SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
In Jakarta,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A.
ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks
to annul and set aside the Resolution1 dated September 27, 1995 and the
Decision2 dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No.
36533,4 and the Orders5 dated August 29, 1994 6 and February 2, 19957
that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.8
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as
stated in the questioned Decision9, are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant
for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went
to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah
Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when
they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at
the room of Thamer. When they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some
pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff.
Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for
help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested
Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go
back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah.
SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated
with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members
but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid
that she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her
inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank
paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA
allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and
Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA
transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident
was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali
Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she
saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her
passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply
stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping
the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight
out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not
allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to
Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she
did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court
where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her
that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it
turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to
Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's
Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court
on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi
judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta
incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport,
however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her
that the airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service
Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took
away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters,
until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same
court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a
decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in
Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. 10
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer,
petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then
asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on
appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic
flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the
international
flights. 11
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the
case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her
return to Manila, 12 she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA,
without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13 for damages against
SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss 14 which
raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause
of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in
interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss)
15. Saudia filed a reply 16 thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint 17 wherein Al-
Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed
its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 18.
The trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29, 1994 denying the
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the Motion to Dismiss,
SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration 21 of
the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition 22 (To
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA
alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction
as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if that
ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged
that the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the
prosecution of the instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24 dated February
2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent
portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian
Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the Opposition
thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as
the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel,
on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended
Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney's fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine
law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within
the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being
nothing new of substance which might cause the reversal or modification
of the order sought to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of
the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order 26 with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary
Restraining Order 27 dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent
Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed,
in the interim.
In another Resolution 28 promulgated on September 27, 1995, now
assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby
DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing
that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical
College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second
Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant
Petition 29 for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated
October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered the Decision 30 dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed.
It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the
Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the
Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It
further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion
to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and
in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order 31 dated April 30, 1996, given due
course by this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, 32
the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I I.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394
based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable
is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves
what is known in private international law as a "conflicts problem".
Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts
done by another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of leave of court is now
moot and academic when this Honorable Court required the respondents
to comment on petitioner's April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For
Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10)
Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be
construed with liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R.
SP NO. 36533 entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et
al." and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With
Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or
within the 15-day reglementary period as provided for under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP
NO. 36533 has not yet become final and executory and this Honorable
Court can take cognizance of this case. 33
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following
issues emerge for our resolution:
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND
TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES".
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN
THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be
settled at the outset. It maintains that private respondent's claim for
alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges
that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex
loci delicti commissi rule. 34
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended
Complaint is based on Articles 19 35 and 21 36 of the Civil Code, then the
instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. 37
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute
that the interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and
Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint 38 dated June
23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines
corporation doing business in the Philippines. It may be served with
summons and other court processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales
(Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo Village,
Makati, Metro Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer
and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA
transferred plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors reauested her to see MR.
Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When
she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took
her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy
simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement
dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so
did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon
flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff
was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later
flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA.
When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sigh a document written in Arabic. They told
her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As
it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's
Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28,
1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer
told her that the airline had forbidden her to take that flight. At the Inflight
Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick
took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to
the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered
a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in
Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff
sought the help of the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped her
pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for her upkeep,
she worked on the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically,
Thamer and Allah freely served the international flights. 39
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a
foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a "conflicts" case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the
diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a "foreign element".
The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic
affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic
limits of their birth or conception. 40
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. 41 The
foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a
contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In
other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. 42
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess,
events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.
We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely
domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the
question of jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended Complaint, 44
and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of
action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, 45 this Court
held that:
The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh
to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent's assertion that
violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable
remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations 46 in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of
the Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47 we find that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit. 48 Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section
1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also
weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction.
Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a
judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and
obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice
of an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g.
by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed. 49

xxx xxx xxx Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to
hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she
of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, fundamental unfairness to her.
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours) Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties
and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of
xxx xxx xxx forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the
venue, Quezon City, is appropriate: parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the
trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court] jurisdiction of the court.

(a) xxx xxx xxx The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions 50
praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
plaintiff. effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the
dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.: 51
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from
disputing the lower court's jurisdiction over defendant's person, prayed for
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action has
prescribed. By interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker
and Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which it
prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor. For the court to validly
decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to
acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's person, who, being the proponent of
the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special
appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion
is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A
special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general
appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a
dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. 52
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over
the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems
seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should
control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in
two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system
regulate the situation. 53
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal
system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law
theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the
problem of deciding which of these two important values should be
stressed. 54
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
"characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified
in a conflicts rule." 55 The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the
forum to select the proper law. 56
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual
situation, event, or operative fact. 57 An essential element of conflict rules
is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact".
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact,
such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the
possible test for the determination of the applicable law. 59 These "test
factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the
following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed
to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are
involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the
place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed
or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts
and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the
place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of
attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex fori — the law of the forum — is particularly
important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not
going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and
because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the
reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of
foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all
legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also
covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment. 60
(Emphasis ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the
Amended Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to
dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private
respondent's assertion that although she was already working in Manila,
petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely
testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA
crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As
it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges,
including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing
over" or "turning over" of the person of private respondent to Jeddah
officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer.
Petitioner's purported act contributed to and amplified or even
proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private
respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention
and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner's
authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith
she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the
alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful.
But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person
and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide
compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
"connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places
where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the
torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said
as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took
place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly
deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the
exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice,
give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner
failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury
allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view
what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality
of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein
private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci
delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability 61 have been
advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In
keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an
occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule,
which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual
context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most
significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account
and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered. 62
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury
occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that
private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner,
a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was
centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on
mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines
has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, 63 raised
by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem", we
find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should
have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal
issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could
properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's
insistence that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the
burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter."
64 As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no obligation to plead and
prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is
based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that
Saudi law should govern this case. 65 And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who
was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden
was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia
is". 66
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in
upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's (herein petitioner's)
motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue
properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and
expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand.
Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the
ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the
litigants, but also for the vindication of the country's system of law and
justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial
court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant
Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or elements
involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging
the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil
Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia
Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,
LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution2 denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd.
(Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign
governments,3 entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA)
with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently
residing in the Philippines.4 The agreement provides that respondent was
to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1,
1999.5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager
of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines,
following the company's consultancy contract with the Philippine
Government.6
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon,
on January 28, 2000, this time for the detailed engineering and
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI)
Project.7 Respondent was named as the project manager in the contract's
Appendix 3.1.8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general
manager for its International Division, informed respondent that the
company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His
services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's
expiry.9
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his
lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be
assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract
was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for
the renewal of the ICA.10
As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners,
respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264
for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa
City.11
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in
Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for
improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and
ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus.12
In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request
for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as project manager
of the BBRI Project.13
On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government v.
Frank14 that matters connected with the performance of contracts are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance,15 denied the
motion to dismiss.16 The trial court subsequently denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration,17 prompting them to file with the appellate
court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
[docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60205].18 On August 23, 2000, the CA
resolved to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds—for lack of
statement of material dates and for insufficient verification and
certification against forum shopping.19 An Entry of Judgment was later
issued by the appellate court on September 20, 2000.20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on
September 19, 2000, still within the reglementary period, a second Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 already stating therein the material dates and
attaching thereto the proper verification and certification. This second
petition, which substantially raised the same issues as those in the first,
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.21
Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court rendered
the assailed April 18, 2001 Decision22 finding no grave abuse of discretion
in the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled, among
others, that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the
case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written
agreement put in issue. The CA thus declared that the trial court was
correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis.23
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA
in the assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution.24
Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials,
petitioners instituted the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25
imputing the following errors to the appellate court:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT
CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN TWO
JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE
AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN OVERLOOKING
THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI
SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAWS.26
The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the
subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific
performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the
country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci
celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship
rule," or forum non conveniens.

However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the
procedural matters raised by the respondent.
Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60205 has already barred the filing of the second petition
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827 (fundamentally raising the same issues
as those in the first one) and the instant petition for review thereof.
We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account
of the petition's defective certification of non-forum shopping, it was a
dismissal without prejudice.27 The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of
the said case due to defects in the formal requirement of verification28
and in the other requirement in Rule 46 of the Rules of Court on the
statement of the material dates.29 The dismissal being without prejudice,
petitioners can re-file the petition, or file a second petition attaching
thereto the appropriate verification and certification—as they, in fact
did—and stating therein the material dates, within the prescribed
period30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said Rules.31
The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision
on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a
subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been
commenced. In other words, the termination of a case not on the merits
does not bar another action involving the same parties, on the same
subject matter and theory.32
Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res
judicata effect, and even if petitioners still indicated in the verification and
certification of the second certiorari petition that the first had already been
dismissed on procedural grounds,33 petitioners are no longer required by
the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-forum shopping in the
instant petition for review of the second certiorari petition, the status of
the aforesaid first petition before the CA. In any case, an omission in the
certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that will not constitute
res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a fatal defect.
It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings,
considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are
no longer present.34
The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner
Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and certify, on behalf of Nippon, the
certiorari petition filed with the CA and not the instant petition. True, the
Authorization35 dated September 4, 2000, which is attached to the second
certiorari petition and which is also attached to the instant petition for
review, is limited in scope—its wordings indicate that Hasegawa is given
the authority to sign for and act on behalf of the company only in the
petition filed with the appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to
the instant petition for review.36 In a plethora of cases, however, this
Court has liberally applied the Rules or even suspended its application
whenever a satisfactory explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the
requirements have been made.37 Given that petitioners herein sufficiently
explained their misgivings on this point and appended to their Reply38 an
updated Authorization39 for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company in
the instant petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient compliance with
the Rules.
However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect
in the verification and certification. As respondent pointed out, and to
which we agree, Hasegawa is truly not authorized to act on behalf of
Nippon in this case. The aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and
even the subsequent August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by
Nippon's president and chief executive officer, not by the company's board
of directors. In not a few cases, we have ruled that corporate powers are
exercised by the board of directors; thus, no person, not even its officers,
can bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the board.40
Considering that Hasegawa verified and certified the petition only on his
behalf and not on behalf of the other petitioner, the petition has to be
denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.41 Substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter that demands strict observance of
the Rules.42 While technical rules of procedure are designed not to
frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect the
proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging
of court dockets.43
Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65
petition to question the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is
a well-established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for
certiorari or mandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and
to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to
trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by
appeal in due course.44 While there are recognized exceptions to this
rule,45 petitioners' case does not fall among them.
This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners
question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific
performance and damages filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the
litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese
nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners
posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties46
following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private
International Law.47
The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory
when they elevated the case to the appellate court. In the Motion to
Dismiss48 filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the
RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law
which will determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that
of Japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus.49 While not abandoning this stance in their petition before the
appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense
of forum non conveniens.50 On petition for review before this Court,
petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non
conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the
applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship
rule.51
Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on
the basis of the change in theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority
v. City of Iloilo.52 We only pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their
arguments to emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws
principles.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three
consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these
phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be
initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the
resulting judgment be enforced?53
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.54
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to
this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application
of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give
a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and
the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for
one do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the
other.55 The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a
transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that
state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.56
In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction.1âwphi1
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise
its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the
plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the
subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property,
over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.57 In assailing
the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to
subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by
the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is
given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law.58 It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.59 To
succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim,60 the movant must show that the
court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law
grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.61
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that
the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the
subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific
performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and
is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.62 What they rather raise as
grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most significant
relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony"63
or the law of the place where a contract is made.64 The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed."65 It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract66 and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly.67 Under the "state of the most significant
relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the
court should determine which state has the most substantial connection
to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court
should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation
of the parties.68 This rule takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue to be resolved.69
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law
applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the
choice of law.70 They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem.71 Necessarily, as
the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not
only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is
exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should
apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the
application of the conflict of laws rules.72 Also, when the law of a foreign
country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case,
the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.73
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign
element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are
three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case,
either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over
the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law
of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account
or apply the law of some other State or States.74 The court’s power to hear
cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws.
While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not
limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal
agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.75
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,76 be used to
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis
for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
does not include it as a ground.77 Second, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.78 In this case, the RTC decided to assume
jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more
properly considered a matter of defense.79
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and
hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by
petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and
appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the
dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against petitioner with the
trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United
States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American
citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government
projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with
the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust
International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for
alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay
respondent’s money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court
but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The
Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an
action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La
Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as
defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI
and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The
complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI
verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in
government projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions
due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of
BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner
itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it
was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines
and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the
latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and
RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said
companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed
that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST,
denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and
prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary
Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment12
seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of forum non
conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the
same. Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of
Walter Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in
Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s
omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual allegations in the
complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial
court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of
forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could
enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to
do business in the Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which motion
was opposed by respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial
court denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition19 with
the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a
writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13
September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from
conducting further proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision21
denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution issued on
10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have
confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and should have also
considered evidence aliunde in resolving petitioner’s omnibus motion, it
found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of
Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of determining whether the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court also stated
that it could not rule one way or the other on the issue of whether the
corporations, including petitioner, named as defendants in the case had
indeed merged together based solely on the evidence presented by
respondent. Thus, it held that the issue should be threshed out during
trial.23 Moreover, the appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial
court when the latter decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on
the ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices.
The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on record for respondent,
manifested that the lawyer handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had
severed relations with the law firm even before the filing of the instant
petition and that it could no longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag
or of respondent despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution25 dated 20
November 2006, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a
comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent
and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions
the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and
witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the
evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders
our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign
elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive
phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems,
namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Thus, in the instances27 where the Court held that the local
judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign
element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the
Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have
the power to enforce its decision.28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the
case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the
case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the
country where the case is filed.29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by
the Constitution and the law30 and by the material allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-
BG is an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed
are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party
defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the
Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are
two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties.33 The choice of law stipulation
will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case
develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
"convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign
elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of
forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more
properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion
of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstances require the court’s desistance.35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals
respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute
notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court
defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings
are binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed
to state a cause of action against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of
action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading.36 As a
general rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is
whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded.37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST
to function as one company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of
Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. On this score, the resolution of
the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as well as
other documents produced in the hearing shows that these evidence
aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a ruling that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and
conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC)
assumed the warranty obligations of defendant Rust International in the
Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after Rust International ceased
to exist after being absorbed by REC. Other documents already submitted
in evidence are likewise meager to preponderantly conclude that Raytheon
International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc.
have combined into one company, so much so that Raytheon International,
Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be held liable for the obligation
of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither these
documents clearly speak otherwise.38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether
petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together requires the presentation of
further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on the merits can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Quiason, Makalintal, Barot & Torres for petitioner.
Alejandro, Aranzaso & Associates for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated August 2, 1985, which
reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court dated February 28,1985
denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by private respondents Jack Robert
Sherman and Deodato Reloj.
A complaint for collection of a sum of money (pp. 49-52, Rollo) was filed by
petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as petitioner BANK) against private respondents Jack Robert
Sherman and Deodato Reloj, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-42850 before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84.
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as COMPANY), a company incorporated in
Singapore applied with, and was granted by, the Singapore branch of
petitioner BANK an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore
dollars 200,000.00 (which amount was subsequently increased to
Singapore dollars 375,000.00) with interest at 3% over petitioner BANK
prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility;
as a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by
petitioner BANK to it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, on October
7, 1982, both private respondents and a certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of
whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and
Several Guarantee (p. 53, Rollo) in favor of petitioner BANK whereby
private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on
demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the
aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder
shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree
that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising
under this guarantee. ... (p. 33-A, Rollo).
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK
demanded payment of the obligation from private respondents,
conformably with the provisions of the Joint and Several Guarantee.
Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, petitioner BANK
filed the above-mentioned complaint.
On December 14,1984, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss (pp
54-56, Rollo) which was opposed by petitioner BANK (pp. 58-62, Rollo).
Acting on the motion, the trial court issued an order dated February 28,
1985 (pp, 64-65, Rollo), which read as follows:
In a Motion to Dismiss filed on December 14, 1984, the defendants seek
the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds, namely:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint; and
2. That the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants.
In the light of the Opposition thereto filed by plaintiff, the Court finds no
merit in the motion. "On the first ground, defendants claim that by virtue
of the provision in the Guarantee (the actionable document) which reads
— preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order (pp. 39-48,
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder
shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree
that the courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising
under this guarantee,
the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court
finds and concludes otherwise. There is nothing in the Guarantee which
says that the courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the courts of other countries or nations. Also, it has long been established
in law and jurisprudence that jurisdiction of courts is fixed by law; it cannot
be conferred by the will, submission or consent of the parties.
On the second ground, it is asserted that defendant Robert' , Sherman is
not a citizen nor a resident of the Philippines. This argument holds no
water. Jurisdiction over the persons of defendants is acquired by service of
summons and copy of the complaint on them. There has been a valid
service of summons on both defendants and in fact the same is admitted
when said defendants filed a 'Motion for Extension of Time to File
Responsive Pleading on December 5, 1984.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by private
respondents which was, however, denied (p. 66, Rollo).
Private respondents then filed before the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) a petition for prohibition with
Rollo). On August 2, 1985, the respondent Court rendered a decision (p.
37, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition with preliminary injuction is
hereby GRANTED. The respondent Court is enjoined from taking further
cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper
court of Singapore which is the proper forum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 38, Rollo), hence, the
present petition.
The main issue is whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the suit.
The controversy stems from the interpretation of a provision in the Joint
and Several Guarantee, to wit:
(14) This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilites arising
hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree
that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising
under this guarantee. ... (p. 53-A, Rollo)
In rendering the decision in favor of private respondents, the Court of
Appeals made, the following observations (pp. 35-36, Rollo):
There are significant aspects of the case to which our attention is invited.
The loan was obtained by Eastern Book Service PTE, Ltd., a company
incorporated in Singapore. The loan was granted by the Singapore Branch
of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. The Joint and Several
Guarantee was also concluded in Singapore. The loan was in Singaporean
dollars and the repayment thereof also in the same currency. The
transaction, to say the least, took place in Singporean setting in which the
law of that country is the measure by which that relationship of the parties
will be governed.
xxx xxx xxx
Contrary to the position taken by respondents, the guarantee agreement
compliance that any litigation will be before the courts of Singapore and
that the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and
determined in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. A
closer examination of paragraph 14 of the Guarantee Agreement upon
which the motion to dismiss is based, employs in clear and unmistakeable
(sic) terms the word 'shall' which under statutory construction is
mandatory.
Thus it was ruled that:
... the word 'shall' is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714).lâwphî1.ñèt
There is nothing more imperative and restrictive than what the agreement
categorically commands that 'all rights, obligations, and liabilities arising
hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore.'
While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and
that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause,
the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "[t]his
guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall
be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance
with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the
Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under
this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all
rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction
in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the
proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (J. Salonga, Private
International Law, 1981, p. 46). Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK
at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary
habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign
tribunal, with more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, private
respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by
them) who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign
court and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention
inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case.
Private respondents' stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their ultimate
intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation.
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been
filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim,
much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any
unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no
showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private
respondents.
In the case of Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, October
31, 1969, 30 SCRA 187, it was ruled:
... An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, 'The parties agree to
sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila,' does not preclude the filing of
suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that
the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive
words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are
totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and
defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two
transactions in question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement
did not change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely
agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort.
They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v.
Lagamon, etc., et al., G.R. No. 57250, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 740,
where the stipulation was "[i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested
in the Court of Davao City." We held:
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice
it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits
in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, Rules
of Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement
which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon
by the parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby
stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest,
has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest
Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often
defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things
within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not
assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and
diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military units
stationed in or marching through State territory with the permission of the
latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of
sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A
State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making
its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought
before them (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, pp. 37-
38).lâwphî1.ñèt
As regards the issue on improper venue, petitioner BANK avers that the
objection to improper venue has been waived. However, We agree with
the ruling of the respondent Court that:
While in the main, the motion to dismiss fails to categorically use with
exactitude the words 'improper venue' it can be perceived from the
general thrust and context of the motion that what is meant is improper
venue, The use of the word 'jurisdiction' was merely an attempt to copy-
cat the same word employed in the guarantee agreement but conveys the
concept of venue. Brushing aside all technicalities, it would appear that
jurisdiction was used loosely as to be synonymous with venue. It is in this
spirit that this Court must view the motion to dismiss. ... (p. 35, Rollo).
At any rate, this issue is now of no moment because We hold that venue
here was properly laid for the same reasons discussed above.
The respondent Court likewise ruled that (pp. 36-37, Rollo):
... In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it
is not authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so
authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle
of forum non conveniens. ...
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis
of the principle of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of
the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, p. 49).lâwphî1.ñèt Thus,
the respondent Court should not have relied on such principle.
Although the Joint and Several Guarantee prepared by petitioner BANK is
a contract of adhesion and that consequently, it cannot be permitted to
take a stand contrary to the stipulations of the contract, substantial bases
exist for petitioner Bank's choice of forum, as discussed earlier.
Lastly, private respondents allege that neither the petitioner based at
Hongkong nor its Philippine branch is involved in the transaction sued
upon. This is a vain attempt on their part to further thwart the proceedings
below inasmuch as well-known is the rule that a defendant cannot plead
any defense that has not been interposed in the court below.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court is hereby REVERSED
and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED, with costs
against private respondents. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia
as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue
of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death
without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise
C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator
Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951
and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and
paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which
may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter,
the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of
my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind
or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in
his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only
P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order
of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen,
one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the
law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not
be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because
several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California
Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen
having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she
is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to
be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the
right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF
(1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is
also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the
Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself
in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record
show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco,
in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and
stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he
resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States
and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in
1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese
Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc.
622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-
Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California
shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question
herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5,
1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came
to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for
short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to
have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home
in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it
is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich
on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired
in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of
the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the
same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown,
has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no
domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time,
certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile
of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the
most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the
only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined
in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination
of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted
can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So
it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition
of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the
contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate
Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner
he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by
the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is
not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen
of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back
to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule
of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the
reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to
the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to
accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why
the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This
would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would
have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi
or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why
the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict
of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-
round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this
inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that
point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit
more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi
plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective
views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states
whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the
renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case
stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch
with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the
renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the
title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land,
or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum,
but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's
title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and
every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the
rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for
an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by
hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree
a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would
show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open
to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply
the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it
will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-
laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of
which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is
renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to
as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules
as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted
to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in
but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by
textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative
answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of
the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S.
872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced.
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law
of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then
apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of
the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2
Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons
for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in
the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts
of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict
of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or
internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by
the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be
certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal
estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance
with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with
the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English
law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws
rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the
law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but
Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and
leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law
of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked
to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the
law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate
in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here,
also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by
the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and
the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as
above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for
its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in
other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California
internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce
the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e.,
apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for
those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities
cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen
and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal
law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.)
cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case
at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not
appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in
the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the
state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art.
946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a
citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his
will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as
the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
against appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had
five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased
him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman;
by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and
finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall
go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely:
Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of
shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of
the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each
or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor —
pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that
they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27,
1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling
the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the
lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court
to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as
to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of
the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the
Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted.
This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have
been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added
a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed
is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills —
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate —
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine
estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article
16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined
under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.
CADALIN VS POEA
QUIASON, J.:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.,"
was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2) to render a
new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in default; (ii) declaring
the said labor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders
Corporation (AIBC) and Brown and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the
claims of the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty.
Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA
Case No. L-86-05-460; and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying
the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991
(Rollo, pp. 8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et.
al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in
POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 and
L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-year prescriptive period
under the Labor Code of the Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptive
period under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the
"three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of petitioners'
overtime pay; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying
the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991
(Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders
Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was
filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in
POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and
L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149 claimants; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as
it denied the motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59;
61-230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the
decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only
to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct
hearings and to receive evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for
lack of substantial evidence or proof of employment.
Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third
Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division. In
the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second Division referred G.R. Nos.
104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the
motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First Division
(G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp.
369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First
Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R.
No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, p. 1562).
I
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B.
Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas
contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended
Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and
employment by BRII (POEA Case No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were
represented by Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as
a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for
overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired
portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely,
and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel
and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and
salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not
remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR;
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of
the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the
complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its
answer.
On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and BRII,
ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten days from
receipt of the order and the movants to file their answers within ten days
from receipt of the bill of particulars. The POEA Administrator also
scheduled a pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and
Manifestation." On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out of the
Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance and Manifestation." On
July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their "Rejoinder and Comments,"
averring, among other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their
answers and to attend the pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The
claimants alleged that AIBC and BRII had waived their right to present
evidence and had defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend
the pre-trial conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike
Out of the Records" filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with
the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation," praying
that the POEA Administrator direct the parties to submit simultaneously
their position papers, after which the case should be deemed submitted
for decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another
complaint for the same money claims and benefits in behalf of several
claimants, some of whom were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-
555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order
dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the
POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers
after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the
same day, AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and
"Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a
second motion for extension of time to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its
motion for extension of time was granted.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for
extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for
failure to file their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among
other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing
AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the
order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal
of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the
appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII be
declared in default.
On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended Complaint
and/or Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding new demands:
namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night work pay, annual leave
differential pay, leave indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits and
their share of forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15,
1985, the POEA Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the
amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary
Judgment." On the same day, the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and
BRII to file their answers to the "Amended Complaint," otherwise, they
would be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence and the
case would be resolved on the basis of complainant's evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper
Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated
March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed the motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to
AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC, together
with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19,
1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from hearing the labor cases
and suspended the period for the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII.
On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to
include additional claimants in the case and to investigate alleged
wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a complaint
(POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA,
demanding monetary claims similar to those subject of POEA Case No. L-
84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon Reyes also filed his own complaint
(POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates
asked for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the
cancellation of the special powers of attorney given the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the claim
to enforce attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA
Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin,
a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on
February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA
Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in the
Supreme Court by the claimants, namely — G.R. No. 72132 on September
26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13,
1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No.
2858 directing the POEA Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the
motions and oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-
05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489),
questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA
Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer the amended
complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November
9, 1987, we dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that all its technical
objections may properly be resolved in the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on
September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants
against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC Commissioners. The
Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-
84-06-555. The second was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P.
Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor
and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos, Maximino N.
Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations of
labor laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its
motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or motion for
extension of time to file the same until the resolution of its motion for
reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On
April 28, 1987, NLRC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the
complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days
from said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On
June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer,"
alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants
filed their "Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with
the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII
submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their "Ex-
Parte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of AIBC and
BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed
their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988,
AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental Memorandum. On September
12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On October
26, 1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational Motion and
Counter-Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of
employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed
a "Consolidated Reply."
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in
POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which
awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants.
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum
For Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC
also filed its motion for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the
"Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for
AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for
the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to Complainants'
Appeal Memorandum," together with their "newly discovered evidence"
consisting of payroll records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation,"
stating among other matters that there were only 728 named claimants.
On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their "Counter-Manifestation,"
alleging that there were 1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the
Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to
appeal on time and AIBC had not posted the supersedeas bond in the
amount of $824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve the labor
cases.
On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational Motion,"
praying that all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their monetary claims for
failure of private respondents to file their answers within the reglamentary
period required by law.
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these
consolidated cases is modified to the extent and in accordance with the
following dispositions:
1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and listed in Annex
"A" hereof are dismissed for having prescribed;
2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly
and severally, to pay the 149 complainants, identified and listed in Annex
"B" hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of payment, of the total
amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective names;
3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complainants classified
and listed in Annex "C" hereof, who appear to have worked elsewhere than
in Bahrain are hereby set aside.
4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B", including those
for overtime work and favorably granted by the POEA, are hereby
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in support thereof or are beyond
the competence of this Commission to pass upon.
In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority
under Article 218(c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, hereby
directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to summon
parties, conduct hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously as
possible, and thereafter submit a written report to this Commission (First
Division) of the proceedings taken, regarding the claims of the following:
(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex "D" attached and made
an integral part of this Resolution, whose claims were dismissed by the
POEA for lack of proof of employment in Bahrain (these complainants
numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the decision of POEA, subject
of the appeals) and,
(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex "E" attached and made
an integral part of this Resolution, whose awards decreed by the POEA, to
Our mind, are not supported by substantial evidence" (G.R. No. 104776;
Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 85-87; G.R. Nos. 105029-31,
pp. 120-122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-44). The petition
was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27, 1992.

Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of
the NLRC were filed. The first, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del
Mundo; the second, by the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro; and
the third, by AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for
reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty. Del
Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro
(G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos. 105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC
and BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for
our approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of their respective
petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the compromise agreements
were concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a
compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the approval
of the agreements were filed by the parties and approved by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio
Abarquez and 47 co-claimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido
Cadalin and 82 co-petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose
M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-
32, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T.
Anglo and 17 co-claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio
Bobongo and 6 co-claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A.
Evangelista and 4 co-claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri
Banaag and 5 co-claimants dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin
Ambrosio and 15 other co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-
32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista and
3 co-claimants dated May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-
1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio R.
Agudo and 36 co-claimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J.
Alonzo and 19 co-claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C.
Dayrit and 2 co-claimants dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254;
G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C. Aceres
and 37 co-claimants dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1257-1375; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-
32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella and 27
co-claimants dated January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and
six co-claimants dated August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No.
104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14).
III
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fifty volumes
now comprising the records of these cases. From the records, it appears
that the complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by
respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown &
Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at
various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in the
Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain,
as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the
Philippine Government, all the individual complainants signed standard
overseas employment contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter,
reference to the records would be sparingly made, considering their
chaotic arrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the
Philippines. These overseas employment contracts invariably contained
the following relevant terms and conditions.
PART B —
(1) Employment Position Classification :—————————
(Code) :—————————
(2) Company Employment Status :—————————
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :—————————
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :—————————
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :—————————
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :—————————
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :—————————
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) :—————————
Months and/or
Job Completion leave with pay. This shall be computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of
a year's service will be computed on a pro-rata basis.
xxx xxx xxx
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION year of service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the employee
failed to avail of such leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as of the year in which said sick leave is granted.
set out in Part B of this Document.
11. BONUS
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and
Employer may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours as maybe A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and
deemed necessary from time to time. payable only upon satisfactory completion of this contract.

4. TERMINATION 12. OFFDAY PAY

a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this
agreement, the Employer may, at his sole discretion, terminate employee's
service with cause, under this agreement at any time. If the Employer
terminates the services of the Employee under this Agreement because of
the completion or termination, or suspension of the work on which the
Employee's services were being utilized, or because of a reduction in force
due to a decrease in scope of such work, or by change in the type of
construction of such work. The Employer will be responsible for his return
transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most expeditious
air route, economy class accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8 hours
regular pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid
at the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is applicable only
when the laws of the Host Country require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were
deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his
Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law
for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August
16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant
to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (italics supplied
only for emphasis):

10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent
to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per centum
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of fifty per
completion of contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation centum thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed
to being from seven o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock in the
morning. . . .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
. . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his
weekly day of rest if circumstances so require and in respect of which an
additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him.
...
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any
official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of
his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous service
with his employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a period of not
less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days
after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect
of the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite
duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other
party thirty days' prior notice before such termination, in writing, in
respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect of other
workers. The party terminating a contract without giving the required
notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount
of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each year of
the first three years of service and of one month's wages for each year of
service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving
indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service
completed within a year.
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated
to the Philippines at the time of the filing of these cases (R.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 59-65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: — Whether or not complainants are entitled to the benefits provided
by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are
entitled to the above-mentioned benefits.
(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a
more favorable treatment of alien employees) bars complainants from
enjoying its benefits.
Second: — Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable in
these cases, whether or not complainants' claim for the benefits provided
therein have prescribed.
Third: — Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.
Fourth: — Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well
as the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the
requirements of due process;
 Sixth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator's failure to hold
(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to respondents in default constitutes a reversible error.
due process;
Seventh: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing the
(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after these following claims:
cases were submitted for decision was valid;
a. Unexpired portion of contract;
(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root
International, Inc.; b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;

(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;
evidence;
d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula
presented by the complainants-appellants are supported by substantial e. Area Differential Pay;
evidence;
f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;
(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the
complainants-appellants prayed for; and, if so, whether or not these g. Salary differential pay;
awards are valid.
h. Wage differential pay;
Fifth: — Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC and
Brown & Root jointly are severally liable for the judgment awards despite i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;
the alleged finding that the former was the employer of the complainants;
j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;
(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown &
Root; k. Fringe benefits under B & R's "A Summary of Employee Benefits"
(Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed
construction contractor precludes a finding that Brown & Root is liable for l. Moral and exemplary damages;
complainants claims.
m. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;
n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to
recruit of AIBC and the accreditation of B & R issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not
excluding reportorial requirements thereof.
Eighth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing
POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised
Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and
admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion
to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC agreed with
the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23, being more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form part of the overseas
employment contract of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the
claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA
Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing
of the claims of the complainants was three years, as provided in Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the labor
cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason that not all the
complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the subject matter of the
action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common or general
interest to all the complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal
rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA
Administrator to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII; (2)
some findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3)
some of the evidence upon which the decision was based were not
disclosed to AIBC and BRII during the hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that
BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants and
held that BRII was the actual employer of the complainants, or at the very
least, the indirect employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA
Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in
denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on the
Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for
refund of the SSS premiums and refund of withholding taxes and the
claimants should file their claims for said refund with the appropriate
government agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims
which are not based on the overseas employment contracts nor the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976;

(3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for
moral and exemplary damages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said
damages was not established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion
of their contract may be allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive
period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely
repatriated prior to the expiration of their overseas contract was not
established; and
(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint
for the suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's recruitment license and the
cancellation of the accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L)
86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that the claimants in
said case were also claimants in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of
dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just resolved the
corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the
POEA did not pass upon the same claims twice.
V the addition of hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the
following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a
speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed private
respondents to file their answers in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the
filing of the original complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total
disregard of its own rules, affirmed the action of the POEA Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC
and BRII in default and should have rendered summary judgment on the
basis of the pleadings and evidence submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the
labor cases filed by AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years;
and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed
POEA Case No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro
(Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of
the labor cases, considering the great difficulty of getting all the records of
the more than 1,500 claimants, the piece-meal filing of the complaints and
(2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was
impossible to prepare the answers within the ten-day period provided in
the NLRC Rules, that when the motion to declare AIBC in default was filed
on July 19, 1987, said party had already filed its answer, and that
considering the staggering amount of the claims (more than
US$50,000,000.00) and the complicated issues raised by the parties, the
ten-day rule to answer was not fair and reasonable;

(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's finding that
there was no common or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy — which was the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23.
Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some being based on salaries
pertaining to the unexpired portion of the contracts while others being for
pure money claims. Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar only
to himself and depending upon the particular circumstances obtaining in
his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that prescribed
by Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (three years) and not
the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten
years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case
No. L-86-05-460 should be dismissed, this being a private quarrel between
the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out
the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2
and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants who entered into the
compromise agreements subject of said manifestations and motions were
his clients and that Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent
them in said agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid less
than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected
additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to
receive; and that the consent of the claimants to the compromise
agreements and quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution dated November 23, 1992, the Court
denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations and Motions
dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to
Enforce Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered into
compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII with the assistance of Atty. De
Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo to
cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for
violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The said lawyers allegedly misled this Court, by making it appear that the
claimants who entered into the compromise agreements were
represented by Atty. De Castro, when in fact they were represented by
Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against
Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the voiding of the
quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on
the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the
three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and
(2) it denied the claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay of
three hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during
the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money claims in
Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated April 16, 1983 of the Ministry
of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No.
104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a
special law, prevails over that provided in the Civil Code of the Philippines,
a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method
of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not
bound by what appeared therein, because such memorandum was
proposed by a subordinate Bahrain official and there was no showing that
it was approved by the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed
that the averaging method was discussed in the course of the negotiation
for the amicable settlement of the dispute and any offer made by a party
therein could not be used as an admission by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976 and not the terms of the employment contracts; (2) granted claims
for holiday, overtime and leave indemnity pay and other benefits, on
evidence admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process; and (3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings
for the 683 claimants whose claims had been dismissed for lack of proof by
the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege that assuming
that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRC erred when it
did not apply the one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-
30).
VI
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they
disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the prescriptive
period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise,
fixing the prescriptive period at three years as provided in Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking
different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive
period applicable to the claims was three years, instead of ten years, as
found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive
period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but
he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines was the operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those
arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided
by the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the
workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso facto amended the worker's
contracts of employment. Respondents consciously failed to conform to
these provisions which specifically provide for the increase of the worker's
rate. It was only after June 30, 1983, four months after the brown builders
brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain for this same claim, when
respondent AIBC's contracts have undergone amendments in Bahrain for
the new hires/renewals (Respondent's Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this
instant case is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years
from the time the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents
shall prescribe in ten years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims
were filed within the ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered the
infirmity of being prescribed (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive
period is three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:
The Labor Code provides that "all money claims arising from employer-
employee relations . . . shall be filed within three years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred" (Art. 291,
Labor Code, as amended). This three-year prescriptive period shall be the
one applied here and which should be reckoned from the date of
repatriation of each individual complainant, considering the fact that the
case is having (sic) filed in this country. We do not agree with the POEA
Administrator that this three-year prescriptive period applies only to
money claims specifically recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code.
Article 291 gives no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider
complainants' cause/s of action to have accrued from a violation of their
employment contracts. There was no violation; the claims arise from the
benefits of the law of the country where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as provided by
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the applicability of said
law was one of characterization, i.e., whether to characterize the foreign
law on prescription or statute of limitation as "substantive" or
"procedural." NLRC cited the decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the
applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New
York for claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would have
prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of
Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not "specifically intended to be
substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the
forum should apply. The Court observed:
. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a
foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its
purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the
foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute
pertains, we think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the
purpose this test is the most satisfactory one. It does not lead American
courts into the necessity of examining into the unfamiliar peculiarities and
refinements of different foreign legal systems. . .
The court further noted:
xxx xxx xxx

Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to
succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian
period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the
particular rights which the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor
Code is a statute having broad objectives, viz: "The present Code regulates
the relations between capital and labor, placing them on a basis of social
justice, so that, without injuring any of the parties, there may be
guaranteed for labor the necessary conditions for a normal life and to
capital an equitable return to its investment." In pursuance of these
objectives the Code gives laborers various rights against their employers.
Article 623 establishes the period of limitation for all such rights, except
certain ones which are enumerated in Article 621. And there is nothing in
the record to indicate that the Panamanian legislature gave special
consideration to the impact of Article 623 upon the particular rights sought
to be enforced here, as distinguished from the other rights to which that
Article is also applicable. Were we confronted with the question of
whether the limitation period of Article 621 (which carves out particular
rights to be governed by a shorter limitation period) is to be regarded as
"substantive" or "procedural" under the rule of "specifity" we might have
a different case; but here on the surface of things we appear to be dealing
with a "broad," and not a "specific," statute of limitations (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp.
92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to
claims "arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as
provided by the Labor Code." They assert that their claims are based on
the violation of their employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 and therefore the claims may be brought within ten
years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo,
G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines,
Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed
under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the
Philippines a "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over
the common-law conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of
action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on
prescription that shall be the governing law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable
after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract. (G.R.
Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period
and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the
forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive
law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private
International Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the
sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending
on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court
applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian
law, after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on
prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum
on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive
law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing
statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute
of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153
[1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law
(Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing
statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-
153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said
Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no
provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or
contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine
Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be
enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S.
553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims
in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution
emphasized that:
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
(Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine
law, the next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the
filing of the claims is three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten
years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides:
Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3)
years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case
involved the correct computation of overtime pay as provided in the
collective bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any
reference as to the computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour
Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead insisted that work
computation provided in the collective bargaining agreements between
the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily
anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year
prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should
govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A.
No. 19933) provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued otherwise
such action shall be forever barred, . . . .
The court further explained:
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA
No. 444 as amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime
work is solely based on said law, and not on a collective bargaining
agreement or any other contract. In the instant case, the claim for overtime
compensation is not so much because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as
amended but because the claim is demandable right of the employees, by
reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining agreement.
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period
for filing "actions to enforce any cause of action under said law." On the
other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the
prescriptive period for filing "money claims arising from employer-
employee relations." The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the
employer-employee relations, which is broader in scope than claims arising
from a specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive
period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only
to money claims specifically recoverable under said Code, does not find
support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of
the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims
"arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right," as provided
by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June 6, 1984
with POEA, the case was decided only on January 30, 1989, a clear denial
of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC and the
POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo,
pp.
31-35).
Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is
not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties
in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy
disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal
proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case.
What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has
been violated, thus:
In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has
been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against
each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the
right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same
factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not
a person officially charged with the administration of justice has violated
the speedy disposition of cases.
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991), we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding
is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a copy
of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and BRII
be declared in default for failure to file their answers within the ten-day
period provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and Regulations
of the POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to
strike out of the records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of
claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill of
particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their
final disposition in the administrative level after seven years from their
inception, cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy
disposition of the cases of complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
claimants. Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first
being on April 3, 1985. 13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of amounts;

The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were
deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups outside of,
Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more than US$65 million according
to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
1. Unexpired portion of contract;
14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to
recruit of AIBC and issued by the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not
excluding reportorial requirements thereof (NLRC Resolution, September
2, 1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).

2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund; Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and
clarity of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with the
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit; motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When claimants filed their
"Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaint
4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay; from the records for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of
particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out
5. Area Differential pay; the complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the deficiencies"
pointed out by AIBC.
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the complaint,
7. Salary differential pay; the records of employment of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be
retrieved from various countries in the Middle East. Some of the records
8. Wage Differential pay; dated as far back as 1975.

