexpected
ly
easily became the head of the literature section of the local Drama Theatre"; he also
"organized a theater of political satire"; then he evacuated through Krasnovodsk to Ch
irchik
near Tashkent; in 1942, he moved from there to Moscow with a front-line theatrical
company under formation and spent the rest of the war with that company.
He recalled how he worked on hospital trains, composing and performing couplets for
wounded soldiers; how they were drinking spirits with a trainmaster.... "All of us, ea
ch in his
own way, worked for the great common cause: we were defending our Motherland." 21 Afte
r
the war he became a well-known Soviet scriptwriter (he worked on many movies) and a
playwright (ten of his plays were staged by "many theaters in the Soviet Union and abr
oad"
[216] [references in square brackets refer to the page number in the source 21]. All t
hat was
in 1940s and 1950s, in the age of general spiritual stagnation — well, he could not st
ep out
of the line, could he? He even made a movie about Chekists, and was awarded for his wo
rk.

Yet in the early 1960s, Galich abruptly changed his life. He found courage to forsake
his
successful and well-off life and "walk into the square." [98] It was after that that h
e began
performing guitar-accompanied songs to people gathering in private Moscow apartments.
He gave up open publishing, though it was, of course, not easy: "[it was great] to rea
d a
name on the cover, not just someone else's, but mine!" [216]

Surely, his anti-regime songs, keen, acidic, and and morally demanding, were of benefi
t to
the society, further destabilizing public attitudes.

In his songs he mainly addressed Stalin's later years and beyond; he usually did not d
eplore
the radiant past of the age of Lenin (except one instance: "The carts with bloody carg
o /
squeak by Nikitsky Gate" [224]). At his best, he calls the society to moral cleansing,
to
resistance ("Gold-digger's waltz" [26], "I choose liberty" [226], "Ballad of the clean
hands"
[181], "Our fingers blotted from the questionnaires" [90], "Every day silent trumpets
glorify
thoughtful vacuity" [92]). Sometimes he sang the hard truth about the past ("In vain h
ad our
infantry perished in 1943, to no avail" [21]), sometimes — "Red myths," singing about
poor
persecuted communists ("There was a time — almost a third of the inmates came from th
e
Central Committee, / There was a time when for the red color / they added ten years [t
o the
sentence] !"[69]). Once he touched dekulakization ("Disenfranchised ones were summone
d
377

in first" [115]). Yet his main blow was against the current establishment ("There are
fences in
the country; behind fences live the leaders" [13]). He was justly harsh there; howeve
r, he
oversimplified the charge by attacking their privileged way of life only: here they ea
t, drink,
rejoice [151-152]. The songs were embittering, but in a narrow-minded way, almost like
the
primitive "Red proletarian" propaganda of the past. Yet when he was switching his focu
s
from the leaders to "the people", his characters were almost entirely boobies, fastidi
ous
men, rabble and rascals — a very limited selection.

He had found a precise point of perspective for himself, perfectly in accord with the
spirit of
the time: he impersonalized himself with all those people who were suffering, persecut
ed
and killed ("I was a Gl and as a Gl I'll die" [248], "We, GIs, are dying in battle").
Yet with his
many songs narrated from the first person of a former camp inmate, he made a strong
impression that he was an inmate himself ("And that other inmate was me myself" [87];
"I
froze like a horseshoe in a sleigh trail / Into ice that I picked with a hammer pick /
After all,
wasn't it me who spent twenty years / In those camps" [24]; "as the numbers [personal
inmate number tattooed on the arm] /we died, we died"; "from the camp we were sent
right to the front!"[69]). Many believed that he was a former camp inmate and "they ha
ve
tried to find from Galichwhen and where he had been in camps." 22

So how did he address his past, his longstanding participation in the stupefying offic
ial Soviet
lies? That's what had struck me the most: singing with such accusatory pathos, he had
never
expressed a single word of his personal remorse, not a word of personal repentance,
nowhere\ Didn't he realize that when he sang: "Oh Party's Iliad! What a giftwrapped
groveling!" [216], he sang about himself? And when he crooned: "If you sell the unctio
n"
[40], as though referring to somebody else, did it occur to him that he himself was "s
elling
unction" for half of his life. Why on earth would he not renounce his pro-official pla
ys and
films? No! "We did not sing glory to executioners!" [119] Yet, as the matter of fact,
they did.
Perhaps he did realize it or he gradually came to the realization, because later, no l
onger in
Russia, he said: "I was a well-off screenwriter and playwright and a well-off Soviet f
lunky.
And I have realized that I could no longer go on like that. Finally, I have to speak l
oudly,
speak the truth ..." [639].

But then, in the sixties, he intrepidly turned the pathos of the civil rage, for insta
nce, to the
refutation of the Gospel commandments ("do not judge, lestye be judged"): "No, I have
contempt for the very essence/Of this formula of existence!" And then, relying on the
sung
miseries, he confidently tried on a prosecutor's robe: "I was not elected. But I am th
e judge!"
[100] And so he grew so confident, that in the lengthy Poem about Stalin (The Legend o
f
Christmas), where he in bad taste imagined Stalin as Christ, and presented the key for
mula
of his agnostic mindset — his really famous, the cliched -quotes, and so harmful line
s: "Don't
be afraid of fire and hell, / And fear only him / Who says: 'I know the right way!'"
[325].

But Christ did teach us the right way.... What we see here in Galich's words is just b
oundless
intellectual anarchism that muzzles any clear idea, any resolute offer. Well, we can a
lways
run as a thoughtless (but pluralistic) herd, and probably we'll get somewhere.

Yet the most heartrending and ubiquitous keynote in his lyrics was the sense of Jewis
h
identity and Jewish pain ("Our train leaves for Auschwitz today and daily"). Other goo
d
examples include the poems By the rivers of Babylon and Kadish. (Or take this: "My six
-

378

pointed star, bum it on my sleeve and on my chest." Similar lyrical and passionate ton
es can
be found in the The memory of Odessa ("I wanted to unite Mandelstam and Chagall). "You
r
kinsman and your cast-off /Your last singerof the Exodus" — as headdressed the departi
ng
Jews.)

The Jewish memory imbued him so deeply that even in his non-Jewish lyrics he casually
added expressions such as: "Not a hook-nosed"; "not a Tatar, not a Yid" [115, 117]";
"you
are still not in Israel, dodderer?" [294]; and even Arina Rodionovna [Pushkin's nann
y,
immortalized by the poet in his works] lulls him in Yiddish [101]. Yet he doesn't ment
ion a
single prosperous or non-oppressed Jew, a well-off Jew on a good position, for instanc
e, in a
research institute, editorial board, or in commerce — such characters didn't even make
a
passing appearance in his poems. A Jew is always either humiliated, or suffering, or
imprisoned and dying in a camp. Take his famous lines: "You are not to be chamberlain
s, the
Jews ... / Neither the Synod, nor the Senate is for you / You belong in Solovki and Bu
tyrki"
[the latter two being political prisons] [40].

What a short memory they have — not only Galich, but his whole audience who were
sincerely, heartily taking in these sentimental lines! What about those twenty years,
when
Soviet Jewry was not nearly in the Solovki, when so many of them did parade as
chamberlains and in the Senate!?

They have forgotten it. They have sincerely and completely forgotten it. Indeed, it is
so
difficult to remember bad things about yourself.

And inasmuch as among the successful people milking the regime there were supposedly n
o
Jews left, but only Russians, Galich's satire, unconsciously or consciously, hit the R
ussians, all
those Klim Petroviches and Paramonovs; all that social anger invoked by his songs targ
eted
them, through the stressed "russopyaty" [derogatory term for Russians] images and deta
ils,
presenting them as informers, prison guards, profligates, fools or drunks. Sometimes i
t was
more like a caricature, sometimes more of a contemptuous pity (which we often indeed
deserve, unfortunately): "Greasy long hair hanging down, / The guest started "Yermak"
[a
song about the cossack leaderand Russian folk hero] ... he cackles like a cock / Enoug
h to
make a preacher swear/ And he wants to chat /About the salvation of Russia" [117-11
8].
Thus he pictured the Russians as always drunk, not distinguishing kerosene from vodka,
not
interested in anything except drinking, idle, or simply lost, or foolish individuals.
Yet he was
considered a folk poet.... And he didn't image a single Russian hero-soldier, workman,
or
intellectual, not even a single decent camp inmate (he assigned the role of the main c
amp
inmate to himself), because, you know, all those "prison-guard seed" [118] camp bosses
are
Russians. And here he wrote about Russia directly: "Every Maris a Messiah! /<...> And
just
dare you to ask — / Brothers, had there even been / Any Rus in Russia?" — "It is abrim
with
filth." — And then, desperately: "But somewhere, perhaps, / She does exist!?" That inv
isible
Russia, where "under the tender skies / Everyone shares / God's word and bread." "I pr
ay
thee: / Hold on! / Be alive in decay, / So in the heart, as in Kitezh, / I could hear
your bells!"
[280-281]

So, with the new opportunity and the lure of emigration, Galich was torn between the
submerged legendary Kitezh [legendary Russian invisble city] and today's filth: "It's
the same
vicious circle, the same old story, the ring, which cannot be either closed, or open!"
[599].

379

He left with the words: "I, a Russian poet, cannot be separated from Russia by 'the fi
fth
article' [the requirement in the Soviet internal passport - "nationality"]!" [588]

Yet some other departing Jews drew from his songs a seed of aversion and contempt for
Russia, orat least, the confidence that it is right to break away from her. Heed a voi
ce from
Israel: "We said goodbye to Russia. Not without pain, but forever.... Russia still hol
ds us
tenaciously. But ... in a year, ten years, a hundred years — we'll escape from her and
find our
own home. Listening to Galich, we once again recognize that it is the right way." 23

Sources:
lB./leBMTMHa. PyccKMM TeaTp m eBpen. Mepyca^nwi: Bn6^noTeKa -Anwa, 1988. T. 1, c. 24.

2 Daniel Mayer. J'ai honte d'etre socialist// Le Monde, 1967, 6 Ju in, p. 3.

3 Michael Medved. The Jewish Question// National Review, 1997, July 28, p. 53.

4 Muxan^ XeM4>eu,. MecTO m Bpewifl (eBpeMCKne 3aw\eTKn). riapuHK: TpeTbfl BO^Ha, 1978,
c. 174.

5 KD. Ko^Kep // PyccKaa wtbicnb, 24 anpeyia 1987, c. 12.

6 T. nowtepaHU,. ripoeKT nucbwia XXIII Cbe3fly// Heony6^MKOBaHHoe. Frankfurt/Main: rio

ceB, 1972, c. 269-276.

7 UJ. MapKMiu. Eiu,e pa3 o Heina bmctm k cawiowiy ce6e // "22": 06mecTBeHHO-noyiMTMHec
KMM m yimepaTypHbifi
>xypHa.n eBpeMCKOM MHTeyiyinreHL^nn v\s CCCP b Ita panne. Te^b-ABMB, 1980, N2 16, c. 1
88.

8 P. Hyfle^bwiaH. Cobctckum a HTMceMHTH3M — npunnHbi m nporH03bi: [CewiMHap] // "22",

1978, N2 3, c. 147.

9 <t>. Ko^Kep. HoBbm njiaH nowiomn coBeTCKOMy eBpeficTBy // "22". 1983, N2 31, c. 14
5.

10 KD. LLrrepH. CnTyau,Mfl HeycTOMHMBa m noTowiy onacHa: [MHTepBbio] // "22", 1984, N2

38, c. 130.

11 B. Borycyia bckmm. B 3amnTy KyHaeBa // "22", 1980. N2 16, c. 169-174.

12 K). LLrrepH. CnTyau,Mfi HeycTOMHMBa... // "22", 1984, N2 38, c. 130.

13 B. Borycyia bckmm. B 3ai4MTy KyHaeBa // "22", 1980. N2 16. c. 175.

14 B.B. LUy^brnH. «Hto Haw\ b hmx He HpaBMTca...»: 06 AHTMceMMTH3Me b Poccmm. riapuHK,

1929, c.49-50.

15 flaH /leBMH. Ha Kpaio co6.na3Ha: [MHTepBbio] // "22", 1978, N2 1, c. 55.

16 A. CyKOHMK. O pe^nrno3HOM m aTencTunecKOM co3HaHnn// BecTHMK PyccKoroXpucTnaHCKorof

lBUHKeHMfl.
napn>K-HbK)-MopK-MocKBa, 1977, N2 123, c. 43-46.

17 P. HyfleyibMaH. OmaHMCb b pa3flywibe...: [Kpynnbifi cto/i]// "22 . 1982, N2 24, c.

112.

18 A. BopoHe-nb. Eyaymee pycchcotf a/inn // "22", 1978, I\l2 2, c. 186.

19 P. /lepT. rio3flHMM onbiT// CnHTaKcuc: ny6^MU,MCTMKa, KpnTMKa, no^ewiMKa. riapuHK,

1980, N2 6, c. 5-6.

20 H. Py6nHLUTeMH. BbiK.moHme Ma thmtoc^oh — noroBopuwi o nosTe // Bpewia m Mbi (flayi

ee — BM):
MewflyHapoflHbiM >KypHa.n ^MTepaTypbi m o6mecTBeHHbix npo6^ew\. Te^b-ABMB, 1975, N2 2,
c. 164.

380

21 A/ieKcaHflp Ta^nn. riecHM. Ctmxm. noswibi. KnHonoBecTb. ribeca. CTaTbM. EKaTepnH6yp

r: Y-OaKTopHfl, 1998
(fla.nee — ra^nn), c. 552, 556, 561-562. CTpaHMU,bi b TeKcre b KBaflpaTHbix CKo6t<a; Y
K33a Hbi Ta K>xe no 3Tow\y

M3flaHMK).

22 B. Bo/imh. Oh Bbiwan Ha n^onaflb// Ta^nn, c. 632.

23 H. Py6nHLUTeMH. BbnunoHMTe w\arHMTo4)OH — noroBopuwi o nosTe // BM, Te^b-ABMB, 197

5, N2 2, c. 177.

381

Chapter 25: Accusing Russia

The Jewish break from the Soviet communism was doubtless a movement of historical
significance.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the fusion of the Soviet Jewry and Bolshevism seemed permanen
t.
Then suddenly, they diverge? What a joy!

Of course, as is always true for both individuals and nations, it is unreasonable to e

xpect
words of remorse from Jews regarding their past involvement. But I absolutely could no
t
expect that the Jews, while deserting Bolshevism, rather than expressing even a sign o
f
repentance or at least some embarrassment, instead angrily turned on the Russian peopl
e: it
is the Russians who had ruined democracy in Russia (i.e., in February 1917), it is the
Russians
who are guilty of support of this regime from 1918 on.

Sure, they claim, it is we (the Russian people) who are the guilty! Actually, it was e
arlierthan
1918 - the dirty scenes of the radiant February Revolution were tale-telling. Yet the
neophyte anti-communists were uncompromising - from now on everyone must accept that
they have always fought against this regime, and no one should recall that it used to
be their
favorite and should not mention how well they had once served this tyranny. Because it
was
the "natives" who created, nurtured and cared for it:

"The leaders of the October Coup ... were the followers rather than the leaders. [Real
ly? The
New Iron Party was made up of the "followers"?] They simply voiced the dormant wishes
of
the masses and worked to implement them. They did not break with the grassroots." "Th
e
October coup was a disasterfor Russia. The country could evolve differently.... Then
[in the
stormy anarchy of the February Revolution] Russia saw the signs of law, freedom and
respect for human dignity by the state, but they all were swept away by the people's
wrath." [1]

Here is a more recent dazzling treatment of Jewish participation in Bolshevism: "The

Bolshevism of Lenin and Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party of Bolsheviks was jus
t an
intellectual and civilized form of 'plebian' Bolshevism. Should the former fail, the l
atter,
much more dreadful, would prevail." Therefore, "by widely participating in the Bolshev
ik
Revolution, providing it with cadres of intellectuals and organizers, the Jews saved R
ussia
from total mob rule. They came out with the most humane of possible forms of
Bolshevism."[2] Alas, "just as the rebellious people had used the Party of Lenin to ov
erthrow
the democracy of intellectuals [when did that exist?], the pacified people used Stali
n's
bureaucracy to get rid of ... everything still harboring free intellectual spirit."[3]
Sure, sure:
"the guilt of the intelligentsia forthe subsequent dismal events of Russian history is
greatly
exaggerated." And in the first place, "the intelligentsia is liable to itself,"[4] and
by no means
to the people. On the contrary, "it would be nice if the people realized theirguilt be
fore the
intelligentsia ."[5]

382

Indeed, "the totalitarian rule ... in its essence and origin is that of the people.
"[6] "This is a
totalitarian country ... because such was the choice of Russian people. "[7]

It is all because the "Tatar's wild spirit captured the soul of Orthodox Russia, "[8]
that is, the
"Asian social and spiritual structure, inherited by the Russians from the Mongols ...
is
stagnant and incapable of development and progress."[9] (Well, Lev Gumilev also develo
ped
a theory that instead of the Tatar yoke, there was a friendly alliance of Russians and
Tatars.
However, Russian folklore, in its many proverbs referring to Tatars as to enemies and
oppressors, provided an unambiguous answer to that question. Folklore does not lie; it
is not
pliant like a scientific theory.) Therefore, "the October coup was an unprecedented
breakthrough of the Asian essence [of Russians]. "[10]

For those who want to tear and trample Russian history, Chaadayev is the favorite
theoretician (although he is undoubtedly an outstanding thinker). First Samizdat and l
ater
emigre publications carefully selected and passionately quoted his published and
unpublished texts which suited their purposes. As to the unsuitable quotations and to
the
fact that the main opponents of Chaadayev among his contemporaries were not Nicholas
I
and Benckendorff, but his friends - Pushkin, Vyazemsky, Karamzin, and Yazikov-these fa
cts
were ignored.

In the early 1970s, the hate against all things Russian was gathering steam. Derogator
y
expressions about Russian culture entered Samizdat and contemporary slang. "Human pigs
ty"
- so much contempt for Russia as being spoiled material was expressed in the anonymou
s
Samizdat article signed by "S. Telegin" (G. Kopylov)! Regarding the forest fires of 19
72, the
same "Telegin" cursed Russia in a Samizdat leaflet: "So, the Russian forests burn? It
serves
Russia rightforall her evil-doing!! "The entire people consolidate into the reactionar
y mass"
(G. Pomerants). Take another sincere confession: "The sound of an accordion [the popul
ar
Russian national instrument] drives me berserk; the very contact with these masses irr
itates
me. "[11] Indeed, love cannot be forced. "'Jews,"Jewish destiny' is just the rehash of
the
destiny of intelligentsia in this country, the destiny of her culture; the Jewish orph
anage
symbolizes loneliness because of the collapse of the traditional faith in 'the
people. "'[12](What a transformation happened between the 19th and mid-20th century
with the eternal Russian problem of "the people"! By now they view "the people" as an
indigenous mass, apathetically satisfied with its existence and its leaders. And by th
e
inscrutable providence of Fate, the Jews were forced to live and sufferin the cities o
f their
country. To love these masses is impossible; to care about them - unnatural.) The sam
e
Khazanov (by then still in the USSR) reasoned: The Russia which I love is a Platonic i
dea that
does not exist in reality. The Russia which I see around is abhorrent"; "she is a uniq
ue kind of
Augean stables"; "her mangy inhabitants"; "there'll be a day of shattering reckoning f
or all
she is today."[13]

Indeed, there will be a day of reckoning, though not for the state of adversity that h
ad fallen
on Russia much earlier.

383

In the 1960s, many among intelligentsia began to think and talk about the situation in
the
USSR, about its future and about Russia itself. Due to strict government censorship th
ese
arguments and ideas were mentioned only in private or in mostly pseudonymous Samizdat
articles. But when Jewish emigration began, the criticisms of Russia openly and venomo
usly
spilled across the free Western world, as itformed one of the favorite topics among th
e
emigres and was voiced so loudly that often nothing else could be heard.

In 1968, Arkady Belinkov fled abroad. He was supposedly a fierce enemy of the Soviet
regime and not at all of the Russian people. Wasn't he? Well, consider his article The
Land of
Slaves, the Land of Masters in The New Bell, a collection he edited himself. And at wh
at did
he direct his wrath? (It is worth considering that the article was written back in the
USSR and
the author did not have enough courage to accuse the regime itself.) Belinkov does not
use
the word "Soviet" even once, instead preferring a familiartheme: eternally enslaved Ru
ssia,
freedom "for our homeland is worse than gobbling broken glass" and in Russia "they
sometimes hang the wrong people, sometimes the wrong way, and never enough." Even in
the 1820s "it was much evident that in the process of evolution, the population of [Ru
ssia]
...would turn into a herd of traitors, informers, and torturers"; "it was the "Russian
fear" -to
prepare warm clothes and to wait for a knock at the door" - note that even here it was
not
the "Soviet fear." (Yet who before the Bolshevik revolution had ever waited for a knoc
k on
the door in the middle of the night?) "The court in Russia does not judge, it already
knows
everything. Therefore, in Russia, it only condemns. "[14] (Was it like that even durin
g the
Alexandrine reforms?.... And what about juries and magistrates? Hardly a responsible,
balanced judgment!)

