I. G.R. No.

214059, October 11, 2017

OSG SHIP MANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., OSG SHIP MANAGEMENT (UK)

LTD., AND/OR JOSEPHINE M. AQUINO, Petitioners, v. ARIS WENDEL R.
MONJE, Respondent.

FACTS:

Challenged before this Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Likewise challenged is the subsequent Resolution4 of the CA promulgated on
August 27, 2014, which upheld the earlier Decision.

Aris Wendel R. Monje (respondent), is a Filipino seafarer, who signed a Contract of

Employment with petitioner OSG Ship Management (UK) Ltd. (OSG UK), through its
manning agent in the Philippines, OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc. (OSG Manila).
He was accepted as an Ordinary-Seaman for eight (8) months, with a 40-hour work
week. On February 11, 2011, the respondent boarded the vessel "Overseas Sifnos."
Sometime in June of the same year, and while on board the vessel, the respondent
complained of severe pain on his left knee, which prompted him to seek medical
consult in the United States of America on June 23, 2011. He was repatriated back
to the Philippines two (2) days later for further treatment. Upon his arrival, OSG
Manila referred the respondent for medical treatment. On June 28, 2011, Dr.
Raymund Jay Sugay (Dr. Sugay) of the Physician's Diagnostic Services Center, Inc.
issued a medical evaluation certificate, indicating therein a working diagnosis of "left
knee pain, etiology unknown."
Also included in this report was Dr. Sugay's opinion that the respondent's illness was
not work-related. The Labor Arbiter issued a Decision in favor of herein respondent.

The respondent appealed the case to the CA which resulted to the reversal of the
decision and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE/S:

whether or not the illness suffered by the respondent is work-related.

RULING:

The issue raised by herein petitioners, whether or not the illness sustained by the
respondent is work-related, is essentially a factual issue, and therefore, not generally
within the scope of review by the Court. However, considering that the NLRC and the
CA have conflicting findings of facts, as one of the instances provided for under Rule
45, the Court can and will be justified in delving into the question of fact now
presented.
The POEA-SEC defined a work-related injury as those "injury(ies) resulting in
disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment" and a work-related
illness is "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied." For illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the POEA-SEC creates a
disputable presumption in favor of the seafarer that these illnesses are work-related.

Considering the foregoing and the diagnosis of the respondent's illness, it was found
that it is not among those listed in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, the main query is
whether or not the petitioners have presented evidence sufficient to overcome the
disputable presumption provided for by the POEA-SEC that the same is work-related.
In the case at hand, the Court finds that no substantial evidence of work relation has
been proven to exist between the diagnosed illness and the respondent's work. As
such, the petitioners herein could not be made liable.

II. G.R. No. 214805, December 14, 2017

MARIANITO PADILLA and ALFREDO JAVALUYAS, Petitioners

vs.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, represented by its Senior Vice
President, JOHNSON ROBERT GO, Respondents

FACTS:

This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed by several poultry Farmers,
namely Eduardo Pineda, Simplicio Ortiz Luis, Jose Bantigue, Azucena Vergara,
Eduardo Guingon and herein petitioners (complainants) against URC.

URC, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of various agro-industrial

products, sold/supplied on credit day-old chicks and poultry feeds to complainants
who, in turn, provided the labor, poultry houses, electricity and water facilities to
care and grow these chicks until they are ready for harvest after 50 days, more or
less. Documents entitled Continuing Credit Accommodation with Real Estate
Mortgage (CCAREM) were executed by the parties whereby URC agreed to extend a
continuous credit accommodation in favor of each complainant, while each
complainant put up a real estate mortgage.

However, sometime in the year 1993, complainants informed URC of the stunting or
slow growth and high mortality rate of the chickens. They claimed that URC supplied
them with low quality feeds with high aflatoxin content and class B or junior day-old
chicks. Meanwhile, the stunted chickens that failed to meet the standard target
weight for harvest were rejected by URC and were condemned (beheaded). As a
result, complainants incurred outstanding obligations. URC made several demands
for complainants to settle their unpaid obligations under the CCAREMs, but they
refused to pay. Hence, on June 25, 1995, URC filed an application for extra judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgages on complainants' respective properties under
the CCAREMs.

Subsequent to that, complainants filed a Complaint for damages, against URC

claiming that they incurred losses and sustained damages from the stunting/slow
growth of the chickens as a result of the low quality feeds with high aflatoxin content
and class B or junior day-old chicks supplied by URC in evident bad faith. Since the
stunting and eventual condemnation/death of the chickens was due to URC's fault,
complainants claimed that their obligation to pay URC was extinguished.

