12 Chapter 6

CHAPTER-6
MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD
In the previous chapters, the course of the freedom struggle against colonial rule was
studied where the role of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has been seldom dealt. This chapter
is fully devoted to his life and role played by him during the struggle against colonial
power and thereafter.
ANCESTORS
To start with his ancestral background, his descendents came from Herat to India during
Babar’s time. One of Maulana Azad’s ancestors, Maulana Jamaluddin alias Shaikh
Bahlol of Delhi, was a contemporary of Akbar the Great.1 2 His
3 family had always
distinguished itself in the pursuit of learning and the zeal to serve the cause of Hadith and
Sunnah. He said to Mahadeo Desai, one of his early biographers, “I can say that there
wasn’t one of my ancestors, but was noted for his learning and sufism.”
Maulana Azad praised his ancestors in his work Tazkirah. Among his ancestors, he
selects his mother’s uncle Shaikh Muhammad Vatri, the Mufti of Madina; his
grandmother’s father, Maulana Munawwaruddin and an ancestor from his father’s side,
his paternal grandfather, Shaikh Jamaluddin of Delhi. Maulana Azad has been accused of
elevating some of his ancestors.
Certain discrepancies have been pointed out in the accounts of his ancestors in Azad Ki
Kahani Khud Azad Ki Zubani and Tazkirah edited by Abdur Razzaq Malihabadi and
India Wins Freedom dictated by Maulana himself in Urdu, translated and written by
Humayun Kabir. Azad Ki Kahani Khud Azad Ki Zubani was published after Maulana
Azad’s death and Maulana Azad did not know about its contents. Tazkirah appeared
1 A.K. Azad, Tazkirah, Malik Ram (ed.) Sahitya Academy, Delhi, 1968, p.25.
2 Ibid, p. 302
3 Quoted by Subhash C. Kashyap (ed.) Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, National Publishing House, New Delhi,
1989, p.3-4
270
without his approval and he had no opportunity to revise it or correct its mistake. India
Wins Freedom is a work of doubtful authenticity. In such a situation, when Maulana
Azad had no control over the texts attributed to him and when book ascribed to him were
published without his approval, some confusion with regard to detail on his life is bound
to occur. Therefore, to attribute motives to Maulana Azad for misleading his readers by
exaggerating the achievements of his ancestors would be totally unjust.
Maulana Munawwaruddin, one of the last Rukn-ul-Mudarassin of the Mughal period, got
frustrated at the conditions prevailing in the country during 1855. He decided to migrate
to Hedjaz. On his way to Bombay, he passed through Bhopal. Sikander Begum, the ruler
of Bhopal was so impressed by his sermons that she prevailed upon him to stay.
During 1857’s revolt, he made his way into Bombay and died there during 1858-59.
Maulana Azad’s father, Maulana Khairuddin, who had accompanied Maulana
Munawwaruddin to Bombay, however continued his journey to Hedjaz. He had already
finished his education in India and hence was able to derive the maximum benefit from
the teaching of the scholars at Mecca and Madina.
Maulana Khairuddin was a learned scholar and a master of theology.4 5He was the only
Indian Muslim scholar of the time to have been selected to teach the tenents of Islam and
deliver sermons in the holiest Muslim seminary of the world.3
COMING TO INDIA
Maulana Azad’s father Maulana Khairuddin remained in Hedjaz for about twenty years.
He paid his first return visit to India in 1887. After that, he continued travelling between
India and Hedjaz till 1897 when he was persuaded by his disciples and followers to come
4 A.K. Azad, Ghubar-i-Khatir, Malik Ram (ed.), Sahitya Academy, Delhi, 1968, p. 255.
5 Ibid.
271
back to India and accept to be the Imam of Calcutta, the then capital of British Indian
Empire.6 Later, his family joined him.
BIRTH OF MAULANA AZAD

Maulana Azad was bom in Mecca during the month of Zill Hijja in 1305 A.H as Firoz
Bakht but was known as Muhiyuddin Ahmed in his youth.7 He has given the year of his
birth as 1888s but has not mentioned the date.9 In the commemoration volume, published
through government assistance, Humayun Kabir has given Maulana Azad’s date of birth
as 11 November 1888.10 But this is not corroborated by any other sources. Qazi Abdul
Ghaffar has placed his date of birth during September 1888.*11 According to Ghulam
Rasul Mihr, Azad was bom on 17 or 18 August 1888. On the basis of Azad’s own
statement in the Tazkirah, Malik Ram calculates that Azad was bom sometime between 9
I <2
August and 6 September 1888. Almost all the biographers of Maulana Azad have
accepted this date.
MAULANA AZAD’S CHILDHOOD

Azad’s mother died when he was only eleven14 and his father was a very strict man, who
gave him lessons thrice a day. Maulana Azad spent most of his time in the company of
his father, his teachers, the visitor-' who called on his father and with his sisters and
brother. OrTce llis sister Fatima Begum recalls, as a boy, he “would climb a raised
platform and ask his sisters to surround him and applaud him and then get down and walk
off slowly and deliberately”.15 He had no friends or companions of his own age to talk to
or play with. He never learnt to play or to go to a school. He knew not what entertainment
6 A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longman, Madras, 1988 p.2. Also in Ian Henderson Douglas,
Abut Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography, Delhi, 1985, p.38.
7 A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.2.
8 Ibid, p.2.
9 A.K. Azad, Tazkirah, p. 310.
10 Humayun Kabir, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Memorial Volume, London 1959, p.2
11 Arsh Malsiani, Abul Kalam Azad, Publication Division, New Delhi, 1976, p.6.
12 Jamia, February 1988, No. 2, Vol. 85, p.36.
13 Malik Ram, Ajkal: Maulana Azad Number, November 1988, p.38.
14 Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 1987, p.219.
15 Arsh Malsiani, op.cit, p.2.
272
or relaxations were. Maulana Azad wrote, “I never got an opportunity of moving out of
my house so far as my education was concerned.”16
He associated with men almost twice his age. Shibli Nomani, who was thirty one years
senior to him and Maulana Habibur Rahman Khan Sherwani, who was his elder by
twenty one years were his friends. In Azad’s house one could seldom hear a guffaw of
laughter. He spent his time in idle-day-dreaming or in talking to himself in a flamboyant
17
declamation before on imaginary audience.
He is compared with John Stuart Mill, who began learning Greek at three and read
Herodotus, Xenophon, Lucian and the first Eight Dialogues of Plato at eight. Like young
Macaulay, he read voraciously, with guidance and also independently, from his father’s
library which had a big collection of books brought largely from Turkey, Egypt, Persia
and from Bombay. He mastered the whole of Fiqa-i-Akbar, Tehzib and Khulasa-i-
Qaidani when he was only twelve years old, which astounded the scholars and religious
divines.18
He had a very sharp memory because of which his teachers had to teach him separately.
He was capable of assimilating passage after passage and reproducing them effortlessly.
He claimed later that whatever he read once sank down and settled in his mind and he
could remember much of it.19 Because o- f the joylessness at home and the kind cf
severe teaching administered under the eagle eye of his father which lacked vividus
visanimi that excites and exalts young men to shine on their own, Azad began to look
serious minded, grave and far too mature for his age.
16 A.K.Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p. 96.

17 Arsh Malsiani, op.cit., p.2.
18 A.K.Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p.98.
19 Abdur Razzaq Malihabadi, Zikr-e-Azad: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Ki Rifaat Mein Artis Saal, Calcutta,
1960, p.116-118.
273
MAULANA AZAD’S EDUCATION
Maulana Khairuddin was very clear and firm about one thing - he wanted his sons to
succeed him as Pirs. Learning and devotion to Islam and its propagation had been
family’s raison d’eter for generations. Piri and Muridi had their own charms which could
hardly be compared with material gains. Accordingly, Maulana Khairuddin planned an
elaborate programme for the education of his children whom he decided to educate at
home. He firmly believed that outside influence would corrupt the habits and manners of
his children and mislead them.
Calcutta had a famous madrassa, a theological centre of higher learning, founded by

Warren Hastings in 1781, where instruction was given in Oriental studies, particularly in
Arabic and Persian. But this did not induce him to send his sons there. Khairuddin did not
think well of the madrassa as an educational institution. The idea of imparting English
education to his sons was abhorrent to him.21 In fact, Maulana Khairuddin hated things
modem. He preferred to live in the medieval world. To him, only Quran, Hadith and
Shariah mattered and he wanted his sons to live in that world.
In Mecca, both the sons had finished the Quran and had learnt some portions of it by
heart. They went to the haram sharif for their lessons in Qerai22 when the family moved
to Calcutta. Khairuddin himself began to teach his children. Though conservative in the
matters of education, he made no distinction between boys and girls.23 As their mother
was an Arab, the boys had started picking up Arabic by instinct. Urdu was treated as
mishmash not to be taken seriously as a literary language. Persian and Arabic languages
were taught, but the main focus of their study was to master the Quran, Hadith and other
Islamic religious literature. Due to heavy pressure of work and his failing health,
20 A.K. Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p.96,

21 Ibid. p. 95.
22 Qerat in the science of reading and chanting the Quran. (A.R.Malihabadi, Azad Ki Kahani Khud Azad Ki
Zubani, Calcutta, 1959, p.169.)
23 Ibid, p.59-63, 180.
274
however, Maulana Khairuddin could not teach the entire course of studies to his sons. So
‘JA
he had to engage some eminent teachers to share his load of work.
Under the guidance of Maulvi Yakub Khan and Maulvi Nazir-ul-Hasan, the children
studied Persian and Arabic languages. Saadat Hasan, who was awarded the title Shams-
ul-Ulema later and was the second master in Calcutta Madrassa taught the fundamentals
of Hadith to Azad.25 Azad’s association with Mirza Mohammed Husain (a profound
Persian and Arabic scholar), who had come to Calcutta from Iran, brought him in close
touch with classical Persian literature. Maulana Azad learnt from Hafiz Walliullah,
Urdu alphabet. With a little proficiency in Urdu, he was able to read Yadgar-e-Ghalib
and Qaitay-e-Burhan. Intellectually, Azad derived great benefit from his year-long
association with Shaikh-ul Rais, an outstanding Arabic and Persian scholar, who guided
him in the study of Sharih Hikmit-i-ul-Ishraq. He learnt the subtleties and nuances of
classical Persian literature from Mirza Shirazi, a Persian scholar who was well-versed in
French, German and English literature. He also took lessons in Turkish language from
one Tahira Beg but could not make any headway in it.30 He learnt the English alphabet
from Muhammad Yusuf Jafri, chief examiner of the Oriental course of studies, who gave
him Peary Churan Sarkar’s first book to read. He then took up the Bible in English and
compared it with its Urdu and Persian versions. Such a comparative study combined
with his reading of English newspapers enabled him to read English books in history and
philosophy.32
Due to the rigorous teaching imparted to Azad, he was able to complete the highly
specialized Dars-e-Nizami (framed by the great teacher Mullah Nizamuddin and
24 A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.2-3. Arsh Malsiani, op.eit, p .7. Also in V.N.Datta, Maulana Azad,
Manohar, New Delhi, 1990, p.9.
25 Abdur Razzaq Malihabadi, Azad Ki Kahani, p. 170,180,188.
26 Ibid, p.173.
27 Ghulam Rasul Mihr (ed.), Naqsh-e-Azad, Delhi, 1980, p.330.
28 Malihabadi, Azad Ki Kahani, p. 205.
29 Ibid, p.209-19.
30 Ibid, p. 213.
31 A.K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.3.
32 Ibid.
275
th
prevalent since the 18 century) when he was only 6, taking one third of the normal time
for completing it.33 This was indeed a remarkable performance for a young boy at that
age. He had started preparing a Persian dictionary before he was ten.34 This amazing feat
is similar to that of young Thomas Babington Macaulay who had begun to write
compendium of universal history at the age of eight.35
After completing Dars-e-Nizami, as was the custom, Maulana Azad was required to teach
a batch of students and he taught higher philosophy, mathematics and logic to fifteen
students.36 About forty years later, Maulana Azad assailed the Dar-e-Nizami as
antiquated and worthless because it encouraged cramming of the text without giving any
insight or developing the thinking faculty.37 He also criticized his father’s method of
teaching which started with the memorization of some texts because that was the method
of teaching in the family of Shah Walliullah.38
Maulana Khairuddin was not content with Dars-e-Nizami for Azad. So he went beyond it
and included in his course of study other subjects like medicines, mathematics,
astronomy and astrology. He taught the whole of Baidawi, some Sufi text of Ibn Arbi and
Suhrawardy. He also initiated Azad into the study of the principles of logic. But the main
focus throughout remained on the study of Quran, Hadith, Tafsir, Fiqa and Islamic
*2Q
religious literature. It was indeed a very hard experience to be taught by Maulana

Khairuddin who would give lessons to his sons thrice a day, in the early morning,
afternoon and at night. The children also said their prayers five times a day like devout
Muslims. They had to get up first at 4 A.M. for their namaz, and this habit of rising early
became a permanent feature of Maulana Azad’s life.40 In the course of his teaching
exercises to his sons, Maulana Khairuddin would examine them to see how far they had
33 A.K Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p.99.

34 Malihabadi, Azad Ki Kahani, p. 203-204.
35 Sir George Otto Trevelyan, The Life and Letters ofLord Macaulay, London, 1889, p.21.
38 Ibid, p.88.
39 A.K.Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p. 97. Malihabadi, Azad Ki Kahani, p. 177-78, 353-54.
40 V.N.Datta, op.cit., p.10.
276
grasped what had been taught to them. In this face to face encounter Maulana Azad
always met with a sharp rebuke from his father as a result of his failure to answer the
questions. Later, reading became a passion and Maulana Azad began to devour books.
His teachers could not keep pace with his progress and had to teach him separately from
other children.41
Maulana Azad recollects the remarks of his teacher who taught him
Rational Sciences, in light humour while referring to his amazing intellectual power:
“this youngster Azad expounds to me the Sadra but is under the fojind illusion that I was
teaching him.”42 In his exposition of the principles of logic and astrology he would leave
even well trained teachers flabbergasted. He read with diligence the works of Imam
Ghazali, Iman Razi, Shah Walliullah of Delhi and the Ain-i-Akbari. The Persian poetical
works of Rumi, Sadi, Hafiz, Bedil etc. were at his fingertips. His favourites in Urdu were
Mir, Ghalib, Hali, Shibli, Syed Ahmad Khan, Mohammad Nazir Ahmed and Muhammad
Husain Azad. Referring to his accomplishments as a youth, Sarojini Naidu once
remarked, “Do not talk of Maulana’s age. He was fifty the day he was bom”.43
Maulana Azad’s curiosity eventually took him outside the sphere of religious literature
much against the wishes of his father 44 Doubts gradually began to stir within him about
his father’s beliefs, convictions and outlook. A point eventually came when Maulana
Azad began to break the traditional chains that bound him.
MAULANA AZAD’S MARRIAGE

Maulana Azad was only thirteen when his father got him married to Zuleikha Begum, the
daughter of Aftabuddin Ahmed, a disciple of Maulana Khairuddin. Zuleikha was only
seven at that time. She had a good schooling in Urdu and Persian and knew elementary
41 A.K. Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p.99.

42 Ibid, p. 98.
43 Quoted by Mushir-ul-Haq, Muslim Politics in Modern India:1857-1947, Meenakshi, Meerut, 1970, p.69.
Also in Humayun Kabir (ed.), Maulana Abul KalamAzad: A Memorial Volume, OUP, Bombay, 1959,
p.69.
44 A.K. Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p. 94-105.
277
Arabic.45 Zuleikha was an accomplished lady, well versed in household affairs and of a
most hospitable nature. She took good care of Maulana Azad and evinced keen interest in
his books and writings. When Azad was writing Tarjuman-al-Quran, she used to keep
fanning him till late at night.46
Azad’s repeated imprisonment had cast a constant shadow of gloom over her and she
used to pray for his safety constantly. Their only child, a son, died at the age of four. As
the child was very handsome, he was named ‘Haseen’ or the beautiful one.47 Gradually,
she became indifferent to her dress and make up. When Maulana Azad left home to
preside over the historic Congress session at Bombay in 1942, Zuleikha, already beset by
ill health, sought vainly to repress her agony while saying good bye to him. She died
when Maulana Azad was detained in the Ahmednagar Fort.48 After his release, Maulana
Azad paid a visit to her grave and read out fateha.49 Her passions, impressions and
emotions towards her husband were recorded in her diary in 1908 and are preserved in
the Azad Bhawan Library at New Delhi.50
MAULANA AZAD’S LOVE

We have scant information about Maulana Azad in the interlude between the death of his
father in 1908 and his launching of al-Hilal in 1912. Douglas believes that from the time
of his father’s death until 1910 Maulana Azad was busy in the pursuit of sexual
indulgences.51 In the formation of this opinion, Douglas seems to have been influenced
by Maulana Azad’s letter to Syed Sulaiman Nadwi which is Maulana Azad’s unequivocal
e"s
confession of his youthful licentiousness.
45 Arsh Malsiani, op.cit., p.9.

46 Ibid.
47 Arsh Malsiani, op.cit, p.9. Also in Rajmohan Gandhi, op.cit, p.221.
49 Ibid.
50 Zuleikha Begum Ki Diary, Azad Bhawan Library, New Delhi, 1908.
51 Douglas, op.cit p. 95.
52 Maulana Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Maktubat-e-Sulaimani, Vol. I, Lucknow, 1963-67, p. 182-88.
278
Nadwi was staying with Maulana Azad in Calcutta to assist him in the editing of al-Hilal.
He saw Maulana Azad from close quarters and found him leading a sinful life contrary to
the injunctions of Islam. In a private letter to Abdul Majid Daryabadi dated 26 October
C <2
1913, Nadwi compared Azad to flowers that look pretty but lack fragrance. Recalling
his period of early youth, Maulana Azad stated that whatever he did, he did in extremes;
be it virtuous deeds or sinful life, he never held back.54
We find oblique references to his love affair disguised in poetic flights and passionate
declamation in the concluding portion of Maulana Azad’s Tazkirah.55 It was on Abdul
Razzaq Malihabadi’s insistence that Azad wrote the last part of Tazkirah in order to give
a brief account of his personal life. Malihabadi tells us that Maulana Azad wrote an
independence piece on his love affair which he withdrew later on the pretext of revising
it.56 Malihabadi produced both the Azad Ki Kahani and Zikr-e-Azad after Maulana
Azad’s death and could have easily reproduced from his memory at least some account of
Maulana Azad’s love affair, but he did not because, as he says, he refused to divulge the
secret of Maulana Azad’s life without obtaining his permission. This argument is
unconvincing. It is quite possible that Malihabadi knew no details about this love episode
for which he made tall claims,
Maulana Azad gives no details about his attachment to the woman he loved. He was no
Rousseau to lay bare his heart! Nor does he tell us the name of the woman for whom he
fell. It is also not clear whether Maulana Azad’s love affair was one-sided or it ruptured
at its initial stage. Maulana Azad’s love episode took place in Bombay around 1909 when
he was already a married man. They must have lived together since 1907, as after the
death of his wife, Maulana Azad refers to their thirty-six years of life together.57 Whether
Maulana Azad would have renounced his wife, contemplated another marriage with a
53 Ibid, p.13-15.
55 A.K. Azad, Tazkirah, p.317.
56 Malihabadi, Zikr-e-Azad, p.270-271.
279
new woman or carried on his intimacy with her clandestinely are all unanswered
questions. Maulana Azad points out that it was the physical aspect of love which aroused
first the intensity of his passion.58 He wrote that it is the physical manifestation of love
that governs the entire universe.59 According to Maulana Azad nothing matter in love
except its object; everything else is irrelevant and by opening one door, all other doors
are closed.
Of his passion for physical love, Maulana Azad burst into a flame of poetic prose in the
following passage: “When I opened my eyes, adolescence had already dawned, every
thorn in the wilderness of my world was gay as a flower with the dews of ambition and
desire. When I looked at myself, I saw a heart filled with quicksilver instead of blood.
Heedlessness and inebriation chanted their magic spells, passions filled with the cups, the
madness of youth caught me by hands; my heart, loving to surrender itself, accepted as its
goal the way shown to it by impulses and desire. In reality, there are three stages, desire,
love, and truth; what I mean by love is love in the narrow, impure physical sense, not the
absolute love, which embraces all creation. No doubt the (love of mine) was also a lapse.
But what shall we say of lapse that casts on the feet of the beloved. The end ofSkll effort
is to reach Him. If lapses and intoxication leads us there, why should not a thousand
forms of constancy and sobriety be offered up on their altar.”60
But Maulana Azad’s love attempts were thwarted. This experience of thwarted love
brought in him the anguish of despair and he wandered into a blind alley.61 Maulana
Azad wrote that the “failure of love opened my eyes”.62 According to Maulana Azad, this
love episode gave him a new vision of love.63 He regarded despair in love as necessary
for real advancement in life. The woman who rejected him became for Maulana Azad a
personification of distinct moral and intellectual values. Swayed by the flood of emotion,
58 A.K.Azad, Tazkirah, p. 318.