Indeed, so overwhelming is the author's hate and so bitter his bile that he vilifies s
uch great
Russian writers as Karamzin, Zhukovsky, Tyutchev and even Pushkin, not to mention Russ
ian
society in general for its insufficient revolutionary spirit: "a pathetic society of s
laves,
descendants of slaves and ancestors of slaves," "the cattle trembling from fearand ang
er,"
"rectum-pipers, shuddering at the thought of possible consequences," "the Russian
intelligentsia always been willing to help stifle freedom." [15]

Well, if, for Belinkov, it was all "masked anti-Soviet sentiments," a sly wink, then w
hy did he
not rewrite it abroad? If Belinkov actually thought differently, then why print it in
this form?

No, that is the way he thought and what he hated.

So was this how dissident Jews repudiated Bolshevism?

Around the same time, at the end of the 1960s, a Jewish collection about the USSR was
published in London. It included a letter from the USSR: "In the depths of the inner
labyrinths of the Russian soul, there is always a pogromist.... A slave and a thug dwe
ll there
too. "[16] Belotserkovsky happily repeats someone else's joke: "the Russians are a str
ong

384

nation, except for their heads. "[17] "Let all these Russians, Ukrainians ... growl dr
unkenly
with their wives, gobble vodka and get happily misled by communist lies ...without u
s ...
They were crawling on all fours worshipping wood and stone when we gave them the God o
f
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. "[18]

"Oh, if only you would have held your peace! This would have been regarded as your
wisdom." (Job 13:5).

(Let us note that any insulting judgment about the "Russian soul" in general or about
the
"Russian character" generally does not give rise to the slightest protest or doubt amo
ng
civilized people. The question "of daring to judge nations as one uniform and faceless
whole"
does not arise. If someone does not like all things Russian orfeels contempt for them,
or
even expresses in progressive circles the belief that "Russia is a cesspool," this is
no sin in
Russia and it does not appear reactionary or backward. And no one immediately appeals
to
presidents, prime ministers, senators, or members of Congress with a reverent cry, "Wh
at
do you think of such incitement of ethnic hatred?" We've said worse of ourselves since
the
19th century and right up to the revolution. We have a rich tradition of this.)

Then we learn of "semi-literate preachers of their religion," and that "Russian Orthod
oxy
hasn't earned the credence of intellectuals" (from "Telegin"). The Russians "so easil
y
abandoned the faith of their forefathers, indifferently watched how their temples wer
e
destroyed in front of their eyes." Oh, here is a guess: "Perhaps, the Russian people o
nly
temporarily submitted to the power of Christianity?" That is for 950 years! "And they
only
waited for the moment to get rid of it," [19] that is, for the revolution? How much il
l will
must accumulate in someone's heart to utter something like that! (Even Russian publici
sts
often slipped into this trap of distorted consciousness. The eminent early emigrant jo
urnalist
S. Rafalsky, perhaps even a priest's son, wrote that "Orthodox Holy Russia allowed its
holy
sites to be easily crushed. "[20] Of course, the groans of those mowed down by Chekist
s'
machine guns during Church riots in 1918 were not heard in Paris. There have been no
uprisings since. I would like to have seen this priest's son try to save the sacred si
tes in the
1920s himself.)

Sometimes it is stated bluntly: "Russian Orthodoxy is a Hottentot religion" (Grobman).

Or,
"idiocy perfumed by Rublev, Dionysius and Berdyaev"; the idea of the "restoration" of
traditional Russian historical orthodoxy "scares many.... This is the darkest future p
ossible for
the country and for Christianity."[21] Or, as novelist F. Gorenshtein said: "Jesus Chr
ist was
the Honorary Chairman of the Union of the Russian People [pre-revolutionary Russian
Nationalist organization], whom they perceived as a kind of universal ataman [Cossack
chieftain]."[22]

Don't make it too sharp -you might chip the blade!

However, one must distinguish from such open rudeness that velvet softSamizdat
philosopher-essayist Grigory Pomerants who worked in those years. Presumably, he rose

385

above all controversies - he wrote about the fates of nations in general, about the fa
te of
the intelligentsia generally; he suggested that nowadays no such thing as people exist
s, save,
perhaps, Bushmen. I read him in 1960s Samizdat saying: "The people are becoming more
and more vapid broth and only we, the intelligentsia, remain the salt of the earth."
"Solidarity of the intelligentsia across the borders is a more real thing than the sol
idarity of
the intelligentsia and its people."

It sounded very modern and wise. And yet, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 it was precisely t
he
unity of the intelligentsia with the "vapid broth" of its non-existent people that cre
ated a
spiritual stronghold long unheard of in Europe. The presence of two-thirds of a millio
n Soviet
troops couldn't break their spirit; it was their communist leaders who eventually gave
in.
(And 12 years later, the same thing happened in Poland.)

In his typically ambiguous manner of constructing endless parallel arguments that neve
r
merge into a clear logical construct, Pomerants never explicitly addressed the nationa
l
question. He extensively dwelt on the Diaspora question, in the most abstract and gene
ral
manner, not specifying any nation, hovering aloft in relativism and agnosticism. He gl
orified
the Diaspora: "Everywhere, we are not exactly strangers. Everywhere, we are not exactl
y
natives."... "An appeal to one faith, tradition and nation flies in the face of anothe
r." He
complained: "According to the rules established for the Warsaw students, one can love
only
one nation" but "what if I am related by blood to this country, but love others as wel
l?" [23]

This is a sophisticated bait-and-switch. Of course, you can love not only one, but ten
or more
countries and nations. However, you can belong to and be a son of only one motherlan
d,
just as you can only have one mother.

To make the subject clearer, I want to describe the letter exchange I had with the Pom
erants
couple in 1967. By that year, my banned novel The First Circle circulated among the
Samizdat - and among the first who had sent me their objections were G. S. Pomerants a
nd
his wife, Z. A. Mirkin. They said that I hurt them by my inept and faulty handling of
the
Jewish question, and that I had irreparably damaged the image of Jews in the novel -an
d
thus my own image. How did I damage it? I thought I had managed to avoid showing thos
e
cruel Jews who reached the heights of power during the early Soviet years. But Pomeran
ts'
letters abounded with undertones and nuances, and they accused me of insensitivity to
Jewish pain.

I replied to them, and they replied to me. In these letters we also discussed the righ
t to
judge entire nations, even though I had done no such thing in my novel.

Pomerants suggested to me then - and to every writer in general as well as to anyone w

ho
offers any personal, psychological or social judgment - to behave and to reason as if
no
nation has ever existed in the world - not only to abstain from judging them as a whol
e but
to ignore every man's nationality. "What is natural and excusable for Ivan Denisovich
(to see

386

Cesar Ma rkovich as a non-Russian) - is a disgrace for an intellectual, and for a Chri

stian (not
a baptized person but a Christian) is a great sin: 'There is no Hellene and no Jew for
me.'"

What an elevated point of view. May God help us all reach it one day. After all, witho
ut it,
would not the meaning of united humanity, and soChristinaity, have been useless?

Yet we have already been aggressively convinced once that there are no nations, and we
re
instructed to quickly destroy our own, and we madly did it back then.

In addition, regardless of the argument, how can we portray specific people without
referring to their nationality? And if there are no nations, are there no languages? B
ut no
writer can write in any language other than his native one. If nations would wither aw
ay,
languages would die also.

One cannot eat from an empty bowl.

I noticed that it was more often Jews than any others who insisted that we pay no atte
ntion
to nationality! What does "nationality" have to do with anything? What "national
characteristics," what "national character" are you talking about?

And I was ready to shake hands on that: "I agree! Let's ignore it from now on...."

But we live in our unfortunate century, when perhaps the first feature people notice i
n
others for some reason is exactly their nationality. And, I swear, Jews are the ones w
ho
distinguish and closely monitor it most jealously and carefully. Their own nation....

Then, what should we do with the fact - you have read about it above - that Jews so of
ten
judge Russians precisely in generalized terms, and almost always to condemn? The same
Pomerants writes about "the pathological features of the Russian character," including
their
"internal instability." (And he is not concerned that he judges the entire nation. Ima
gine if
someone spoke of "pathological features of the Jewish character"... What would happen
then?) The Russian "masses allowed all the horrors of Oprichnina to happen just as the
y
later allowed Stalin's death camps."[24] (See, the Soviet internationalist bureaucrati
c elite
would have stopped them - if not for this dull mass....) More sharply still, "Russian
Nationalism will inevitably end in an aggressive pogrom,"[25] meaning that every Russi
an
who loves his nation already has the potential for being pogromist.

We can but repeat the words of that Chekhov's character: "Too early!"

Most remarkable was how Pomerants's second letter to me ended. Despite his previously
having so insistently demanded that it is not proper to distinguish between nations, i
n that
large and emotionally charged letter, (written in a very angry, heavy hand), he delive
red an
ultimatum on how I could still save my disgusting The First Circle. The offered remedy
was
this: to turn Gerasimovich [the hero] into a Jew! So a Jew would commit the novel's gr
eatest
act of spiritual heroism! "It is absolutely not important that Gerasimovich had been d
rawn

387

from a Russian prototype," says our indifferent-to-nations author (italics added). In

truth, he
did give me an alternative: if I still insisted on leaving Gerasimovich Russian, then
I must add
an equally powerful image of a noble, self-sacrificing Jew to my story. And if I would
not
follow any of his advice, Pomerants threatened to open a public campaign against me.
(I
ignored it at this point.)
Notably, he conducted this one-sided battle, calling it "our polemic," first in foreig
n journals
and, when it became possible, in the Soviet magazines, often repeating and reprinting
the
same articles, although taking care each time to exorcise the blemishes his critics ha
d picked
up the last time. In the course of this he uttered another pearl of wisdom: there was
only
one Absolute Evil in the world and it was Hitlerism - in this regard, our philosopher
was not
a relativist, not at all. But as to communism, this former prisoner of the camps and b
y no
means a Communist himself, suddenly proclaims that communism - is not an
unquestionable evil (and even "some spirit of democracy surrounded the early Cheka"),
and
he does so harder and harder over the years (reacting to my intransigence towards
communism). [26] On the other hand, hard core anti-communism is undoubtedly evil,
especially if it builds upon the Russian Nationalism (which, as he had reminded us ear
lier,
cannot be separated from pogroms).

That is where Pomerants's smooth high-minded and "non-national" principles led.

Given such a skewed bias, can mutual understanding between Russians and Jews be
achieved?

"You mark the speck in your brother's eye, but ignore the plank in your own."

In those same months when I corresponded with Pomerants, some liberal hand in the
Leningrad Regional Party Committee copied a secret memorandum signed by Shcherbakov,
Smirnov, and Utekhin on the matter of alleged "destructive Zionist activity in the cit
y" with
"subtle forms of ideological subversion." My Jewish friends asked me "How should we de
al
with this?" "It is clear, how," - I replied before even reading the paper - "Openness!
Publish
it in Samizdat! Our strength is transparency and publicity!" But my friends hesitated:
"We
cannot do it just like that because it would be misunderstood."

After reading the documents, I understood their anxiety. From the reports, it was clea
rthat
the youth's literary evening at the Writers' House on January 30, 1968 had been politi
cally
honest and brave - the government with its politics and ideology had been both openly
and
covertly ridiculed. On the other hand, the speeches had clear national emphases (perha
ps,
the youth there were mostly Jewish); they contained explicit resentment and hostility,
and
even, perhaps, contempt for Russians, and longing for Jewish spirituality. It was beca
use of
this that my friends were wary of publishing the document in Samizdat.

I was suddenly struck by how true these Jewish sentiments were. "Russia is reflected i
n the
window glass of a beer stand," -the poet Ufland had supposedly said there. How

388

horrifyingly true! It seemed that the speakers accused the Russians, not directly, but
by
allusions, of crawling under counters of beer pubs and of being dragged from the mud b
y
their wives; that they drink vodka until unconscious, they squabble and steal....

We must see ourselves objectively, see our fatal shortcomings. Suddenly, I grasped th
e
Jewish point of view; I looked around and I was horrified as well: DearGod, where we,
the
Jews? Cards, dominoes, gaping atTV.... What cattle, what animals surround us! They hav
e
neither God nor spiritual interests. And so much feeling of hurt from past oppression
rises in
your soul.

Only it is forgotten, that the real Russians were killed, slaughtered and suppressed,
and the
rest were stupefied, embittered, and driven to the extremes by Bolshevikthugs and not
without the zealous participation of the fathers of today's young Jewish intellectual
s.
Modern day Jews are irritated by those mugs who have become the Soviet leadership sinc
e
the 1940s - but they irritate us as well. However, the best among us were killed, not
spared.

"Do not look back!" - Pomerants lectured us later in his Samizdat essays; do not look
back
like Orpheus who lost Eurydice this way.

Yet we have already lost more than Eurydice.

We were taught since the 1920s to throw away the past and jump on board modernity.
But the old Russian proverb advises - go ahead but always look back.

We must look back. Otherwise, we would never understand anything.

***

Even if we had tried not to look back, we would always be reminded that the "core [Rus
sian
issue] is in fact the inferiority complex of the spiritless leaders of the people that
has
persisted throughout its long history," and this very complex "pushed the Russian Tsar
ist
government towards military conquests.... An inferiority complex is disease of
mediocrity."[27] Do you want to know why the Revolution of 1917 happened in Russia? Ca
n
you guess? Yes, "the same inferiority complex caused a revolution in Russia. "[28] (O
h,
immortal Freud, is there nothing he hasn't explained?)

They even stated that "Russian socialism was a direct heir of Russian autocracy"[29] -

precisely a direct one, it goes without saying. And, almost in unison, "there is direc
t
continuity between the Tsarist government and communism ... there is qualitative
similarity." [30] What else could you expect from "Russian history, founded on blood a
nd
provocations?"[31] In a review of Agursky's interesting book, Ideology of National
Bolshevism, we find that "in reality, traditional, fundamental ideas of the Russian na
tional
consciousness began to penetrate into the practice and ideology of the ruling party ve
ry
early"; "the party ideology was transformed as early as the mid-1920s." Really? Alread
y in

389

the mid-1920s? How come we missed it at the time? Wasn't it the same mid-1920s when th
e
very words "Russian," "I am Russian" had been considered counter-revolutionary? I
remember it well. But, you see, even backthen, in the midst of persecution againstall
that
was Russian and Orthodox, the party ideology "began in practice to be persistently gui
ded by
the national idea"; "outwardly preserving its internationalist disguise, Soviet author
ities
actually engaged in the consolidation of the Russian state. "[32] Of course! "Contrary
to its
internationalist declarations, the revolution in Russia has remained a national affai
r."[33]
This "Russia, upturned by revolution, continued to build the people's state. "[34]

People's state? How dare they say that, knowing of the Red Terror, of the millions of
peasants killed during collectivization, and of the insatiable Gulag?

No, Russia is irrevocably condemned for all her history and in all her forms. Russia i
s always
under suspicion, the "Russian idea" without anti-Semitism "seems to be no longer an id
ea
and not even the Russian one." Indeed, "hostility towards culture is a specific Russia
n
phenomenon"; "how many times have we heard that they are supposedly the only ones in
the whole world who have preserved purity and chastity, respecting God inthe middle o
f
their native wilderness"[35]; "the greatest soulful sincerity has supposedly found she
lter in
this crippled land. This soulful sincerity is being presented to us as a kind of natio
nal treasure,
a unique product like caviar."[36]

Yes, make fun of us Russians; it is for our own good. Unfortunately, there is some tru
th to
these words. But, while expressing them, do not lapse into such hatred. Having long be
en
aware of the terrifying decline of our nation under the communists, it was precisely d
uring
those 1970s that we gingerly wrote about a hope of revival of our morals and culture.
But
strangely enough, the contemporary Jewish authors attacked the idea of Russian revival
with
a relentless fury, as if (or because?) they feared that Soviet culture would be replac
ed by the
Russian one. "I am afraid that the new 'dawn' of this doomed country would be even mor
e
repugnant than its current [1970-1980s] decline."[37]

Looking back from the "democratic" 1990s, we can agree that it was a prophetic declara
tion.
Still, was it said with compassion or with malice?

And here is even more: "Beware, when someone tells you to love your homeland: such lov
e
is charged with hatred.... Beware of stories that tell you that in Russia, Russians ar
e the worst
off, that Russians suffered the most, and that the Russian population is dwindling" -
sure, as
we all know, this is a lie! "Be careful when someone tells you about that great states
man ...
who was assassinated" (i.e., Stolypin) - is that also a deception? No, it is not a dec
eption:
"Not because the facts are incorrect" - nevertheless, do not accept even these true fa
cts:
"Be careful, be aware!"[38]

There is something extraordinary in this stream of passionate accusations.

390

Who would have guessed during the fiery 1920s that after the enfeeblement and downfall
of
that "beautiful" (i.e., Communist) regime in Russia, those Jews, who themselves had su
ffered
much from communism, who seemingly cursed it and ran away from it, would curse and kic
k
not communism, but Russia itself- blast herfrom Israel and from Europe, and from acros
s
the ocean!? There are so many, such confident voices ready to judge Russia's many crim
es
and failings, her inexhaustible guilt towards the Jews - and they so sincerely believe
this guilt
to be inexhaustible -almost all of them believe it! Meanwhile, their own people are co
yly
cleared of any responsibility for their participation in Cheka shootings, for sinking
the barges
and their doomed human cargo in the White and Caspian seas, fortheir role in
collectivization, the Ukrainian famine and in all the abominations of the Soviet
administration, for their talented zeal in brainwashing the "natives." This is not con
trition.

We, brothers or strangers, need to share that responsibility.

It would have been cleanest and healthiest to exchange contrition for everything commi
tted.
I will not stop calling the Russians to do that.

And I am inviting the Jews to do the same. To repent not for Trotsky, Kamenev and Zino
viev;
they are known and anyway can be brushed aside, "they were not real Jews!" Instead, I
invite Jews to look honestly into the oppressive depths of the early Soviet system, at
all
those "invisible" characters such as Isai Davidovich Berg, who created the infamous "g
as
wagon"[39] which later brought so much affliction on the Jews themselves, and I call o
n
them to look honestly on those many much more obscure bureaucrats who had pushed
papers in the Soviet apparatus, and who had never appeared in light.

However, the Jews would not be Jews if they all behaved the same.

So other voices were heard.

As soon as the great exodus of Jews from the USSR began there were Jews who - fortunat
ely
for all, and to their honor - while remaining faithful to Judaism, went above their ow
n
feelings and looked at history from that vantage point. It was a joy to hear them, and
we
hear them still. What hope for the future it gives! Their understanding and support ar
e
especially valuable in the face of the violently thinned and drastically depleted rank
s of
Russian intelligentsia.

A melancholy view, expressed at end of 19th century, comes to mind: "Every country
deserves the Jews it has. "[40]

It depends where you look.

If it were not for voices from the third wave of emigration and from Israel, one woul
d
despair of dialogue and of possibility for mutual understanding between Russians and J
ews.

391

Roman Rutman, a cybernetics worker, had his first article published in the emigre Sami
zdat
in 1973. It was a bright, warm story of how he first decided to emigrate and how it tu
rned
out -and even then he showed distinct warmth towards Russia. The title was illustrativ
e: "A
bow to those who has gone and my brotherhood to those who remain."[41] Among his very
first thoughts during his awakening was "Are we Jews or Russians?"; and among his thou
ghts
on departure there was "Russia, crucified for mankind."
Next year, in 1974, in an article The Ring of Grievances, he proposed to revise "some
established ideas on the 'Jewish question'" and "to recognize the risk of overemphasiz
ing
these ideas." There were three: (1) "The unusual fate of the Jewish people made them
a
symbol of human suffering"; (2) "A Jew in Russia has always been a victim of unilatera
l
persecution"; and (3) "Russian society is indebted to the Jewish people." He quoted a
phrase
from The Gulag Archipelago: "During this war we discovered that the worst thing on ear
th is
to be a Russian" and recognized that the phrase is not artificial or empty, that it is
based on
war losses, on the revolutionary terror before that, on hunger, on "the wanton destruc
tion
of both the nation's head - its cognitive elite, and its feet, the peasantry." Althoug
h modern
Russian literature and democratic movements preach about the guilt of Russian society
before Jews, the author himself prefers to see the "circle of grievances" instead of
"the
saccharine sentimentality about the troubles and talents of the Jewish people." "To br
eak
this '"circle of grievances' one must pull at it from both sides. "[42]

Here it is - a thoughtful, friendly and calm voice.