The trial court rendered a Decision declaring the obligations of Alfredo Javaluyas and
Marianito Padilla to Universal Robina Corporation extinguished.

On April 22, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision granting URC's appeal holding that
under the CCAREM, URC shall only be accountable if the loss, damage, or destruction
of the subject livestock was due to its fault, which, in this case, was not proven. In
ruling in favor of URC, the CA held that there was no credible evidence, except mere
self-serving claims, that URC supplied contaminated poultry feeds which affected the
growth of the broiler chicks. No veterinarians or nutritionists were presented to prove
petitioners' claims. The CA therefore ruled that petitioners should bear the loss of the
broiler chickens and are liable to pay URC their outstanding obligations.

ISSUE:

whether or not there is sufficient evidence to establish URC's fault or

negligence for the defective/stunted growth of the broiler chickens as would
extinguish petitioners' obligation under the CCAREM.

RULING:

Under Paragraph 5 of the CCAREM under, URC is accountable only if the loss, damage,
or destruction of the broiler chickens was due to its fault, otherwise, petitioners
should bear the loss and their obligation to pay the day-old chicks and poultry feeds
purchased from URC is not extinguished.

It bears stressing that both the RTC and the CA found no evidence of fault or
negligence on the part of URC. In any event, the Court finds no compelling reason to
deviate from the finding of the lower courts inasmuch as it is supported by the
evidence and records of the case. In this case, URC maintains that it is unlikely that
it supplied its customers with defective poultry feeds because if it were, it would not
have passed quality control. In light of the ruling in Nutrimix, it is incumbent on
petitioners to establish the liability of URC on the basis of breach of implied warranty.
No evidence, however, was adduced. As correctly observed by the CA, there was
nothing in the records, except self-serving claims, which proves that URC delivered
low-quality feeds tainted with high aflatoxin and other harmful components. There
were no veterinarians/nutritionists or any other credible evidence presented by
petitioners to confirm that the poultry feeds supplied by URC were contaminated or
affected the growth of the broiler chicks.

In fine, petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence the fault or

negligence of URC. For this reason, petitioners can be held liable for their unsettled
obligations under the CCAREMs they executed in favor of URC.

III. G.R. No. 208053, October 18, 2017

MEATWORLD INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner

vs.
DOMINIQUE A. HECHANOVA, Respondent

FACTS:

Petitioner Meatworld International, Inc., a corporation engaged in the business of

selling fresh meat under the brand name of "Mrs. Garcia's Meats" in different outlets
located in different malls or markets, hired respondent Dominique A. Hechanova as
a head butcher. At the time of termination, respondent was assigned at the outlet of
Robinsons Place Mall, Ermita, Manila.

On March 2, 2011, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with claim for
reinstatement and backwages against petitioner and/or Joyce Alcoreza (Alcoreza),
Vice-President of petitioner. Respondent alleged that he was suspended for violating
the regulation of SM Hypermarket, Muntinlupa, prohibiting employees of
concessionaires from tasting food peddled by some promodizers; that after his
suspension, he reported to the office of petitioner for his reassignment but he was
informed by the Employee Relation Supervisor Junel Romadia, that there was no
available outlet yet. In response, petitioner claimed that it did not dismiss respondent
as he was the one who failed to report for work.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring respondent to have been illegally
dismissed. The Labor Arbiter gave no credence to petitioner's theory, that respondent
failed to return to work for fear of being investigated for his violations of company
rules and regulations, for lack of evidence. The Labor Arbiter also found petitioner's
accusations against respondent to be untrue and without basis. However, considering
that the work environment would no longer be healthy, the Labor Arbiter ordered the
payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. In the absence of any factual or
legal basis, the Labor Arbiter relieved Alcoreza of any liability.

Petitioner appealed the case to the NLRC but decision of the Labor Arbiter was
affirmed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the· NLRC denied the same.
Unfazed, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari 55 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which the CA dismissed due to the following infirmities:
1. there was no proper proof of service of the Petition to the adverse party and the
agency a quo; and there was no competent evidence regarding the identity of Jocelyn
B. Alcoreza as the alleged authorized representative of co-petitioner Meatworld
International. Further, there was no board resolution empowering Jocelyn B.
Alcoreza to represent petitioner corporation in this case.