59 Ibid, p.319-20.
60 Ibid, p.314-18. Cf. Mujeeb, ‘The Tadkirah’ in Humayun Kabir (ed.), op.cit. p.142-145.
61 A.K. Azad, Tazkirah, p.318.
62 Ibid, p.324.
63 Ibid, p.330.
280
Maulana Azad wrote with pardonable exaggeration that it was this experience which
entirely shaped his personality to the exclusion of all other influences including his
education and family traditions. He wrote what came to him as pain became for him
eventually a medicine and a healing power for his wounds.64
MAULANA AZAD’S SKEPTICISM

Immersed in the close world of learning, Maulana Azad craved for an escape from the
unusually rigorous scholastic atmosphere and to become a freeman. He could not get
peace by just reading Islamic history and theology and preaching it to faithful. During the
eighteenth century, the Wahabi ideology was becoming famous. As it opposed the system
of Piri, Maulana Khairuddin vindictively opposed the Wahabis. Maulana Azad first under
his father’s influence and without any knowledge of their ideology treated them as
heretics. But his ignorance was soon dispelled and he found to his dismay that his faith in
his father’s lifestyle loosening. At the young age of twelve passing through an emotional
and mental crisis, Maulana Azad became impatient to break the shackles of tradition that
bounded him. Maulana Khairuddin believed that the relation of the human mind with the
world was only moral and intellectual and not emotional or imaginative. But Maulana
Azad apprehended more than what religious rituals and the bookish knowledge
comprehended. He wanted another kind of existence and therefore there commenced in
him a strong reaction against what his father valued and stood for.
At this stage, Maulana Azad was impressed with the writing of Syed Ahmed Khan, which
opened a new vista of thought for him.65 He found Syed Ahmed Khan totally opposed to
his father’s traditional orthodoxy, which gave him satisfaction.66 He was convinced that a
man could not be truly educated unless he studied modem science, philosophy and
literature. He made it clear to his father that he would not like to succeed him as Pir.
64 Ibid.
65 Malihabadi, AzadKi Kahani, p.361-62. Also in A.K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.3.
66 V.N.Datta, op.cit, p.17.
281
This rebellion on Azad’s part made his father terribly angry.68 It was a parting of the
ways between the father and the son for all times.69 Piri would have brought him social
status, fame and wealth. But Maulana Azad was made of different stuff. He chose a new
path, hard and independent. All through his life, he attached the veneration shown to Pirs,
10
tombs and other fanatical practices performed in the name of Islam.
Syed Ahmed Khan’s religious writings brought Azad closer to the true spirit of Islam
which had been obscured by the juristic sects and meaningless controversies raised by the
contentious Ulemas in the interpretation of the Quran.71 Syed Ahmed Khan had subjected
the Quran to rational criticism and rejected all that was opposed to logic and nature. He
strongly admired Syed Ahmed Khan for his strong defence of Islam on rational grounds
against the secular criticism which aimed at undermining the traditional foundations of
belief. Maulana Azad used the term of mujtahid-e-mutlaq (the absolute interpreter) for
Syed Ahmed Khan indicating the intellectual debt that he owed to him. He described
himself at that stage of his religious development as mujitahid fil mazhab (interpreter
within a jurist school).73 He believed that nothing was more inimical to man’s moral and
spiritual development than to be bound by the chains of taqlid,74 The overall impact of
Syed Ahmed Khan’s writings resulted in the repudiation of his family’s traditional
orthodoxy and a complete refocusing of his ideas about Islam.73
Azad faced the agonizing task of rethinking about his whole religious outlook. Syed
Ahmad Khan’s ideas, it turned out, could not satisfy him for long. His mind was further
assailed by intellectual doubts and vague forebodings. He began to question the entire
basis of religion and its place in life. His restlessness and insatiable curiosity began to
probe deeper into the accepted system of religioh beliefs. Maulana Azad pointed out that
68 Malihabadi, AzadKi Kahani, p.375.

69 V.N.Datta, op. cit, p.18.
70 Malihabadi, Zikr-e-Azad, p.460-476.
71 A.K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.3. Malihabadi, AzadKi Kahani, p.359-61.
72 W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis, Victor Gallenez, London, 1946, p.20.
73 Ian Henderson Douglas, op.cit, p. 56-57, n.74.
75 Ibid, p. 102.
282
from the age of fourteen, he was tom by religious conflicts for about nine years (1902-
1910).76 He regards this period of nine years as the darkest in his life.77 Maulana Azad’s
religious outlook had changed due to Syed Ahmed Khan who had shown him that the
reality of Islam was different from what his ancestors had believed it to be. This freed
Maulana Azad from the fetters of his parental religious orthodoxy. He began to question
the validity and justification of conventional and customary religion and would not be
content with facile answers.78 He thought that religion with its elaborate and complex
paraphernalia was only a creation of man. These doubts led him to question the
existence of God, prophethood, revelation, the immortality of soul etc. He became a
heretic and religion ceased to appeal to him.80 He was longing to find something new.81
He had come to the realization that religion itself, although it was supported to create a
spirit of harmony, was the greatest cause of strife in the social history of man. There
cannot be either multiplicity or contradiction in truth. Where there is opposition and
dispute, there is no truth. He passed through a period of mental anguish and he gave
up namaz}4 He also abandoned celebrating the Id. He could not sleep the whole night
Of
and was emotionally disturbed.
BECOMING FREE
Maulana Azad started writing poems, literary and political articles for Urdu newspapers
and journals at a very early age. His first ghazal was published in a poetic selection called
Armughan-e-Farrukh published from Bombay.86 At the age of twelve, he became a
publisher and issued in 1900, a poetic journal called Nairang-e-Aalam, which continued
76 Malihabadi, Zikr-e-Azad, p.289.

77 Malihabadi, AzadKi Kahani, p.398.
78 Ibid, p.259. Also in Malihabadi, Zikr-e-Azad, p.252.
79 Malihabadi, Azad Ki Kahani, p.398.
80 Ibid, p.39,297. Malihabadi, Zikr-e-Azad, p.252.
85 V.N. Datta, op.cit. p.21,
86 Arsh Malsiani, op.cit, p.8.
283
for eight months.87 But he soon left the poetry and at the age of sixteen, started editing his
own paper Lisan-al-Sidq which aimed at promoting social reform, development of Urdu,
and cultivation of literary taste. His association with Maulana Shibli, a renowned scholar
in 1904, widened his social and literary interests. He cultivated his natural talent for
writing at home itself. The influence of Shibli and Syed Ahmed Khan’s writings acted as
a further stimulant which found its concrete expression in the unending flow of literary
output that India was to see in the years to come.
He was not a conformist writer. He refused to be tied to inherited beliefs and became
questioner of things taken as established by others. So he adopted the pen name of Azad
oo
or free. Through his journalistic writings, Maulana Azad gave lofty and inspiring
message. He also tried to impress the people through his new interpretation of Islam. All
these things made him so popular that the people meeting him for the first time were
shocked at his tender age and had to be reassured that they were meeting the real
Maulana Azad.
Maulana Azad does not relate how he returned to faith and sanity but he uses allegorical
phrases to describe beliefs rebirth: “The shock of unilateral love opened my eyes, as if
into a different world... Every leaf was like a letter. Flowers opened its lips. Stones rolled
up to point out something. The skies came down to resolve my queries. Angels held me
by their arms that I might not falter. The sun came to light my way that I might not
OQ
stumble. All the veils were taken off.”
MAULANA AZAD’S ASSOCIATION WITH THE REVOLUTIONARIES

In 1906, Maulana Azad, eighteen at the time, had attended the Dacca Conference at
which the Muslim League was founded.90 At this time, the Swadeshi movement (1905-
1908) had started against Lord Curzon’s Partition of Bengal. Maulana Azad, as a member
87 Ibid, p.9. Also in S.C. Kashyap (ed.), op.cit, p.5.

88 A K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p. 4.
89 Quoted by Arsh Malsiani, op. cit, p,14-15.
90 Rajmohan Gandhi, op.cit, p.220.
284
of the Muslim League rebelled against the loyalty to the Raj, and joined one of the
Bengal’s revolutionary groups.91 Maulana Azad came in close touch with a staunch
extremist Shyamsunder Chakrabarti and met other revolutionaries including the firebrand
Aurobindo Ghosh. The early revolutionaries tended to be ‘aggressively Hindu’ and
entertained strong suspicions about the Muslims. Maulana Azad sought to counteract the
distrust of the Muslim community by the Hindu revolutionist. He argued with his new
comrades that the Muslims could be won over and that their indifference would make the
struggle for freedom more difficult.93 Maulana Azad induced some of his associates to
join the revolutionary movement and he succeeded in setting up secret societies in a few
towns in Northern India.94
Intelligence Branch Records yield partial evidence in support of Maulana Azad’s claim
that he had assisted in the spread of extremist revolutionary activity beyond. After he
became well known as the editor of al-Hilal (1912), the Intelligence Branch conducted
extensive enquiries to uncover his political antecedents. These showed that he had been
active in the Punjab during 1907-1908. He was an active helper of the ‘extremist party in
Lahore’ and had contact with Amba Prasad, Ajit Singh and other revolutionaries to his
north Indian contacts.95
During the war Maulana Azad had carried on a pan-Islamic and anti-British propaganda
through al-Hilal and al-Balagh. He had championed the cause of the liberation of the
country and even recommended jihad for this purpose. He formed the Hizbullah Party
“to enlist and organize a body of dedicated Muslims, make an agreement with the
Hindus, and launch a joint struggle against the British.”96

92 Ibid, p.4-5.
93 Rajat Ray, 'Revolutionaries, Pan-Islamist and Bolsheviks: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and the Political
Underworld in Calcutta, 1905-1925 ’ in Mushir-ul Hasan (ed.), Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in
Colonial India, Manohar, New Delhi, 1981, p. 103.
94 V.N.Datta, op.cit, p.104.
95 Home (Poll.), 42, History Sheet on Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 1912, NAI.
96 Rajmohan Gandhi, op,cit, p.233.
285
According to Intelligence Reports, Maulana Azad turned the minds of many young
students to revolutionary activity. One report records that the “fanatical school boys had
been maddened by the subtle incitements of learned, eloquent but hypocritical priest Abul
Kalam Azad.” These students were going to Turkey for training to wage jihad against the
British. Maulana Azad was closely in touch with Obeidullah Sindhi who had escaped to
Afghanistan in 1915. He was engaged in doing spadework in India for intensifying
revolutionary activity." Obeidullah who was a minister in the Provincial Government of
India set up in Kabul was sending letters to Maulana Azad.
In Intelligence Reports, Azad is dubbed as an ‘extremist’ and “a dangerous man.”100 He

was also consulted by Maulana Mahmudul Hass'an on the desirability of going to the
Middle Eastern countries.101 Maulana Azad gave financial support to some of the
conspirators because of the influence he wielded over the Muslim community in
Calcutta. He was expected to reach Kabul to assist Obeidullah in revolutionary
activities.
It is evident from the Intelligence Reports that Azad was extemed from Bengal not
because of any incriminating article published in al-Balagh which was strictly a religious
paper, but for his involvement in the Silk Conspiracy/Letter^ Case and his close
association with some of its leaders, and the Government of India considered his political
activity dangerous. He was permitted to stay in Ranchi on the condition that he would
stop all political activities, provide guarantees for his behaviour and give identity of his
1 ftt
visitors and not leave Ranchi in any case until further orders.
97 Foreign & Political, Frontier B-Confidential, A Proceeding; 1914, p.241-430; Proceeding, 271, NAI.
98 Ibid. Also in Home (Poll), A, June 1919, NAI.
99 Ibid. Letter to Col. C. Wilson from Sir Charles Cleveland, No. 3923, XI, 1 December 1916; Appendix to
the Silk Letter Conspiracy, NAI.
100 Home (Poll.), A, June 1919, NAI. Also in Home (Poll.), A, May 1916, NAI.
101 Home (Poll.), A, 1919, NAI.
102 James Campbell Ker, Political Trouble in India, 1907-17, Calcutta, 1917, p.314.
103 Home (Poll.), A, 1919, NAI.
286
PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS
Gandhi wanted to see Maulana Azad at Ranchi but the government disallowed him.
When Azad was released on 27 December 1919, he found a new world and a new age in
India. The country had been plunged into political turmoil in 1919 and it was politically
astir as never before. During the period of his enforced speculation and absence from the
political scene, the country had to witness the anti-Rowlatt agitation, Satyagraha
movement Jallianwala Bagh massacre, Martial Law and its atrocities. A new spirit had
been awakened in the country.104
The year 1919 witnessed scenes of Hindu-Muslim unity when Hindus and Muslims drank
water from the same glass. This manifestation of Hindu Muslim^ unity disturbed the
ruling authority and they took it as a serious challenge to their existence. The
confrontation between the people and government during the agitations resulted in open
clashes. Then came the tragic episode of the Jallianwala Bagh which marked a turning
point in the political history of India. The Martial Law atrocities created terror among the
people and they felt humiliated and outraged by high-handed acts like the Crawling Order
and compulsory roll call of respectable lawyers at police stations.
People had gradually been driven to the point of exasperation and anger by the
government. Rabindranath Tagore renounced his knighthood in protest against the
Jallianwala Bagh massacre. Gandhi returned his Kaiser-i-Hind Gold Medal and his Zulu
War Medal. People were in a sullen and defiant mood. Gandhi now emerged as a national
leader. In his Autobiography, Jawaharlal Nehru called the 1919 Amritsar Congress as the
first “Gandhi Congress”.105 When the Ali Brothers appeared at the Amritsar Congress
session they were received with a thunderous applause and became the ‘darlings of the
people’.106
104 V.N.Datta, Maulana Azad, Manohar, New Delhi, 1990, p.106.

105 Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, OUP, New Delhi, 1980, p.44.
106 V.N.Datta, op.cit., p. 106.
287
MAULANA AZAD’S ROLE IN THE KHILAFAT AND NON-COOPERATION
MOVEMENTS
A major cause of unrest among the Muslims in India at this time was the humiliating
treatment meted out to Turkey, the last great Islamic power. This enraged the Indian
Muslims. The threatened dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, Greece claiming the
whole of Thrace and Italy landing her forces in the Gulf of Adalia, created serious
apprehensions in the Muslim mind about the future of their holy places. The Muslims
feared that the Sultan of Turkey would be deprived of the authority necessary for the
discharge of duties going with his office as Caliph or spiritual head of Islam.
Ever since Turkey had entered the war, the Muslims in India expressed their sympathy
with that country and were preaching that the first duty of Muslims was allegiance to the
Caliph. Turkey capitulated on 31 October 1918. The Greeks demanded the coastal strip
including Smyrna and the Arabs revolted against their sovereign and Caliph. The Indian
Muslims led by Dr. M.A. Ansari demanded that all armed forces be withdrawn from the
holy places, the Hedjaz, Damascus, Baghdad, Najaf and Karbala.
Maulana Azad had for long been deeply concerned about Turkey and her degraded
position. Because of Ms pro-Turkish leanings his paper al-Hilal had been banned. When
he came out of his internment he found that Turkey had been further humiliated. He also
realized that the British government had caused estrangement among his countrymen by
inflicting on them wanton acts of cruelty. There could be no question for Maulana Azad
of supporting the government. Nor could ‘moderation’ appeal to him. He felt attracted to
the Khilafat movement and he plunged into it.
Before 1920, Maulana Azad had defined the collective identity of the Muslim community
in terms of Islam. Now with the emergence of Khilafat Movement he received
institutional support for his own thinking. The die was cast and there was no turning
back! It was during the Non-cooperation movement that he began to think of Hindus and
288
Muslims forming ‘Ummat-i-Wahidaa’’ (one nation). Thereafter, he became a grand
1 07
agitator and an ardent spokesman of the nationalist cause.
Maulana Azad wrote that it was not he who sought politics but that politics sought him.
He was swept off his feet by the tide of politics. It is necessary to understand Azad’s role
in the Khilafat agitation because this laid the foundations for his future development as a
great political leader. The Khilafat issue agitated all strata of the Muslim community.
Judith Brown who has made an intensive study of the political developments in India
since 1915-1922, has divided the Khilafat movement into three distinct phases, the first
phase lasting until 1919, the second from the release of the Ali Brothers and Azad at the
end of December up to early May 1919, and the third from mid-May to August 1920
when the Khilafat was joined with the agitation of the Punjab into a single movement of
Non-Cooperation.108
Initially Khilafat Committee was set up on 19 March 1919 at Bombay with Mian
Muhammad Chotani, a rich timber merchant as its President. It was he who paid the
travel expenses of the Khilafat delegation to England and extended a major part of the
financial support for the agitation in Upper India. The All India Khilafat Conference took
place at Lucknow on 21 September 1919. The Khilafat Day was observed on 17 October
to focus public attention on the Khilafat. Until November 1919, the Bombay Khilafat
Committee controlled the entire campaign and on 23 November it changed its name to
Central Khilafat Committee of India. According to Richard Gordon, a Cambridge
historian, “North India became the power house of the movement but Bombay was still
the treasury.”109
All through Maulana Azad remained closely associated with the Khilafat agitation and
107 Ian Henderson Douglas, op.cit., p.172-78 and 234-38.

108 Judith M. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, 1915-22, Cambridge, 1972, p.190-230. Also in V.N. Datta
and S.C.Mittal, Sources ofNational Movement, New Delhi, 1995, p.XIX-XXIII.
109 R.A. Gordon, ‘Non-Cooperation and Council Entry ’, in Locality, Province and Nation, Essays in Indian
Politics, 1870-1940, Cambridge, 1957, p. 13.
289
deeply involved in the programmes launched for giving it a momentum. During the war
years, he had shown strong pro-Turkish leanings. When Gandhi took up the Khilafat
cause, he found in Maulana Azad a staunch supporter who forcefully argued in favour of
the observance of hartal on 9 March 1920. While some prominent Muslim leaders like
Ajmal Khan, Abdul Bari and Hasrat Mohani has expressed reservation about Non
cooperation, Maulana Azad had no hesitation of doubts. The plight of Turkey had
infuriated him, and he was determined to fight for the restoration of the Khilafat.
He considered himself a citizen of historical Islamic brotherhood which was known as

the Turkish Caliphate. When the British and Khilafat collided, Maulana Azad declared
his loyalty to the Turkish sovereign. Often in his speeches he referred to the Covenant
Prophet Mohammad had brought about between the inhabitants of Medina and the Jews.
That Covenant had been negotiated by the parties after the entrance of Mohammad into
Medina (627 A.D.)
The object of the agreement was to forge a workable alliance for the common defence of
the adherents of the prophet and the Jews against the hostile Quresh who had persecuted
the Prophet in Mecca and forced him to immigrate to Medina. By citing the relevant
portions from the Quran and Hadith, he enjoined upon the Muslims to join the Hindus
against the British and forge what the Covenant had declared “Ummat-i- Wahidaa”.110
Maulana Azad set at rest doubts entertained by some of his Muslim colleagues about the
propriety of joining the Non-cooperation movement. By his scholarly interpretation of the
Quran, he emphasized that the Quran permitted the Muslims joining the Hindus against
the British on moral grounds. He enjoyed the full confidence of Gandhi and both
supported each other on Non-cooperation. At the All Indian Khilafat Conference held in
Calcutta in September 1920, Maulana Azad justified Non-Cooperation by the Islamic
edict of Tark-e-mavalat. He emphasized the role the Ulama and Sufis ought to play in
110 A.K.Azad, Khutabat-e-Sadarat,Majlis-e-Khilafat, Agra, 25 August 1921 in A.K. Azad Khutbat-e-Azad,

