EN BANC Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in

default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner,

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed
by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration
and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise
of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment
and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff
moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties
and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this
stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement."
It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the
following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution
on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility
of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August
25, 1955.

Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am
leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why —
That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING
VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court
had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed
to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of
July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956.
This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of
settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid
petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955
in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed
no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating
facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated:
"That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his
failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event
and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this
stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs.
Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-
15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact
unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside
was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk
of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962,
this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of
the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same
did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no
standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts
that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that
"mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed
out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code
the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary
to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for
a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1).
Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-
to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion
were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but
two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply
left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother
opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day,
the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally
eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As
to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit
as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted
in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion,
however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower
court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R)
revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-
4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from
December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted
the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed
and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise
of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal
knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of
love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access
to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff
had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support
herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as
promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was
bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of
her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00
attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately
decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was
shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but
decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised
on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal
and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of
a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the
rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30,
1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De
Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under
Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from
the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in
1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of
the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest
of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of
promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in
the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura,
27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces
of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof
of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would
tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward
for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E.
Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and
residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with
summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each
other sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant
started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due
time the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the
defendant as are wont of young people in love had frequent outings
and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime
in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage,
the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest and
repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except
for a short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of
the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and
promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started
conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff
informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his
promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and
righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing
the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to
all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever
actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-
appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the
child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia
Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next
friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the
first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar
Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-
named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant
to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with
Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five
hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after
answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant
to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for
him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in
other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from
so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the
defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize
Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia
was of the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent
family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right.
His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo,
where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month
of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years,
was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her
acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which
Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The
defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of
her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note
directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as
follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his
departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit
he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation
that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in
order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and
promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and
all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he
employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made
arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital
of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother
and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived
together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses,
including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time,
however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs
of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to
another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came
for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for
this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of
Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre,
quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the
mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the
meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we
have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient.
It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived,
becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living
person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of
rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really
not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a
child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources
of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral
evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used
in the writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now
suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded.
The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of
two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to
be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The
baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco
instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant
intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is
removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant
makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the
letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged
Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the
last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the
defendant urged her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the
sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated
in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single
document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable
authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the
opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the
admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made in
one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before
us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other
letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by
Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall
be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the
writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court
erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession
of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself,
and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to
acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil
Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the
conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our
conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had
acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in
connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is
undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for
it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This
situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a
second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long
enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The
circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action
was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article
135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status shall
continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while
it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal.
With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial
court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco,
for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily
proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits
none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there
is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the
amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco.
And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the
Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So
ordered.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-
appellant Cesar Syquia has expressly acknowledged his paternity of the child
Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and secondly, that said child
has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son of said
defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, justified by his acts, as required by article
135 of the Civil Code.
The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.
Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-
appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as follows:
Sabado, 1.30 p. m. — 14 febrero, 1931
Rev. PADRE:
La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de
a la criatura.
(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA
Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant
Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-appellee Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the
child contain the following expressions:
Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el
de junior tambien no lo manches. A cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y
por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."
Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."
Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come
tu mucho. ... ."
Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."
Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural
child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly
acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article,
says:
Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion
acerca de si es posible admitir por otro medio la prueba de la
paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el articulo es
terminante y la intencion de la ley mas terminante aun. Se establecio
en la base 5.a que "no se admitira investigacion de la paternidad sino
en los casos de delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que
conste su voluntad indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo,
deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion de
estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.
No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al
reconocimiento de un hijo natural, aunque solo se limite a pedir
alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho
por escrito, en la posesion constante de estado de hijo natural o en
sentencia firme recaida en causa por de delito violacin, estupro o rapto.
El escrito y la sentencia habran de acompañarse a la demandada, y no
puede admitirse otra prueba que la conducente a justificar que el
escrito es indubitadamente del padre que en el reconozca su
paternidad, o la relativa a los actos directos del mismo padre o de su
 familia, que demuestren la posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la
prueba de estos dos hechos podran utilizarse todos los medios que
permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el juez rechazar la
que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija a la investigacion de la
paternidad.
xxx xxx xxx
En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase
presente que no basta hacerlo por incidencia; es indespensable que se
consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del
padre, de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con
este fin, como se ordena an la base 5.a antes citada, de las aprobadas
por la Ley de 11 de mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque
contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de
tener por objecto el reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo
natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que
incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a
quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una persona el titulo y
tratamiento de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso
decidiran los un modo suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira
de base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la posesion contante
del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo, y con arreglo a su
numero 2.º
Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres
and Barza vs. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez
Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are those established
in article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of which is that the
father may be compelled to acknowledge his paternity, "When an indubitable
writing of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his paternity." The
writing that is required by said provision must be complete in itself and by
itself, and must contain all the statements that are necessary to constitute a full
and clear acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in order that
it may serve as a basis for compelling him to acknowledge said child should
be afterwards deny his paternity. If several writings put together, each not
being complete in itself, should be necessary in order to obtain a full and
complete expression of acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child,
the general prohibition to investigate paternity would be violated.
By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the
others to the herein plaintiff-appellee, Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot
ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June", which the defendant-
appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to the priest is his,
nor who is the "junior" that he recommends to said Antonia L. de Jesus to take
good care of, as there is nothing in anyone of said letters from which it may be
inferred that Antonia L. de Jesus was enciente at the time, that the "junior" was
the being she was carrying in her womb, and that it was the "creature that is
coming in June." To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove that Cesar
Syquia had had illicit relations with Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such
relations the woman became pregnant, and that she gave birth to a boy in June
1931. All this certainly constitutes an investigation of the paternity of Cesar
Syquia of said child outside of the documents, which is prohibited by law.
Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J,
Exhibit C is insufficient to constitute a "indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia,
in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco,"
as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article
135 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural
child in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the
conduct of the father himself or that of his family.
The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C,
F, G, H, and J and the following facts, as found by the lower court in its
decision:
Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el
demandado Cesar Syquia llamo a su comprovinciano Dr.
Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en
la Ciudad de Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese
efecto llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus acompañado del Dr.
Talavera al Hospital San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el
17 de junio de 1931 asistida por dicho Dr. Talavera, que firmo el
certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.
 Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el
demandado estuvo viviendo con este y con la demandante Antonio L.
de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila, entregando
a dicha demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del
consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo firmado el contrato para el
suministro del fluido electrico en dicha casa.
Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing
that Ismael Loanco has enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child, because being of prior date to the birth of said child they can not
be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing possession of the status
of natural child, as no human being can enjoy such possession until he be born
with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738;
Granados vs. Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not
reported).
It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given
to the child Ismael when it was baptized, so that the name of its mother,
Loanco, had to be given to it.
The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the
testimony of the witnesses during the trial, are not sufficient to constitute the
uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural child of said
Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:
In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:
. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by
Don Telesforo, we find that he visited the mother of the plaintiff; that
he paid money for her support; that he paid money for the support of
the plaintiff; that he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son;
that the plaintiff called him "Papa," and that Don Telesforo answered
to this designation; that when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he
kissed his hand; that Don Telesforo wrote letters to him; that he paid
his fees for instruction in school, and secured him a position in a
commercial house.
xxx xxx xxx
All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff
possesses continuously the status of a natural child. They may have a
tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child, but
that it is not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the
child as his. By the express terms of article 135 that recognition must
appear either in writing, made by the father, or it must appear in acts
which show that the son has possessed continuously the status of a
natural child. No recognition by the father of the child which comes
short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must
appear that it was the intention of the father to recognize the child as
to give him that status, and that the acts performed by him were done
with that intention.
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain says:
En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la
posesion de estado de hijo natural se requiere que los actos sean de tal
naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la
paternidad, la voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en
las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no accidentalmente, sino
continuedamente, porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo
valor que el reconocimiento expreso.lawphil.net
En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907,
que estima que el hecho de que dos nodrizas criaron a otros tantos
niños, sufragando el gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa de
la demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los
mismos el mayor cuidado; el de que subvenia a las necesidades de la
madre y de los seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se
llamaba como el padre; y el de que los porteros de la casa donde vivio
la actora sabian que el finado visitaba a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha
familia que tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como padre de
los menores, no son suficientes para fundar la declaracion de
paternidad, pues no es legal confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o
menos la presuncion o convencimiento en que una persona este de su
paternidad con relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren su
proposito de poner a estos hijos en la posesion de tal estado.
It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the
herein defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia cannot be compelled to acknowledge
the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there exists not an
indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of
said child, and because the said child has not enjoyed the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child of the said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as
required by article 135 of the Civil Code.
The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint
dismissed.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time,
much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring
husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which
decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's
decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the
South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the
first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that
as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having
sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed,
slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There
was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The
same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went
to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle,
his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during
this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by
just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988
until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even
see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations
to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital,
on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was
kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed
for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was
also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband,
he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies
with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled
for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has
no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there
is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if
there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact
between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was
that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his
wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because
she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid
that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother,
and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because
they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis
was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out
whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection.
(Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the
original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza
said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis
is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that
with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID
the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May
22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio
de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
 II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as
proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed
by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no
collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141,
private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint;
that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion
except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended
to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of
the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it
could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined
by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He
admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the
petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts.
88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without
trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between
the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling
the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is
not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the
appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not
have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as
error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such
as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not
want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made
a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have
sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage
void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that
any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also
claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as
stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with
private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and
avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never
did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out
or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea
that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire
belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March
15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of
symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins,
111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were
true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that
defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity
weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it
is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence
proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual
act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation,
the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the
sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say
"I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy
is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must
be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely
not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated
marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46132 May 28, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rogelio A. Vinluan for defendant-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Felipe Santiago, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal
Case No. 1048 before the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Nueva Ecija. The
criminal complaint filed by Mabini Garcia in the said case reads as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1975 in Cabanatuan City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force or intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse
with the undersigned complainant against the latter's will.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 3, Rollo)
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision on
February 23, 1977, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Felipe Santiago guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and penalized
under Art. 335, pars. 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences him to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, civil interdiction
for life and perpetual absolute disqualification. He will also pay the
costs of the case (sic).
It is here to be observed that while the accused is said to have pointed
a gun to the side of the victim while riding the tricycle and in going up
the Driftwood Hotel, the crime of rape was not actually committed
with the use of the gun, hence, the death penalty is not; reposed on the
accused.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 39-40, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows:
The accused, Felipe Santiago, and the victim herein, Mabini Garcia,
were officemates at the time of the incident in question. Felipe
Santiago was the head of the GSIS Branch Office in Cabanatuan City.
He was the superior officer of Mabini Garcia who was an employee in
the Investment Unit of the said branch office.
The incident in question transpired in the late afternoon of May 26,
1975, while Mabini Garcia was on her way to see her dressmaker in
Cabanatuan City. She took a tricycle and was proceeding in the
direction of the Development Bank Building when she heard the
accused, Felipe Santiago, call her from another tricycle. She stopped
her tricycle and Santiago approached her. He told her that he wanted
to discuss some office matters with her, and he asked her to join him
for a snack at the Manrio Restaurant. Mabini Garcia answered that she
would proceed to the Manrio immediately after seeing her dressmaker.
She then went to her dressmaker and, as agreed, proceeded to the
Manrio. She saw Felipe Santiago there sitting at a table drinking beer.
Only a few people were present. When she went to his table, she found
a chicken sandwich and a glass of lemon juice already on the table.
She told him she was full. However, she was thirsty and so, she drank
the lemon juice, about half of its contents at first, but as they
conversed, continued drinking little by little until she consumed the
glassful. (pp. 4-12, t.s.n., April 2, 1976)
After conversing for a few minutes, Santiago professed his feelings
for Mabini Garcia. He told her that he was in love with her. The latter
was surprised and taken aback. She reminded him that he was a
married man and she had no future with him. At this answer, the
accused wrinkled his brow and looked angry. Mabini Garcia bade him
goodbye soon afterwards because she started to feel dizzy. The
accused stopped her from leaving and held her thigh while she was
still seated. She stood up and told him not to molest her (bastusin).
She sat down again in order not to arouse the attention of the other
people. After a while, Santiago went to the comfort room. Mabini
Garcia took advantage of his absence and went out from the Manrio
to go home. She called for a tricycle and was about to board it when,
all of a sudden, Felipe Santiago appeared and pushed her into the
tricycle. He sat beside her inside the tricycle and warned not to make
an outcry or scandal, otherwise, he would shoot her. Santiago put his
left arm around her, while his right hand pointed a gun, covered with
a jacket, at her right side. He ordered the tricycle to go straight ahead
in the direction of the Driftwood Hotel. Mabini Garcia was afraid and
nervous but unable to shout because she was dizzy. (pp. 12-20, t.s.n.,
April 2, 1976).
When the tricycle stopped, Mabini Garcia saw that they were inside
the compound of the Driftwood Hotel Santiago alighted from the
tricycle, pulling Mabini Garcia with him The victim resisted and held
onto the side of the tricycle with her two hands. However, because of
her weak, nervous and dizzy condition, Santiago succeeded in pulling
her out. He warned her again not to create any scandal or else, he
would shoot her. Santiago then brought her to a room in the hotel and
quickly closed the door. (pp. 21-30, t.s.n., April 2, 1976).
Inside the room, Santiago held her by the shoulders and began to kiss
her with the gun still pointed at her side. She pleaded with him not to
pursue his evil intentions, and to have pity on her as she had not done
him any wrong. Santiago continued to kiss her while she struggled to
avoid contact with his body. Then Santiago slapped her and she fell.
She managed to rise up but Santiago boxed her in the stomach and she
became unconscious. (pp. 31-35, t.s.n., April 2, 1976).
When Mabini Garcia came to, she found herself on the bed totally
naked, her vagina bleeding, her thighs painful, and she felt that
Santiago had succeeded in abusing her. Santiago was also in bed,
embracing and kissing her. She felt weak, then, she cried and cursed
Felipe Santiago. Although she felt weak, she kicked him. (pp. 4-11,
t.s.n., June 4, 1976)
After a few minutes, Santiago stood up and told Mabini Garcia to dress
up. He threw her clothes to her and she got up, still crying, and started
to dress. The accused warned her not to report the matter to anybody
or he would kill her. Mabini Garcia was afraid, because she had known
the accused to have been involved before in a murder case. She knew
he was not joking. The accused told her to go with him. Mabini Garcia
obeyed because she was afraid of the accused and she felt weak. They
rode on a tricycle. Again, the accused warned her not to report the
matter to anybody or he would kill her. Mabini Garcia continued to
cry softly in the tricycle, taking care not to make the driver notice her
condition. When the tricycle reached the intersection of the highway,
and Mabini Street, the accused went down and told the victim to
proceed home. (pp. 14-18, t.s.n., June 16, 1976).
Mabini Garcia reached her house at around 8:00 P.M. and her mother,
brother and sister were already resting. Only the household helper was
in the sala, She informed Mabini that supper was ready, but Mabini
answered she will not eat supper anymore. She went to her room right
away because she did not want the helper to notice that anything was
wrong. She cried the whole night over the injustice committed upon
her by Felipe Santiago. (pp. 6-11, t.s.n., July 19, 1976)
Mabini Garcia went as usual to office the following day because she
did not want anyone to know what had happened to her. Besides, she
thought that Felipe Santiago would not report for work because earlier,
she heard him announce at a Division Meeting that he would be out
on official business for two weeks starting that day. However, at
around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Felipe Santiago suddenly arrived
in the office. Mabini Garcia was surprised and disturbed but she
concealed her feelings. She frequented the comfort room to give vent
to her crying. (pp. 11-18, t.s.n., July 19, 1976).
The following day, Santiago did not come to office, He reported again
only on the following Friday. Mabini Garcia continuously reported to
the office from May 27, 1975 until the end of the week, keeping her
shame to herself. She tried to conceal her sadness, but sensed that her
officemates must have noticed, after some time, that she was not her
usual self (pp. 19-20, July 19, 1976).
The GSIS Cabanatuan Office celebrated its office anniversary on May
31, 1975, with a dinner-dance at the La Parilla. Mabini Garcia did not
want to attend the affair but she was prevailed upon by Mrs.
Benjamina de Vera, their Chief in the Salary Loan and Policy Section,
who fetched her from her house. At the La Parilla, she joined her
companions in the Investment Unit of the GSIS. She noticed that some
of the employees did not attend, but she was the only one fetched from
her house. Mabini Garcia did not feel like dancing but an officemate
kept approaching her for a dance, so, finally she agreed to dance with
him. While they were dancing, Felipe Santiago, whose presence she
had not noticed until that time, tapped her partner's shoulder, and took
his place in dancing with her. She pushed him away, but Santiago held
her tight, and said in a low, but firm voice that he would slap and
humiliate her if she tried to leave him in the middle of the dance hall.
After the piece, Mabini Garcia wanted to go home. She went back to
her seat and asked for Mrs. de Vera, but she was nowhere to be found.
Pretending that she had a headache, she told the person sitting beside
her to inform Mrs. de Vera that she left because she was not feeling
well. (pp. 20-30, t.s.n., July 19, 1976)
Mabini Garcia continued going to office regularly, still ashamed to
reveal her misfortune because it might bring dishonor to her family.
Finally, she felt that her problem was too much to bear, alone. On June
30, 1975 she revealed to her brother Rufino the abomination
committed upon her by Felipe Santiago. He suggested that they inform
their other brothers and their mother about the incident. After
revealing the incident to their eldest brother, Atty. Mario T. Garcia, he
advised them to report the incident to the operatives of the Philippine
Constabulary, which they did. (pp. 34-49, t.s.n., July 19, 1971). (pp.
29, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 126, Rollo)
On the same day, the victim was examined by Dr. Leonides Soriano, the senior
resident physician at the Paulino J. Garcia Memorial Medical and Research
Center in Cabanatuan City. Her findings were as follows:
Breast—epherical, popilla brownish pink
Pubic hair—moderate in amount
Labia majora and minora—pinkish in color
Hymen—laceration old healed at 1:00, 5:00 & 9:00 o'clock facing the
clock
Vagina—admits 1 finger with ease, 2 fingers with difficulty SMEAR
FOR SPERMATOZOA . . . NEGATIVE." (p. 23, Rollo)
In this appeal, the accused-appellant assigned eight (8) errors committed by
the lower court, to wit:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
UNCORROBORATED STORY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS THEREOF.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE
WAS AN ABSENCE OF ANY OPPOSITION, STRUGGLE OR
TENACIOUS RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THAT NO FORCE, VIOLENCE OR
INTIMIDATION WAS EMPLOYED BY THE ACCUSED.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A DELAY OF
THIRTY-FIVE (35) DAYS IN REPORTING THE ALLEGED RAPE
IS NOT OVERLY LONG AND THAT COMPLAINANT'S
EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY HAS THE SEMBLANCE OF
TRUTH.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOR OF THE COMPLAINANT AFTER
THE ALLEGED RAPE BELIE AND NEGATE HER CHARGE OF
RAPE.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINANT LIED IN RESPECT OF HER CLAIM OF
VIRGINITY AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED RAPE AND THAT
THIS LIE DESTROYED HER CREDIBILITY ON OTHER
MATERIAL MATTERS.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NOTHING IN
THE SUBSTANTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE PROSECUTION
HAS BEEN REFUTED.
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
NOT UPON THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION BUT UPON THE ALLEGED WEAKNESS OF
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE,
EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO MEET THE QUANTUM OF
PROOF—WHICH IS EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT—NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE, (pp. 21-24, Brief for Appellant, p. 100, Rollo)
The appellant contends that the testimony of the victim, Mabini Garcia is
doubtful as it is uncorroborated, aside from the fact that it contains serious
inconsistencies and contradictions as follows: Firstly, the alleged abduction of
the victim could not have happened in a busy thoroughfare outside the Manrio
Hotel, considering that the meeting between the accused and the victim
appears to have been accidental. Secondly, the victim failed to state in her
affidavit submitted to the Philippine Constabulary that she was raped at the
Driftwood Hotel. Thirdly, in her testimony in court, the victim stated that she
was pushed into the tricycle by the accused after she left the Manrio Hotel but
in her affidavit before the Philippine Constabulary, she stated nothing of this
incident. Fourthly, the complainant's earlier testimony upon direct
examination that she felt the gun poked at her side all the way from Manrio
Hotel to the Driftwood Hotel is inconsistent with her latter testimony that the
first time she saw the gun was after she had been allegedly abused by the
accused.
The main question raised by appellant is credibility of the prosecution's main
witness the—victim herself. It is well-settled that the lone testimony of the
victim in the prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict
of conviction, the rationale being that owing to the nature of the offense, the
only evidence that can oftentimes be adduced to establish the guilt of the
accused is the offended party's testimony (People v. Lor, L-47440-42,
September 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 41). Hence, if the testimony of the offended
party is not improbable, a defendant may be convicted on the lone testimony
of the victim. We have perused the long testimony of the victim and We found
nothing improbable about it. On the contrary, the victim has testified clearly
and logically as to events which happened on that fateful day. Her narration of
events even included details which she could not have supplied if they were
not true.