And over these years, we many times heard the firm voice of Michael Kheifetz, a recen
t
GULag prisoner. "A champion of my people, I cannot but sympathize with the nationalist
s of
other peoples."[43] He had the courage to call for Jewish repentance: "The experience
of the
German people, who have not turned away from their horrifying and criminal past, and w
ho
never tried to lay the blame for Nazism on some other culprits, on strangers, etc. bu
t,
instead constantly cleansed itself in the fire of national repentance, and thus create
d a
German state that for the first time was admired and respected by all mankind; this
experience should, in my opinion, become a paragon for the peoples that participated i
n the
crimes of Bolshevism, including the Jews." "We, Jews, must honestly analyze the role w
e
played in other nations' affairs, the role so extraordinarily foretold by Z. Jabotinsk
y."[44]

M. Kheifetz demonstrated a truly noble soul when he spoke of "the genuine guilt of
assimilated Jews before the native peoples of those countries where they live, the gui
lt,
which cannot and must not allow them to live comfortably in the Diaspora." About Sovie
t
Jewry of the 1920s and 1930s he said: "Who if not us, their bitterly remorseful descen
dants,
has the right to condemn them for this historic mistake [zealous participation in buil
ding
communism] and the settling of historical scores with Russia forthe Pale of Settlement
and
the pogroms?"[45] (Kheifetz also mentioned that B. Penson and M. Korenblit, who had
served labor camp terms along with him, shared his views.)

392

Almost simultaneously with the words of Kheifetz, by then already an emigrant, Feliks
Svetov
vividly called out for Jewish repentance from inside the Soviet Union in a Samizdat no
vel
Open the doors to me. [46] (It was no accident that F. Svetov, due to his Jewish perce
ptivity
and intelligence, was one of the first to recognize the beginning of Russian religious
revival.)

Later, during a passionate discourse surrounding the dispute between Astafievand Edelm
an,
Yuri Shtein described "our Ashkenazi-specific personality traits, formed on the basis
of our
belief of belonging to the chosen people and an insular, small town mentality. Hence,
there
is a belief in the infallibility of our nation and our claim to a monopoly on sufferin
g.... It is
time for us to see ourselves as a normal nation, worthy but not fa ultless, like all t
he other
peoples of the world. Especially now, that we have our own independent state and have
already proved to the world that Jews can fight and plow better than some more populou
s
ethnic groups." [47]

During the left liberal campaign against V. Astafiev, V. Belov, and V. Rasputin, liter
ary
historian Maria Shneyerson, who, after emigrating, continued to love Russia dearly an
d
appreciate Russian problems, offered these writers her enthusiastic support.[48]

In the 1970s, a serious, competent, and forewarning book on the destruction of the
environment in the USSR under communism was published in the West. Written by a Sovie
t
author, it was naturally published under a pseudonym, B. Komarov. After some time, th
e
author emigrated and we learned his name -Zeev Wolfson. We discovered even more: that
he was among the compilers of the album of destroyed and desecrated churches in Centra
l
Russia. [49]

Few active intellectuals remained in the defeated Russia, but friendly, sympathetic Je
wish
forces supported them. With this shortage of people and under the most severe persecut
ion
by the authorities, our Russian Public Foundation was established to help victims of
persecution; I donated all my royalties for The Gulag Archipelago to this fund; and, s
tarting
with its first talented and dedicated manager, Alexander Ginzburg, there were many Jew
s
and half-Jews among the Fund's volunteers. (This gave certain intellectually blind ext
reme
Russian nationalists sufficient reason to brand our Foundation as being "Jewish.")

Similarly, M. Bernshtam, then Y. Felshtinsky and D.Shturman were involved in our study
of
modern Russian history.

In the fight against communist lies, M. Agursky, D.Shturman, A. Nekrich, M. Geller, an

d A.
Serebrennikov distinguished themselves by their brilliant, fresh, and fair-minded jour
nalism.

We can also recall the heroism of the American professor Julius Epstein and his servic
e to
Russia. In self-centered, always self-righteous, and never regretful of any wrongdoing
s
America, he single-handedly revealed the mystery of Operation Keelhaul, how after the
end
of the war and from their own continent, Americans handed over to Stalinist agents an
d

393

therefore certain death, hundreds and thousands of Russian Cossacks, who had naively
believed that since they reached the 'land of free' they had been saved. [50]
All these examples should encourage sincere and mutual understanding between Russians
and Jews, if only we would not shut it out by intolerance and anger.

Alas, even the mildest remembrance, repentance, and talk of justice elicits severe out
cries
from the self-appointed guardians of extreme nationalism, both Russian and Jewish. "A
s
soon as Solzhenitsyn had called for national repentance" - meaning among Russians, an
d
the author didn't mind that - "here we are! Our own people are right there in the fron
t line."
He did not mention any name specifically but he probably referred to M. Kheifetz. "Se
e, it
turns out that we are more to blame, we helped ... to install ... no, not helped, but
simply
established the Soviet regime ourselves ... were disproportionately present in variou
s
organs."[51]

Those who began to speak in a voice of remorse were furiously attacked in an instant.
"They
prefer to extract from their hurrah-patriotic gut a mouthful of saliva" - what a style
and
nobility of expression! - "and to thoroughly spit on all 'ancestors,' to curse Trotsky
and
Bagritsky, Kogan, and Dunaevsky"; "M. Kheifetz invites us to 'purge ourselves in the f
ire of
national repentance.'" [52]

And what a thrashing F. Svetov received for the autobiographical hero of his novel: "A
book
about conversion to Christianity ... will contribute not to an abstract search for rep
entance,
but to a very specific anti-Semitism.... This book is anti-Semitic." Yes, and what is
there to
repent? -The indefatigable David Markish angrily exclaims. Svetov's hero sees a "betra
yal" in
the fact that "we desert the country, leaving behind a deplorable condition which is e
ntirely
our handiwork: it is we, as it turns out, who staged a bloody revolution, shot the fat
her-tsar,
befouled and raped the Orthodox Church and in addition, founded the GULag Archipelag
o,"
isn't that right? First, these "comrades" Trotsky, Sverdlov, Berman, and Frenkel are n
ot at all
related to the Jews. Second, the very question about someone's collective guilt is wro
ng. [53]
(As to blaming Russians, you see, it is a different thing altogether: it was always ac
ceptable
to blame them en masse, from the times of the elder Philotheus.)

David's brother, Sh. Markish reasons as follows, "as to the latest wave of immigrants
from
Russia ... whether in Israel or in the U.S., they do not exhibit real Russophobia ...
but a self-
hatred that grows into direct anti-Semitism is obvious in them only too often. "[54]

See, if Jews repent - it is anti-Semitism. (This is yet another new manifestation of t

hat
prejudice.)

The Russians should realize their national guilt, "the idea of national repentance can
not be
implemented without a clear understanding of national guilt.... The guilt is enormous,
and
there is no way to shift it on to others. This guilt is not only about the things of p
ast, it is also

394

about the vile things Russia commits now, and will probably continue committing in th
e
future," as Shragin wrote in the early 1970s. [55]

Well, we too tirelessly call the Russians to repent; without penitence, we will not ha
ve a
future. After all, only those who were directly affected by communism recognized its e
vils.
Those who were not affected tried not to notice the atrocities and later on to forget
and
forgive them, to the extent that now they do not even understand what to repent of. (E
ven
more so those who themselves committed the crimes.)

Every day we are burning with shame for our unsettled people.

And we love it too. And we do not envision our lives without it.

And yet, for some reason, we have not lost all faith in it.

Still, is it absolutely certain that you had no part in our great guilt, in our unsucc
essful
history?
Here, Shimon Markish referred to Jabotinsky's 1920s article. "Jabotinsky several times
(on
different occasions) observed that Russia is a foreign country to us, our interest in
her should
be detached, cool, though sympathetic; her anxiety, grief and joy are not ours, and ou
r
feelings are foreign to her too." Markish added: "That's also my attitude towa rds Rus
sian
worries." And he invites us to "call a spade a spade. However, regarding this delicate
point
even free western Russians are not awesomely courageous.... I prefer to deal with
enemies. "[56]

Yet this sentence should be divided into two: is it the case that to "call a spade a s
pade" and
to speak frankly mean being an enemy? Well, there is a Russian proverb: do not love th
e
agreeable; love the disputers.

I invite all, including Jews, to abandon this fear of bluntness, to stop perceiving ho
nesty as
hostility. We must abandon it historically! Abandon it forever!

In this book, I "call a spade a spade". And at no time do I feel that in doing so it i
s being
hostile to the Jews. I have written more sympathetically than many Jews write about
Russians.

The purpose of this book, reflected even in its title, is this: we should understand e
ach other,
we should recognize each other's standpoint and feelings. With this book, I want to ex
tend a
handshake of understanding - for all our future.

But we must do so mutually!

This interweaving of Jewish and Russian destinies since the 18th century which has so
explosively manifested itself in the 20th century, has a profound historical meaning,
and we

395

should not lose it in the future. Here, perhaps, lies the Divine Intent which we must
strive to
unravel - to discern its mystery and to do what must be done.
And it seems obvious that to know the truth about our shared past is a moral imperativ
e for
Jews and Russians alike.

Sources:

[I] B. Shragin. Protivostoyaniedukha [Sta ndoff of the Spirit(hereinafter -- B. Shragi

n)]. London: Overseas
Publ ications, 1977, p. 160, 188-189.

[2] Nik. Shulgin. Novoe russkoesamosoznanie [The New Russian Mind].// Vek 20 i mir [Th
e 20th Century and
the World]. Moscow, 1990, (3), p. 27.

[3] M. Meyerson-Aksenov. Rozhdeniye novoi intelli gents ii [The Birth of New Intellige
ntsia]. // Samosoznanie: Sb.
statei. [Self-conscious ness:The Col lection of Articles]. New York: Chronicles, 1976,
p. 102.

[4] B. Shragin, p, 246,249.

[5] O. Altaev. Dvoinoe soznani e intel I igentsii i psevdo-kultura [Dual Mind of Intel
ligentsia and Pseudo-Culture].
// Vestnik RusskogoStudencheskogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniya [Herald of Russian Student
Christian
Movement]. Paris -New York, 1970, (97), p. 11.

[6] M. Meyerson-Aksenov. Rozhdeniye novoi intelligentsii [The Birth of New Intelligent

sia]. // Samosoznanie: Sb.
statei. [Self-conscious ness:The Col lection of Articles]. New York: Chronicles, 1976,
p. 102.

[7] Beni Peled. My ne smozhem zhdat escho dve tysyachi let! [We cannot wait for anothe
r two thousand
years!]. [Interview] // "22": Obshchestvenno-politicheskiy i I iteraturniy zhurna I ev
reyskoy intel I igentsii izSSSR v
Izraile [Social, Political and Literary Journal of the Jewish Intelligentsia from the
USSR in Israel]. Tel -Aviv, 1981,
(17), p. 114.

[8] N. Prat. Emigrants kie kompleksy v istoricheskomaspekte [Emigrant's Fixations inth

e Historical Perspective].
//Vremya i my: Mezhdunarodny zhurnal literatury i obshchestvennykh problem [Epoch and
We (hereinafter -
EW): International Journal of Literature and Social Problems]. New York, 1980, (56),
p. 191.

[9] B. Shragin, p, 304.

[10] Ibid., p. 305

[II] M. Deich. Zapiski postoronnego [Commentaries of an Outsider].// "22", 1982,(26),

p. 156.
[12] B. Khazanov. Novaya Rossiya [new Russia].// EW, Tel -Aviv, 1976,(8), p. 143.

[13] Ibid., p. 141, 142, 144.

[14] A. Belinkov. Strana rabov, strana gospod [The land of slaves, the land of master
s]. // The New Bell : The
Collection of Literary and Opinion Writings. London, 1972, p. 323, 339, 346, 350.

[15] Ibid., p. 325-328,337, 347, 355.

[16] N. Shapiro. SI ovo ryadovogo sovetskogo evreya [The Word of an Ordinary Soviet Je
w]. //The Russian Anti -
Semi tism and Jews. Collection of essays. London, 1968, p. 50-51.

[17] The New American, New York, 1982, March 23-29, (110), p. 11.

396

[18] Jakob Yakir. Ya pishu Viktoru Krasinu [I Write to Viktor Krasin]. // Our Country,
Tel Aviv, 1973, December 12.
Cited from the New Journal, 1974, (117), p. 190.

[19] Amram. Reaktsiya ottorzheniya [The Reaction of Rejection]. // "22", 1979, (5), p.
201.
[20] The New Russian Word, New York, 1975, November 30, p. 3.

[21] M. Ortov. Pravoslavnoegosudarstvo I tserkov [The orthodox State and the Church].
The Way: The
Orthodox Almanac. New York, 1984, May-June, (3), p. 12,15.

[22] F. Gorenshtein. Shestoi konets krasnoi zvezdy [The Sixs Pointof the Red Star].//
EW, New York, 1982, (65),
p. 125.

[23] G. Pomerants. Chelovek niotkuda [The Man from Nowhere]. From G. Pomerants, Unpubl
ished. Frankfurt,
Posev, 1972, p. 143, 145, 161-162.

[24] G. Pomerants. Sny zemli [Nightdreams of Earth]. // "22", 1980, (12), p. 129.
[25] G. Pomerants. Chelovek niotkuda [The Man from Nowhere]. From G. Pomerants, Unpubl
ished. Frankfurt,
Posev, 1972, p. 157.

[26] G. Pomerants. Son o spravedl ivom vozmezdii [A Dream about Recompense]. // Syntak
sis:Journalism,
Critique, Polemic. Paris, 1980, (6), p. 21.

[27] L. Frank. Eshche raz o "russkom voprose" [The "Russian Question" Once Again].// R
usskaya mysl [The
RussianThinker], 1989, May 19, p. 13.

[28] Amrozh. Sovetskii antisemitism- prichiny i prognozy [Soviet Anti-Semitism: Causes

and Prospects].
Seminar.// "22", 1978, (3), p. 153.

[29] V. Gusman. Perestroika: mify i realnost[Perestroika:Myths and the Reality].// "2

2", 1990, (70), p. 139,
142.

[30] B. Shragin, p, 99.

[31] M. Amusin. Peterburgskie strasti [Passions of St. Petersburg].// "22", 1995,(96),

p. 191.
[32] I.Serman. Review. // "22", 1982, (26), p. 210-212.
[33] B. Shragin, p, 158.

[34] M. Meyerson-Aksenov. Rozhdeniye novoi i ntel I i gents i i [The Birth of New Inte
lligentsia]. //Samosoznanie:
Sb. statei. [Self-consciousness:The Collection of Articles] New York: Chronicles, 197
6, p. 102.

[35] B. Khazanov. Pisma bez stempelya [The Letters without Postmark].// EW, New York,
1982,(69), p. 15 6,
158, 163.

[36] B. Khazanov. Novaya Rossiya [New Russia]. //EW, Tel Aviv, 1976, (8), p. 142.

[37] M. Vaiskopf.Sobstvenny Platon [Our Own Platon].// "22", 1981, (22), p. 168.

[38] B. Khazanov. Po kom zvonitzatonuvshy kolokol [ForWhom the Sunken Bell Tolls]. //S
trana i mir:
Obshchestvenno-politichesky, economichesky i kulturno-filosofsky zhurnal [Country and
World: Social, Political,
Economic and Cultural-Philosophical Journal (henceforth - Country and World]. Munich,
1986, (12), p. 93-94.
397

[39] E. Zhirnov. "Protsedura kazni nosilaomerzitelnykharakter" [The Execution was Abom

inable]. //
Komsomol skaya Pravda, 1990, October 28, p. 2.

[40] M. Morgulis. Evreisky vopros vego osnovaniyakh i chastnostyakh [TheBasics and Det
ails ofthe Jewish
Question]. //Voskhod, St. Petersburg, January 1881, Book 1, p. 18.

[41] R. Rutman. Ukhodyashchemu - poklon, ostayushchemusya - bratstvo [A bow to those w

ho has gone and
my brotherhood to those who remain]. // New Journal, New York, 1973, (112), p. 284-29
7.

[42] R. Rutman. Koltsoobid [Circle of Grievances].// New Journal, New York, 1974, (11
7), p. 178-189; and in
English: Soviet Jewish Affairs, London, 1974, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 3-11.

[43] M. Kheifetz. Russkii patriot VladimirOsipov [Russian Patriot VladimirOsipov].// K

ontinent: Literaturny,
obshchestvenno-politichesky i religiozny zhurnal [Continent: Literary, Social, Politic
al and Religious Journal
(henceforth - Continent]. Paris, 1981, (27), p. 209.

[44] M. Kheifetz. Nashi obshchie uroki [The Lessons We Shared]. //"22", 1980, (14), p.
162-163.

[45] M. Kheifetz. Evreiskiezametki [The Jewish Notes]. Paris. Tretya vol na [The Third
Wave], 1978, p. 42, 45.

[46] Feliks Svetov. Open the doors to me. Paris: Editeurs Reunls,1978.

[47] Yu. Shtein. Letter to Editor. // Country and World, 1987, (2), p. 112.

[48] M. Shneyerson. Razreshennaya pravda [Allowable Truth]. // Continent, 1981, (28);

see also: M. Shneyerson.
Khudozhestvenny mir pisatelya i pisatel vmiru [The Artistic World of an Author andthe
Author in the World].//
Continent, 1990, (62).

[49] B. Komarov. Unichtozhenie prirody [Destruction of the Nature]. Frankfurt: Posev,

1978; Razrushennye i
oskvernennye khramy: Moskva i Srednyaya Rossia [Destroyed and Desecrated Churches: Mos
cow and Central
Russia]. Afterword: Predely vandalizma [TheLimits of Vandalism]. Frankfurt: Posev, 198
0.
[50] Julius Epstein. Operation Keelhaul : The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 t
o the Present. Old
Greenwich, Connecticut: Devin-Adair, 1973.

[51] V. Zeev. Demonstratsiya objektivnosti [Pretendingto be Evenhanded]. //New America

n, 1982, June 1-7,
(120), p. 37.

[52] V. Boguslavsky.VzashchituKunyaeva [In Defence ofKunyaev]. //"22", 1980,(16), p. 1

66-167,170.
[53] D. Markish.Vykrest [Convert to Christianity].// "22", 1981,(18), p. 210.

[54] Sh. Markish.Oevreiskoi nenavisti k Rossi i [On the Jewish Hatred towards Russi
a].// "22", 1984,(38), p.
218.

[55] B. Shragin, p, 159.

[56] Sh. Markish. Eshcheraz o nenavisti ksamomu sebe [Once Again on Self-Hatred]. "2
2", 1980, (16), p. 178-
179, 180.

398

Chapter 26: The beginning of Exodus

The Age of Exodus, as Jews themselves would soon name it, began rather silently: its s
tart
can be traced to a December 1966 article in Izvestiya, where the Soviet authorities
magnanimously approved "family reunification," and under this "banner the Jews were
given the right to leave the USSR"[1]. And then, half a year later, the historic Six-D
ay War
broke out. "Like any epic, this Exodus began with a miracle. And as it should be in an
epic,
three miracles were revealed to the Jews of Russia -to the Exodus generation": the mir
acle
of the foundation of Israel, "the miracle of the Purim 1953" (that is, Stalin's deat
h), and "the
miracle of the joyous, brilliant, intoxicating victory of 1967. "[2]

The Six-Day War gave a strong and irreversible push to the ethnic consciousness of th
e
Soviet Jews and delivered a blow to the desire of many to assimilate. It created among
Jews
a powerful motivation for national self-education and the study of Hebrew (within a
framework of makeshift centers) and gave rise to pro-emigration attitudes.

How did the majority of Soviet Jews perceive themselves by the end of the 1960s, on th
e eve
of Exodus? No, those who retrospectively write of a constant feeling of oppression an
d
stress do not distort their memories: "Hearing the word 'Jew,' they cringe, as if expe
cting a
blow.... They themselves use this sacramental word as rarely as possible, and when the
y do
have to say it, they force the word out as quickly as possible and in a suppressed voi
ce, as if
they were seized by the throat.... Among such people there are those who are gripped b
y the
eternal incurable fear ingrained in their mentality." [3] Or take a Jewish author who
wrote of
spending her entire professional life worrying that her work would be rejected only be
cause
of her nationality [ethnicity in American terminology]. [4] Despite having an apparent
ly
higher standard of living than the general population, many Jews still harbored this s
ense of
oppression.