Malik Ram (ed.), New Delhi, 1981, p.51.
290 j
/
/
urging people to support Non-cooperation. Alongwith Muhammad Ali and Maulana
Abdul Majid Badauni, Maulana Azad addressed a meeting in Amritsar on 24 October
1920 and exhorted people not to co-operate with the government that disregarded then-
religious sentiments.
Gandhi inaugurated the Madrassa Islamia in Nakhuda Jama Mosque at Calcutta where
Maulana Azad had made arrangements for the study of Arabic as a part of Non
cooperation programme. Gandhi inaugurated the Madrassa and gave his blessings to this
important venture.111 On 13 December 1920, Azad delivered a highly inspiring speech on
how students fired by a spirit of patriotism should join this institution. Azad appointed
Husain Ahmad Madni of Deoband (1879-1957), a zealous worker of the Khilafat, as its
manager.
Maulana Azad was particularly active in organising the student population for non
cooperation. His erudition and eloquence acted as magic on them. The Congress and the
Central Khilafat Committee adopted a common programme of rectifying the Khilafat
wrongs and establishing Swaraj. The Khilafat Conference held at Karachi on July 8-10,
11T
1921 endorsed the fatwa urging people not to serve the British army.
In order to check the growing influence of Khilafat leaders, in mid-September 1921, the
government arrested Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Dr. Kitchlew, Shri Shankarachary,
Husain Ahmad Madni, Nihar Ahmad and Pir Ghulam Mujjahhid. After Shaukat Airs
arrest, Maulana Azad took over as Secretary of the Central Khilafat Committee on 22
September 1921. He had now to look after the organisation of Khilafat Committee on 22
September 1921.
111 Malihabadi, Zikr-e-Azad, p.45. Also in Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: A Study of Indian
Muslim Leadership, University of Pennsylvania, 1972, p.169-72.
112 A.K. Azad Khutbat-e-Azad, p.37-39. Also in Abu Salman Shahjahanpuri (ed.), Makatib-e-Azad,
Karachi, 1968, p. 115.
113 Francis Robinson, Separation Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the UP Muslims 1860-1925,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974, p.330. Also in Minault, op.cit., p.169-72.
291
The major responsibility for propagating the Khilafat and Non-cooperation ideas fell on
him. Because of his vast knowledge of Islamic history and culture he was able to serve as
guide on many sensitive issues which needed clarification. For intensifying the Non
cooperation campaign, he began to tour the country to hold meetings and give lectures.
He went to Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Agra and other places to spread the
agitation against the government.
Maulana Azad marked the assumption of his office as Secretary of Central Khilafat
Committee by publishing an article in his new Urdu weekly Paigham which he launched
in collaboration with Abdur Razzaq Malihabadi on 23 September 1921 from Calcutta.114
In the first issue, he summarized the accomplishments of the Central Khilafat Committee
- how it had adopted the non cooperation movement programme, mobilized public
opinion by organizing meetings in various parts of the country, and raised a fund for
furthering the Khilafat cause.
The paper propagated the view that the Muslims could no longer remain the subjects of a
government that suppressed religious freedom. It further urged that the real aim of the
Khilafat movement was freedom of India for which the Muslims must fight. To achieve
this object, the paper exhorted the Muslims to order their life according to the Sharia,
pray daily for God’s mercy, promote communal harmony and remain in the vanguard of
Non-cooperation.
Maulana Azad attacked the government for arresting the Khilafat leaders. He said that
every Muslim in India was committing the same crime for which the leaders had been
arrested, that he and others who were outside would most willingly and joyfully go to jail
for the same crime, the crime of defying the government and fighting for the liberation of
the country from the fetters of foreign rule. He declared that in Islam there was no choice,
either the Muslim must remain free or die.115
114
Paigham, 23 September 1921.
115
Ibid.
292
Reiterating that the arrest of national leaders was unjustified and there was a strong
resentment in the country, Maulana Azad called upon the people to follow the example
set by the leaders: “We have no sorrow for their arrest, but we should be jealous of their
honour and should be more ready than before for the duty which was theirs as well as
ours. In 1915 I was interned for nine months. After their internment I said at that time
with sorrow that in this path they had stolen a march over me. Today instead of
sorrowing, we should congratulate them and shall again say that they have out stepped us
all.”116 Azad’s speeches and articles during the campaign gave us an idea of the
principles, which he cherished, on the Khilafat and Non-cooperation.
In the Presidential address delivered to the U.P. Khilafat Conference held at Agra on 25
August 1921, Azad forcefully maintained that the Khilafat issue did not concern only a
particular community or class but the whole country and on it really depended the future
of India. He stated that the Quran makes a distinction between Muslims and non-
Muslims and directs that the non-Muslim nations that attack the Muslims are not to be
befriended whereas those that are friendly to them should be invited to work for a
common cause. Maulana Azad said in his picturesque diction that it was possible to be
friendly, “with a snake or a scorpion but not with the British, it was possible to give milk
to a snake on one’s palm, it was out of the question ever to compromise with British.”118
What the country needed, above all, he emphasized, was Faith, Action and Sacrifice.119
In another speech, which was delivered at the Khilafat Conference in Agra on 26 October
1921, Maulana Azad condemned the government action of arresting the Khilafat leaders.
He termed this action as downright madness. He reiterated the position he had taken
earlier on 28 February 1920 at the Calcutta Khilafat Conference that it was completely
irreligious for the Muslim soldiers to serve in the British army and called upon it to resign
116 Ibid, 22 September 1921, 14 October, 21 October 1921. Minault, op.cit. p.125.
117 A.K. Azad, Khutbat-e-Azad, p.40-68.
118 Ibid, p.59-62. Also in V.N. Datta, op.cit., p.120.
119 Ibid, p.72.
293
from British service. Maulana Azad argued that it was the army that had enslaved the
country and therefore, it was necessary for the Muslim soldiers to quit the British service
in order to liquidate the Empire. While delivering his presidential speech at Lahore on 21
November 1921 at the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind, he appealed to the soldiers again to
1Ofl
resign from service.
He also lamented that he had not been arrested by the government. It is clear from his
speeches that Maulana Azad was fiercely attacking the government for its misdeeds.121
He was justifying the co-operation of Hindus and Muslims on the basis of his lucid
interpretation of the Quran and he was organizing the agitation against the British
government, which had given an affront to their religion.
Maulana Azad was speaking less like a pan Islamist now and more like an Indian
passionately devoted to the liberation of his country from foreign rule. His powerful
eloquence had profound impact on the audience. His choice of words was most effective.
His speeches were scholarly in content, vigorous in diction, picturesque in form and rich
in historical references evoking memories of the past that would inspire his audience.
In the speeches, he delivered before the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind at Lahore on 18

November 1921, Maulana Azad had exhibited his erudition by surveying Islamic history
and showing how great religious thinkers and leaders in the past had suffered privations,
tortures and even executions in the cause of Truth.122 He proclaimed that he saw no
reason why the Ulama, the repository of true faith, should not emulate their example by
fighting against oppression perpetrated by the British.
Despite Maulana Azad’s highly inflammatory speeches and his feverish anti-British
activity, the Government did not arrest him. He felt extremely unhappy about his not
120 Ibid, p. 139-157.

121 This account is based on analysis of his speeches and articles on the Khilafat published in Paigham and
Khutbat-e-Azad,
122 A.K. Azad, Khutbat-e-Azad, p.83-156.
294
being arrested when many of his friends and colleagues were already in jail. But he did
not have to wait indefinitely. When the government decided to act, Maulana Azad had
some premonition about it. On 8 December 1921, he wrote down a message, which was
found lying in his papers after his arrest. The message read as follows: “God knows best
how painful it had become for me to stay out of jail. Those who go to jail first do not
know the torments of the ones left behind. Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Lala Lajpat Rai
and Pandit Motilal Nehru have completed their journey while I am still waiting for my
destination. That destination is now in sight and my heart is full of joy.. .”123
MAULANA AZAD’S TRIAL

Maulana Azad was arrested on 10 December 1921 at 4.30 pm. He was dictating a letter to
his friend, Fazluddin Ahmad at that time. Azad was arrested without a warrant the same
day as C. R. Das and they met in jail. The speeches delivered by Maulana Azad in
Mirzapur Park at Calcutta on 1 and 15 July 1921 was used as a basis for his arrest.124 He
was produced before the presidency magistrate, M. D. Swinner. He was sentenced to a
year’s rigorous imprisonment on 9 February 1922 under section 124-A of the Indian
Penal Code. On hearing the sentence, Azad smiled and said: “It is much less than what I
had expected.” Maulana Azad’s wife sent a telegram to Gandhi complaining that the
punishment awarded to her husband was mild.125 In his journal Young India dated 23
February 1922 Gandhi hailed the statement as an “oration deserving penal servitude for
life.” Azad gave his statement in chaste Urdu some portions of which Mahadev Desai
and Durlab Singh translated into English.
Maulana Azad made it clear at the outset that he expected no justice from the law court
before which he had appeared because the law courts under the British regime were based
on a system in which no magistrate could give justice to the accused person. He
condemned the present system of government as pernicious because it used the courts as
123 A.G. Noorani, Indian Political Trials, New Delhi, 1976, p.41.
124 Ibid, p.160.
125 Ibid, p.161.
126 Mahadeo Desai, Maulana Azad, Shivlal Aggrawal & Co., Agra, 1946, p.44.
295
weapons of vengeance and injustice. Maulana Azad went on to narrate how in history
some of the greatest men like Jesus, Socrates and Galileo inspired by high ideas had
suffered at the hands of courts. He spoke of the convict’s dock as a “wonderful place
i on
where the most righteous as well as the most criminal men are made to stand.” He then
thanked the Almighty for the honour done to him by his arrest and trial in the court of law
which he left “could be an object of envy for emperors.”
Admitting that he was fighting the British government in the name of liberty and justice
and that he was determined to provoke disaffection among people, Maulana Azad said: “I
am the first Muslim in India who invited this nation for the first time in 1912 to commit
this crime and within three years succeeded in bringing about a revolution in their slavish
mentality. Hence, if the Government regards me a criminal and consequently desires to
award punishment I earnestly acknowledge that it would not be an unexpected thing and
that I will have absolutely no grudge against that.”129
Maulana Azad pointed out that the real reason for his arrest was that the government
wanted to arrest him before the arrival of the Prince of Wales in Calcutta on 24 December
so that there would be no hartal which they thought he would succeed in organizing. The
government was convinced that Azad would threaten the peace of the town. Under the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, the government declared all the national
organizations of volunteers unlawful. Maulana Azad maintained that he expected the
government either to withdraw the order banning meetings or to arrest him.
He attacked the government fiercely of depriving the Indians of their fundamental rights
of liberty. To Maulana Azad, the promise of liberty to be granted through ‘graduated
stages’ by the government was nothing but delaying tactics which added insult to injury.
Such a procedure was like an owner of a property “receiving it by bits and a creditor his
127
A. G. Noorani, op.cit, p.164.
128
Ibid.
129
Ibid, p. 165.
130
Ibid, p. 167-168.
296
dues by installments.”131 Analyzing some of the liberal and egalitarian principles of
Islam, Azad pointed out that Islam “constitutes a perfect system of freedom and
democracy” where cardinal principle is that the “highest right is not might but right
itself.”132 Personal monarchy and bureaucratic autocracy, Azad averred, were an
anathema to Islam. Azad argued that as a Muslim it was his moral duty to stand up for
truth and speak it fearlessly. He said: “To expect from a Mussalman he should not
pronounce what is right is to ask him to retire from Islamic life. If you have no right to
demand from a person to give up his religion, then certainly you cannot require a
Mussalman that he should not call tyranny a tyranny, because both the things are
synonymous...
“This is that vital organ of Islamic life, which if cut off, terminates the very existence of
its best characteristics...In the Quran - the Holy Book of Islam, the Mussalmans have
been told that they are witnesses of truth in God’s universe. In the capacity of a nation
this is their national character.”133
Maulana Azad saw no justification whatsoever for perpetuation of British rule in India
which was based on the exploitation of the people of India. Like Edmund Burke, he
believed that liberty is a natural and God-given gift of man and that no country however
benevolent has any right to subjugate others because “slavery is slavery and is opposed to
the will and canons of God.” He maintained that it was his moral duty to fight for the
liberty of his country from foreign rule. Maulana Azad reported how the Prophet
extracted a promise of righteousness from any person by binding him to obey the
Quranic command, “I will always proclaim the truth in whatever condition and wherever
I may happen to be.”134
131 Ibid, p.168.

132 Ibid, p. 169.
133 Ibid, p.170.
134 Ibid, p.171.
297
Maulana Azad declared that to Mussalmans whose religious duties make it imperative on
them to accept death rather than hesitate from proclaiming the truth, a case registered
under section 124-A, the maximum punishment for which, is seven years, can never be a
frightful thing. He cited some examples from Islamic history to show how humble men
of lowly order dared to speak the truth against the mighty but surprisingly such cases did
1 O/C
not incur the displeasure of the authorities in the past. On the other hand, the Kings
often appreciated the dissenting voices and rectified the wrongs, Maulana Azad pointed
out that the Islamic governments did not, as a rule, invoke ignoble laws like Section 124-
A to crush the liberties of the people.
The struggle against a foreign power, Maulana Azad maintained, had to be waged,
according to Islam either by the use of sword or non-violence. He urged that in the
present case the struggle had to be carried on in a true spirit of non-violence. Admitting
that he bore no grudge for having been involved by the government in a case for
punishment, Azad declared that “a true Muslim has either to immolate himself or to live
1 T7
as a free man; no third course is open to him in Islam.”
Maulana Azad made it clear that there was no question of his showing any loyalty to a
government that was tyrannical. He declared: “During the last two years not a single day
has passed when I had not proclaimed the tyranny of the Government with regard to ‘the
Khilafat’ and ‘the Punjab affairs’. I admit having always said that for a Government
which is bent on exterminating the Khilafat and is neither prepared to compensate nor is
ashamed of the tyrannies of the Punjab there can be no loyalty in the heart of any
Indian.”138
Maulana Azad spelled out some of the basic principles which had governed his life, the
principles which he would never sacrifice: “Continuously in the last twelve years I have
135
Ibid.
136
Ibid.
137
Ibid. p. 173.
138
Ibid, p.174.
298
been training my community and my country to demand their rights and their liberty. I
was only eighteen years old when I first started speaking and writing on this theme. I
have consecrated my whole being to it and sacrificed the best of my life, meaning the
whole of my youth, to my infatuation for this ideal. For four years, I have suffered
internment but even during my internment I never desisted from pursuing my work and
inviting people to follow this national goal. This is the mission of my life and if I live at
all I elect to live only for this single purpose even as the Quran says: “My prayers and my
observances and my life and death are all for my Lord, the Lord and the Universe”.”139
Maulana Azad wanted to be punished for another reason. In his statement, he told the
authorities that it was under his Presidentship of the Central Khilafat Conference on 28-
29 February 1920 that a resolution was passed wherein it was declared irreligious for any
faithful Muslims to serve in the British army. This resolution, he asserted was adopted
thrice under his Presidentship. He added, “So I am the proper person to deserve
punishment in connection with this crime because I have done nothing except
infringement of section 124-A many times by delivering speeches which contain all the
things for which I have not been charged.”140
Clarifying his position on the means to be adopted for the national struggle against the
British, Maulana Azad said that in this war of liberty and justice he would adopt the path
of non-violence and Non-cooperation. He made it clear that unlike Gandhi he believed in
the use of armed force for liberty and justice because “violence is fully in harmony with
the natural law of God in these circumstances under which Islam permits the use of such
violence.” But so far India was concerned, he thought that “India can only triumph
through a non-violent agitation and India’s triumph will be memorable example of the
victory of moral force.”141
139 Ibid, p. 175.

140 Ibid, p.177.
141 Ibid, p. 178.
299
Maulana Azad maintained that what the authorities regarded as sedition was in reality
patriotism in his eyes. He argued: “I am charged with ‘sedition’ but let me understand the
meaning of ‘sedition’. Is ‘sedition’ that struggle for freedom which has not as yet been
successful? If this is so, I confess frankly, but at the same time let me remind you that this
very thing is called patriotism when it is successful. The armed leaders of Ireland were
regarded rebels until yesterday but what title would the Great Britain suggest for Dr.
Valera and Griffith today?”142
Maulana Azad did not lament over the prospects of being sentenced to imprisonment. On
the other hand, he regarded it necessary for the attainment of freedom of the country as
would be evident from the following: “I had said in these very speeches the seed of
liberty can never yield fruit unless fertilized by the water of oppression. The Government
has begun fertilization. I had also said, “Don’t be sad over the arrest of Khilafat
volunteers. If you really want justice and freedom, get ready for going to the jails”.”143
The concluding part of Maulana Azad’s statement, like Gandhi’s statement on his trail on
18 March 1922, addressed to the magistrate reflects his passion for liberty and dignity of
character: “Mr. Magistrate, I will not take any more time of the court now. It is an
interesting and instructive chapter of history which both of us are engaged in preparing.
The dock has fallen to our lot and to yours, the magisterial chair. I admit that the chair is
as much necessary for this work as this dock. Let us come and finish our role in this
memorable drama. The historian is eagerly awaiting it and the future is looking towards
us. Allow us to occupy this dock repeatedly and continuously and you may also go on
writing the judgment again and again. For some time, this work will continue till the
gates of another court of law are flung open. Time will act as its judge and pass the
judgment. And that verdict will be final in all respects.”144
142
Ibid.
143
Ibid.
144
Ibid.
300
In his lengthy statement before the court, Maulana Azad strengthened his argument by
historical citations. Moreover, through his own interpretations of the Quran he justified
his struggle against the alien rule. It was his mission to fight for the liberation of his
country. His statement lacked Gandhi’s brevity and Shaukat Ali’s flamboyance and
rhetoric. It did not possess Abdul Bari’s fiery sallies. But it was remarkable for its
erudition, gravity of tone, candour and clarity of thought. Translations are inadequate and
never reach the force of the original, particularly in the case of Maulana Azad who was a
master of chaste, elegant and powerful Urdu prose. Qual-e-Faisal which contained his
original Urdu statement delivered before the court is written in a style whose rich
eloquence will be more difficult to render in any translation.
Maulana Azad was placed in the European ward of Alipur Central Jail, Calcutta. His
other companions were C.R. Das, Subhash Chandra Bose and Birendra Nath Sasmal.
During his prison days, Malihabadi compiled a portion of his autobiography, known as
Azad Ki Kahani Khud Azad Ki Zubani.
MAULANA AZAD’S OPINION ON THE ABOLITION OF KHILAFAT

During the period of his imprisonment, the political scene was changing fast. A serious
riot took place in the village of Chauri Chaura in UP, on 4 February 1922. About 200
demonstrators led by Non-cooperation volunteers attacked a small force of twenty-two
policemen. The police opened fire but was overpowered and the agitators set the police
station ablaze, burning the entire police force alive excepting two who managed to escape
the flames only to be beaten to death. This violence shocked Gandhi and he suspended
the Non-cooperation movement. The government had been thinking of taking stem action
against Gandhi and sentenced him to imprisonment for six years in March 1922.
Maulana Azad gave Gandhi unstinted support and Gandhi too backed him. They were
working together on the same wavelength in their anti-imperial struggle. Azad acted as
the ideologue of Khilafat agitation. He gave legitimacy to the movement by justifying it
through citations from the Quran. His views on the Khilafat question were embodied in a
301
long treatise entitled Masala-e-Khilafat-Wa-Jazirat-ul-Arab which was published in
1920. Maulana Azad’s thesis was that it would be irreligious to support the British when
Turkey was being humiliated and the Khilafat abolished. He put forward the thesis that
Islam and Indian nationalism are not incompatible.
Maulana Azad’s remarkable contribution was to bring the Hindus in support of this view
and Muslims together on the same platform and he frequently quoted from the Quran. He
emphasized that Islam did not produce a cleavage between the Hindus and Muslims, but
on the contrary, provided a strong base for their unity. When he brought Muslims into
Indian politics he built the entire edifice of his ideas on religious grounds.
The abolition of the Khilafat disheartened Muslim leadership in India, but that was not
the case with Maulana Azad who took a pragmatic view of the whole matter. He
explained his viewpoint in his articles, The Khilafat Problem and the Turkish Republic
published in Zamindar in 1924. He stated that the Turkish government by abolishing the
Khilafat of the Ottoman dynasty had rectified a wrong which lay in an artificial division
between spiritual and temporal powers. He thought that in reality the Khilafat has ceased
to exist since 1922. The object now should be to organize Muslims in India on the
foundation of Islamic ethics. Maulana Azad’s exposition of the Khilafat in this light has
been regarded as a piece of “cool-headed casuistry.”145
The Ulema demanded that Indian Muslims be governed according to the principles of
Quran. In Bihar, Maulana Azad and Azad Sobhani, a lecturer and journalist, conceived
the idea of setting up religious courts in the districts which were to administer the
Sharia.146 Finally, the idea was to set up such court in other provinces which would then
elect an amir-e-hind}41 But due to the opposition of Abdul Bari and the Ali Brothers the
idea was dropped.
145 Gail Minault, op.cit., p.204-205.