Based on the victim's testimony, the incident happened at 6:00 in the evening
when there were only few persons passing by. She also stated that she felt weak
and dizzy after drinking the lemon juice offered to her by the appellant at the
Manrio Hotel. It is therefore not impossible for the appellant to easily force the
victim into the tricycle without much resistance and bring her to the Driftwood
Hotel where he would consummate his evil intentions.
The failure of the victim to state certain details in her affidavit before the
PC, i.e., the name of the hotel where she was raped and the fact that the
appellant pushed her into the tricycle refer merely to minor details which do
not destroy her credibility. The victim's statements in her affidavit and her
testimony in court are substantially the same, the latter being more accurate as
the victim had ample opportunity to clearly narrate the incident in court.
The victim's alleged contradictory statements concerning her perception of the
gun held by the appellant is of little importance. In fact, We could not find any
inconsistency therein. The facts are clear that she felt the gun poked at her
while she and appellant were riding in the tricycle but she saw the gun only
after she was abused. Inconsistency on matters of minor details do not detract
from the actual fact of rape. Testimonial discrepancies would have been caused
by the natural fickleness of memory which tend to strengthen rather than
weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony (People
v Cayazo, L-47398, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586).
A reading of the assailed decision will reveal that the trial court has carefully
analyzed and discussed not only the victim's testimony but also her conduct
while in the witness stand. Said the trial court:
. . . On the other hand, the whole gamut of the statements made by
Mabini Garcia cannot be assailed anywhere as a prevarication. She has
not stated anything that is in itself an impossibility or an improbability.
Her story is complete in long and numerous details covering an
expanse of so many days. Had she just invented the story of the rape,
she could not have just as easily invented all the details she gave and
in fact, it would have been safer for her not to tell such a long story.
She even mentioned a part played by Mrs. Benjamina de Vera, Chief
of Salary Loan and Policy Section of the GSIS office and subordinate
of the accused. In fact, this part she mentioned does not touch on the
rape itself, but what this Court sees is that had Mabini Garcia
fabricated the rape incident, she would not have mentioned the name
of Mrs. de Vera at all. Her manner of declaring, her demeanor, her
straight-forwardness all mark her as a reliable witness, telling the
whole truth as she saw it. This Court does not even take into account
her occasional outbursts of weeping, except to say that they did not
appear to be in the way of acting or, as is said in the vernacular, mere
"arte." Nothing has ever been said, nor can it be in any manner
deduced, that Mabini Garcia had an axe to grind against the accused
or that she was bent on extracting money from him. She was his
subordinate employee and she was never threatened with removal,
demotion or punishment of any kind. There was never any previous
incident by which one could say that she wanted money. There was a
lapse of thirty-five days between the incident and the time she reported
the matter to any member of her family for the purpose of a complaint.
This delay is not overly long and her explanation on how and why she
kept the secret to herself for a while has every semblance of truth. (pp.
37-39, Rollo)
As can be gleaned from the above quoted discussion, the trial court upheld on
justifiable grounds the testimony of the victim as to the truth of the
perpetuation of the crime charged. Where the issue is credibility of the
witnesses, the findings and conclusions of the trial court are binding upon this
Court.
The appellant's submission that the victim failed to raise an outcry or offer
serious resistance when she was abducted and later raped has no merit. The
suggestion of the victim that she was drugged after drinking the lemon juice
given by the appellant explains why the victim was unable to resist the accused
effectively or make an outcry. While no chemical test was undertaken to
concretely prove that the juice she drank actually contained drugs, the fact
remains uncontroverted as appellant did not even take the witness stand in
order to deny that after the victim drank the lemon juice already prepared for
her, she began to feel weak and dizzy. Even the driver of the tricycle where
she and appellant rode towards the Driftwood Hotel observed that she was very
pale (TSN, Dec. 2, 1975, p. 20, Records). Further, where appellant succeeded
in bringing her to the Driftwood Hotel, he boxed her in the stomach which
rendered her unconscious and allowed appellant to satisfy his beastly desires
(TSN, June 16, 1976, p. 117, Records). It is clear that the acts of appellant were
deliberately done to deprive the victim of reason and the will to resist his
sexual assault. The effect is thus similar to that of violence in overcoming
resistance with which she could very well have successfully thwarted the
lustful act. Appellant undoubtedly had clearly committed the crime charged by
depriving complainant of reason to be able to have carnal knowledge of her
without the latter having in the least shown any sign of consent (People v.
Bautista, No. L 49778, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 483). In a rape of a
woman deprived of reason or who is unconscious, the victim has no will. In
that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant
resistance to the sexual intercourse.
Records show that it took the victim thirty-five (35) days before finally
reporting the crime to the police authorities. The lapse of the said period cannot
be considered as unreasonably long to render the victim's testimony doubtful.
In her testimony in court, she related how she suffered emotionally and
psychologically in trying to keep to herself the outrage done to her; that at first,
she did not want to reveal what had happened to her because of the shame it
will bring to her family, aside from the fact that her brothers might take the
law into their own hands and create trouble; that she finally told her family
about the rape because she felt aggrieved by the incident (TSN, July 19, 1976,
pp. 160-165, Records). Where the complainant or victim has fully explained
her failure to report the sexual abuse immediately after the rape, there is no
reason to cast doubt on the veracity of her testimony (People v. Cabradilla, L-
33788, November 29, 1984, 133 SCRA 413). The delay in reporting the crime
to the authorities may be due to fear of the malefactor or the shame that would
result from the disclosure of the dishonor done to the offended woman (People
vs. Tano, 109 Phil. 912; People vs. Castillo, 111 Phil. 1024).
Appellant contends that the victim lied when she testified that she was a virgin
at the time of the rape incident, since the doctor-witness for the defense stated
that the round edges in the lacerations found in the hymen of the victim show
that the victim had sexual intercourse at least six months previously long
before the alleged rape.
We agree with the conclusions of the trial court that virginity is not a necessary
element in the crime of rape and that the time in which wounds heal differ
among people, in addition to the fact that methods of treatment of a wound
may result in differences in the period of healing. We have held in one case
that lack of fresh lacerations does not negative sexual intercourse where
medical examination was conducted 16 days after alleged assault (People v.
Deus, No. 63729, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 660). Moreover, the fact that
hymenal lacerations were found to be "healed round edge" and no spermatozoa
were found do not necessarily negate rape (People v. Malabad, No. 63219,
November 28, 1984, 133 SCRA 392).
Furthermore, the appellant has not shown any improper motive on the part of
the victim for her to testify as she did (People v. Mañago, No. 90669,
November 21 1990). It has long been held that no young Filipina of decent
repute would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished,
unless that is the truth. For it is her natural instinct to protect her honor (People
v. Avero, No. 76483, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 130).
Unfortunately, the accused did not take the witness stand to explain his side.
We cannot hold to against him, for an accused has the right to remain silent
and no adverse inference should be drawn from that silence. In view thereof,
in order to gain conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its
evidence rather than on the weakness of the defense (People v. de Dios y
Exconde, G.R. No. 58174, July 6, 1990). Considering the totality of the
evidence on record in the instant case, We find that the guilt of the accused has
been established with proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, We find on
the basis of the evidence that the offense was committed with the use of a
deadly weapon. The applicable provision is Article 335, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death (People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990). No
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense. Hence, the
trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the
accused but failed to impose an indemnity for the victim.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the trial court dated February 23,
1977 is AFFIRMED. The accused, Felipe Santiago is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P40,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court
assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel
Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September
13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-
trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007,
the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled
investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer
did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the
pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very
beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall
cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it
and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience
only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship;
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned
to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued
the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA
stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence
of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded
that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their
consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of
a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real
and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire
American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating
her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and,
therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its
petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon
of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led
to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of
particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only
to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred
to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is
one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the
subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to
achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the
bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple
to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose
of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted
from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in
existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an
alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live
together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent,
to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual
consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies
the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they
do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no
exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the
spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the
outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon
as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be
married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily
understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover,
to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband
to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from
a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore,
been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an
immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United
States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose"
marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration,
the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA
ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As
in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage
in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband
and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed
lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential
requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of
any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must
also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective
by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention
to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was
that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It
is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create
any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or
for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them
to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a
limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties
in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does
not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is
not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by
law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize
marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence,
though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for
the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid
and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article
46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a
previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of
a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality.
No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of
evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may
only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is
no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the
sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage.
Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further
trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage
void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in
their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter
into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to
get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may
easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil
Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
 The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent
judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have
been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned
with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had
earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for
lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-
IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation
from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a
married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario,
he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to
the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt
upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will
suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this
declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio
Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the
latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before
him.In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to
have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left
the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor
been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption
that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint
affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample
reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this
provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved
or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance
of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the
beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony
outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code,
thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request
the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the
justifications for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no
pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is
the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance
of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention
are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's
failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like
the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know
and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not
learned in the law.While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status
of married persons.
 The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan
and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum
to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one
of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void,
and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect
in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.
OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001.
Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage
until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity,
petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a
retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for
his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so
much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice
to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action.
On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent
judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was
requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the
marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the
documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage
in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However,
on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty
walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located
almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if
respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he
acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he
carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he
discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he
refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding,
it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage
license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would
give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to
comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave
him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his
sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties
that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He
attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to
her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated
28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that
respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want
of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and
reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she
filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment
filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now
bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia
filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped
in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January
2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a
Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on
17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot
issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record
of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so
the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent
judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter
dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the
failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation
dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a
marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his
territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed
on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority
of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.
Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed
by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the
ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen.
They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited
to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for
violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a
marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that
the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota
of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.
 Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of
cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal
effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not
involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend
upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a
complainant in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional power to
discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the
trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this
Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined
P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent
Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas.1 As
ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to
them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer.
Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married
in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of
Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states
that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971,
when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth.
The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus
consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that
there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil
Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the
Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20,
 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not
appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before
June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any
application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract
on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to
the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability
of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to
show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court.
She insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently
established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial
court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void
and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage
contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court
erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar that
marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that
no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for
relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent
Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony
of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null
and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the
solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties
when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182
was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar
of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin
F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that
no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a
local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search
and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no.
3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned
by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed
by an officer having custody of an official record or by his
deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to
find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support
of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer
any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was
a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is
one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting
parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was
initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial
cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served
with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt
thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly
declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack
of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence
on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her
husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage
license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented
by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any
reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995
MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The responsibility of a Judge is indeed heavy. As the incarnation of law and
justice, it is his sworn duty to lead by example, to be the example. But how
can he inspire the people to live by the law if he himself fails to do so?
Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. Bernabe of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleges that on October 4, 1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were
married before respondent Judge Bernabe. She avers that Respondent Judge
assured her that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after
October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent Judge
on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage
contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a
marriage license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived with the
relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.1
In his comment,2 Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of
Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the
complainant.
Respondent contends:
1. That the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig has actually prepared the marriage
license but it was not released due to the subsequent objection of the father of
Marcelo Moreno;
2. That he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to
violate the law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was
moved only by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who
wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition;
3. That in order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to
perform the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage
license was definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were
complete;"3
4. That the contracting parties were not known to him; and
5. That both parties, particularly the complainant, were fully apprised of the
effects of a marriage performed without the required marriage license.
In a Resolution dated August 10, 1994, we referred this matter for
investigation, report and recommendation to Executive Judge Martin
Villarama, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156.
In his Memorandum of October 11, 1994, Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended
the dismissal of the complaint against Respondent for failure of complainant
to appear on any of the scheduled hearings and on the basis of a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay"4 executed on behalf of complainant who has left for Singapore by
her elder sister Sherlita N. Bendanillo expressly withdrawing her complaint
against Respondent.
Judge Villarama, however, also recommended that the Respondent be issued
a stern warning "in view of the fact on record that he indeed solemnized a
marriage without the requisite marriage license. . . ."5
On November 7, 1994, we referred the aforementioned Memorandum to the
Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court
Administrator stated:
Careful study of the records reveal that indeed respondent
Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized
the marriage without a marriage license. As a judge, he is
presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of the
Family Code of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by
E.O. 227), which provides that one of the formal requisites of
a marriage is a valid marriage license. Absence of said
requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning
(Article 35 [3], the Family Code of the Philippines). Judges
are enjoined to show more than just a cursory acquaintance of
the law and other established rules.6
It recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing
a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative
sanctions be imposed against him.7
We concur with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Respondent, by his own admission8 that he solemnized the marriage between
complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has
dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence"9 and to his promise to be "faithful to
the law." 10
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives
which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him
completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the law.
11
Must we always repeat our reminder in Uy v. Dizon Capulong and several
other cases12 that —
. . . the judge is the visible representation of law and justice
from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey
the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be
the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to
avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. To fulfill this
mission, the judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings
and doctrines of this Court. If the judge is already aware of
them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying
them; otherwise such omission can never be excused.
 And have we not frequently stressed that:
. . .judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the
confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the
gavel of justice. Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, enjoins
judges "to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with the
mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Conduct
that they be exemplars in their communities and the living
personification of justice and the Rule of Law. . . . 13
A case in point, a definite precedent and a clear basis in determining the
liability of Respondent in the instant case is Cosca, et al. v. Palaypayon, Jr.,
et a1. 14 where Judge Palaypayon, Jr. was duly fined and sternly warned for,
among others, solemnizing marriages without licenses. We declared:
. . . the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every
employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it
is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or
position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they
being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and
those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are
providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that
"[p]riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect,
or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the
provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
Finally, on the alleged withdrawal of the complaint against Respondent, we
reiterate our ruling in Imbing v. Tiongson:15
The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the
administrative case against herein respondent judge will not
necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have
been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its
jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter
alleged in the complaint. The Court has an interest in the
conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the
delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction
may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance from
further prosecuting the case he or she initiated.
To condition administrative actions upon the will of every
complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone a
detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory power to
discipline erring members of the Judiciary. Definitely,
personal interests are not material or controlling. What is
involved here is a matter of public interest considering that
respondent is no ordinary citizen but an officer of the court
whose personal behavior not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Respondent is hereby ordered to
pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984 multiple chest, abdomen, left supraclavicular region and left shoulder." There
were five (5) incised wounds and six (6) stab wounds on the deceased.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in holding
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant. as it did that appellant and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and
validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when the officiating priest
testified otherwise and there was no marriage contract executed on the
RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 occasion or later on; hence, the accused could only be liable for homicide; (2)
in failing to appreciate in favor of appellant the mitigating circumstances of
Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court, Fourteenth provocation or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
Judicial District, Cebu-Bohol (now Regional Trial Court), finding accused circumstance to offset the same; and, (3) in convicting appellant of the crime
Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and of parricide and in imposing upon him the penultimate penalty of reclusion
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory perpetua.
penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Susana Taborada-
Borromeo, in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with "the trial court's finding to the
of insolvency; and to pay the costs. effect that he killed Susana Taborada (the deceased) without legal
justification" The main issue raised by him is that he and Susana were not
Records show that at high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias legally married and therefore the crime committed is not parricide, but
and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of Susana, that homicide.
Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her. The 71-
year old Matilde Taborada told the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence of marriage in
who was then working in their mango plantation. Upon hearing the report of order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias
the child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana's Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife.
hut. The windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep Hereunder is his testimony on this point: têñ.£îhqwâ£
through the bamboo slats at the wall where he saw Susana lying down, Q Please state your name, age and other
motionless, apparently dead beside her one-month old child who was crying. personal circumstances?
Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old,
bolo. married, farmer, resident of Putingbato,
Babag Cebu City.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police The COURT: têñ.£îhqwâ£
officer Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. The peace officers Q You say you are married,
shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly that he who is your wife?
would smoke first before he would open the door. When he did, the peace A Susana Taborada.
officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her Q When did you get
abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side. married with Susana
Taborada?
When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble incoherent A I forgot.
words. Q Where did you get
married?
Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer, submitted his necropsy report A Near the RCPI station in
(Exhibits "A" & "B") which states that the cause of death was "stab wounds, Babag.
Q There is a church there?
 A There is a chapel.
Q Were you married by a
priest or a minister?
A By a priest.
Q Who is this priest?
A Father Binghay of
Guadalupe.
Q Do you have any children
with Susana Taborada?
A We have one.
Q How old is the child?
A I already forgot, I have
been here for quite a long
time already. (pp. 4-5, tsn.,
December 12, 1981 hearing)
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the
existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA 525).
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216)
The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law.
The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not
concubinage: legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that
persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other. The
reason for this presumption of marriage is well stated in Perido vs. Perido, 63
SCRA 97, thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is
that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment
of the law leans toward legal matrimony. ...
And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration
thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs.
Trias, 4 SCRA 849).
Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to say that the penalty for
parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. (Article 246, Revised Penal Code)
Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that where the
law prescribed a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances, with no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, assuming
the presence of the mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same,
the penalty is still reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to P30,000.00.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. L-2209-CTJ August 27, 1981
ABDON SEGUISABAL, complainant,
vs.
HON. JOSE R. CABRERA, City Judge of Toledo City, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In his verified Complaint filed on 18 June 1979, Abdon Seguisabal has charged
City Judge Jose R. Cabrera of Toledo City with gross misconduct in office and
gross ignorance of the law for having solemnized, on 14 April 1978, the
marriage of Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy without the requisite marriage
license pursuant to Article 53 of the Civil Code, and for having failed to
transmit a copy of the marriage contract, signed by him and the parties, to the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City within fifteen (15) days from
the date of solemnization as mandatorily required by Article 68 of the same
Code.
That respondent actually solemnized said marriage without the requisite
license, is shown by the marriage contract issued to the contracting parties
(Annexes "C", "C-1"). The f failure to transmit a copy of the marriage contract
to the Local Civil Registrar is substantiated by the Certifications, both issued
on 5 June 1979, by the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City (Annex "A" and
"B"),
Required to comment, respondent Judge explained:
On April 14, 1978 at around 12:00 o'clock noon, Jaime
Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy accompanied by the mother of
Jaime Sayson the father of Marlyn Jagonoy and several others
appeared before my Office bringing with them a Marriage
Contract to be solemnized in marriage. I asked them for their
Marriage License but they told me that the Local Civil
Registrar of Toledo City cannot issue the same because the
one in-charge was not in his Office, it being already 12:00
o'clock noon. The bride-to-be was three months pregnant.
Presuming that the papers were in order inasmuch as the
parents were present, I solemnized the marriage but told the
parties to come back in the afternoon together with the
Marriage License. The parties did not come in the afternoon
and the papers left in my office were lost in the mass of paper
works attendant in the Office of the City Judge, in fact, I have
virtually forgotten about it myself.
Sometime in May 1979, about a year after, a crying girl
bringing with her a child appeared before me in my office and
I Identified her as Marlyn Jagonoy. She informed me that her
husband, Jaime Sayson, who was a draftee in the Philippine
Army died in an encounter with the Muslim rebels in
Maguindanao and subsequently died. The army authorities
will give her the benefits if and when she can prove that she
was actually married to the said Jaime Sayson. In sympathy
and fairness to Marlyn Jagonoy whose marriage I actually
solemnized, I searched for the papers and found them. I told
the father of Marlyn to go to the Local Civil Registrar's Office
in order that Marriage License be issued to her which he did
but came back and told me that the Local Civil Registrar will
not receive the papers and will not issue the Marriage License
for the reason that the parties have not attended the Family
Planning Seminar required by law before Marriage License
may be issued. Believing that Family Planning was no longer
necessary inasmuch as Jaime Sayson was already dead, I
issued to them the Marriage Contract in order that they can
enjoy the benefits accruing Jaime Sayson who died a hero's
death in the service of the flag of the Republic. In issuing the
Marriage Contract, I had done it in good faith and in sympathy
and in fairness to the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy, whom I believe
is entitled to the benefits she could enjoy it simply because of
the technicality of the law. The issuance of the Marriage
Contract made everybody happy, The parents of the boy and
the parents of the girl were satisfied and are not even a party
to this Complaint (Rollo, pp. 9-10).
Respondent Judge further averred that the complainant herein was obviously
ill-motivated and resorted to this administrative action out of spite because he
had, on 24 November 1978, dismissed Criminal Case No. A-1712 for Alarm
and Scandal filed by complainant against a certain Marcelo Rizal, and that
complainant is the accused in Criminal Case No. A-1907 for Qualified Theft
pending before respondent's Court.
Considering the admissions made by respondent, and as observed in the
Memorandum Report dated 22 October 1980 submitted by Deputy Court
Administrator, Leo D. Medialdea, concurred in by Court Administrator,
Justice Lorenzo Relova, there was no more need for a formal investigation to
determine the administrative liability of respondent Judge. Respondent must
be held guilty of the charge filed for in solemnizing the marriage of Jaime
Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy on 14 April 1978 without requiring the essential
pre-requisite of a marriage license, respondent had undoubtedly transgressed
Article 53(4) of the Civil Code in the absence of any showing that the subject
marriage falls under marriages of an exceptional character wherein a license is
not mandatorily required. Respondent was likewise remiss in his duty under
Article 68 of the Civil Code to transmit to the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo
City within fifteen (15) days from the date of solemnization of the marriage in
question, a copy of the marriage contract duly signed by him as the
solemnizing officer and by the contracting parties.