9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System;
10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal
Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A Summary of Employees
Benefits consisting of 43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator
were interrupted several times by the various appeals, first to NLRC and
then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were filed
against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on May 29,
1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05-460). NLRC, in exasperation, noted that the
exact number of claimants had never been completely established
(Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new
cases were consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the
proceedings, thus:
These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards
resolution had the parties and their counsel been more interested in
pursuing the truth and the merits of the claims rather than exhibiting a
fanatical reliance on technicalities. Parties and counsel have made these
cases a litigation of emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is
remarkable. As late as last month, this Commission made a last and final
attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties (this Commission issued a
special order directing respondent Brown & Root's resident agent/s to
appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance. Even this failed (Rollo,
p. 58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the
disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which complained:
It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these
consolidated cases appear to be not only the individual complainants, on
the one hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two
lawyers for the complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante
De Castro, have yet to settle the right of representation, each one
persistently claiming to appear in behalf of most of the complainants. As a
result, there are two appeals by the complainants. Attempts by this
Commission to resolve counsels' conflicting claims of their respective
authority to represent the complainants prove futile. The bickerings by
these two counsels are reflected in their pleadings. In the charges and
countercharges of falsification of documents and signatures, and in the
disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a large
extent, abetted in confounding the issues raised in these cases, jumble the
presentation of evidence, and even derailed the prospects of an amicable
settlement. It would not be far-fetched to imagine that both counsel,
unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the complainants, with the
proverbial pot of gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the
aggregate of the claims in these cases. It is, likewise, not improbable that
their misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them to throw all caution to
the wind in the matter of elementary rules of procedure and evidence
(Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the listing of
some of the complainants in both petitions filed by the two lawyers. As
noted by NLRC, "the problem created by this situation is that if one of the
two petitions is dismissed, then the parties and the public respondents
would not know which claim of which petitioner was dismissed and which
was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be consolidated
in a "class suit" because "all the named complainants have similar money
claims and similar rights sought irrespective of whether they worked in
Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the
Middle East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all before the court (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law, many
of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were
deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under different terms and conditions
of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch
as the first requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general
interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical
that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims
in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the
claims is the same (for employee's benefits), there is no common question
of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain,
many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed
elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and
not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. The named
claimants have a special or particular interest in specific benefits
completely different from the benefits in which the other named claimants
and those included as members of a "class" are claiming (Berses v.
Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant is only
interested in collecting his own claims. A claimants has no concern in
protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that
hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered
into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. A
principle basic to the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on the
record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others
(Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this
matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in
a class suit in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them
under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one
complaint (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the
exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all
indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the
decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the
decision is adverse to them, in which case the others who were impleaded
by their self-appointed representatives, would surely claim denial of due
process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA
Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro
guilty of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities, falsification,
duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his appearances as
counsel for some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to
put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing multiple petitions and
complaints involving the same issues, with the result that the courts or
agencies have to resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however, applies only
to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is
entitled "Additional Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple
Filing of Petitioners and Complainants." The first sentence of the circular
expressly states that said circular applies to an governs the filing of
petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the
anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts and administrative agencies,
said circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical
conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no
jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14,
1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for
attorney's fees for legal services rendered in favor of the claimants (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or
administrative agency which renders and executes the money judgment
secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written notice
thereof to be delivered to his clients and to the adverse party (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the
charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the
administrative agency that rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De
Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility should be filed in a separate and appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting their
formula of "Three Hours Average Daily Overtime" in computing the
overtime payments. They claim that it was BRII itself which proposed the
formula during the negotiations for the settlement of their claims in
Bahrain and therefore it is in estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-
22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain
dated April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and the Area
Manager, Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary of the
compensation offered by the Company to the employees in respect of the
difference of pay of the wages of the overtime and the difference of
vacation leave and the perusal of the documents attached thereto i.e.,
minutes of the meetings between the Representative of the employees
and the management of the Company, the complaint filed by the
employees on 14/2/83 where they have claimed as hereinabove stated,
sample of the Service Contract executed between one of the employees
and the company through its agent in (sic) Philippines, Asia International
Builders Corporation where it has been provided for 48 hours of work per
week and an annual leave of 12 days and an overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of
the normal hourly wage.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company in its computation reached the following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35
months for the Philippino (sic) employees . . . .
2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee is
US$2.69 . . . .
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours plus in all public
holidays and weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of service as compensation
for the difference of the wages of the overtime done for each Philippino
(sic) employee . . . (Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared by
them but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain Department of Labor; (2)
that there was no showing that the Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved
said memorandum; and (3) that the offer was made in the course of the
negotiation for an amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was
not admissible in evidence to prove that anything is due to the claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without observing the
rule on presenting official documents of a foreign government as provided
in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be
admitted in evidence in proceedings before an administrative body. The
opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could
easily verify its authenticity and accuracy.
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as contained in
the memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to settle a claim is not an
admission that anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror.
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of the record
with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is great
public interest in having the protagonists settle their differences amicable
before these ripen into litigation. Every effort must be taken to encourage
them to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and counter-offers
in the negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to bind a party
to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do, would defeat
the salutary purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment
contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the
host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the
laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment
contract." It quoted with approval the observation of the POEA
Administrator that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it
refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which became the
law of the parties. They contend that the principle that a law is deemed to
be a part of a contract applies only to provisions of Philippine law in
relation to contracts executed in the Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and
BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became
applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable that those stipulated therein. It was stipulated in said contracts
that:
The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he will not
engage in any other business or occupation, nor seek employment with
anyone other than the Employer; that he shall devote his entire time and
attention and his best energies, and abilities to the performance of such
duties as may be assigned to him by the Employer; that he shall at all times
be subject to the direction and control of the Employer; and that the
benefits provided to Employee hereunder are substituted for and in lieu of
all other benefits provided by any applicable law, provided of course, that
total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country
regulation or custom, it being understood that should applicable laws
establish that fringe benefits, or other such benefits additional to the
compensation herein agreed cannot be waived, Employee agrees that such
compensation will be adjusted downward so that the total compensation
hereunder, plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp. 352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more
felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to the
employee may be "adjusted downward so that the total computation
(thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation" therein agreed, another part of the same provision
categorically states "that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below
that of the host country regulation and custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where
there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the
employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The
presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other
and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced
their bargaining power (Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA
70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment
contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed
(Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the
foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties,
including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth
(16 Am Jur 2d,
150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just
agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to
the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign
contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate
as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris,
The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese,
Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to
the parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.,
151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some
relationship to the parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict
of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the contracts sought to
be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law
because the services were rendered in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486
(1982), the "Employment Agreement," between Norse Management Co.
and the late husband of the private respondent, expressly provided that in
the event of illness or injury to the employee arising out of and in the
course of his employment and not due to his own misconduct,
"compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject
to the limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of
the Philippines or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel,
whichever is greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of
the vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at the
time of his death, granted a better compensation package, we applied said
foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII
is inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench. The issue in that case was
whether the amount of the death compensation of a Filipino seaman
should be determined under the shipboard employment contract executed
in the Philippines or the Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard
employment contract was controlling, the court differentiated said case
from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express
stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign law would be
applicable if it afforded greater compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to
due process when said administrative agency granted Friday-pay
differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave differential and leave
indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At first,
NLRC reversed the resolution of the POEA Administrator granting these
benefits on a finding that the POEA Administrator failed to consider the
evidence presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of fact of the
POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that some
of the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-
107). But instead of remanding the case to the POEA Administrator for a
new hearing, which means further delay in the termination of the case,
NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of the claims itself. It is this
procedure that AIBC and BRII complain of as being irregular and a
"reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted on
appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have been "unilaterally
submitted by the claimants and not disclosed to the adverse parties"
(Rollo, pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to
the POEA administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed
submitted for resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA
Administrator in resolving the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no
opportunity to refute said evidence of the claimants before the POEA
Administrator, they had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to
present their
counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII
themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence which
they failed to present before the POEA Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to
"use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process."
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of the
evidence of both parties submitted before the POEA Administrator and
NLRC, the latter considered that it was not expedient to remand the cases
to the POEA Administrator for that would only prolong the already
protracted legal controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits instead
of remanding them to the trial court for the reception of evidence, where
the same can be readily determined from the uncontroverted facts on
record (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations VIII
Commission, 127 SCRA 463 [1984]).
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when it on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion
ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find
listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 whose claims no such abuse of discretion.
had been denied by the POEA Administrator "for lack of proof" and for 69
claimants listed in Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.
found by NLRC itself as not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-45).
SO ORDERED
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the determination of a
question, matter or controversy, within its jurisdiction, . . . ." G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under Article vs.
218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had already been dismissed AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS,
because such provision contemplates only situations where there is still a respondents.
question or controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the technical rules

of procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by
administrative agencies (First Asian Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v.
Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152
SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before
NLRC.
BUENA, J.:
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate
mortgage constituted over a third party mortgagor's property situated in
the Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal loan
before foreign courts?

Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure and
evidence in administrative proceedings, there are cardinal rules which
must be observed by the hearing officers in order to comply with the due
process requirements of the Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated
in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision 1 of public respondent Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997
and its resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking
and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines,
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
California, United States of America while private respondent American
Realty Corporation (ARC) is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a
limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted
three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the following
corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El
Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "borrowers"), all of which are existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of
private
respondent. 3
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA and
the corporate borrowers signed and entered into restructuring
agreements. As additional security for the restructured loans, private
respondent ARC as third party mortgagor executed two real estate
mortgages, 4 dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of
land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the
restructured loans prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions 5
before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan, to wit:
a) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No 2098) against Liberian Transport
Navigation S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona
Shipping Company S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A., Eduardo Katipunan
Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on June 17, 1992.
b) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245) against El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio
Katipunan Litonjua on July 2, 1992;
c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court
(Action No. 4039 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El
Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A. Pacific Navigators
Corporation, Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering
(Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan
Litonjua on November 19, 1992; and
d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court
(Action No. 4040 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El
Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company, S.A., Pacific Navigators
Corporation, Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering
(Edyship) Co., Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on November 21, 1992.
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private respondent
ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was private not impleaded as party-
defendant.
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines an application for extrajudicial
foreclosure 6 of real estate mortgage.
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the mortgaged real
properties were sold at public auction in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale,
with Integrated Credit and Corporation Services Co (ICCS) as the highest
bidder for the sum of Twenty four Million Pesos (P24,000.000.00). 7
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, Branch 159, an action for damages 8 against the petitioner, for
the latter's act of foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages
despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan.
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee
from foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been
filed, is not applicable in the present case, claiming that:
a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and not a party
to the principal restructuring agreements, was never made a party
defendant in the civil cases filed in Hongkong and England;
b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in the
Philippines since the civil actions were filed in Hongkong and England. As
such, any decisions (sic) which may be rendered in the abovementioned
courts are not (sic) enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action
to enforce the foreign judgments is first filed in the Philippines, pursuant
to Rule 39, Section 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the principal
agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing civil
actions for sums of money.
On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for
suspension 10 of the redemption period on the ground that "it cannot
exercise said right of redemption without at the same time waiving or
contradicting its contentions in the case that the foreclosure of the
mortgage on its properties is legally improper and therefore invalid."
In an order 11 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the private
respondent's motion for suspension after which a copy of said order was
duly received by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged properties at
the foreclosure sale, consolidated its ownership over the real properties,
resulting to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T-
186272, T-186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in its name.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its favor, ICCS
sold the real properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for the
amount of Thirty Nine Million Pesos (P39,000,000.00). 12 Accordingly,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-187783(m),
T-16653P(m) and T-16652P(m) were issued in the latter's name.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 13 in favor of private
respondent ARC dated 12 May 1993, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the filing in
foreign courts by the defendant of collection suits against the principal
debtors operated as a waiver of the security of the mortgages.
Consequently, the plaintiff's rights as owner and possessor of the
properties then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-
78762, T-78763, T-78760 and T-78761, all of the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines, were violated when the defendant
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages constituted thereon.
Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
following sums, all with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
the complaint up to the date of actual payment:
1) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Ninety Nine
Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00);
2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00); and
3) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower
court prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration which the
appellate court denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review 14 on certiorari where herein
petitioner BANTSA ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following
assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded the doctrines laid
down by this Hon. Supreme Court in the cases of Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as G.R. No. 74730 promulgated on
August 25, 1989 and Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. IAC, 196
SCRA 29 (1991 case), although said cases were duly cited, extensively
discussed and specifically mentioned, as one of the issues in the
assignment of errors found on page 5 of the decision dated September 30,
1997.
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it awarded the private respondent actual and exemplary damages
totalling P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998 although such huge amount
was not asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint, is contrary
to law and is totally unsupported by evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection suit against
the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts
constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and
exemplary damages in favor of private respondent ARC, as third-party
mortgagor, is proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits that a
waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of two
requisites: an ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and
subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to collect the
principal loan does not suffice; a final judgment must be secured and
obtained in the personal action so that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure
may be appreciated. To put it differently, absent any of the two requisites,
the mortgagee-creditor is deemed not to have waived the remedy of
foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable and upholds
the jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach 15 and similar cases adjudicated
thereafter, thus:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may he may
pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause
of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave
open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution,
even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property,
an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a
deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant,
other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the
satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his
cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit
of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right
of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to
bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result
not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano vs. Enriques,
24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25
Phil., 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being
sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and
then again in the place where the property lies.
In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating jurisprudence
enunciated in Manila Trading and Supply Co vs. Co Kim 17 and Movido vs.
RFC, 18 invariably held:
. . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his
security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness
with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the
debtor, including the subject matter of the mortgage . . . , subject to the
qualification that if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue
further the remedy he has waived. (Emphasis Ours)
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a
mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. 19
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are
deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one
remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is
deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing
of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provision of Rule 68 of the of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage
creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with
the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate
mortgages over its properties as security for the debt of the principal
debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities
of a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not
parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own
property. 20
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of
another's obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily
bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contract—
loan—remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter
that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the
mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount
of the loan. 21
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of filing the
action for collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur,
is untenable.
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with the petitioner in
said case, that the filing of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the
mortgage:
A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy of
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted over the personal property
as security for the debt or value of the promissory note when he seeks to
recover in the said collection suit.
. . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not foreclosure,
thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage as basis for relief, he clearly
manifests his lack of desire and interest to go after the mortgaged property
as security for the promissory note . . . .
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for
clarity and emphasis, that the mere act of filing of an ordinary action for
collection operates as a waiver of the mortgage-creditor's remedy to
foreclose the mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary action for
collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the present case
is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the
other necessarily must arise. Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection
suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate-Appellate Court, 23 a
case relied upon by petitioner, supposedly to buttress its contention, this
Court had occasion to rule that the mere act of filing a collection suit for
the recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the
other remedy of foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is
non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available
for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only
one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause
of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc, vs. Icarangal. 24
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single
cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in
the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words,
the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt
and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the
same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they
constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage
constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and
both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only
one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by
applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action
by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the
first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor
to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to
recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect,
be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much
cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the
doctrine enunciated in Caltex wherein this High Court relaxed the
application of the general rules to wit:
In the present case, however, we shall not follow this rule to the letter but
declare that it is the collection suit which was waived and/or abandoned.
This ruling is more in harmony with the principles underlying our judicial
system. It is of no moment that the collection suit was filed ahead, what is
determinative is the fact that the foreclosure proceedings ended even
before the decision in the collection suit was rendered. . . .
Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of context. We must
stress that the Caltex case was never intended to overrule the well-
entrenched doctrine enunciated Bachrach, which to our mind still finds
applicability in cases of this sort. To reiterate, Bachrach is still good law.
We then quote the decision 25 of the trial court, in the present case, thus:
The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the exception rather than the rule,
dictated by the peculiar circumstances obtaining therein. In the said case,
the Supreme Court chastised Caltex for making ". . . a mockery of our
judicial system when it initially filed a collection suit then, during the
pendency thereof, foreclosed extrajudicially the mortgaged property
which secured the indebtedness, and still pursued the collection suit to the
end." Thus, to prevent a mockery of our judicial system", the collection suit
had to be nullified because the foreclosure proceedings have already been
pursued to their end and can no longer be undone.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it has not been shown whether the defendant pursued
to the end or are still pursuing the collection suits filed in foreign courts.
There is no occasion, therefore, for this court to apply the exception laid
down by the Supreme Court in Caltex by nullifying the collection suits.
Quite obviously, too, the aforesaid collection suits are beyond the reach of
this Court. Thus the only way the court may prevent the spector of a
creditor having "plural redress for a single breach of contract" is by holding,
as the Court hereby holds, that the defendant has waived the right to
foreclose the mortgages constituted by the plaintiff on its properties
originally covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762,
T-78760 and T-78761. (RTC Decision pp., 10-11)
In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of severe criticism, to
say the least. 26
Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by citing the case of
PCIB vs. IAC. 27 Again, petitioner tried to fit a square peg in a round hole.
It must be stressed that far from overturning the doctrine laid down in
Bachrach, this Court in PCIB buttressed its firm stand on this issue by
declaring:
While the law allows a mortgage creditor to either institute a personal
action for the debt or a real action to foreclosure the mortgage, he cannot
pursue both remedies simultaneously or successively as was done by PCIB
in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392 to enforce payment of the
1.3 million promissory note secured by real estate mortgages and
subsequently filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the
rule against splitting a cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the
expediency of filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily
abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted
over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private
respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually
foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed
the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence
and our statute books.
In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy of
foreclosure after the collection suit was filed, considering that the creditor
should not be afforded "plural redress for a single breach of contract." For
cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its
enforcement. 28
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial but the efficacy
of the remedy chosen in addressing the creditor's cause. Hence, a suit
brought before a foreign court having competence and jurisdiction to
entertain the action is deemed, for this purpose, to be within the
contemplation of the remedy available to the mortgagee-creditor. This
pronouncement would best serve the interest of justice and fair play and
further discourage the noxious practice of splitting up a lone cause of
action.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to
petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions
for sums of money. 29
We rule in the negative.
This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet its
crumbling cause. In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply
notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English
law on the matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle
in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A
foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. 30 Thus, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal
law. 31 This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter
were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, 32 said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound
and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment
or order shall not be applied. 33
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. 34
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause
of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent —
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws. 35
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is
entitled to the award of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the
act of petitioner BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate
mortgages constituted a clear violation of the rights of herein private
respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of
pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation
and the same must be proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-
substantial, no damages will be given. 36 Indeed, the question of the value
of property is always a difficult one to settle as valuation of real property
is an imprecise process since real estate has no inherent value readily
ascertainable by an appraiser or by the court. 37 The opinions of men vary
so much concerning the real value of property that the best the courts can
do is hear all of the witnesses which the respective parties desire to
present, and then, by carefully weighing that testimony, arrive at a
conclusion which is just and equitable. 38
In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for relying
heavily on the valuation made by Philippine Appraisal Company. In effect,
BANTSA questions the act of the appellate court in giving due weight to the
appraisal report composed of twenty three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro
Marquez and submitted as evidence by private respondent. The appraisal
report, as the records would readily show, was corroborated by the
testimony of Mr. Reynaldo Flores, witness for private respondent.
On this matter, the trial court observed:
The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee formally offered as
evidence the appraisal report dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit J, Records, p.
409), consisting of twenty three (23) pages which set out in detail the
valuation of the property to determine its fair market value (TSN, April 22,
1994, p. 4), in the amount of P99,986,592.00 (TSN, ibid., p. 5), together
with the corroborative testimony of one Mr. Reynaldo F. Flores, an
appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. (TSN, ibid., p.
3). The latter's testimony was subjected to extensive cross-examination by
counsel for defendant-appellant (TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22). 39
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the familiar
and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should
be respected. 40 The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge
of respect for the reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing
the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 41
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, principally because they are in a better position to assess the
same than the appellate court. 42 Besides, trial courts are in a better
position to examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of
witnesses. 43
Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses rest primarily with the trial court. 44 In the case at
bar, we see no reason that would justify this Court to disturb the factual
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with regard
to the award of actual damages.
In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial court justified the
award by presenting the following ratiocination in its assailed decision 45,
to wit:
Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the matter of valuation. The size of
the subject real properties are (sic) set forth in their individuals titles, and
the Court itself has seen the character and nature of said properties during
the ocular inspection it conducted. Based principally on the foregoing, the
Court makes the following observations:
1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in Bo. Sto. Cristo, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which is (sic) not distant from Metro Manila —
the biggest urban center in the Philippines — and are easily accessible
through well-paved roads;
2. The properties are suitable for development into a subdivision for
low cost housing, as admitted by defendant's own appraiser (TSN, May 30,
1994, p. 31);
3. The pigpens which used to exist in the property have already been
demolished. Houses of strong materials are found in the vicinity of the
property (Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), and the vicinity is a growing community. It
has even been shown that the house of the Barangay Chairman is located
adjacent to the property in question (Exh. 27), and the only remaining
piggery (named Cherry Farm) in the vicinity is about 2 kilometers away
from the western boundary of the property in question (TSN, November
19, p. 3);
4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of the property, as
indubitably shown by the fact that on March 18, 1994, ICCS (the buyer
during the foreclosure sale) sold the consolidated real estate properties to
Stateland Investment Corporation, in whose favor new titles were issued,
i.e., TCT Nos. T-187781(m); T-187782(m), T-187783(m); T-16653P(m) and
T-166521(m) by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan;
5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject properties to
Stateland Investment Corporation for Thirty Nine Million (P39,000,000.00)
Pesos, which is more than triple defendant's appraisal (Exh. 2) clearly
shows that the Court cannot rely on defendant's aforesaid estimate
(Decision, Records, p. 603).
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on
the credibility of witnesses command great respect and consideration
especially when the conclusions are supported by the evidence on record.
46 Applying the foregoing principle, we therefore hold that the trial court
committed no palpable error in giving credence to the testimony of
Reynaldo Flores, who according to the records, is a licensed real estate
broker, appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. since
1990. 47 As the records show, Flores had been with the company for 26
years at the time of his testimony.
Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not confine itself to
the appraisal report dated 29 March 1993, and the testimony given by Mr.
Reynaldo Flores, in determining the fair market value of the real property.
Above all these, the record would likewise show that the trial judge in
order to appraise himself of the characteristics and condition of the
property, conducted an ocular inspection where the opposing parties
appeared and were duly represented.
Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted, we affirm the
ruling of the trial court as regards the valuation of the property —
. . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00) for the 39-
hectare properties (sic) translates to just about Two Hundred Fifty Four
Pesos (P254.00) per square meter. This appears to be, as the court so holds,
a better approximation of the fair market value of the subject properties.
This is the amount which should be restituted by the defendant to the
plaintiff by way of actual or compensatory damages . . . . 48
Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court awarding an amount
allegedly not asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint.
Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and compensatory
damages by the lower court exceeded that prayed for in the complaint, the
same is nonetheless valid, subject to certain qualifications.
On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.
— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgement; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation
of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
amendment to be made.
The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion
de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. 49 citing Northern Cement
Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 50 is enlightening:
There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the
necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may be validly
awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the
facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no
amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where defendant
had himself raised the point on which recovery was based. The appellate
court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence
although the pleadings were actually not amended. Amendment is also
unnecessary when only clerical error or non substantial matters are
involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Laguna (48 Phil.
5). In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the rule on
amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or
prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the recent case of National
Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held that
where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings and the evidence
adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to
conform with the evidence.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above-mentioned rule and
in light of the decisions cited, the trial court should not be precluded from
awarding an amount higher than that claimed in the pleading
notwithstanding the absence of the required amendment. But it is upon
the condition that the evidence of such higher amount has been presented
properly, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to
support their respective contentions and to refute each other's evidence.
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence
adduced during trial does not preclude an adjudication by the court on the
basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the
pleadings, or serve as a basis for a higher award of damages. Although the
pleading may not have been amended to conform to the evidence
submitted during trial, judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply
on the basis of the issues alleged but also the basis of issues discussed and
the assertions of fact proved in the course of trial. The court may treat the
pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although
it had not been actually so amended. Former Chief Justice Moran put the
matter in this way:
When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or implied
consent of the adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings,
judgment may be rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be
considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied
consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to
object thereto.
Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence
before it even though the relevant pleading had not been previously
amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the
adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the basis requirements of
fair play had been met, as where litigants were given full opportunity to
support their respective contentions and to object to or refute each other's
evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had been
amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the
basis of all the evidence before it.
In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was afforded the
opportunity to refute and object to the evidence, both documentary and
testimonial, formally offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair
play are deemed satisfied. In fact, the testimony of Reynaldo Flores was
put under scrutiny during the course of the cross-examination. Under
these circumstances, the court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction
and committed no reversible error in awarding actual damages the amount
of which is higher than that prayed for. Verily, the lower court's actuations
are sanctioned by the Rules and supported by jurisprudence.
Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the amount
of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being excessive, is subject
to reduction. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 51 Considering its
purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in every case and should not be
awarded to unjustly enrich a prevailing party. 52 In our view, an award of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in the present case qualifies the test of
reasonableness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION of the amount awarded as exemplary damages. According,
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private respondent the sum of
P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damage and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child
custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon
Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April
1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In
June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th
Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (Agreement4 ) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties
chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising
from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois
court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged
that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over
Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack
of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s
motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held
that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering
the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree,
including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2)
the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code6 prohibiting
compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the
divorce decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is
no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration,
holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding
on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the
Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement
novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody
from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is independent of the
divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the
parties’ child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to
enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity
considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for
the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed
his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation.9 An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit
to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded
not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s
divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded.
What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for
Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various
provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on
joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois
court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the
Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.12 Otherwise, the
contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the
beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and
other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to
test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two
facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been
born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no
longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce
decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated
in fact or in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole
parental custody17 to the mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound
policy consideration,19 subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to
obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-
divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their
child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has
also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint
custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have
not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
authority when spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the
spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below
seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2)
separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age
bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that
is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents
cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal
custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately
agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole
custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to
preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under
the second paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text
that "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To
limit this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while
placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double
standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of
separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the
simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy
vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven
years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her."23 This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender
age."24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent
(mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes
incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options,
or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25 However,
these are objections which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or
uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is
the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or
undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents
may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation and other
privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of sole
maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely
grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor
under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of
Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year.
From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law gives the
separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to
agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that
petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the
Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the
Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent’s act
effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default custodial
regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting
on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.28
There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that
the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he
is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal
complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the
foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he no
longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints under
Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign
divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality,
irrespective of who obtained the divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its
lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the
question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus
removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody
regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default
standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child.30
As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s
parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share
custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to
allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit
evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest,
and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with
the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be
invoked to serve the child’s best interest.31
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June
2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 55380 September 26, 1994
IN RE: PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE REGISTER OF DEATHS
OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY OF DAVAO CITY, FROM THE NAME "FLAVIANO
CASTRO ZAPANTA" TO "FLORENCIO B. ZAPANTA," GLICERIA S. ZAPANTA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OF DAVAO AND THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dante C. Sandiego for petitioner.
VITUG, J.:
The case at bench has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals after its
assessment that it merely raises a pure question of law.
The case stemmed from the filing of a "Petition for Correction of Entry in
the Register of Deaths of the Civil Registry of Davao City from the name
"Flaviano Castro Zapanta" to "Florencio B. Zapanta," by Gliceria S. Zapanta
before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Davao
(docketed Sp. No. 1913).
The narration of the case by the Court of Appeals is hereunder quoted:
The petition alleges that petitioner Gliceria S. Zapanta is the widow of the
late "Florencio B. Zapanta;" that said deceased was born in Sta. Rita,
Pampanga, on 24 October 1899, as evidenced by his certificate of baptism
(p. 5, Record on Appeal); that on 5 August 1965, the late Florencio B.
Zapanta was admitted and confined at the San Pedro Hospital, Davao City,
and met his untimely demise on 11 August 1965 (p. 6, Record on Appeal);
that after the traditional church ceremonies at the Sta. Ana Church, Davao
City, the remains of the deceased was entombed at the municipal
cemetery of Davao City on 12 August 1965; that when petitioner requested
the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City for a certified true copy of the death
certificate of her late husband, she discovered, to her dismay and surprise,
that the name indicated in said death certificate was "Flaviano Castro
Zapanta," albeit the date of death and all other circumstances and
information reflected therein clearly and conclusively revealed that the
person referred to therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio
B. Zapanta (p. 7, Record on Appeal). Hence, petitioner prays that, after due
notice and hearing, an order be issued directing the Local Civil Registrar of
Davao City to correct the death certificate of her deceased husband by
changing his name from "Flaviano Castro Zapanta" to "Florencio B.
Zapanta."
After due publication of the notice of hearing, the Assistant City Fiscal of
Davao City filed a motion to dismiss the petition, advancing inter-alia that
petitioner seeks to correct not only a clerical error, but indeed a substantial
one. In support of the opposition, heavy reliance has been made in the
cases of Schultz vs. Republic, L-10055, 13 Sept. 1958; Black vs. Republic, L-
10869, 10 Nov. 1958; Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, 50 O.G. 1078; Ansaldo vs.
Republic, 55 O.G. 6541; Balite vs. Republic, L-17332, 29 Nov. 1961; Tan Su
vs. Republic, L-12140, 29 April 1959, where all substantial corrections in
the civil registry were denied because only innocuous or clerical error could
be corrected (p. 10, Record on Appeal). Said motion to dismiss was
opposed by petitioner.
In dismissing the petition, in its 31st January 1975 Order, the court a quo
rationalized that the correction of the name "Flaviano Castro Zapanta" to
"Florencio B. Zapanta," was not merely clerical but substantial in nature
and that it thereby did not have the power to grant the relief prayed for.
The trial court committed a reversible error.
Article 407 of the Civil Code provides that "(a)cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the Civil
Register." The civil status referred to pertains to one's birth, marriage,
death, legal separation, annulment of marriage, judgment declaring the
nullity of marriage, legitimation, adoption, acknowledgement of natural
children, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction,
judicial determination of filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor and
change of name. 1 Any change or correction in a civil registry record is not
allowed without a judicial order. 2
The general perception, following Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic 3 and cases
contemporary and closely subsequent to it, 4 was that the judicial
proceeding under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule 108 5 of
the Rules of Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or clerical
errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected
by mere reference to
it, 6 such as misspellings and obvious mistakes. Starting, however, with the
case of Republic vs. Hon. Macli-ing, 7 the Court, through Justice Melencio-
Herrera, explained:
It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily
affect the identity of the father. In that sense, it can be said to be
substantial. However, we find indubitable evidence to support the
correction prayed for. In the Alien Certificate of Registration of the father,
his name appears as "Sy Piao." The same is true in his Immigrant Certificate
of Residence. . . . The school records of Oscar Sy both in high school and
at St. Louis University in Baguio, recorded the name of his father as "Sy
Piao" . . . .
In the case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as well as
subsequent cases predicated thereon, we forbade only the entering of
material corrections in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a
summary action. The proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, were not summary.
Thereafter, in Republic vs. Valencia, 8 the Court, through Justice Gutierrez,
Jr., discussed, rather at length, the phrase "appropriate proceeding" that
could warrant the correction of even non-clerical errors. There, Leonor
Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica
Go, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the
cancellation and correction of the entries of birth of Bernardo Go and
Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of Cebu City. The Solicitor General opposed
the petition, alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil
Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court, contemplated a summary proceeding solely to
allow innocuous changes in registry entries. The Court ruled:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well
as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy
is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor
General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412
of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits
"that the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an
appropriate proceeding."
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law
Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning
to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have
been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where
the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or
proceeding is "appropriate."
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide: . . .
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning
the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
are — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition,
it becomes the duty of the court to — (1) issue an order fixing the time and
place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to
oppose the petition: — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed
and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer
be described as "summary." There can be no doubt that when an
opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person
having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or
corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings
thereon become adversary proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower
court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the
recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well
be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.
The doctrine was reiterated in Chiao Ben Lim v. Zosa 9 and Republic v. Flojo.
10
Accordingly, the dismissal by the trial court of Gliceria's petition must now
be reversed. The records show that the publication requirement has
already been complied with. The next step would thus be for the court a
quo to consider the petition before it to be, in substance, an adversary
proceeding and to allow petitioner and all adverse and interested parties
their day in court.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order of the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Davao is hereby SET ASIDE and Special Proceedings
No. 1913 is ordered reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February
19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People
of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On
January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time,
their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and
her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
(which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9
Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu
City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently
living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to
receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for
violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted
his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch
20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still
continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen
(14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in
economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold
Departure Order against respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was
arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent
filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2)
prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21
dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that
the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien,
and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto
reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article
19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under
R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who
are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s
nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling.
Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those
advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court
hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is
not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s
duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be
charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child.
Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner
who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound
by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is
the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against
the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following
issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the
instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the
Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling
of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court
without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing
a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised
or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves
in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In
Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of
error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal
action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition
for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA
on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law."
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or
falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law
– the response thereto concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national
has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel
question of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly
commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws,
specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the
factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by
this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to
the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus,
in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the
administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the
hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition
meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s
contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the
parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that
notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying
with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and
clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are
entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of
the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on
Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil
Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the
principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law,
i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a
foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not,
however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to
a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the
present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law
of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to
support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce
decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated
that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands
in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under
this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce
obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status
of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not
completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the
divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation
that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not
disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national
law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their
children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would
still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and
SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter
were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound
and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment
or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause
of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
— ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously
unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce
a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no
longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in
San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be
made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing
or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of
the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage
in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the
woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to
the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial
support to the child is considered anact of violence against women and
children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality
Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn
in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law
and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein
are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is
likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not
admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262
in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the
ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which
provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f)
shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I)
shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A.
No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still
ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has
clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided
support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being
admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19,
2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on
the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114323 July 23, 1998
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC., respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered
by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND
NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC
CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED.
The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The present
conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in
a contract entered into by and between both parties on February 26, 1983
whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In
consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private
respondent the amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable,
divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil well
cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of
Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India.
However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the private
respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point
destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had
already received payment and despite several demands made by the
petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement.
Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that
the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well
cement with Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's designated port.
However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the
petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then informed the private
respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to
Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates:
Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all
questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification
designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to
quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other question,
claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the
supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or
failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the
completion/abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration
of the persons appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of
dispute. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator
so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the
matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his
duties as Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of
the matter in dispute or difference.
The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred
or vacating his office or being unable to act for any reason the Member of
the Commission shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator in
accordance with the terms of the contract/supply order. Such person shall
be entitled to proceed with reference from the stage at which it was left
by his predecessor. Subject as aforesaid the provisions of the Arbitration
Act, 1940, or any Statutory modification or re-enactment there of and the
rules made there under and for the time being in force shall apply to the
arbitration proceedings under this clause.
The arbitrator may with the consent of parties enlarge the time, from time
to time, to make and publish the award.
The venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun. 1*
On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved
the dispute in petitioner's favor setting forth the arbitral award as follows:
 Total amount of award US $ 899,603.77
NOW THEREFORE after considering all facts of the case, the evidence, oral
and documentarys adduced by the claimant and carefully examining the In addition to the above, the respondent would also be liable to pay to the
various written statements, submissions, letters, telexes, etc. sent by the claimant the interest at the rate of 6% on the above amount, with effect
respondent, and the oral arguments addressed by the counsel for the from 24.7.1988 up to the actual date of payment by the Respondent in full
claimants, I, N.N. Malhotra, Sole Arbitrator, appointed under clause 16 of settlement of the claim as awarded or the date of the decree, whichever is
the supply order dated 26.2.1983, according to which the parties, i.e. M/S earlier.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Pacific Cement Co., Inc. can refer
the dispute to the sole arbitration under the provision of the Arbitration I determine the cost at Rs. 70,000/- equivalent to US $5,000 towards the
Act. 1940, do hereby award and direct as follows: — expenses on Arbitration, legal expenses, stamps duly incurred by the
claimant. The cost will be shared by the parties in equal proportion.
The Respondent will pay the following to the claimant: —
Pronounced at Dehra Dun to-day, the 23rd of July 1988. 2
1. Amount received by the Respondent
To enable the petitioner to execute the above award in its favor, it filed a
against the letter of credit No. 11/19 Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India (hereinafter
referred to as the foreign court for brevity), praying that the decision of the
dated 28.2.1983 US $ 477,300.00 arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. The foreign court issued
notices to the private respondent for filing objections to the petition. The
2. Re-imbursement of expenditure incurred private respondent complied and sent its objections dated January 16,
1989. Subsequently, the said court directed the private respondent to pay
by the claimant on the inspection team's the filing fees in order that the latter's objections could be given
consideration. Instead of paying the required filing fees, the private
visit to Philippines in August 1985 US $ 3,881.00 respondent sent the following communication addressed to the Civil judge
of Dehra Dun:
3. L.C. Establishment charges incurred
The Civil Judge
by the claimant US $ 1,252.82
Dehra Dun (U.P.) India
4. Loss of interest suffered by claimant
Re: Misc. Case No. 5 of 1989
from 21.6.83 to 23.7.88 US $ 417,169.95
M/S Pacific Cement Co.,
 ORDER
Inc. vs. ONGC Case
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the
Sir: basis of conditions of award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall
be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from
1. We received your letter dated 28 April 1989 only last 18 May 1989. defendant (US$ 899,603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six
hundred and three point seventy seven only) along with 9% interest per
2. Please inform us how much is the court fee to be paid. Your letter annum till the last date of realisation. 4
did not mention the amount to be paid.
Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and
3. Kindly give us 15 days from receipt of your letter advising us how several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private
much to pay to comply with the same. respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as
owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a complaint with
Thank you for your kind consideration. Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the
enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The
Pacific Cement Co., Inc. private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2) lack of cause of
By: action; and (3) plaintiffs claim or demand has been waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished. The petitioner filed its opposition to the said
Jose Cortes, Jr. motion to dismiss, and the private respondent, its rejoinder thereto. On
January 3, 1992, the RTC issued an order upholding the petitioner's legal
President 3 capacity to sue, albeit dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid cause of
action. The RTC held that the rule prohibiting foreign corporations
Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court transacting business in the Philippines without a license from maintaining
refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the a suit in Philippine courts admits of an exception, that is, when the foreign
required filing fees, and thereafter issued an Order on February 7, 1990, to corporation is suing on an isolated transaction as in this case. 5 Anent the
wit: issue of the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause of action, however, the
RTC found the referral of the dispute between the parties to the arbitrator
ORDER under Clause 16 of their contract erroneous. According to the RTC,