146 Robinson, op.cit., p.327.
147 Ibid, p. 153-54.
302
In October 1923, the Grand National Assembly declared Turkey as a Republic and
Mustafa Kamal Pasha abolished the Khilafat on 1 March 1924. The symbol of Khilafat
that had united the Hindus and Muslims had now ceased to exist and mistrust and
tensions between the two communities started growing fast. The Moplah riots occurred in
Malabar in 1921. The years 1922-24 were marked by a series of communal riots which
sullied the Hindu-Muslim relations. The Shuddhi, Sanghathan, Tablig, and Tanzim
movements launched with the object of converting people from one community to
another greatly added to religious strife and tension in the country.
At the Gaya Session in December 1922, the Congress was split into two groups, ‘no-
changers’ who were loyal to Gandhi’s programme of Non-cooperation and ‘pro
changers’ who were known as Swarajists. The Swarajists led by Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das
and Ajmal Khan favoured entry into the Legislative Council by participating in the
coming elections in order to wreck them from within. Malaviya also supported Das. Most
of the Muslim leaders stood by Gandhi’s programme.
MAULANA AZAD’S ROLE IN UNITING THE FRACTION-RIDDEN

CONGRESS
When Maulana Azad came out of jail on 1 January 1923, he was distressed to find the
whole atmosphere in the country vitiated by the virus of communalism.148 He felt that for
meeting the challenge of communalism it was necessary to renew the spirit of Hindu-
Muslim unity. Gandhi was in jail. Maulana Azad was upset to find a split within the
Congress due to sharp differences between the ‘no-changers’ and ‘pro-changers’. The
first step to tackle the Hindu-Muslim riots and the Congress split was to call a special
Congress Session at Delhi in September 1923.149 Maulana Azad was elected as its
President, and he was the youngest person elected to hold this high office. He was about
thirty-five. M.A. Ansari acted as the Secretary. The Congress was facing a crisis like the
148 Azad mistakenly states that he was released in May 1923. (Tarjuman-al-Quran (English Translation by
Syed Ahmed Latif), Vol.l, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, p.24.)
149 In Khutbat-e-Azad, the date of this session is wrongly given as 15 December. (A.K.Azad, Khutbat-e-
Azad, p. 157.)
303
one after the Surat Congress split of 1907, when the Moderates and Extremists had
fought each other.
Maulana Azad delivered an eloquent Presidential address running into about forty-three
pages.150 At the outset, he offered congratulations to Turkey on her victory and to
Mustafa Kamal Pasha for infusing a new spirit among his countrymen. He mentioned
with special emphasis that for the sake of the freedom of Turkey, thousands of Indians
had gone to jail and suffered privations by resigning their jobs. Pointing that the Non
cooperation had made Indians hold their head high and straighten their backs. Azad
extolled the virtues of Non-violence as a technique for liberating Indians from British
rule.151
He repudiated the notion that Non-cooperation had failed. He elaborated on the benefits
that India had derived from it. According to Maulana Azad, non-violence had inspired
the Indians with lofty ideals and cultivated among them a spirit of solidarity, sacrifice and
patriotism. Azad suggested some concrete steps for political education of the masses by
setting up reading rooms, night schools and other institutions for adult education. He
1 ST
believed in the force of mobilizing public opinion by a wide circulation of newspapers.
Maulana Azad emphasized in his speech that Non-cooperation movement was founded
on the principles of truth and non-violence, the ideals which both Tolstoy and Gandhi had
propagated on moral grounds to fight the wrongs which men were forced to suffer.154 He
assured his countrymen that there was no cause for dismay and urged them to stand
united and continue their fight for the righteous cause of freedom. He regretted that
Gandhi, the great leader of the Indian people, was in jail. He pointed out that the Turks
and Arabs who had enshrined their faith in him and wished him a splendid victory in his
fight for truth and justice venerated Gandhi.
150 Ibid, p.157-210.

151 Ibid, p. 180-81.
152 Ibid, p.191-193.
153 Ibid, p.202-203.
304
Maulana Azad expressed his anguish over communal riots and forcefully attacked the
element that was busy in injecting communal poison into the minds of the common
people. He said, “If an angel were to descent from the high heavens and proclaim from
the heights of the Qutub Minar to abandon the mission of Hindu-Muslim unity and within
twenty four hours Swaraj will be yours, I will refuse the preferred Swaraj and not yield
on my stand. The delay of Swaraj will affect Indians but the end of our unity will be the
loss of the entire human race.”155
Maulana Azad repudiated the idea of Hindu Sanghathan or Muslim Sanghathan

(organization). Only one type of Sanghathan, he declared, was needed and that was the
Indian National Congress.156 He warned the British not to obstruct their march to
freedom. If they continued to do so, the Indians would be compelled to overthrow the
obstacles placed in their way,
Maulana Azad saw the Congress caught up in a dilemma. At the Gaya Congress in
September 1922, Das’s resolution which had recommended the principle of Council entry
was defeated by the combined strength of the followers of Gandhi and Khilafat leaders
who wanted the Non-Cooperation movement to continue. Das resigned on 1 January
1923 and alongwith Motilal Nehru founded the Swaraj Party.
With his sedate realism, Maulana Azad wanted to bridge the gulf between the two rival
groups. He was convinced that this conflict would weaken the Congress and help the
ruling power. He refused to identify himself with either camp. About the differences in
the Congress, Maulana Azad said: “I fail to understand why strict adherence to the creed
of Non-cooperation should not accommodate several schools of thought. It is a case of
difference in opinion regarding one of the items in the programme where too, it is not
really a difference in principles but in details of their application, not in the goals but the
154 Ibid, p. 181-182.

155 Ibid, p.205.
156 Ibid, p.207-208.
305
means to be adopted for them. If there is a difference of opinion in the matter, the same
1 S7
significance cannot be attached to it as to a difference in principle.”
He tried to reconcile the no-changers and pro-changers, the Gandhites and the Swarajists.
He pointed out that both the groups instead of being antagonistic to each other should
carry out their plans. There could be no conflict between them so long as both were
solidly united in their common goal of freedom of India. As a result of Maulana Azad’s
plea, the Congress gave permission to the Swarajists, the pro-chargers to fight the
Council elections and readmitted the followers of Das, Motilal and Vithalbhai Patel to the
Congress fold. Gandhi’s no-chargers’ followers included C. Rajagopalachari, Rajendra
Prasad, Vallabhbhai Patel and M.A. Ansari.
Maulana Azad saved the Congress from a split. He reconciled both the groups to a
compromise formula and made each group follow the programme it had wanted so. The
Congress obtained large majorities in almost all the legislators. It secured forty-five seats
in the Legislative Assembly and for the next few years the party functioned as a
nationalist opposition at the Centre.
Thus, the fight for Swaraj was carried on both within and outside the Council. Maulana
Azad’s success in saving the Congress from split shows his sound political instinct and
shrewdness of judgment. Gandhi was released on 5 February 1924 following an attack of
appendicitis. He asked his followers, the pro-changers to take up constructive work in
towns and villages. He also supported the Swarajists’ Council entry. Thus, he endorsed
Maulana Azad’s line.
MAULANA AZAD’S ROLE IN PACIFYING COMMUNAL HATRED

The communal riots in 1924 reached their climax in Kohat (North Western Frontier) on 9
and 10 September 1924. Gandhi was shaken by the communal outrages and to do
penance for the sins of his country including his own, he undertook a twenty-one day
157 Ibid, p.196-97.
306
fast. The violent communal riots, which occurred between 1923-27, vitiated the political
atmosphere in the country. There were eleven communal riots in 1923, eighteen in 1924,
sixteen in 1925, thirty-five in 1926 and thirty-one up to November in 1927. In 1926, the
first year of Lord Irwin’s term as Viceroy, forty riots took place. Swami Shraddhanand’s
murder by a Muslim fanatic further accentuated the religious tension. It is a sad
commentary on the development of the period that only eight years earlier Swami
Shraddhanand had preached the gospel of Hindu-Muslim unity from the pulpit of the
Jama Masjid of Delhi.
A Unity Conference was held on 26 September 1924 at Delhi under the Presidentship of
Motilal Nehru and Chairmanship of Muhammad Ali. It was attended by 300 delegates
representing different parties. Its aim was to devise ways of combating the rising tide of
communalism. The resolutions passed at the Conference provided for the freedom of
conscience and religion, condemnation of acts like desecration of places of worship and
the prosecution of those who used compulsion in the matter of conversion.158
Maulana Azad took an active part in this conference and it was largely due to his
initiative that the following resolution was passed: “This Conference declares that it is
not only wrong against law but also against religion for anyone to take the law into his
own hands, either for the purpose of retaliation or punishment, and therefore, declares
that all points in dispute shall be decided by reference either to private arbitration or
where that is impossible, by reference to a court of law.”159 Maulana Azad declared at
this Conference that cow slaughter even for purpose of sacrifice was not an integral part
of Islam and that the Muslims were reducing the habit of beef eating for promoting
communal harmony.160
158 R.Subramania Iyer, The Role ofMaulana Azad in Indian Politics, Oriental Research Institute,
Hyderabad, 1968, p.37.
159
Ibid. Also in Mahadeo Desai, op.eit., p.62.
’ Ibid.
307
The All-Parties Conference met at Bombay on 21 November 1924 at the suggestion of
Muhammad Ali, the Congress President, who wanted a united scheme to resolve the
Hindu-Muslim rift. Nothing, however, came of this meeting. Another meeting of the All-
Parties Conference took place on 23 January 1925 at Delhi to bring about unity among
the parties and to draw up a scheme for the representation of communities in the
legislatures. But no agreement was arrived at.
As a third party, it was natural for the British to exploit the Hindu-Muslim antagonism
and use it to their advantage. The Non-cooperation movement had ended, the Swarajists
had entered the Council, and the Congress too had followed suit in 1926. Its
representation had been somewhat reduced in number but it was still the largest single
group in the Council. The experience of the Congress leaders in the Council was one of
bitter disappointment because they found that the British refused to oblige the Indians by
promoting in any way the cause of ‘self-government’ or ‘responsible government for
India.’
To quell the growing Hindu-Muslim communal tension in the country, Motilal Nehru and
Maulana Azad issued a manifesto in the form of a circular letter about the formation of
the Indian National Union on 31 July 1926 which was supported by influential leaders
like Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, M.A. Ansari, Dr.
Syed Mahmud, Lala Duni Chand and Choudhary Khaliquzzaman.161 The manifesto
aimed at organizing those sections of enlightened Indians who agreed that communalism
was a negation of nationalism and that continued national conflicts would lead “to our
1 f\1
utter political, economic and social ruin.”
Maulana Azad’s object was to isolate and weaken the mischievous elements in society,
which were poisoning the minds of Hindus and Muslims by spreading hatred among
them through nefarious propaganda against each other.16”’ The membership of the
161 The Indian Quarterly Register, 1926, Vol. II, p.90-94.

162 Ibid.
163
308
proposed Indian National Union would be open to those individuals who did not belong
to any communal organization. The Union was to be truly national and was also intended
to be a non-political platform. It was also supposed to give training to village Panchayats
to settle disputes arising among different sections or individuals belonging to the village
community.
A preliminary meeting to finalize the objects of Indian National Union took place on 10
December 1926 in Delhi. The draft rules and regulations of the Union were defined as
follows: (1) to promote and foster the growth of a United Indian Nation and to remove all
causes of inter-communal discord and separatist tendencies; and (2) to launch a vigorous
propaganda in order to foster the spirit of true nationalism and genuine patriotism among
the people of India and to create an atmosphere in the country that would “facilitate a
settlement of all communal issues in a noble spirit of compromise and good will.”164
The office of the Union was to remain in Delhi with Lala Shankar Lai as its Secretary.
Membership of the Union was open to anyone not under the age of 18 years and the
annual subscription was one rupee. A pledge for enrolment of membership was to be
signed by an individual whose guiding principle was to foster communal amity.
The inauguration of the Indian National Union was viewed with mixed feelings.165 In
Congress circles the proposal was commended but the Hindu newspapers in Punjab
distrusted the Union and condemned it as another sinister move to sacrifice Hindu
interests to appease rabid Muslim communalists.166
Politically the period from 1923 to 1927 was at low ebb. The communal riots flared up
and the worst of them took place in Calcutta for about six weeks in April and May 1926.
C.R. Das’s death in 1925 was a terrible loss to the country. Maulana Azad had great
164
Ibid, p.94.
165
Ibid.
166
Ibid.
309
admiration for Das and regarded him a statesman par excellence. 167 He thought that Das’s
Bengal Pact which had won the enthusiastic support of the Muslim intelligentsia was a
tour de force. Das had firmly believed that so long as Muslims are not strongly
represented in public life and services, there could be no possibility of Hindu-Muslim
understanding.
Maulana Azad published articles in al-Hilal and Zamindar on Das’s contribution to

Indian Nationalism. According to Maulana Azad, Das was not an idealist but a man of
action who never mistook a shadow for the substance. Maulana Azad emphasized Das’s
liberality towards Muslims in Bengal as he offered to reserve eighty per cent of the new
appointments in Calcutta Corporation.168 He strongly felt that Das’ passing away at a
time when Hindu-Muslim antagonism was vitiating the climate of the county was a great
blow to the cause of secularism. With Das’s demise and Gandhi’s withdrawal from active
politics in 1926, the forces of unity and secularism were weakened.
The appointment of the Simon Commission in 1927 to examine the constitutional

question of India induced the Indian leaders to formulate a scheme of Indian constitution
acceptable to all the parties. Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State of India, asked the
Swarajists to produce a Constitution “which carries behind it a fair measure of general
agreement among the great people of India.” From 1927 onwards, it was the
constitutional question which dominated Indian politics and various attempts were made
by Indian political parties to resolve it.
The communal problem had become a bugbear for Indian leadership and seemed to defy
any solution during the 1920s and 1930s. The Nehru Report (1928), Jinnah’s Fourteen
Points (March 1929), and the All-Parties Conference (December 1929), the Simon
Commission proposals (May 1930) and the three Round Table Conferences (November
1930 to January 1932) could not settle the communal problem which in Gandhi’s words
167 A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.24-25.

168 Ibid, p.25.
310
became a “problem of problems.”169 The basic question was of Muslim representation as
a minority community in the new constitutional arrangements that were to be made at the
provincial and central level.
Historians have generally attributed the partition of India to the failure of Congress-
League Interim Government experiment and the recrudescence of communal riots in
1946 or to the Lahore Resolution of 1940 which made a demand for a separate Muslim
homeland. The failure to form the Congress-League Coalition ministry in UP in 1937 is
also regarded as a real divide between the Congress and the League which paved the way
for the creation of Pakistan. But the crucial period of the late twenties and early thirties
when the seeds of partition were actually sow^a is usually ignored. It is in this period
when the real parting of ways between the Congress and the Muslim League took place.
In order to understand how Hindu-Muslim rift widened in Indian politics, it would be

helpful to focus on the Nehru Report because it was on this document of historical
importance that all discussions for settling the constitutional question ultimately hinged.
The Nehru Report was published on 15 August 1928. The Report accepted two of the
Delhi Proposals (1927) about the formation of North-West Frontier Province and Sind
and rejected separate electorate and the principle of weightage. It recommended the
unitary form of government at the Centre. The Nehru Report took the view that adult
franchise would solve the problem of Muslim representation in India because it was
based on the assumption that if cultural autonomy and religious liberty were guaranteed,
1 no
the communal problem would be solved.
The Nehru Report debarred Muslims from reservation of seats in provinces where they
constituted a majority. The Report worked on the principle that “a minority must remain
a minority, whether any seats were reserved or not.” Jawaharlal Nehru assured Dr. Syed
Mahmud in his letter of 30 June 1928 that a detailed examination of the Muslim
169 Mushir-ul-Hasan (ed,), Muslims and the Congress, Manohar, New Delhi, p.266.
170 The All Parties Conference, 1928, Report ofthe Committee Appointed by the Conference to determine
the Principles for Constitution for India, 1928, p.43.
311
population in Bengal and Punjab shows that the Muslims were “certain of electoral
majority at least equivalent to their number.”171 According to R. Coupland, the
constitution as recommended by the Nehru Report was “dominated by the tradition of
unitary government exhibited by British rule.”172
On the whole the Muslims of Bengal and Punjab welcomed the Report but Shaukat All,
Hasrat Mohani and Muhammad Ali vehemently opposed it on the ground that the
Muslims were denied the federal form of government and one-third representation in the
Legislature. Aga Khan and Mohammad Shafi rejected the Report saying that separate
electorates were the only way to safeguard the interests of the Muslims.
In his letter of 26 April 1929, Shaukat Ali complained to Syed Mahmud about the “rift
which the cursed Nehru Report has created amongst us Muslims” and the ‘infidelity of
the Hindus who have betrayed in Muslim interests.” The nationalist Muslims like
Maulana Azad, Ansari, Syed Mahmud and Saifuddin Kitchlew supported the Report.174
At the All-Parties Conference in Calcutta in the last week of December 1928, Jinnah
described in Nehru Report as “neither helpful nor fruitful in any way.” He suggested
three amendments - (1) In the Central Legislature, Muslims should be given one-third of
the seats. (2) The residuary powers should vest in the Provinces and not in the Centre. (3)
The Muslims in Punjab and Bengal be represented on the basis of population for ten
years if adult franchise was not introduced, subject to subsequent revision of this
principle.
At the Conference, Jinnah declared that Hindu-Muslim settlement was essential to the
political progress of the country. He said: “I am not speaking as a Mussalmans but as an
171 V.N.Datta & B. Cleghom, A Nationalist Muslim and Indian Politics, Delhi, 1974, p.89. Also in David
Page, Prelude to Partition — The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control (1920-1932), OUP,
Delhi, 1982, p.172.
172 R. Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India, p.94.
173 V.N.Datta & B. Cleghom, op.cit., p.92.
174 The Indian Quarterly Register, 1929, Vol.I, No.1-2.
312
Indian. And it is my desire to see that we get seven crores of Mussalmans to march along
with us in the struggle for freedom.”175 The Hindu Mahasabha leaders and the Sikh
representatives from Punjab rejected Jinnah’s amendment. After this, Jinnah is reported
to have wept and said to a friend, Jamshed, “This is parting of the ways.”176 This was
Jinnah’s formal farewell to Indian nationalism. The entente cordiale that had existed
between the Congress and the League came to an end. The Ali Brothers left the Congress
and joined the reactionary wing of the League which was led by Aga Khan and
Muhammad Shafi. Jinnah submitted Fourteen Points to the First Round Table Conference
which were supported by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind.
The result of the failure of Indian leadership to submit an agreed constitutional plan was
the Ramsay MacDonald’s Award on 16 August 1932, which retained separate electorates
and the provision of a Muslim majority in Punjab and Bengal. The Hindu Mahasabha
rejected it; the Muslims thought it a ‘distinct advance’ but the Congress adopted a neutral
attitude towards it, neither accepting nor rejecting it.
It is evident from the above account that a great opportunity was lost by Indian leadership
to settle the Hindu-Muslim problem through constitutional means. Absorbed in
constructive work activities, Gandhi was looking to the Almighty for the light, hoping
that He would show him the right path. He declared “I dare not touch the problem of
Hindu-Muslim unity. It has passed out of human hands and has been transferred to God’s
hands.”177 Jawaharlal Nehru, a radical youth committed to socialism believed that the
communal problem was essentially an economic issue.
The Muslim leaders as representatives of their community wanted some concrete steps
for the protection of their minority rights. They were dissatisfied with the Nehru Report.
They wondered why the Delhi proposals of 20 March 1927, which had been formulated
among others by Jinnah, Muhammad Shafi and the Raja of Mahmudabad and accepted
175 David Page, op.cit. p.191.

176 Aziz Beg, Jinnah and His Times-A Biography, Islamabad, 1986, p.370.
177 Collected Works ofMahatma Gandhi, Vol. 32, p.511.
313
later by the Congress Working Committee in May 1927, were being discarded. Motilal
would not budge an inch from his position and regarded Jinnah as a big obstacle in the
solution of the problem.
In retrospect, it seems that due to the intransigence of Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh
groups from Punjab, the Congress refused to meet the Muslim demands. Jawaharlal
Nehru admitted later that there were political reactionaries in the Congress who were
“communalists under national cloak.” Men of such a mould would not conceded
Muslim demands. The Congress leaders like Gandhi, Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru
believed that concessions to Muslims would not solve the communal problem. It was
not the satisfaction of minority demands that was important in their calculation but the
fight for India’s independence which would bring in the masses to unite for a common
goal. It seems that whenever the Congress was confronted with the monstrosity of
communalism the only way it saw for meeting the challenge was to launch a Civil
Disobedience movement.
Because of the sectarian attitude of the Muslim League on the minority problem, the
nationalist Muslims broke away from it and founded on 27 July 1929 the All India
Nationalist Muslim Party with Azad as its convener. Other prominent members of the
group were M.A. Ansari, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Dr. Syed Mahmud, Dr. Saifuddin
Kitchlew, the Raja of Mahmudabad, T.A.K. Sherwani and Choudhary Khaliquzzaman.
The aims of the party were:
1. To promote among the Muslims of India the spirit of nationalism and to
develop a mentality above communalism and to inspire into them confidence
in Indian national ideals.
2. To induce the Muslims to take their proper share in national struggle; and
178 Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, p. 136.