The defense of good faith interposed by respondent is unavailing. As a judicial
officer, he is expected to know the law on the solemnization of marriages. His
feeling of sympathy and fairness to the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy" cannot serve
as a license for him to deliberately transgress or dispense with legal requisites.
In view, however, of respondent's twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7)
months of service in the Judiciary, and considering that he has applied for
retirement under Republic Act No. 5095 due to schemic heart ailment, we have
mitigated the corresponding administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge to be guilty of gross neglect of duty,
he shall pay a fine equivalent to three (3) months salary, the same to be
deducted from his gratuity upon his retirement from the service.
A copy of this Decision should be attached to his personal record.
SO ORDERED,
[G.R. No. 149530.October 22, 2001]
ARTHUR L. TE vs. LILIANA CHOA, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court
dated OCT 22 2001
G.R. No. 149530(Arthur L. Te vs. Liliana Choa, et al.)
Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision
of the regional trial court which declared petitioner's marriage to private
respondent null and void ab initio for the latter's failure to obtain a certificate
of legal capacity to contract marriage from the Chinese Embassy of which
private respondent is a citizen.
On June 8, 1990, a case of bigamy was filed borne of the grief and humiliation
which befell private respondent when she learned that her husband petitioner
was already living with another woman with whom he had contracted
marriage.
Thereafter, in retaliation, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of
marriage invoking the following grounds: (1) absence of a certificate of legal
capacity from the Chinese diplomatic officials under Article 21; (2)
psychological incapacity under Article 36; (3) consent obtained by fraud and
intimidation under Article 45, paragraphs 3 and 4; and (4) concealment by
appellant of her pregnancy by another man under Article 46, paragraph 2, all
of the Family Code.
The record reveals that the parties in the case at bar were sweethearts and
engaged in pre-marital sexual relations which resulted in private respondent's
pregnancy. Hence, on September 14,' 1988, the parties contracted marriage
before Judge Santiago Ranada, Jr. in Makati City.
However, prior to the marriage, the parties agreed that they would not live
together until after private respondent gives birth as both agreed that they were
not ready for married life, aside from the fact that their respective parents had
no knowledge of private respondent's pregnancy.
In the meantime, after the solemnization of their marriage, petitioner and
private respondent regularly saw each other. Often, petitioner would pick
private respondent from her office to eat lunch, watch a movie and share
intimate relation.
On April 21, 1989, private respondent gave birth to a daughter which
bore the name Ava Nicole Marie C. Te. However, after the birth of the
daughter, petitioner refused to perform his obligations to his family. Shortly
thereafter, private respondent received rumors about petitioner's affair with
another woman which turn out to be true.
On May 25, 1998, the trial court declared the marriage of herein parties null
and void ab initio.
However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.
Thus, the instant petition which we find to be unavailing.
As to the alleged psychological incapacity of private respondent, petitioner
contends that the appellate court erred when it retroactively applied the
guidelines for the determination of psychological incapacity enunciated in the
case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina (G.R. 108783) which was
decided on February 13, 1997 to the case which was decided by trial court on
February 28, 1996 long before Molina took effect.
The Court is not convinced. It is a legal truism that to overcome a presumption
created by law, such as the validity of a marriage and the sanity of the
contracting parties, the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing
(Katipunan vs. Tenorio, 38 O.G. 173, Sept. 29, 1937)
Even before the Molina case, the Court had, on several occasions, ruled that
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated (Santos vs. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]).
In the case at bar, it was petitioner who prevailed upon private respondent not
to cohabit with him when he told the latter to stay with her family because he
could not afford to take care of a family.
Petitioner's bare allegations that private respondent only sought the marriage
as a scheme to clear the cloud on her citizenship issue and that petitioner never
intended to live with petitioner is not sufficient to cause a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of private respondent.
Anent the issue of the non-submission of a certificate of legal capacity to
marry, Articles 2 and 3 in relation to Article 4 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio except as
stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
In the case at bar, all the essential requisites for a valid marriage are present.
The non-submission of the certificate of legal capacity which constitutes a
mere irregularity in a formal requisite cannot in anyway affect the validity of
the marriage.
WHEREFORE, petition is denied due course.
SO ORDERED
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
Domingo Franco, for appellant.
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant
were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the
peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de
matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition
directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907,
signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have
mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the
peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a
document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the
plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states
the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed
it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named;
that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted
in what they had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce
witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the
husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a
certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses
Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in
which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by
the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the
parties were legally married on the day named. The evidence in support of that
decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she
signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said
plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named, together
with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed
the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one
of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant,
and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign
the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified
to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court
of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the
two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in
the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she
never appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married to the
defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that
she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the
defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent
of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case,
but which we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to much weight.
The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married
brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario
Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her company.
But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every
morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church
unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when the
testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the
defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the
store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother;
that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany
her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining some dress
patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store, but
instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of
the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the ceremony
had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and
that they thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house
of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the
justice of the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and before
the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to
overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the
appellant in his brief. It appears that during her first examination she was
seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her
examination was adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house
where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse was due
to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of
the justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact,
it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies the claim of
the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the
peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she
told the facts substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the
plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said she did not appear before the
justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant
claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote
letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is
as follows:
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is
very angry and if he be informed that we have been married civilly, I
am sure that he will turn me out of the house.
Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I
can not remain here.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the
morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this
morning because my sister in law will not let me go there; if it suits
you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing,
and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don't like
to go without Pacita.
The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should
know anything about it.
Yours, ROSAL.
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita
Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the
Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after
the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come
here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high
because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of
loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that
you are willing to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don't
like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch
as she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the
court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist
on being married I must do it right.
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may
do what he wishes.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as
follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the
steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my father's permission for our
marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem
proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission,
you must request his consent.
Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly
married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every
thing may be carried out, with patience.
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the
steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same
boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the
defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived
together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting
with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was
brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the certificate of
marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the
decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the
justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace,
even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not
constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the
parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.
first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to
allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first
amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of
what he had intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second
amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of
discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She
proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is
question the justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said,
"You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a
positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked EN BANC
the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the
plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930
under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of
the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardian ad litem, Pedro
of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which Madridejo, plaintiff-appellee,
certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the vs.
marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such
presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to L. D. Abaya and S. C. Pamatmat for appellants.
the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document Aurelio Palileo for appellee.
signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to
unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so
states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven
that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish
VILLA-REAL, J.:
language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed;
and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold,
This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et
that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted
al. from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna holding as
to a legal marriage.
follows:
The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations
Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de
contained in the complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that the
Leon's next of kin, and hereby orders the defendants in case No. 5258
parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The
to restore and deliver the ownership and possession of the property
defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial
described in the complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio
of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in
Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.
regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of
this amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was again
allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of paragraphs In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as
2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the committed by the trial court, to wit:
parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely the
 1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez is valid.
2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the
subsequent marriage of his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo,
a natural child, was legitimated.
3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of
the defendants and appellants.
The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of fact and of
law raised herein are as follows:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child,
Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in
the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro
Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan,
Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data
being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day
old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being
made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's
door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the
parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9,
1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-
appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro
Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest
of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential
requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.
Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny
that Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is the natural son of the Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, The only question to be decided is whether the
subsequent marriage of his parents legitimated him.
Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent
marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents
before or after the celebration thereof.
According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be
effective as a legitimation, the natural children born out of wedlock must have
been acknowledged by the parents either before or after its celebration. The
Civil Code has established two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and
compulsary. Article 131 provides for the voluntary acknowledgment by the
father or mother as follows:
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the
record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.
Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:
Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural
child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly
acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the
conduct of the father himself of that of his family.
3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal
Code with regard to the acknowledgment of the issue, shall be
observed.
Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother,
reads:
Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural
child:
1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the
cases mentioned in the next preceding article.
 2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully
proven.
Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been
acknowledged by his parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, under any
of the provisions above quoted.
To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has
voluntarily acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his son, except the registry
certificate of birth, Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record of birth
mentioned in the law, for it lacks the requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil
Registry. It, no doubt, is a public instrument, but it has neither been executed
nor signed by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he
acknowledges Melecio Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro Madridejo
testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan with necessary data
for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo, and although said official
inscribed the data thus given in the civil registry of births, this is not sufficient
to bring it under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public
document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set
forth in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or in the baptismal register, where
of Exhibit 2 is a certificate, and which constitutes final proof only of the
baptism, and not of the kinship or parentage of the person baptized (Adriano
vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore, church registers of baptism are no
longer considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil.,
215).
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro
Madridejo or Flaviana Perez, either before or after their marriage. 1awph!l.net
Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by
compulsion?
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of
the Civil Code, and by the mother according to article 136, requires that the
natural child take judicial action against the father or mother, or against the
persons setting themselves up as the heirs of both, for the purpose of
compelling them to acknowledge him as a natural son through a judgment of
the court.
In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not
demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child, which is the condition
precedent to establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his
right to the estate of his uterine brother, Domingo de Leon, but he has not even
impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his mother,
Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might have authority to make a valid
and effective pronouncement of his being a natural child, and to compel them
to acknowledge him as such.
The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants'
answer amounts to an admission that he is indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and
relieves him of the burden of proving that his mother acknowledged him as a
son before her marriage. Such an admission would have been affective if the
present action had been brought for the purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez
or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or
by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did
not legitimate him.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the
defendants absolved with costs against the appellee without prejudice to any
right he may have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural
son of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNS, J., dissenting:
I dissent and the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998]
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX
TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may
marriage and filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review
on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals[1] Decision promulgated on
December 1, 1994[2] and Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995[3] in
CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and
dismissed petitioners action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint [4] for
partition and damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both
surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I.[5] On
October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a
party.[6]
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision[7] in favor
of the petitioner, in which it ruled:[8]
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is
the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit
the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels
of land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified
that he had been receiving [his] share from said land before and the
same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year
he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore
cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on
the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his
parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription
against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed:[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioners]
complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution
which reads:[10]
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration, dated
December 15, 1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters
raised in the motion that merit the modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition.[11]
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as
follows:[12]
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court
of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of
four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio
Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio
Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three
(3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff
demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3)
equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of
his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that
plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before
plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with
them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint
had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940
and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3)
children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died
in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4)
parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty
three (23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the
defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned
 into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3)
individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties,
this Court hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial courts decision:[13]
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the
time she testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio
captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she
was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association
of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because they are
neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the father
of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both
were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much
later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of
the witness was about 30 meters away from plaintiffs parents[] house and she
used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the defendants as
they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle
and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff
is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she
also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed
Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels
of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation. That she knows all
these [parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land,
witness answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she
knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio
Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the
[war] and after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes,
Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned or divided among
the 3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she
identified a woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man
with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the
defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the
wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and
Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the
same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in
this case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for
identification. She testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In
said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which witness identified as
the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court when xxx the picture
[was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio
Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of
his parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked as
Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name
of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively,
were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also
marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question
very well as she used to pass by it always. It was located just near her house
but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it. When asked if
she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and
B, witness answered she does not know as she was not present during the
picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture as she
knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was
survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this
case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and
a widow. She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of
Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister
and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That
she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of
Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant
pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato
and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of
land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting
and harvesting season. That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes
the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the
4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving
the widow of Inocentes any share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two
brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and
usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present. The witness testified that
upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he
was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That
while Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land
while he was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a
misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his
fathers share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He
testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle,
they being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents of his father and
the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his
father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead
having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about
25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he
showed a certificate of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit
C. That his birth certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a
certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being
their nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiffs mother died when he
was 13 years old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He
lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the
defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar
and then they were invited by the defendants to live with them. So he and his
wife and children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and his family
lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live with them, he
presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his
aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs daughter, his uncle and his wife. In
short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family picture previously
marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying
plaintiffs son. According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his
wife and children were living with the defendants. That a few years after
having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he
requested for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked
for [a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in
controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The
harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00
each. The boundaries are : East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio;
North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut
tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining
owners are : East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-
Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio
Trinidad, the deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the
plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40
cavans two times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones;
West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A
with an area of 540 square meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl.
No. 703310 with reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad
married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering
Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of
Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad
while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia
Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of
Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the
name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother
they were getting the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and
corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his
mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New Washington, Aklan,
by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a
municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not
know because he was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death
certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime. That after
the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,]
he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case. That during the
lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of
the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single
and they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioners] highest
educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old,
unemployed and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified
having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They
being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by
the name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and
brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of
Felix and Lourdes and he is already dead. According to the witness,
Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death
Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this fact because
at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing
with his aunt, Nanay Taya, referring to Anastacia Briones who is
mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as
Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes
Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia
Trinidad, and with his children before 1940 for only 3 months. When
asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody before
his death, he answered, That I do not know, neither does he kn[o]w a
person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if
he can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness knew
of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband
and wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall
because he was then in Manila working. That after the war, he had
gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as
he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes
Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who
claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered: I do not know about that..
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he started to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the
hereditary property of their father was located there. When asked if
he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of
this case before the court, witness answered that he does not
know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio
Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death of
Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross examined,
Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old. That according to him,
his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war. When
asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was
buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in
their own land because the Japanese forces were roaming around the
place.When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family
picture of the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to
identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-
1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said picture
marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he
knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself,
LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single
and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and
he is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he
had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to
Tigayon in 1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941
his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he
died. While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not
aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in
Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked if she
knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she
knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in
Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her
brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as
husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad, she said, Yes, but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived
with them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live
with the defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name
of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died
already. When asked by the court if there had been an instance when
the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he
did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in
her house, witness also said, He did not.
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes
Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio
Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad
and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead,
she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad
and Anastacia Briones.Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her
brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same
manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and
children. She herself testified that she does not have any family of her
own for she has [no] husband or children. According to her[,] when
Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot
in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime
and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese
forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that
Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in
December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness
could not answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit
A which is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was
[sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered; Yes. and the child
that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio
Trinidad. According to her, she was only requested to hold this child
to be brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the
baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if
there was a party, she answered; Maybe there was. When confronted
with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying the child,
witness identified herself and explained that she was requested to
bring the child to the church and that the picture taken together with
her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latters child was taken
during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in
court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child
marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child
being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the
plaintiff, witness answered she does not know because her eyes are
already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in
the picture who was at the right of the child held by her brother, Felix,
and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as
his wife, witness answered that she cannot identify because she had
a poor eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad,
holding another child in the picture for the same reason. When asked
by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this
picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito
Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she does not
know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD
SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was
her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad
because they were her cousins. She testified that a few months after
the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lolas house whose
names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that
Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he
went home only when his father fetched him in Manila because he
was already sick. That according to her, about 1 months after his
arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that
she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been
married to Inocentes Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when
Inocentes Trinidad died.According to her she was born in 1928,
therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out. When
asked if she can remember that it was only in the early months of the
year 1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not
sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their
private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces
and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who
was 76 years old and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified
that xxx she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents]
in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from
them. When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes Trinidad,
[Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only
for 15 days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year
because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived
with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the
street from her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not
true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the
name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was
personally present when couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay,
a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes
Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in good physical condition. That
 she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be
Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by
a Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That during
the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes
Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal
witness, he was not able to present a marriage contract of his parents
but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one
Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births,
deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were
destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Courts Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the
late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled:[14]
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced
sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final
judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument,
or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified
for the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died
single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the
plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New
Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the
protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n.
Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of
the marriage, nor of Inocentes acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son,
who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs.
Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the interested parties openly and
adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-
ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958)
acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p.
497). Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of the
parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their father
died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when
plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the
land for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the
same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:[15]
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by
preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced
sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants)
Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,]
the decision of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on
July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August 3,
1988.
4. Whether or not petitioners status as a legitimate child can be
attacked collaterally by the private respondents.
5. Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have
acquired ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive
prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents marriage
and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioners status as a legitimate child subject to collateral
attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive
prescription?
The Courts Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios
real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-
heir of the decedents estate.[16] His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend
on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage
between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court
holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the
reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral
Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate courts assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts.But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of
the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had to
meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this case.[17]
Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother
(Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence
of their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to
accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias[18] ruled that when the question of
whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact
of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony
of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial
in subsequent documents.[19]
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification[20] from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages
were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners case. Although the
marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place.[21]
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by
petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial
of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and
Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband
and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of
Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers association,
used to visit Inocentes and Felicidads house twice or thrice a week, as she lived
only thirty meters away.[22]On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes
house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioners
baptismal party held at the same house.[23] Her testimony constitutes evidence
of common reputation respecting marriage.[24] It further gives rise to the
disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[25] Petitioner
also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and
Felicidad were named as the childs father and mother.[26]
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record
of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document
or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding
article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of
status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document,
final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.[27]
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification[28] that records relative to
his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the
old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation,
he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and
Gerardos testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5)
carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late
Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioners first daughter, and Lourdes
Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad
(Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioners first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were
taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly prove
petitioners filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the
private respondents as Inocentes legitimate son ante litem motam.
 Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she
admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners
daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry
the child before she was baptized.[29] When shown Exhibit A, she recognized
her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife and the couples children -- slyly
explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect.[30]
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of
filiation, it is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and
special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of
Appeals:[31]
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, according to the Civil Code, or by evidence of proof in
his favor that the defendant is her father, according to the Family
Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p.
246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the
Trinidad family by either consanguinity or affinity,[32] her testimony does not
constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be
used to establish petitioners legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly
preponderates over private respondents self-serving negations. In sum, private
respondents thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March
1941. Private respondents witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died
in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was
willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied
by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because
he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months, and his answers on direct
examination were noncommittal and evasive:[33]
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad
was married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you
residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said them, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt
Anastacia Trinidad and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do
you know if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have
known of anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your
aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir,
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody
who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of
Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that,
when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from
Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their
grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in
March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew
Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that
Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.[34]
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7,
1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not
convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941.[35] The Japanese forces occupied
Manila only on January 2, 1942;[36] thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not
occupied until then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury
their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who
were roaming around the area.[37]
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad)
without objection from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status
as Inocentes legitimate child.[38]
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by
one side outweighs that of the adverse party.[39] Compared to the detailed (even
if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that
petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is
unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial
court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the
witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof,
and their personal credibility.[40] Applying this rule, the trial court significantly
and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioners favor. It
declared:
xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with
defendants enjoying the status of being their nephew xxx before
plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own where later
on he started demanding for the partition of the share of his father,
Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants xxx
is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family
pictures were taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea
of getting his fathers share. xxxx His demand for the partition of the
share of his father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they
disowned him as their nephew. xxxx In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed
the continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged father
by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only
broken when plaintiff demanded for the partition xxx as he was
already having a family of his own. xxxx.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent
herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being
her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them
the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio
captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had
been a PTA officer and the court sized her up as a civic minded
person. She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the
witness for the defendants who are either cousin or nephew of
Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant,
Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor
children.[41]
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted.[42] Rather than
rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of
his parents marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application
of this doctrine to petitioners cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in
when one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property
without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had
been in possession -- in the concept of owners -- of the parcels of land in issue
since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of
the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act
of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-
ownership.[43] Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition,
petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private
respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time,
recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond
question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-
ownership of petitioners father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of
these pieces of land were still in their fathers name. Although private
respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared
with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still,
they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court
of Appeals, the Court held:[44]
x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents
with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs
for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or
impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs.
Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share
of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership
duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega,
148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition
is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC,
156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may
be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and
for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error
in holding that petitioners claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision dated
July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for
the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as
publisher of Balalong, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other
than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution
and its subsequent loss or destruction.Accordingly, the fact of marriage may
be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) dated January 15, 1998,
and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it
being more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged
Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is
AFFIRMED in toto.[2]
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision[3] is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of
[herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa
Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called reconstructed marriage contract
excluded under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring
said Exh. B spurious and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of
the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of
injunction earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of
deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage
Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son
of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961
issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo
in Case No. T-46 (entitled Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al)
herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share
of the deceaseds estate as Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving
heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa
and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint
for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellees claim
as the legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo
Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased
Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo
was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila
sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the
Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr.
Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the
original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage
Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the
execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil
registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving the implication
that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a
record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely
placed his thumbmark on said contract purportedly on 16
September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn
Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day
before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975
attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for
five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus
the trial court concluded that the thumbmark was logically not
genuine. In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the
circumstances of the loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant
Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly gave the copies
of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration. And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose
Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the
date of the marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact, on the
face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one Benjamin
Molina who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave
the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported
marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church
where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in
Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein
Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of
Judge Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moyas
signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of
Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the
facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he
was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering
from glaucoma.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the
authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moyas signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI
Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature. He
pointed out irregularities and significant fundamental differences in
handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the
standard signature and concluded that the questioned and the standard
signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas signature,
appellee presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination
made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui
who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive
of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report,
Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious
habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics between
the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition
for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the
findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the
challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased
Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and
non-existent.[4] (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in
this wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the
contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife shall be set
forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and
the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a
marriage must be an authentic copyof the marriage contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be
established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the
document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and
subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3)
copies of the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructedcontract. Also,
appellant failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the
original document.
With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in
the questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil
was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the
order acted in the performance of his regular duties.
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was
subjected to a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates
the possibility of forgery of Judge Moyas signature. The value of the opinion
of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of whether a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape
notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis,
the assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a relative
one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of the
particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not
reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in
determining qualifications of this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial courts findings of fact when ably
supported by substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight
and respect by the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts
were overlooked or ignored by the court below which if considered might vary
the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that would warrant
reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to
great weight and respect on appeal especially when established by unrebutted
testimony and documentary evidence.[5] (citations omitted, emphasis in the
original)
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review
before this Court.[6]
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the
resolution of this Court:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob
and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E.
Jacob.[7]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid, but respondents
adoption has not been sufficiently established.
First Issue:
Validity of Marriage
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while
a voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.[8] Aware of this
fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage
between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was
neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. [9] We cannot sustain this
contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void
because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced,
because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.[10] An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.[11] Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article
76 of the Civil Code.[12] The Civil Code governs this case, because the
questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity
of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot
be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses.[13] Upon a
showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without
any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced
to prove its contents.[14]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when
they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr.
Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the
wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor
Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been
recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of
parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the
Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L.
Marino -- ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be
reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the
Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the
marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have
disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and
loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,[15] the
Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence
of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may
not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is
accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-
existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs
of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation
for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxxxxxxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily
collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic
papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not
necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by
parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available,
to establish its execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented but
not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand
on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.[16] But even there, we said
that marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.[17]
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the
signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously
narrated the execution thereof.[18] The Court has also held that [t]he loss may
be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who
ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place
or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept
by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to
find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.[19]
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of
Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as
well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence --
testimonial and documentary -- may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage
contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been
obtained.[20] Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the
reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is not
the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias[21], we have held that marriage may be proven
by any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to
testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."[22] (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,[23] we similarly held:
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence
may be presented to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of
marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,[24] in which, because
of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted testimonial evidence
in its place.[25]
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry
pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).[26] He finds
it quite bizarre for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their
marriage.[27] On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first
place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does
not invalidate the marriage.[28] In the second place, it was not the petitioners
duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar.Instead, this
charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.[29]
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is xxx of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio -- Always presume
marriage.[30] (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude[31], 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97,
March 12, 1975.31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[32] Given the undisputed, even
accepted,[33] fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and
wife,[34] we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that
the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the
Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the
regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to
the testimony of respondents handwriting expert, for the assessment of the
credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial
court x x x.[35]
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded
great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth
or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present
case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard
the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the
records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court failed to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion.[36] Hence, the present case is an exception to the general rule that
only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.[37]
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moyas
signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on
this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one
for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents expert and
brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.[38] Respondent Pilapil
justifies the trial judges action by arguing that the Deposition was
ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the
signature on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof:[39]
"Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A. I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judges
testimony out of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge
Moyas statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered
the queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.[40]
The answer I do not remember did not suggest that Judge Moya was
unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in
the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
 Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. A deposition[;] will you please
recall whether you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the
signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the
signature reading Jose[;] I cant make out clearly what comes after the
name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.[41]
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he
positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not
discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the
newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document
shown to him.[42] Indeed, we find no reason and the respondent has not
presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI
Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your
examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the
standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same
person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail,
the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural
pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph
as the capital letter J.[43]
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services
having been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was
recognized even by Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio
Pagui.[44]
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The
alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however,
Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The
only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused
pleaded guilty.[45] Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he
was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the
questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils
conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as
shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter.[46] In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had
treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records
Management[47] in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur,[48] issued Certifications that there was no record that
Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent. [49]
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming
such relationship.[50] This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the
evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between
Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby
recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent
Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO
SY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition[3] for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City.[4] Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two
children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and
February 14, 1978,respectively.[5]
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in
Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They
operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.[6]
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the
spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their
mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his
father.[7]
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed
as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to
a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband
abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for
more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.[8] Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by
the spouses.[9] The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina.[10]
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against
her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988,
she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her
husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San
Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her
and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the
computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance,
Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different
parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her
when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was
dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her
body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical
Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first
time Fernando maltreated her.[11]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision[12] dated April
26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1)
repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent
against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable
cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in its decision[13] dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on
the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a
decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll
to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity.
She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction
of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological
incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological
incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her
without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself.
Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband
existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.[15]
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision[16] dated
December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of
the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological
incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
trial court. In the decision[17] of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it
ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported
psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to
nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court
that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years
from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation
in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance
with law and the evidence on record.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of Appeals
denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996.[20]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the following
issues: Jurismis
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT
DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE
WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED
UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER
MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE
ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE
PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS
CELEBRATED IN 1973;Jjjuris
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A
REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS
CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A
REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT
OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE
HERETO.[22]
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the
ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the
time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute
nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack
of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that,
according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different
and incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and
justice,[23] in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural
rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect
and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not
to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their
existence would be defeated.[24] Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities
should not be subject to cavil.[25] In our view, the case at bar requires that we
address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and
violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent
facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects
according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates
of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to
the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she
points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she
submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage
contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as
Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial.[26] The date of celebration of their
marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973,
is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph
three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it.[27] This fact
was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her
direct examination,[28] as follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were
married on November 15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both
their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes
" B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the
course of the trial.[29] These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows
that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite,
yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.[30]
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that
indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court
that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September
17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15,
1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is clearly applicable in
this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported
marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified
among those enumerated in Articles 72-79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus
conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter
Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during
the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the
view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party
failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof
of the facts contained therein.[33]
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent
need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of
petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the
time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as
the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside.
The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina
Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for
lack of marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21076 March 31, 1965
WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Platon A. Baysa for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision
finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into
the country as a non-quota immigrant. This decision was affirmed by the Board
of Commissioners on July 12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in
a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. However, on June
28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new
set of members, rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. On
August 9, 1962, petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an
opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision, but the same was
denied for lack of merit. Whereupon, on September 14, 1962, petitioner
initiated the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before
the Court of First Instance of Manila which incidentally was considered by it
as a petition for certiorari.
In due time, respondents filed their answer, and, after the parties had submitted
a written stipulation of facts, attaching thereto some documentary evidence,
the court a quo rendered a decision granting in, toto the relief prayed for. Thus,
the court declared valid the decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 3 while it restrained respondents from excluding petitioner from the
country. Respondents interposed the present appeal.
It appears that in the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry
sometime in June, 1961, petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in
1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was
married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that they had several
children all of whom are not in the Philippines; that their marriage was
celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28, 1961 the Board
of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among others, that
petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted
her into the country as a non-quota immigrant; that this decision was affirmed
by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by the
Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu
proprio decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners composed of a new
set of members dated June 28, 1962 the latter found that petitioner's claim that
she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in evidence as it was
"bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship"; that said Board
further held that, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas
had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and
married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she
married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962
Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although
in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then
in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same
affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four
years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in
1912.1äwphï1.ñët
In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and
her alleged husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by
the immigration authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village
leader in China in 1929, coupled with the fact that the only basis in support of
petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral
and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife
relationship," the Board of Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record
concerning the admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its finding
that she was improperly admitted. Thus, said Board made the following
comment:
The only basis in support of the claim that she is the wife of Perfecto
Blas is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial
proof of husband-wife relationship. She relies on the records of
Perfecto Blas in connection with his cancellation case and the
testimony of the supposed children in the previous admission
proceeding. But this claim is belied by the admission of Perfecto Blas
himself, in the hearing conducted by a Board of special inquiry in
connection with his entry on January 23, 1947, that he was married to
one Ng Yo in Ki Say, Chingkang, China in 1936, his first visit there
being in 1935; he could not therefore have been married to herein
applicant in 1929.
The above comment cannot be disputed, it finding support in the record.
Indeed, not only is there no documentary evidence to support the alleged
marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so
many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity
concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. This claim cannot also
be entertained under our law on family relations. Thus, Article 15 of our new
Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated
in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any
court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or
minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine
Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume,
therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village
leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as
reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new
Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid
under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the
Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof
was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being the case,
we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a
foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.
The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved
the same as any other fact. Courts cannot take judicial notice of what
such laws are. In the absence of pleading and proof the laws of a
foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our own.
(Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46).
In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a
foreign law, it will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on
the same subject. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil.
472).
In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular
subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867).
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers
mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that
petitioner's marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. As a corollary, the
petition for mandamus filed before the court a quo is hereby dismissed. No
costs.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN
YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE,
RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where
he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the
Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo
Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special
Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among others that
(a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their
knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage
to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida
Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom
he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the
legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is
the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p.
107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp.
12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the
legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp.
28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of
Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28;
Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah
as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp.
68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the
probate court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower
Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy,
Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an
unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze
Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased
Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui
Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to
Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws
of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on
December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1",
English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and
Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property
should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat;
and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook
Wah as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased.
[CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was
however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective
appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045
entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen"
questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition
and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment
was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was
initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the
petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered
the denial and decided to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners
assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT
TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN
VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES,
MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND
RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT
WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with
Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument
they rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January
19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage
certificate because the practice during that time was for elders
to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case,
her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into
[an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the
agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be married, the
wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that the
said agreement was complied with; that she has five children
with Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who are alive
are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest
being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze
Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her
husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before
he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the
practice during the time of her marriage was a written
document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride
and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that
in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of
marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk
to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the
bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law,
then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on
engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring some
pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then
one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding,
which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on
January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom
brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and
on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the
dowry for her daughter and then the document would be
signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is
known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the
document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as
well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves
do not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed
in a carriage where she would be brought to the town of the
bridegroom and before departure the bride would be covered
with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the
bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during
her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom),
there were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened
the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down
the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that
during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat,
signed the document with her mother; that as to the
whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married
for 46 years already and the document was left in China and
she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was
left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she
does not know the whereabouts of that document because of
the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain
place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after her
wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as
husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that
Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April
in the same year they were married; that she went to the
Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again
she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as
husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat
during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated
that he was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister
with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese
government, a document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being
sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the
trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to
Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife
whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p.
54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on
October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status—
Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China;
"Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January
12, 1968 where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status—
Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee
Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the
Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the
information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs.
Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in
Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said
marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the
Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name
"Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12
citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1,
p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered
by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The
same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign
custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which
states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid
foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With
respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses,
skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law
of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books
of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule
132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official
record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law
[Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing
Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative
to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan
Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not
only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law
or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with
said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not
duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had
been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137
(1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the
principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
They must be alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector
of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial
letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential
requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on
his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by
authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was
the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese
law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed
taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case,
petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was
still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in
1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)]
as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial
pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the
contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds
true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case
did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the
oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of
marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should
be presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No.
L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her
testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the
Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat
was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her
marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction
[Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private
respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the
following are entered: "Children if any: give number of
children—Four"; and, "Name—All living in China" [Exhibit
"SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she
had five children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive
namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN,
December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for
presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support
Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein
Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told
her he has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah
and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977,
pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy
Mat according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of
legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners
are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another
[See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the
deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and
its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full
blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged
natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for
twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor
their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered
into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance
on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his
children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support
and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law
husband and wife and that out of such relationship, which they
have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate
effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida
Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953;
Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now
deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born
on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL
PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant
that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the
furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided
into two equal shares between, and
distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to
Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the same
to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel
Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall
be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be
his obligation to give to the aforenamed
children an amount of One Thousand Pesos (
Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the
two doors of the same building now occupied
by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the
parties, of the real estates and properties registered and/or
appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties
mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and
properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their
children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and
Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego
during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record
by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage
to Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been
ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No.
5502, entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the
Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption,
revocation of adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
 (3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations,
legal separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and
title seven, chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21
SCRA 1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72
SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts were abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with
the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia
v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence
it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by
petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in
Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should
arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court,
said incident shall be determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10,
1976, 72 SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act
No. 4834 **** a case involving paternity and
acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the
intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano,
L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision presupposes
that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing
and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting
rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215,
July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity
of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by
respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* The petition for review in G.R. No. 56045 was denied for
lack of merit on March 9, 1981, Counsel for the petitioners
then filed a Motion for Consolidation and for Extension of
Time to File Motion for Reconsideration which was granted
on July 8, 1981. On February 17, 1982, however, petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of March 9, 1981
was denied.
** Other than the exceptions contained in this article, this
provision of law is derived from Section 19, Act No. 3613 and
Section IV, General Order No. 68.
*** The presumption that, in the absence of proof, the foreign
law is the same as the law of the forum, is known as processual
presumption which has been applied by this Court in the cases
of Lim v. The Insular Collector of Customs, 36 Phil, 472
(1917); International Harvester Co. in Russia v. Hamburg-
American Line, 42 Phil. 845 (1918); Miciano v. Brimo, 60
 Phil, 867 (1924); and Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. L- BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
18176, October 26, 1966,18 SCRA 450. AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.

**** Rep. Act 4834 created the Juvenile and Domestic The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Relations Court of Iloilo. Section 1 of said Act is the exact edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
copy of section 19-A of Rep. Act 5502. Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T.
Gatchalian, et al.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991 BIDIN, J.:

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General
AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, seeking 1) to set aside the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil Case No.
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained
COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE petitioners from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO would lead to the deportation of respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated
vs. September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against respondent
29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN,respondents. Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the
aforesaid civil cases.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person with prayer
COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO to the trial court for further proceedings.
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs. On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court considers the comment filed by
172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as
SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.
REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents. There is no dispute as to the following facts:

G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991 On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian,
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian (Annex
vs. "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago
Gatchalian testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee,
namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena
Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived
in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all
surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and
Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram
bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto
Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are
the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and
Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision
dated July 6, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as
Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration
authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9
setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board
of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of
Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that
the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William
and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu
proprio of the proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the
decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent
Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6,
1962 was issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners
dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory (Annex "F",
petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners
(whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20, 1962) became the subject of controversy
in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court
sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners
having been promulgated on July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period
for review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the
July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board
of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then
Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision
of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest
issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming
the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting
respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest
issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation
wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along
with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6,
1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs.
45 (c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known
as the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of
the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate
action (Annex "20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission
of Immigration and Deportation * issued a mission order commanding the
arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", counter-petition). The
latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was
released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29,
presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-
54214 alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of
Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent
judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying
the motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor
children filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90
for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged,
among others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the
institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same day,
respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order
restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings
against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges
have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the
subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with
the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they
acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise
of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case
against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his
citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in
ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the
competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases
of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6,
1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a
Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed
Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1)
assuming that the evidence on record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino
citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case
until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2)
petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of
respondent's citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-
judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought
to be deported has already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order
the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals
which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of
quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board of
Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial
agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ."
Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of
Appeals is vested with —
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial
bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are
those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs.
Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434,
it is specifically provided that the decisions of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified
the matter when We ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to
 be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434
insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of
B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of
existing law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision,
or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary
of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law";
the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act
Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the
"Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission;
the Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board;
the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may
appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period
and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or
questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final
judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved
party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as
provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various
special courts, jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be,
consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes.
Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor
Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless,
reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by
way of appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission
of Land Registration, en consulta, are appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are
likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, and so are decisions of the
Social Security Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of
certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that
such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of
rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations
Commissions, whose decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It is only
when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain
bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration
Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others,
that the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs
in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-
judicial agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are
directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to
judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987
Administrative Code, which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to
judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the
statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules
of Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg.
129 and which thus modifies the latter, provides that the decision of an agency
like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court
specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any
court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of
the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level
or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as
aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its
decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil
action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in
the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180
SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest
the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings
(Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at
least insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim
to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation
proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be
ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96
Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We
quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized
and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A
citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any
official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding,
he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his
protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the
legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and
evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in
allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the
remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his
undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must
also be protected on time, to prevent undue harassment at the hands of
ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is
this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only
after the Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it,
besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public
opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners
over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday
vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]).
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the
"claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed
only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua
Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107
[1977]). It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is
substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance
of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be
the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1),
BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for
prohibition concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and
in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But
not in the case at bar.1âwphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings
submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to
decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not
without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to
always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be
served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised
again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs.
Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265
[1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37
[1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]),
We also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence
is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute
based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial
court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would
not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had
already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA,
112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra;
Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al., 19 SCRA 58;
 Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25
SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste
of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government,
not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs.
Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-
up is that where the dictates of justice so demand . . . the Supreme
Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citingSamal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al.,
Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA
1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional
Trial Court but also before Us in the form of public documents attached to his
pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his
Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition)
before the Bureau of Immigration already stated that there is no longer a need
to adduce evidence in support of the deportation charges against respondent.
In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha vs.
Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already settled respondent's alienage.
Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship
specially so where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the
Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong
vs. Deportation Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled
by this Court in the Arocha and Vivocases, We disagree. It must be noted that
in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was the actual date of rendition of
the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the
decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the
figure (date) "20" was erased and over it was superimposed the figure "6"
thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period from
July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not
squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of respondent's
who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha
in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party
to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July
6, 1962) finding respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily
proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make any
categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the
doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs.
Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA
561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and
in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in
a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51
SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party
in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative
agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown
hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the
party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall
constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other
case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a
decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered
conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained
in accordance with the procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be
raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth
in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners.
Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent
follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued
on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the
Court finds the same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as
the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of
implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are
concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest
only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must
be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of
arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being
unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po
Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155;
Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9
SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he
constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and
administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime
is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge,
why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve
less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for
purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest
is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test
of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo,
p. 183, counter-petition) issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly
indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the
suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission
order directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para.
a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
xxx xxx xxx
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately
conduct custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has
a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based,
ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to
stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same
was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records
indicate, which petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in their petition
or comment to the counter-petition of respondent, respondent Gatchalian,
along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a
motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in
1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to
the motion for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1
the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of
Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of
Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was
due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which
was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the
registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry
concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their
Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized
travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered
illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to
remain in the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order
(Annex "6", counter-petition) which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No.
1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as
Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated
their Identification Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official
act of the government on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian
continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent
William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the
BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of
said order states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based
on the citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order
dated July 12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not
satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or grandchildren of
Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was
reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the
"applicants being the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at
p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in
Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-
Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate
child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino;
that he was born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine
Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961
(Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine
citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry
which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on
July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino
and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P.
Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing to re-open the question of
citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even
put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau
of Immigration show that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been
declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-
opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question Santiago
Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent William
Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in this
case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's
arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation
arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not
be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs.
Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such
inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which places this case
beyond the reach of the resultant consequence of the fraudulent act
committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she
gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a
Chinese resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband, and
that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of deportation
proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed
from the date of her admission. Note that the above irregularity was
divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an
spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in the
investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the minor
on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the
immigration authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus
the fact that the mother was found to be married to another Chinese
resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the
Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a
 month, the immigration officials then must have considered the
irregularity not serious enough when, inspire of that finding, they
decided to land said minor "as a properly documented preference
quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why
two years later the immigration officials would reverse their attitude
and would take steps to institute deportation proceedings against the
minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much
as the attitude of the mother would be condemned for having made use
of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and
acquire permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say
unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed the mother to
remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by
inaction, thus allowing the period of prescription to set in and to
elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would
be to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault
of his thereby leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of
support and protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the
part of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation
which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor
herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against
herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent
was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long
years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed
and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against
respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of
respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then
Acting Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and
Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of
exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to
respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case.
They also opined that under Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5)
years limitation is applicable only where the deportation is sought to be
effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and
that no period of limitation is applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8,
11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that
such deportation proceedings should be instituted within five (5) years. Section
45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the offenses
therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment
for not more than two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who—
(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another
individual, or falsely appears in the name of deceased individual, or
evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name;
fictitious name; or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any
person not authorized by law to receive such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to
be false; or
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and
admission by the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the
Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful
concealment of a material fact; or
(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself
to be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any requirement of the
immigration laws; or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any
false statement or representations; or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first
securing an immigration clearance certificates required by section
twenty-two of this Act; or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing
acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not
 more than two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis
supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art.
90, Revised Penal Code); correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art.
92, Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended,
(Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c)
after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more,
but less than six years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the
offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-
year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien
after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC
are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription.
Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to
prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of
the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute
the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol.
1, 1974, at p. 855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a
criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus,
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal
procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment
may not be executed after the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry
or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be enforced
only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144
(3) of the Civil Code, an action based on judgment must be brought within 10
years from the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5)
years after the cause of deportation or exclusion arises when effected under
any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a) of
Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12
of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the prescriptive period of the deportation or
exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was
rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion
proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly,
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to
revive and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten
(10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William
Gatchalian has continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee
Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has four (4)
minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino
(Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes
"9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a registered voter of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage
(Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in business in the Philippines since
1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and
Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-
petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs and
in which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed
the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as such until
petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the
authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good
and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
How could one who has helped the economy of the country by providing
employment to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and be
summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to attract
foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least
US$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an
alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not
downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is
diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of
their position, petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with
Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William)
Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any
evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any
showing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have
been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were
contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages
cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco,
followed the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid
marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been
demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother,
a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot
be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46
[1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine
law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago
Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a
twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China
relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that
the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation
of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same
scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of
Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular
and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship
to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements
or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree
(Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support
in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved
by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
(See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco
Gatchalian aforementioned are not self-serving but are competent proof of
filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a
marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to
marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the
Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And
any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how
far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the
coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case
of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual
presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the
foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a
legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the
legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino
citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens
contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of
respondent William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965])
relied upon by petitioners. The ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply
in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to have
been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among
those authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code
(now Art. 7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues
raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R.
Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is
declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for
lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen;
Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges
are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting:
I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in the ponencia of Mr.
Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the
Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and
hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their
citizenship, and that "a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the
Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings." I also
agree with the conclusion that the petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board
of Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the
Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies.
However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William Gatchalian
should be treated as an exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law
which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion that this Court
should, in this instance, rule on the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of
remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits
would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions or
misapply the exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No
fact or circumstance exists to justify the application of the exceptions for the
benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary, substantial facts exist to render
immutable the unqualified application of the law and the doctrine.
To my mind, the questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely within
their quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, the rule laid down in Filipinas
Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25) and Lupangco vs.
Court of Appeals (160 SCRA 848) does not apply.
Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, and Our resolutions of 15 September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No.
79635 (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.) and G.R.
No. 80320 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et
al.), respectively, and Our decisions of 16 March 1989, 22 December 1989,
and 6 June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578 (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), 171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625
(Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), 180
SCRA 609, 617, and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.),
respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for appropriate redress instead of filing
petitions for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial
courts should have dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned orders,
respondents Judge Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before the former court and
his wife and minor children filed a separate complaint before the latter has not
been explained. It is to be noted that he is a registered voter of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage
(Annex 12, Counter-Petition). Therefore, he should have filed his petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. His wife and minor children are not
parties to the case before the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Their causes of action are based mainly on their claim that the acts of the
Boards against William tend to deprive plaintiff mother consortium and
connubium and the plaintiffs minors protection and support. At once, the
viability of their causes of action is doubtful; however, if indeed they have
valid causes of action, they could have been joined as co-plaintiffs in the case
filed by William. It appears then that their filing of a separate complaint before
another court was part of a strategy to frustrate the proceedings before the
Boards. As correctly maintained by the petitioning Boards, we have here a
clear case of forum-shopping, especially considering the fact that on
September 4, 1990, or two days before the filing of the case before the
Valenzuela court the government filed a motion to dismiss the case before the
Manila court. Forum-shopping has long been condemned and proscribed.
In People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450, 463), promulgated on
28 November 1980, this Court held that a party "should not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums." In the Resolution of
31 July 1986 in E. Razon Inc., et al. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R.
No. 75197, this Court held:
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping, an
act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with
the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that
tends to degrade the administration of justice. (See also Buan vs.
Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34; Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp.
vs. PCGG, 153 SCRA 591; Minister of Natural Resources, et al. vs.
Heirs of Orval Hughes, et al., 155 SCRA 566; Limpin vs. IAC, 161
SCRA 98; Collado vs. Hernando, 161 SCRA 639; Villanueva, et al.
vs. Adre, et al., 172 SCRA 877; Danville Maritime, Inc. vs. COA, 175
SCRA 717; Crisostomo vs. SEC, 179 SCRA 154; Adlawan vs. Tomol,
179 SCRA 42; and Alonto vs. Memoracion, 185 SCRA 73).
William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in the regional trial
courts. Under the guise of a counter-petition, he is now before this Court in an
active offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bang directly
to this Court the issue of his deportation and to divest the Boards of their
original jurisdiction thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he
did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately chose, instead, to
separately go to the wrong court, evidently to delay the proceedings before the
Boards, which they accomplished when the two judges separately issued
orders restraining said Boards from commencing or continuing with any of the
proceedings which would lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil
Case No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation charges against
William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90).
Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665) cited in the ponencia as
another authority which allows William Gatchalian to enjoy the protective
mantle of the exceptionary rule affecting the exclusive power of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation to try and hear cases against
aliens and in the process also determine their citizenship is either not
applicable or is mis-applied. This case laid down the principle that "when the
evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right
to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings. . . . If he is a citizen and evidence thereof
is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has
finished its investigation of his undesirability. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The
word courts should not now be interpreted to mean or to include the regional
trial courts because, as stated above, said courts do not have any appellate
jurisdiction over the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the Board
of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry. This case was decided in
1955 yet, or twenty-six years before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.
The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial intervention is
that the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, or
as stated in Co vs. Deportation Board, (78 SCRA 104, 107), the claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are no reasonable grounds for the belief
that the claim is correct.
The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even show, a conclusive or
substantial evidence that William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the
contrary, very serious doubts surround such a claim from the beginning. His
initial entry into the Philippines was made possible through a Certificate of
Identity (as Filipino) which was issued on the basis of a forged cablegram by
the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then new Board
of Commissioners promulgated a written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-2108-
C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for admission as Philippine citizens of
Jose, Elena, Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and Johnson,
all surnamed Gatchalian) reversing the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July 1961 and ordering the exclusion of William Gatchalian
and the others as aliens not properly documented. Accordingly, a warrant of
exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was issued by the Commissioners
commanding the deportation officer to exclude William Gatchalian, and
others, and to cause their removal from the country on the first available
transportation in accordance with law to the port of the country of which they
were nationals. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads as follows:
The claim to Philippine citizenship of above-named applicants is
based on the citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order,
dated July 12, 1960. It is alleged that applicants JOSE
GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA
GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN are the legitimate
children of Santiago Gatchalian with one Chiu Gim Tee. Except for
the self-serving testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and his alleged
children, there has not been submitted any evidence of Santiago
Gatchalian's marriage to Chiu Gim Tee and the birth of the alleged
children of the couple. The personal records of Santiago Gatchalian
on file with this office do not reflect the names of applicants as his
children, and while two names listed in his Form 1 (ACR application),
Jose and Elena, bear the same name as two of herein applicants, the
difference in the ages of said applicants, casts serious doubt on their
identity. Apropos, the applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, GLORIA
GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA
GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, not having
satisfactorily proved as the children of Santiago Gatchalian,
determination of the citizenship of the other applicants, JUAN
GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN and JOHNSON
GATCHALIAN, whose right to Filipino citizenship are merely drawn
from their fathers, Jose Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian, is
unnecessary. (Decision, Annex "E" of Petition).
Looking back to the case of Santiago, William's alleged grandfather, I cannot
find sufficient credible evidence to support his claim of Filipino citizenship.
For a long time before 20 July 1960 he considered himself a Chinese citizen.
The "conclusion" of the Bureau of Immigration that Santiago is a Filipino
citizen is based on totally questionable and insufficient evidence which cannot
inspire belief. The Order itself, signed by Associate Commissioner Felix
Talabis, supports this conclusion. It reads in full as follows:
This is a petition for the cancellation of an alien registry of
SANTIAGO GATCHALIAN, registered as Chinese and holder of
ACR No. A-219003 issued at Manila on 13 February 1951 and ICR
No. 7501 dated 3 May 1946. He is alleged to be the son of Filipino
parents who were not lawfully married.
It is alleged that the petitioner was born in Binondo, Manila, on 25
July 1905, to Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. It is noted that
in his application for alien registration filed with this Office on 13
January 1951, Santiago Gatchalian stated that his deceased parents
were Pablo Pacheco and Marciana. He was identified by his only
brother, Joaquin Pacheco, who insisted that he and petitioner are
illegitimate. It is true that, on record, there is a certificate signed on 26
October 1902 by Maxima Gatchalian, their maternal grandmother,
giving consent to the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian to Pablo
Pacheco (Exh. B), but Joaquin said that his parents did not actually get
married. In proof of this, the baptismal record of the petitioner
expressly states that Santiago Gatchalian was born on 25 July 1905
and baptized on 6 October 1905, being the son of Marciana
Gatchalian, "filipina", and an unknown father (verbatim copy dated 22
June 1907, Parish Priest of Binondo, Manila).
The petitioner, apparently not completely certain about his civil status,
has been interchangeably using his paternal and maternal surnames.
In school he was known as Santiago Pacheco (Class card for 1920-21,
Meisic, Manila; Certificates of completion of third and fourth grades,
Meisic Primary School); but in his residence certificate dated 17
September 1937, and in Tax Clearance Certificate issued on 2 October
1937, he is referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a communication
dated 6 June 1941, he was addressed to as Santiago Pacheco by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes office.
Considering, however, the positive assertion by his elder brother who
is better informed about their origin, the incontestable entry in his
baptismal record that he is illegitimate and the entry in the marriage
contract of his elder brother wherein the father's name is omitted and
the mother, Marciana Gatchalian, is described as Filipina (marriage
contract dated 29 November 1936) there is sufficient evidence to
establish that Santiago Gatchalian is really Filipino at birth, being the
legitimate child of a Filipino woman.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition to cancel his alien registration is
granted, petitioner shall henceforth be shown in the records of this
office as a citizen of the Philippines and the issuance to him of the
 appropriate Identification certificate showing his correct status is
hereby authorized. (Order of 12 July 1960, Annex "1" of Comment
with Counter-Petition).
As to his alleged marriage to Chu Gim Tee, and their five children, we only
have his self-selling oral testimony, thus:
Q What is the name of your wife?
A Her name is Chu Gim Tee.
Q Is she still alive?
A No, she died in 1951, in Amoy.
Q Do you have children with her, if so, mention their names, ages and
sexes?
A Yes. I have five children, all of them alive and they are as follows:
Jose Gatchalian, born on Jan. 2, 1927 in Amoy; Gloria Gatchalian,
born February 20, 1929 in Amoy; Francisco Gatchalian, born on
March 3, 1931 in Amoy; Elena Gatchalian, born on April 4, 1933 in
Amoy; Benjamin Gatchalian, born on 31 March 1942 in Amoy.
Q Where are they living now?
A All of them are now living in Macao, with my sister-in-law by the
name of Chu Lam Tee. (p. 4, Transcript of the proceedings before the
Citizen Evaluation Board on 12 February 1960, Annex "2" of
Comment with Counter-Petition).
If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, were
married, what was his reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that
he, is an illegitimate son? The only possible reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a
Chinese citizen, in which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of
Marciana, a "filipina." But to give full faith and credit to the oral insistence of
illegitimacy is to do violence to the presumptions of validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the legitimacy of children. (Art. 220,
Civil Code). These are among the presumptions which the ponencia precisely
applied when it rejected the petitioners' claim that Santiago failed to establish
his claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's (father of William)
claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of which were allegedly celebrated
abroad. I cannot find any valid justification why these presumptions should be
liberally applied in favor of claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but
denied to purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines.
Interestingly, Santiago used the surname Pacheco during such proceedings and
when he testified, he gave his name as Santiago Gatchalian Pacheco. This is
an incontrovertible proof that he recognized the legitimate union of his father
and mother.
On 18 February 1960, Santiago was recalled to be confronted re his claim as
to the number of his children; he testified thus:
Q In your testimony on February 12, this year, you named as your
children the following: Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and Benjamin,
all born in Amoy, arranged according to the order of their ages.
However, in your Form 1 when you secured your ACR in 1951, you
mentioned only Jose Gatchalian and Elena Gatchalian. Why, what is
the reason why in this form that you filled up in 1951, you mentioned
only Jose and Elena?
A That form I am not the one who filled it because that is not my
handwriting. It is the handwriting of my broker or the clerk of my
broker. However, when they prepared that I mentioned my children
named Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena in a piece of paper which I gave
to him, except Benjamin.
Q Why did you not mention Benjamin in the list?
A Because he was not yet baptized then. (Transcript, p. 7, Annex "2"
of Comment with Counter-Petition).
The explanation is very flimsy and does not deserve the respect of a passing
glance.
There is no showing that Gatchalian took any immediate definite positive step
against the 6 July 1962 decision and the warrant of exclusion.
It was only sometime in 1973, or eleven years after, that he and others covered
by the warrant of expulsion filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of
Special Inquiry. There has been no explanation for the unreasonable delay in
the filing of the motion. It may be surmised that it was due to his minority,
considering that he was allegedly only twelve years old when he arrived in
Manila from Hongkong on 27 June 1961. But, such minority was no obstacle
to the filing of any remedial action for and in his behalf.
The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry
of 14 March 1973 to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda for the
reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners were not
only highly anomalous, irregular and improper, it was done without any
semblance of authority. The Board of Special Inquiry did not have the power
to review, modify or reverse a Decision of the Board of Commissioners
rendered about eleven years earlier. Then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda,
acting alone, did not likewise have the power or authority to approve the
recommendation of said Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the July 6, 1961
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, to reverse, and nullify, the Decision
of 6 July 1962 of the Board of Commissioners, and to order the admission of
William Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to Sec. 26 (b) of C.A. No.
613, as amended (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940), only the Board of
Commissioners can act on the recommendation, if at all it was legally and
validly done. The Board of Commissioners is composed of the Commissioner
of Immigration and the two Deputy Commissioners. In the absence of any
member of the Board, the Department Head shall designate an officer or
employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve as member thereof. In any
case coming before it, the decision of any two members shall prevail. (Sec. 8,
C.A. No. 613 as amended). The Department Head referred to is the Secretary
of Justice since the Commission is, for administrative purposes, under the
supervision and control of the Department of Justice.
The decision then of Acting Commissioner Nituda was void and invalid ab
initio. In view thereof, the rationalization in the ponencia that the issue could
be re-opened since the decision of the Board of Commissioners of 6 July 1962
did not constitute res judicata is irrelevant. But even if it is to be conceded that
the 6 July 1962 decision did not constitute res judicata, I find it both strange
and illogical to give full faith and credit to the unilateral action of Mr. Nituda
and to use it to bar the Boards from exercising its power and jurisdiction over
William Gatchalian.
Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of Santiago, I find it rather
strange why Santiago did not mention him in his testimony before the
Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William was already eleven years
old. It is logical to presume that the proceeding initiated by Santiago was
principally for the benefit of his alleged children and grandchildren. It was, as
subsequent events proved, intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry
into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven months after he obtained a
favorable decision from the Board, and on two successive dates, his alleged
children and grandchildren entered the country. On 25 June 1961 his alleged
children Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and Juan
arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter Gloria and son
Francisco with his alleged children William and Johnson also arrived from
Hongkong. (pp. 4-5, Petition).
That he has continuously resided in the Philippines since 1961; he is married
to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a
Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino; he is a
registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and
exercised his right of suffrage; he is engaged in business in the Philippines
since 1973, and is a director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and
Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and that the companies he runs and
in which he has a controlling investment provided a livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents; he is a taxpayer; and he has
continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioning Boards initiated the deportation
proceedings against him, are not of any help to William Gatchalian. For, they
neither confer nor strengthen his claim of Filipino citizenship since they are
all rooted on the illegal and void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda of 15 March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid ab initio cannot
be a source of valid acts. Neither can such substantive infirmity be cured by
salutary acts that tend to confirm the status conferred by the void decision.
In the light of the foregoing, it follows that the warrant of exclusion issued
against William Gatchalian pursuant to and by virtue of the 6 July 1962
Decision of the Board of Commissioners subsists and remains valid and
enforceable.
I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer
enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is already barred by prescription
considering that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation
"shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises."
Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows:
 (b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12
paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be
effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation
arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the
court or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to
the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported. (As
amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503). (Emphasis supplied).
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and
12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the
limitation does not apply. These clauses read as follows:
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a non-
immigrant;
(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the
overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the Philippines,
or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed
to organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the
assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or
who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of
property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization
entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who in any
manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the
dissemination of such doctrines;
xxx xxx xxx
(11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-
marketing, independent of any criminal action which may be brought
against him;
(12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred and Seventy-Three,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the
Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine
citizenship;
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the warrant for his exclusion
was issued within a period of five years following his entry.
Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065) is not applicable to Mr. Gatchalian. In
issue in that case was the deportation of a minor whose mother fraudulently
entered the Philippines by using the name of a resident Chinese merchant who
is not her lawful husband but against whom no deportation proceedings was
initiated within five years following her entry. Said mother did in fact acquire
permanent residence status. Furthermore, the minor's mother never claimed to
be a Filipino citizen.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the questioned orders of respondents Judge
Joselito Dela Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having been issued
beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-
54214 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the
COUNTER-PETITION.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to join the opinion written by my distinguished brother in
the Court, Mr. Justice A.A. Bidin, and I, therefore, undertake to submit this
separate opinion.
For convenience, the following is a precis of the matters discussed in detail
below.
1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 is defective in its
language. The surrounding facts, however, make quite clear that an amended
warrant of arrest or mission order, or a new one correctly worded, may be
issued by Immigration Commissioner Domingo for the purpose of carrying out
an existing and valid Warrant of Exclusion covering respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission.
2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners ("BOC") and
Warrant of Exclusion remain valid and effective and enforceable against
respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants for that matter. That
Decision reversed a 6 July 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
("BSI") and held that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants
failed to subtantiate and prove their claim to Philippine citizenship in 1961.
Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any
mode of entitlement subsequent to his application for entry as a citizen of the
Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth
and supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian, also a
supposed citizen of the Philippines.
3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo,1 the Supreme Court upheld the validity
and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of
Exclusion not only against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian who
was taken into custody by immigration authorities in 1965, but also against
Pedro's co-applicants, which include respondent William Gatchalian. The
validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian, as a
supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen
of the Philippines, was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings
before the BSI and the BOC, and by the Solicitor General and Pedro
Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal
effect of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not
substantiated their claim to Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled
that the Gatchalian applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their true
nationality might be.
4. Should this Court now determine to examine once more the claim to
Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian, a detailed
examination of the facts, including the supposed status of Santiago Gatchalian
as a natural born Philippine citizenship, shows that those claims to Philippine
citizenship were indeed not proven by respondent William Gatchalian and his
co-applicants. Since respondent William Gatchalian does not claim to have
been naturalized as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC
Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not a Philippine citizen.
5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh to some, I respectfully
submit that the remedy lies not with this Court which is charged with the
application of the law as it is in fact written, but with the political branches of
the Government. It is those departments of Government which must consider
the desirability and wisdom of enacting legislation providing for the
legalization of the entry and stay of aliens who may be in the same situation as
respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants.
I
1. Petitioner argues that respondent William Gatchalian's arrest follows as a
matter of "consequence" of the Warrant of Exclusion issued by the BOC on 6
July 1962. This is opposed by respondent Gatchalian upon the ground that the
Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest does not mention that it is issued pursuant
to a final order of deportation or Warrant of Exclusion.
The Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 issued by
petitioner Commissioner Domingo, CID, reads in part as follows:
Intelligence Officers/Agents: All Teams
Team No.
Subject: William, Juan, Francisco, Jose, Benjamin, Jonathan, Pedro,
Gloria, Elena, all surnamed Gatchalian
Address: Bgy. Canumay, Valenzuela, M.M.
xxx xxx xxx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 113, Section 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Section 37,
para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
2. Make a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest under
Rule 125, Section 12.
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately
conduct custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has
a right to remain silent and a right to counsel;
4. Prepare and file an affidavit of arrest with the Special Prosecutor's
Office and, in case of a search, prepare and file an inventory of the
 properties seized, verified under oath following Office Memorandum
Order No. 45
xxx xxx xxx
The above Mission Order merely referred to Section 37 (a) of the Immigration
Act, as amended, and to Sections 45 and 46 of the Administrative Code (should
be Immigration Law), and that its wording suggests that the arrest is sought to
be carried out for the purpose of carrying out a preliminary investigation or
custodial interrogation rather than for the purpose of enforcing a final order of
deportation or warrant of exclusion. More specifically, the Mission Order
failed to mention the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision and Warrant of Exclusion. At
the same time, there is no gainsaying the fact that the 6 July 1962 BOC
Decision and Warrant of Exclusion do exist and became final and, as discussed
in detail below, remain valid and effective.