Petitioner sought reconsideration contending that it complied with the proof of service
requirement and that the Secretary's Certificate attached to the Petition is sufficient
proof of the authority of Alcoreza to file the said Petition. In its Resolution, the CA
conceded that petitioner complied with the proof of service requirement, however, it
maintained that petitioner failed to present the Board Resolution and the competent
evidence of identity of the affiant. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

(a) whether the Secretary's Certificate attached to the Petition is sufficient

proof of the authority of Alcoreza to file the said petition in behalf of the
corporation.

(b) whether the respondent is illegally dismissed.

RULING:

Under the Corporation Code, a corporation exercises its powers and transacts its
business through its board of directors or trustees. Its corporate officers and agents,
therefore, cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without
authority from the board of directors. Corollarily, in order for a person to represent a
corporation in a suit, a board resolution authorizing the former to represent the latter
is necessary. In this case, no board resolution was attached to the Petition for
Certiorari. However, in lieu thereof, petitioner attached a Secretary's Certificate
attesting that Alcoreza was duly authorized by the Board of Directors to sign the
necessary pleadings, verification, and certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of
the corporation. This, under prevailing jurisprudence, is sufficient proof of authority.

B. Respondent was illegally dismissed.

In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
employee's termination was for a valid or authorized cause. This rule, however,
presupposes that the employee was dismissed from service. In this case, the Court
finds that although there was no actual dismissal, the failure of petitioner to assign
respondent to a specific branch without any justifiable reason constituted illegal
constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as a "cessation of work because continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely." Similarly, there is
constructive dismissal "when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by
an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option
but to forego with his continued employment. Simply put, it is a "dismissal in disguise
or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not."

IV. G.R. No. 205912. October 18, 2017.*

 ROGELIA R. GATAN and THE HEIRS OF BERNARDINO GATAN, namely:
RIZALINO GATAN and FERDINAND GATAN, petitioners, vs. JESUSA
V.VINARAO, and SPOUSES MILDRED CABAUATAN and NOMAR CABAUATAN,
respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of Document and Recovery of
Possession with Damages against respondents Jesusa Vinarao and spouses Nomar
and Mildred Cabauatan.

Petitioners alleged that Bernardino and his wife, petitioner Rogelia, acquired a parcel
of land in Casibarag Sur, Cabagan, Isabela. According to petitioners, sometime in
January 2002, respondent spouses Cabauatan asked petitioner Rogelia if they could
temporarily erect a house on the spouses Gatan's property to which Rogelia agreed
since respondent Mildred Cabauatan was Bernardino's relative. Subsequently,
petitioner Rogelia learned of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by
Bernadino on December 30, 1989 conveying a portion of the spouses Gatan's
property in favor of respondent. Petitioner Rogelia questioned the validity of the deed
averring that Bernardino could not have signed the said Deed because he was
illiterate; and that the Deed of Absolute Sale lacked her marital consent since it was
signed not by her, but by a certain Aurelia Ramos Gatan. Petitioner Rogelia then
confronted the spouses Vinarao regarding the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and
demanded that the respondent spouses Cabauatan vacate the subject property.

Respondents denied that they falsified Bernardino's signature on the Deed of Absolute
Sale and insisted that Bernardino could write his own name.

ISSUE:
whether the Deed of Absolute Sale is void and inexistent absent the spouses
Gatan's consent, considering that Bernardino's signature on said Deed was forged
and the same Deed lacked petitioner Rogelia's marital consent.

RULING:

The Petition at bar is without merit. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 30,
1989 is notarized, and it is a well-settled principle that a duly notarized contract
enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution, as well as the
full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this legal
presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.
In a plethora of cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of
notarized documents on the ground of the unrebutted presumption of their
genuineness and due execution. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December
30, 1989 executed by Bernardino Gatan in favor of Sostones Vinarao is valid and
binding on the petitioners who failed to show convincing and clear proof of its
invalidity.

In forgery, as a general rule, cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,

positive and convincing evidence. Neither did [petitioner] Rogelia Gatan sufficiently
prove that her signature appearing on the Deed was likewise forged. She merely
dwelt on her argument that she was not Aurelia Gatan but nothing was presented to
substantiate her allegation that the signature therein was not hers. She did not even
present corroborating witnesses much less an independent expert witness who could
declare with authority and objectivity that the questioned signatures are forged.

V. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for

every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial
remedy exists and is available

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467. October 18, 2017.*

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 14-4308-RTJ)

ATTY. EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, petitioner, vs. JUDGE EMMANUEL P. PASAL,

Presiding Judge, Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City,
respondent.

