URBANO V.
IAC If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield.
He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and
there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he
was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the
right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October
27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the
medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the
hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to
be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died
the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by
the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new
trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the
deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion
was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the
latter’s death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom."
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six
days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign
to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause."
PEOPLE V. ABARCA
Facts:
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife having
sexual intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca residence. The
two also caught Abarca looking at them and so Koh grabbed his pistol and
thereafter Abarca fled. He went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. One hour
later, Abarca, armed with an armalite, went to the gambling place where Koh
usually stays and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died instantaneously.
However, two more persons, Arnold and Lina Amparado were shot in the adjacent
room. These two other persons survived due to timely medical intervention.
first place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other two persons injured. He was not
also committing a crime when he was firing his gun at Koh – it being under Art. 247.
Abarca was however negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to make
sure no one else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical
injuries through simple negligence for the injuries suffered by the two other
persons who were in the adjacent room when the incident happened.
The accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle
upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder. The court cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of murder with
frustrated double murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.

Held:

No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter. These elements are present in this case.

Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife with
Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarca’s
rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh.

However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other persons he
shot in the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the
PEOPLE V. ULEP
Facts:
On May 21, 1970, at nine o'clock in the evening, in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, one
Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on that
very day by her husband, accused Macario Ulep. The following day, the Chief of
Police of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion
Pablo who allegedly died of a heart attack. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health
Officer went to the house of the deceased and there they saw the body on a
bamboo bed surrounded by relatives, friends, and the husband of the deceased,
Macario. The Chief of Police suggested that an autopsy be conducted but the
husband refused to allow the same. However, at the behest of the daughter, the
request for an autopsy was made shortly before the burial. The cause of death was
cardiac arrest and primary shock. Two weeks after the burial, Macario Ulep
admitted that he caused the death of his wife by elbowing her because his wife was
then drunk and was uttering indecent words. In another investigation, he reiterated
that the cause of death of his wife was his elbowing her on her breast. Ulep
retracted his statement in court by narrating that more than a year before that, and
while his wife went to have their palay milled, their bullcart loaded with sacks of
rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast. With the pain in her
chest, she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo."
primary shock. This is so because only extravasated blood was present around the
immediate area of the fractures, this means that the fractures were not depressed
or that the fractured ends did not cave-in, so as to injure the heart and impede its
functions to cause cardiac arrest. And third, although the pleura or thoracic cavity
was lacerated at the points of fracture, the same could not have caused cardiac
arrest or primary shock because the lacerations were limited to the pleura.
Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or
tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused (a) is the efficient cause of
death; or (b) accelerated his death; or (c) is the proximate cause of death; then
there is criminal liability.
Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. Even though the victim may have been previously affected by some
internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot accelerated death, he who
caused such acceleration is responsible for the death as the result of an injury
willfully and unlawfully inflicted.
There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for
these in human acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic death.

Issue:

Whether or not Macario Ulep should be liable for the death of his wife, Asuncion
Ulep

Held:

Yes. Macario presented a witness to prove that sometime in February or March,

1969 his wife was pinned down by a sack of rice and the side portion of a bullcart
and was attended to by a town quack doctor called an arbularyo. This witness said
that two (2) ribs on each side of the chest were fractured, without stating which
particular ribs were so affected. First, there were no contusions on the chest of the
victim. This indicates that the elbow blows were not of sufficient force to fracture
the ribs. This is so because a fracture necessarily results in the extravasation of
blood in the fractured area and it is the extravasated blood that causes the swelling
or contusion. Second, even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found
by Dr. Bonoan were present, the same could have not caused cardiac arrest and
PEOPLE V. BINDOY
Facts:
Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Occidental Misamis, for appelant was
stenced to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased with the amount of P1,000. The crime charged against the accused is
homicide.
In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop. Donato
Bindoy offered some tuba to Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she
already have one, but Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he
carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see what;s happening,
instead got stabbed in the chest by Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy succeeded
in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand
towards the left behind the accused and with such violence that the point of the
bolo reached Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy.
Issue:
Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?
Held:
Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the testimony of the accused, Pacas and
Bindoy were actually for the possession of the bolo. When Pacas let go of the bolo,
Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment
when Emigdio Omamdam came up and who was therefore hit in the chest without
Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it was caused accidentally and without
malicious intent because he was only defending his possession of the bolo which
Pacas was trying to wrench away from him and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The Court therefore acquitted Bindoy based on the facts stated. The injury was
accidental and the defendant should be acquitted.
"In many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of
the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the
criminal act."
PEOPLE V. RAMONES
Facts:
The accused willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, without any just causetherefor and
with intent to kill and treachery, assaulted and attacked Yu Lon by suddenly giving
hima fist blow on the back part of the head, treacherously,
under conditions which intended directlyand especially to insure, the
accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself arisingfrom any defense the
victim Yu Lon might make, thus causing him to fall on the ground as aconsequence
of which he suffered a lacerated wound in the scalp and a fissured fracture on the
leftoccipital region, which were necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate
death of the saidYu Lon. Defendant was found guilty of murder in the CFI, for which
the defendant made an appeal.Counsel enumerated the following assignment of
error:
(1) that the trial court erred in finding thetrue assailant of Yu Lon, (2) assuming that
the appellant is such person, the trial court erredin finding that the appellant struck
his supposed victim, (3) assuming that the appellant issuch person, and that the
appellant did indeed strike Yu Lon, the trial court erred in that theblow was struck
in the rear, (4) the trial court erred in finding that the identity of the appellantwas
fully established, (5) the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of murder (Art
248) rather than maltreatment (Art 266).
Issue:
Whether or not Cagoco is liable for the death of Yu Lon
Held:
Under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of the
deceased because his death was the direct consequence of defendant’s felonious
act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a
treacherous manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although
he did not intend to kill the deceased, and since the defendant did commit the
crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of the
qualifying circumstances of treachery.
BELBIS, JR. V. PEOPLE The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the victim
ceased when petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon.
Facts: Rodolfo, who was in possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful
aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by a person claiming self-defense
Version of the Prosecution:
must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be
Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
Tiwi, Albay. On the night of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. aggression. In the present case, four stab wounds to the back of the victim are not
At around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir, Jose’s live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and necessary to prevent the alleged continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as
calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. the latter was already without a weapon.
It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto
Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the death of
Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was brought
the victim is not controlling since what really needs to be proven in a case when the
to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was confined for 6 days. Jose was brought
victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. It can be concluded from the
back to the hospital on January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys had
doctors’ testimonies that without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been
inflamed due to infection. He died the next day.
afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused
Version of the Defense: his death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual
act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. The petitioners
Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in are found guilty of homicide.
engaged in a conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told
them to go home. While on their way home, they heard Jose’s whistle go off as the
latter was following them. Rodolfo asked Jose what is the matter and the latter
replied, “What about?” Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo, but the latter
was able to evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a scabbard.
Rodolfo and Jose grappled for the bolo while Alberto was merely shouting at them
to stop. Rodolfo eventually got hold of the bolo but he suffered a wound in his hand
so Alberto took him to the hospital.

Issue:

Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt
which would warrant his acquittal

Held:

No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had
done the deed to defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing
the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes
the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.
PEOPLE V. MABUG-AT Held:

Facts: Yes. Although the mere act of firing at a person is not a proof per se if intent to kill,
yet when the surrounding circumstances of the act are such that they leave no
The accused and Juana Buralo were sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the room for doubt that the intention was to kill the person fired upon, the crime is not
accused on account of the latter having frequently visited the house of one Carmen. simply “discharge of firearm,” but homicide or murder as the case maybe.
Their relations were such that the accused invited Juana to take a walk on the
afternoon of August 9, 1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. The qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into
On the third day, or the night of August 11th, the accused went to the threshold of account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from
Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some devotion. the one who became his victim.
There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to
come downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If you do not
want to go upstairs, I will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill him."
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs,
when they went in the direction of their house. The accused, who was seen by the
two girls, followed them without saying a word. It is only a short distance from the
house where the devotion took place to that of the offended party, the houses
being adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at
the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta
Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of her neck, having entered the posterior
region thereof and coming out through the left eye, which was completely
destroyed. Due to proper medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is one
of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this case. The defense, without
abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime,
contends that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a
firearm, with injuries, it not having been proven that it was the accused's intention
to kill. The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his
disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a walk, the fact that the
accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at the house where the
devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and especially having
aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our opinion, permit of no other
conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was the accused's intention to kill

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is liable for frustrated murder

PEOPLE V. GONA
Facts:
On the evening of October 26, 1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in
the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been a liberal supply of
alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became intoxicated, with the result
that a quarrel took place between the Mansace Dunca and the defendant. Dunca
and his son Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and
one Awad. The defendant left the house about the same time with intention of
assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening and the intoxicated condition
of the defendant, he mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicted on him a mortal
wound with a bolo.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of intentional homicide
Held:
The mistake of the defendant in killing one man instead of another did not relieve
him from criminal responsibility and could not even be considered a mititgating
circumstance.
JACINTO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a post
dated checked worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam
International, Inc. The said check was deposited to the account of Jacqueline
Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another employee of Mega
Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced.
However, Baby said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August
1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the
two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6)
years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.
Held:
Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving
the cash replacement should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;
That the act was alone with evil intent; and
That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she
had performed all the acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found
GUILTY of an impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto
mayor and pay courts.
INTOD V. CA
Facts:
Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandaya’s house to ask him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with
Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the
4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and
companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangan’s house. Thereafter,
petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city
and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in
the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted
Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment
on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner
contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the
other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict
Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent.
Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that “xxx. The
crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that
petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3)
Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact,
the crime is possible, m not impossible.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal
impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order
to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not
amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the
law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a performance of
the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act
does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls
in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the cot pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which
render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.

Issue:

Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?

Held:

Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against person or property because: 1) the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means employed is either a)
inadequate or b) ineffectual.