179 V.N.Datta, op.cit, p.136-137.
314
3. To create such relations between majority and minority communities as would
lead the former to consider the right of minorities in a spirit of broad-minded
l sn
patriotism and the latter in that of true nationalism.
Maulana Azad and Ansari published a manifesto on behalf of the Nationalist Party
explaining its main objective. In April 1931 at a conference of Muslim Congress
members in Lucknow a resolution was adopted calling for adult franchise, abolition of
separate electorates and guarantees for the protection of national languages and religious
minorities. The other important recommendation was the reservation of seats; minorities
which constituted less than 30 per cent of a province’s population should have the right to
additional seats. These efforts to come to an agreement with the League on the minority
question failed once again. The National Muslims Party did not have an independent
identity and was guided by the Congress ideology and programme.
MAULANA AZAD’S ROLE IN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT

The Congress had declared complete independence as its goal at the Madras Congress of
1927. Gandhi launched two Civil Disobedience movements at short intervals (1930-31
and 1932). The British government announced the consideration of constitutional
problems which needed to be resolved before preparing India for self-government. Much
debate went on among the official and non-official circles regarding the form of
government suitable for India.
The British declared that it was the communal problem that really thwarted the question
of India’s political advancement. In fact, the British made full capital out of it because of
the differences on this issue among the political parties. On the communal question, a
deadlock seemed to have been created. The Simon Commission Report was published on
23-24 June 1930. It omitted any mention of Dominion Status as the goal of India.
However, it did suggest among other things maximum devolution of responsibility to
provincial ministries and a strong government at the centre but it maintained that the
Governor-General’s executive would not be responsible to the Assembly.
180 The Indian Quarterly Register, 1929, Vol.II, p.350.
315
Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, announced on 31 October 1929 Round Table Conference and
said that the national issue of Indian constitutional progress was the attainment of
Dominion Status. The Congress challenged the statement and asked for clarification
whether a Dominion Status was to be granted immediately. The Congress Session at
Lahore in December 1929 declared independence of the country as its goal and
authorized the All India Congress Committee to start Civil Disobedience movement
whenever it thought it necessary. The Congress insisted on the government to accept the
Nehru Report. Gandhi was convinced that the government was indulging in delaying
tactics to hoodwink the Indian people. He launched the Civil Disobedience campaign on
12 March 1930 with a view to paralyzing the government by mass performance cf
specific illegal acts like violating the Salt Tax, boycott of English goods, etc. Gandhi was
arrested and taken to Yeravada jail in May 1930.
Over 60,000 persons courted arrest in the first six months. The movement damaged the
British economic interests, reducing the Indian imports from England considerably,
especially textiles and yam where the reduction was nearly to the extent of 31 to 45 per
cent. Azad was also arrested on 21 August 1930. In the Civil Disobedience, the
nationalist Muslim groups such as the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind, Ahrar Party of Punjab,
and Khudai Khidmatgar Organization of North-West Frontier Province cooperated with
the Congress. The Civil Disobedience was a popular movement and was strong
particularly in Bihar, Orissa, UP, Bengal and Bombay. It acquired mral adherents, and
the women participation in it was quite striking.
Gandhi could not attend this Conference which took place in London on 12 November
1930. It could not resolve the communal problem. Gandhi was let out on 26 January
1931. The Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed on 5 March 1931 under which the British
government agreed to release the prisoners and the Congress to suspend the Civil
Disobedience. Maulana Azad was released on 11 May 1932. Gandhi attended the Second
Round Table Conference on 7 September 1931. He insisted on the premise that the
316
Round Table Conference should draw up a scheme for a responsible government at the
Centre as in the Provinces with immediate effect. He tabled the Congress scheme which
was a reproduction of the Nehru Report. He admitted his utter failure to bring about any
agreed settlement acceptable to the parties concerned.
The British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald announced the Communal Award which
introduced separate electorates for the depressed and backward classes and allowed
reservation of seats for Muslims. Gandhi undertook a fast unto death on 20 September
1932 in Yeravada jail against the Award. Ultimately, an agreement was reached by what
is known as the Poona Pact which reserved certain seats for the depressed classes.
Within three weeks of Gandhi’s return in January 1932 he was again back in prison.
During his absence from India, the government clamped a number of severe and drastic
Ordinances and made a number of arrests including those of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar
Patel, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Syed Mahmud and others. The Civil Disobedience was
resumed on 1 January 1932. The Viceroy had refused to grant an interview to Gandhi for
negotiations. According to official statistics 14,800 arrests were made in January and
17,800 in February. Gandhi was released on 8 March 1933 and at his recommendation
Mr. M.S. Aney, the Acting President of the Congress suspended the Civil Disobedience
movement.
Maulana Azad was upset over the Communal Award. He was deeply concerned about the
minority problem and he took the initiative of bringing about an agreement among the
communities on the communal question and he was supported in it by Madan Mohan
Malaviya, Syed Mahmud and Shaukat Ali. Gandhi was in jail at that time. These leaders
tried to persuade the Muslim League to arrive at a settlement on the basis of the
acceptance of the Thirteen Points (out of Jinnah’s Fourteen) and Muhammad Ali’s
formula. But this effort proved fruitless.
317
Due to Malaviya’s initiative the Unity Conference held at Allahabad on 3 November
1932 did not oppose the concessions made to the Muslims by the Communal Award. It
also accepted the separation of Sind with certain conditions. But at the All-Parties
Muslim Conference in Allahabad on 11 December 1932, prominent Muslim leaders from
Punjab rejected the Award. The British government too accepted the Muslim
representation in the federal chambers and the separation of Sind.181
The British used Jinnah’s Fourteen Points to inflame the existing religious differences.
The three Round Table Conferences provided the material for the Joint Committee of
both Houses of Parliament whose proposal formed the basis of the Government of India
Act 1935. India was to become a federal state, though what is known as the federal part
of the Act never came into operation.
The Act of 1935 established effective responsible government in the provinces giving it
controls over a large number of subjects. Of course, communal representation and
safeguarding of interests of the minority communities were ensured. A White Paper was
published on the recommendation of Simon Commission but there was no mention of
Dominion status. Both the Congress and the League strongly criticized the Act.
Nevertheless, the Act brought peace to the country for the present and the political parties
decided to work it out by contesting the elections which they found round the comer.
After the Khilafat movement, Azad was actively engaged in promoting the cause of
Hindu-Muslim unity. He supported the Nehru Report but thought that it could be
accepted only with certain modifications. He was instrumental in the establishment of
Indian National Union and was the moving spirit behind the formation of All India
Nationalist Muslim Party. He participated in the meeting of LMty Conferences to bridge
the difference between Hindus and Muslims and negotiated with the League leaders for
181 Moin Shakir, in B.N.Pande (ed.), A Centenary History ofIndian National Congress, 1919-1935, Vol.II,
AICC & Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, p.333.
318
the settlement of communal issues. He was now a confirmed nationalist whose
watchwords were freedom, national unity and cultural harmony.
In his Autobiography, Jawaharlal Nehru has discussed the role of nationalist Muslims in
Indian politics. He wrote: “The collapse and elimination of Nationalist Muslims as a
group-as individuals they are, of course, important leaders of the Congress - forms a
pitiful story.”182 Nehru thought that the nationalist Muslims had practically lost their
political hold on the masses by 1934. He added: “They (the Nationalist Muslims) were all
upper middle class folk, and there were no dynamic personalities amongst them - they
lost touch with the masses...Indeed they never went to the masses.”183 This is true, that
among the Muslims in the Congress, there was no mass leader. The exception was Abdul
Ghaffar Khan who had a large following in the North-West Frontier Province.
The Muslim communal leaders gained popular support by rousing fears in the minds of
their co-religionists about their future being threatened by the Hindu-majority rule. The
Congress, on the other hand, failed to offer any alternative course to allay these fears. The
nationalist Muslims were supposed to act as a pressure group on the Congress but they
failed in this role because they were not listened to by Congress leadership.
When Ansari expressed his misgivings about the Civil Disobedience movement in
February 1931, he was snubbed by Gandhi and he had to resign as President of the Delhi
Provincial Congress Committee. Later, the Congress policy of approaching Jinnah
directly over their heads weakened their influence. Motilal boasted that Ansari dared not
defy him on his Report.
Even the loyalty of nationalist Muslims in the Congress began to be questioned and their
community did not hesitate to vilify them. Perhaps men of such idealism and strong
convictions as nationalist Muslims who suffered much at the hand of their own
182
Jawaharlal Nehru, op.cit., p. 139.
183
Ibid.
319
community and became suspect in the eyes of others could never be found. They
sacrificed so much and gained so little, but they never swerved from the path they had
chosen.
Maulana Azad too was reviled and castigated by his co-religionists and his bona fides
began to be questioned in the Congress. To understand the character and force of India’s
struggle for freedom it is necessary to realize the predicament of nationalist Muslims like
Maulana Azad who were remarkable men but who were prevented from playing an
effective role of which they were really capable by the wrong turn events took in the late
twenties and early thirties.
MAULANA AZAD AS CONGRESS PRESIDENT

After M.A. Ansari’s death in 1936, the Congress depended mainly on Azad for guidance
on the problems concerning Muslims. From now onwards he emerges as a front-rank
political leader. He was elected a member of the Congress Working Committee on 16
April 1936 under the Presidentship of Jawaharlal Nehru and became with Vallabhbhai
Patel and Rajendra Prasad a member of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee which came to
be known as ‘High Command.’ As a member of this Committee it became his
responsibility to supervise the working of the legislature and ministries in the provinces.
The Muslim majority provinces, Bengal, Punjab and North-West Frontier were put under
his charge. Later UP was also placed under his supervision.
The Congress contested the elections in February 1937 to combat the 1935 Act, which
resulted in a striking Congress success securing an overall majority in five provinces and
emerging as the single strongest party in two others. Over 54 per cent of the electorate
went to the polls and out of the total of 1581 seats in the Provincial Assemblies, the
Congress won as many as 711. The Congress won 26 out of 58 Muslim seats contested
against the total of 485 reserved separate seats. The non-Congress Muslims won 424
seats. The Muslim League contested a little less than half the seat reserved for Muslims in
separate constituencies and won about sixty per cent of them. The Congress was able to
320
form ministries in seven provinces: UP, Bihar, Bombay, Central Provinces, Madras and
North-West Frontier. Assam had a Congress ministry in September 1938, after the first
cabinet was thrown out and Sind formed a cabinet supported by the Congress Party. The
League was extremely weak in Muslim majority provinces and was routed in Punjab. It
failed to form ministries even in Sind, and North-West Frontier Province. However, it
showed better results in UP, and Bengal. It won 108 out of 482 total Muslim seats but
was nowhere able to form a ministry.
In his political thinking Maulana Azad had been close to C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru. He
firmly believed in settling political issues through negotiations. He had succeeded in
resolving differences between the ‘No-Changers’ and ‘Pro-Changers’ in 1923-24. On the
Nehru Report, too, he had tried to bring together the contending parties. As a politician,
his mind was always active in devising alternatives for resolving political issues. On the
formation of provincial ministries after the election in 1937, he was keen on the Congress
and the League sharing power in the experiment of self-government. In his view this
opportunity for working together might prove helpful in resolving the communal
question. 184
•
Increasingly dissatisfied with what he considered the smugness and obtuseness of Indian
politics, Jinnah went to London in 1930 and practiced there at the Privy Council. He was
later persuaded to return to India by Liaquat Ali Khan to reorganize the Muslim League.
When a prominent Congress leader told Nehru that Jinnah was practicing law at the Privy
Council, he is reported to have said, ‘good riddance’. This comment was carried to Jinnah
who felt enraged so much at this that he returned to India to settle his accounts with
Nehru.185 Whatever be the reasons for Jinnah’s return, he started taking active part in
Indian politics and began to reorganize the Muslim League.
184 Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, Longmans Green, Lahore, 1961, p.160-163. A.K.
Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.170-172. H.V.Hodson, The Great Divide, Hatchison & Co., London, 1969,
p.66-67. Also in Rajendra Prasad Papers: Jawaharlal to Rajendra Prasad,21 July 1937, File No. 1/37,
Letter No.42.NAI.
321
As a leader of the Independent Party, Jinnah congratulated the ‘Hindu-Brethren’ for
protecting the rights of depressed classes on 1 February 1935. He complimented Gandhi
for serving the cause of the minorities by his ‘fast unto death’ which compelled the
government to come to a settlement known as the “Poona Pact.” Jinnah’s speeches before
the elections reflect his abiding faith in Gladstonian liberalism, and his political idiom
was not religious but secular and constitutional. At this stage of his political career, he
thought in terms of the political rights of minorities. The Mullahs and Moulvis nowhere
existed in his political vocabulary.
In the election manifesto of the League prepared under his direction the emphasis was on
the cultivation of ‘Victorian Liberalism’ among people which means the preservation of
their democratic rights of equality and justice. Jinnah fought the elections on the basis of
co-operation with the Congress. He said, “There is really no substantial difference
between the League and the Congress and we shall always be glad to co-operate with the
1 fiA
Congress in their constructive programme.”
The 1937 electoral manifestoes of the Congress and the League did not had any
substantial differences on social and economic matters such as industrial development,
uplift of the rural population, relief from rural indebtedness and civil liberty. The
Congress manifesto was drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru. In the League manifesto special
emphasis was laid on fighting the reactionary forces (meaning the National Agricultural
Party), upholding the ideas of ‘Victorian Liberalism’, nationalizing the Indian army and
188
reducing the cost of administration.
The League manifesto stressed the need for co-operation with the Congress in self-rule.
The only difference lay in its insistence on separate electorates and protection and
185 V.N.Datta, Madanlal Dhingra and Revolutionary Movement, New Delhi, 1978, Appendix-III, p.94.
186 R.S.Symonds, The Making ofPakistan, OUP, London, 1949, p.53.
187 S. Gopal, Selected Works ofJawaharlal Nehru, Vol.VII, p.459-467. Also in AICC Papers: File No.
41/1936, p.629-664, NMML. For League’s Manifesto see Sharif A1 Mujahid, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah,
Studies in Interpretation, Quaid-e-Azam Academy, Karachi, 1981, Appendix, p.482-489.
188 Sharif A1 Mujahid, ibid, p.486.
322
promotion of Urdu.189 The League’s demand for safeguarding the minority rights cannot
be regarded as communalism. There was nothing in the League’s programme to obstruct
a political “entente” between the Congress and the League.
Nehru’s letter to Dr. Rajendra Prasad dated 21 July 1937 is very significant on the
Congress-League relations.190 Nehru makes it clear that there was no conflict between the
Congress and the League during the elections and the desire was to avoid it.191 According
to him, the tussle was wholly with the government party meaning (the National
Agricultural Party) and there was hardly any problem in practice “in promoting good
relations with the League.” Nehru wrote that he even “supported the League candidate if
1Q9
he was not reactionary.”
Hailing the Lucknow Pact of 1916 as a unique demonstration of the purpose, earnestness
and co-operation between the two great sections of the people of India, the League
manifesto emphasized that from that time onward the Muslims had stood shoulder to
1 Q-2
shoulder with the Hindus in the task of the attainment of self-government. The
manifesto further stated that the Muslims did not lag behind in patriotic co-operation with
the Hindus and hoped that they “can rely on the majority with a complete sense of
confidence.”194 It is in this background of cordiality of relationship between the two
political parties before the 1937 elections testified by both Jinnah and Nehru that Azad’s
efforts for a negotiated settlement on the ministry formation in UP have to be seen.
It is now acknowledged that for Congress-League coalition in Bombay, Jinnah

approached K.M. Munshi who later became a minister in the cabinet but his offer was
turned down by the ‘High Command.’195 Even after a fierce controversy with Nehru on
189 Ibid. Also in H.V.Hodson, op.cit., p.60.

190 Rajendra Prasad Papers: Jawaharlal to Rajendra Prasad, 21 July 1937, File No. 1/37, Letter No.42,
NAI.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193
Sharif A1 Mujahid, op.cit., p. 483.
194 Ibid.
195 Rajmohan Gandhi, India Wins Errors, New Delhi, 1989, p. 21-33.
323
this issue, Jinnah approached B.G. Kher, the Premier in Bombay for Congress-League
coalition. Jinnah’s lieutenant, Khaliquzzaman, a prominent Muslim League leader of UP,
who, was a staunch Congressman earlier^was closely associated with Nehru,approached
the Congress for a coalition ministry in UP. He could not have come up without Jinnah’s
approval with an offer to negotiate with the Congress on the formation of a coalition
ministry. Jinnah himself was in favour of a coalition ministry in Bombay. As a member
of the Congress Parliamentary Board, Azad met Khaliquzzaman on 5 July 1937 and
initiated the talks for the Congress-League ministry in UP.196 Thereafter, he held several
meetings with Khaliquzzaman on this issue.
According to Khaliquzzaman, the Muslim League Parliamentary Board had authorized

him to continue talks with the Congress provided (1) The Muslim League Legislature
Party did not join the Congress in wrecking the Constitution. (2) The Congress and the
League were to agree upon a programme in accordance with the programme of the
League. (3) The Communal Award and separate electorate in the local self-governing
bodies were to continue till an all-India settlement of the communal problem was arrived
at.197
It is believed that Khaliquzzaman negotiated behind Jinnah’s back or that Jinnah would
have wriggled out because he was not consulted is contrary to facts. Jinnah of 1937
cannot be regarded as a die-heart communalist. He had accepted the principle of an All-
India Federation at the Round Table Conference in 1930. During the interim period
before the 1935 Act, Congress and Muslim League had combined against the
government.
In 1937, the Muslim League was a small organization run with inadequate resources both
in terms of men and material. After the elections it was natural for the League to think of
sharing power with the Congress in UP, when both the parties had fought the elections on
Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, op.cit. p.160-162,

Ibid
324
a common platform with more or less identical programmes on the major social and
economic issues.
After the elections, the Congress emerged as the strongest party to form an independent
ministry in UP. But out of the 64 Provincial Assembly seats reserved for Muslims chosen
by separate electorate, 26 were won by Muslim League, 28 by independent Muslims, 9
by the National Agricultural Party and only 1 by the Congress. Hafiz Muhammad
Ibrahim defected from the League to join the Congress later.
Khaliquzzaman, leader of the Muslim League Party in UP, was negotiating on the
coalition-ministry formation with Maulana Azad in July 1937. What Sri Prakasa, a
detached observer of contemporary events, who became later the Governor of Bombay,
wrote that Maulana Azad was deeply committed to the formation of coalition Ministry in
UP.199 On Pant’s query how many ministerial seats the League would want,
Khaliquzzaman replied ‘2 out of 6, 3 out of 8.’
The conditions stipulated by the Congress for the League joining the Ministry came as a
rude shock to Khaliquzzaman. According to these conditions the Muslim League group
in UP. Provincial Legislature would cease to function as a separate group and become a
part of the Congress party and Muslim League and the Muslim League Parliamentary
Board would also be dissolved.200
What the Congress wanted was the merging of the League with the Congress. When
Maulana Azad proposed these conditions to Khaliquzzaman he said, “You want me to
sign the death warrant of the Muslim League.”201 These were impossible demands which
no political party worth the name could accept unless it had decided to liquidate itself.
198
R.Coupland, op.cit, p. 111.
199
Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 187-188. Also in Oral Transcript ofSri Prakasa, NMML.
200
Ibid.
201
Ibid.
325
These conditions were a clear threat to the League that they must abandon their separate
political identity before they could think of sharing power with the Congress.
Khaliquzzaman made an alternative proposal which were as such: (1) on communal

matters the League should have complete freedom of action; and (2) in the Ministry there
should be two members of the League, himself and Nawab Ismail Khan.202 The Congress
rejected this proposal and the UP. Congress Ministry was formed with two Muslims, one,
the only Congress Muslim elected and the other who had deserted the League to become
a minster.
Thus, a good opportunity of active co-operation between the Congress and League was
lost for which the country was to pay a being price later. If the coalition ministry
supported by the League could work satisfactorily in Bengal and later the Unionist
Ministry in Punjab with the Congress alliance, why it could not do so in UP. It is possible
that the irritating problems like the future of Urdu, Vande Mataram, music before
mosques; the unfurling of national flag and Gandhi’s Basis Education could have been
resolved by a mutual spirit of give-and-take. Recalling how the Congress rule had
harassed the Muslims, Jinnah told Lord Mountbatten in early 1947, “Well, look, what
they did to us in 1938-39 they oppressed us.”
A successful working of the Congress-League coalition would have prevented the

possibility of the division of the country. The Iqbal-Jinnah correspondence shows that the
poet-philosopher was urging Jinnah in May 1937 to fight for the establishment of an
autonomous Muslim state in north-western India but Jinnah was rather cool to this
proposal.204 The Aligarh professors prepared a comprehensive thesis on the two-nation
theory and submitted it to Jinnah. This they did to strengthen his hands for building up a
separate state of Muslim majority areas but Jinnah was not inclined to encourage it.
202 Ibid, p.162-163.