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, gross

incompetence, gross inefficiency and/or neglect of duty filed by Atty. Eddie U.
Tamondong against Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, relative to its resolution in a special civil action against the client of Atty.
Tamondong.

The heirs of Enrique Abada filed a case for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession,
Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and Annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate with Sale, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities against Atty.
Tamondong's client, Henmar Development Property Inc. (Henmar). Subsequently,
Atty. Tamondong, filed an Omnibus Motion (Ad Cautelam) in behalf of his client,
which prayed for, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint. In its Order,
the MTCC denied the motion to dismiss of Henmar. Henmar filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was also denied by the MTCC in its Order.

Aggrieved, Henmar filed, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Preliminary

Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC,
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2013- 184. The case was raffled to Branch 38,
presided by Judge Pasal.
On December 23, 2013, Judge Pasal issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for
lack of merit. Henmar filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order, Judge Pasal
deemed the Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar as already submitted for
resolution. However, even after more than six months, Judge Pasal had yet to resolve
the said Motion.

Hence, Atty. Tamondong initiated the instant administrative complaint charging

Judge Pasal with gross ignorance of the law and/or gross incompetence. He contends
that Judge Pasal's Resolution in Special Civil Action legally erroneous. In addition,
Atty. Tamondong questions Judge Pasal's failure to seasonably act on and resolve
the Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar and avers that Judge Pasal's inaction on
said Motion for more than six months constituted gross inefficiency and/or gross
neglect of duty.

The Office of the Court Administrator respectfully recommended that the instant
administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Pasal, be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; that he be found guilty of gross inefficiency and/or neglect of
duty arising from undue delay in resolving a motion and be fined; and the charge of
gross ignorance of the law against respondent Judge Pasal is dismissed for being
judicial in nature and for lack of merit.

The Court, in a Resolution fully adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

ISSUE:
Whether the administrative complaint filed is the proper judicial remedy
against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.

RULING:
There is no merit in Atty. Tamondong's charge of gross ignorance of the law and/or
gross incompetence against Judge Pasal.1âwphi1

Judge Pasal issued the Resolution in Special Civil Action in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions, and any errors he might have committed therein cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
judicial remedies. The issues of jurisdiction being argued by Atty. Tamondong are
judicial matters, which again can only be decided upon through judicial remedies. A
party's recourse, if prejudiced by a judge's orders in the course of a trial, is with the
proper reviewing court and not with the OCA, through an administrative complaint.

The Court declared that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy
for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists
and is available. The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. A judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for
his official acts, no matter how erroneous, provided he acts in good faith.
 VI. When the issue of prescription requires the determination of
evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an outright dismissal
without hearing.

G.R. No. 201378 October 18, 2017

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., Petitioner

vs.
TIARA COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Respondent

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner G.V. Florida Transport Inc. to challenge the Decision of the Court of Appeals
and its Resolution which denied GV Florida's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The CA granted respondent Tiara Commercial Corporation's petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It found that Branch 129 of the
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to grant TCC's motion to dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint in an
action for damages pending before the RTC.

The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages against GV
Florida and its bus driver Arnold Vizquera before the RTC. This action arose out of a
vehicle collision between the buses of VLI and GV Florida along Capirpiwan, Cordon,
Isabela. In its complaint, VLI claimed that Vizquera's negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision and GV Florida failed to exercise due diligence in supervising its
employee.

In its Answer, GV Florida alleged that the Michelin tires of its bus had factory and
mechanical defects which caused a tire blow-out. This, it claimed, was the proximate
cause of the vehicle collision.

Hence, GV Florida instituted a third-party complaint against TCC from which it

purchased from TCC fifty (50) brand new Michelin tires, four (4) of which were
installed into the bus that figured in the collision. It claimed that though Vizquera
exerted all efforts humanly possible to avoid the accident, the bus nevertheless
swerved to the oncoming south-bound lane and into the VLI bus. GV Florida maintains
that the '"proximate cause of the accident is the tire blow out which was brought
about by factory and mechanical defects in the Michelin tires which third-party
plaintiff GV Florida absolutely and totally had no control over."

TCC eventually filed a motion to dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint.

The RTC denied TCC's motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion for
reconsideration in its Order. Thus, TCC filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the RTC's denial of its
motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
The CA rendered its Decision granting TCC's petition and reversing the Orders of the
RTC. It then proceeded to rule that GV Florida's third-party complaint against TCC is
a claim for implied warranty which, under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, must be filed
within six months from delivery. While the CA noted that the delivery receipt for the
tires is not in the records of the case, it may be assumed that the tires were delivered
a few days after the purchase date. Since GV Florida only filed the third-party
complaint on April 8, 2008, the action has prescribed.