Indeed, cultivated Jews complained more of cultural rather than economic oppression.
"The
Soviet Jews are trying ... to retain their presence in the Russian culture. They strug
gle to
retain the Russian culture in their inner selves. "[5] Dora Shturman recalls: "When th
e
Russian Jews, whose interests are chained to Russia, are suddenly deprived - even if o
nly on
paper or in words - of their right to engage in the Russian life, to participate in th
e Russian
history, as if they were interlopers or strangers, they feel offended and bewildered.
With the
appearance of Tamizdat [a Russian neologism for dissident self-published (Samizdat)
literature, published outside the USSR (from the Russian word, 'tarn', meaning 'there'
or 'out
there')] and Samizdat, the xenophobia felt by some Russian authors toward Jews who
sincerely identified themselves as Russians manifested itself for the firsttime in man
y years,
not only on the street level and on the level of state bureaucracy, but appeared on th
e elite
intellectual level, even among dissidents. Naturally, this surprised Jews who identifi
ed with
Russians."[6] Galich: "Many people brought up in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s used to re
gard

399

themselves as Russians from their earliest years, in fact from birth, and indeed ... t
hey share
all their values and thoughts with the Russian culture."[7]

Another author drew the portrait of "the average modern Russian Jew," who "would serv
e
this country with good faith and fidelity. He ... had carefully examined and identifie
d his own
flaws. He had become aware of them.... And now he tries to get rid of them ... he has
stopped arms flourishing. He has gotten rid of his national peculiarities of speech wh
ich were
carried over into Russian.... At some point he would aspire to become equal with the
Russians, to be indistinguishable from them." And so: "You might not hear the word 'Je
w' for
years on end. Perhaps, many have even forgotten that you are a Jew. Yet you can never
forget it yourself. It is this silence that always reminds you who you are. It creates
such an
explosive tension inside you, that when you do hear the word 'Jew,' it sounds like fat
e's
blow." This is a very telling account. The same author describes the cost of this
transformation into a Russian. "He had left behind too much" and become spiritually
impoverished. "Now, when he needs those capacious, rich and flexible words, he can't f
ind
them... .When he looks for but can't find the right word, something dies inside him,"
he had
lost "the melodic intonation of Jewish speech" with all its "gaiety, playfulness, mirt
h,
tenacity, and irony."[8]

Of course, these exquisite feelings did not worry each Soviet Jew; it was the lot of t
he tiniest
minority among them, the top cultural stratum, those who genuinely and persistently tr
ied
to identify with Russians. Itwas them who G. Pomeranz spoke about (though he made a
generalization for the whole intelligentsia): "Everywhere, we are not quite out of pla
ce.
Everywhere, we are not quite in our place"; we "have become something like non-Israel
i
Jews, the people of the air, who lost all their roots in their mundane existence.
"[9]
Very well put.

A. Voronel develops the same theme: "I clearly see all the sham of their [Jews'] exist
ence in
Russia today." [10]

If there's no merging, there will always be alienation.

Nathan Sharansky often mentioned that from a certain point he started to feel being
different from the others in Russia.

During the Dymshits-Kuznetsov hijacking affairtrial in December 1970, L. Hnoh openly

stated what he had apparently nurtured for quite a while: "It became unbearable for me
to
live in a country I don't regard as my own."

What integrity of mind and courage of word!

So it was this feeling that grew among the Soviet Jews, and now increasingly among th
e
broad Jewish masses.

400

Later, in 1982, another Jewish journalist put it like thus: "I am a stranger, lama str
anger in
my own country which I love abstractly but fear in reality."[ll]

In the beginning of the 1970s, in a conversation with L.K. Chukovskaya she told me (I
made a
note at the time): "This Exodus was forced on Jewry. I pity those whom the Russians ma
de
feel Jewish. The Soviet Jews have already lost their sense of Jewishness and I conside
r this
artificial awakening of their national sense to be specious."

This was far from the truth. Despite the fact that she socialized with many Jews from
both
capitals, Chukovskaya was mistaken. This Jewish national awakening was not artificial
or
forced; it was an absolutely natural and even necessary milestone of Jewish history. I
t was
the sudden realization that "one can say 'Jew' proudly!"[12]
Another Jewish publicist reflected on the experience of his generation of young people
in
the USSR: "So what are we - the 'grandchildren' and heirs of that cruel experiment, wh
o
broke through the shell and hatched here in Israel -what are we to sayabout our father
s
and grandfathers? Should we blame them that they didn't raise us in Jewish way? Yet ou
r
very sense of Jewishness was in great part the result of their (as well as our) failur
es,
catastrophes and despair. So let us appreciate this past.... Is it up to us to throw s
tones at the
shattered skulls of the romantics of yesterday?" [13]

This sincerely and honestly expressed intergenerational connection to the fathers and
grandfathers, who were so enthusiastic in the early Soviet years, greatly supplements
the
whole picture. (You can read between the lines the author's rejection of the benefits
and
advantages of the 'new class' that has replaced those 'romantics.')

ASamizdat article properly pointed out: "The opinion that the current rise in Jewish e
thnic
consciousness among assimilated Soviet Jews is just a reaction to the re-emergence of
anti-
Semitism seems deeply mistaken. What we have here is more likely a coincidence. "[14]

Different contemporaries described the development of their Jewish self-identificatio

n
somewhat differently. Some wrote that "nearly everyone agreed that nothing was
happening in the 1960s" in the sense of national revival, though "after the war of 196
7
things began to change." Yet it was the plane hijacking incident that led to the
breakthrough. [15] Others suggest that "Jewish groups were already forming in the mid-

1960s in Leningrad, Moscow, and Riga," and that by the end of the decade a Jewish
"underground center" was established in Leningrad. Yet what kind of conspiracy could i
t be?
"Makeshift centers to study Hebrew and Jewish history were formed ... and not really f
or
study of Hebrew, but rather for the socialization of people who wished to study it. Ac
tual
language usually was learnt not beyond two to three hundred words.... As a rule, all
participants were state functionaries, and, like their entire milieu, far removed from
the
Jewish religion and national traditions alike." "The Jews of the 1960s had only a vagu
e
conception of Zionism." And yet, "we felt ourselves to be sufficiently Jewish, and saw
no
need whatsoever for any sort of additional 'Jewish educational remedy.'" In response t
o the

401

barrage of anti-Israeli propaganda, "the inner sympathy towards Jewry and to Israel" g
rew.
"Even if we were told then that Israel had abandoned Judaism, it would make no differe
nce
for us." And then the movement "began to transform from an underground to a mass, ope
n
...'parlour' phenomenon." Still, "then nobody believed in the possibility of emigratio
n, at
least in our time, yet everyone considered a quite real possibility of ending up in a
camp. "[16] (The interviewer comments: "Alas, it is too short a step from conspiracy t
o
'devilry'. I sawthis in the Jewish movement of the 1970s, after the trials in Leningra
d.")[17]

Thus, the return to Jewish culture started and continued without counting on emigratio
n
and initially did not affect the everyday life of the participants. "I'm not sure that
Aliyah
[return to Israel] began because of Zionists," as those first Zionist groups were too
weak for
this. "To a certain extent, it was the Soviet government that triggered the process by
raising
a tremendous noise around the Six-Day War. The Soviet press painted the image of a war
like
invincible Jew, and this image successfully offset the inferiority complex of the Sovi
et
Jews." [18]

But "hide your 'Judaic terror' from your co-workers' eyes, from your neighbors' ears!"
At
first, there was a deep fear: "these scraps of paper, bearing your contact details, we
re as if
you were signing a sentence for yourself, for your children, for your relatives." Yet
soon "we
ceased whispering, we began to speak aloud," "to prepare and celebrate" the Jewish
holidays and "study history and Hebrew." And already from the end of 1969 "the Jews by
the
tens and hundreds began signing open letters to the 'public abroad.' They demanded to
be
'released' to Israel. "[19] Soviet Jewry, "separated from world Jewry, trapped in the
melting
pot of the despotic Stalinist empire ... was seemingly irredeemably lost for Jewry - a
nd yet
suddenly the Zionist movement was reborn and the ancient Moses' appeal trumpeted agai
n:
'Let my people go!'" [20]

"In 1970 the whole world began to talk about Russian Jews." They "rose, they became
determined. ...There is only one barrier separating them from their dream -the barrier
of
governmental prohibition. To break through, to breech it, to fly through it was their
only
wish.... 'Flee from Northern Babylon!'" was the behest of the arrested plane hijacker
s, the
group led by E. Kuznetsov and M. Dymshits.[21] In December 1970 during their trial in
Leningrad "they weren't silent, they didn't evade, they openly declared that they want
ed to
steal a plane to fly it across the border to Israel. Remember, they faced the death se
ntence!
Their 'confessions' were in essence the declarations of Zionism. "[22] A few months la
ter in
May 1971, there was a trial of the 'Zionist organizations of Leningrad,' soon followed
by
similartrials in Riga and Kishinev.

These trials, especially the two Leningrad trials, became the new powerful stimulus fo
r the
development of the Jewish ethnic consciousness. A new Samizdat journal, The Jews in th
e
USSR, began to circulate soon afterwards, in October 1972. It vividly reported on the
struggle for the legalization of emigration to Israel and covered the struggle for the
right to
freely develop Jewish culture in the USSR.

402

But even at this point only a minority of Jews were involved in the nascent emigratio
n
movement. "It seems that the life was easierfor the Soviet Jews when they knew that th
ey
had no choice, that they only could persevere and adapt, than now, when they've got a
choice of where to live and what to do.... The first wave that fled from Russia at the
end of
the 1960s was motivated only by the goal of spending the rest of their lives in the on
ly
country without anti-Semitism, Israel. "[23] (As the author noted, this does not inclu
de those
who emigrated for personal enrichment.)

And "a part of Soviet Jewry would happily repudiate their national identity, if they w
ere
allowed to do so. "[24] - so scared they were. This section included those Jews who cu
rsed
'that Israel,' claiming that it is because of Israel that law-abiding Jews are often b
eing
prevented from career advancement: "because of those leaving, we too will suffer."

The Soviet government could not but be alarmed by this unexpected (for them as for th
e
whole world) awakening of ethnic consciousness among Soviet Jews. It stepped up
propaganda efforts against Israel and Zionism, to scare away the newly conscious. In M
arch
1970 it made use of that well-worn Soviet trick, to get the denunciation from the mout
hs of
the "people themselves," in this case from the people of "Jewish nationality." So the
authorities stageda denunciatory public press-conference and it was dutifully attended
not
only by the most hypocritical "official Jews" such as Vergelis, Dragunsky, Chakovsky,
Bezymensky, Dolmatovsky, the film director Donsky, the propagandists Mitin and Mintz,
but
also by prominent people who could easily refuse to participate in the spectacle and i
n
signing the "Declaration" without significant repercussions for themselves. Among the
latter
were: Byalik: the members of Academy, Frumkin and Kassirsky: the internationally renow
ned
musicians, Fliyer and Zak; the actors, Plisetskaya, Bystritskaya, and Pluchek. But sig
n it they
did. The "Declaration" "heaped scorn on the aggression carried by the Israeli ruling c
ircles ...
which resurrects the barbarism of the Hitlerites"; "Zionism has always been an express
ion of
the chauvinist views of the Jewish bourgeois and its Jewish raving"; and the signatori
es
intend "to open the eyes of the gullible victims of Zionist propaganda": "under the gu
idance
of the Leninist party, working Jews have gained full freedom from the hated Tsarism."
Amazing, see who was the real oppressor? The one already dead for half a century!

But times had changed by this point. The "official Jews" were publicly rebuked by I.
Zilberberg, a young engineer who had decided to irrevocably cut ties with this country
and
leave. He circulated an open letter in response to the "Declaration" in Samizdat, call
ing its
signatories "lackey souls", and repudiated his former faith in communism: "we naively
placed our hopes in 'our' Jews - the Kaganovichs, the Erenburgs, etc." (So, after all,
they had
once indeed placed their hopes there?) At the same time he criticised Russians: aftert
he
1950s, did "Russians repent and were they contrite ... and, after spilling a meagre fe
w tears
about the past ... did they swear love and commitment to their new-found brothers?" In
his
mind there was no doubt that Russian guilt Jews was entirely one-sided.

403

Such events continued. Another Samizdat open letter became famous a year later, this o
ne
by the hitherto successful film director Mikhail Kalik, who had now been expelled from
the
Union of Soviet film-makers because he declared his intention to leave for Israel. Kal
ik
unexpectedly addressed a letter about his loyalty to Jewish culture "to the Russian
intelligentsia." It looked as if he had spent his life in the USSR not among the succe
ssful, but
had suffered for years among the oppressed, striving for freedom. And now, leaving, h
e
lectured this sluggish Russian intelligentsia from the moral high ground of his victim
hood.
"So you will stay ... with your silence, with your 'obedient enthusiasm?' Who then wil
l take
care for the moral health of the nation, the country, the society?"

Six months later there was another open letter, this time from the Soviet writer Grigo
ry
Svirsky. He was driven to this by the fact that he hadn't been published for several y
ears and
even his name had been removed from the Encyclopaedia of Literature in punishment for
speaking out against anti-Semitism at the Central Literary House in 1968. This punishm
ent he
termed "murder," with understandable fire, though he forgot to glance back and to see
how
many others suffered in this regard. "I do not know how to live from now on," he wrote
to
the Union of Writers. (This was a sentiment common to all 6,000 members of the union:
they all believed that the government was bound to feed them for their literary work).
These
were "the reasons which made me, a man of Russian culture, what is more a Russian writ
er
and an expert on Russian literature, feel myself to be a Jew and to come to the irrevo
cable
decision to leave with my family to Israel"; "I wish to become an Israeli writer." (Bu
t he
achieved no such transformation of his profession from one nation to another. Svirsky,
like
many previous emigrants, had not realized how difficult he would find adjusting to Isr
ael,
and chose to leave there too.)

The hostile anti-Russian feelings and claims we find in so many voices of the awakene
d
Jewish consciousness surprise and bewilder us, making our hearts bleed. Yet in these
feelings of the "mature ferocity" we do not hear any apology proffered by our Jewish
brothers for at least the events of 1920s. There isn't a shadow of appreciation that R
ussians
too are a wronged people. However, we heard some other voices among the "ferocious" i
n
the previous chapter. Looking back on those times when they were already in Israel, th
ey
sometimes gave a more sober account: "we spent too much time settling debts with Russi
a
in Jews in the USSR" at the expense even of devoting "too little to Israel and our lif
e there ...
and thinking too little about the future."[25]

***

For the ordinary mundane and unarmed living, the prospect of breaking the steel shell
that
had enveloped the USSR seemed an impossible and hopeless task. But then they despaire
d -
and had to try - and something gave! The struggle for the right to emigrate to Israel
was
characterised throughout by both determination and inventiveness: issuing complaints t
o
the Supreme Soviet, demonstrations and hunger strikes by the "refuseniks" (as Jews wh
o
had been refused exit to Israel called themselves); seminars by fired Jewish professor
s on

404

the pretext of wanting "to maintain their professional qualifications"; the organizati
on in
Moscow of an international symposium of scientists (at the end of 1976); finally, refu
sal to
undergo national service.

Of course, this struggle could only be successful with strong support from Jewish
communities abroad. "For us the existence in the world of Jewish solidarity was a star
tling
discovery and the only glimmer of hope in that dark time" remembers one of the first
refuseniks.[26] There was also substantial material assistance: "among refuseniks in M
oscow
there was born a particular sort of independence, founded on powerful economic suppor
t
from Jews abroad."[27] And so they attached even more hopes to assistance from the Wes
t,
now expecting similarly powerful public and even political help.

This support had its first test in 1972. Somebody in the higher echelons of the Sovie
t
government reasoned as follows: here we have the Jewish intelligentsia, educated for f
ree in
the Soviet system and then provided with opportunities to pursue their academic career
s,
and now they just leave for abroad to work there with all these benefits subsidized by
the
Soviet state. Would it not be just to institute a tax on this? Why should the country
prepare
for free educated specialists, taking up the places loyal citizens might have had, onl
y to have
them use their skills in other countries? And so they started to prepare a law to inst
itute this
tax. This plan was no secret, and quickly became known and widely discussed in Jewish
circles. It became law on August 3, 1972 in the Order of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet
of the USSR "On the compensation by citizens of the USSR, who are leaving to permanent
ly
live abroad, of the government expenditure on their education." The amount proscribed
was
between 3,600 and 9,800 roubles, depending on the rank of the university (3,600 was i
n
those days the yearly salary of an ordinary senior researcher without a doctorate).

A storm of international indignation erupted. During the 55 years of its existence, no

ne of
the monstrous list of the USSR's crimes had caused as united an international protest
as this
tax on educated emigrants. American academics, 5,000 in number, signed a protest (Autu
mn
1972); and two thirds of American senators worked together to stop an expected favorab
le
trade agreement with the USSR. European parliamentarians behaved similarly. For their
part,
500 Soviet Jews sent an open letter to UN General Secretary Kurt Waldheim (nobody yet
suspected that he too would soon be damned) describing: "serfdom for those with a high
er
education." (In reaching for a phrase they failed to realize how this would sound in a
country
which had genuine kolkhoz serfdom).

The Soviet government buckled, and consigned the order to the scrapheap.

As to the agreement on trade? In April 1973, union leaderGeorge Meany argued that the
agreement was neither in the interest of the USA nor would it ease international tensi
ons,
but the senators were concerned only about Soviet Jews and ignored these arguments. Th
ey
passed the agreement but adding the "Jackson amendment," which stated that it would on
ly
be agreed to once Jews were allowed to leave the USSR freely. And so the whole world

405

heard the message coming from the American capital: we will help the Soviet government
if
they release from their country, not everyone, but specifically and only Jews.

Nobody declared loud and clear: gentlemen, for 55 years it has been but a dream to esc
ape
from under the hated Soviet regime, not for hundreds of thousands but for millions of
our
fellow citizens; but nobody, ever had the right to leave. And yet the political and so
cial
leaders of the West never showed surprise, never protested, never moved to punish the
Soviet government with trade restrictions. (There was one unsuccessful attempt in 1931
to
organise a campaign against Soviet dumping of lumber, a practise made possible only by
the
use of cheap convict labour, but even this campaign was apparently motivated by
commercial competition). 15 million peasants were destroyed in the "dekulakisation,"
6
million peasants were starved to death in 1932, not even to mention the mass execution
s
and millions who died in the camps; and at the same time it was fine to politely sign
agreements with Soviet leaders, to lend them money, to shake their "honest hands", to
seek
their support, and to boast of all this in front of your parliaments. But once it was
specifically
Jews that became the target, then a spark of sympathy ran through the West and it beca
me
clear just what sort of regime this was. (In 1972 I made a note on a scrap of paper:
"You've
realized [what's going on], thank God. But for how long will your realisation last? Al
l it takes
is for the problems Jews had with emigrating to be resolved, and you'll become deaf, b
lind
and uncomprehending again to the entirety of what is going on, to the problems of Russ
ia
and of communism.")

"You cannot imagine the enthusiasm with which it [the Jackson amendment] was met by
Jews in Russia.... 'Finallya leverstrong enough to shift the powers in the USSR is
discovered.'" [28] Yet suddenly in 1975 the Jackson amendment became an irrelevance, a
s
the Soviet government unexpectedly turned down the offer of the trade agreement with t
he
US. (Or it rather calculated that it could get more advantages from other competing
countries).

The Soviet refusal made an impression on Jewish activists in the USSR and abroad, but
not
for long. Both in America and Europe support for Jewish emigration out of the USSR bec
ame
louder. "The National Conference in Defence of Soviet Jews." "The Union on Solidarity
with
Soviet Jewry." "The Student Committee of Struggle for Soviet Jewry." On the "Day of
National Solidarity with Soviet Jews" more than 100,000 demonstrated in Manhattan,
including senators Jackson and Humphrey (both were running for the Democratic
nomination for President.) "Hundreds different protests took place.... The largest of
these
were the yearly 'Solidarity Sundays' - demonstrations and rallies in New York which we
re
attended by up to 250,000 people (these ran from 1974-1987)."[29] A three day meeting
of
18 Nobel laureates in support of the Corresponding Member of Academy Levichtook place
in Oxford. Another 650 academics from across the world gave their support - and Levich
was
allowed to emigrate. In January 1978 more than a hundred American academics sent a
telegram to Brezhnev demanding that he allow professor Meiman to go abroad. Another

406
worldwide campaign ended in another success: the mathematician Chudnovsky received
permission to leave for a medical procedure unavailable in the USSR. It was not just t
he
famous: often a name until then unheard of would be trumpeted across the world and the
n
returned to obscurity. For example, we heard it especially loudly in May 1978, when th
e
world press told us a heart-rending story: a seven year old Moscow girl Jessica Katz h
ad an
incurable illness, and her parents were not allowed to go to the States! A personal
intervention from Senator Edward Kennedy followed, and presto! Success! The press
rejoiced. The main news on every television channel broadcast the meeting at the airpo
rt,
the tears of happiness, the girl held aloft. The Russian Voice of America devoted a wh
ole
broadcast to how Jessica Katz was saved (failing to notice that Russian families with
sick
children still faced the same impenetrable wall). A medical examination later showed t
hat
Jessica wasn't ill at all, and that her cunning parents had fooled the whole world to
ensure
her leaving. (A fact acknowledged through gritted teeth on the radio, and then buried.
Who
else would be forgiven such a lie?) Similarly, the hunger strike of V. Borisov (Decemb
er 1976)
who had already spent nine years in a 'mental asylum' was reported by the Voice of Ame
rica
no differently from the 15 days of imprisonment of llya Levin, and if anything, more
attention was given to the latter. All a few refuseniks had to do was sign a declarati
on about
their inability to leave the USSR and it was immediately reported by the Freedom, Voic
e of
America, the BBC and by the other most important sources of mass information, so much
so
that it is hard now to believe how loudly they were trumpeted.