203 Larry Collins and Dominque Lapiere, Mountbatten and the Partition ofIndia, Vol.I, OUP, New Delhi,
1982, p.43.
204 C.M.Naim (ed.), Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan: Vision and Reality, New York, 1979, p.88-89.
326
Jinnah had left the Congress during the Non-cooperation on the Mahatma’s mixing
religion with politics. The rejection of the UP coalition proposals by the Congress was a
bitter pill for him to swallow and at the Lucknow Muslim League Conference which took
place in the middle of October 1937, after the talks on the coalition issues had failed, he
chose what Gandhi then called ‘a war path.’ In Jinnah’s politics, the conference, in fact,
marks the beginning of a new militant phase based on strong mistrust of the aims and
objectives of the Congress Party. Leaders like Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan of Punjab, Sir
Fazl-ul-Haq of Bengal and Sir M. Saddullah of Assam gave Jinnah fullest support by
advising the members of their respective parties to join the League.
The UP Muslim leadership including Shaukat Ali, Khaliquzzaman and Liaquat Ali using
Aligarh Muslim intellectuals as their base infused an entirely new spirit in the League.205
A few months after the Lucknow conference, 40 League branches were set up in UP and
the League membership rose to 100,000. Jinnah became a symbol of Muslim destiny and
began to be greeted in the country as a spokesman of the urges and aspirations of the
Muslims. There was a swift and striking increase in his popularity. He said, “Muslims
can expect neither justice nor fair play under Congress government.”206 In the light of the
Muslim League’s growing popularity,“no weighty consequences followed the failure of
UP talks.” The failure of these talks strengthened the arguments in favour of a separate
Muslim state.208
A perusal of the condition laid down by the Congress for the coalition ministry shows
that the Congress was not at all serious about any compromise with the League swayed
by its euphoria over its election success; it refused to compromise with the League and
showed lack of political realism. In the words of the Raja of Mahmudabad, the Congress
205 Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.170-174.

206 V.N.Datta, Maulana Azad, p. 151.
207 S. Gopal, op.cit., Vol.I, p.20.
208 Bimal Prasad in Richard Sisson & Stanley Wolpert (ed.), Congress and Indian Nationalism, Cambridge
University Press, Berkeley, 1988, p.320 & 326.
327
wanted the League “to commit suicide at the steps of Anand Bhawan.” The real decision
on the coalition ministry rested with the members of the Congress Parliamentary Sub-
Committee like Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad and the leader of UP Legislative
Party, Govind Ballabh Pant. Intellectually and temperamentally Jawaharlal Nehru loathed
the idea of negotiating with any communal organization particularly the League which he
condemned as a reactionary organization led by feudal landlords for their vested interests.
Nehru had been one of the chief organizers of his party elections in UP. Because of his
high political stature in the country and his closeness to Gandhi his word on political
matters carried great weight on the Congress-League coalition in UP, his letter to Prasad
shows clearly that he was firmly opposed to it from the beginning.209 In this letter, he was
influenced by what Azad called ‘theoretical consideration’.
Nehru wrote that he did not like to use his own expression, “angling for ministries.”210 He
opposed the idea of giving two ministerial berths to the League. He “disliked the
^11
bargaining of seats.” He asked: “What about those who severed their connections with
the League and joined us? He anticipated “risk of conflict” by “this bargaining” in his
own party. To give greater emphasis to the matter, which strongly agitated his mind,
Nehru stated very emphatically that he was “repelled by this talk on opportunistic basis.”
In reality, Nehru favoured the entry into the cabinet of his friend Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and
Hafiz Ibrahim who had defected from the League for merging itself with the Congress
were stringent, the underlying idea being to prevent the League from accepting these
on
terms.
Nehru wanted nothing short of winding up of the League. Khaliquzzaman was willing to
negotiate further but the Congress withdrew its offer. Khaliquzzaman wanted to call
another meeting of the Muslim League Legislature Party to consider the matter further.
209 Rajendra Prasad Papers, op.cit.

210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
328
On the Congress League coalition Nehru had consulted Dr. K.M. Ashraf, Acharya
Kripalani, Narendra Deva, members of the Congress Socialist Party and Purshottamdas
Tandon, a staunch Hindu revivalist who too refused co-operation with the League.
Khaliquzzaman calls this group a motley crowd of the Leftists and a Hindu reactionary,
and thinks that Nehru was influenced on the coalition issue by their views. M.C. Chagla
holds Nehru responsible for not allowing the coalition in UP. "
Thus, Maulana Azad’s efforts for a Congress-League coalition did not succeed.214 His
wise counsel was disregarded though he had Gandhi’s support on this issue.215 Sri
Prakasa in his letter to Khaliquzzaman says that Maulana Azad who was ‘zonal dictator’
at the time could not overcome his regrets on the failure of the Congress-League
coalition.216 Khaliquzzaman further points out that Maulana Azad being influenced by
Nehru took away the Jamiat-ul-Ulema from the League on 17 May 1937 which sealed
the fate of further negotiations with the Congress for any political understanding.217
Before the 1937 elections, the League had worked for safeguarding the minority interests
of the Muslims but after the elections it began to think of a separate homeland. A man of
moderate disposition, Khaliquzzaman had made earnest efforts to bring about a
rapprochement between the Congress and the League. Khaliquzzaman said, “I ran from
pillar to post, begging the Congress leadership to realize the dangers they were courting
918
but this was taken as a weakness.”
After the failure of these talks on the coalition, Jinnah was altogether a different man.
Bellicose in his speeches, he refused to have anything to do with the Congress. Now
Gandhi, Nehru, Subhash Bose and Prasad were desperately keen to open unity talks with
Jinnah but he was not willing to listen to them. The great opportunity for collaboration of
213 M.C.Chagla, Roses and December, Bombay, 1973, p.81-82.

214 Rajmohan Gandhi, India Wins Errors, p. 23.
2,5 Ibid.
216 Khaliquzzaman, op.cit, p. 187-188.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid, p. 167.
329
the two parties in the task of safeguarding the minority interests within the political
framework of united India was lost. The Congress policy on the coalition issue was to put
it in Hodson’s words, “a blunder of the first order.”219
Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, while analyzing the circumstances leading to the
partition also thought that the Congress attitude towards the UP coalition problem was
most unreasonable. Recalling the events, he said in an interview: “Instead of having
enough sense to have coalition government and bringing in the Muslim League (and even
at the worst if they did not do that, they should have gone out of the way to give the
Muslims the best possible treatment), they (the Congress) in fact, did not allow them in
anywhere and opposed them. They convinced the Muslim League that was the kind of
treatment they in fact would get if they did not try and stand out for independence.”
The year 1940 opened with Maulana Azad’s election as President of Indian National
Congress on 17 March and the Muslim League’s Resolution of 23 March for a secure
separate homeland. Earlier, Maulana Azad had presided over the Congress session at
Delhi in September 1923. When Subhash Chandra Bose was contesting the Presidential
election against Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Gandhi proposed Maulana Azad’s name. Maulana
Azad agreed first but later withdrew on 21 January 1939 leaving Bose and Pattabhi
Sitaramayya to contest.
As was his wont, Maulana Azad avoided embroiling himself in any such controversy. But
now when critical decisions were to be taken there were sound reasons for Maulana Azad
being called upon to take up Presidentship of the Congress. He was known for his quiet
temper, sobriety of judgment and physiographic tact to grasp the essentials of political
problems. He was elected President of the Congress at Ramgarh (in Chotta Nagpur area
in Bihar) by 1864 votes against M.N. Roy who polled only 183.
219 Hodson, op.cit., p.67.

220 Larry Collins & Dominique Lapiere, op.cit., p.22.
330
Gandhi was keen on Maulana Azad’s election to the Presidency as he thought that in the
prevailing atmosphere of communal tension this might help in curbing the growth of
communalism. Meanwhile, Subhash Chandra Bose declared his candidature for the
second term of Presidency. The right-wing leadership in the Congress headed by Gandhi
opposed this move because they disapproved of Bose’s militant policy on national issues.
Maulana Azad supported the right-wing leadership in its fight with Bose. He did not
think that it was the proper time for an open confrontation with the British. In his letter to
Nehru dated 17 April 1939 Azad wrote: “I consider the affair of Subhash Babu to be
neither a struggle between the right and left, not the question of a composite and
homogeneous working committee. It is only a matter of Subhash and some of his
supporters. It matters little in what form tangle comes to an end; we have to consider
these questions independently and specifically, in order to reach a solution.”
However, Azad remained at the helm of the Congress for about six years at a critical
juncture in the country’s history when momentous political decisions were taken. He took
up his new responsibility with great elan. He reconstituted the Congress Working
Committee and brought back Nehru who had been excluded in Prasad’s Committee. He
also included C. Rajagopalachari, Dr. Syed Mahmud and Asaf Ali as members. He
delivered an eloquent and forceful Presidential address at Ramgarh on 19 March 1940,
which dealt with vital national and international issues.
This address was marked by passionate energy as well as logical clarity and precision.223
He delivered his speech in chaste Urdu and it was translated into English by Nehru.
Maulana Azad liked Nehru’s translation of his speech which showed how Nehru had
captured the true spirit of the original and rendered it into English with felicity and
accuracy of phrasing. Maulana Azad thought that the English translation was a real
221 Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History ofIndian National Congress, Vol.II, Madras, 1935, p. 105.
222 Jawaharlal Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters, p.381-382.
223 A.K.Azad, Khutbat-e-Azad, p.269-322.
331
improvement on his original text which he attributed to Nehru’s first rate intellect and
exceptional talents.224
In his address, Maulana Azad focused mainly on India’s immediate political problems in
the context of the prevailing international crisis. He strongly attacked the rise of fascism
in Europe but showed no mercy for British imperialism either since it continued to deny
the right of self-determination to the subject people. He declared that India’s fight was
not directed against the British people but British imperialism which even at that critical
moment withheld from the people their fundamental rights.
About the future of India, Maulana Azad made it clear that his country was no longer
willing to be duped by any British assurances of ‘safeguards’ or ‘promises of
concessions’ after the termination of the war. Maulana Azad dispelled the impression
from the minds of his countrymen that the ‘third Power’ - meaning Britain, was going to
quit India. The need of the hour, he felt, was to see the goal clearly and to unite the
people to fight the battle for India’s freedom.
Maulana Azad also covered the communal problem at great length. He admitted its stark
reality but said that it had been created by the British for serving their sinister designs. He
firmly believed in the unity of Hindu-Muslim composite culture. According to Maulana
Azad, Hindus and Muslims professed different religious faiths but as a nation they were
one, an integral part of the common heritage for which any nation could be legitimately
proud. He pointed out that there was no contradiction in being a good Indian and a devout
Muslim, in owning the common heritage of Islam and India.
He said emphatically that the inexorable logic of history had fused the Hindus and
Muslims into a nation and no power on earth could sunder that indissoluble bond. On the
Hindu-Muslim question, he declared: “Full eleven centuries have passed by since then.
224 Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters, Asia, Bombay, 1958, p.424-425.

225 A. K.Azad, Khutbat-e-Azad, p.272-273.
226 Ibid, p.295.
332
Islam has now as great a claim on the soil of India as Hinduism. If Hinduism has been the
religion of the people here for several thousands of years; Islam also has been their
religion for a thousand years. Just as a Hindu can say with pride that he is an Indian and a
997
Hindu, so also we can say with equal pride that we are Indians and follow Islam.”
Azad then assured the Muslims that their fears of being swamped by the Hindus were
groundless because the strength of any community did not depend on the sheer brutality
of its numbers but on its own internal resources to stand for its rightful place in national
life.228
Discussing how the Muslim interests would be protected, Azad explained two basic
principles, which he maintained, had guided the Congress policy throughout its history.
1. Whatever Constitution is adopted for India, there must be the fullest
guarantees in it for the rights and interests of minorities.
2. The minorities should judge for themselves what safeguards are necessary for
the protection of their rights and interests. The majority should not decide this.
Therefore, the decision in this respect must depend upon the consent of the
minorities and not on a majority vote.
Maulana Azad firmly believed that the rights of minorities could be protected in a
federation which he explained as follows: “The recognized minorities have a right, if they
so please, to choose their representative by their votes. Their representative will not have
to rely upon the votes of any other community except their own. So far as the question of
the rights and interests of the minorities is concerned, the decision will not depend upon
the majority of votes in the Constituent Assembly. It will be subject to the consent of the
minority. If unanimity is not achieved on any question, then an impartial tribunal, to
which the minority have also consented, will decide the matter. This last proviso merely
227 Ibid, p.298.

228 Ibid, p.292.
333
in the nature of a provision for a possible contingency is most unlikely to be required. If a
'J'JQ
more practical proposal is made, there can be no objection to that.”
Maulana Azad reminded the British government that with the formation of the ministries
in 1937, the Congress had stretched forth its hand of cooperation to the government but
they were forced to withdraw it after the unilateral declaration of war. The question
facing the Indian people, Maulana Azad asked, was “where do we go from here?”
Maulana Azad thought that not much had been lost yet and the situation could be
'J'lfX
salvaged provided the government understood the political climate in the country.
Placing his faith in the leadership of Gandhi, Maulana Azad hoped that the deadlock
between the Congress and the government could still be resolved.
On Hindu-Muslim unity and composite culture of which he was a symbol, Azad

delivered some strikingly lyrical passages remarkable for their intellectual range,
convictions and sensitivity. Maulana Azad said: “I would remind my co-religionists that I
stand today exactly where I stood in 1912 when I addressed them on this question
(Hindu-Muslim unity). I have given thought to the innumerable things which have helped
since then. My eyes and my mind did not fail to watch them and to think about them. I
was in their midst and I examined every circumstance with care. I can not belie my
experience, I repeat today what I had said throughout the entire period that the ninety
nine millions of Indian Muslim have no right course of action except the one to which I
invited them in 1912.”231
On the theme of composite culture, there appears in his diction a kind of bold and noble
purity as he invoked the idea of human brotherhood forged between the two great streams
of Indian civilization, that is, Hinduism and Islam. The following passage shows his
pride as an heir to India’s rich cultural heritage. “I am a Muslim and proud of the fact.
229 Ibid, p.288.

230 Ibid, p.289.
231 Ibid, p.283-284.
232 Ibid, p.285, 296.
334
Islam’s splendid traditions of thirteen hundred years are my inheritance. I am unwilling to
lose even the smallest part of this inheritance. In addition, I am proud of being an Indian.
I am part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality...I am indispensable in this
noble edifice. Without me this splendid structure of India is incomplete. I am an essential
element which has gone to build India. I can never surrender this claim.”233
Maulana Azad admired the virtues of composite culture but he condemned strongly the
Hindu and Muslim tendency to revive exclusively their own narrow past to the neglect of
rich heritage of common culture which they have jointly evolved through the centuries.
He warned: “If the Hindus think of reviving their thousand years old way of life, then
they must be living under an illusion. Similarly, if the Muslims believe in adopting their
hundred years old beliefs which they had brought from Persia and Middle East then they
/y'2A
are mistaken.”
Maulana Azad believed that ‘revivalism’ of the true spirit of religion may be justified but
any idea of reproducing the old social and cultural pattern of life was fraught with
dangerous consequences for the progress of any society.235
Maulana Azad emphasized that for the freedom of their country, unity and discipline, the
leadership of Mahatma Gandhi was absolutely necessary.236 The Presidential address
delivered by Maulana Azad was a firm grasp of contemporary national and international
issues which reflected his strong denunciation of fascism and British imperialism, his
deep concern for Hindu-Muslim unity, his firm faith in Gandhi’s leadership and his still
lurking hope of resolving the Indian political question with the British through
negotiations and goodwill on both sides.
233
Ibid, p.299.
234
Ibid.
235
Ibid.
236
Ibid, p.284, 300.
335
To check the rising tide of communalism, the Congress launched a Muslim mass contact
programme. The idea of this campaign was initiated by Nehru, to which the Congress lent
its approval in October 1937. In this campaign the Congress was supported by the
Ahrars, Khudai Khidmatgars and the socialists. Dr. K.M. Ashraf was put in charge of the
Muslim mass contact campaign. The campaign had success initially in some parts of UP,
Bihar, Bengal and Punjab.237 It failed to generate Muslim confidence in the Congress in
rural areas. From the beginning Gandhi had strong reservations about it.
Maulana Azad too worked for the Muslim mass contact programme and enlisted for it the
support of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind. It was the alliance of the right wing in the Congress
OT o
with the Hindu Mahasabha which wrecked the campaign. With the termination of the
tenure of Nehru’s Presidentship of the Congress, all zeal for it was gone. Dr. Ashraf
'J'lQ
complained that he was sitting idle in his office doing nothing. The upshot was that this
campaign, though inspired by good intentions, proved ill-conceived and unproductive and
further aggravated the already deteriorating relations between the Congress and the
League.
When the Congress was in office, the Muslim League launched a virulent tirade against it
by condemning it as a purely Hindu organization and oppressing the Muslim by its anti-
Muslim programmes and policies. The League approached the government for the
appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the alleged atrocities on the Muslims.
The League published the Pirpur Report at the end of 1938 which highlighted the
oppression inflicted on the Muslim during Congress rule. As a member of the Congress
Parliamentary Board, Azad knew the working of the ministries and he found that the
League’s allegations of the Congress discriminatory attitude towards Muslims were
absolutely baseless. Azad condemned the Pirpur Report which he thought had made all
sorts of false allegations.
237 Mushir-ul-Hasan in Richard Sisson & Stanley Wolpert (ed.), op.cit., p.214.
238 Ibid.
239 Bimal Prasad, ibid, p.314-335.
336
On the outbreak of War, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow declared on 3 September 1939
“War has broken out between His Majesty and Germany and that a state of war
emergency has existed.”240 In this way, India went into the war as a belligerent country
against Germany. This unilateral declaration of war without consulting the Congress and
the League was strongly resented by the political parties in India. The Congress voiced a
strong protest against it. By its resolution of 14 September 1939, the Congress Working
Committee insisted that the issue of war and peace must be decided by the Indian people
and no outside authority could impose any decision on them nor could the Indian people
permit their resources to be exploited for imperialist ends.
The Congress emphasized that if Britain was fighting for democracy, it must give the
right of self-determination to the people of India. It firmly believed that no genuine
support for defence would be possible without the establishment of self government in
India. The Congress asked the British government to specify precisely its war aims in
regard to “democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged.” The
Committee posed the question: “Do they (the British government) included the
elimination of imperialism and the treatment of India as a free nation whose policy will
be guided in accordance with the wishes of her people?”241
Maulana Azad protested that without consulting the Congress, Britain had the impudence
to push the country into war. He made it clear that British rule was not to be tolerated
any longer. He said: “So far as the question of war is concerned our position is quite
clear. We see the face of British imperialism as clearly now as we did in the last war. Our
case is crystal clear. We do not wish to see British imperialism triumphant and stronger
and thus lengthen the period of our own subjection to it. We absolutely refuse to do so.
R.Coupland, op.cit., p.211

Ibid
Ibid, p.274-275
Ibid
337
In his statement of 17 October, the Viceroy declared Dominion Status, as enunciated by
Lord Irwin in 1929, to be the goal of British policy in India. But the immediate step for
associating Indian opinion with the prosecution of war seemed to be “the establishment
of a consultative group representative of all major political parties in British India and of
the Indian princes over which the Governor General would preside.”244
The Congress Working Committee, at a meeting held at Wardha on 22 October 1939,

regarded the Viceroy’s statement as “in every way unfortunate” and called upon the
Congress ministries to tender their resignation. By November 1938 all the ministries
resigned. Jinnah declared 23 December 1939 as ‘Day of Deliverance’ and thanksgiving
and a mark of relief that the Hindu Raj as established by the Congress regime had at last
come to an end. The resignation of the Congress ministries in 1939 was a hasty and ill-
conceived act which was likely to damage the Congress and the country. There was still a
possibility of further negotiations with the government. This decision of the Congress left
an open field for the League to strengthen itself and captured power in Bengal, Punjab,
Sind and North-West Frontier Province which it could not have dreamt of earlier.
The war took a serious turn for the Allied Powers during April 1940 to December 1942.
Holland, Belgium and France had collapsed by mid-April 1940. France sought armistice
and the British were forced to evacuate Dunkirk. The Allied powers were engaged in a
desperate fight for their survival. The US declared war against the Axis powers towards
the end of 1941.
The first problem that confronted the Congress under Azad’s Presidency was to define its
attitude towards the European War, which provoked much controversy in the Congress
and brought it almost on the verge of a split. Gandhi’s attitude of non-participation of
India in the war was firm. A pacifist by conviction, he was not prepared to involve India
into war. Non-violence was an article of faith with him. He would not entertain using
armed force even for defending the freedom of his county against a threat of aggression.
244 Ibid.
338
He made it plain that his non-partieipation in it was not based on political expediency but
strictly on moral grounds. He would not lend support to British efforts in war even
though such a positive response should draw his country closer to freedom. Such
bargaining counters were alien to his temperament. But other Congress leaders did not
share Gandhi’s views on non-violence and India’s non-participation in the war.
At Ramgarh session of the Congress, the issue of Civil Disobedience was evaded but
faith in Gandhi’s leadership was strongly affirmed. At the Wardha Congress Session, 17-
20 June 1940 things took a different turn altogether. There was no meeting round
between Gandhi and other members of the Congress Working Committee on India’s
participation in the war. The Congress Working Committee resolved that it could not
make non-violence a matter of policy in meeting external aggression.245
It stated further that “Gandhiji should be free to pursue his great ideal in his own way and
therefore absolve him from responsibility for the programme and activity which the
Congress has to pursue under the conditions at present prevailing in India and the world
in regard to external aggression and internal disorder.”246
The question of the Congress attitude on war came up again at the Congress Working
Committee meeting in Delhi, on 3 July-7 July 1940. The Committee decided to support
provided the British made an immediate unequivocal declaration of the full independence
of India. To support the British war efforts, the Congress demanded the setting up of a
provisional national government which “commands the confidence of all the elected
elements in the Central Legislature and secure the closest co-operation of the responsible
'JA'7
governments in the Provinces.”
245 Pattabhi Sitaramayya, op.cit., p. 192-193.