GV Florida thus filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the CA's Decision.

GV Florida also challenges the CA's ruling that its third-party complaint against TCC
should be dismissed on the ground of prescription. It claims that prescription cannot
be the basis of a dismissal when the issue involves evidentiary matters that can only
be threshed out during trial. In this case, GV Florida asserts that the issue of whether
its action has prescribed requires a determination of when the Michelin tires were
delivered. Thus, there is a need to examine the delivery receipts which, as GV Florida
highlights, are not in the records of the CA as stated in the Decision itself.

ISSUE:
Whether the third-party complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.

RULING:

We also disagree with the CA that GV Florida's third-party complaint should be

dismissed on the ground of prescription.

Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint without going to trial on the
merits. Under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is raised in a motion to dismiss which
is filed before the answer. It may also be raised as an affirmative defense in the
answer. At the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defense may be conducted as if a motion to dismiss was filed. Nevertheless, this is
only a general rule. When the issue of prescription requires the determination of
evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an outright dismissal without hearing.

The Court has consistently held that the affirmative defense of prescription does not
automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss
only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already
prescribed. If the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring
a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss.

We find that the reckoning date from which the prescriptive period may be
ascertained is not apparent from the pleadings themselves. We agree with GY
Florida's observation that the CA itself admitted in its Decision that the delivery
receipts do not appear in the records. A finding of fact as to the date of delivery can
only be made after hearing and reception of evidence. Thus, the CA erred in ruling
that GV Florida's third-party complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.

VII. The company-designated physicians' failure to arrive at a final

and definite assessment of a seafarer's fitness to work or level of
disability within the prescribed periods means that the seafarer shall
be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled.

G.R. No. 206113, November 6, 2017

SHARPE SEA PERSONNEL, INC., MONTE CARLO SHIPPING, and MOISES R.

FLOREM, JR., Petitioners
vs.
MACARIO MABUNAY, JR., Respondent

FACTS:

One Macario G. Mabunay, Jr. (Mabunay) entered into a contract of

employment with Sharpe Sea, an agent for C.F. Sharp & Company Pte.
Ltd/Monte Carlo. Sharpe Sea was represented by its fleet manager, Florem.
Mabunay was hired as an oiler for a period of nine (9) months aboard M/V
Larisa which he boarded on April 14, 2009. While on board, Mabunay ·slipped
and hit his back on the purifier while he was cleaning the second floor of the
engine room. He lost consciousness when he fell and when he awoke, his back
was numb and he had difficulty getting up.

Despite the persistent pain in his back and numbness in his legs, Mabunay
continued working. On April 23, 2009, Mabunay was brought to Nanjing
Hospital for a medical checkup and he was diagnosed with chest and spinal
column bone damage. He was declared unfit to work by his attending
physician. Immediately, Mabunay was medically repatriated to Manila. Upon
arrival, Mabunay reported to Sharpe Sea's office and was told to report to Dr.
Nicomedes G. Cruz, a company-designated physician. Dr. Cruz recommended
that Mabunay undergo a discectomy "for decompression of cervical area with
fusion and bone grafting and fixation of cervical plates and screws." On
January 21, 2010, Mabunay filed a complaint against Sharpe Sea, Monte
Carlo, and Florem for the payment of his medical expenses, total disability
benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. Meanwhile, Mabunay sought the
opinion of Dr. Alan Leonardo R. Raymundo, an orthopedic surgeon, who
diagnosed him with "herniated disc, C4-C5" and opined that he was unfit to
work as a seaman in his present condition. Also, Mabunay sought the opinion
of another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Rommel F. Fernando who also found him
unfit to work.

Hence, the Labor Arbiter ruled in Mabunay's favor and directed Sharpe Sea to
pay him permanent and total disability benefits. It concluded that the
company-designated physicians and Mabunay's personal physicians found
that he was unfit for sea duty because he still needed regular medical
checkups and treatment; and rejected Sharpe Sea's claim that its company-
designated physicians assessed Mabunay with a disability rating of Grade 8
since it was not supported by the records.

Both Sharpe Sea and Mabunay filed their respective memoranda on appeal to
the Labor Arbiter Decision.

On June 22, 2011, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed
with modification the Labor Arbiter Decision. It upheld the Labor Arbiter's
finding that the records were bereft of evidence to support Sharpe Sea's claim
that its company-designated physicians gave Mabunay a disability rating of
Grade 8. In contrast, Mabunay adequately proved that his private physicians
both assessed him to be unfit for work.