Of course it has to be noted that all the pomp surrounding the appearance of a Soviet
Jewish
movement served to awaken among worldwide Jewry, including those in America, an
exciting conception of themselves as a nation. "Prophetic obsession of the first Zioni
sts" in
the USSR "induced exulting sympathy among the Western Jews." "The Western Jews saw
their own ideals in action. They began to believe in Russian Jews ... that meant for t
hem
believing in their own best qualities.... All that which Western Jews wanted to see ar
ound
themselves and ... didn't see. "[30] Others said, with a penetrating irony: "The offer
ed
product (an insurrectionary Jewish spirit) found a delighted buyer (American Jews). Ne
ither
America, nor American Jews are at all interested in Jews from the USSR in themselves.
The
product bought was precisely the spirit of Jewish revolt. The Jews of America (and wit
h them
the Jews of London, Amsterdam, Paris, etc.), whose sense of Jewishness had been excite
d by
the Six-Day War triumph ... saw the chance to participate.... It was a comfortable 'st
ruggle'...
that moreover did not involve any great exertion. "[31]

However, it cannot be denied that these inspirations both here and there merged, and
worked together to destabilise the walls of the steel shell of the old Soviet Union.

***

It is the general opinion that mass Jewish emigration from the USSR began in 1971, whe
n
13,000 people left (98% to Israel). It was 32,000 in 1972, 35,000 in 1973 (the proport
ion
going to Israel varying from 85% to 100%)[32]. However these were for the most part no
t

407

from the ethnically Russian areas, but from Georgia and the Baltic. (AJewish delegate
to an
international congress declared that "Georgia is a country without anti-Semitism"; man
y
Georgian Jews later became disappointed with their move to Israel and wanted to go bac
k).
There was no mass movement from the central part of the USSR. Later, when leaving was
made more difficult, some expressed a serious regret (R. Nudelman): the "tardy courage
of
future refuseniks might have, perhaps, been unnecessary if they had taken advantage of
the
breech made when they'd had the chance." Someone disagrees: "But people need time to
mature! ... See how long it took before we understood that we must not stay, that it i
s
simply a crime against your own children."[33]

"Ho, ho, [come forth], and flee from the land of the north, saiththe LORD." (Zech2:6)
Nonetheless, the excitement of Jewish emigration took root in Russian and Ukrainian to
wns
too. By March 1973, 700,000 requests to emigrate had been registered. However, autumn
1973 saw the Yom Kippur War, and the desire of many to emigrate suddenly diminished.
"Israel's image changed sharply after the Yom Kippur War. Instead of a secure and brav
e rich
country, with confidence in tomorrow and a united leadership, Israel unexpectedly appe
ared
before the world as confused, flabby, ripped apart by internal contradictions. The sta
ndard
of living of the population fell sharply."[34]

As a result only 20,000 Jews left the USSR in 1974. In 1975-76, "up to 50% of emigrati
ng
Soviet Jews" once in the stopover point of Vienna "went ... past Israel. This period s
aw the
birth of the term 'directists'" -that is to say those who went directly to the United
States. [35] After 1977, their numbers "varied from 70 to 98 percent."[36]

"Frankly, this is understandable. The Jewish state had been conceived as a national re
fuge
for Jews of the whole world, the refuge which, to begin with, guarantees them a safe
existence. But this did not transpire. The country was in the line of fire for many ye
ars. "[37]

What is more "it soon became clearthat Israel needed not intellectual Soviet Jews ...
but a
national Jewish intelligentsia." At this point "thinking Jews... realised with a horro
r that in
the way they had defined themselves their whole life they had no place in Israel," bec
ause as
it turned out for Israel you had to be immersed in Jewish national culture - and so on
ly then
"the arrivals realised their tragic mistake: there had been no point to leaving Russi
a"[38]
(although this was also due to the loss of social position) - and letters back warned
those
who hadn't left yet of this. "Their tone and content at that time was almost universal
ly
negative. Israel was presented as a country where the government intervenes in and see
ks
to act paternally in all aspects of a citizen's life."[39] "A prejudice against emigra
tion to Israel
began to form among many as early as the mid-1970s. "[40] "The firm opinion of Israel
that
the Moscow and Leningrad intelligentsia began to acquire was of a closed, spiritually
impoverished society, buried in its own narrow national problems and letting today's
ideological demands have control over the culture.... At best ... it is a cultural bac
kwater, at
worst ... yet another totalitarian government, lacking only a coercive apparatus. "[4
1] "Many

408

Soviet Jews gained the impression, not without reason, that in leaving the USSR for Is
rael
they were exchanging one authoritarian regime for another."[42]

When in 1972-73 more than 30,000 Soviet Jews had left for Israel per year, Golda Meir
used
to meet them personally at the airport and wept, and the Israeli press ca Ned their ma
ss
arrivals "the Miracle of the 20th century." Backthen "everyone left for Israel. Those
who
took the road to Rome," that is to say not to Israel, "were pointed out. But then the
number
of arrivals started to fall from year to year. It decreased from tens of thousands to
thousands,
from thousands to hundreds, from hundreds to a few lone individuals. In Vienna, it was
no
longer those taking the road to Rome [the next stop on the road to the final desired
destination, usually the U.S.] who were pointed out, it was those 'loners,' those 'clo
wns,'
those 'nuts,' who still left for Israel. "[43] "Backthen Israel used to be the 'norm'
and you had
to explain why you were going 'past' it, but it was the other way round now: it was th
ose
planning to leave for Israel that often had to explain their decision. "[44]

"Only the first wave was idealistic"; "starting with 1974, so to speakthe second echel
on of
Jews began to leave the USSR, and for those Israel might have been attractive, but mai
nly
from a distance." [45] Another's consideration: "Perhaps the phenomenon of neshira
[neshira - dispersal on the way to Israel; noshrim - the dispersed ones] is somehow
connected to the fact that initial emigration used to be from the hinterlands [of the
USSR],
where [Jewish] traditions were strong, and now it's more from the centre, where Jews h
ave
substantially sundered themselves from their traditions. "[46]

Anyway, "the more open were the doors into Israel, the less Jewish was the efflux," th
e
majority of activists barely knowing the Hebrew alpha bet. [47] "Not to find their Jew
ishness,
but to get rid of it ... was now the main reason for emigration."[48] They joked in Is
rael that
"the world has not been filled with the clatter of Jewish feet running to settle in th
eir own
home.... Subsequent waves quickly took into account the mistake of the vanguard, and
instead enthusiastically leapt en masse to where others' hands had already built their
own
life. En masse, it should be noted, for here finally was that much spoken of 'Jewish
unity."'[49] But of course these people "left the USSR in search of 'intellectual free
dom,' and
so must live in Germany or England" or more simply in the United States. [50] And a po
pular
excuse was that the Diaspora is needed as "somebody has to give money to resource-les
s
Israel and to make noise when it is being bullied! But on the other hand, the Diaspor
a
perpetuates anti-Semitism. "[51]

A. Voronel made a broader point here: ""The situation of Russian Jews and the problem
of
their liberation is a reflection of the all-Jewish crisis.... The problems of Soviet J
ews help us to
see the disarray in our own ranks"; "the cynicism of Soviet Jews" in using calls from
made up
relatives in Israel instead of "accepting their fate, the Way of Honour, is nothing mo
re than a
reflection of the cynicism and the rot affecting the whole Jewish (and non-Jewish) wor
ld";
"questions of conscience move further and further into background under the influence
of
the business, the competition and the unlimited possibilities of the Free World."[52]

409

So it's all quite simple - it was just a mass escape from the harsh Soviet life to the
easy
Western one, quite understandable on a human level. But then what's about "repatriatio
n?"
And what is the "spiritual superiority" of those who dared to leave over those who sta
yed in
the "country of slaves"? In fighting in those days for emigration Soviet Jews loudly
demanded: "Let my people go!" But that was a truncated quote. The Bible said: "Let my
people go, that they may hold a feast unto me in the wilderness." (Ex. 5:1) Yet someho
w too
many of those released went not into the desert, but to the abundance of America.

***

Can we nonetheless say that in the early years of sudden and successful emigration to
Israel,
it was the Zionists beliefs and ambitions that acted as the prime stimulus for Jews to
leave?
The testimony of various Jewish writers would suggest not.

"The Soviet situation of the end of the 1960s was one of Aliyah, not of a Zionist move
ment.
There were many people psychologically ready to flee the USSR. What can be called a Zi
onist
movement was entirely subsidiary to this group of people. "[53] Those who joined makes
hift
centres dedicated to the actual study of Jewish history and culture "were mostly
characterised by a complete lack of the careerism so common among the Soviet-Jewish
intelligentsia. This was why they dedicated the entirety of their free time to Jewish
affairs."[54] For them the "era of the Hebrew teachers" had started even as early as t
he end
of the 1970s, and by the beginning of the 1980s these "Torah teachers were the only on
es
who still influenced the minds. "[55]

The motives of many others who emigrated are explained as follows: "The Soviet
government has placed obstacles in the way of achieving the most important things -
professional advancement," and so "Jewry is in danger of degradation." [56] "They wer
e
driven into Jewishness, and then into Zionism ... by their faceless bureaucratic nemes
is. "[57]
"Many ... had never encountered anti-Semitism or political persecution. What burdened
them was the dead end that their lives as Soviet Jews had become - as bearers of a
contradiction from which they could free themselves neither by 'assimilation' nor by t
heir
'Jewishness"'[58] "There was a growing sense of incompatibility and sorrow"; "dozens a
nd
dozens of dolts ... are dragging you into insignificance ... are pushing you to the bo
ttom."[59]
So came the longing to escape the Soviet Union. "This bright hope, when a man under th
e
complete control of the Soviet government could in three months become free ...was
genuinely exhilarating. "[60]

Of course, a complex emotional environment developed around the act of departure. A

writer says: the majority of Soviet Jews are "using the same 'Zionist' door ... they s
adly leave
that familiar, that tolerant Russia" (a slip, but one that is closerto the truth, as t
he author
had meant to say "tolerated by" Jews)[61]. Or said thusly: "The vast majority decided
to
emigrate with their heads, while their insides," that is to say concern with being par
t of a

410

country and its traditions, "were against."[62] No one can judge to what extent this w
as a
"majority." But as we've seen the mood varied from the good poetry of Liya Vladimorov
a:

But for you my beloved, for you the proud,

I bequest the memories and the departure

to the then-popular joke: "Could the last person to leave please turn off the light
s."

This growing desire to emigrate among Soviet Jews coincided with the beginning of the
"dissident" movement in the USSR. These developments were not entirely independent: "f
or
some of them [Jewish intellectuals] 'Jewish ethnic consciousness in the USSR' was a ne
w
vector of intellectual development ... a new form of heterodoxy," [63] and they regard
ed
their own impatient escape from the country as also a desperately important political
cause.
In essence, the dilemma facing the Zionists at the start of the 20th century was repea
ted: if it
is your aim to leave Russia, should you at the same time maintain a political struggle
within
it? Backthen, most had answered "yes" to the struggle; now, most answered "no." But a
n
increasingly daredevil attitude to emigration could not but feed a similarly daredevil
attitude
to politics, and sometimes the daredevils were one and the same. So for example (in 19
76)
several activists in the Jewish movement — V. Rubin, A. Sharansky, V. Slepak — togethe
r
made an independent decision to support the "Helsinki Group" of dissidents, "but this
was
regarded in Jewish circles as an unjustifiable and unreasonable risk," as it would lea
d "to the
immediate and total escalation of the government's repression of Jewish activism," an
d
would moreover turn the Jewish movement "into the property of dissidents. "[64]

On the other side, many dissidents took advantage of the synchronicity of the two
movements, and used emigration as a means of escape from their political battlefield f
or
their own safety. They found theoretical justifications for this: "Any honest man in t
he USSR
is an eternal debtor to Israel, and here is why.... The emigration breech was made in
the iron
curtain thanks to Israel ... it protects the rear of those few people willing to oppos
e the
tyranny of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and to fight for human right
s in
the USSR. The absence of this 'emergency exit' would be deadly to the current democrat
ic
movement."[65]

It has to be admitted that this is a very cynical justification, and that it says litt
le good of the
dissident movement as a whole. A hostile critic then noted: "these 'opponents' [of the
CPSU]
are playing an odd game: they become involved in the democratic movement, already sur
e
of an 'emergency exit' for themselves. But by this they demonstrate the temporary and
inconsequential character of their activity. Do potential emigrants have the right to
speak of
changing Russia, or especially on behalf of Russia?"[66]

One dissident science fiction author (and later, after emigration, a Russian Orthodox
priest)
suggested this formulation, that Jewish emigration creates "a revolution in the mind o
f
Soviet man"; "the Jews, in fighting for the right to leave, become transformed into fi
ghters

411

for freedom" in general. ..."The Jewish movement serves as a social gland that begins
to
secrete the hormones of rights awareness;" it has become "a sort of ferment perpetuati
ng
dissidence." "Russia is becoming 'deserted,'" "that 'abroad/ so mythical before, is be
coming
populated by our own people," "the Jewish Exodus ... is gradually leading totalitarian
Soviet
Moscow to the plains of freedom." [67]

This view was readily accepted and in the coming years came to be loudly trumpeted: "t
he
right to emigrate is the primary human right." It was repeated often and in unison tha
t this
was an "enforced escape," and "talk about the privileged position Jews occupy with reg
ards
to emigration is slander."[68]

Yes, taking a lifeboat from a sinking ship is indeed an act of necessity. But to own a
lifeboat is
a great privilege, and after the gruelling ordeals of half a century in the USSR Jews
owned
one, while the rest did not. Those more perceptive expressed a more conscientious feel
ing:
"It is fine to fight for the repatriation of Jews, it is understandable, and it is fin
e to fight for
the right to emigrate for everyone - that too is understandable; but you cannot fight
for the
right to emigrate but, for some reason, only for Jews."[69] Contrary to the self-satis
fied
theoreticians of emigration, and their belief that it brought all Soviet people closer
to
emigrating abroad and so partly freed them, in reality those unable to emigrate came t
o feel
more hopeless, to an even greater extent fooled and enslaved. There were emigrants wh
o
understood this: "What is cruellest about this situation is that it is Jews who are le
aving. It
has bizarrely become a question of something akin to a certificate of authenticity."
[70]

Precisely. But they chose to blind themselves to this.

What could the remaining residents of "totalitarian Moscow" think? There was a great
variety of responses, from grievance ("You, Jews, are allowed to leave and we are
n't...") to
the despair of intellectuals. L.KChukovksaya expressed it in conversation to me: "Doze
ns of
valuable people are leaving, and as a result human bonds vital for the country are rip
ped
apart. The knots that hold together the fabric of culture are being undone."

To repeat the lesson: "Russia is becoming deserted."

We can read the thoughtful comments of an emigrant Jewish author about this Departur
e:
"Russian Jewry were pathfinders in their experiment to merge with the Russian people a
nd
Russian culture, they became involved in Russia's fate and history, and, repulsed away
as if
by a similarly charged body, left." (What an accurate and penetrating comparison!) "Wh
at is
most stunning about this Departure is how, at the moment of greatest assimilation,
voluntary it was.... The pathetic character of the Russian Aliyah of the 1970s ... was
that we
were not exiled from the country on a king's order or by the decision of party and par
liament,
and we were not fleeing to save ourselves from the whips of an enraged popular pogro
m ...
this fact is not immediately obvious to the participants in this historical event. "[7
1]

412

No doubt, the Jewish emigration from the USSR ushered in a great historical shift. Th
e
beginning of the Exodus drew a line under an epoch lasting two centuries of coerced co
-
existence between Jews and Russians. From that point every Soviet Jew was free to choo
se
for himself — to live in Russia or outside it. By the second half of the 1980s each wa
s entirely
free to leave for Israel without struggle.

The events that took place over two centuries of Jewish life in Russia -the Pale of
Settlement,the escape from its stultifying confines, the flowering, the ascension to t
he ruling
circles of Russia, then the new constraints, and finally the Exodus - none of these ar
e
random streams on the outskirts of history. Jewry had completed its spread from its or
igin
on the Mediterranean Sea to as faraway as Eastern Europe, and it was now returning bac
k
to its point of origin.

We can see in both this spread and in its reversal a supra-human design. Perhaps those
that
come after us will have the opportunity to see it more clearly and to solve its myster
y.

Sources:
[I] F. Kolker. Novyi plan pomoshchi sovetskomu evreistvu [A New Plan for Assistanceto
the Soviet Jewry]. //
"22": Obshchestvenno-pol iticheskiy i literaturniy zhurnal evreyskoy intel ligentsii i
zSSSR v Izraile [Social, Pol itical
and Literary Journal of the Jewish Intelligentsia from the USSR in Israel (henceforth
- "22")] . Tel -Aviv, 1983, (31),
p. 145.

[2] V. Boguslavsky.Otsyi deti russkoi alii [Fathers and Children of Russian Aliyah].//
"22", 1978,(2), p. 176.

[3] I. Domalsky.Tekhnologiya nenavisti [The Technology of Hate]. // Vremya i my: Mezhd

unarodny zhurnal
literatury i obshchestvennykh problem [Epoch and We: International Journal of Literatu
re and Social Problems
(henceforth - EW)]. Tel Aviv, 1978, (25), p. 106-107.

[4] Ya. Voronel. U kazhdogo svoi dom [Everyone Has a Home]. // "22", 1978, (2), p. 150
-151.

[5] I. Domalsky.Tekhnologiya nenavisti [The Technology of Hate]. // EW. Tel Aviv, 197
8, (25), p. 129.

[6] D. Shturman. Razmyshleniya nadrukopisyu [Mulling over the Manuscript].// "22", 198
0,812), p. 133.

[7] Aleksandr Gal ich. Pesni. Stikhi. Poemy. Kinopovest. Piesa. Statii [Songs. Verses.
Poems. Movie-essay. Piece.
Essays]. Ekaterinburg, U-Faktoriya, 1998, p. 586.

[8] Rani Aren. V russkomgalute [In the Russian Galuth]. // "22", 1981, (19), p. 133-13
5,137.

[9] G. Pomerantz. Chelovek niotkuda [A Man from Nowhere]. From G. Pomerantz, Unpublish
ed. Frankfurt:
Posev, 1972, p. 161, 166.

[10] A. Voronel. Trepet iudeiskikh zabot [The Thril Is of Jewish Worries]. 2nd Editio
n, Ramat-Gahn: Moscow-
Jerusalem, 1981, p. 122.

[II] M. Deich.Zapiski postoronnego [Notes of an outsider]// "22," 1982,(26), p. 156.

[12] R. Rutman. Ukhodyashchemu - poklon, ostayushchemusya - bratstvo [Farewell to thos

e who leaves,
brotherhood to those who stay]. //The New Journal, 1973, (112), p. 286.

[13] V. Boguslavsky.VzashchituKunyaeva [In Defence ofKunyaev]. //"22", 1980,(16), p. 1

76.

413

[14] N. Ilsky. Istoriya i samosoznanie [The Historyand Consciousness]. //The Jews inth
e USSR, 1977, (15):
citation from "22", 1978, (1), p. 202.

[15] A. Eterman. Tretye pokolenie [The Third Generation]. Interview. // "22", 1986, (4
7), p. 124.
[16] V. Boguslavsky.Uistokov[At the Origins]. Interview.// "22", 1986, (47), p. 102,10
5-108.
[17] Ibid., p. 109.

[18] V. Boguslavsky.Oglyanis v razdumye [Look Behind and Think]. Panel discussion.//

"22", 1982,(24), p. 113.

[19] V. Boguslavsky.Otsyi deti russkoi alii [Fathers and Chi Idren of Russian Aliya
h].// "22", 1978, (2), p. 176-
177.

[20]I.Oren. Ispoved [Confession] // "22", 1979, (7), p. 140.