It should be noted also that by 6 September 1990, Special Prosecutor Mabolo
had filed a Manifestation or Motion before the Bureau of Immigration
explicitly referring to the Warrant of Exclusion issued against respondent
William Gatchalian and his original co-applicants for admission in 1961,
which had been passed upon in Arocha vs. Vivo(supra), and argued that there
was, therefore, no longer any need to adduce evidence in support of the charges
against respondent William Gatchalian.
Thus it appears to me that the Warrant of Arrest or Mission Order dated 15
August 1990, ineptly worded as it is, may be amended so as to refer explicitly
to the mentioned Warrant of Exclusion, or a new warrant of arrest or mission
order issued similarly explicitly referring to the Warrant of Exclusion.
2. It is indispensably necessary to refer to the Warrant of Exclusion of 6 July
1962 which read as follows:
WHEREAS, upon review, motu proprio of the proceedings had on the
application for admission as Philippine citizens of JOSE
GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN, BENJAMIN
GATCHALIAN, JUAN GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN,
GLORIA GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, WILLIAM
GATCHALIAN, and JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, the Board of
Commissioners found them not entitled to admission as Filipinos in a
Decision, dated July 6, 1962, and ordered their exclusion as persons
not properly documented;
AND WHEREAS, the Decision of the Board of Commissioners, dated
6 July 1962, ordering the exclusion of above-named applicants, has
now become final and executory.
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in the
undersigned by law, you are hereby ordered to exclude the aforenamed
individuals and cause their removal from this country to the port where
they came or to the port of the country of which they are nationals, on
the first available transportation, in accordance with law. (Emphasis
supplied)
It should be noted that respondent William Gatchalian was a party to the 1961-
1962 proceedings before the Bureau of Immigration which proceedings
culminated in the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the aforequoted
Warrant of Exclusion.
It is, however, insisted by respondent William Gatchalian that the Warrant of
Exclusion may no longer be executed or implemented as against him in view
of the passage of approximately twenty-eight (28) years since the issuance of
such Warrant. Respondent Gatchalian here relies upon Section 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act which states that:
Sec. 37 (b). Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 3, 7, 8, 11
and 12 of the Par. (a) of this Section at any time after entry, but shall
not be effected under any other clauses unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause
for deportation arises . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year-
limitation is applicable only where deportation is sought to be effected under
clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where
deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8 11 and
12 of Section 37 (a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that, to the
contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."
Examination of contemporaneous facts shows that the Government has sought
to effect the exclusion and deportation of respondent William Gatchalian upon
the ground that he had entered the country as a citizen of the Philippines when
he was not lawfully admissible as such at the time of entry under Section 37
(a) (2), since the BOC had held him and the other Gatchalians there involved
as not properly documented for admission, under Section 29 (a) (17) of the
Immigration Act, as amended. On 7 July 1990, the Acting Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") initiated the proceedings
immediately before us by writing to the Secretary of Justice recommending
that respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants covered by the
Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July 1962, be charged with: "Violation of
Section 37 (a), paragraphs 1 and 2, in relation to Section 45 (c), (d) and (e) of
Commonwealth Act 613 as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of
1940." The Secretary of Justice endorsed this recommendation to Immigration
Commissioner Domingo for investigation and immediate action. On 20
August 1990, Special Prosecutor Mabolo filed a charge sheet against
respondent William Gatchalian which specified the following charges:
The respondent is an alien national who unlawfully gained entry into
the Philippines without valid travel document in violation of the
Immigration Act; Sec. 37 par. a, sub pars. (1) and (2);
That respondent being an alien misrepresented himself as Philippine
Citizen by false statements and fraudulent documents in violation of
the Immigration Act, Sec. 45, par. (c), (d) and (e).
That respondent being an alien national is an undocumented person
classified as excludable under the Immigration Act, Sec. 29 (a) sub
par. (17).
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 37 (a) (1) and (2), of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
provides as follows:
Sec. 37 (a). The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien.
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection
and admission by the Immigration authorities at a designated port of
entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry; (As
amended by Republic Act No. 503).
(2) An alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 37 (a) (2), quoted above, relates back to Section 29 (a) of the
Immigration Act, as amended, which lists the classes of alien excluded from
entry in the Philippines, as follows:
Sec. 29. (a). The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from
entry into the Philippines;
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be
required under the provisions of this act. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the instant case, the net result is that no time limitation is applicable
in respect of the carrying out of the Warrant of Exclusion issued in 1962.
A little reflection suffices to show why this must be so. What was involved in
1961 when the supposed children and grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian
first descended upon the Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to be
a Philippine citizen to enter for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On
the part of the Government, what was at stake was the right to exclude from
the country persons who had claimed the right to enter the country as
Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate such claimed status.
Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted
into the country by the simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not
to be entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from
the deportation of aliens, who, after having been initially lawfully admitted
into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to deportation.
Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back to their country of
origin.2 This is so in cases where the alien has not yet gained a foothold into
the country and is still seeking physical admittance. However, when the alien
had already physically gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or
devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded any time after it is found that
he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry. Technically, the alien
in this case is being excluded; however, the rules on deportation can be made
to apply to him in view of the fact that the cause for his exclusion is discovered
only after he had gained physical entry.
It is worth noting at this point that in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), this Court upheld
the 6 July 1962 Order of the BOC and the application of the Warrant of
Exclusion, in respect of Pedro Gatchalian, even though more than five (5)
years had elapsed by the time the Court's Decision was promulgated on 26
October 1967.
Though respondent William Gatchalian is physically inside the country, it is
the government's basic position that he was never lawfully admitted into the
country, having failed to prove his claim of Philippine citizenship, and hence
the Warrant of Exclusion of 6 July 1962, or a new Warrant of Exclusion for
that matter, may be executed "at any time" under Section 37 (b). It is the
correctness of that basic position which must be ascertained and in that
ascertainment, the mere passage of time is quite peripheral in relevance
considering the express language of Section 37 (b).
My distinguished brother, Bidin, J., finally invokes Act No. 3326, and on the
basis of Section 1 thereof, would hold that where the arrest for purpose of
deportation is made more than five (5) years after the cause for deportation
arose, the prescriptive period of eight (8) years should be applied. Act No.
3326 which took effect on 4 December 1926, establishes prescriptive periods
in respect of criminal prosecutions for violations penalized not by the Revised
Penal Code but rather by special acts which do not otherwise establish a period
of prescription. In other words, Act No. 3326 establishes a statute of
limitations for the institution of criminal proceedings. It is, however, quite
settled that deportation proceedings cannot be assimilated to criminal
prosecutions for violation either of the Revised Penal Code or of special
statutes.3 Moreover, Act No. 3326 purports to be applicable only where the
special act itself has not established an applicable statute of limitations for
criminal proceedings. It cannot, however, be said that Article 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act (quoted earlier) has not established an applicable statute of
limitations. For, precisely, Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation may be effected under certain clauses of Section 37 (a) "at any
time after entry." One of those instances is, precisely, deportation upon the
ground specified in Clause (2) of 37 (a) which relates to "any alien who enters
the Philippines after the effective date of this act, who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry." Thus, the Immigration Act, far from failing to
specify a prescriptive period for deportation under Section 37 (a) (2), expressly
authorizes deportation under such ground "at any time after entry." It is, thus,
very difficult to see how Act No. 3326 could apply at all to the instant case.
Finally, we must recall once more that what is actually involved in the case at
bar is exclusion, not deportation.
3. It is urged by the government that Arocha vs. Vivo (supra) has already
resolved the claim to Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian
adversely to him and that such ruling constitutes res judicata. Upon the other
hand, respondent William Gatchalian vehemently argues that neither the 6 July
1962 BOC's Decision nor Arochadefinitely settled the question of his
citizenship.
My respectful submission is that respondent William Gatchalian's argument
constitutes a highly selective reading of both the BOC Decision and the
Decision in Arocha Written by J.B.L. Reyes, J. for a unanimous court. The 6
July 1962 Decision of the BOC, in its dispositive portion, reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Board
finds and hereby holds that the applicants[Jose Gatchalian, Elena
Gatchalian, Benjamin Gatchalian, Juan Gatchalian, Pedro Gatchalian,
Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, William Gatchalian and
Johnson Gatchalian] herein have not satisfactorily proved their claim
to Philippine citizenship and therefore the Decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry, dated July 6, 1961 admitting them as Filipinos is
hereby reversed, and said applicants should be, as they are hereby
ordered excluded as persons not properly documented.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Since respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants in 1961 claimed
the right to enter the country as Philippine citizens, determination of their right
to enter the Philippines thus indispensably involved the resolution of their
claim to Philippine citizenship. In other words, the determination of that
citizenship in the instant case was not a mere incident of the case; it was rather
the central and indeed the only issue that had to be resolved by the BOC.
Review of the 1961 proceedings before the BSI shows that the sole issue
before it was the supposed Philippine citizenship of the applicants. Thus, the
very same issue of claimed Philippine citizenship was resolved by the BOC
when it reversed the 6 July 1961 decision of the BSI. This case may be
distinguished from other types of cases, e.g., applications for public utility
franchises, petitions for change of name, applications for registration as voter,
filing of certificates of candidacy for an elective position, etc., where the
central issue is not citizenship although resolution of that issue requires a
determination of the citizenship of the applicant, candidate or petitioner.
The ruling of the BOC that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants for admission as Philippine citizens had not satisfactorily proved
their claim to Philippine citizenship, can only be reasonably read as a holding
that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants were not Philippine
citizens, whatever their true nationality or nationalities might be. Thus, it
appears to be merely semantic play to argue, as respondent William Gatchalian
argues, that the 1962 BOC Decision did not categorically hold him to be an
"alien" and that the BOC had merely held him and his co-applicants as "not
properly documented." The phrase "not properly documented" was strictly and
technically correct. For William Gatchalian and his co-applicants had
presented themselves as Philippine citizens and as such entitled to admission
into the country. Since the BOC rejected their claims to Philippine citizenship,
William Gatchalian and his co-applicants were non-Filipinos "not properly
documented for admission" under Section 29 (a) (17), Immigration Act as
amended.
4. In Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), the Supreme Court had before it the following
items:
1. The 6 July 1961 Decision of the BSI which allowed the entry of
respondent Gatchalian and his co-applicants as citizens of the
Philippines;
2. A split BOC Decision approving the 6 July 1961 BSI decision,
which had been "noted" by two (2) Commissioners but rejected by
Commissioner Galang on 14 and 26 July 1961 and 21 August 1961,
respectively;
3. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC in which the BOC had
reviewed motu proprio the Gatchalian proceedings before the BSI and
reversed the BSI decision of 6 July 1961;
4. The Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July 1962 issued pursuant to the
6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC; and
5. A decision of the Manila Court of First Instance dated 31 July 1965,
rendered in a habeas corpusproceeding brought to effect the release
of Pedro Gatchalian who had been taken into custody by immigration
officials pursuant to the 6 July 1962 Warrant of Exclusion.
The Court of First Instance ("CFI") decision ordered Pedro Gatchalian's
release upon the ground that the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision had been issued
beyond the one (1) year period for review of the BSI decision of 6 July 1961.
The CFI decision was reversed and nullified by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that the BOC Decision of 6 July 1962 had not been
antedated and that it was valid and effective to reverse and nullify the BSI
order granting admission to the Gatchalians as citizens of the Philippines.
The Court also held that the split BOC decision of July-August 1961
did not operate to confirm and render final the BSI decision of 6 July 1961, the
split decision being null and void because it had not been rendered by the BOC
as a body.
The Court further rejected Pedro Gatchalian's argument that he was not bound
by the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision:
It is argued for the appellee that the minutes in Exh. 5-A refer only to
the cases of Gloria, Francisco and Benjamin Gatchalian. But the
designation of the case is "Gloria Gatchalian, et al." No reason is
shown why the case of these three should be considered and voted
upon separately, considering that the claims to citizenship and entry
of all were based on the same circumstances, applicants being the
descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino and that all their
applications for entry were in fact jointly resolved by the Board of
Inquiry in one single decision (Annex 1, petition, G.R. No. L-24844).4
I respectfully submit that the above-quoted ruling in Arocha disposes of the
contention here being made by respondent William Gatchalian that he is not
bound by the Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, Arocha held that the 1962 BOC
Decision was valid and effective and William was certainly one of the
applicants for admission in the proceedings which began in 1961 before the
BSI.
Respondent William Gatchalian contends that the Court in Arocha did not find
him nor any of his co-applicants to be aliens and that all the Court did was to
hold that the 6 July 1962 Board of Commissioners decision had not been
antedated. This contention cannot be taken seriously. As has already been
pointed out several times, the 1962 Board of Commissioners decision held that
William Gatchalian and his eight (8) other co-applicants for admission had not
proved their claim to Philippine citizenship; not being Filipinos, they must
have been aliens, to be excluded as persons not properly documented.
Moreover, a review of the Rollo in Arocha vs. Vivo shows that the parties there
had expressly raised the issue of the citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian in their
pleadings. The Solicitor General, in his fifth assignment of error, argued that
the Court of First Instance had erred in declaring Pedro Gatchalian a Filipino,
and simultaneously urged that the 6 July 1962 decision of the Board of
Commissioners was quite correct. Pedro Gatchalian, upon the other hand,
contended that precisely because he was a Filipino, the Bureau of Immigration
had no jurisdiction to exclude him.5
The Court also said in Arocha:
Finally, it is well to note that appellee did not traverse the allegation
of appellant Commissioners in their return to the writ of Habeas
Corpus that appellee Pedro Gatchalian gained entry on the strength of
a forged cablegram, purportedly signed by the former Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano, and apparently authorizing
appellee's documentation as a Filipino (par. 3[a] of Return, C.F.I. Rec.,
pp. 15-16). Such failure to deny imports admission of its truth by the
appellee, establishes that his entry was irregular. Neither has he
appealed the decision of the Commissioners of Immigration to the
Department Head.6
Since the physical entry of Pedro Gatchalian was effected simultaneously with
that of Francisco and William Gatchalian, on exactly the same basis and on the
strength of the same forged cablegram allegedly from then Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano, it must follow that the entry of Francisco
and William Gatchalian was similarly irregular. The applications for
admission of the nine (9) Gatchalians were all jointly resolved by the BSI on
6 July 1961 on the identical basis that they were all descendants of Santiago
Gatchalian, a supposed natural born Philippine citizen.
5. The purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision by Commissioner Nituda
in 1973, cannot be given any effect. A close examination of the same reveals
that such purported reversal was highly irregular.
Respondent William Gatchalian alleges that Mr. Nituda, being in 1973 Acting
Commissioner of Immigration, had the authority to reverse the BOC Decision
of 6 July 1962, since he (Nituda) had immediate control, direction and
supervision of all officers, clerks and employees of the Bureau of Immigration.
Control means, respondent Gatchalian continues, the power to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.7
Respondent Gatchalian's view is obviously flawed. The Commissioner's
power of control over the officers and employees of the Bureau of Immigration
cannot be compared to the power of control and supervision vested by the
Constitution in the President of the Philippines (which was what Ham was all
about), for the Commissioner's general power of control cannot be said to
include the power to review and set aside the prior final decision reached by
the BOC. The Commissioner of Immigration, acting alone, cannot be regarded
as an authority higher than the BOC itself (constituted by the Commissioner
and the two [2] Associate Commissioners), in respect of matters vested by the
governing statute in such Board itself. One of these matters is precisely the
hearing and deciding of appeals from decisions of the BSI, and the motu
proprio review of the entire proceedings of a case within one (1) year from the
promulgation of a decision by the BSI.8
Respondent Gatchalian points to Section 29 (b) of the Immigration Act as
amended, as empowering Nituda to reverse the 1962 BOC Decision. Section
29 (b) reads as follows:
Section 29. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the Commissioner
of Immigration, in his discretion, may permit to enter (sic) any alien
properly documented, who is subject to exclusion under this section,
but who is —
(1) an alien lawfully resident in the Philippines who is
returning from a temporary visit abroad;
(2) an alien applying for temporary admission.
It is difficult to understand respondent's argument. For one thing,
Section 29 (b) relates to an "alien properly documented" while
respondent Gatchalian precisely claims to be a citizen of the
Philippines rather than a resident alien returning from a temporary
visit abroad or an alien applying for temporary admission.
It should be recalled that Nituda's 1973 Decision approved a ruling
rendered by a Board of Special Inquiry in 1973 that respondent
Gatchalian was properly documented, a ruling which was precipitated
by a "Petition for Rehearing" filed by respondent Gatchalian and his
co-applicants in 8 March 1972 before the BSI. There are a number of
obvious defects in the action of the BSI. Firstly, the motion for
rehearing was filed way out of time.Rule 3, B 22 of the Immigration
Rules and Regulations of 1 January 1941 provides as follows:
At any time before the alien is deported, but not later than
seven days from the date he receives notice of the decision on
appeal of the Board of Commissioners, the applicant or his
attorney or counsel may file a petition for rehearing only on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. Such petition shall
be in writing and shall set forth the nature of the evidence
discovered and the reason or reasons why it was not produced
before. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Gatchalian's and his co-applicants' motion for rehearing
was filed, not seven (7) days but rather ten (10) years after notice of
the 1962 BOC Decision had been received by them. Secondly, Rule 3,
B 25 of the Immigration Rules and Regulations prescribed that any
motion for rehearing shall be filed only with the Board of
Commissioners; the Gatchalians' motion for rehearing was filed with
the BSI which then purported to reopen the case "without first securing
the consent in writing of the Commissioner of Immigration" as
required by Rule 2, D 20.
Furthermore, the purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision was
made not by the duly constituted BOC in 1973, but only by its
Chairman, then Acting Commissioner Nituda. Mr. Nituda's action
flew in the face of Rule 3, B 22 of the Immigration Rules and
Regulation, which mandates that the decision of any two (2) members
of the BOC shall prevail. It thus appears that Mr. Nituda purported to
act as if he were the entire BOC. Indeed, even the BOC itself in 1973
could not have lawfully reversed a final decision rendered by the BOC
ten (10) years ago.9
We must, finally, not lose sight of the ruling in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra) where
the Supreme Court expressly outlined the procedure to be followed by the
BOC in resolving cases before them. This court was very explicit in holding
that individual actions of members of the BOC are legally ineffective:
. . . [T]he former Immigration Commissioners appeared to have acted
individually in this particular instance and not as a Board. It is shown
by the different dates affixed to their signatures that they did not
actually meet to discuss and vote on the case. This was officially made
to record by the Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order No. 9,
on January 24, 1962, wherein he stated.
that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate
in the cases coming before it. [Citation omitted]
Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the
purpose of its constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the
Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate
collectively and in order that their views and Ideas should be
exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs.
Humphrise, LRA 1915F 1047). This process is of the essence of a
board's action, save where otherwise provided by law, and the salutary
effects of the rule would be lost were the members to act individually,
without benefit of discussion.
The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be
exercised by the individual members separately. Their acts
are official only when done by the members convened in
sessions, upon a concurrence of at least a majority and with at
least a quorum present. [Citation omitted]
Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing
a board but of the official body, the members must be together
and act in their official capacity, and the action should appear
on the records of the board. [Citation omitted]
 Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of different
individuals, that board can act officially only as such, in
convened sessions, with the members, or a quorum thereof,
present. [Citation omitted]10 (Emphasis supplied)
The act of Mr. Nituda of reversing the 1962 Decision of the BOC
could not hence be considered as the act of the BOC itself.
The pretended act of reversal 0of Mr. Nituda must, therefore, be
stricken down and disregarded for having been made in excess of his
lawful authority. The 1973 order of Nituda was ineffective to vest any
right upon respondent Gatchalian who, it is worth nothing, did not
pretend to submit any newly discovered evidence to support their
claim to Philippine citizenship already rejected by the 1962 BOC. In
essence, Mr. Nituda purported not merely to set aside the 1962 BOC
Decision but also the 1967 Decision of this Court in Arocha vs. Vivo.
II
I turn to an examination of the underlying facts which make up the
basis of the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship. The
most striking feature of this claim to Philippine citizenship is that it
rests upon a fragile web constructed out of self-serving oral testimony,
a total lack of official documentation whether Philippine or foreign, of
negative facts and of invocation of presumptions without proof of
essential factual premises. Put in summary terms, the claim of William
Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship rests upon three (3) premises, to
wit:
a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen;
b. the supposed filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as a
legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian, which leads to the
intermediate conclusion that Francisco was a Philippine
citizen; and
c. the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a legitimate
son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to the final conclusion
that William Gatchalian is a Philippine citizen.
I respectfully submit that a careful examination of the facts made of
record will show that the correctness and factual nature of each of
these layered premises are open to very serious doubt, doubts which
can only lead to the same conclusion which the BOC reached on 6 July
1962 when it reversed the BSI, that is, that there was failure to prove
the Philippine citizenship of William Gatchalian and of his eight (8)
alleged uncles, aunts and brother in 1961 when they first arrived in the
Philippines.
1. The supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian must
be considered first. Santiago was allegedly born in Binondo, Manila,
on 25 July 1905 to Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. The
records do not disclose anything about Pablo Pacheco but everyone,
including William Gatchalian, assumes that Pablo Pacheco was a
Chinese subject and never became a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
The basic claim of Santiago was that his mother Marciana Gatchalian
was a Philippine citizen and that Marciana was not lawfully married
to Pablo Pacheco and that consequently, he (Santiago) was an
illegitimate son of Marciana Gatchalian.