Mabunay filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing its
Decision and Resolution of the NLRC. The Court of Appeals partially granted
Mabunay's Petition.

Petitioners claim that under the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), for a disability
compensation to be validly awarded, the illness or injury must have been
suffered during the seafarer's employment, with a company- designated
physician determining his disability rating. They point out that respondent has
signed this contract.

Furthermore, petitioners likewise assert that the POEA-SEC mandates a

company-designated physician to conduct the medical evaluation and provide
the disability grading, if applicable. The POEA-SEC provides a procedure for
resolution should the seafarer disagree with the company-designated
physician's assessment. However, respondent failed to comply with this
established procedure; thus, he should be bound by the company-designated
physician's assessment of a Grade 8 disability rating.

ISSUE:

whether or not the assessment of the company-designated physician should

be upheld over the contrary findings of respondent's private physicians
RULING:

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third

doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

Petitioners repeatedly claimed before the proceedings in the labor tribunals

that Dr. Cruz gave respondent a Grade 8 disability assessment, yet the records
show that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim which was affirmed by
the NLRC. Despite the company-designated doctor's finding that complainant
was suffering from the aforequoted illness, there is no evidence on record that
complainant was given a disability grading of grade 8 as claimed by the
respondents. The record of the case does not show any proof of such disability
grading given by the company-designated physician.

While it is true that technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases
and the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence for the first time on
appeal, the delay in the submission of evidence must be adequately explained
which the petitioners half-heartedly tried to explain.

Petitioners failed to clarify why a document available as early as August 18,

2009 was only submitted into evidence on July 19, 2011, giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion that it was nonexistent on the date indicated in the
medical report.

Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a

definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability
within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the
seafarer s medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed
totally and permanently disabled. 105 (Emphasis supplied)

With the company-designated physicians' failure to issue either a fit-to-work

certification or a final disability rating within the prescribed periods,
respondent's disability was rightfully deemed to be total and permanent.

VIII.Failure to discharge its burden of showing that the

acts of the respondent lawyers truly violated the CPR and
the Lawyer's Oath warrants the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint.

A.C. No. 10333 November 6, 2017

 CORNELIO V. YAGONG, Complainant
vs.
CITY PROSECUTOR NEOPITO ED G. MAGNO and ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR DON S. GARCIA, Respondents

FACTS:
The present case is an administrative complaint filed by Cornelio
V. Yagong against City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and
Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia for alleged violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

David Flores charged complainant Cornelio V. Yagong and his

neighbor, Jimmy Coronel, with violation of Presidential Decree (PD)
16121 and theft, respectively, before the City Prosecution Office of
Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. Yagong claimed that
when he filed his Counter-Affidavit on January 2, 2012,
respondents City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and Assistant
City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia had already come out with their
Resolution indicting them of said criminal cases. He contended that
Magno and Garcia were bias and partial, and into the scheme of
money-making for a favorable resolution. Thus, he filed the
present administrative complaint.

On the other hand, Magno and Garcia insisted that in resolving

cases filed before their office, they are only guided by the concepts
of prevailing laws and jurisprudence in conducting Preliminary
Investigations. They filed the proper Information against Yagong
in the performance of their official functions. As a matter of
procedure, the complaint against Yagong and Coronel was raffled
among the associate prosecutors for Preliminary Investigation. The
case was then assigned to Garcia for evaluation as to the existence
of probable cause to warrant indictment. After a thorough
examination of all the evidence adduced by the parties, Garcia
found the existence of probable cause. In his capacity as the
Approving Authority, Magno authorized the consequent filing of the
Criminal Information for Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against
Yagong.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against Magno and Garcia which the same was adopted
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of the administrative complaint is
proper.

RULING:

Yes. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction

and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with
great caution, only for the most imperative reasons, and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. As a
rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent
of the charges proffered against him until the contrary is proved,
and that, as an officer of the court, he has performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. In disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof is upon the complainant and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Considering the serious
consequence of disbarment, this Court has consistently held that
only a clear preponderant evidence would warrant the imposition
of such a harsh penalty. It means that the record must disclose as
free from doubt a case that compels the exercise by the court of
its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done, as
well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly demonstrated.

Yagong's failure to discharge its burden of showing that the acts of

the respondent lawyers truly violated the CPR and the Lawyer's
Oath warrants the dismissal of the instant administrative
complaint.