Since objections filed by defendant have been rejected through Misc. Suit [a] perusal of the shove-quoted clause (Clause 16) readily shows that the
No. 5 on 7.2.90, therefore, award should be made Rule of the Court. matter covered by its terms is limited to "ALL QUESTIONS AND DISPUTES,
RELATING TO THE MEANING OF THE SPECIFICATION, DESIGNS, DRAWINGS
AND INSTRUCTIONS HEREIN BEFORE MENTIONED and as to the QUALITY
OF WORKMANSHIP OF THE ITEMS ORDERED or as to any other questions,
claim, right or thing whatsoever, but qualified to "IN ANY WAY ARISING OR
RELATING TO THE SUPPLY ORDER/CONTRACT, DESIGN, DRAWING,
SPECIFICATION, etc.," repeating the enumeration in the opening sentence
of the clause.
The court is inclined to go along with the observation of the defendant that
the breach, consisting of the non-delivery of the purchased materials,
should have been properly litigated before a court of law, pursuant to
Clause No. 15 of the Contract/Supply Order, herein quoted, to wit:
"JURISDICTION
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in
connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction
and the place from which this supply order is situated."6
The RTC characterized the erroneous submission of the dispute to the
arbitrator as a "mistake of law or fact amounting to want of jurisdiction".
Consequently, the proceedings had before the arbitrator were null and
void and the foreign court had therefore, adopted no legal award which
could be the source of an enforceable right. 7
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court
concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction
over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not
validly adopt the arbitrator's award. In addition, the appellate court
observed that the full text of the judgment of the foreign court contains
the dispositive portion only and indicates no findings of fact and law as
basis for the award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be enforced by any
Philippine court as it would violate the constitutional provision that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 8 The appellate
court ruled further that the dismissal of the private respondent's
objections for non-payment of the required legal fees, without the foreign
court first replying to the private respondent's query as to the amount of
legal fees to be paid, constituted want of notice or violation of due process.
Lastly, it pointed out that the arbitration proceeding was defective because
the arbitrator was appointed solely by the petitioner, and the fact that the
arbitrator was a former employee of the latter gives rise to a presumed
bias on his part in favor of the petitioner. 9
A subsequent motion for reconsideration by the petitioner of the appellate
court's decision was denied, thus, this petition for review on certiorari
citing the following as grounds in support thereof:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL SINCE:
A. THE NON-DELIVERY OF THE CARGO WAS A MATTER PROPERLY
COGNIZABLE BY THE PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE 16 OF THE CONTRACT;
B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL COURT OF DEHRADUN, INDIA WAS
AN AFFIRMATION OF THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE
ARBITRATOR AND THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE IN THIS JURISDICTION;
C. EVIDENCE MUST BE RECEIVED TO REPEL THE EFFECT OF A
PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT UNDER A FOREIGN JUDGMENT. 10
The threshold issue is whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over
the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under
Clause 16 of the contract. To reiterate, Clause 16 provides as follows:
Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all
questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification
designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to
quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other question,
claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the
supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or
failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the
completion/abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration
of the persons appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of
dispute. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator
so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the
matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his
duties as Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of
the matter in dispute or difference. 11
The dispute between the parties had its origin in the non-delivery of the
4,300 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner. The primary question
that may be posed, therefore, is whether or not the non-delivery of the
said cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under the above-quoted
Clause 16. The petitioner contends that the same was a matter within the
purview of Clause 16, particularly the phrase, ". . . or as to any other
questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising or relating
to the supply order/contract, design, drawing, specification, instruction . .
.". 12 It is argued that the foregoing phrase allows considerable latitude so
as to include non-delivery of the cargo which was a "claim, right or thing
relating to the supply order/contract". The contention is bereft of merit.
First of all, the petitioner has misquoted the said phrase, shrewdly inserting
a comma between the words "supply order/contract" and "design" where
none actually exists. An accurate reproduction of the phrase reads, ". . . or
as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way
arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing,
specification, instruction or these conditions . . .". The absence of a comma
between the words "supply order/contract" and "design" indicates that
the former cannot be taken separately but should be viewed in conjunction
with the words "design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions". It is thus clear that to fall within the purview of this phrase,
the "claim, right or thing whatsoever" must arise out of or relate to the
design, drawing, specification, or instruction of the supply order/contract.
The petitioner also insists that the non-delivery of the cargo is not only
covered by the foregoing phrase but also by the phrase, ". . . or otherwise
concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same
during the stipulated/extended period or after completion/abandonment
thereof . . .".
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of
statutes, is equally applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning and
scope of vague contractual stipulations, such as the aforementioned
phrase. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word
or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of the words in which it is found or with which it
is associated, or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed
by reference to associated words. 13 A close examination of Clause 16
reveals that it covers three matters which may be submitted to arbitration
namely,
(1) all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the
specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned
and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered; or
(2) any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way
arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing,
specification, instruction or these conditions; or
(3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to
execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the
completion/abandonment thereof.
The first and second categories unmistakably refer to questions and
disputes relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials of the supply/order contract. In the third category,
the clause, "execution or failure to execute the same", may be read as
"execution or failure to execute the supply order/contract". But in
accordance with the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, this reference to the
supply order/contract must be construed in the light of the preceding
words with which it is associated, meaning to say, as being limited only to
the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials
of the supply order/contract. The non-delivery of the oil well cement is
definitely not in the nature of a dispute arising from the failure to execute
the supply order/contract design, drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters
involving the technical aspects of the contract is but a logical inference
considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to arbitration is for
such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person possessed with
the required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the
regular courts.
This Court agrees with the appellate court in its ruling that the non-delivery
of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by the regular courts
as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their contract:
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in
connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and
the place from which this supply order is situated. 14
The following fundamental principles in the interpretation of contracts and
other instruments served as our guide in arriving at the foregoing
conclusion:
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual. 15
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
together, attributing the doubtful ones that sense which may result from
all of them taken jointly. 16
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the
construction of an instrument, where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all. 17
Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a contract
should not be read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the
contrary, interpreted in the light of the other related provisions. 18 The
whole and every part of a contract must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its harmonious whole. Equally applicable is the canon of
construction that in interpreting a statute (or a contract as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory
that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole. 19
The petitioner's interpretation that Clause 16 is of such latitude as to
contemplate even the non-delivery of the oil well cement would in effect
render Clause 15 a mere superfluity. A perusal of Clause 16 shows that the
parties did not intend arbitration to be the sole means of settling disputes.
This is manifest from Clause 16 itself which is prefixed with the proviso,
"Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract . . .", thus
indicating that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is not all encompassing, and
admits of exceptions as may be provided elsewhere in the supply
order/contract. We believe that the correct interpretation to give effect to
both stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims
or disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions,
specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract, and
for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
The petitioner then asseverates that granting, for the sake of argument,
that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not a proper subject for
arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to conform to the
specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling within the ambit of
Clause 16. In this contention, we find merit. When the 4,300 metric tons of
oil well cement were not delivered to the petitioner, an agreement was
forged between the latter and the private respondent that Class "G"
cement would be delivered to the petitioner as replacement. Upon
inspection, however, the replacement cement was rejected as it did not
conform to the specifications of the contract. Only after this latter
circumstance was the matter brought before the arbitrator. Undoubtedly,
what was referred to arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery of
the cargo at the first instance but also the failure of the replacement cargo
to conform to the specifications of the contract, a matter clearly within the
coverage of Clause 16.
The private respondent posits that it was under no legal obligation to make
replacement and that it undertook the latter only "in the spirit of liberality
and to foster good business relationship". 20 Hence, the undertaking to
deliver the replacement cement and its subsequent failure to conform to
specifications are not anymore subject of the supply order/contract or any
of the provisions thereof. We disagree.
As per Clause 7 of the supply order/contract, the private respondent
undertook to deliver the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement at "BOMBAY
(INDIA) 2181 MT and CALCUTTA 2119 MT". 21 The failure of the private
respondent to deliver the cargo to the designated places remains
undisputed. Likewise, the fact that the petitioner had already paid for the
cost of the cement is not contested by the private respondent. The private
respondent claims, however, that it never benefited from the transaction
as it was not able to recover the cargo that was unloaded at the port of
Bangkok. 22 First of all, whether or not the private respondent was able to
recover the cargo is immaterial to its subsisting duty to make good its
promise to deliver the cargo at the stipulated place of delivery. Secondly,
we find it difficult to believe this representation. In its Memorandum filed
before this Court, the private respondent asserted that the Civil Court of
Bangkok had already ruled that the non-delivery of the cargo was due
solely to the fault of the carrier. 23 It is, therefore, but logical to assume
that the necessary consequence of this finding is the eventual recovery by
the private respondent of the cargo or the value thereof. What inspires
credulity is not that the replacement was done in the spirit of liberality but
that it was undertaken precisely because of the private respondent's
recognition of its duty to do so under the supply order/contract, Clause 16
of which remains in force and effect until the full execution thereof.
We now go to the issue of whether or not the judgment of the foreign court
is enforceable in this jurisdiction in view of the private respondent's
allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which the
award in favor of the petitioner was based. The pertinent portion of the
judgment of the foreign court reads:
ORDER
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the
basis of conditions of award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall
be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from
defendant (US$ 899,603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six
hundred and three point seventy seven only) along with 9% interest per
annum till the last date of realisation. 24
As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No.
3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This is a categorical declaration that
the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as
contained in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an
exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the parties,
and the arbitrator's evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the foregoing is
deemed to have been incorporated into the foreign court's judgment the
appellate court was in error when it described the latter to be a "simplistic
decision containing literally, only the dispositive portion". 25
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum
decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco v.
Permskul, 26 this Court held that the following memorandum decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the requirements of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this
Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb
the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. 27
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier
case of Romero v. Court of Appeals, 28 where the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals adopted the findings and disposition of the Court of
Agrarian Relations in this wise:
We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-
assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm
the correctness of the trial court's factual findings and the soundness of its
conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby
adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the
court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision. 29
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if
only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. 30 This is
particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy
and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this
case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single spaced
pages.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. 31 This Court has
held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or
the internal law of the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural rules of the
Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by
adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the same must be accorded
respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates
that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay
the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot
invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
otherwise.
The private respondent claims that its right to due process had been
blatantly violated, first by reason of the fact that the foreign court never
answered its queries as to the amount of docket fees to be paid then
refused to admit its objections for failure to pay the same, and second,
because of the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who was a
former employee of the petitioner.
Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense 33 or stated otherwise, what is
repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be heard. 34 Thus,
there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted,
where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy
and he waived his right to do so. 35
In the instant case, the private respondent does not deny the fact that it
was notified by the foreign court to file its objections to the petition, and
subsequently, to pay legal fees in order for its objections to be given
consideration. Instead of paying the legal fees, however, the private
respondent sent a communication to the foreign court inquiring about the
correct amount of fees to be paid. On the pretext that it was yet awaiting
the foreign court's reply, almost a year passed without the private
respondent paying the legal fees. Thus, on February 2, 1990, the foreign
court rejected the objections of the private respondent and proceeded to
adjudicate upon the petitioner's claims. We cannot subscribe to the private
respondent's claim that the foreign court violated its right to due process
when it failed to reply to its queries nor when the latter rejected its
objections for a clearly meritorious ground. The private respondent was
afforded sufficient opportunity to be heard. It was not incumbent upon the
foreign court to reply to the private respondent's written communication.
On the contrary, a genuine concern for its cause should have prompted the
private respondent to ascertain with all due diligence the correct amount
of legal fees to be paid. The private respondent did not act with prudence
and diligence thus its plea that they were not accorded the right to
procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy from this
Court. 36
The private respondent bewails the presumed bias on the part of the
arbitrator who was a former employee of the petitioner. This point
deserves scant consideration in view of the following stipulation in the
contract:
. . . . It will be no objection any such appointment that the arbitrator so
appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the
matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his
duties as Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of
the matter in dispute or difference. 37 (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 38 that:
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume
the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in
personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise
of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. 39
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment, the private
respondent herein, had the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity which it failed to do in the instant case.
The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than
to order its enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner merely prays
for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. As this Court
has ruled on the validity and enforceability of the said foreign judgment in
this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the RTC for the reception of
evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND
NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint in Civil Case No. 4006 before
Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED, and another in its stead
is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent PACIFIC CEMENT
COMPANY, INC. to pay to petitioner the amounts adjudged in the foreign
judgment subject of said case.
SO ORDERED.
ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD., petitioner,
vs.
GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated July 30, 1999 and its Resolution dated
September 29, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51134 setting aside the Orders dated
October 30, 1998 and December 16, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 117, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 98-1389.
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd., petitioner, is a foreign corporation
based in Singapore. It is engaged in the manufacture, repair, and
maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand International Airways, Inc.,
respondent, is a domestic corporation engaged in airline operations.
Sometime in January 1996, petitioner and respondent executed an
"Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus A 300 B4-103
Aircraft Registration No. RP-C8882" (First Agreement). Under this
stipulation, petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and modification
works on respondent's aircraft. The parties agreed on the mode and
manner of payment by respondent of the contract price, including interest
in case of default. They also agreed that the "construction, validity and
performance thereof" shall be governed by the laws of Singapore. They
further agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-
exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
At about the same time, or on January 12, 1996, the parties verbally agreed
that petitioner will repair and undertake maintenance works on
respondent's other aircraft, Aircraft No. RP-C8881; and that the works shall
be based on a General Terms of Agreement (GTA). The GTA terms are
similar to those of their First Agreement.
Petitioner undertook the contracted works and thereafter promptly
delivered the aircrafts to respondent. During the period from March 1996
to October 1997, petitioner billed respondent in the total amount of
US$303,731.67 or S$452,560.18. But despite petitioner's repeated
demands, respondent failed to pay, in violation of the terms agreed upon.
On December 12, 1997, petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic
of Singapore an action for the sum of S$452,560.18, including interest and
costs, against respondent, docketed as Suit No. 2101. Upon petitioner's
motion, the court issued a Writ of Summons to be served extraterritorially
or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court sought the assistance of
the sheriff of Pasay City to effect service of the summons upon respondent.
However, despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the
claim.
On February 17, 1998, on motion of petitioner, the Singapore High Court
rendered a judgment by default against respondent.
On August 4, 1998, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City, a
Petition for Enforcement of Judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1389.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two grounds: (1) the
Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; and (2)
the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having been
rendered in violation of its right to due process.
On October 30, 1998, the RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss,
holding that "neither one of the two grounds (of Grand) is among the
grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure."
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC
in its Order dated December 16, 1998.
On February 15, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari assailing the RTC Order denying its motion to dismiss.
Respondent alleged that the extraterritorial service of summons on its
office in the Philippines is defective and that the Singapore court did not
acquire jurisdiction over its person. Thus, its judgment sought to be
enforced is void. Petitioner, in its comment, moved to dismiss the petition
for being unmeritorious.
On July 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision granting the
petition and setting aside the Orders dated October 30, 1998 and
December 16, 1998 of the RTC "without prejudice to the right of private
respondent to initiate another proceeding before the proper court to
enforce its claim." It found:
In the case at bar, the complaint does not involve the personal status of
plaintiff, nor any property in which the defendant has a claim or interest,
or which the private respondent has attached but purely an action for
collection of debt. It is a personal action as well as an action in personam,
not an action in rem or quasi in rem. As a personal action, the service of
summons should be personal or substituted, not extraterritorial, in order
to confer jurisdiction on the court.
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
on September 29, 1999.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the Singapore High Court has
acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the service of
summons upon its office in the Philippines; and (2) whether the judgment
by default in Suit No. 2101 by the Singapore High Court is enforceable in
the Philippines.
Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country; however, under the rules of comity, utility and
convenience, nations have established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries.1 Certainly, the Philippine legal system
has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the
viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the
requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines.2
The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment
in our legal system are contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. – The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is
merely presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be
repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or
by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party
attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.3
Respondent, in assailing the validity of the judgment sought to be
enforced, contends that the service of summons is void and that the
Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum,4 which in this case is the law of Singapore. Here,
petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons
outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore
High Court granted "leave to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the
Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the Philippines
for service of any originating process issued by the Philippines at ground
floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati
City, or elsewhere in the Philippines."5 This service of summons outside
Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court
19966 of Singapore, which provides.
(2) Where in accordance with these Rules, an originating process is to be
served on a defendant in any country with respect to which there does not
subsist a Civil Procedure Convention providing for service in that country
of process of the High Court, the originating process may be served –
a) through the government of that country, where that government is
willing to effect service;
b) through a Singapore Consular authority in that country, except where
service through such an authority is contrary to the law of the country; or
c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country for service
of any originating process issued by that country.
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of
summons by the sheriff,7 his deputy or other proper court officer either
personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant8 or by substituted
service.9 In this case, the Writ of Summons issued by the Singapore High
Court was served upon respondent at its office located at Mercure Hotel
(formerly Village Hotel), MIA Road, Pasay City. The Sheriff's Return shows
that it was received on May 2, 1998 by Joyce T. Austria, Secretary of the
General Manager of respondent company.10 But respondent completely
ignored the summons, hence, it was declared in default.
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in
accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High
Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that
court against respondent is valid.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51134 are set aside.
The RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City is hereby DIRECTED to hear Civil Case No.
98-1389 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate
mortgage constituted over a third party mortgagor's property situated in
the Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal loan
before foreign courts?
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision 1 of public respondent Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997
and its resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking
and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines,
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
California, United States of America while private respondent American
Realty Corporation (ARC) is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a
limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted
three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the following
corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El
Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "borrowers"), all of which are existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of
private
respondent. 3
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA and
the corporate borrowers signed and entered into restructuring
agreements. As additional security for the restructured loans, private
respondent ARC as third party mortgagor executed two real estate
mortgages, 4 dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of
land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the
restructured loans prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions 5
before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan, to wit:
a) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No 2098) against Liberian Transport
Navigation S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona
Shipping Company S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A., Eduardo Katipunan
Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on June 17, 1992.
b) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245) against El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio
Katipunan Litonjua on July 2, 1992;
c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court
(Action No. 4039 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El
Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A. Pacific Navigators
Corporation, Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering
(Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan
Litonjua on November 19, 1992; and
d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court
(Action No. 4040 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El
Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company, S.A., Pacific Navigators
Corporation, Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering
(Edyship) Co., Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on November 21, 1992.
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private respondent
ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was private not impleaded as party-
defendant.
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines an application for extrajudicial
foreclosure 6 of real estate mortgage.
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the mortgaged real
properties were sold at public auction in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale,
with Integrated Credit and Corporation Services Co (ICCS) as the highest
bidder for the sum of Twenty four Million Pesos (P24,000.000.00). 7
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, Branch 159, an action for damages 8 against the petitioner, for
the latter's act of foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages
despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan.
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee
from foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been
filed, is not applicable in the present case, claiming that:
a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and not a party
to the principal restructuring agreements, was never made a party
defendant in the civil cases filed in Hongkong and England;
b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in the
Philippines since the civil actions were filed in Hongkong and England. As
such, any decisions (sic) which may be rendered in the abovementioned
courts are not (sic) enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action
to enforce the foreign judgments is first filed in the Philippines, pursuant
to Rule 39, Section 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the principal
agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing civil
actions for sums of money.
On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for
suspension 10 of the redemption period on the ground that "it cannot
exercise said right of redemption without at the same time waiving or
contradicting its contentions in the case that the foreclosure of the
mortgage on its properties is legally improper and therefore invalid."
In an order 11 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the private
respondent's motion for suspension after which a copy of said order was
duly received by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged properties at
the foreclosure sale, consolidated its ownership over the real properties,
resulting to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T-
186272, T-186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in its name.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its favor, ICCS
sold the real properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for the
amount of Thirty Nine Million Pesos (P39,000,000.00). 12 Accordingly,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-187783(m),
T-16653P(m) and T-16652P(m) were issued in the latter's name.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 13 in favor of private
respondent ARC dated 12 May 1993, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the filing in
foreign courts by the defendant of collection suits against the principal
debtors operated as a waiver of the security of the mortgages.
Consequently, the plaintiff's rights as owner and possessor of the
properties then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-
78762, T-78763, T-78760 and T-78761, all of the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines, were violated when the defendant
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages constituted thereon.
Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
following sums, all with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
the complaint up to the date of actual payment:
1) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Ninety Nine
Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00);
2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00); and
3) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower
court prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration which the
appellate court denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review 14 on certiorari where herein
petitioner BANTSA ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following
assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded the doctrines laid
down by this Hon. Supreme Court in the cases of Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as G.R. No. 74730 promulgated on
August 25, 1989 and Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. IAC, 196
SCRA 29 (1991 case), although said cases were duly cited, extensively
discussed and specifically mentioned, as one of the issues in the
assignment of errors found on page 5 of the decision dated September 30,
1997.
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it awarded the private respondent actual and exemplary damages
totalling P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998 although such huge amount
was not asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint, is contrary
to law and is totally unsupported by evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection suit against
the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts
constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and
exemplary damages in favor of private respondent ARC, as third-party
mortgagor, is proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits that a
waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of two
requisites: an ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and
subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to collect the
principal loan does not suffice; a final judgment must be secured and
obtained in the personal action so that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure
may be appreciated. To put it differently, absent any of the two requisites,
the mortgagee-creditor is deemed not to have waived the remedy of
foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable and upholds
the jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach 15 and similar cases adjudicated
thereafter, thus:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may he may
pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause
of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave
open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution,
even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property,
an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a
deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant,
other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the
satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his
cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit
of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right
of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to
bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result
not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano vs. Enriques,
24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25
Phil., 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being
sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and
then again in the place where the property lies.

In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating jurisprudence
enunciated in Manila Trading and Supply Co vs. Co Kim 17 and Movido vs.
RFC, 18 invariably held:
. . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his
security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness
with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the
debtor, including the subject matter of the mortgage . . . , subject to the
qualification that if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue
further the remedy he has waived. (Emphasis Ours)
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a
mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. 19
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are
deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one
remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is
deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing
of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provision of Rule 68 of the of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage
creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with
the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate
mortgages over its properties as security for the debt of the principal
debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities
of a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not
parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own
property. 20
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of
another's obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily
bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contract—
loan—remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter
that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the
mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount
of the loan. 21
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of filing the
action for collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur,
is untenable.
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with the petitioner in
said case, that the filing of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the
mortgage:
A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy of
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted over the personal property
as security for the debt or value of the promissory note when he seeks to
recover in the said collection suit.
. . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not foreclosure,
thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage as basis for relief, he clearly
manifests his lack of desire and interest to go after the mortgaged property
as security for the promissory note . . . .
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for
clarity and emphasis, that the mere act of filing of an ordinary action for
collection operates as a waiver of the mortgage-creditor's remedy to
foreclose the mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary action for
collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the present case
is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the
other necessarily must arise. Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection
suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate-Appellate Court, 23 a
case relied upon by petitioner, supposedly to buttress its contention, this
Court had occasion to rule that the mere act of filing a collection suit for
the recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the
other remedy of foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is
non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available
for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only
one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause
of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc, vs. Icarangal. 24
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single
cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in
the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words,
the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt
and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the
same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they
constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage
constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and
both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only
one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by
applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action
by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the
first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor
to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to
recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect,
be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much
cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the
doctrine enunciated in Caltex wherein this High Court relaxed the
application of the general rules to wit:
In the present case, however, we shall not follow this rule to the letter but
declare that it is the collection suit which was waived and/or abandoned.
This ruling is more in harmony with the principles underlying our judicial
system. It is of no moment that the collection suit was filed ahead, what is
determinative is the fact that the foreclosure proceedings ended even
before the decision in the collection suit was rendered. . . .
Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of context. We must
stress that the Caltex case was never intended to overrule the well-
entrenched doctrine enunciated Bachrach, which to our mind still finds
applicability in cases of this sort. To reiterate, Bachrach is still good law.
We then quote the decision 25 of the trial court, in the present case, thus:
The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the exception rather than the rule,
dictated by the peculiar circumstances obtaining therein. In the said case,
the Supreme Court chastised Caltex for making ". . . a mockery of our
judicial system when it initially filed a collection suit then, during the
pendency thereof, foreclosed extrajudicially the mortgaged property
which secured the indebtedness, and still pursued the collection suit to the
end." Thus, to prevent a mockery of our judicial system", the collection suit
had to be nullified because the foreclosure proceedings have already been
pursued to their end and can no longer be undone.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it has not been shown whether the defendant pursued
to the end or are still pursuing the collection suits filed in foreign courts.
There is no occasion, therefore, for this court to apply the exception laid
down by the Supreme Court in Caltex by nullifying the collection suits.
Quite obviously, too, the aforesaid collection suits are beyond the reach of
this Court. Thus the only way the court may prevent the spector of a
creditor having "plural redress for a single breach of contract" is by holding,
as the Court hereby holds, that the defendant has waived the right to
foreclose the mortgages constituted by the plaintiff on its properties
originally covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762,
T-78760 and T-78761. (RTC Decision pp., 10-11)
In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of severe criticism, to
say the least. 26
Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by citing the case of
PCIB vs. IAC. 27 Again, petitioner tried to fit a square peg in a round hole.
It must be stressed that far from overturning the doctrine laid down in
Bachrach, this Court in PCIB buttressed its firm stand on this issue by
declaring:
While the law allows a mortgage creditor to either institute a personal
action for the debt or a real action to foreclosure the mortgage, he cannot
pursue both remedies simultaneously or successively as was done by PCIB
in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392 to enforce payment of the
1.3 million promissory note secured by real estate mortgages and
subsequently filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the
rule against splitting a cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the
expediency of filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily
abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted
over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private
respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually
foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed
the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence
and our statute books.
In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy of
foreclosure after the collection suit was filed, considering that the creditor
should not be afforded "plural redress for a single breach of contract." For
cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its
enforcement. 28
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial but the efficacy
of the remedy chosen in addressing the creditor's cause. Hence, a suit
brought before a foreign court having competence and jurisdiction to
entertain the action is deemed, for this purpose, to be within the
contemplation of the remedy available to the mortgagee-creditor. This
pronouncement would best serve the interest of justice and fair play and
further discourage the noxious practice of splitting up a lone cause of
action.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to
petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions
for sums of money. 29