The first point that should be made in respect of Santiago's claim was
that he had always regarded himself as a Chinese citizen until around
1958 or 1960, that is, when he reached the age of 53 or 55 years.
Santiago, by his own testimony, lived the bulk of his adult life in China
where he went in 1924 at age 19 and where he stayed for about 13
years returning to the Philippines for the first time in 1937. He
returned in the same year to China, stayed there for another nine (9)
years, and then came back to the Philippines again in 1946. He once
more left the Philippines for China on 14 April 1947 and returned on
14 June 1947. Upon his second return to the Philippines in 1946, he
documented himself as a Chinese national: he was holder of ICR No.
7501 dated 3 May 1946. He continued to be documented as such, the
record showing that he was also holder of an ACR No. A-219003
dated 13 January 1951. Santiago, again by his own statement, married
in China a Chinese woman. This Chinese wife, however, Santiago
never brought or attempted to bring to the Philippines and she
allegedly died in China in 1951, or four (4) years after Santiago had
permanently returned to the Philippines.
In 1958, when he was 53 years of age, Santiago obtained a residence
certificate where for the first time he described himself as a Filipino.
It was also only in 1960, that is, when Santiago was 55 years of age,
that he filed a petition for cancellation of his ACR obviously upon the
theory that he had always been a Philippine citizen. It was at the
hearing of his petition for cancellation of his ACR that Santiago made
his oral statements concerning the supposed circumstances of his
birth, parentage and marriage. Santiago's petition to cancel his ACR
was apparently made in preparation for efforts to bring in, the
succeeding year, a whole group of persons as his supposed
descendants.
The second point that needs to be made in respect of Santiago's claim
of citizenship resting on his supposed status as an illegitimate son of a
Filipina woman, is that no birth certificate bearing the name of
Santiago Gatchalian was ever presented.
Instead, a baptismal certificate bearing the name Santiago Gatchalian
was presented showing the name of Marciana Gatchalian, Filipina, as
mother, with the name of the father unknown. There was also
presented a marriage certificate dated 1936 of Joaquin Pacheco,
alleged brother of Santiago Gatchalian, also showing Marciana
Gatchalian as mother with the name of the father similarly left blank.
These two (2) pieces of paper, together with Santiago's own statements
to the Citizenship Evaluation Board as well as the statements of
Joaquin Pacheco to the same Board, constituted the sum total of the
evidence supporting Santiago's claim to Philippine citizenship and on
the basis of which an Order dated 12 July 1960, signed by Felix S.
Talabis, Associate Commissioner, granted the petition to cancel
Santiago's alien registry.
In so issuing his Order granting cancellation of Santiago's ACR,
Commissioner Talabis disregarded Santiago's failure to present a birth
certificate, in obvious violation of rules of the Bureau of Immigration
which expressly require the submission of a birth certificate, or a
certified true copy thereof, in proceedings brought for cancellation of
an ACR upon the ground that the petitioner is an illegitimate son of a
Filipina mother.11 It is well-settled that a baptismal certificate is proof
only of the administration of baptism to the person named therein, and
that such certificate is not proof of anything else and
certainly not proof of parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or
illegitimacy.12
That Order also casually disregarded a number of other things, one of
which was a document dated 1902 signed by Maxima Gatchalian, the
mother of Marciana Gatchalian, stating that Maxima —
. . . residing in the City of Manila, mother of Marciana
Gatchalian, unmarried, of 18 years of age, her father being
dead, do hereby freely consent to her marriage with Pablo C.
Pacheco, of Manila, and that I know of no legal impediment
to such marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
Such parental consent indicated that a marriage ceremony would have
taken place shortly thereafter as a matter of course; otherwise, the
consent would have been totally pointless. Even more importantly,
Commissioner Talabis' Order disregarded the testimony of Santiago
Gatchalian himself in the same cancellation proceedings that he
(Santiago) believed that his parents had been married by the Justice
of the Peace of Pasig, Rizal.13 In his Order, Commissioner Talabis
referred to the fact that Santiago Gatchalian had been "interchangeably
using his parental and maternal surnames. In school, he was known
as Santiago Pacheco (Class Card for 1920-1921, Meisic Manila;
Certificates of Completion of Third and Fourth Grades, Meisic
Primary School). But in his Special Cedula Certificate No. 676812
dated 17 September 1937, and in tax clearance certificate issued on 2
October 1937, he is referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a
Communication dated 6 June 1941, he was addressed to as Santiago
Pacheco by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office." At the very
least, such use of both paternal and maternal surnames indicated that
Santiago was uncertain as to his supposed illegitimacy. In our case
law, moreover, the use of a paternal surname may be regarded as an
indication of possession of the status of a legitimate or acknowledged
natural child.14
Perhaps the most important aspect of Commissioner Talabis Order
granting cancellation of Santiago's ACR, is that such Order failed to
give any weight to the presumption in law in favor of marriage, a
presumption significantly reinforced by the parental consent given by
Maxima Gatchalian to the marriage of her daughter Marciana
Gatchalian to one Pablo C. Pacheco. A related presumption is that in
favor of the legitimacy of offspring born of a man and woman
comporting themselves as husband and wife.15 I respectfully submit
that these presumptions cannot be successfully overthrown by the
simple self-serving testimony of Santiago and of his alleged brother
Joaquin Pacheco and by the two (2) pieces of paper (the baptismal
certificate of Santiago and the marriage certificate of Joaquin
Pacheco). It seems relevant to point out that Joaquin Pacheco, too, was
unable to present any birth certificate to prove his supposed common
parentage with Santiago Gatchalian; Joaquin was allegedly born
in 1902, the same year that Maxima Gatchalian gave her consent to
the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian and Pablo C. Pacheco.
The third point that needs to be underscored is that Santiago
Gatchalian did nothing to try to bring into the Philippines his supposed
sons and daughters and grandchildren since 1947, when he returned
permanently to the Philippines, and until 1960. The story given by the
nine (9) supposed descendants of Santiago when they first arrived in
the Philippines was that they had left the People's Republic of China
and had gone to Macao in 1952 and there they stayed until they moved
to Hongkong in 1958. It should also be noted that the youngest
supposed child of Santiago, Benjamin Gatchalian, was said to have
been born in China in 1942 and was consequently only five (5) years
old when Santiago returned permanently to the Philippines in 1947. In
other words, Santiago Gatchalian behaved as if the nine (9) supposed
descendants did not exist until 1960 when Commissioner Talabis'
Order cancelling Santiago's ACR was issued.
It may also be noted that Santiago's 1951 ACR application mentioned
only two (2) children of Santiago: Jose and Elena. In 1961, however,
Santiago stated before the immigration investigator that he had a total
of five (5) children: Jose, Elena, Francisco, Gloria and Benjamin.
Santiago's explanation strongly echoes a common lawyer's excuse for
failure to seasonably file some pleading, and, it is respectfully
submitted, is equally contrived and unpersuasive; that he had his clerk
fill up the ACR; that he gave his clerk four (4) names (not five [5]);
that the clerk had simply failed to fill up the ACR correctly. In its 6
July 1962 Decision, the BOC noted that "while the two (2) names
listed in [Santiago's] [ACR application] Jose and Elena, bear the same
names as two of the [9] applicants, the difference in the ages of said
persons compared to the said applicants, casts serious doubts on their
Identity."16
It is suggested in the majority opinion that the question of citizenship
of Santiago Gatchalian is a closed matter which cannot be reviewed
by this Court; that per the records of the Bureau of Immigration, as of
20 July 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino
citizen and that this forecloses re-opening of that question thirty (30)
years later. I must, with respect, disagree with this suggestion. The
administrative determination by the Bureau of Immigration as of 20
July 1960 certainly does not constitute res adjudicatathat forecloses
this Court from examining the supposed Philippine citizenship of
Santiago Gatchalian upon which private respondent William
Gatchalian seeks to rely. The Court cannot avoid examining the
Philippine nationality claimed by Santiago Gatchalian or, more
accurately, claimed on his behalf by William Gatchalian, considering
that one of the central issues here is the tanability or untenability of
the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship and hence to
entry or admission to the Philippines as such citizen.
2. The second of the three (3) premises noted in the beginning of this
section is: that Francisco Gatchalian was the legitimate son of
Santiago Gatchalian and therefore followed the supposed Philippine
citizenship of Santiago. This premise has in fact two (2) parts: (a) the
physical filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as the son of Santiago
Gatchalian; and (b) that Santiago Gatchalian was lawfully married to
the Chinese mother of Francisco Gatchalian. This premise is
remarkable for the total absence of documentary support for either of
its two (2) parts. Francisco was born in Amoy, China in 1931,
according to Santiago. The sum total of the evidence on this premise
consists of Francisco Gatchalian's own statement and that of Santiago.
No birth certificate or certified true copy thereof, or comparable
documentation under Chinese law, was submitted by either Santiago
or by Francisco. No secondary evidence of any kind was submitted.
No testimony of a disinterested person was offered.
Santiago Gatchalian claimed to have been married in China in 1926 to
a Chinese woman, Chua Gim Tee, out of which marriage Francisco
was allegedly born. No documentary proof of such marriage in China,
whether primary or secondary, was ever submitted. Neither was there
ever presented any proof of the contents of the Chinese law on
marriage in 1926 and of compliance with its requirements.
It is firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he who asserts and relies
upon the existence of a valid foreign marriage must prove not only the
foreign law on marriage and the fact of compliance with the requisites
of such law, but also the fact of the marriage itself. In Yao Kee vs. Sy-
Gonzales,17 the issue before the Court was whether the marriage of
petitioner Yao Kee to the deceased Sy Kiat in accordance with
 Chinese law and custom had been adequately proven. In rendering a
negative answer, this Court, speaking through Cortes, J., said:
These evidence may very well prove the fact of
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same
do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law and custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition
of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally
binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must
be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence"
[Article 12, Civil Code]. On this score the Court had occasion
to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact"
[Patriarca vs. Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of
a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the
Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as
determined by Philippine law.
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to
establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven,
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence [Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49
(1922).18(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, there was absolutely no proof other than Santiago's bare
assertion that a marriage ceremony between Santiago and Chua Gim Tee had
taken place in China in accordance with Chinese law. The contents of the
relevant Chinese law on marriage at the time of the supposed marriage, was
similarly not shown. Should it be assumed simply that the requirements of the
1926 Chinese law on marriage are identical with the requirements of the
Philippine law on marriage, it must be pointed out that neither Santiago nor
Francisco Gatchalian submitted proof that any of the requirements of a valid
marriage under Philippine law had been complied with.
I respectfully urge, therefore, that the reliance in the majority opinion upon our
conflicts rule on marriage embodied in Article 71 of the Civil Code (now
Article 26 of the Family Code; then Section 19 of Act No. 3630) is
unwarranted. The rule that a foreign marriage valid in accordance with the law
of the place where it was performed shall be valid also in the Philippines,
cannot begin to operate until after the marriage performed abroad and its
compliane with the requirements for validity under the marriage law of the
place where performed, are first shown as factual matters. There is, in other
words, no factual basis for a presumption that a lawful marriage under Chinese
law had taken place in 1926 in China between Santiago Gatchalian and Chua
Gim Tee.
It must follow also that Francisco Gatchalian cannot simply rely upon a
presumption of legitimacy of offspring of a valid marriage.1âwphi1 As far as
the record here is concerned, there could well have been no marriage at all in
China between Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee (just as Santiago had
insisted that his father and mother had never married each other) and that
consequently Francisco Gatchalian could just as well have followed the
nationality of his admittedly Chinese mother.
3. The last premise noted earlier is the supposed filiation of William
Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco which resulted in William's
following the supposed Philippine citizenship of Francisco Gatchalian.
William was, according to Santiago Gatchalian, born in Amoy, China in 1949.
Here again, just in the case of Francisco Gatchalian, there is a complete
absence of contemporaneous documentary evidence of the supposed filiation
of William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian.19 The only
support ever presented for such alleged filiation consisted of the oral
statements of Santiago Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian and William
Gatchalian. It is difficult to resist the impression that there took place here a
pyramiding of oral statements, each resting upon another oral statement and
all going back to the supposed bastardy of Santiago, a status suddenly
discovered or asserted by Santiago in his 55th year in life. No birth certificate,
or comparable documentation under Chinese law, exhibiting the name of
William Gatchalian was submitted.
Francisco Gatchalian stated that he had married a Chinese woman, Ong Siu
Kiok, in Amoy in 1947 according to Chinese custom. Once again, we must
note that there was no proof submitted that a marriage ceremony satisfying the
requirements of "Chinese custom" had ever taken place in China between
Francisco and Ong Siu Kiok; neither was there any proof that a marriage
"according to Chinese custom" was valid and lawful under Chinese law in
1947 and of factual compliance with the requirements of the law and custom
in China concerning marriage.20 Ong Siu Kiok was alleged to have died in
Macau and never came to the Philippines. It must then follow, once again, that
no presumption of a lawful marriage between Francisco Gatchalian and his
alleged Chinese wife can be invoked by William Gatchalian. It follows still
further that William Gatchalian cannot invoke any presumption of legitimacy
in his own favor. As in the case of his putative father Francisco, William could
as well have followed the nationality of his concededly Chinese mother.
One final note: it might be thought that the result I have reached is unduly
harsh considering the prolonged physical stay of William Gatchalian in the
country. But this Court must apply the law as it is in fact written. I respectfully
submit that the appropriate recourse of respondent William Gatchalian, should
he feel that he has some humanitarian claim to a right to stay in the Philippines,
is to the political departments of Government. Those departments of
Government may then consider the wisdom and desirability, in the light of the
interests of the country, of legislation permitting the legalization of the entry
and stay in the Philippines of respondent William Gatchalian and those
similarly situated. Unless and until such legislation is enacted, this Court really
has no choice save to apply and enforce our immigration law and regulations
and our law on citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in
G.R. Nos. 95122-23, and to SET ASIDE the Resolution/Temporary
Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990 issued by respondent Judge Dela
Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-5214, as well as the Order of respondent Judge
Capulong dated 6 September 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90; and to RE-
AFFIRM that respondent William Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of
the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-
appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of
San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student
of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and
socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age,
an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the
couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their
matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted
another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his
return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then
elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to
the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting
place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did
not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after
the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that
she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised,
because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted
because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke
(t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses
sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate
what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church,
due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the
officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take
place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between
Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father,
and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that
day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued
living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of
22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was
not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and
Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not
prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"),
but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition
(Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study,
and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two
years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for
the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was
issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of
Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September
1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten
children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May
1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño,
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage
to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they
had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife.
It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to
the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta
F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs
of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the
damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the
plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the
defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from
the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us.
Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and
both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest
(army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere
shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize
marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish
priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil
law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force
at the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the
legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis
supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal
requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil
effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which
provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage
shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of
the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that
the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their
marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee
Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to
note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing
priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for
divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and
binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she
was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been
in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake,
the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated
by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab
initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until
annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly,
Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District
Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued,
Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to
further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of
the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts.
97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage
bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a
foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent
violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the
third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, policy and good customs,
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce
decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members
of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should
have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of
our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam
quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort
cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier,
95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong
caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute,
contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person
not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the
basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an
invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this
court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior
to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize
divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the
present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in
effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710.
The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs.
Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results
that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London
in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her
death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very
children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations
are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941
of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from
Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in
the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union
is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands
undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed
error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of
a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the
question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the
answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are
well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the
Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they
are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too
strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of
their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the
Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was
begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these
letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and
for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño
house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he
would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her
hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the
clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the
parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous
one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony
was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the
refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her
decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an
alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her
money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should
not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce;
she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her
parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections
in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law
distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the
marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the
liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will
justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not
liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child
in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest
of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his
right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for,
his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a
divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take
his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support,
so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her
spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of
advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the
case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or
social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled
by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven
facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give
vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor
Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account,
against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that
(a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized
by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never
lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally
agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally
invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant
is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and
with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told,
we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of
moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are
excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important,
and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that
said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole
deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to
P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted
with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person
other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort
does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their
part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way
of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn
seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984,
in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the
Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were
married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973
and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil
Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City,
stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered
to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss
in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and
is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However,
when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a
certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste
of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in
this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds,
and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada
Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its
declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine
Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the
property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case
is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the
trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who,
giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were
neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated
in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP &
GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to
file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated
by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated
by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as
her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is
that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond
of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of
a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by
the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party
conjugal property. is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to under Philippine law?
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not of law.
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
are to be served. the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that
to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court. herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of
the impugned Decision reads:
Without costs. WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
SO ORDERED.
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
FIRST DIVISION
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380
Petitioner,
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
Present:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva
Davide, Jr., C.J., at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
- versus - (Chairman), Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz
Quisumbing, V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their
Azcuna, JJ. son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, naturalized as an American citizen.
Respondent. Promulgated:
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
October 5, 2005 obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She,
Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue,
x--------------------------------------------------x San Gabriel, California.
DECISION Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
QUISUMBING, J.: filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY
UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for
legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and
not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his
case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree
which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of
law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private
citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying
for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for
judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on
how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent
of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
 On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered
the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the
validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced
here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-
Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens
when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse
is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph
2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
 The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry. No pronouncement as to costs.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy
SO ORDERED.
of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for
legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties FIRST DIVISION
appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,
the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse. [G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization
of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13] DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
The Case
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, The Facts
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare
 The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic
Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United
States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his
favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and
he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant
and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office
of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating
that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left
blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February
2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family
allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and
all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be
suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their
conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault
and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by
both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed
for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior
Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual
allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if
they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The
will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by
Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito
Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their
three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically
my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno
and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City
Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my
lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether
real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed
to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of
by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this
my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to
act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute
should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree
in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever
my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by
virtue of this Last Will and Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will
and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that
the testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial
court admitted the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo
died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition[22] for
letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1)
that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and
1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc.
No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the
trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the
newspaper Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958
at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for
the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to
receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under
Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3)
months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits,
and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession
of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all
debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be
decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when
required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be
performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence
could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of
the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were
not legally adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the
trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties
she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
for reconsideration of the decision.[33]
[34]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack
of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various
arguments raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the
late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand
the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen
long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to
Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted
and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals
did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called
to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of
the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore
refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled
to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the
will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated
that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
(underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife
and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish
to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo
are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues
raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of
the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4,
1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law
with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch
to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca
Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of
the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a
writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal
Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979,
assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No.
01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application
for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a
resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of
both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San
Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to
Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's
marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996,
initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of
the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On
February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them
to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint
custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would
issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations
pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said
agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired
during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil
Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated
January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that,
since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is
carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the
ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente
Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court.
In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also
prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their
daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds
of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment
of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the
allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and
Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other.
Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for
support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the
Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent
is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to
Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the
instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by
Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery
against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August
8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the
appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of
the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED
in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the
assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount
of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April
30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary
injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this
issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed
under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March
25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental
orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed
CA Decision reads:
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a
cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the
basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or
petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage
with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on
February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino
citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her
allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not
shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The
Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did
not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to
that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and
eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over
a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of
her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly
Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's
representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured
her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning
the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision,
but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004
Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds
for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition
that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which
would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No.
01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision
submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN
ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING
ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE
MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD
ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
 IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an
absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this
jurisdiction.32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the
appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner
Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered
in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the
judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be
one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following
are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she
was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted,
and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her
marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of
Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she
stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau)
of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On
its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed
been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however,
that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by
the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars
are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5,
1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color
of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on
face: none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant
to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order
of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose
B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel
purposes.
 Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and
dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez
issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement
of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as
a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the
date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was
purportedly issued on October 11, 1995after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee
on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been
issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued
the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for
this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance
of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes
judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to
January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the
certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino
citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition
issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987
Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the
DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory
services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission
and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of
Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a
Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall
automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the
way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of
Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate
thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis
ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport
only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero
issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too
much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which,
to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca
was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also
imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as
Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification
certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual
issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be
exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen.
But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have
that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case
No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show
proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition
shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the
RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on
February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there
was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only
documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-
Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex
"B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued
on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document
be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being
crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not
have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached
consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as
Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to
dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said
petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's
opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97
valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a
Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second,
she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the
text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly
submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing
incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of
age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared
before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN
OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino,
appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney
given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this
case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the
property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through
their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No.
362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree
No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured
by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it
may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured
the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied,
but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings
on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to
the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained
in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed
to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule
39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
 (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment
is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain
Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign
divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid
and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the
pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is
hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the
legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance,
be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact
of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the
Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as
regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consists only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente
M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the
divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97
dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City,
Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not
merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with
each and every provision of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court
from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that
Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of
action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of
action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence
of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her
to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly
show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support
given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been
born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000,
or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support,
which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the
support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente
and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall
have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente
lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability
of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed
any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for
support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review
in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, – versus – MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 221029
24 April 2018
Facts:
On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:
 Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named YOSHIDO MINORO;
 Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after
due proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese
Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that,
based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford
Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless
Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall
have control over issues related to Filipino family rights and duties, together
with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts
and civil relations, including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held
that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is
applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married
to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al.
v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the
law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the
legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no
longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who
filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
Issue:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2)
of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and
plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or
the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse...