[21] V. Boguslavsky.Otsyi deti russkoi alii [Fathers and Children of Russian Aliya
h].// "22", 1978, (2), p. 177-
178.

[22] V. Boguslavsky.Uistokov[At the Origins]. Interview.// "22", 1986, (47), p. 121.

[23] G. Fain.V roli vysokooplachivaemykh shveitzarov [In the Role of Highly Paid Doork
eepers]. // EW, Tel Aviv,
1976,(12), p. 135.

[24] I. Domalsky. Tekhnologiya nenavisti [The Technology of Hate]. // EW. Tel Aviv, 19
78, (25), p. 106.
[25] R. Nudelman. Oglyanis v razdumye [Look Behind and Think]. Panel discussion. //"2
2", 1982, (24), p. 141.
[26] N. Rubinshtein.Ktochitatel?[Who is the Reader?] // EW, Tel Aviv, 1976,(7), p. 13
1.
[27] E. Manevich. Letter to the editor. // EW, New York, 1985, (85), p. 230-231.

[28] V. Perelman. Krusheniechuda: prichiny i sledstviya. Beseda s G. Rosenblyumom [Col

lapseofthe Miracle:
Causes and Consequences. Conversation with G. Rosenblum]. // EW, Tel Aviv, 1977, (24),
p. 128.
[29] Kratkaya Evreiskaya Entsiklopediya [The Short Jewish Encyclopedia (henceforth —SJ
E)]. Jerusalem, 1996. v.
8, p. 380.

[30] A. Voronel. Vmesto poslesloviya [Instead of Afterword]. // "22", 1983,(31), p. 14

0.

[31] V. Boguslavsky.Oni nichegone ponyali [They still don'tget it].// "22", 1984, (3
8), p. 156.

[32] F. Kolker. Novy plan pomoshchi sovetskomu evreistvu [A New Plan for Assistancetot
he Soviet Jewry]. //
"22", 1983,(31), p. 144.

[33] Yu. Shtern. Situatsia neustoichiva i potomu opasna [The Situation is UnstableandT
herefore Dangerous].
Interview. // "22", 1984, (38), p. 132,133.

[34] E. Manevich. Novaya emigratsiya:slukhi i realnost [New Emigration: the Rumors and
Reality] . // EW, New
York, 1985,(87), p. 107-108.

[35] F. Kolker. Novy plan pomoshchi sovetskomu evreistvu [A New Plan for Assistancetot
he Soviet Jewry]. //
"22", 1983,(31), p. 144.

[36] V. Perelman. Oglyanis vsomnenii [Look Back in Doubt]. // EW, New York, 1982,(66),
p. 152.

414

[37] S. Tsirul nikov. Izrail -god 1986 [Israel, the Year of 1986] . // EW, New York, 1
986, (88), p. 135.

[38] G. Fain.V roli vysokooplachivaemykh shveitzarov [In the Role of Highly Paid Doork
eepers]. // EW, Tel Aviv,
1976,(12), p. 135-136.

[39] E. Manevich. Novaya emigratsiya:slukhi i realnost [New Emigration: the Rumors and
Reality] . // EW, New
York, 1985,(87), p. 111.

[40] E. Finkelshtein.Most, kotory rukhnul ... [The Bridge that Had Collapsed]. // "2
2", 1984,(38), p. 148.
[41] E. Sotnikova. Letter to Editor.// EW, Tel Aviv, 1978,(25), p. 214.

[42] M. Nudler. Oglyanis v razdumye [Look Behind and Think]. Panel discussion.// "22",
1982,(24), p. 138.
[43] V. Perel man. Letter to Editor. // EW, Tel Aviv, 1977, (23), p. 217.

[44] Yu. Shtern. Dvoinaya otvetstvennost [Dual Liability]. Interview// "22", 1981,(2
1), p. 126.

[45] E. Manevich. Novaya emigratsiya:slukhi i realnost [New Emigration: the Rumors and
Reality]. // EW, New
York, 1985,(87), p. 109-110.

[46] G. Freiman. Dialogob aliei emigratsii [The Dialog(with Voronel) on Aliyah and Emi
gration].// "22", 1983,
(31), p. 119.

[47] A. Eterman. Tretye pokolenie [The Third Generation] Interview// "22", 1986,(47),
p. 126

[48] B. Orlov. Puti-dorogi "rimskikh piligrimov" [The Ways and Roads of "Roman Pilgrim
s"] // EW, Tel Aviv, 1977,
(14), p. 126.

[49] A. Voronel. Oglyanis v razdumye [Look Behind andThink]. Panel discussion. //"22",
1982, (24), p. 117-118.
[50] E. Levin. Oglyanis v razdumye [Look Behind andThink]. Panel discussion.// "22", 1
982,(24), p. 127.
[51] A. Dobrovich. Letter to Editor. // "22", 1989, (67), p. 218.

[52] A. Voronel. Vmesto poslesloviya [Instead of Afterword]. // "22", 1983, (31), p. 1

39-141.

[53] V. Bogusl avsky. Oglyanis v razdumye [Look Behind and Think]. Panel discussion.//
"22", 1982,(2 4), p. 139.

[54] V. Boguslavsky.Uistokov[At the Origins]. Interview.// "22", 1986, (47), p. 105.

[55] A. Eterman. Tretye pokolenie [The Third Generation]. Interview // "22", 1986, (4
7), p. 136-140.

[56] A. Voronel. Dialogob aliei emigratsii [The Dial og (with G. Freiman) on Aliyah an
d Emigration].// "22",
1983,(31), p. 119.

[57] Lev Kopelev. O pravdei terpimosti [On Truth and Tolerance]. New York: Khronika Pr
ess, 1982, c. 61.
[58] Editorial. (R.Nudel man] // "22", 1979,(7), p. 97.
[59] E. Angenits.Spuskvbezdnu [Descend into Abyss]. // "22", 1980,(15), p. 166,167.

[60] A. Eterman. Tretye pokolenie [The Third Generation] Interview// "22", 1986,(47),
p. 125.

[61] V. Boguslavsky.VzashchituKunyaeva [In Defence of Kunyaev]. //"22", 1980,(16), p.

175.

415

[62] V. Lyubarsky.Chto del at, a ne kto vinovat[The Question Is Not Who Is Guilty, But
What to Do].// EW, New
York, 1990,(109), p. 129.

[63] B. Khazanov. Novaya Rossiya [The New Russia]. // EW, Tel Aviv, 1976,(8), p. 143.

[64] V. Lazaris. Ironicheskaya pesenka [Ironic Song].// "22", 1978, (2), p. 207.

[65] I.Melchuk. Letter to Editor// EW, Tel Aviv, 1977, (23), p. 213-214.

[66] V. Lazaris. Ironicheskaya pesenka [Ironic Song].// "22", 1978, (2), p. 200.

[67] M. Aksenov-Meerson. Evreiskii iskhod vrossiiskoi perspective [The Jewish Exodus f

rom Russian Point of
View]. // EW, Tel Aviv, 1979, (41).

[68] G. Sukharevskaya. Letter to Editor. // Seven Days, New York, 1984, (51).

[69] I.Shlomovich. Oglyanisvrazdumye [Look Behind and Think]. Panel discussion.// "2
2", 1982,(24), p. 138.
[70] B. Khazanov. Novaya Rossiya [The New Russia] // EW, Tel Aviv, 1976, (8), p. 143.

[71] B. Orlov. Ne tevy uchili alfavity [You HaveStudied Wrong Alphabets]. // EW, Tel A
viv, 1975, (1), p. 127-128.

416

Chapter 27: About the assimilation. Author's

afterword
When and how did this extraordinary Jewish status of "guests everywhere" begin? The
conventional wisdom suggests thatthe centuries -old Jewish diaspora should be dated fr
om
the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in AD70; and that, after being thrown out of the
ir
native land, the Jews began wandering around the world. However, it is not true becaus
e
"the great majority of the Jews were already dispersed by that time; hardly more than
one-
eighth of the nation lived in Palestine. "[1] The Jewish Diaspora had begun much earli
er: "The
Jews were mainly a dispersed nation by the time of the Babylonian captivity [6th centu
ry
B.C.] and, possibly, even earlier; Palestine was only a religious and, to certain exte
nt, a
cultural center." [2]

Scattering of the Jews was already foretold in the Pentateuch. "I will scatter you amo
ng the
nations" (Leviticus 26:33). "Yahweh will scatter you among the peoples, and you shall
be left
few in number among the nations" (Deuteronomy 4:27).

"Only a small part of the Jews had returned from the [Babylonian] captivity; many had
remained in Babylon as they did not want to abandon their property." Large settlement
s
were established outside of Palestine; "large numbers of Jews concentrated ...in major
trade
and industrial centers of the ancient world." (For example, in Alexandria under Ptolem
aic
dynasty, Jews accounted for two-fifth of the population.) "They were, mainly, traders
and
craftsmen. "[3] The Jewish-Hellenistic philosopher Philo Judaeus (who died in the midd
le of
the 1st century, 20 years before the destruction of the Temple) states: "[The Jews] re
gard
the Holy City as their metropolis because the Holy Temple of Almighty God is situated
there,
and they call "homeland" the countries where they live, and where their fathers,
grandfathers, great-grandfathers and ancient forebears lived, and where they were born
and
brought up." [4]

Mikhail Gershenzon mused on the fates of the Jewish nation after the Babylonian captiv
ity:
"[The Jews] took roots in foreign lands and, contrary to expectations, didn't aspire t
o return
to their old homeland." "Just recall: the Kingdom of Judah was still there, yet most o
f the
Jews were already scattered across the whole Middle East; the Second Temple still stoo
d in
all its splendor, but the Language of the Bible was no longer heard on the streets and
in the
houses of Jerusalem; everybody spoke either Syrian or Greek there." Even back then th
e
Jews were inclined to think: "We should not hold dear our national independence, we
should learn to live without it, under foreign rule; we should not become attached to
a land
or to a single language. "[5]

Modern Jewish authors agree: "The Jews in the ancient world were scattered and
established large centers in the Diaspora even before the collapse of Jewish nationhoo
d. "[6]
"The nation which was given the Law did not want to return to its native country. Ther
e is

417

some very profound and still not understood meaning in it. It is much easierto chat ab
out
Jewish values and about the preservation of Jewry than to explain the true reasons for
such
a long Galut."[7] (Even in the mid-20th century the Hebrew language still had no word
for
"Diaspora" as for the living in the voluntary scattering, there was only "Galut," refe
rring to
the forced exile.)

From the historical evidence we see that the scattering of the Jews was not solely the
ir
unfortunate fate, but also a voluntary quest. Indeed, it was a bemoaned disaster, but
could it
also be a method of making life easier?This is an important question in attempting to
understand the Diaspora.

The Jews still do not have a generally accepted view on the Diaspora, whether it has b
een
blessing forthem or a bane.

Zionism, from the very moment of its birth, responded to this question firmly (and ful
ly in
line with its essence): "Our scattering is our biggest curse; it brings us no good, an
d no
advantages and no peace to others as well.... We are guests everywhere ... and we are
still
unwanted, everybody wants to get rid of us. "[8] "To be a homeless man, feeling as a g
uest
everywhere — this is the true curse of exile, its real bitterness !"[9] "Some say that
having
several 'homes' improves chances to survive for the Jews. In my view, a nation staying
in
many other's homes and not caring about its own cannot expect security. The availabili
ty of
many homes corrupts."[10]

Yet the opposite opinion is even more prevalent, and it seems to be more credible. "Pe
rhaps,
the Jewish nation had survived and persevered not in spite of its exile, but because o
f it; the
Jewish Diaspora is not an episode, but the organic 'ingredient' of Jewish history."[l
l]

"Was the Jewish nation preserved in all its uniqueness in spite of the exile and scatt
ering or
because of it? The tragedy of Jerusalem in AD70 destroyed the state, yet it was necess
ary to
save the people"; "the extraordinarily intensified instinct of national self-preservat
ion"
prompted Jews toward salvation through Diaspora. "[12] "Jewry was never able to fully
comprehend its situation and the causes for it. They saw exile as the punishment for t
heir
sins, yet time and time again it turned out to be the dispensation by which the Lord h
as
distinguished his nation. Through the Diaspora, the Jew worked out the mark of the Cho
sen
he foresaw on his brow.... The scattered state of the nation is not unnatural for hi
m....
Already in the periods of the most comfortable existence in their own state, Jewry wa
s
stationing garrisons on its route and spearheading vanguards in all directions, as if
sensing its
future dispersion and getting ready to retreat to the positions it had prepared in adv
ance."
"Thus, the Diaspora is a special form of Jewish existence in space and time of this wo
rld. "[13]
And look how awesomely mobile are the Jews in Diaspora. "The Jewish people never strik
e
root in one place, even after several generations."[14]

But after they were so widely scattered and had become small minorities among other
nations, the Jews had to develop a clear position toward those nations — how to behav
e

418

among them and how to relate to them, to seek ultimate bonding and merging with those
nations, or to reject them and separate from them? The Holy Scripture contains quite a
few
covenants of isolation. The Jews avoided even their closest kindred neighbors, the
Samaritans and Israelites, so irreconcilably that it was not permitted to even take a
piece of
bread from them. Mixed marriages were very strictly forbidden. "We will not give our
daughters to the peoples of the land or take their daughters for our sons." (Nehemiah
10:30)
And Ezra had ordered them to dissolve even the existing marriages, even those with chi
ldren.

Thus, living in Diaspora for thousands of years, the Jews did not mix with other natio
ns, just
as butter does not mix with water, but comes to the surface and floats. During all tho
se long
centuries, they perceived themselves as something distinct, and until the 18th century
"the
Jews as a nation have never shown any inclination for assimilation." The pre-revolutio
nary
Jewish Encyclopedia, while quoting Marx's assertion that "the Jews had not assimilate
d,
because they represented the highest economic class, that is the class of capitalists
amidst
the agricultural and petty bourgeois nations," objects, saying that the economy was
secondary: "the Jews of the Diaspora have consciously established their own economy wh
ich
protected them from assimilation. They did it because they were conscious of their cul
tural
superiority," which, for its part, was created by "the spiritual meaning of Judaism in
its most
complete form. The latter protected them from imitation."[15]

But "from the mid-18th century the Jews started to believe in assimilation, and that
becomes ... the ferment of decomposition of the Jewish nation in Western Europe of th
e
19th century." Assimilation begins when "the surrounding culture reaches the height he
ld by
the Jewish culture, or when the Jewry ceases to create new values." The national will
of the
European Jews was weakened by the end of the 18th century; it had lost ground because
of
extremely long waiting. Other nations began creating brilliant cultures that eclipsed
Jewish
culture. "[16] And exactly then Napoleon launched the Pan-European emancipation; in on
e
country after another, the roads to social equality were opening before the Jews, and
that
facilitated assimilation. (There is an important caveat here: "There is no unilateral
assimilation," and "the assimilating Jews supplemented the host cultures with Jewish
national traits." Heine and Borne, Rica rdo and Marx, Beaconsfield-Disraeli and Lassal
le,
Meyerbeer and Mendelssohn — "during their assimilation into the host cultures, they ad
ded
Jewish elements to them. "[17])

In some cases, assimilation leads to a brighter creative personal self-fulfillment. Bu

t, overall,
"assimilation was the price paid by the Jews for the benefit of having access to the E
uropean
culture. Educated Jews convinced themselves that "the Jews are not a nation, but only
a
religious group. "[18] "The Jewish nation, after it joined the realm of European natio
ns,
began to lose its national uniqueness ... only the Jew from the ghetto retained pronou
nced
national traits ... while the intelligent Jew tried with all his strength to look unli
ke a typical
Jew." Thus spread "the theory that there is no Jewish nation, but only 'the Poles, Fre
nchmen
and Germans of Mosaic Law. "'[19]

419

Marx, and then Lenin sawthe solution of Jewish question inthe full assimilation of the
Jews
in the countries of their residence.

In contrast to the clumsiness of those ideologues, the ideas of M.O. Gershenzon are mu
ch
more interesting. He put them forward late in life, in 1920, and they are all the mor
e
interesting because the lofty thinker Gershenzon was a completely assimilated Russian
Jew.
Nevertheless, the Jewish question was alive and well in his mind. He explored it in hi
s article
The Destinies of the Jewish Nation.

Unlike the contemporary Jewish Encyclopedia, Gershenzon believes that Jewish assimilat
ion
is the ancient phenomenon, from time immemorial. One voice constantly "tempted him [th
e
Jew] to blend with the environment — hence comes this ineradicable and ancient Jewish
aspiration to assimilate." Yet another voice "demanded above all things to preserve hi
s
national uniqueness. The whole story of scattering is the never-ending struggle of two
wills
within Jewry: the human will against the superhuman one, the individual against the
collective.... The requirements of the national will towards the individual were so ru
thless
and almost beyond human power, that without having a great hope common to all Jewry,
the Jew would succumb to despair every now and then, and would be tempted to fall awa
y
from his brethren and desert that strange and painful common cause." Contrary to the v
iew
that it is not difficult to explain why assimilation began precisely at the end of the
18th
century, Gershenzon is rather surprised: "Is it not strange that assimilation so unexp
ectedly
accelerated exactly during the last one hundred years and it continues to intensify wi
th each
passing hour? Shouldn't the temptation to fall apart be diminished greatly nowadays, w
hen
the Jews obtained equal rights everywhere?" No, he replies: "It is not the external fo
rce that
splits the Jews; Jewry disintegrates from the inside. The main pi liar of Jewry, the r
eligious
unity of the Jewish nation, is decayed and rotten." So, what about assimilation, where
does
it lead to? "At first sight, it appears that ... [the Jews] are imbued, to the marrow
of their
bones, with the cosmopolitan spirit or, at least, with the spirit of the local cultur
e; they share
beliefs and fixations of the people around them." Yet it is not exactly like that: "Th
ey love the
same things, but not in the same way.... They indeed crave to embrace the alien god
s... They
strive to accept the way of life of modern culture.... They pretend that they already
love all
that — truly love, and they are even able to convince themselves of that." Alas! One c
an only
love his own faith, "the one born in the throes from the depths of the soul. "[20]

Jewish authors genuinely express the spiritual torment experienced by the assimilating
Jew.
"If you decided to pretend that you are not a Jew, or to change your religion, you ar
e
doomed to unending internal struggle with your Jewish identity.... You live in terribl
e
tension.... In a way, this is immoral, a sort of spiritual self-violation."[21] (This
inner conflict
was amazingly described by Chekhov in his essayTumbleweed.) "This evil stepmother —
assimilation ... forced the individual to adapt to everything: to the meaning of life
and human
relations, to demands and needs, to the way of life and habits. It crippled the psycho
logy of
the nation in general and ... that of the national intelligentsia in particular." It c
ompelled

420

people "to renounce their own identity, and, ultimately, led to self-destruction. "[2
2] "It is a
painful and humiliating search of identity."[23] But even "the most complete assimilat
ion is
ephemeral: it never becomes natural," it does not liberate "from the need to be on gua
rd"
all the time. [24]

In addition to the lackof trust on the part of surrounding native people, assimilating
Jews
come under fire from their fellow Jews; they are accused of "consumerism and conformis
m,"
of "the desire to desert their people, to dispose of their Jewish identity," and of "t
he
national defection. "[25]

Nevertheless, during the 19th century everything indicated that assimilation was feasi
ble
and necessary, that it was predetermined and even inevitable. Yet the emergence of Zio
nism
casta completely new light on this problem. Before Zionism, "every Jew suffered from
painful duality,"[26] the dissonance between the religious tradition and the surroundi
ng
external world.

In the early 20th century Jabotinsky wrote: "When the Jew adopts a foreign culture ...
one
should not trust the depth and strength of such conversion. The assimilated Jew canno
t
withstand a single onslaught, he abandons the 'adopted' culture without any resistanc
e
whatsoever, as soon as he sees that the power of that culture is over ... he cannot be
the
pillarfor such a culture." He provided a shining example of the Germanized Austria -Hu
ngary,
when, with the growth of Czech, Hungarian and Polish cultures, Germanized Jews activel
y
conformed to new ways of life. "It is all about certain hard realities of the natural
relationship between a man and his culture, the culture created by his ancestors. "[2
7] This
observation is true, of course, though "hard realities" sounds somewhat dry. (Jabotins
ky not
only objected to assimilation fiercely, he also insistently warned the Jews to avoid R
ussian
politics, literature and art, cautioning that after a while the Russians would inevita
bly turn
down such service. [28])

Many individual and collective examples, both in Europe and Russia, in the past and
nowadays, illustrate the fragility of Jewish assimilation.