We rule in the negative.
This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet its
crumbling cause. In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply
notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English
law on the matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle
in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A
foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. 30 Thus, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal
law. 31 This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter
were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, 32 said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound
and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment
or order shall not be applied. 33
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. 34
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause
of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent —
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws. 35
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is
entitled to the award of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the
act of petitioner BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate
mortgages constituted a clear violation of the rights of herein private
respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of
pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation
and the same must be proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-
substantial, no damages will be given. 36 Indeed, the question of the value
of property is always a difficult one to settle as valuation of real property
is an imprecise process since real estate has no inherent value readily
ascertainable by an appraiser or by the court. 37 The opinions of men vary
so much concerning the real value of property that the best the courts can
do is hear all of the witnesses which the respective parties desire to
present, and then, by carefully weighing that testimony, arrive at a
conclusion which is just and equitable. 38
In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for relying
heavily on the valuation made by Philippine Appraisal Company. In effect,
BANTSA questions the act of the appellate court in giving due weight to the
appraisal report composed of twenty three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro
Marquez and submitted as evidence by private respondent. The appraisal
report, as the records would readily show, was corroborated by the
testimony of Mr. Reynaldo Flores, witness for private respondent.
On this matter, the trial court observed:
The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee formally offered as
evidence the appraisal report dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit J, Records, p.
409), consisting of twenty three (23) pages which set out in detail the
valuation of the property to determine its fair market value (TSN, April 22,
1994, p. 4), in the amount of P99,986,592.00 (TSN, ibid., p. 5), together
with the corroborative testimony of one Mr. Reynaldo F. Flores, an
appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. (TSN, ibid., p.
3). The latter's testimony was subjected to extensive cross-examination by
counsel for defendant-appellant (TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22). 39
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the familiar
and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should
be respected. 40 The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge
of respect for the reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing
the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 41
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, principally because they are in a better position to assess the
same than the appellate court. 42 Besides, trial courts are in a better
position to examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of
witnesses. 43
Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses rest primarily with the trial court. 44 In the case at
bar, we see no reason that would justify this Court to disturb the factual
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with regard
to the award of actual damages.
In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial court justified the
award by presenting the following ratiocination in its assailed decision 45,
to wit:
Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the matter of valuation. The size of
the subject real properties are (sic) set forth in their individuals titles, and
the Court itself has seen the character and nature of said properties during
the ocular inspection it conducted. Based principally on the foregoing, the
Court makes the following observations:
1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in Bo. Sto. Cristo, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which is (sic) not distant from Metro Manila —
the biggest urban center in the Philippines — and are easily accessible
through well-paved roads;
2. The properties are suitable for development into a subdivision for
low cost housing, as admitted by defendant's own appraiser (TSN, May 30,
1994, p. 31);
3. The pigpens which used to exist in the property have already been
demolished. Houses of strong materials are found in the vicinity of the
property (Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), and the vicinity is a growing community. It
has even been shown that the house of the Barangay Chairman is located
adjacent to the property in question (Exh. 27), and the only remaining
piggery (named Cherry Farm) in the vicinity is about 2 kilometers away
from the western boundary of the property in question (TSN, November
19, p. 3);
4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of the property, as
indubitably shown by the fact that on March 18, 1994, ICCS (the buyer
during the foreclosure sale) sold the consolidated real estate properties to
Stateland Investment Corporation, in whose favor new titles were issued,
i.e., TCT Nos. T-187781(m); T-187782(m), T-187783(m); T-16653P(m) and
T-166521(m) by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan;
5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject properties to
Stateland Investment Corporation for Thirty Nine Million (P39,000,000.00)
Pesos, which is more than triple defendant's appraisal (Exh. 2) clearly
shows that the Court cannot rely on defendant's aforesaid estimate
(Decision, Records, p. 603).
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on
the credibility of witnesses command great respect and consideration
especially when the conclusions are supported by the evidence on record.
46 Applying the foregoing principle, we therefore hold that the trial court
committed no palpable error in giving credence to the testimony of
Reynaldo Flores, who according to the records, is a licensed real estate
broker, appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. since
1990. 47 As the records show, Flores had been with the company for 26
years at the time of his testimony.
Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not confine itself to
the appraisal report dated 29 March 1993, and the testimony given by Mr.
Reynaldo Flores, in determining the fair market value of the real property.
Above all these, the record would likewise show that the trial judge in
order to appraise himself of the characteristics and condition of the
property, conducted an ocular inspection where the opposing parties
appeared and were duly represented.
Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted, we affirm the
ruling of the trial court as regards the valuation of the property —
. . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00) for the 39-
hectare properties (sic) translates to just about Two Hundred Fifty Four
Pesos (P254.00) per square meter. This appears to be, as the court so holds,
a better approximation of the fair market value of the subject properties.
This is the amount which should be restituted by the defendant to the
plaintiff by way of actual or compensatory damages . . . . 48
Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court awarding an amount
allegedly not asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint.
Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and compensatory
damages by the lower court exceeded that prayed for in the complaint, the
same is nonetheless valid, subject to certain qualifications.
On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.
— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgement; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation
of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
amendment to be made.
The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion
de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. 49 citing Northern Cement
Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 50 is enlightening:
There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the
necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may be validly
awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the
facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no
amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where defendant
had himself raised the point on which recovery was based. The appellate
court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence
although the pleadings were actually not amended. Amendment is also
unnecessary when only clerical error or non substantial matters are
involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Laguna (48 Phil.
5). In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the rule on
amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or
prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the recent case of National
Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held that
where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings and the evidence
adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to
conform with the evidence.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above-mentioned rule and
in light of the decisions cited, the trial court should not be precluded from
awarding an amount higher than that claimed in the pleading
notwithstanding the absence of the required amendment. But it is upon
the condition that the evidence of such higher amount has been presented
properly, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to
support their respective contentions and to refute each other's evidence.
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence
adduced during trial does not preclude an adjudication by the court on the
basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the
pleadings, or serve as a basis for a higher award of damages. Although the
pleading may not have been amended to conform to the evidence
submitted during trial, judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply
on the basis of the issues alleged but also the basis of issues discussed and
the assertions of fact proved in the course of trial. The court may treat the
pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although
it had not been actually so amended. Former Chief Justice Moran put the
matter in this way:
When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or implied
consent of the adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings,
judgment may be rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be
considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied
consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to
object thereto.
Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence
before it even though the relevant pleading had not been previously
amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the
adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the basis requirements of
fair play had been met, as where litigants were given full opportunity to
support their respective contentions and to object to or refute each other's
evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had been
amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the
basis of all the evidence before it.
In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was afforded the
opportunity to refute and object to the evidence, both documentary and
testimonial, formally offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair
play are deemed satisfied. In fact, the testimony of Reynaldo Flores was
put under scrutiny during the course of the cross-examination. Under
these circumstances, the court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction
and committed no reversible error in awarding actual damages the amount
of which is higher than that prayed for. Verily, the lower court's actuations
are sanctioned by the Rules and supported by jurisprudence.
Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the amount
of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being excessive, is subject
to reduction. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 51 Considering its
purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in every case and should not be
awarded to unjustly enrich a prevailing party. 52 In our view, an award of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in the present case qualifies the test of
reasonableness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION of the amount awarded as exemplary damages. According,
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private respondent the sum of
P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damage and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119602 October 6, 2000
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court in
CA-G.R. CV No. 36821, entitled "Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-
appellant, versus Philippine President Lines, Inc., defendant-appellant."
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by
Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in
Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the
loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle
Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the
harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas
through the Orinoco River.1 He was asked to pilot the said vessel on
February 11, 19882 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.3
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was
at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate
(then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port4
at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988.5 Captain Colon left the bridge when the
vessel was under way.6
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San
Roque Channel at mile 172.7 The vessel proceeded on its way, with the
pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the
shallowness of the channel.8
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations.9
These occurred at 4:12 a.m.10 It was then that the watch officer called the
master to the bridge.11
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel12 and verified that
it was in the centre of the channel.13 He then went to confirm, or set down,
the position of the vessel on the chart.14 He ordered Simplicio A. Monis,
Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom
tanks.15
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco
River,16 thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein
petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of
Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines,
Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine
Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon
amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of
litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was
dismissed in an Order dated November 7, 1988.17
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following facts:
"1. The jurisdictional facts, as specified in their respective pleadings;
"2. That defendant PPL was the owner of the vessel Philippine Roxas at the
time of the incident;
"3. That defendant Pioneer Insurance was the insurance underwriter for
defendant PPL;
"4. That plaintiff Wildvalley Shipping Co., Inc. is the owner of the vessel
Malandrinon, whose passage was obstructed by the vessel Philippine
Roxas at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, as specified in par. 4, page 2 of the
complaint;
"5. That on February 12, 1988, while the Philippine Roxas was navigating
the channel at Puerto Ordaz, the said vessel grounded and as a result,
obstructed navigation at the channel;
"6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory pilotage
channel;
"7. That at the time of the incident, the vessel, Philippine Roxas, was under
the command of the pilot Ezzar Solarzano, assigned by the government
thereat, but plaintiff claims that it is under the command of the master;
"8. The plaintiff filed a case in Middleburg, Holland which is related to the
present case;
"9. The plaintiff caused the arrest of the Philippine Collier, a vessel owned
by the defendant PPL;
"10. The Orinoco River is 150 miles long and it takes approximately 12
hours to navigate out of the said river;
"11. That no security for the plaintiff's claim was given until after the
Philippine Collier was arrested; and
"12. That a letter of guarantee, dated 12-May-88 was issued by the
Steamship Mutual Underwriters Ltd."18
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the
petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. The dispositive portion thereof
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant
Philippine President Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S.
$259,243.43, as actual and compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53,
as expenses incurred abroad for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of
U.S. $22,000.00, as and for attorney's fees of plaintiff's local lawyer, and to
pay the cost of this suit.
"Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."19
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest
with the private respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the
case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came out
with its questioned decision dated June 14, 1994,20 the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding defendant-appellant's appeal to be meritorious,
judgment is hereby rendered reversing the Decision of the lower court.
Plaintiff-appellant's Complaint is dismissed and it is ordered to pay
defendant-appellant the amount of Three Hundred Twenty-three
Thousand, Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three Centavos (₱323,042.53) as and
for attorney's fees plus cost of suit. Plaintiff-appellant's appeal is
DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED."21
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration22 but the same was denied
for lack of merit in the resolution dated March 29, 1995.23
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner assigns the following errors to the court a quo:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED
TO THE MASTER NOR THE OWNER OF THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" FOR THE
GROUNDING OF SAID VESSEL RESULTING IN THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO
ORINOCO;
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE;
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" IS SEAWORTHY;
4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN
SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION
FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTION WAS INTERPOSED
BELATEDLY ON APPEAL;
5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT ANY
FAIR OR REASONABLE BASIS WHATSOEVER;
6. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE IS MERITORIOUS HENCE, PETITIONER SHOULD
BE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND INTEREST.
The petition is without merit.
The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is
applicable to the case at bar.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.24
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an
unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder.
Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral
testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.25
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office." (Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence
of a written foreign law.26
In the noted case of Willamette Iron & Steel Works vs. Muzzal,27 it was
held that:
"… Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California,
since the year 1918 under oath, quoted verbatim section 322 of the
California Civil Code and stated that said section was in force at the time
the obligations of defendant to the plaintiff were incurred, i.e. on
November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This evidence sufficiently
established the fact that the section in question was the law of the State
of California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do not
exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the
existence of a foreign law.
"`The foreign law is a matter of fact …You ask the witness what the law is;
he may, from his recollection, or on producing and referring to books, say
what it is.' (Lord Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief Justice
Denman in a well-known English case where a witness was called upon to
prove the Roman laws of marriage and was permitted to testify, though he
referred to a book containing the decrees of the Council of Trent as
controlling, Jones on Evidence, Second Edition, Volume 4, pages 3148-
3152.) x x x."
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the
Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela,28
to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje
(pilotage law of Venezuela)29 and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje
No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco River).
Captain Monzon has held the aforementioned posts for eight years.30 As
such he is in charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering and
navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that
come into the office of the harbour masters.31
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta
Oficial32 of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial
was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of
Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a
book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.33 Only a
photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be
public documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers of Venezuela.34
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal
custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by
a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with
the seal of his office.35 The latter requirement is not a mere technicality
but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.36
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the
Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence
with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who
attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those
records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of
his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such
certificate could be found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the
written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority,
when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it
be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.37
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not
pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the
pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue.38
A review of the Complaint39 revealed that it was never alleged or invoked
despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred
within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading
and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be
the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual
presumption.40
Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a thorough study of the
errors assigned by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private
respondent that would warrant the award of damages.
There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to
give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance
with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission
of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
"If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed
in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall
be required."
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which
an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property.
This we have found private respondent to have exercised when the vessel
sailed only after the "main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were
checked and found to be in good running condition;41 when the master
left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot
who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master
ordered the inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks when the
vibrations occurred anew.42
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority
Administrative Order No. 03-85, otherwise known as the Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a
master of a vessel and its pilot, among other things.
The pertinent provisions of the said administrative order governing these
persons are quoted hereunder:
"Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory
pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be
responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
ports due to his negligence or fault. He can be absolved from liability if the
accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has
exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize the
damage.
"The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage
grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command
of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel
or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the
Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of
the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master.
"Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be
determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light
of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
"x x x
"Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or Pilots’ Association. --
The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
"x x x
"f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the
time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or
berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the
moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order."
The Code of Commerce likewise provides for the obligations expected of a
captain of a vessel, to wit:
"Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in the office of
captain:
"x x x
"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take command on entering and
leaving ports, canals, roadsteads, and rivers, unless there is a pilot on board
discharging his duties. x x x."
The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander of the
vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in control of the
ship as he can still perform the duties conferred upon him by law43 despite
the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is not
required of him to be on the bridge while the vessel is being navigated by
a pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides:
"Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a harbor and anchoring
thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well
as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or
another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be
under compulsory pilotage.
"xxx."
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the
engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal,
bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, pilot Ezzar
Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an official pilot in the Harbour at Port
Ordaz, Venezuela,44 and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12) years.45
He also had experience in navigating the waters of the Orinoco River.46
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the
order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the
Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the
vessel,47 mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were
navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel.48 Moreover, the
pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was very familiar
with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and that
he does not even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco River.49
Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master
chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of
the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and experience
of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.
"Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of compulsory pilotage, are in a
different class from ordinary employees, for they assume to have a skill
and a knowledge of navigation in the particular waters over which their
licenses extend superior to that of the master; pilots are bound to use due
diligence and reasonable care and skill. A pilot's ordinary skill is in
proportion to the pilot's responsibilities, and implies a knowledge and
observance of the usual rules of navigation, acquaintance with the waters
piloted in their ordinary condition, and nautical skill in avoiding all known
obstructions. The character of the skill and knowledge required of a pilot
in charge of a vessel on the rivers of a country is very different from that
which enables a navigator to carry a vessel safely in the ocean. On the
ocean, a knowledge of the rules of navigation, with charts that disclose the
places of hidden rocks, dangerous shores, or other dangers of the way, are
the main elements of a pilot's knowledge and skill. But the pilot of a river
vessel, like the harbor pilot, is selected for the individual's personal
knowledge of the topography through which the vessel is steered."50
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When
the vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what was going
on, and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the middle of the channel
and that the vibration was as (sic) a result of the shallowness of the
channel."51
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine
Roxas as well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge
of the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the
portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the
depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all
probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent
and liable for its grounding.
In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it was held that:
"x x x The master of a ship, and the owner also, is liable for any injury done
by the negligence of the crew employed in the ship. The same doctrine will
apply to the case of a pilot employed by the master or owner, by whose
negligence any injury happens to a third person or his property: as, for
example, by a collision with another ship, occasioned by his negligence.
And it will make no difference in the case that the pilot, if any is employed,
is required to be a licensed pilot; provided the master is at liberty to take a
pilot, or not, at his pleasure, for in such a case the master acts voluntarily,
although he is necessarily required to select from a particular class. On the
other hand, if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and, a
fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty, then, and in such case,
neither he nor the owner will be liable for injuries occasioned by the
negligence of the pilot; for in such a case the pilot cannot be deemed
properly the servant of the master or the owner, but is forced upon them,
and the maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se does not apply."
(Underscoring supplied)
Anent the river passage plan, we find that, while there was none,52 the
voyage has been sufficiently planned and monitored as shown by the
following actions undertaken by the pilot, Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez, to wit:
contacting the radio marina via VHF for information regarding the channel,
river traffic,53 soundings of the river, depth of the river, bulletin on the
buoys.54 The officer on watch also monitored the voyage.55
We, therefore, do not find the absence of a river passage plan to be the
cause for the grounding of the vessel.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because
the circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence
on the part of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the
following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of such character
as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for
defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.56
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control
over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory
pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to
apply, i.e., negligence and control, to render the respondent liable, are
absent.
As to the claim that the ship was unseaworthy, we hold that it is not.
The Lloyd’s Register of Shipping confirmed the vessel’s seaworthiness in a
Confirmation of Class issued on February 16, 1988 by finding that "the
above named ship (Philippine Roxas) maintained the class "+100A1
Strengthened for Ore Cargoes, Nos. 2 and 8 Holds may be empty (CC) and
+LMC" from 31/12/87 up until the time of casualty on or about
12/2/88."57 The same would not have been issued had not the vessel been
built according to the standards set by Lloyd's.
Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd's Register of Shipping testified
thus:
"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did top side tank have any bearing
at all to the seaworthiness of the vessel?
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel, and also basing on the class
record of the vessel, wherein recommendations were made on the top side
tank, and it was given sufficient time to be repaired, it means that the
vessel is fit to travel even with those defects on the ship.
"COURT
What do you mean by that? You explain. The vessel is fit to travel even with
defects? Is that what you mean? Explain.
"WITNESS
"A Yes, your Honor. Because the class society which register (sic) is the third
party looking into the condition of the vessel and as far as their record
states, the vessel was class or maintained, and she is fit to travel during
that voyage."
"x x x
"ATTY. MISA
Before we proceed to other matter, will you kindly tell us what is (sic) the
'class +100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes', mean?
"WITNESS
"A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was built according to Lloyd's rules
and she is capable of carrying ore bulk cargoes, but she is particularly
capable of carrying Ore Cargoes with No. 2 and No. 8 holds empty.
"x x x
"COURT
The vessel is classed, meaning?
"A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor, or seaworthy."58
It is not required that the vessel must be perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship
must be reasonably fit to perform the services, and to encounter the
ordinary perils of the voyage, contemplated by the parties to the policy.59
As further evidence that the vessel was seaworthy, we quote the
deposition of pilot Vasquez:
"Q Was there any instance when your orders or directions were not
complied with because of the inability of the vessel to do so?
"A No.
"Q. Was the vessel able to respond to all your commands and orders?
"A. The vessel was navigating normally."60
Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the Philippine Roxas submitted an
accident report wherein he stated that on February 11, 1988, he checked
and prepared the main engine, machineries and all other auxiliaries and
found them all to be in good running condition and ready for maneuvering.
That same day the main engine, bridge and engine telegraph and steering
gear motor were also tested.61 Engineer Mata also prepared the fuel for
consumption for maneuvering and checked the engine generators.62
Finally, we find the award of attorney’s fee justified.1âwphi1
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
"x x x
"(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
"x x x"
Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the private respondent was
unjustifiably forced to litigate, thus the award of attorney’s fees was
proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 36821 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK,
petitioners,
vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside
the Court of Appeals’1 Decision of August 24, 1998 and Resolution of
December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 423102 affirming the trial court’s
denial of petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity)
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of
damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests
on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth
US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized
conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18,
1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by
stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and this law
does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal,
temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on the
same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial
should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the
motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit ("Walden
affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account
stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all
of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office
in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its
motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17, 1996,
respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. In its Decision dated August
24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14,
1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for
partial summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden
affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence
relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of Appeals
considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents
defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows:
"SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
x x x."
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in
Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign law:
"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office."
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Bank’s argument that Section 2,
Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to move with the
supporting Walden affidavit for partial summary judgment in its favor. The
Court of Appeals clarified that the Walden affidavit is not the supporting
affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of
genuine issue between the parties. The Court of Appeals concluded that
even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary judgment,
the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to
prove the foreign law.
The Issues
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
- "Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against
"x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN
LAW AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND THEREBY ‘CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF
OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x’."3
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was
entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law
bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Consequently, outright dismissal
by summary judgment of these claims is warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the
requirements of Rule 35 on summary judgments and those of a trial on the
merits in considering the Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points
out that the Walden affidavit is not hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits
the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing
affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden affidavit, he failed to
show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on
motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved,
except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.4
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues
raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits,
depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so
as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.6
A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are
genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero’s complaint
before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he
relies for his claim for damages. He is seeking damages for what he asserts
as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to
signature verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his
account." In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign
law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other
than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerrero’s complaint while
specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out in the Bank’s answer.