246 Ibid.
247 R.Coupland, op.cit., p.240. Also in Bhupen Qanungo in B.N.Pande (ed.), op.cit., p.353.
339
The underlying idea was that India would take up armed defence if her national demands
were conceded. It was a bargaining counter.248 In sum, it meant the Congress assurance to
the British: “we will support you in the war if our demands are met.” This resolution was
drafted by C. Rajagopalachari and supported by Azad and Patel. Gandhi said that Patel
was ‘Rajaji’s greatest prize5 who lent his support to the Delhi Resolution.249 Abdul
Ghaffar Khan resigned in protest against the resolution.
The All India Congress Committee meeting held at Poona on 27 and 28 July 1940
confirmed the Delhi Resolution by 95 votes to 47, the opinion in the Congress Working
Committee being divided. At the meeting Azad said “The Indian National Congress is a
political organization pledged to win the political independence of the country. It is not
an institution for organizing world peace.”
Soon after the Poona Congress, Azad received a letter from all but four members of the
Congress Working Committee saying that they doubted whether they should continue as
members of the Congress Working Committee because of their disagreement with the
Congress on India’s participation in the war." They would continue to be members so
long as the difference had no immediate effect on the Congress policy but in case the
British government accepted the terms of Delhi Poona offer or Congress participation in
war efforts, they would have no alternative but to resign 252 Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari,
Dr. Syed Mahmud and Asaf Ali did not sign this letter. This letter written by the majority
of the members of the Congress Working Committee knocked out the basis for Delhi
Poona offer of the Congress to the government.
Maulana Azad felt deeply hurt at this letter from his colleagues who, he thought, could
have talked over the matter with him or called another meeting of the Working
248 Amrit Bazaar Patrika, 28 July 1940.

249 Pattabhi Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.201.
250 V.N.Datta, Maulana Azad, p.162.
251 Bhupen Qanungo in B.N.Pande (ed.), op.cit., p.358.
252 Ibid, p.361.
340
Committee for it.253 Almost a similar situation had confronted Subhash Chandra Bose.
The letter from his colleagues threatened Maulana Azad’s position as President and
warned him not to negotiate with the government for India’s participation in the war. It
asserted a firm confidence in Gandhi’s leadership. He was no Subhash who would revolt,
quit the Congress and organize another party. He did not had a large following. He knew
that even Nehru who shared his views and who enjoyed great popularity among the
masses would not go that far. He would not tackle a problem that was too much for him.
He did not show the strength to take up cudgels with the Congress leadership. He had no
option left but to yield.
Not by any means on idealist, Maulana Azad’s approach to politics was pragmatic. When
Nehru expressed his reservations about launching Satyagraha on the ground that this
would be contrary to the Shan (dignity) of India to take undue advantage when Britain
was involved in war, Maulana Azad wrote a strong letter on 28 May 1940.
“I do not know what is the shan of India? What is the considered decision? I want to
know. We can’t grope in the dark like blind men. We should adopt a way with open eyes
even if it embarrasses England...You interpret the Ramgarh decision against the honour
and dignity of India. I do not understand how this confused and illogical conception
could find a way to your mind.”254
Maulana Azad believed in non-violence only as a matter of policy, not as an article of

faith. He justified even the use of armed force for the cause of liberty. In his attitude
towards the present war, Maulana Azad’s sympathies were entirely with the Allies who
were fighting Nazism. At this critical juncture, he disfavoured any Civil Disobedience
movement. He was conscious of the growth of the strength of Muslim League which was
demanding a separate homeland.
253 Ibid. Also in A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.35-36.

254 Jawaharlal Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters, p.433. Also in Abu Salman Shahjahanpuri, Makatib-e-Azad,
p.19.
341
As one who had an acute historical sense reinforced by his knowledge of Bismarckian
diplomacy and the study of the Balkans, he thought that negotiations with the British
when they were involved in a desperate situation for their survival might prove
advantageous to India politically and also curb the ascendancy of communal politics.
Like Rajagopalachari, he regarded the Congress mainly as a political organization meant
to fight for the liberation of his country and achieve self-rule. Therefore, at this critical
stage when circumstances seemed favourable to India, he thought that parleys and
negotiations might help in resolving the Indian political problem. The immediate need
was to demand, as the Congress did, a provisional national government enjoying the
confidence of the people.
On July 9, 1940 Jinnah reacted strongly against the Delhi Congress Resolution of 7 July
1940 which had demanded the setting up of a national government. He condemned this
Congress move as a sinister design to establish Hindu Raj. Azad sent his clarification in a
telegram to Jinnah: “I have read your statement of July 9. The Delhi Resolution of the
Congress means by national government a composite cabinet not limited to any single
party. But is it the position of the League that they can agree to any provisional
arrangement not based on two nations scheme? If so, please clarify by wire.”255
In his reply, Jinnah rebuked Azad: “I have received your telegram. I cannot reciprocate
confidence. I refuse to discuss with you by correspondence or otherwise as you have
completely forfeited the confidence of Muslim India. Cannot you realize you are made a
Muslim show-boy Congress President to give it colour that it is national and deceive
foreign countries. You represent neither Muslims nor Hindus. The Congress is a Hindu
body. If you have self-respect resign at once. You have done your worst against the
•yc/:
League so far. I know you have hopelessly failed. Give it up.”
255 Pattabhi Sitaraxnayya, op.cit., p.202.

256 Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p,250. Even Khaliquzzaman, Jinnah’s favourite regards this telegram as
impolite.
342
On the Delhi-Poona offer, Azad and his supporters could not have their way and were
forced to retreat. As a pragmatist, he realized that the non-violence could not be a policy
against external aggression and it would not become a cardinal principle in deciding
about political action in a world governed by human willfulness. Rajagopalachari had
told Gandhi that he was ‘obsessed with non-violence’, and that ‘his vision had got
blurred’.
Gandhi was determined to disallow the Congress from participating in the war and this
view was to influence the entire Congress policy during the war. He may have thought
that Allied powers were going to lose the war. So, when Lord Linlithgow invited
Maulana Azad as Congress President to discuss with him the August Offer, he declined
the invitation on 10 August 1940, even without consulting his colleagues. He knew that
the Congress had denied him the authority to negotiate with the government. Was it for
nothing that Jinnah had called him the show-boy (Congress President)?
AUGUST OFFER
Encouraged by the conciliatory attitude of the Congress which was reflected in the Delhi-
Poona offer and by his anxiety to enlist India support for war, Linlithgow made the
August 8 offer inviting the Congress to join the new Advisory Defence Council and the
Governor-General Council, but as regards self-government, there was to be nc
constitutional advance until after the War. R. J. Moore has shown in his studies that this
proposal was drawn up by Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister.
The proposal recommended an extended executive council in which the Congress

representative would be included. The Muslim League received a pledge that the British
“would not transfer power to any system of government where authority is directly
denied by large and powerful elements in India’s national life.” By this declaration the
Muslims had something like “the veto on constitutional advances that the 1935 Act had
given to the provinces. Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Punjab Premier, thought that this
343
declaration had “removed the spectre of Hindu Raj.”258 The August Offer said nothing
about national government but a firm no to the Congress demand for independence, and
gave a mere promise for constitution-making after the War.
Gandhi regarded Maulana Azad’s refusal to meet the Viceroy as “God inspired.” He
feared that there might be a settlement between the Congress and the government. At the
Wardha Congress on 18 August, the August Offer was rejected and regarded as ‘opposed
to the best interests of the country’. In Congress circles there was a talk about suspending
0f\(\
the Working Committee and electing Rajendra Prasad as Congress President.
Obviously, this was a reaction against Maulana Azad’s views on non-violence. In mid-
September 1940, the AICC met at Bombay and affirmed its full confidence in Gandhi’s
leadership.
The Congress resolved on 15 September 1940 that it firmly “believed in the policy of
non-violence not only in the struggle for Swaraj but also in so far as this may be possible
of application in a free India,” By this resolution, the Congress was thrown back on
Gandhi’s pacifism and non-cooperation. The Muslim League neither accepted nor
rejected the August Offer, but the League’s cooperation in the conduct of the War was
still made “conditional on the Viceroy’s acceptance of the ‘fifty-fifty’ principle.”261
Gandhi launched a limited Satyagraha movement on 18 September 1940. The immediate

issue on which the movement was started was to protect civil liberty, i.e. the right to the
freedom of speech. In practice, it meant the right to propagate that India does not believe
in the war waged by the Allied powers and dissuading people from assisting in the war
efforts. Maulana Azad was arrested on 31 December 1940 and sentenced to
imprisonment for two years. By May 1941 about 14,000 Congressmen had been put in
prison.
258 RJ.Moore, Escape jrom Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Politics, London, 1984, p.58.
260 Sitaramayya, op,cit., p.210.
261 R.Coupland, op.cit., p.246.
344
The Viceroy had expanded in July 1941 his Council to 15, of which eleven were Indian.
Due to the advancing tide of the Japanese conquest in the East and the pressure of the
Indian members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council on the government to adopt
conciliatory attitude towards the Congress, all the Satyagrahis were released. Maulana
Azad came out of the gaol somewhat frustrated. He felt as though nothing had been
gained in the cause of India’s freedom since the beginning of the War.262
The Congress Working Committee met at Bardoli in the Surat district of Gujarat on 23 to
30 December 1941 and at Wardha on 13 and 14 January 1942. The Japanese were
advancing on India and the danger of their penetration in the country was real. The issue
of non-violence and non-participation of India in the war came up again at Bardoli.
Gandhi was again inflexible in his commitment to non-violence. The impression created
by the Bardoli resolution was that the Delhi-Poona Offer was being revived again by the
Congress.263
The Bardoli Congress resolved that the ‘Bombay Resolution of 16 September 1940 still
holds today.’ Gandhi realized that the Bombay Resolution was contrary to his views on
non-violence and he resigned from the leadership of the Congress. He wrote to Maulana
Azad that he found: “great error in the interpretation of Bombay Resolution. I had
interpreted it to mean that the Congress was to refuse participation in the present or all
war on the ground principally of non-violence.
The discovery of this error makes it impossible for me to lead the Congress. The
resolution contemplated material association with British in the war effort as a price for
guaranteed independence of India. If such was my view and I believed in the use of non
violence for gaining independence I would consider my self guilty of unpatriotic conduct.

263 Bhupen Qanungo, op.cit., p.440.
345
It is my certain belief that only non-violence can save India and the world from self
extinction.”264
So Gandhi resigned from the Congress leadership and decided to continue Civil
Disobedience for “free speech against all war with such Congressmen and other whom I
select.”265 Abdul Ghaffar Khan also resigned from the Congress Working Committee.
Explaining the differences between Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee.
Maulana Azad said that Gandhi would not like to obtain India’s freedom by participation
in the war. He declared: “But I am prepared to accept the independence of my country at
'Sf.C.
any moment. The only thing is that it should be real independence.”
CRIPPS PROPOSAL
The winter of 1941-42 brought the war close to the Indian borders due to the Japanese
advance. This impending danger of invasion combined with Roosevelt’s and Chiang Kai
Shek’s efforts made the British government take another initiative to resolve the Indian
problem. Churchill was in the United States and Attlee was in charge of the Cabinet. Sir
Stafford Cripps whose diplomatic success with the Russians had enhanced his reputation
and who was Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House of Lords, came to India to
negotiate with the Indian leaders, a settlement of the political question.
Maulana Azad was a hard negotiator. As Congress President, he held consultations with
Sir Stafford. He carried the impression from his talks that the Indian question could be
resolved. He was prepared to accept certain limitations on the normal powers of the
Defence Minister but he was firm on the question of national government which he
thought should function as a cabinet with the Viceroy as a constitutional head. It seemed
to him that Cripps was making a positive response to the Congress proposals but this
1 Rajendra Prasad Papers: Gandhi to Azad, 30 December 1941, File No.2 - A/41, NAI.
265
Ibid.
266 The Hindu, 16 January 1942.
267 A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.54-75, 267-278. R.Coupland, op.cit., p.263-286. Also in RJ.Moore,
op.cit., p.69-75.
346
hope proved an illusion.
The Congress rejected the Cripps proposals because they provided nothing tangible and
immediate and left things to the future. The Congress insisted that the new government
must immediately have full powers of the Dominion Status and strongly urged for giving
more powers to the executive council and reducing the role of the Secretary of State. The
Congress also objected to the provincial option and the inclusion of the princes instead of
the people of the states in the constitution making body. The actual breakdown of the
Cripps proposal which is evident from Maulana Azad-Cripps correspondence was not on
the formula about defence responsibilities but on the Congress demand that the national
government must be a cabinet government with full powers and not merely a
continuation of the Viceroy’s Council.
The Cripps proposals were meant to act as a sop to the Indian aspirations and at the same
time to mollify public opinion in USA and England. The Amery diaries show that
Churchill and Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India were pulling strings from
behind. Moore also has shown how Linlithgow prompted Cripps to withdraw the offer.268
At one time, Churchill called for the resignation of Cripps ‘from the war council with
impunity.’
But the Cripps proposals conceded Pakistan in principle in recommending that once the
constitution was drawn up any province might opt out from the Indian Union and become
a separate dominion. Such a political concession to the League, was not acceptable to
Maulana Azad. Percival Spear thought that the rejection of the Cripps Offer was a
prelude to Pakistan.269 The implication is that the Congress should have shared power
with the League which might have settled the communal problems and paved the way to
self-rule after the war.
268 RJ.Moore, ibid, p.72.

269 Percival Spear, Oxford History ofIndia, Vol.III, OUP, Oxford, 1958, p.828.
347
To Maulana Azad the question of national government with certain limitations in view of
Britain’s precarious military position was of paramount importance. That is why he
rejected the Cripps proposals. These proposals might have led to the balkanization of
India which the Congress could not have accepted. The failure of the Cripps proposal was
a prelude to Quit Indian movement. According the Moore, once again Churchill barred
the road to India’s freedom.
QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT AND MAULANA AZAD

Increasingly dissatisfied with the British attitude, the Congress demanded their
withdrawal from the Cripps proposal and threatened to launch a new Civil Disobedience
movement. The All India Congress Committee passed the Quit India Resolution on 8
August 1942 and only 13 votes were cast against it. Maulana Azad and Nehru had serious
reservations about launching a Civil Disobedience movement. They wished to cooperate
in the war provided they had real responsibility. However, Gandhi held different views
and in early July told Maulana Azad that they could not work together.271 In fact, Gandhi
demanded Azad’s resignation but Patel intervened and averted the crisis. Nehru moved
the Quit India Resolution and Maulana Azad also fell in line with him. Gandhi declared
at the meeting: “There is no question of one more chance. This is an open rebellion.”
Nehru had coined the phrase ‘open rebellion’. The closing words of Gandhi’s speech
were ‘Do or Die’.
Justice Wickenden’s report shows that Gandhi started the movement due to the failure of
Individual Satyagraha, and Cripps Mission, the growing Muslim demand for Pakistan, the
presence of American troops in India and the Japanese victories. He chose the time
which he thought appropriate for forcing Britain to concede freedom to India. But the
overwhelming consideration, as noted earlier, which weighed with him, was to save India
270
R.J.Moore, op.cit., p.104.
272 Ibid.
273 P.N.Chopra (ed.), Historical Judgment on Quit India, Justice Wickenden’s Report, New Delhi, 1989,
p.255.
348
from the ravages of war and keeping her out of it. He knew that the country was not non
violent and anticipated violence as a consequence of his movement.
In his press interview to the Congress worker, Maulana Azad said in Delhi on 17 July
1942: “Gandhiji has been made to promise that the new movement will not be stopped
merely for the reason that violence might be displayed. However, Congressmen should
'yn A
never resort to or encourage violence.”
The government took stern action by arresting the members of the Congress Working
Committee including Maulana Azad, Nehru, Patel, Asaf Ali, Syed Mahmud and
Narendra Deva and on 9 August they were dispatched to Ahmednagar fort.
Violent disturbances flared up in rural areas of UP and Bihar where railway stations were
burnt, communications disrupted and policemen killed. It was the left-wing element in
the Congress that stimulated a violent form of revolutionary activity. In his letter to the
Prime Minister Churchill, Linlithgow, the Viceroy, wrote on 31 August 1942, “I am
engaged here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity
and extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military
security.” Churchill even told the King in desperation that he would give up India after
the war though he changed his mind on the termination of the war when he was out of
power.
The Quit India movement was ruthlessly suppressed with 1000 lives lost and 60,000
people arrested. From a larger angle the movement had profound results as it sowed the
seeds of the ultimate British withdrawal from India. The prestige of British rule received
a rude j olt given by this movement.
Ibid, p.71
Ibid
349
But some ironies which attended this movement cannot be escaped, Gandhi’s non
violence turned into violence and with the Congress leaders in jail, the Muslim League
got a golden opportunity to seize power. By 1945, the League enjoyed the status of being
the party controlling government in Sind, North-West Frontier Province, Bengal and even
in the Hindu majority province of Assam. When the Congress leaders were released, they
saw in the League their potential rival.
Maulana Azad was arrested on 9 August 1942 in the early morning at Bhulabhai Desai’s
residence where he usually stayed. He was taken to Ahmednagar Fort where he remained
till April 1945. Thereafter, he was removed to Bankura in Bengal and released on 15
June 1945. During this period of his prison life, his wife died at Calcutta. When she was
seriously ill the Government of India was inclined to release him but he declined. In his
prison life he wrote a bunch of letters published later as Ghubar-e-Khatir, considered by
literary critics to be a masterpiece of Urdu prose.
Maulana Azad’s health lay shattered in prison. He had lost forty pounds in weight. After
his release, he contemplated relaxing and recuperating but that hope remained unfulfilled.
As Congress President, hectic political activity was to consume his entire time. He went
to his hometown Calcutta from Bankura. He knew that his wife Zuleikha was no more
there to receive him. On reaching Calcutta, he went first to his wife’s grave where he said
the fateha.
SIMLA CONFERENCE
The political deadlock had lasted through the War. At the end of the War, Lord Waved,
the Viceroy, made a new offer to Indian political parties. Wavell called a meeting of
Indian leaders at Simla on 25 June 1945 to resolve the Indian problem. His first object
was the formation of a new Executive Council as contemplated in the Cripps proposals.
The question was how the Executive Council was to be composed.
350
Jinnah wanted all five Muslim members in the Council of fourteen to be members of the
Muslim League. In other words, every Muslim on the Executive Council had to be from
the Muslim League.276 Jinnah declared that the Muslim League alone represented the
Muslims and no other party had the right to nominate a Muslim on the Council. Neither
the Viceroy nor the Congress accepted this view.
Maulana Azad repudiated Jinnah’s contention of nominating all the Muslims on the
Council.277 He emphasized that to yield to Jinnah’s demand would mean reducing the
97R
Congress to a communal organization, a position which he was not prepared to accept.
He said that the issue was political but was being given a religious turn to mislead the
people. Challenging the League’s contention that Muslim League was the sole
representative of the Muslims, Maulana Azad said that in the Muslim majority province
of Punjab, the Unionist Ministry was in power; in North-West Frontier it was the
Congress that ruled and in Sind Congress support had brought a Non-League ministry
into the saddle.279
When pressed by correspondents to confirm whether he had agreed to the inclusion of

Non-Congress Muslims in the Council, Maulana Azad said that for resolving the
deadlock if the League agree to the inclusion of able Muslim nationalists who belonged
neither to the League nor the Congress, he would not insist on the inclusion of Congress
Muslim nationalists in the Council 280 He added that if the League had approved his
proposal he would have persuaded his colleagues to accept it. Maulana Azad went so far
as to suggest that the League should accept the right of the Congress to choose
whomsoever it wanted but in practice the Congress would not do so. This proposal shows
that Maulana Azad was willing to stay out of power. Whether or not the Congress would
accept such a proposal was another matter.
276 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, Muslim League and the Demandfor Pakistan, Cambridge,
1985, p. 16-17. R.J. Moore, op.cit., p.16-17, 34-35. Also in A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p. 119-138.
277 The Hindustan Times, 18 July 1945.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 Ibid.
351
He blamed Wavell for not dealing firmly with the League.281 He would have liked
Wavell to proceed in the matter and constitute the Executive Council with or without the
League. Maulana Azad said, “Those who are prepared to go forward should be allowed to
•JO*)
go and those who wish to be kept out should be left out.”
Wavell being a solider was comparatively straightforward and well-intentioned in his

attempts to solve the problem. He put the cards on the table but lacked what Attlee called
‘suppleness in dealing with political problems.’283 Wavell and Maulana Azad got on well
with each other. Attlee thought Wavell was a ‘curious silent bird.’284 Maulana Azad too
was reserved by nature. Wavell found Maulana Azad, “honest, moderate and a gentleman
but not a strong character.” He wrote to King George VI on 8 July 1946 that Azad was
a gentleman who stood for good sense and moderation “as far as he was able, in spite of
poor health and a naturally weak character.” Maulana Azad was also struck by
Wavell’s sincerity of purpose and frankness. Wavell records that in his presence at Simla,
9R7
Maulana Azad stretched forth his hand to shake it with Jinnah but he refused.
Jinnah’s view was that if other political parties start claiming to represent Muslims, this
would seriously hit his position as the sole spokesman of Muslims and thereby weaken
his authority to establish his claim for a separate homeland. The Simla Conference failed
not on the basis of conflicting political objectives but on account of the communal
question, which created division among different Indian groups. Jinnah was willing to
tolerate the continuation of British rule rather than have a Congress monopoly of power.
He scuttled the Simla Conference by his intransigence.
281 Ibid, 21 July 1945.