Consider Benjamin Disraeli, the son of a non-religious father; he was baptized in adol
escence
and he did not just display the English way of life, he became no less than the symbol
of the
British Empire. So, what did he dream about at leisure, while riding his novel -writin
g hobby-
horse? He wrote about exceptional merits and Messianism of the Jews, expressed his ard
ent
love to Palestine, and dreamt of restoring the Israeli homeland![29]

And what's about Gershenzon? He was a prominent historian of Russian culture and an
expert on Pushkin. He was even criticized for his "Slavophilism." But, nevertheless, a
t the
end of his life, he wrote: "Accustomed to European culture from a tender age, I deepl
y
imbibed its spirit ... and I truly love many things in it.... But deep in my mind I li
ve differently.
For many years a secret voice from within appeals to me persistently and incessantly:
This is
not yours! This is not yours! A strange will inside me sorrowfully turns away from [Ru
ssian]

421
culture, from everything happening and spoken around me.... I live like a stranger who
has
adapted to a foreign country; the natives love me, and I love them too; I zealously wo
rk for
their benefit ... yet I feel lama stranger, and I secretly yearn for the fields of my
homeland." [30]

After this confession of Gershenzon, it is appropriate to formulate the key thesis of

this
chapter. There are different types of assimilation: civil and domestic assimilation, w
hen the
assimilated individual is completely immersed in the surrounding life and accepts the
interests of the native nation (in that sense, the overwhelming majority of Russian, E
uropean
and American Jews would perhaps consider themselves assimilated); cultural assimilatio
n;
and, at the extreme, spiritual assimilation, which also happens, albeit rarely. The la
tter is
more complex and does not result from the former two types of assimilation. (In the op
inion
of a critic, The Correspondence between Two Corners by Vyacheslav Ivanov and M.O.
Gershenzon, that "small book of tremendous importance", serves as "a proof of the
inadequacy of Jewish assimilation, even in the case of apparently complete cultural
assimilation. "[31])

Or take another individual, [M. Krol], a revolutionary in his youth and a "converted"
emigre
after the revolution, he marvels that the Russian Jews even in their new countries of
emigration demonstrated "a huge amount of national energy" and were building an "origi
nal
Jewish culture" there. Even in London the Jews had their own Yiddish schools, their ow
n
social organizations, and their own solid economics; they did not merge with the Engli
sh way
of life, but only accommodated to its demands and reinforced the original English Jewr
y.
(The latter even had their own British Council of Jews, and called themselves the "Jew
ish
community of the Great Britain" — note that all this was in England, where Jewish
assimilation was considered all but complete.) He witnessed the same thing in France,
and
was particularly impressed by the similar "feat" in the United States. [32]

And there is also that unfailing and reliable Jewish mutual support, that truly outsta
nding
ability that preserves the Jewish people. Yet it further weakens the stability of assi
milation.
It was not only the rise of Zionism that prompted the Jews to reject assimilation. The
very
course of the 20th century was not conductive to assimilation.

On the eve of World War II in 1939, a true Zionist, Max Brod, wrote: "It was possible
to argue
in support of the theory of assimilation in the days of far less advanced statehood of
the
19th century," but "this theory lost any meaning in the era when the peoples increasin
gly
consolidate"; "we, the Jews, will be inevitably crushed by bellicose nationalistic peo
ples,
unless we take our fate into our hands and retreat in time. "[33]

Martin Buber had a very stern opinion on this in 1941: "So far, our existence had serv
ed only
to shake the thrones of idols, but not to erect the throne of God. This is exactly why
our
existence among other nations is so mysterious. We purport to teach others about the
absolute, but in reality we just say 'no' toother nations, or, perhaps, we are actuall
y nothing

422

more than just the embodiment of such negation. This is why we have turned into the
nightmare of the nations. "[34]

Then, two deep furrows, the Catastrophe and the emergence of Israel soon afterwards,
crossed the course of Jewish history, shedding new and very bright light on the proble
m of
assimilation.

Arthur Koestler clearly formulated and expressed his thoughts on the significance of t
he
state of Israel for world Jewry in his book Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine 1917-19
49 and
in an article, Judah at the Crossroads.

An ardent Zionist in his youth, Koestler left Vienna for a Palestinian kibbutz in 192
6; he
worked for a few years in Jerusalem as a Hebrew-writing columnist for Jabotinsky's
newspaper; he also reported for several German newspapers. And then he wrote: "If we
exclude from the Jewish religion the mystical craving for the Promised Land, then the
very
basis and essence of this religion would disappear." And further, "after the restorati
on of the
Jewish state, most of the Jewish prayers, rites and symbols lost their meaning.... The
God of
Israel has abided by the treaty; he had returned the land of Canaan to Abraham's see
d.... If,
however, [the religious Jew] defies the order to return to the land of his ancestors a
nd thus
violates the treaty, he consequently ... anathematizes himself and loses his Jewishnes
s." On
the other hand, it may be difficult for not very religious Jews to understand why they
should
make sacrifices to preserve "Jewish values" not included in the religious doctrine. "T
he
[Jewish] religion loses any sense if you continue to pray about the return to Zion eve
n after
you have grimly determined not to go there." A painful choice, yes, but "the choice th
at
must be made immediately, for the sake of the next generation.... Do I want to move t
o
Israel? If I do not, then what right do I have to continue calling myself a Jew and th
us to mark
my children with the stigma of isolation? The whole world would sincerely welcome the
assimilation of the Jews," and after three generations or so, "the Jewish question wou
ld fade
away." [35]

The London newspaper Jewish Chronicle objected to Koestler: perhaps, "it is much bette
r,
much more reasonable and proper for a Jew from the Diaspora to live as before, at the
same
time helping to build the State of Israel?" Yet Koestler remained adamant: "They want
both
to have their cake and eat it. This is the route to disaster."[36]

Yet all previous attempts at assimilation ended in failure; so why it should be differ
ent this
time? — argued the newspaper. Koestler replied: "Because all previous attempts of
assimilation were based on the wrong assumption that the Jews could be adequate sons o
f
the host nation, while at the same time preserving their religion and remaining 'the C
hosen
people.'" But "ethnic assimilation is impossible if Judaism is preserved; and converse
ly
Judaism collapses in case of ethnic assimilation. Jewish religion perpetuates the nati
onal
isolation — there is nothing you can do about this fact." Therefore, "before the resto
ration
of Israel, the renunciation of one's Jewish identity was equivalent to refusal to supp
ort the
423

persecuted and could be regarded as a cowardly surrender." But "now, we are talking no
t
about surrender, but about a free choice."[37]

Thus, Koestler offered a tough choice to the Diaspora Jews: "to become Israelis or to
stop
being Jews. He himself took the latter path. "[38] (Needless to say, Jews in the Diasp
ora met
Koestler's conclusions mainly with angry criticism.)

Yet those who had chosen the first option, the citizens of the State of Israel, obtain
ed a new
support and, from that, a new view at this eternal problem. For instance, a modern Isr
aeli
author writes sharply: "The Galut Jew is an immoral creature. He uses all the benefits
of his
host country but at the same time he does not fully identify with it. These people dem
and
the status which no other nation in the world has — to be allowed to have two homeland
s:
the one, where they currently live, and another one, where 'their heart lives .' And a
fter that
they still wonder why they are hated!"[39]

And they do wonder a lot: "Why, why are the Jews so disliked (true, the Jews are disli
ked,
this is fact; otherwise, why strive for liberation?)? And from what? Apparently, not f
rom our
Jewishness...." "We know very well that we should liberate ourselves, it is absolutel
y
necessary, though ... we still cannot tell exactly what from. "[40]

A natural question — what should we do to be loved — is seldom asked. Jewish authors

usually see the whole world as hostile to them, and so they give way to grief: "The wo
rld is
now split into those who sympathize with the Jewish people, and those seeking to destr
oy
the Jewish people."[41] Sometimes, there is proud despair: "It is humiliating to rely
on the
authorities for the protection from the nation which dislikes you; it is humiliating t
o thank
ingratiatingly the best and worthiest of this nation, who put in a good word for you.
"[42]

Another Israeli disagrees: "In reality, this world is not solely divided on the ground
s of one's
attitude toward Jews, as we sometimes think owing to our excessive sensitivity." A. Vo
ronel
agrees: "The Jews pay too much attention to anti-Semites, and too little — to
themselves."[43]

Israel, the Jewish state, must become the center that secures the future of world Jewr
y. As
early as in the 1920s no other than Albert Einstein wrote to no other than Pyotr Ruten
berg, a
former Social Revolutionary and possibly the main author of the revolutionary demands
of
January 9, 1905 (he accompanied Orthodox Father Gapon during the workers' procession o
n
that date but was later one of his executioners; still later, Rutenberg left Russia to
rebuild
Palestine): "First of all, your [Palestinian settlers'] lives must be protected, becau
se you
sacrifice yourselves for the sake of the Spirit and in the name the entire Jewish nati
on. We
must demonstrate that we are a nation with the will to live and that we are strong eno
ugh
for the great accomplishment that would consolidate our people and protect our future
generations. For us and for our posterity, the State must become as precious as the Te
mple
was for our ancestors ."[44]

424

Jewish authors support this conviction in many ways: "The Jewish problem, apparently,
has
no reliable solution without the Jewish state."[45] "Israel is the center that guarant
ees the
future of the Jews of the whole world." [46] Israel is the only correct place for Jew
s, one
where their "historical activity does not result in historical fiasco. "[47]

And only a rumble coming from that tiny and endlessly beleaguered country betrays "th
e
phantom of the Catastrophe, permanently imprinted in the collective unconscious of th
e
lsraelis."[48]
* * *

And what is the status of assimilation, the Diaspora, and Israel today?

By the 1990s, assimilation had advanced very far. For example, "for 80-90% of the Amer
ican
Jews, the modern tendencies of the Jewish life promise gradual assimilation." This hol
ds true
not only for the United States: "Jewish life gradually disappears from most of the Dia
spora
communities." Most modern-day Jews "do not have painful memories of the Catastroph
e....
They identify with Israel much less than their parents." Doubtlessly, "the role of the
Diaspora
is shrinking disastrously, and this is fraught with inevitable loss of its essential c
haracteristics."
"Will our grandchildren remain Jews...? Will the Diaspora survive the end of this mill
ennium
and, if so, for how long? Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, one of the greatest teachers of our t
ime ...
warns that the Jews of the Diaspora are no longer a group, 'whose survival is guarante
ed by
being in jeopardy.'" And because of that, they, paradoxically, "are already on the roa
d to
extinction, participating in the 'Catastrophe of self-destruction.'" Moreover, "anti-S
emitism
in Western countries cannot be anymore considered as the element that strengthens Jewi
sh
identity. Anti-Semitic discrimination in politics, business, universities, private clu
bs, etc. is for
all practical purposes eliminated. "[49] In present-day Europe "there are many Jews wh
o do
not identify as Jews and who react idiosyncratically to any attempt to connect them wi
th
that artificial community." "The assimilated Jew does not want to feel like a Jew; he
casts
away the traits of his race (according to Sartre). "[50] The same author offers a scor
ching
assessment: "European Jews reject their Jewishness; they think it is anti-Semitism tha
t
compels them to be the Jews. Yet that is a contradiction: A Jew identifies as a Jew on
ly when
he is in danger. Then he escapes as a Jew. But when he himself becomes the source of
danger, he is not a Jew." [51]

Thus, "the contours of the collapse of the Diaspora take shape exactly when the Wester
n
Jews enjoy freedom and wealth unprecedented in Jewish history, and when they are, or
appear to be, stronger than ever." And "if the current trends do not change, most of t
he
Diaspora will simply disappear. We have to admit a real possibility of the humiliatin
g, though
voluntary, gradual degradation of the Diaspora.... Arthur Koestler, the advocate of
assimilation, who in the 1950s predicted the death of the Diaspora, might prove to be
right
after a 1 1. "[52]

425

Meanwhile, "the Jews of the world, sometimes even to their own surprise, feel like the
y are
personally involved in the destiny of Israel." "If, God forbid, Israel is destroyed, t
hen the Jews
in other countries will disappeartoo. I cannot explain why, but the Jews will not surv
ive the
second Catastrophe in this century."[53] Another author attributes the "Jewish mytholo
gy of
the imminent Catastrophe" precisely to life in the Diaspora, and this is why "American
(and
Soviet) Jews often express such opinions." They prepare for the Catastrophe: should Is
rael
fall, it will be they who will carry on the Jewish nation. [54] Thus, "almost all of m
any
hypotheses attempting to explain the purpose of Jewish Diaspora ... recognize that it
makes
Jewry nearly indestructible; it guarantees Jewry eternal life within the limits of the
existence
of mankind. "[55]

We also encounter quite a bellicose defense of the principle of Diaspora. American pro
fessor
Leonard Fayne said: "We oppose the historical demand to make aliyah. We do not feel li
ke
we are in exile." In June 1994 "the President of the World Jewish Congress, Shoshana
S.
Cardin, aggressively announced to the Israelis: 'We are not going to become the forage
for
aliyah to Israel, and we doubt you have any idea about the richness and harmony of
American Jewish life.'" [56] Others state: "We are interesting for the peoples of the
world not
because of peculiarities of our statehood, but because of our Diaspora which is widel
y
recognized as one of the greatest wonders of world history." [57] Others are rather ir
onic:
"One rogue came up with ...the elegant excuse that the "choseness" of the Jews is alle
gedly
nothing else but to be eternally scattered." [58] "The miracle of the restoration of I
srael post
factum gave new meaning to the Diaspora; simultaneously, it had brilliantly concluded
the
story that could otherwise drag on. In short, it had crowned the miracle of the Diaspo
ra. It
crowned it, but did not abolish it." [59] Yet "it is ironic too, as the goals for whic
h we
struggled so hard and which filled us with such pride and feeling of difference, are a
lready
achieved." [60]

Understanding the fate of the Diaspora and any successful prediction of its future lar
gely
depends on the issue of mixed marriages. Intermarriage is the most powerful and
irreversible mechanism of assimilation. (It is no accident that such unions are so abs
olutely
forbidden in the Old Testament: "They have dealt faithlessly with the Lord; for they h
ave
borne alien children." (Hosea 5:7)) When Arnold J. Toynbee proposed intermarriage as
a
means to fight anti-Semitism, hundreds of rabbis opposed him: "Mass mixed marriage
means the end of Jewry."[61]

A dramatic growth of mixed marriages is observed in the Western countries: "Data

documenting the statistics of 'dissolution' are chilling. In the 1960s 'mixed marriage
s'
accounted for approximately 6% of Jewish marriages in the United States, the home of t
he
largest Jewish community in the world. Today [in 1990s], only one generation later, th
is
number reached 60% — a ten-fold increase. The share of 'mixed marriages' in Europe an
d
Latin America is approximately the same.... Moreover, apart from the orthodox Jews, al
most
all Jewish families in Western countries have an extremely low birth rate." In additio
n, "only

426

a small minority of children from 'mixed families' are willing to adopt a distinctly J
ewish way
of life."[62]

And what about Russia?The Shorter Jewish Encyclopedia provides the following statistic
s: in
1988 [still under the Soviet regime], in the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialis
t
Republic), 73% of married Jewish men, and 63% of married Jewish women had non-Jewish
spouses (in 1978 these numbers were lower: 13% for men, and 20% for women.). "Actuall
y,
Jews in such marriages tend to lose their Jewish self-consciousness much faster; they
more
often identify themselves with other nationalities during census. "[63]

Thus, almost everywhere, to a greater or lesser degree, we have the "erosion of Jewish
life,"
"dilution of racial, religious and ethnic borders that, until recently, served as the
barriers for
assimilation and 'intermarriage.'" Today, "when common anti-Semitism declined so abrup
tly,
... the Jews have lost a many great principles that in past used to be strong pillars
of self-
identification."^]

The Jews of the Diaspora are often attacked by the Israelis. Thirty and forty years af
ter the
creation of the State of Israel, the Israelis ask Diaspora Jews mockingly and sometime
s
angrily: "So, what about modern Jews? Most likely, they will always remain in their tr
ue
historical home, in the Galuth."[65] "The Algerian Jews had preferred France to Israe
l, and
then the majority of the Iranian Jews, who left Khomeini's rule, gave a wide berth to
Israel."
"By pulling up stakes, they search for countries with higher standards of living, and
a higher
level of civilization. The love of Zion is not sufficient in itself."[66] "The eternal
image of a
classical'imminent catastrophe' does not attract the Jews to Israel anymore."[67] "The
Jews
are a nation corrupted by their stateless and ahistoric existence."[68] "The Jews did
not pass
the test. They still do not want to return to their homeland. They prefer to stay in G
alut and
complain about anti-Semitism every time they are criticized.... And nobody may say a b
ad
word about Israel, because to criticize Israel is 'anti-Semitism!' If they are so conc
erned
about Israel, why do they not move here to live? But no, this is exactly what they try
to
avoid!"[69] "Most of the Jews of the world have already decided that they do not want
to be
independent.... Look at the Russian Jews. Some of them wanted independence, while othe
rs
preferred to continue the life of a mite on the Russian dog. And when the Russian dog
had
become somewhat sick and angry, they have turned to the American dog. After all, the J
ews
lived that way for two thousand years ."[70]

And now, the the Diaspora Jew "is often nervous when confronted by an Israeli; he woul
d
rather feel guilty than ... share his fate with Israel. This sense of inferiority is c
ompensated by
intensely maintaining his Jewish identity ... through deliberate over-emphasizing of p
etty
Jewish symbolism." At the same time, "the Jew from the Diaspora alone shoulders the
specific risk of confronting surrounding anti-Semitism." Yet, "no matter how the Israe
l
behaves, the Diaspora has no choice: it will quietly stand behind the Israelis like an
unloved
but faithful wife."[71]

427

It was forecasted that "by 2021, the Diaspora will probably shrink by another million
souls."
"The interior workings of Jewish history... indicate that, most likely, the size of wo
rld Jewry
will further decrease with the gradual concentration of a Jewish majority in Zion and
not in
the Diaspora."[72]

Yet couldn't it be the other way around? Maybe, after all, the Russian Jew Josef Biker
man
was right when he confidently claimed that the Diaspora is indestructible? "I accept G
alut,
where we have lived for two thousand years, where we have developed strong cohesion,
and where we must live henceforth, to live and prove ourselves."[73] Could it be that
those
two voices which, according to Gershenzon, always sound in Jewish ears — one calling t
o
mix with the surroundings, and another demanding to preserve Jewish national uniquenes
s,
— will sound forever?
A reputable historian noted (after World War II) "a paradox in the life of modern Jewr
y:
ever-growing immersion of Jews in the life of other nations does not diminish their na
tional
identity and sometimes even intensifies it." [74]

Below are few testimonies made by Russian Jews during the Soviet ("internationalist")
period.

"I always had an acute perception of my Jewishness.... From the age of 17, when I left
the
cradle of high school, I mixed in circles where the Jewish question was central." "My
father
had a very strong Jewish spirit; despite that, he never observed traditions, Mitzvoth,
did not
know the language, and yet ... everything, that he, a Jew, knew, was somehow subordina
ted
to his Jewish identity."[75]

A writer from Odessa, Arkady Lvov, remembers: "When I was a 10-year old boy, I searche
d
for the Jews among scientists, writers, politicians, and first of all, as a Young Pion
eer [a
communist youth group in the former Soviet Union], I looked for them among the member
s
of government." Lazar Kaganovich was in third place, ahead of Voroshilov and Kalinin,
"and I
was proud of Stalin's minister Kaganovich... I was proud of Sverdlov, I was proud of U
ritsky...
And I was proud of Trotsky — yes, yes, of Trotsky!" He thought that Ostermann (the adv
iser
of Peter the Great) was a Jew, and when he found that Ostermann actually was German, h
e
had "a feeling of disappointment, a feeling of loss," but he "was openly proud that Sh
afirov
was a Jew." [76]

Yet there were many Jews in Russia who were not afraid "to merge with the bulk of the
assimilating body,"[77] who devotedly espoused Russian culture:

"In the old days, only a handful of Jews experienced this: Antokolsky, Levitan, Rubins
tein,
and a few others. Later there were more of them. Oh, they've fathomed Russia so deepl
y
with their ancient and refined intuition of heart and mind! They've perceived her
shimmering, her enigmatic play of light and darkness, her struggles and sufferings. Ru
ssia
attracted their hearts with her dramatic fight between good and evil, with her
428

thunderstorms and weaknesses, with her strengths and charms. But several decades ago,
not a mere handful, but thousands Jews entered Russian culture.... And many of them be
gan
to identify sincerely as Russians in their souls, thoughts, tastes and habits.... Yet
there is still
something in the Jewish soul ... a sound, a dissonance, a small crack — something very
small,
but through it, eventually, distrust, mockery and hostility leaks from the outside, wh
ile from
the inside some ancient memory works away.

So who ami? Who ami? Am I Russian?