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address
the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse
to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is
at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a
means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of
the latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign
laws, both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations
in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who
are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
are based merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to
one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article
26 (2) of the Family Code.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity
or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action
for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather
silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to
their fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time
and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the
petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3]However,
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement
and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection
to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why
the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why
no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from
that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma
was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and
that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article
76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether
there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment
may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year
period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This
5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that
is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and
its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known
to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the
local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to
the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage
to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
 Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment
known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention,
he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings
thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during
the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved
to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact
from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot
be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court,
which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before
the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A
marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can
never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in
a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages
have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties
of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages
as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished
the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond
that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was
void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary
in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make
the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of
mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage,
so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though
no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts."
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except
in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity
can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise
in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case
No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R.
SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who
were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the
instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial
Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12
May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born
out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought
to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when
he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter
not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea
for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He
therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits[5] of the late
Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his
staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had
been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent
Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply,
the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must
be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment
to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he
had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant
to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn
to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known
that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge
of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before
him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to
live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are
not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage
tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more
when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of
time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other
is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as
a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law
excuses no one has special application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant
with the law and basic legal principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is
simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is
hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be
imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R.
ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4;
and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu
·City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City;
CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu
City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D.
VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu
City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu
City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch
4, Cebu City. Respondents.
*PERLAS-BERNABE
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed
with a heavy burden of responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its
dispensation ― from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk ― live up to the
strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public
service."1
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007
Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).2 The judicial
audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. 3 Certain
package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for
instant marriages.4
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded
to Cebu City and headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating
Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City.5 A female and male lawyer
of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They
went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to
Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would
be recognized by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of
Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then agreed
that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage
application process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and
assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the marriage
process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be
solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the
day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the
regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos (₱3,000) only.6
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6
July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and
directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective
comments.7 The Court also suspended the judges pending resolution of the
cases against them.8
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 20079 and
Supplemental Report.10 Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates
were examined by the judicial audit team.11 The team reported that out of the
643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under
Article 3412 of the Family Code.13 The logbooks of the MTCC Branches
indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage
certificates in the courts’ custody.14 There is also an unusual number of
marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili
and Liloan, Cebu.15 There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with
marriage licenses obtained on the same day.16 The town of Barili, Cebu is more
than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of
almost two (2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10)
kilometers away from Cebu City.18
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and
government personnel, also reported the following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get
married by checking whether their documents were complete and referred
them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards;19
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge
Necessario. There were also "assistants" who would go over the couples’
documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya
also narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their
acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu
despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous
marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis;20
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the
available judges. She admitted that after the payment of the solemnization fee
of three hundred pesos (₱300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the
parties and the judge, was paid to the latter.21 She admitted that she accepted
four thousand pesos (₱4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil
Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a
certain "Mang Boy";22
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married
and that most of the marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil
registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were
not strict about couples’ attendance in the family planning seminar. She also
admitted that couples gave her food while the judge received five hundred
pesos (₱500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners
were said to have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one
thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500) for gasoline expenses if the marriage
was celebrated outside the chambers;23
5) Marilou Cabañez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to
Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales. However, she denied receiving any
amount from these couples. She told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th,
and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage solemnization;24
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He
told the investigating team that Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples wishing
to get married without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of
cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries. The
judge would then receive an envelope containing money from the couple.
Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates;25
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the
investigating team that couples looked for Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang
bayad."26 The excess of three hundred pesos (₱300) that couples paid to Judge
Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking fund" of Branch 9;27
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges
Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married under Article 34 of
the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint
cohabitation for ten pesos (₱10);28
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted
that he referred couples to Branch 2, Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared
that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge
Necessario.29 He informed the judge that the couple only had birth
certificates.30 The respondent judge then inquired about their ages and asked
them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the
marriage;31 and
10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she
does not scrutinize marriage applications.32 Couples who are non-Barili
residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili office because
these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu.33 She also added that
while couples still need to submit a certificate of attendance in the family
planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the application
for marriage license.34
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou
Baguio-Manera was a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May
2007, she and her then fiancé wanted to set a marriage date.35 Her younger
sister who was married in a civil wedding last year gave her the number of a
certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the wedding was
scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their
birth certificates. No marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked
for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500). According to Baguio-
Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was
necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order
No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand what that
statement meant at that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the
situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fiancé.
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July
2007 affidavit, she recounted how she and her boyfriend went to the Provincial
Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging in at the entrance, they
were offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand five hundred
pesos (₱1,500). The guard also offered to become "Ninong" or a witness to the
wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through with the
civil wedding at that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring
Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and
Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of
Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental
Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b) directing the
Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental
Report; c) requiring the court personnel listed below to show cause within
fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them for their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading
them in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Cebu City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5) Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for appropriate action on the
administrative matter involving the violation of the law on marriage by Ms.
Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms.
Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b)
directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the Supplemental Report of the
OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu
City, to comment within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement of staff
member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9’s court personnel received an
amount in excess of the ₱300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose
marriages were solemnized by her. This amount goes to the court’s "sinking
fund".36
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of
the OCA and its Supplemental Report,37 the respondent judges argued the
following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding
the documents presented to him by contracting parties.38 He claims that
marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required
affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation
have been used by other judges even before he became a judge.39 He avers that
he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an
impediment to marry.40 He also asks the parties searching questions and
clarifies whether they understood the contents of the affidavit and the legal
consequences of its execution.41 The judge also denies knowledge of the
payment of solemnization fees in batches.42 In addition, he argues that it was
a process server who was in-charge of recording marriages on the logbook,
keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages
monthly.43
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and
that he is not required to inquire whether the license was obtained from a
location where one of the parties is an actual resident.44 The judge believes that
it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to determine
its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public
documents.45 The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing
marriages which involves: first, the determination whether the solemnization
fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of cohabitation and birth
certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the
parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal capacity to marry,
passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers when the party is divorced;
fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses questions regarding
cohabitation and interviews the children of the parties, if any.46
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls
the actions of the judicial audit team during the investigation an
"entrapment".47 She also claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing
marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact
that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the
parties resided.48 As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that
she cannot be faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges
are not handwriting experts.49 The affidavits also enjoy the presumption of
regularity.50 Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as
hearsay.51 The respondent said that when Baguio-Manera and her husband
were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the veracity of
the statements, particularly the fact that they have been living together for five
years.52 The judge also attributes the irregularity in the number of marriages
solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks.53
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage.54 He
maintains that it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents
submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license
issued.55 It is only when there is no marriage license given that he ascertains
the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry.56 As
to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with
the fact that these are pro forma. He states that marriage certificates are
required with the marriage license attached or the affidavit of cohabitation only
and the other documents fall under the responsibility of the local civil registrar.
He surmises that if the marriage certificate did not come with the marriage
license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document might have been
inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil
registrar. As to the payment of the docket fee, he contends that it should be
paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before because judges will
be pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the
task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of Court.57 The judge also argues
that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty.58
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of
Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of
Case.59 This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the
suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them from solemnizing
marriages until further ordered.60
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early
Resolution with Waiver of Formal and/or Further Investigation and Motion to
Dismiss.61 In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion
and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their
unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic benefits from 9 July 2007.62
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,63 the OCA recommended the
dismissal of the respondent judges and some court employees, and the
suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the liabilities of the
respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents and
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere
affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his
embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for
failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty
of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of
the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors
during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect
of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to
make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing
marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted
a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from
his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect
of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to
make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere
affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the
embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that prohibits court
personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any
or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions and for giving false information for the purpose
of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel
Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to
indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for providing couples who are to
be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of
cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are
guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other
remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or
involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against
Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabañez,
for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the
MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross
neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant
the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURT’S RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator are supported by the evidence on record and applicable law and
jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a
heavy burden and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public.65 In
Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of
official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any
conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration
of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish
the faith of the people in the Judiciary.66
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of
swift marriages. The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws
and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of
justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella
M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without following the proper
procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines
and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the solemnization
process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the
individual liabilities of the respondent judges and court personnel vis-à-vis the
evidence presented by the OCA against them.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand
one hundred twenty-three (1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007.67 However,
only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were actually
examined by the judicial audit team.68 Out of the 184 marriages, only seventy-
nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred five
(105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79
marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the
marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a
period of years.69 There were also twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by
the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license,
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.70
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable
supporting documents such as marriage licenses.71 The OCA found that the
place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the supporting
documents differ from the place where they obtained their marriage
license.72 The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and
superimpositions in the entries of residence.73 Likewise, in lieu of the required
certificate of legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by the
parties.74 Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were also
apparent in the documents.75
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34
of the Family Code. These marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit
of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one or both of them during
cohabitation.76 For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of
22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are
residents of Lapu-Lapu City.77
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of
the solemnization fee but the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be
found.78 The presence of the receipts implies that these marriages were
solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to
2007.79 However, the logbook showed that he solemnized two hundred
seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that
he solemnized five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out
of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75) under
Article 34 of the Family Code.80 This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages
solemnized under Article 34 in a four-year period.81
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or
Judge Necessario as solemnizing officers found in his custody.82 There were
also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code where one or both
of the contracting parties were minors during cohabitation.83 To illustrate,
respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the marriage of Julieto W. Baga,
22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old.84
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the
contracting parties were residents of Cebu City.85 The judge solemnized three
(3) marriages without the foreign party’s required certificate of legal capacity
to marry.86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the solemnization fee in
almost all of the marriages the judge officiated.87
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages
from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage certificates actually
examined.88 However, the monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized
three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007.89 The
OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started to
use a logbook to keep track of marriages.90
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or
missing documents such as the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity
to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.91 In several instances, only
affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity to marry.92
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable
character of the validity of the required documents particularly the marriage
license.93 The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and
superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties’ place of residence.94
In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo
and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license
containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and
a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.95
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of
the Family Code wherein the marriage requirements’ authenticity was doubtful
due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given
address of the parties.96 These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-
year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25
May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is
"Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an application for
marriage license attached to the marriage certificate showing that Secuya’s
address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."97
Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages
from 2006 to 2007 based on the marriage certificates examined by the judicial
audit team.98 However, only three (3) marriages were reported for the same
period.99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or
42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code.100 Thirty-eight
(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from
the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu.101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from
the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu.102 Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other
local civil registrars.103
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses,
applications for marriage license, certificates of legal capacity to contract
marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage,
joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to the
solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no
corresponding marriage certificates.104 He solemnized two marriages of Buddy
Gayland Weaver, an American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9)
months.105 No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage or the divorce decree was presented.106
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete
supporting documents such as the certificate of legal capacity to marry and the
joint affidavit of cohabitation.107 He solemnized nine (9) marriages under
questionable circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit or
affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to
marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing
in the marriage documents, and the solemnization of the marriage on the same
day the marriage license was issued.108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that
the solemnization fee of ₱300 was paid.109 On the other hand, there were
twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were paid late.110
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the
requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable
character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering,
erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ place
of residence.111 These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font
size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and
marriage license.112 These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross
inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala,113the Court held that inefficiency implies
negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the
payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v.
Adolfo,114 defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a task
expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the
frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger
or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit
team show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were
missing115 or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on
different dates.116 The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization
fee starts off the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp
of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages
where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of
legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted
were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the
certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family
Code117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have
been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license
issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of
parties to contract marriage.118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross
ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code119 with respect to the
marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.120 The audit team cites in
their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from
eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere
submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation.121 These affidavits
were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.122
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of
marriages of some couples where no marriage license was previously issued.
The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the
same day the marriage was solemnized.123
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the
ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the
duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of
evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the
presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the
moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen,124 this Court held that:
…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a
marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar.
All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued
by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,125 that "the presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the
marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity
of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the
submission of the certificate from the embassy of the foreign party to the local
registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have been more
diligent in reviewing the parties’ documents and qualifications. As noted by
the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the presence of
mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the
marriage license issuance.
The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required
qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of
a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article
34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license.126 Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed.127 The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted
pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter.
The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid
under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract.128 The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other
during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage.129
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the
respondents, the Family Code provides the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of
the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab
initio.130 The actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding
the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the
proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications. In
Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano,131 the Court said that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of
the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the marriage.
It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman.
They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in the instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently.132
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis ordered Celerina Plaza, a personal employee of the judge, to wait for
couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services.133 Crisanto Dela Cerna
also stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage
certificates and bring them to her house when she found out about the judicial
audit.134 In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the
solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a business.135 The respondent
judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for
repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant
a copy of her comment. She was also fined the amount of five thousand pesos
(₱5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC.136 She was
reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-
001337.137Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator
v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1817, promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of
gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars
and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed from service,
with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if
any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of
their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of
incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is
considered as an indication of lack of integrity."140 In connection with this, the
administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to
office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible
representation of the law and more importantly of justice.141
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright
shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the
following employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC,
Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of grave misconduct when she informed the
female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate the marriage and
the requirements on the same day of the lawyer’s visit.142
What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for
a fee of ₱3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit
based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit
shall influence their official actions.
Mongaya’s claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she
knew from other offices as the usual practice143 is inexcusable. As found by
the OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false information
for the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes
grave misconduct."144 Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave
offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on
a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation
of justice; parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon
court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In
performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as
sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably
affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s trust and
confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave
in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only
to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary.145
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of
court personnel. Her actions placed doubts on the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the MTCC, Cebu City, is guilty of gross misconduct. She assisted the
couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and accepted
₱4,000 from them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and adopted by this
Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage
license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.147 The claim
that she gave the amount to a certain Borces who was allegedly the real
facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage. According to the
OCA, when the couple went back for their marriage certificate, they
approached Rodriguez and not Borces.148 When Borces told Rodriguez that the
marriage certificate had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed
Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate.149
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon
I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, merits a grave penalty.150 Such
penalty can be dismissal from service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca
Alesna are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the service.
Aranas provided couples who were to be married under Article 34 of the
Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.151 On the other hand,
Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit which
according to Alesna costs ₱10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount
involved in the transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives
the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making money out of
judicial transactions.152
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo153 that acts of court personnel outside
their official functions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The
purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court personnel
from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma
Valencia, Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca
Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit
team that they received food from couples they assisted.154 This is in violation
of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which
prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions
or proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are
admonished considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of
minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that commission
of an administrative offense for the first time is an extenuating circumstance.155
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya.
The OCA reports that Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she received
₱5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure
necessary documents.156 The information was volunteered by Corazon Retuya
with no supporting sworn statement from the couple. However, she denies this
fact later on in her Comment.157 Finding the earlier statement of Corazon
Retuya as unclear and lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the
findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against
Marilou Cabañez. Cabañez was only implicated in this case through the sworn
statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that they paid a certain
"Meloy" ₱1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family through the
assistance of Cabañez.158Cabañez denies that she was the one who assisted the
couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal
assistant of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname
"Meloy" not from Cabañez herself but from Baguio-Manera’s younger
sister.159 When Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she
did not obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is Cabañez. The Court adopts
the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification of Cabañez
and finds merit in her denial.160
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the
case against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg. The judge was only implicated
through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged
sinking fund". No evidence was presented as to the collection of an excess of
the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg or her staff had
knowledge of such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty
and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if
any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of
gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that
he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty
and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she
not been previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817
(Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty
and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if
any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
4, Cebu City, GUILTY of violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she
be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel
Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with
a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
1, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu
City, and Emma Valencia, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court
Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and
Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements
of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office
of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings
against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished
copies of the Supplemental Report dated 14 August 2007 and are ADVISED
to conduct an investigation with respect to the statements of Filomena C.
Lopez, Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar
of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage licenses and to take the
necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents’ files that are with
the Office of the Bar Confidant and distributed to all courts and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998]
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY* and
HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78,
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ration decidendi and the fallo of a
decision is the primary issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed
by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabels petition for
appointment as administratrix of her grandmothers estate by virtue of her right
of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico
Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony
of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita
Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco
Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-
Suntay filed a criminal case[1]against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In
retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI)[2] a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among
others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children
who were living with their mother.[3] The suit was docketed as civil case
number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive
portion which reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void
and of no effect as between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and
shown by the records that the question of the case and custody of the three
children have been the subject of another case between the same parties in
another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot
be litigated in this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the
third party defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that
defendant is willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand
for P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded the sum of P50,000.00 as her
counterclaim and to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
As basis thereof, the CFI said:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the
Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case
(September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued
to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even
as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was
actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate
understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on
July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would
justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after
(sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of the plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to
be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to
the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really
lives more in fancy that in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).[5] (emphasis supplied)
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabels paternal
grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.[6]
Five years later or on October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo
Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[7] a petition for
issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her
late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay which case was docketed as
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged among
others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and
prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the estate.[8]
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is
the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal
properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to
protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her
family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than
thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued
instead to him.[9]
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition,
petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main
that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the
decedents estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of
the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of
representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his mother, the late
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by
the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of the respondent Isabels parents is null
and void, the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the
estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent.[10] On October 16, 1997, the
trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss.[11] When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court
in an order dated January 9, 1998,[12] petitioner, as mentioned above filed this
petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in
denying his motion to dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration on the
grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for
the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was
timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage
of respondent Isabels parents null and void must be upheld; and (d) said
decision had long become final and had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioners motion to
dismiss was late having been filed after the opposition was already filed in
court, the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that
petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent
Isabels allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay,
the decedents son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a
miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the
erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and
its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage, the
court either sustains the validity of marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after
hearing a marriage voidable otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly,
that the status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are
annulled is voidable.
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is
concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction,
and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding.[13] There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power for it to prosper.[14]
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court
did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder. To with:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the
pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture
is inappropriate considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as
distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was
not adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause
of action against a particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital
interest in the maintenance of the proceedings, not only because of the taxes
due it, but also because if no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by
escheat.
xxx xxx xxx
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner
to file ad maintain this special proceedings, that in the case at bench, the body
of the decision determines the nature of the action which is for annulment, not
declaration of nullity.
The oppositors contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex A
Motion) prevails over the body thereof is not of a final decision is definite,
clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of
interpretation or construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision
may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgement (78 SCRA 541
citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The
reason is that the dispositive portion must find support from the decisions ratio
decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked
as Annex A of oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the
Civil Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner
being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of
annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the
Phils.).[15]
The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be
observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.[16] The Rules
do not only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for. express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally
wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall
under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall
may be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint.
be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same
Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioners
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
opposition.[17] which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
called natural children by legal fiction.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed
Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes
almost two years after respondent Isabel was already through with the
the legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot
presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two
destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union produced during
witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but also
its continuance.[22]
dilatory.
Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from
connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate;
established jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact
obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away
faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case.In fact, the alleged
with[23] whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the
conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof
beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later
which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal
ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in
is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent
nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status condition which
Isabels parents is clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code,
already exists from the very beginning.
the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument that it is the dispositive
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI
portion of the decision which must control as to whether or not the marriage
decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabels
of respondent Isabels parents was void or voidable.Such argument springs
parents is null and void and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the
from a miscomprehension of the judgment of the Civil Case No. Q-7180 and
marriage from its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage
the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision
is illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and
and its dispositive portion.
83[18] of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85
enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled.[19] Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the
resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that
decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties
void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void
and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the
marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for
decision or order which may be somewhat confusing,[24] the same is not
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are
without qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive
called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and
part of a final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be
obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89[20] irrespective
wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction which
of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad
usually is the case where the order or decision in question is that of a court not
faith.
of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces on which the judgment is based.[25]
all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court
in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves
 Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive
portion and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the
whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and
judgment of the court. In Republic v. delos Angeles[26] the Court said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that [i]n case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot be
any less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments.
x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a
whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by
fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and
part if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court,
consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864
[Emphasis supplied]
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of
Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even
as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was
actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate
understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on
July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would
justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be
without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the
finding of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives
more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).[27]
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage
of respondent Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil
Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore
governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary
interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on
said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court
setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For
purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate
grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional
right of representation in the estate of their grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo
Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their
grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the
courts of whether Letters of Administration may be granted to her. Neither do
the Court adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities involved
over the decedents estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all magistrates of
all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be
exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it
is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The
adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions
made as well as the directions and instructions given by the court in the
premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled out
clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute,
debate or interpretation.[28]
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.