283 RJ.Moore, op.cit., p.149.
284 Ibid.
285 Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, OUP, London, 1973, p.315.
286 Ibid, p.497.
287 Ibid, p.257.
352
Azad made the last ditch effort to retain the unity of country and avoid the creation of
Pakistan. From 1942 to 1947 Cripps met Indians almost at every critical turn whenever
any constitutional issue arose about India. He drafted almost every statement, suggested
alterations and held frequent consultations with Indian political leaders. Cripps viewed
the Congress President, Azad as “the foundation and basis of India’s future destiny.”288
CABINET MISSION
With the advent of the Labour Party in power in England, the Indian national leaders in
the Congress Party became optimistic about India’s future and thought that the Labour
Government would fulfill their commitment to the cause of India’s self-rule. Azad
regarded the Labour Party in power as “an event of historic importance and a prelude to a
")OQ
constitutional settlement.” In the words of the Secretary of State, Lord Pethick
Lawrence, the Cabinet Mission was “dispatched to India with the object of taking
immediate and positive steps to provide full self-government for India.”290
The Mission was to hold discussions with the elected representatives of British India and
the Indian states in order to arrive at an agreement about the forming of a constitution,
setting up of constitution-making machinery and an interim government having the
support of the main Indian parties. The Cabinet Mission arrived in India on 23 March
1946 with a three men team, the Secretary of State of India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, Sir
Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade and A.Y. Alexander, the First Lord of
the Admiralty. The Mission announced their plan on 6 March 1946.
Maulana Azad took special interest in the Cabinet Mission proposals and thought them
reasonable enough for resolving the Indian problem. The democratic process had been set
in motion and elections were held for the provincial assemblies in 1945. The Congress
288
RJ.Moore, op.cit., p.75.
289
Ibid, p.60.
290
V.N.Datta, op.cit., p.172.
353
won over 91.3 percent of the general votes and the League nearly 75 per cent of the
Muslim votes, thereby securing all the Muslim seats.291
The Congress emerged victorious in all the non-Muslim majority provinces, Assam, UP,
Bombay, Madras, Orissa, the Central Provinces and Bihar and also in the Muslim
majority province of North West Frontier. The Muslim League formed governments in
Bengal and Sind but was frustrated in Punjab. Thus, the League governed only in two
provinces and its strategy lay in toppling the coalition government of Punjab. The
election results showed that the League had gained a spectacular success. While in 1937,
the League had won only 4.4 percent of the Muslim votes in 1946, it captured about 75
per cent. On the basis of these election results Jinnah could declare with confidence that
only the League represented the Muslims and no one else had the right to speak on their
behalf.
The Cabinet Mission proposals provided a compromise between “Jinnah’s sovereign

Pakistan and Congress’s strong and organic Centre.” The Cabinet Mission scheme was a
modification of the Cripps Proposals. It envisaged a federal union controlling defence,
foreign affairs and communications. The states were to be included in the federal union
after negotiations. The powers of the federal union were reduced and the individual
provinces had the liberty to form a subordinate union of their own. Each of these was to
decide for itself the powers it would exercise outside the range of federal subjects. On the
basis of this arrangement, a Constituent Assembly would be convened to complete the
constitution-making process. The Cabinet Mission Plan opened an avenue for reconciling
united India with Muslims autonomy though the powers of the federal government were
reduced and the provinces were at liberty to form subordinate groups of their own.
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan on 6 June 1946 in the belief that
the formation of Pakistan was inherent in the grouping of the Muslim areas in sections B
291 Ayesha Jalal, op.cit., p.101.
354
and C.292 The Congress accepted the Plan with reservations and queries on 24 May 1946
and 25 June 1946. The Congress was entirely opposed to any executive or legislative
machinery for groups of provinces - the three tier system which the Cabinet Mission
regarded as an essential feature of the Plan. Maulana Azad made it clear to Wavell that
North West Frontier, Assam and the Sikhs in Punjab were entirely opposed to the
compulsory grouping of provinces.
Clarifying the position to Maulana Azad, Wavell wrote that grouping of provinces “was
not compulsory in the statement of 16 May 1946 but the decision for it has been left to
the elected representatives of the groups sitting together in sections.”294 To Jinnah, prior
formation of the Muslim groups was fundamental so that once the groups were formed he
could negotiate with the Congress groups but to the prior acceptance of an All-India
Union was fundamental. To the Cabinet Mission the grouping of provinces was the
crux of the problem which could be modified only by an inter-party arrangement. The
chief concern of the Congress was to gain power at the Centre. The League’s fear was
that in an all-India federation the four Muslim majority provinces would be outweighed
by the seven Hindu majority provinces.
The Congress was opposed to the grouping of provinces and this issue soon came out in
the open. Gandhi mistrusted Maulana Azad because he had been carrying on negotiations
with the Cabinet Mission without the knowledge of his colleagues. Maulana Azad was
replaced by Nehru as President of the Congress. In his speech to the All India Congress
Committee on 7 July 1946, Nehru said: “We are not bound by a single thing except that
we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly.”
At a press conference on 10 July, Nehru elaborated upon his AICC speech: “We have
292 Hodson, op.cit, p.153.

293 N.Mansergh & EWR.Lumby (ed.), Transfer ofPower, Vol.VII, p.169.
294 Ibid, p.171-172.
295 Hodson, op.cit., p. 145.
296 RJ.Moore, op.cit., p.157. Also in A.K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.181-182.
355
agreed to go into the Constituent Assembly and we have agreed to nothing else.. .what we
do there, we are entirely and absolutely free to determine... The big probability is that
from any approach to the question, there will be no grouping. Speaking in betting
language, there was 4 to 1 chance of the North-West Frontier Province deciding against
grouping. The group B collapses. It is highly likely that Assam will decide against
grouping with Bengal, although I would not like to say what the initial decision may be,
since it is evenly balanced. But there is going to be finally no grouping there, because
Assam will not tolerate it under any circumstances.”297
Nehru added later that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly “completely
-JAO
unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise.” After Nehru’s
statement, Jinnah protested against complete repudiation of the basic terms on which the
long term scheme rested. The Cabinet Mission tried to clarify that the parties could not go
outside its terms in the Constituent Assembly. Jinnah condemned the “pettifogging and
haggling attitude of the Congress.” He issued a strong statement, “I find we have
exhausted all reason. It is no use looking to any other sources for help and assurance.
There is no other tribunal to which we can go. The only tribunal is the Muslims. This day
we bid goodbye to Constituent Assembly and Constitutional methods.”299 Jinnah went
further and said, “Today we have forged a pistol and are in a position to use it.”300
INTERIM GOVERNMENT
The Congress was invited by Wavell to enter into the Interim Government on 10 August
1946. Jinnah protested against the formation of the Interim Government. He declared 16
August as a Direct Action Day. Within three days of its declaration, 20,000 people were
•JAI
killed and seriously injured in Calcutta. Communal riots flared up in different parts of
the country. The brutal killings brought the country almost on the verge of a civil war.
297 Ibid, p.158.

299 Ayesha Jalal, op.cit., p.209-213.
300 Saad. R. Khairi, Jinnah Reinterpreted, OUP, Karachi, 1995,p.234.
356
The Muslim League had called in the mullahs and pirs, who held meetings in and around
the mosques and aroused the dormant passions of the Muslims against the Congress,
provoking them into violence.302
Nehru’s emotional outburst on the grouping question did incalculable harm to the
possibility of cooperative working of the Cabinet Mission Plan. It was taken by Jinnah as
a declaration to wipe out their identity as a separate independent unit in the All-India
Federation. Michael Brecher, Nehru’s biographer, regards Nehru’s statement as the “most
fiery and provocative statement in his forty years of public life.” Mosley wrote that
Nehru’s remarks were a direct act of sabotage.304 Maulana Azad’s reactions to Cabinet
Mission Plan were completely opposed to Nehru’s. Maulana Azad thought that Nehru’s
provocative speech turned the tables by giving Jinnah the handle to withdraw his
commitment to the Cabinet Mission Plan.305 S. Gopal however, rejects Azad’s
contentions as stated in India Wins Freedom.
Another opportunity for settling the constitutional crisis was lost in this way by the
Congress through its tactless handling. The Congress tried to salvage the situation by
issuing certain clarification on the Cabinet proposals but it was too late. From the
Transfer of Power volumes, it must be said in favour of Azad that all through he was
working behind the scenes to make the Cabinet Mission proposals acceptable.
Like most of his Congress colleagues, Azad was firmly opposed to the partition of the
country which he thought would create more problems instead of solving them. He
realized that the Cabinet Mission Plan was the best option available. On the basis of this
understanding, he lent it full support as is evident from his correspondence with Wavell.
Maulana Azad made it clear to Wavell that the Congress would not accept parity with the
302 Jalal, op.cit., p.217.

303 Michael Brecher, Jawaharlal Nehru - A Political Biography, OUP, London, 1959, p.316.
304 Leonard Mosley, Last Days of the British Raj, Weidenfeld & Nichelson, London 1961, p.28.
306 S. Gopal, op.cit., Vol. I, p.227-229.
357
League in the formation of government as this would lead to perpetual conflicts.307 He
wanted an immediate declaration from the government about complete independence
^AO
with the Viceroy remaining only as its constitutional head.
Maulana Azad thought the Cabinet Mission Plan despite some limitation was a sound
formula to work on for preventing partition. Even after Nehru’s provocative statement on
the Constituent Assembly, Maulana Azad continued his efforts to save the Cabinet
Mission proposals although they had already been rejected by the League. He held the
view that the decentralization of power in a federal government with autonomous units
which the Cabinet Mission proposals offered was the only feasible alternative to
Pakistan. Maulana Azad also admitted the right of a province to step out under certain
conditions.309 The League joined the Interim Government in October 1946. Maulana
Azad was convinced that once the League had come in the Cabinet, the question of its
withdrawal from it would not arise. He knew Jinnah’s tactics.
MAULANA AZAD’S EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF THE

COUNTRY
Maulana Azad felt so desperately involved in the idea of preserving the unity of India
that he carried on negotiations with the Cabinet Mission even without the knowledge of
Gandhi and Congress Working Committee which shocked Gandhi so much when he
came to know about it he could not sleep for a whole night. According to Sudhir Ghosh,
such dealings on the part of the Congress President meant to Gandhi a ‘moral death to the
Congress.’310 Maulana Azad had assured the Cabinet Mission that he could get the
Congress Working Committee agree to a single Federation which would be broken down
into parts legislating separately for optional subjects.311
307 N.Mansergh & EWR.Lumby, op.cit., p.171-172.

308 Ibid, p.163-164, 169.
310 Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhi’s Emissary, Calcutta, 1967, p.105-110.
311 Mansergh & Lumby, op.cit., p.145, 149 & 150.
358
He suggested discussions between the Congress and League representatives on the basis
that “the Congress started from the position he had described and that the Muslim League
started from the position that they wanted two legislatures on the second tier.”312 Maulana
Azad made this move on his own and did not want anything to be said about it to Gandhi.
When Gandhi asked Maulana Azad whether he had been writing to the Cabinet Mission
on his own, Maulana Azad denied it. Ghosh notes that the copy of Maulana Azad’s letter
to the Mission was lying at that time just at a little remove on Gandhi’s desk.
F. F. Turnbull’s Minutes dated 13 February 1947 show Maulana Azad’s sustained

endeavour to see the Cabinet Mission proposal through. Turnbull wrote, “Azad is more
than anyone else the person who sought to get the Cabinet Mission proposals accepted
and he tends to outrun what his colleagues on the Working Committee are prepared to
accept.”313
A man of moderate disposition, Maulana Azad was not influential enough to change the
attitude of his colleagues towards the Cabinet Mission Plan. Wavell had hinted at it in his
letter to King George VI. Maulana Azad had ceased to be the Congress President. He told
Lord Mountbatten that if he had not relinquished his office as President of the Congress,
he might have saved the country from partition.314 He suggested to Mountbatten to take
up the Cabinet Mission proposals and work for their acceptance by the parties concerned
and in case of dispute on their interpretation he should use his personal influence to bring
-> i c
about an agreement between the contending parties.
Maulana Azad’s advice to Congress leadership was disregarded and his hopes for the
preservation of the unity of India were shattered. The Mountbatten Plan of Partition was
accepted by the Congress Working Committee on 2 June 1947. The atmosphere in the
Committee was tense. Abdul Ghaffar Khan voted against the Partition Plan and said: “We
312 Ibid, p.149.

313 Ibid, VoUX, p.676.
3,4 Ibid, Vol.X, p.33-34.
315 Ibid, p.142.
359
•2 i s
have been destroyed (Hum to tabha ho gaye). You are throwing us to the wolves.”
Maulana Azad whispered to him with bitter irony, “You should now join the League.”
For the rest sitting in a corner, he uttered not a word and was puffing away at his endless
cigarettes.
Thus, the Congress leadership was caught up in 1947 in a flurry of events beyond then-
control and had to accept partition since it could offer no alternative proposal acceptable
to all concerned. To some leaders in the Congress only Ram-Rahim approach could
resolve the communal problem which was threatening to split the country; to others it
was an economic issue requiring long-term action. To Azad who seemed to have a clearer
understanding of communal politics, the immediate requirement was sharing power with
the minorities and safeguarding their interests.
The basic questions were: “How do you treat the minorities? What status do you give
them in Free India?”318 It was this crucial issue that provided the League the real
ammunition for its politics. Maulana Azad believed that political problems are not
resolved by utopianism or pious resolutions. The leadership must be in touch with the
ground realities and be prepared to work out compromises which would promote the
well-being of the society as a whole.
In his political approach, Maulana Azad knew what objectives could be achieved in the
given circumstances and how far miscalculations and mistakes caused by hurry or stress
of conflicts could be harmful. For him, politics was not to be adjusted to human
reasoning alone but to human nature in its totality. That is why; he showed extraordinary
sagacity in understating contemporary politics. At many critical points his standpoint
turned out to be right and it was vindicated by subsequent developments.
316
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Thrown to the Wolves, Calcutta, 1961, p.97.
317
Ibid.
318
V.N.Datta, Maulana Azad, p.177.
360

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CHAPTER-6

MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD

BIRTH OF MAULANA AZAD

MAULANA AZAD’S CHILDHOOD

16 A.K.Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p. 96.

Calcutta had a famous madrassa, a theological centre of higher learning, founded by

20 A.K. Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p.96,

he had to engage some eminent teachers to share his load of work.

religious literature. It was indeed a very hard experience to be taught by Maulana

33 A.K Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p.99.

MAULANA AZAD’S MARRIAGE

41 A.K. Azad, Ghubar-e-Khatir, p.99.

MAULANA AZAD’S LOVE

45 Arsh Malsiani, op.cit., p.9.

58 A.K.Azad, Tazkirah, p. 318.

MAULANA AZAD’S SKEPTICISM

68 Malihabadi, AzadKi Kahani, p.375.

and was emotionally disturbed.

76 Malihabadi, Zikr-e-Azad, p.289.

stumble. All the veils were taken off.”

MAULANA AZAD’S ASSOCIATION WITH THE REVOLUTIONARIES

87 Ibid, p.9. Also in S.C. Kashyap (ed.), op.cit, p.5.

91 A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.6.

In Intelligence Reports, Azad is dubbed as an ‘extremist’ and “a dangerous man.”100 He

104 V.N.Datta, Maulana Azad, Manohar, New Delhi, 1990, p.106.

107 Ian Henderson Douglas, op.cit., p.172-78 and 234-38.

He considered himself a citizen of historical Islamic brotherhood which was known as

110 A.K.Azad, Khutabat-e-Sadarat,Majlis-e-Khilafat, Agra, 25 August 1921 in A.K. Azad Khutbat-e-Azad,

In the speeches, he delivered before the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind at Lahore on 18

120 Ibid, p. 139-157.

MAULANA AZAD’S TRIAL

131 Ibid, p.168.

139 Ibid, p. 175.

MAULANA AZAD’S OPINION ON THE ABOLITION OF KHILAFAT

145 Gail Minault, op.cit., p.204-205.

MAULANA AZAD’S ROLE IN UNITING THE FRACTION-RIDDEN

150 Ibid, p.157-210.

Maulana Azad repudiated the idea of Hindu Sanghathan or Muslim Sanghathan

154 Ibid, p. 181-182.

MAULANA AZAD’S ROLE IN PACIFYING COMMUNAL HATRED

157 Ibid, p.196-97.

161 The Indian Quarterly Register, 1926, Vol. II, p.90-94.

Maulana Azad published articles in al-Hilal and Zamindar on Das’s contribution to

The appointment of the Simon Commission in 1927 to examine the constitutional

167 A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.24-25.

In order to understand how Hindu-Muslim rift widened in Indian politics, it would be

175 David Page, op.cit. p.191.

178 Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, p. 136.

MAULANA AZAD’S ROLE IN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT

180 The Indian Quarterly Register, 1929, Vol.II, p.350.

MAULANA AZAD AS CONGRESS PRESIDENT

It is now acknowledged that for Congress-League coalition in Bombay, Jinnah

189 Ibid. Also in H.V.Hodson, op.cit., p.60.

According to Khaliquzzaman, the Muslim League Parliamentary Board had authorized

Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, op.cit. p.160-162,

Khaliquzzaman made an alternative proposal which were as such: (1) on communal

A successful working of the Congress-League coalition would have prevented the

202 Ibid, p.162-163.

205 Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.170-174.

209 Rajendra Prasad Papers, op.cit.

213 M.C.Chagla, Roses and December, Bombay, 1973, p.81-82.

219 Hodson, op.cit., p.67.

224 Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters, Asia, Bombay, 1958, p.424-425.