No, no. I am a Russian Jew."[78]

Indeed, assimilation apparently has some insurmountable limits. That explains the diff
erence
between full spiritual assimilation and cultural assimilation, and all the more so, be
tween the
former and widespread civic and social assimilation. Jews — fateful ly for Jewry — pre
serve
their identity despite all outward signs of successful assimilation, they preserve "th
e inner
Jewish character" (Solomon Lurie).

The wish to fully merge with the rest of mankind, in spite of all strict barriers of t
he Law
seems natural and vivid. But is it possible? Even in the 20th century some Jews believ
ed that
"the unification of the mankind is the ideal of Judaic Messianism."[79] But is it real
ly so? Did
such an ideal ever exist?

Far more often, we hear vigorous objections to it: "Nobody will convince or compel me
to
renounce my Jewish point of view, or to sacrifice myJewish interests for the sake of s
ome
universal idea, be it 'proletarian internationalism,' (the one we idiots believed in t
he 1920s)
or 'Great Russia,' or 'the triumph of Christianity,' or 'the benefit of all mankind,'
and so
on." [80]
Nearly assimilated non-Zionist and non-religious Jewish intellectuals often demonstrat
e a
totally different attitude. For instance, one highly educated woman with broad politic
al
interests, T.M.L., imparted to me in Moscow in 1967 that "it would be horrible to live
in an
entirely Jewish milieu. The most precious trait of our nation is cosmopolitanism. It w
ould be
horrible if all Jews would gather in one militarist state. It is totally incomprehensi
ble for
assimilated Jews." I objected timidly: "But it cannot be a problem for the assimilated
Jews as
they are not Jews anymore." She replied: "No, we still have some [Jewish] genes in u
s."

Yet it is not about the fatality of origin, blood or genes, it is about which pain — J
ewish pain
or that of the host nation — is closerto one's heart. "Alas, nationality is more than
just
knowledge of language, or an introduction to the culture, or even an attachment to th
e
nature and way of life of the country. There is another dimension in it — that of the
commonality of historic destiny, determined for each individual by his involvement in
the
history and destiny of his own people. While for others this involvement is predetermi
ned by
birth, for the Jew it is largely a question of personal choice, that of a hard choice.
"[81]

429

So far, assimilation has not been very convincing. All those who proposed various ways
for
universal assimilation have failed. The difficult problem of assimilation persists. An
d though
on a global scale the process of assimilation has advanced very far, it by no means
foredooms the Diaspora.

"Even Soviet life could not produce a fully assimilated Jew, the one who would be
assimilated at the deepest, psychological level. "[82] And, as a Jewish author conclud
es,
"Wherever you look, you will find insoluble Jewish residue in the assimilated liquid.
"[83]
Yet individual cases of deep assimilation with bright life histories do occur. And we
in Russia
welcome them wholeheartedly.

* * *

"A Russian Jew ... A Jew, a Russian.... So much blood and tears have been shed around
this
boundary, so much unspeakable torment with no end in sight piled up. Yet, at the same
time,
we have also witnessed much joy of spiritual and cultural growth.... There were and st
ill are
numerous Jews who decide to shoulder that heavy cross: to be a Russian Jew, and at th
e
same time, a Russian. Two affections, two passions, two struggles.... Isn't it too muc
h for one
heart? Yes, it is too much. But this is exactly where the fatal tragedy of this dual i
dentity is.
Dual identity is not really an identity. The balance here is not an innate but rather
an
acquired entity."[84] That reflection on the pre-revolutionary Russia was written in 1
927 in
the Paris emigration.

Some fifty years later, another Jew, who lived in Soviet Russia and later emigrated to
Israel,
looked back and wrote: "We, the Jews who grew up in Russia, are a weird cross — the
Russian Jews.... Others say that we are Jews by nationality and Russians by culture. Y
et is it
possible to change your culture and nationality like a garment...? When an enormous pr
ess
drives one metal into another, they cannot be separated, not even by cutting. For deca
des
we were pressed together under a huge pressure. My national identity is expressed in m
y
culture. My culture coalesced with my nationality. Please separate one from another. I
am
also curious which cells of my soul are of the Russian color and which are of the Jewi
sh one.
Yet there was not only pressure, not only a forced fusion. There was also an unexpecte
d
affinity between these intercrossing origins, at some deep spiritual layers. It was as
if they
supplemented each other to a new completeness: like space supplements time, the spirit
ual
breadth supplements the spiritual depth, and the acceptance supplements the negation;
and
there was a mutual jealousy about 'choseness'. Therefore, I do not have two souls, whi
ch
quarrel with each other, weaken each other, and split me in two. I have one soul ... a
nd it is
not two-faced, not divided in two, and not mixed. It is just one. "[85]

And the response from Russia: "I believe that the contact of the Jewish and Slavic sou
ls in
Russia was not a coincidence; there was some purpose in it. "[86]

430

Author's afterword

In 1990, while finishing April 1917 and sorting out the enormous amount of material no
t
included in The Red Wheel, I decided to present some of that material in the form of
a
historical essay about Jews in the Russian revolution.

Yet it became clearalmost immediately that in order to understand those events the ess
ay
must step back in time. Thus, it stepped backto the very first incorporation of the Je
ws into
the Russian Empire in 1772. On the other hand, the revolution of 1917 provided a power
ful
impetus to Russian Jewry, so the essay naturally stretched into the post-revolutionary
period.
Thus, the title Two Hundred Years Together was born.

However, it took time for me to realize the importance of that distinct historical bou
ndary
drawn by mass emigration of the Jews from the Soviet Union that had begun in the 1970
s
(exactly 200 years after the Jews appeared in Russia) and which had become unrestricte
d by
1987. This boundary had been abolished, so that for the first time, the non-voluntary
status
of the Russian Jews no longer a fact: they ought not to live here anymore; Israel wait
s for
them; all countries of the world are open to them. This clear boundary changed my inte
ntion
to keep the narrative up to the mid-1990s, because the message of the book was alread
y
played out: the uniqueness of Russian-Jewish entwinement disappeared at the moment of
the new Exodus.

Now, a totally new period in the history of the by-now-free Russian Jewry and its rela
tions
with the new Russia began. This period started with swift and essential changes, but i
t is still
too early to predict its long-term outcomes and judge whether its peculiar Russian-Jew
ish
character will persevere or it will be supplanted with the universal laws of the Jewis
h
Diaspora. To follow the evolution of this new development is beyond the lifespan of th
is
author.

Sources:

[1] I.M. Bikerman. K samopoznaniyu evreya: Chem my byli,chem my stali,chemmy dolzhny b

yt [To the Self-
Knowl edge of a Jew: What We Were, What We Beca me, What We Must Be]. Paris, 1939, p.
17.

[2] S.Ya. Lurye. Antisemitizm v drevnem mire [Anti-Semitism in the Ancient World]. Te
l -Aviv: Sova, 1976, p. 160
[1st ed. - Petrograd: Byloye, 1922].

[3] Ibid.*, p. 64, 122, 159.

[4] S.Ya. Lurye. Antisemitizm v drevnem mire* [Anti-Semitism in the Ancient World], p.
160.

[5] M. Gershenzon. Sudby evreyskogo naroda [The Destinies of the Jewish Nation] // "2
2": Obshchestvenno-
pol iticheskiy i I iteraturniy zhurnal evreyskoy intel ligentsii izSSSR v Izraile [Soc
ial, Pol itical and Literary Journal of
the Jewish Intelligentsia fromthe USSR in Israel]. Tel -Aviv, 1981, (19), p. 109-110.

[6] S. Tsiryulnikov. Filosofiya evreyskoy anomalii [Philosophy ofthe Jewish Anomaly]

// Vremya i my (daleye -
VM): Mezhdunarodny zhurnal literaturyi obshchestvennykh problem [Epoch and We (hereina
fter -EW):
International Journal of Literature and Social Problems]. New York, 1984, (77), p. 14
8.

[7] A-B. Yoshua.Golos pisatelya [Voiceof the Writer]// "22", 1982, (27), p. 158.

431
[8] Max Brod. Lyubov na rasstoyanii [Loveatthe Distance] // TW, Tel -Aviv, 1976, (11),
p. 197-198.

[9] Amos Oz. vremeni i o sebe [On Time and on Me] // Kontinent: Literaturny, obshchest
venno-pol iticheskiy i
religioznyzhurnal [Continent: Literary, Social, Political and ReligiousJournal]. Mosco
w, 1991, (66), p. 260.

[10] A-B. Yoshua. Golos pisatelya [Voiceofthe Writer] // "22", 1982, (27), p. 159.

[11] S. Tsiryulnikov. Filosofiyaevreyskoyanomalii [Philosophy ofthe Jewish Anomaly] //

EW, New York, 1984,
(77), p. 149-150.

[12] P. Samorodnitskiy. Stranny narodets [Strange Little Nation] // "22", 1980, (15),
p. 153, 154.
[13] E. Fishteyn. Izgaluta s lyubovyu [From the Galutwith Love] // "22", 1985, (40),
p. 112-114.
[14] M. Shamir. Sto let voyny [One Hundred Years of War] // "22", 1982,(27), p. 167.

[15] Evreyskaya Entsiklopediya (daleye-EE) [The Jewish Encyclopedia (hereinafter - TJ

E)]: 16volumes. Sankt-
Petersburg.: Obshchestvo dlya Nauchnykh Evreyskikh Izdaniyi Izd-vo Brokgauz-Efron [St.
Petersburg: Society
for Scientific Jewish Publications and Publisher Brokgauz-Efron], 1906-1913. V. 3, p.
312.

[16] Ibid., p. 313.

[17] Ibid.

[18] M. Krol.Natsionalizmi assimilyatsiya vevreyskoy istorii [Nationalismand Assimilat

ion intheJewish
History]// Evreyskiy mir: Ezhegodnik na 1939 g. (daleye - EM-1) [The Jewish World:Year
book for 1939
(hereinafter - JW-1)]. Paris:Obyedineniyerussko-evreyskoy intelligentsii [Association
of Russian-Jewish
Intelligentsia], p. 187.

[19] I.L Klauzner. Literatura na ivritev Rossi i [Literature in Hebrew in Russia] //Kn
iga o russkom evreystve: Ot
1860-kh godov do Revolyutsii 1917 g. [Book on the Russian Jewry: From the 1860s until
the 1917 Revolution].
New York: Soyuz Russkikh Evreyev [The Union of Russian Jews], 1960, p. 506.

[20] [20] M. Gershenzon. Sudby evreyskogo naroda [The Destinies ofthe Jewish Nation]//
"22", 1981,(19), p.
111-115.

[21] N. Podgorets. Evreyi v sovremennom mire [The Jews in the Modern World]: [Intervie
w] // EM, New York,
1985,(86), p. 117.

[22] V. Levitina.Stoiloli szhigat' svoy khram.... [Should We Really Burn Our Templ
e....] // "22", 1984, (34), p.
194.

[23] Boguslavskiy.Zametki na polyakh [Marginal Notes]// "22", 1984,(35), p. 125.

[24] O. Rapoport. Simptomy odnoy bolezni [Symptoms of One Disease]// "22", 1978, (1),
p. 122.

[25] L. Tsigel'man-Dymerskaya.Sovetskiy antisemitizm- prichinyi prognozy [Soviet Anti-

Semitism -Causes and
Forecasts]: [Seminar] // "22", 1978, (3), p. 173-174.

[26] G. Shaked. Trudno li sokhranit' izrail'skuyu kul'turu vkonfrontatsii s drugimi ku

l'turami [Is ItDifficultto
Preserve Jewish Culture in Confrontation with Other Cultures]// "22", 1982,(23), p. 13
5.

[27] VI . Jabotinsky. Na lozhnom puti [On a False Road] // VI. Jabotinsky. Felyetony
[Feuil letons]. Sankt-
Petersburg: Tipografiya "Gerold" [St. Petersburg: Gerold Printing Establishment], 191
3, p. 251,260-263.

432

[28] VI. Jabotinsky.Chetyre statyi o "chirikovskom intsidente" [Four Articles on the

"Chi rikov Incident"] (1909)
//Ibid., p. 76.

[29]TJE, V. 4, p. 560,566-568.

[30] Vyacheslavlvanov,M.O. Gershenzon. Perepiska izdvukh uglov [The Correspondence Bet

ween The Two
Corners]. Petrograd: Al konost, 1921, p. 60, 61.

[31] O. Rapoport. Simptomy odnoy bolezni [The Symptoms of One Disease] // "22", 1978,
(1), p. 123.

[32] M. Krol.Natsionalizmi assimilyatsiya vevreyskoy istorii [Nationalismand Assimilat

ion intheJewish
History] //JW-1, p. 191-193.

[33] MaxBrod. Lyubov' na rasstoyanii [Loveat a Distance]// EW, Tel -Aviv, 1976, (11),
p. 198-199.

[34] Martin Buber. Natsionalnyebogi i Bog Izrailya [TheNational Gods andthe God of lsr
ael]//EW, Tel -Aviv,
1976,(4), p. 117.

[35] Artur Koestler. luda na pereputye [Judahatthe Crossroads] //EW, Tel -Aviv, 1978,
(33), p. 104-107,110.
[36] Ibid., p. 112.
[37] Ibid., p. 117, 126.

[38] V. Boguslavskiy.Galutu-s nadezhdoy [To the Galuth with Hope] // "22", 1985,(40),
p. 135.

[39] A-B. Yoshua. Golos pisatelya [Voiceofthe Writer] // "22", 1982, (27), p. 159.

[40] Yu. Viner. Khochetsya osvoboditsya [I Want to Become Free] // "22", 1983, (32),
p. 204-205.

[41] M. Goldshteyn. Mysli vslukh [Thoughts Aloud] // Russkaya mysl [RussianThinker], 1

968, February 29, p. 5.

[42] M. Kaganskaya.Nashegostepriimstvo... [OurHospitality...]// "22", 1990, (70), p. 1

11.

[43] A. Voronel'. Oglyanis'vrazdumye... [Look Back in Reflection]: [Round Table] // "2

2", 1982,(24), p. 131.

[44] A. Chernyak. Neizvestnoye pismo Einshteyna [The Unknown Letter of Einstein]// "2
2", 1994,(92), p. 212.

[45] A. Katsenelenboygen. Antisemitizm i evreyskoye gosudarstvo [Anti-Semitismand the

Jewish State] II "11",
1989,(64), p. 180.

[46] I. Li bier. Izrail — diaspora: Krizis identifikatsii [Israel — the Diaspora: The
Crisis of Identification] // "22",
1995,(95), p. 168.

[47] N. Gutina. Dvusmyslennaya svyaz [An Ambiguous Connection] // "22", 1981, (19), p.
124.

[48] M. Kaganskaya.Mifprotivrealnosti[MythAgainstReality]//"22", 1988,(58), p. 141.

[49] I.Libler. Izrail - diaspora... [Israel --the Diaspora...] // "22", 1995,(95), p.

149-150,154,157.

[50] Sonja Margolina. Das Endeder Lugen: Rutland und die Juden im 20. Jahrhundert. Ber
l in: Siedl er Verlag,
1992,S. 95, 99.

433

[51] S. Margolina. Germaniya i evrei: vtoraya popytka [Germany and the Jews: The Secon
d Attempt] // Strana i
mir [The Country and the World], 1991, (3), p. 143.

[52] I. Li bier. Izrail - diaspora... [Israel -the Diaspora...] // "22", 1995,(95), p.

150, 155.

[53] N. Podgorets. Evreyi v sovremennom mire [The Jews in the Modern World]: [Intervie
w] // EW, New York,
1985,(86), p. 113,120

[54] Z. Ba r-Sel I a. I slams kiy fundamentalizm i evreyskoye gosudarstvo [Islamic Fun

damental ism and the Jewish
State] // "22", 1988,(58), p. 182-184.

[55] E. Fishteyn. Izgaluta s lyubovyu [From the Galuth with Love] // "22", 1985, (40),
p. 112.
[56] I. Li bier. Izrail -diaspora... [Israel --the Diaspora...]// "22", 1995,(95), p.
152.

[57] E. Fishteyn. Glyadimnazad my bez boyazni... [We Are Looking Back with No Fea
r]//"22", 1984,No. 39, p.
135.

[58] A. Voronel. Oglyanis' v razdumye... [Look Back in Reflection]: [Round Table]// "2
2", 1982,(24), p. 118.

[59] E. Fishteyn. Izgaluta s lyubovyu [From the Galuth with Love] // "22", 1985, (40),
p. 114.

[60] I. Li bier. Izrail - diaspora... [Israel --the Diaspora...]// "22", 1995,(95), p.

156.

[61] Ed Norden. Pereschityvaya evreyev* [Recounting the Jews] // "22", 1991,(79), p. 1

26.

[62] I. Li bier. Izrail - diaspora... [Israel --the Diaspora...] // "22", 1995,(95),

p. 151,152.

[63] Kratkaya Evreyskaya Entsiklopediya [TheShorter Jewish Encyclopedia]:Jerusalem: Ob

shchestvo po
issledovaniyu evreyskikh obshchin [Society for Study of Jewish Communities], 1996, V.
8, p. 303, Table 15.

[64] I. Li bier. Izrail - diaspora... [Israel --the Diaspora...] // "22", 1995,(95),

p. 156.

[65] N. Gutina.Dvusmyslennaya svyaz[An Ambiguous Connection] // "22", 1981,(19), p. 12

5.

[66] S. Tsiryulnikov. Filosofiyaevreyskoyanomalii [Philosophy of Jewish Anomaly] // E

W, New York, 1984, (77),
p. 148.

[67] I. Li bier. Izrail - diaspora... [Israel --the Diaspora...] // "22", 1995,(95),

p. 165.

[68] Z. Bar-Sell a. I slams kiy fundamentalizm i evreyskoye gosudarstvo [Islamic Funda

mental ism and the Jewish
State] // "22", 1988,(58), p. 184.

[69] A-B. Yoshua. Golos pisatelya [Voiceofthe Writer] // "22", 1982, (27), p. 158.

[70] Beni Peled. Soglasheniyene s tern pa rtnyorom [Agreement with the Wrong Partner]
// "22", 1983, (30), p.
125.

[71] E. Fishteyn. Izgaluta s lyubovyu [From the Galuth with Love] // "22", 1985, (40),
p. 115, 116.
[72] Ed Norden. Pereschityvaya evreyev [Recounting the Jews] // "22", 1991, (79), p. 1
20, 130-131.
[73] I.M. Bikerman. K samopoznaniyu evreya [To the Self-Knowledge of a Jew]. Ibid., p.
62.

434

[74] Sh. Ettinger. Noveyshiy period [Modern Period]// Istoriya evreyskogo naroda [Hist
ory of the Jewish
Nation] / Sh. Ettinger (Ed.). Jerusalem: Gesharim; Moscow: Mosty kultury [Bridges of C
ulture], 2001, p. 587.

[75] A. Eterman. Tretye pokoleniye [The Third Generation] [Interview] // "22", 1986,(4
7), p. 123-124.
[76] A. Lvov. Vedi za soboy otsa svoyego [Lead the Way to Your Father] // EW, New Yor
k, 1980, (52), p. 183-184.

[77] VI. Jabotinsky. Na lozhnom puti [On the Wrong Road] // VI . Jabotinsky. Felyetony
[Feuilletons]. Ibid., p. 251.

[78] Rani Aren. V russkomgalute [In the Russian Gal uth] // "22", 1981,(19), p. 135-13
6.

[79] G.B. Sliozberg. Dela minuvshikh dney: Zapiski russkogo evreya [The Things of Days
Bygone: The Memoirs of
a RussianJew]: 3 volumes. Paris, 1933-1934, V. 1, p. 4.

[80] Sh. Markish.Eshchyorazo nenavisti ksamomu sebe [OnceAgainon the Hate to Yoursel
f]// "22", 1980,
(16), p. 189.

[81] L. Tsigelman-Dymerskaya.Sovetskiy antisemitizm — prichiny i prognozy [Soviet Anti

-Semitism - Causes
and Forecasts]: [Seminar]// "22", 1978,(3), p. 175.

[82] Yu. Shtern. Dvoynaya otvetstvennost [Double Responsibility]// "22", 1981, (21),
p. 127.

[83] O. Rapoport. Simptomy odnoy bolezni [Symptoms of One Disease]// "22", 1978, (1),
p. 123.

[84] St. Ivanovich.Semyon Yushkevich i evreyi [Semyon Yushkevich and the Jews] / Publi
katsiya Ed. Kapitaykina
[Publication of Ed. Kapitaykin]//Evrei v kul'ture Russkogo Zarubezhya [The Jews in the
Russian-Language
Culture]. Jerusalem, 1992, V. 1, p. 29.

[85] [R. Nudelman] Kolonka redaktora [Editor's Column] // "22", 1979, (7), p. 95-96.
[86] L-skiy.Pisma izRossii [Letters from Russia]//"22", 1981, (21), p. 150.

435