True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case
based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the
parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment as supported by the
Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham,
fictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that
the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed
and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or
where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.7 The resolution
of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a
question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do
not prove themselves in our courts.8 Foreign laws are not a matter of
judicial notice.9 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.
Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or
Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear dispute on
material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any
of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court
of Appeals10 which held that:
"x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the
above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette
Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the presentation of
other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that
case, the Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of an
attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a
section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force
at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the
Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld
the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of California as proved by
the respondents’ witness. In that case, the counsel for respondent
"testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951, he is
familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When
asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards
exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited Article 4,
Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as
published in Derring’s California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney
Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section
was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a
foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and
used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances,
the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered."
Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held
to be competent proof of that law." (Emphasis supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause.
These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in
the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be
established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex
parte and the affiant never testified in open court.1a\^/phi1.net The
Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on
damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not
state the specific New York law on damages. We reproduce portions of the
Walden affidavit as follows:
"3. In New York, "[n]ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial
sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded both in tort and
contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a cause of action against the
defendant, but is unable to prove" actual damages. Dobbs, Law of
Remedies, § 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since Guerrero is claiming for actual
damages, he cannot ask for nominal damages.
4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I have
reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not use the phrase
"temperate damages" in its index. I have also done a computerized search
for the phrase in all published New York cases, and have found no cases
that use it. I have never heard the phrase used in American law.
5. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of a Bank’s
relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs Guerrero’s claim
arising out of the non-payment of the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that
this was a wrongful dishonor. However, the UCC states that "justifiable
refusal to pay or accept" as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank
refuses to pay a check for reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing
or illegible signature or a forgery, § 3-510, Official Comment 2. ….. to the
Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no signature card on ….
and could not verify Guerrero’s signature. In my opinion, consistent with
the UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable reason not to pay.
6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a
justifiable refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that "neither consequential
or special or punitive damages may be had except as specifically provided
in the Act or by other rule of law". UCC 4-103 further provides that
consequential damages can be recovered only where there is bad faith.
This is more restrictive than the New York common law, which may allow
consequential damages in a breach of contract case (as does the UCC
where there is a wrongful dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and
mental distress are considered consequential damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v.
Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits);
Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374
N.Y.S..2d 868, 869-70 (4th Dep’t 1975) damage to reputation); Dobbs, Law
of Remedies §12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress cannot be
recovered for a breach of contract. Geler v. National Westminster Bank
U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes,
Ltd., 150 A.D.2d 860,540 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (3d Dep’t 1989) Martin v.
Donald Park Acres, 54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dep’t 1976).
Damage to reputation is also not recoverable for a contract. Motif
Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-
70.1a\^/phi1.net
9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase stock,
New York courts will not take into consideration the performance of the
stock after the breach. Rather, damages will be based on the value of the
stock at the time of the breach, Aroneck v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456
N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dep’t 1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d
1276, 463 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1983).
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if
they were the type that would naturally arise from the breach and if they
were "brought within the contemplation of parties as the probable result
of the breach at the time of or prior to contracting." Kenford Co., Inc. v.
Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting
Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N.Y. 32, 36 (1918).
11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees unless
they are provided by contract or statute. E.g., Geler v. National
Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Camatron Sewing
Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc., 179 A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st
Dep’t 1992); Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577
N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (1st Dep’t 1991). There is no statute that permits
attorney’s fees in a case of this type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of
contract, even where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted with malice.
Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Catalogue Service of …chester11 _v. Insurance Co. of North America, 74
A.D.2d 837, 838, 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dep’t 1980); Senior v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 110 A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242
(2d Dep’t 1985).
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is
alleged and proven that the wrong supposedly committed by defendant
amounts to a fraud aimed at the public generally and involves a high moral
culpability. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d
488 (1961).
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that
exemplary damages are not available for a mere breach of contract for in
such a case, as a matter of law, only a private wrong and not a public right
is involved. Thaler v. The North Insurance Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406
N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dep’t 1978)."12
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal
interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws
and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the
Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of
the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached
copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit,
these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official
records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New
York law and jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply
with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of
foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New
York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s failure to submit an opposing
affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of
Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not make the submission of
an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus:
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at
least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the
hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is only
permissive and not mandatory.13
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Bank’s
motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just
because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the
motion for partial summary judgment, although he did not present an
opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing
affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden affidavit did
not establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not
admit, expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the Walden
affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and
jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing affidavit. As
the party moving for summary judgment, the Bank has the burden of
clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact and that
any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the
movant.14
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to
submit an opposing affidavit considering that what the Bank seeks to be
opposed is the very subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero need not
file an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit because his complaint
itself controverts the matters set forth in the Bank’s motion and the
Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters already
averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo
correctly denied the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment. There is
a need to determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the
Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages under the
applicable laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Bank’s resort to a motion
for partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has successfully
defeated the very purpose for which summary judgments were devised in
our rules, which is, to aid parties in avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
August 24, 1998 and the Resolution dated December 14, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145587 October 26, 2007
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN,
respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the October 18,
2000 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56120 which
affirmed the January 15, 1999 Decision3 and September 30, 1999
Resolution4 rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
(Third Division) in POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194, ordering Expertise Search
International (ESI), EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. (EDI), and Omar
Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) jointly and severally to pay Eleazar S. Gran
(Gran) the amount of USD 16,150.00 as unpaid salaries.
The Facts
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs).5 ESI is another recruitment agency
which collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and
deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by
ESI to work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.6
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for
curricula vitae of qualified applicants for the position of "Computer
Specialist."7 In a facsimile transmission dated November 29, 1993, OAB
informed EDI that, from the applicants' curricula vitae submitted to it for
evaluation, it selected Gran for the position of "Computer Specialist." The
faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees to the terms and conditions of
employment contained in it, one of which was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi
Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran's immediate
dispatch.8
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment
contract9 that granted him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of
two years. Gran was then deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on
February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly
salary—his employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Information Sheet indicated USD
600.00 only. However, through the assistance of the EDI office in Riyadh,
OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month.10
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his
employment was terminated through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter,11 on the
following grounds:
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency
primarily on your salary and contract duration.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment
agency[,] vide OAB letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993.12
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or
instructions (non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several
instructions).
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00
representing his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a
Declaration13 releasing OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise,
towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21,
1994, against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and
Western Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region,
Quezon City, which was docketed as POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194 for
underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In his February 10, 1998 Decision,14 Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, to
whom Gran's case was assigned, ruled that there was neither
underpayment nor illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that there was no underpayment of salaries
since according to the POEA-Overseas Contract Worker (OCW) Information
Sheet, Gran's monthly salary was USD 600.00, and in his Confirmation of
Appointment as Computer Specialist, his monthly basic salary was fixed at
SR 2,500.00, which was equivalent to USD 600.00.
Arbiter Caday also cited the Declaration executed by Gran, to justify that
Gran had no claim for unpaid salaries or wages against OAB.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, the Labor Arbiter found that
Gran failed to refute EDI's allegations; namely, (1) that Gran did not submit
a single activity report of his daily activity as dictated by company policy;
(2) that he was not qualified for the job as computer specialist due to his
insufficient knowledge in programming and lack of knowledge in ACAD
system; (3) that Gran refused to follow management's instruction for him
to gain more knowledge of the job to prove his worth as computer
specialist; (4) that Gran's employment contract had never been
substituted; (5) and that Gran was paid a monthly salary of USD 850.00,
and USD 350.00 monthly as food allowance.
Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter decided that Gran was validly dismissed
from his work due to insubordination, disobedience, and his failure to
submit daily activity reports.
Thus, on February 10, 1998, Arbiter Caday dismissed Gran's complaint for
lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, Gran filed an Appeal15 on April 6, 1998 with the NLRC, Third
Division. However, it appears from the records that Gran failed to furnish
EDI with a copy of his Appeal Memorandum.
The Ruling of the NLRC
The NLRC held that EDI's seemingly harmless transfer of Gran's contract to
ESI is actually "reprocessing," which is a prohibited transaction under
Article 34 (b) of the Labor Code. This scheme constituted
misrepresentation through the conspiracy between EDI and ESI in
misleading Gran and even POEA of the actual terms and conditions of the
OFW's employment. In addition, it was found that Gran did not commit any
act that constituted a legal ground for dismissal. The alleged non-
compliance with contractual stipulations relating to Gran's salary and
contract duration, and the absence of pre-qualification requirements
cannot be attributed to Gran but to EDI, which dealt directly with OAB. In
addition, the charge of insubordination was not substantiated, and Gran
was not even afforded the required notice and investigation on his alleged
offenses.
Thus, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and rendered a new
one, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE. Respondents Expertise
Search International, Inc., EDI Staffbuilders Int'l., Inc. and Omar Ahmed Ali
Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) are hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to pay
the complainant Eleazar Gran the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of
actual payment of SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS
(US$16,150.00) representing his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract.
SO ORDERED.16
Gran then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment17 on March 29, 1999
with the NLRC and petitioner receiving a copy of this motion on the same
date.18
To prevent the execution, petitioner filed an Opposition19 to Gran's
motion arguing that the Writ of Execution cannot issue because it was not
notified of the appellate proceedings before the NLRC and was not given a
copy of the memorandum of appeal nor any opportunity to participate in
the appeal.
Seeing that the NLRC did not act on Gran's motion after EDI had filed its
Opposition, petitioner filed, on August 26, 1999, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision after receiving a copy of the Decision
on August 16, 1999.20
The NLRC then issued a Resolution21 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, ratiocinating that the issues and arguments raised in the
motion "had already been amply discussed, considered, and ruled upon"
in the Decision, and that there was "no cogent reason or patent or palpable
error that warrant any disturbance thereof."
Unconvinced of the NLRC's reasoning, EDI filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA. Petitioner claimed in its petition that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the appeal despite Gran's
failure to perfect the appeal.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA subsequently ruled on the procedural and substantive issues of
EDI's petition.
On the procedural issue, the appellate court held that "Gran's failure to
furnish a copy of his appeal memorandum [to EDI was] a mere formal
lapse, an excusable neglect and not a jurisdictional defect which would
justify the dismissal of his appeal."22 The court also held that petitioner
EDI failed to prove that private respondent was terminated for a valid
cause and in accordance with due process; and that Gran's Declaration
releasing OAB from any monetary obligation had no force and effect. The
appellate court ratiocinated that EDI had the burden of proving Gran's
incompetence; however, other than the termination letter, no evidence
was presented to show how and why Gran was considered to be
incompetent. The court held that since the law requires the recruitment
agencies to subject OFWs to trade tests before deployment, Gran must
have been competent and qualified; otherwise, he would not have been
hired and deployed abroad.
As for the charge of insubordination and disobedience due to Gran's failure
to submit a "Daily Activity Report," the appellate court found that EDI failed
to show that the submission of the "Daily Activity Report" was a part of
Gran's duty or the company's policy. The court also held that even if Gran
was guilty of insubordination, he should have just been suspended or
reprimanded, but not dismissed.
The CA also held that Gran was not afforded due process, given that OAB
did not abide by the twin notice requirement. The court found that Gran
was terminated on the same day he received the termination letter,
without having been apprised of the bases of his dismissal or afforded an
opportunity to explain his side.
Finally, the CA held that the Declaration signed by Gran did not bar him
from demanding benefits to which he was entitled. The appellate court
found that the Declaration was in the form of a quitclaim, and as such is
frowned upon as contrary to public policy especially where the monetary
consideration given in the Declaration was very much less than what he
was legally entitled to—his backwages amounting to USD 16,150.00.
As a result of these findings, on October 18, 2000, the appellate court
denied the petition to set aside the NLRC Decision.
Hence, this instant petition is before the Court.
The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. WHETHER THE FAILURE OF GRAN TO FURNISH A COPY OF HIS APPEAL
MEMORANDUM TO PETITIONER EDI WOULD CONSTITUTE A
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND A DEPRIVATION OF PETITIONER EDI'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AS WOULD JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF GRAN'S APPEAL.
II. WHETHER PETITIONER EDI HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS JUSTIFIABLE BY REASON OF
INCOMPETENCE. COROLLARY HERETO, WHETHER THE PRIETO VS. NLRC
RULING, AS APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
III. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS JUSTIFIABLE BY REASON OF
INSUBORDINATION AND DISOBEDIENCE.
IV. WHETHER GRAN WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO
TERMINATION.
V. WHETHER GRAN IS ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES FOR THE UNEXPIRED
PORTION OF HIS CONTRACT.23
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit except with respect to Gran's failure to furnish EDI
with his Appeal Memorandum filed with the NLRC.
First Issue: NLRC's Duty is to Require Respondent to Provide Petitioner a
Copy of the Appeal
Petitioner EDI claims that Gran's failure to furnish it a copy of the Appeal
Memorandum constitutes a jurisdictional defect and a deprivation of due
process that would warrant a rejection of the appeal.
This position is devoid of merit.
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that failure of appellant to furnish a copy
of the appeal to the adverse party is not fatal to the appeal.
In Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission,24 this Court set aside
the order of the NLRC which dismissed an appeal on the sole ground that
the appellant did not furnish the appellee a memorandum of appeal
contrary to the requirements of Article 223 of the New Labor Code and
Section 9, Rule XIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Also, in J.D. Magpayo Customs Brokerage Corp. v. NLRC, the order of
dismissal of an appeal to the NLRC based on the ground that "there is no
showing whatsoever that a copy of the appeal was served by the appellant
on the appellee"25 was annulled. The Court ratiocinated as follows:
The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a mere
formal lapse, an excusable neglect. Time and again We have acted on
petitions to review decisions of the Court of Appeals even in the absence
of proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals as required by
Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act on the petitions and simply
require the petitioners to comply with the rule.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
The J.D. Magpayo ruling was reiterated in Carnation Philippines Employees
Labor Union-FFW v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 Pagdonsalan
v. NLRC,28 and in Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.29
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from these cases is that failure to furnish
the adverse party with a copy of the appeal is treated only as a formal
lapse, an excusable neglect, and hence, not a jurisdictional defect.
Accordingly, in such a situation, the appeal should not be dismissed;
however, it should not be given due course either. As enunciated in J.D.
Magpayo, the duty that is imposed on the NLRC, in such a case, is to require
the appellant to comply with the rule that the opposing party should be
provided with a copy of the appeal memorandum.
While Gran's failure to furnish EDI with a copy of the Appeal Memorandum
is excusable, the abject failure of the NLRC to order Gran to furnish EDI
with the Appeal Memorandum constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The records reveal that the NLRC discovered that Gran failed to furnish EDI
a copy of the Appeal Memorandum. The NLRC then ordered Gran to
present proof of service. In compliance with the order, Gran submitted a
copy of Camp Crame Post Office's list of mail/parcels sent on April 7,
1998.30 The post office's list shows that private respondent Gran sent two
pieces of mail on the same date: one addressed to a certain Dan O. de
Guzman of Legaspi Village, Makati; and the other appears to be addressed
to Neil B. Garcia (or Gran),31 of Ermita, Manila—both of whom are not
connected with petitioner.
This mailing list, however, is not a conclusive proof that EDI indeed
received a copy of the Appeal Memorandum.
Sec. 5 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure (1990) provides for the proof and
completeness of service in proceedings before the NLRC:
Section 5.32 Proof and completeness of service.—The return is prima facie
proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete
upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to
claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first
notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such time.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, if the service is done through registered mail, it is only deemed
complete when the addressee or his agent received the mail or after five
(5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster. However, the NLRC
Rules do not state what would constitute proper proof of service.
Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, provides for proofs of service:
Section 13. Proof of service.—Proof of personal service shall consist of a
written admission of the party served or the official return of the server, or
the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date,
place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof
shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail,
proof shall be made by such affidavit and registry receipt issued by the
mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with
the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee (emphasis supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, it is obvious that the list submitted by
Gran is not conclusive proof that he had served a copy of his appeal
memorandum to EDI, nor is it conclusive proof that EDI received its copy
of the Appeal Memorandum. He should have submitted an affidavit
proving that he mailed the Appeal Memorandum together with the registry
receipt issued by the post office; afterwards, Gran should have
immediately filed the registry return card.
Hence, after seeing that Gran failed to attach the proof of service, the NLRC
should not have simply accepted the post office's list of mail and parcels
sent; but it should have required Gran to properly furnish the opposing
parties with copies of his Appeal Memorandum as prescribed in J.D.
Magpayo and the other cases. The NLRC should not have proceeded with
the adjudication of the case, as this constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The glaring failure of NLRC to ensure that Gran should have furnished
petitioner EDI a copy of the Appeal Memorandum before rendering
judgment reversing the dismissal of Gran's complaint constitutes an
evasion of the pertinent NLRC Rules and established jurisprudence. Worse,
this failure deprived EDI of procedural due process guaranteed by the
Constitution which can serve as basis for the nullification of proceedings in
the appeal before the NLRC. One can only surmise the shock and dismay
that OAB, EDI, and ESI experienced when they thought that the dismissal
of Gran's complaint became final, only to receive a copy of Gran's Motion
for Execution of Judgment which also informed them that Gran had
obtained a favorable NLRC Decision. This is not level playing field and
absolutely unfair and discriminatory against the employer and the job
recruiters. The rights of the employers to procedural due process cannot
be cavalierly disregarded for they too have rights assured under the
Constitution.
However, instead of annulling the dispositions of the NLRC and remanding
the case for further proceedings we will resolve the petition based on the
records before us to avoid a protracted litigation.33
The second and third issues have a common matter—whether there was
just cause for Gran's dismissal—hence, they will be discussed jointly.
Second and Third Issues: Whether Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason
of incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between
the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are
governed by the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is
considered law between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In
formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.34
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically
states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures,
etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply
to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the
termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to
a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign
law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as
the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law.35
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on
the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play.36 Where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours.37 Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws
in determining the issues presented before us.
Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due
to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience.
This claim has no merit.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and
jurisprudence that the employer should prove that the dismissal of
employees or personnel is legal and just.

Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code38 states that:
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS39
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and
their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under
Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of
Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the workers to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer.
xxx
In many cases, it has been held that in termination disputes or illegal
dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal
is for just and valid causes; and failure to do so would necessarily mean
that the dismissal was not justified and therefore illegal.40 Taking into
account the character of the charges and the penalty meted to an
employee, the employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, consistent,
and convincing evidence to prove that the dismissal is valid and legal.41
This is consistent with the principle of security of tenure as guaranteed by
the Constitution and reinforced by Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.42
In the instant case, petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was
validly dismissed for just cause, due to incompetence and insubordination
or disobedience. To prove its allegations, EDI submitted two letters as
evidence. The first is the July 9, 1994 termination letter,43 addressed to
Gran, from Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing Director of OAB. The second is
an unsigned April 11, 1995 letter44 from OAB addressed to EDI and ESI,
which outlined the reasons why OAB had terminated Gran's employment.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist
position because he had "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero
knowledge of [the] ACAD system."45 Petitioner also claims that Gran was
justifiably dismissed due to insubordination or disobedience because he
continually failed to submit the required "Daily Activity Reports."46
However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other evidence was
presented to show how and why Gran was considered incompetent,
insubordinate, or disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to
overcome the burden of proving that Gran was validly dismissed.
Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his
"insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD
system" based only on the above mentioned letters, without any other
evidence, cannot be given credence.
An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation.
Incompetence may be shown by weighing it against a standard,
benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI failed to establish any such bases to
show how petitioner found Gran incompetent.
In addition, the elements that must concur for the charge of
insubordination or willful disobedience to prosper were not present.
In Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, we held that:
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin
elements must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have
been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and
(2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to
the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged
to discharge.47
EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or
willful disobedience. As indicated by the second requirement provided for
in Micro Sales Operation Network, in order to justify willful disobedience,
we must determine whether the order violated by the employee is
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and pertains to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to show that the order of the company which was
violated—the submission of "Daily Activity Reports"—was part of Gran's
duties as a Computer Specialist. Before the Labor Arbiter, EDI should have
provided a copy of the company policy, Gran's job description, or any other
document that would show that the "Daily Activity Reports" were required
for submission by the employees, more particularly by a Computer
Specialist.
Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment or
recruitment agencies and not the foreign employer, they should have
adduced additional evidence to convincingly show that Gran's employment
was validly and legally terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the
foreign-based employer but also on the employment or recruitment
agency for the latter is not only an agent of the former, but is also solidarily
liable with the foreign principal for any claims or liabilities arising from the
dismissal of the worker.48
Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to
incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience.
Petitioner also raised the issue that Prieto v. NLRC,49 as used by the CA in
its Decision, is not applicable to the present case.
In Prieto, this Court ruled that "[i]t is presumed that before their
deployment, the petitioners were subjected to trade tests required by law
to be conducted by the recruiting agency to insure employment of only
technically qualified workers for the foreign principal."50 The CA, using the
ruling in the said case, ruled that Gran must have passed the test;
otherwise, he would not have been hired. Therefore, EDI was at fault when
it deployed Gran who was allegedly "incompetent" for the job.
According to petitioner, the Prieto ruling is not applicable because in the
case at hand, Gran misrepresented himself in his curriculum vitae as a
Computer Specialist; thus, he was not qualified for the job for which he was
hired.
We disagree.
The CA is correct in applying Prieto. The purpose of the required trade test
is to weed out incompetent applicants from the pool of available workers.
It is supposed to reveal applicants with false educational backgrounds, and
expose bogus qualifications. Since EDI deployed Gran to Riyadh, it can be
presumed that Gran had passed the required trade test and that Gran is
qualified for the job. Even if there was no objective trade test done by EDI,
it was still EDI's responsibility to subject Gran to a trade test; and its failure
to do so only weakened its position but should not in any way prejudice
Gran. In any case, the issue is rendered moot and academic because Gran's
incompetency is unproved.
Fourth Issue: Gran was not Afforded Due Process
As discussed earlier, in the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor
laws and regulations shall govern the relationship between Gran and EDI.
Thus, our laws and rules on the requisites of due process relating to
termination of employment shall apply.
Petitioner EDI claims that private respondent Gran was afforded due
process, since he was allowed to work and improve his capabilities for five
months prior to his termination.51 EDI also claims that the requirements
of due process, as enunciated in Santos, Jr. v. NLRC,52 and Malaya Shipping
Services, Inc. v. NLRC,53 cited by the CA in its Decision, were properly
observed in the present case.
This position is untenable.
In Agabon v. NLRC,54 this Court held that:
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282,
the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing
or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before
terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after
hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and
(2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and
284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor
and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his
separation.
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2)
notices before their employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to
apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second notice to
communicate to the employees that their employment is being
terminated. In between the first and second notice, the employees should
be given a hearing or opportunity to defend themselves personally or by
counsel of their choice.55
A careful examination of the records revealed that, indeed, OAB's manner
of dismissing Gran fell short of the two notice requirement. While it
furnished Gran the written notice informing him of his dismissal, it failed
to furnish Gran the written notice apprising him of the charges against him,
as prescribed by the Labor Code.56 Consequently, he was denied the
opportunity to respond to said notice. In addition, OAB did not schedule a
hearing or conference with Gran to defend himself and adduce evidence in
support of his defenses. Moreover, the July 9, 1994 termination letter was
effective on the same day. This shows that OAB had already condemned
Gran to dismissal, even before Gran was furnished the termination letter.
It should also be pointed out that OAB failed to give Gran the chance to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative in
accordance with Article 277 of the Labor Code. Clearly, there was no
intention to provide Gran with due process. Summing up, Gran was
notified and his employment arbitrarily terminated on the same day,
through the same letter, and for unjustified grounds. Obviously, Gran was
not afforded due process.
Pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Agabon,57 an employer is liable to
pay nominal damages as indemnity for violating the employee's right to
statutory due process. Since OAB was in breach of the due process
requirements under the Labor Code and its regulations, OAB, ESI, and EDI,
jointly and solidarily, are liable to Gran in the amount of PhP 30,000.00 as
indemnity.
Fifth and Last Issue: Gran is Entitled to Backwages
We reiterate the rule that with regard to employees hired for a fixed period
of employment, in cases arising before the effectivity of R.A. No. 804258
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act) on August 25, 1995, that
when the contract is for a fixed term and the employees are dismissed
without just cause, they are entitled to the payment of their salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract.59 On the other
hand, for cases arising after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, when the
termination of employment is without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%)
per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term
whichever is less.60
In the present case, the employment contract provides that the
employment contract shall be valid for a period of two (2) years from the
date the employee starts to work with the employer.61 Gran arrived in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and started to work on February 7, 1994;62 hence, his
employment contract is until February 7, 1996. Since he was illegally
dismissed on July 9, 1994, before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, he is
therefore entitled to backwages corresponding to the unexpired portion of
his contract, which was equivalent to USD 16,150.
Petitioner EDI questions the legality of the award of backwages and mainly
relies on the Declaration which is claimed to have been freely and
voluntarily executed by Gran. The relevant portions of the Declaration are
as follows:
I, ELEAZAR GRAN (COMPUTER SPECIALIST) AFTER RECEIVING MY FINAL
SETTLEMENT ON THIS DATE THE AMOUNT OF:
S.R. 2,948.00 (SAUDI RIYALS TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT ONLY)
REPRESENTING COMPLETE PAYMENT (COMPENSATION) FOR THE
SERVICES I RENDERED TO OAB ESTABLISHMENT.
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT OAB EST. HAS NO FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN MY
FAVOUR AFTER RECEIVING THE ABOVE MENTIONED AMOUNT IN CASH.
I STATE FURTHER THAT OAB EST. HAS NO OBLIGATION TOWARDS ME IN
WHATEVER FORM.
I ATTEST TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THIS STATEMENT BY AFFIXING MY
SIGNATURE VOLUNTARILY.
SIGNED.
ELEAZAR GRAN
Courts must undertake a meticulous and rigorous review of quitclaims or
waivers, more particularly those executed by employees. This requirement
was clearly articulated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Land and
Housing Development Corporation v. Esquillo:
Quitclaims, releases and other waivers of benefits granted by laws or
contracts in favor of workers should be strictly scrutinized to protect the
weak and the disadvantaged. The waivers should be carefully examined, in
regard not only to the words and terms used, but also the factual
circumstances under which they have been executed.63 (Emphasis
supplied.)
This Court had also outlined in Land and Housing Development
Corporation, citing Periquet v. NLRC,64 the parameters for valid
compromise agreements, waivers, and quitclaims:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned
simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof
that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or
the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will
step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that
the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking. (Emphasis supplied.)
Is the waiver and quitclaim labeled a Declaration valid? It is not.
The Court finds the waiver and quitclaim null and void for the following
reasons:
1. The salary paid to Gran upon his termination, in the amount of SR
2,948.00, is unreasonably low. As correctly pointed out by the court a quo,
the payment of SR 2,948.00 is even lower than his monthly salary of SR
3,190.00 (USD 850.00). In addition, it is also very much less than the USD
16,150.00 which is the amount Gran is legally entitled to get from
petitioner EDI as backwages.
2. The Declaration reveals that the payment of SR 2,948.00 is actually the
payment for Gran's salary for the services he rendered to OAB as Computer
Specialist. If the Declaration is a quitclaim, then the consideration should
be much much more than the monthly salary of SR 3,190.00 (USD
850.00)—although possibly less than the estimated Gran's salaries for the
remaining duration of his contract and other benefits as employee of OAB.
A quitclaim will understandably be lower than the sum total of the
amounts and benefits that can possibly be awarded to employees or to be
earned for the remainder of the contract period since it is a compromise
where the employees will have to forfeit a certain portion of the amounts
they are claiming in exchange for the early payment of a compromise
amount. The court may however step in when such amount is
unconscionably low or unreasonable although the employee voluntarily
agreed to it. In the case of the Declaration, the amount is unreasonably
small compared to the future wages of Gran.
3. The factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the Declaration
would show that Gran did not voluntarily and freely execute the document.
Consider the following chronology of events:
a. On July 9, 1994, Gran received a copy of his letter of termination;
b. On July 10, 1994, Gran was instructed to depart Saudi Arabia and
required to pay his plane ticket;65
c. On July 11, 1994, he signed the Declaration;
d. On July 12, 1994, Gran departed from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and
e. On July 21, 1994, Gran filed the Complaint before the NLRC.
The foregoing events readily reveal that Gran was "forced" to sign the
Declaration and constrained to receive the amount of SR 2,948.00 even if
it was against his will—since he was told on July 10, 1994 to leave Riyadh
on July 12, 1994. He had no other choice but to sign the Declaration as he
needed the amount of SR 2,948.00 for the payment of his ticket. He could
have entertained some apprehensions as to the status of his stay or safety
in Saudi Arabia if he would not sign the quitclaim.
4. The court a quo is correct in its finding that the Declaration is a contract
of adhesion which should be construed against the employer, OAB. An
adhesion contract is contrary to public policy as it leaves the weaker
party—the employee—in a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation. Certainly, the
employer is being unjust to the employee as there is no meaningful choice
on the part of the employee while the terms are unreasonably favorable
to the employer.66

Thus, the Declaration purporting to be a quitclaim and waiver is
unenforceable under Philippine laws in the absence of proof of the
applicable law of Saudi Arabia.
In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims
and waivers of employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should
contain the following:
1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;
2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding
amounts, which the employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed
compromise amount;
3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in
English, Filipino, or in the dialect known to the employees—that by signing
the waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to
receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and
4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document
voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of the document and
that their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress,
intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person.
It is advisable that the stipulations be made in English and Tagalog or in the
dialect known to the employee. There should be two (2) witnesses to the
execution of the quitclaim who must also sign the quitclaim. The document
should be subscribed and sworn to under oath preferably before any
administering official of the Department of Labor and Employment or its
regional office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or a labor attaché
in a foreign country. Such official shall assist the parties regarding the
execution of the quitclaim and waiver.67 This compromise settlement
becomes final and binding under Article 227 of the Labor Code which
provides that:
[A]ny compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon with the assistance
of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the regional office of the DOLE, shall be
final and binding upon the parties and the NLRC or any court "shall not
assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-
compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement
was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.
It is made clear that the foregoing rules on quitclaim or waiver shall apply
only to labor contracts of OFWs in the absence of proof of the laws of the
foreign country agreed upon to govern said contracts. Otherwise, the
foreign laws shall apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 18, 2000 Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 56120 of the Court of Appeals affirming the January 15, 1999
Decision and September 30, 1999 Resolution of the NLRC
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner EDI-Staffbuilders
International, Inc. shall pay the amount of PhP 30,000.00 to respondent
Gran as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC.,
petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M.
TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.

Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General and Jose A. Rico for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners pray that the order dated June 20,
1979 of the National Seamen Board, and the decision dated December 11,
1979 of the Ministry of Labor be nullified and set aside, and that "if
petitioners are found liable to private respondent, such a liability be
reduced to P30,000.00 only, in accordance with respondent NSB's
Standard Format of a Service Agreement."
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent
Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when
he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with
petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl"
is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time
of his death was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00 (Petition, page
5).
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and
time-off allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits
and reliefs available in connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo,"
filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that
the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management
Co. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent,
respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. On
the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not
be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take
judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an
alternative, they offered to pay private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the
sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the Board's Memorandum
Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case.
The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, after hearing the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979,
ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and severally the following:
I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency as death compensation benefits;
II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral
expenses;
III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees.
It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen
Board within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11, 1979, the
Ministry rendered its decision in this case as follows:
Motion for reconsideration filed by respondents from the Order of this
Board dated 20 June 1979 requiring them to pay complainant, jointly and
severally, the amount of Thirty-four thousand and two hundred ten dollars
($34,210.00) representing death benefits, funeral expenses and attorney's
fees.
The facts in the main are not disputed. The deceased, husband of
complainant herein, was employed as a Second Engineer by respondents
and served as such in the vessel "M.T. Cherry Earl" until that fatal day in
May 1978 when, while at sea, he suffered an apoplectic stroke and died
four days later or on 29 May 1978. In her complaint filed before this Board,
Abordo argued that the amount of compensation due her should be based
on the law where the vessel is registered, which is Singapore law. Agreeing
with said argument, this Board issued the questioned Order. Hence this
Motion for Reconsideration.
In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that the
law of Singapore should not be applied in the case considering that their
responsibility was not alleged in the complaint that no proof of the
existence of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore was ever
presented and that the Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's
Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay
complainant the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as death
benefits based on this Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which, they
maintained, should apply in this case.
The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the law of
Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter. we rule in the
affirmative. Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion which, to
our mind, is more appropriate and perhaps acceptable in the regular court
of justice. Nothing is raised in their motion but question of evidence. But
evidence is usually a matter of procedure of which this Board, being merely
a quasi-judicial body, is not strict about.
It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the course
of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of
cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and
proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. But it
is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never
meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such
as the National Seamen Board. For well-settled also is the rule that
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical
rules. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long
line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury
or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in
which the vessel is registered shall be considered. We see no reason to
deviate from this well-considered policy. Certainly not on technical
grounds as movants herein would like us to.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the
Order of tills Board dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. Let execution issue
immediately.
In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse
Management Co. (PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex
"C" of the Supplemental Complaint, it was stipulated that:
In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course
of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring
whilst on board any vessel to which he may be assigned, but not any other
time, the EMPLOYER win provide employee with free medical attention,
including hospital treatment, also essential medical treatment in the
course of repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If
such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the
EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified
physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury
was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct
compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to
the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the
Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel
whichever is greater. (Emphasis supplied)
In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and
the late Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid
under Philippine Law or the law of registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever
is greater. Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered
P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in
this case.
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint
of Restituta C. Abordo and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar
with Singapore Law, the National Seamen Board is justified in taking
judicial notice of and in applying that law. In the case of VirJen Shipping
and Marine Services, Inc. vs. National Seamen Board, et al (L41297), the
respondent Board promulgated a decision, as follows:
The facts established and/or admitted by the parties are the following: that
the late Remigio Roldan was hired by the respondent as Ordinary Seamen
on board the M/V "Singapura Pertama," a vessel of Singapore Registry; that
on September 27, 1973, the deceased Remigio Roldan met an accident
resulting in his death while on board the said M/V "Singapura Pertama"
during the performance of his duties; that on December 3, 1973, the
respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. paid the complainant
Natividad Roldan the amount of P6,000.00 representing Workmen's
Compensation benefits and donations of the company; that the amount of
P4,870 was spent by the respondent company as burial expenses of the
deceased Remegio Roldan.
The only issue therefore remaining to be resolved by the Board in
connection with the particular case, is whether or not under the existing
laws (Philippine and foreign), the complainant Natividad Roldan is entitled
to additional benefits other than those mentioned earlier. The Board takes
judicial notice, (as a matter of fact, the respondent having admitted in its
memorandum) of the fact that "Singapura Pertama" is a foreign vessel of
Singapore Registry and it is the policy of this Board that in case of award of
benefits to seamen who were either injured in the performance of its
duties or who died while in the course of employment is to consider the
benefits allowed by the country where the vessel is registered. Likewise,
the Board takes notice that Singapore maritime laws relating to workmen's
compensation benefits are similar to that of the Hongkong maritime laws
which provides that in case of death, the heirs of the deceased seaman
should receive the equivalent of 36 months wages of the deceased
seaman; in other words, 36 months multiplied by the basic monthly wages.
In the employment contract submitted with this Board, the terms of which
have never been at issue, is shown that the monthly salary of the deceased
Remigio Roldan at the time of his death was US$80.00; such that, 36
months multiplied by $80 would come up to US$2,880 and at the rate of
P7.00 to $1.00, the benefits due the claimant would be P20,160. However,
since there was voluntary payment made in the amount of P6,000 and
funeral expenses which under the Workmen's Compensation Law had a
maximum of P200.00, the amount of P6,200.00 should be deducted from
P20,160 and the difference would be P13,960.00.
WHEREFORE, the Board orders the respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. to pay the complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of
P13,960.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision. The Board
also orders the respondent that payment should be made through the
National Seamen Board.
The foregoing decision was assailed as null and void for allegedly having
been rendered without jurisdiction and for awarding compensation
benefits beyond the maximum allowable and on the ground of res judicata.
This Court in its resolution dated October 27, 1975 and December 12, 1975,
respectively dismissed for lack of merit the petition as well as the motion
for reconsideration in said G.R. No. L- 41297.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the
National Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving
Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that
the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to
workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on
judicial notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of
procedure — particularly of evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not
strictly apply." (Oromeca Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 4
SCRA 1188).
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including
its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
For lack of merit, this petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128803 September 25, 1998
ASIAVEST LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO HERAS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In issue is the enforceability in the Philippines of a foreign judgment. The
antecedents are summarized in the 24 August 1990 Decision1 of Branch
107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-52452;
thus:
The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint on December 3, 1987
against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong
Court Judgment dated December 28, 1984 and amended on April 13, 1987,
to wit:
1) US$1,810,265.40 or its equivalent in Hong Kong currency at the
time of payment with legal interest from December 28, 1984 until fully
paid;
2) interest on the sum of US$1,500.00 at 9.875% per annum from
October 31, 1984 to December 28, 1984; and
3) HK$905.00 at fixed cost in the action; and
4) at least $80,000.00 representing attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and cost, with interest thereon from the date of the judgment
until fully paid.
On March 3, 1988, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. However,
before the court could resolve the said motion, a fire which partially razed
the Quezon City Hall Building on June 11, 1988 totally destroyed the office
of this Court, together with all its records, equipment and properties. On
July 26, 1988, the plaintiff, through counsel filed a Motion for
Reconstitution of Case Records. The Court, after allowing the defendant to
react thereto, granted the said Motion and admitted the annexes attached
thereto as the reconstituted records of this case per Order dated
September 6, 1988. Thereafter, the Motion to Dismiss, the resolution of
which had been deferred; was denied by the Court in its Order of October
4, 1988.
On October 19, 1988, defendant filed his Answer. The case was then set
for pre-trial conference. At the conference, the parties could not arrive at
any settlement. However, they agreed on the following stipulations of
facts:
1. The defendant admits the existence of the judgment dated
December 28, 1984 as well as its amendment dated April 13, 1987, but not
necessarily the authenticity or validity thereof;
2. The plaintiff is not doing business and is not licensed to do business
in the Philippines;
3. The residence of defendant, Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Quezon
City.
The only issue for this Court to determine is, whether or not the judgment
of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of
law or fact, such as to overcome the presumption established in Section
50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in favor of foreign judgments.
In view of the admission by the defendant of the existence of the
aforementioned judgment (Pls. See Stipulations of Facts in the Order dated
January 5, 1989 as amended by the Order of January 18, 1989), as well as
the legal presumption in favor of the plaintiff as provided for in paragraph
(b); Sec. 50, (Ibid.), the plaintiff presented only documentary evidence to
show rendition, existence, and authentication of such judgment by the
proper officials concerned (Pls. See Exhibits "A" thru "B", with their
submarkings). In addition, the plaintiff presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to show its entitlement to attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation. . . . .
On the other hand, the defendant presented two witnesses, namely.
Fortunata dela Vega and Russel Warren Lousich.
The gist of Ms. dela Vega's testimony is to the effect that no writ of
summons or copy of a statement of claim of Asiavest Limited was ever
served in the office of the Navegante Shipping Agency Limited and/or for
Mr. Antonio Heras, and that no service of the writ of summons was either
served on the defendant at his residence in New Manila, Quezon City. Her
knowledge is based on the fact that she was the personal secretary of Mr.
Heras during his JD Transit days up to the latter part of 1972 when he
shifted or diversified to shipping business in Hong Kong; that she was in-
charge of all his letters and correspondence, business commitments,
undertakings, conferences and appointments, until October 1984 when
Mr. Heras left Hong Kong for good; that she was also the Officer-in-Charge
or Office Manager of Navegante Shipping Agency LTD, a Hong Kong
registered and based company acting as ships agent, up to and until the
company closed shop sometime in the first quarter of 1985, when shipping
business collapsed worldwide; that the said company held office at 34-35
Connaught Road, Central Hong Kong and later transferred to Carton House
at Duddel Street, Hong Kong, until the company closed shop in 1985; and
that she was certain of such facts because she held office at Caxton House
up to the first quarter of 1985.
Mr. Lousich was presented as an expert on the laws of Hong Kong, and as
a representative of the law office of the defendant's counsel who made a
verification of the record of the case filed by the plaintiff in Hong Kong
against the defendant, as well as the procedure in serving Court processes
in Hong Kong.
In his affidavit (Exh. "2") which constitutes his direct testimony, the said
witness stated that:
The defendant was sued on the basis of his personal guarantee of the
obligations of Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A. There is no record
that a writ of summons was served on the person of the defendant in Hong
Kong, or that any such attempt at service was made. Likewise, there is no
record that a copy of the judgment of the High Court was furnished or
served on the defendant; anyway, it is not a legal requirement to do so
under Hong Kong laws;

a) The writ of summons or claim can be served by the solicitor
(lawyer) of the claimant or plaintiff. In Hong Kong there are no Court
personnel who serve writs of summons and/or most other processes.
b) If the writ of summons or claim (or complaint) is not contested, the
claimant or the plaintiff is not required to present proof of his claim or
complaint nor present evidence under oath of the claim in order to obtain
a Judgment.
c) There is no legal requirement that such a Judgment or decision
rendered by the Court in Hong Kong [to] make a recitation of the facts or
the law upon which the claim is based.
d) There is no necessity to furnish the defendant with a copy of the
Judgment or decision rendered against him.
e) In an action based on a guarantee, there is no established legal
requirement or obligation under Hong Kong laws that the creditor must
first bring proceedings against the principal debtor. The creditor can
immediately go against the guarantor.
On cross examination, Mr. Lousich stated that before he was
commissioned by the law firm of the defendant's counsel as an expert
witness and to verify the records of the Hong Kong case, he had been acting
as counsel for the defendant in a number of commercial matters; that
there was an application for service of summons upon the defendant
outside the jurisdiction of Hong Kong; that there was an order of the Court
authorizing service upon Heras outside of Hong Kong, particularly in Manila
or any other place in the Philippines (p. 9, TSN, 2/14/90); that there must
be adequate proof of service of summons, otherwise the Hong Kong Court
will refuse to render judgment (p. 10, ibid); that the mere fact that the
Hong Kong Court rendered judgment, it can be presumed that there was
service of summons; that in this case, it is not just a presumption because
there was an affidavit stating that service was effected in [sic] a particular
man here in Manila; that such affidavit was filed by one Jose R. Fernandez
of the firm Sycip Salazar on the 21st of December 1984, and stated in
essence that "on Friday, the 23rd of November 1984 he served the 4th
defendant at No. 6 First Street, Quezon City by leaving it at that address
with Mr. Dionisio Lopez, the son-in-law of the 4th defendant the copy of
the writ and Mr. Lopez informed me and I barely believed that he would
bring the said writ to the attention of the 4th defendant" (pp. 11-12, ibid.);
that upon filing of that affidavit, the Court was asked and granted
judgment against the 4th defendant; and that if the summons or claim is
not contested, the claimant of the plaintiff is not required to present proof
of his claim or complaint or present evidence under oath of the claim in
order to obtain judgment; and that such judgment can be enforced in the
same manner as a judgment rendered after full hearing.
The trial court held that since the Hong Kong court judgment had been duly
proved, it is a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties;
hence, the party impugning it had the burden to prove want of jurisdiction
over his person. HERAS failed to discharge that burden. He did not testify
to state categorically and under oath that he never received summons.
Even his own witness Lousich admitted that HERAS was served with
summons in his Quezon City residence. As to De la Vega's testimony
regarding non-service of summons, the same was hearsay and had no
probative value.
As to HERAS' contention that the Hong Kong court judgment violated the
Constitution and the procedural laws of the Philippines because it
contained no statements of the facts and the law on which it was based,
the trial court ruled that since the issue relate to procedural matters, the
law of the forum, i.e., Hong Kong laws, should govern. As testified by the
expert witness Lousich, such legalities were not required under Hong Kong
laws. The trial Court also debunked HERAS' contention that the principle of
excussion under Article 2058 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was
violated. It declared that matters of substance are subject to the law of the
place where the transaction occurred; in this case, Hong Kong laws must
govern.
The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be
recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to
overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment. It then
decreed; thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay to
the plaintiff the following sums or their equivalents in Philippine currency
at the time of payment: US$1,810,265.40 plus interest on the sum of
US$1,500,000.00 at 9.875% per annum from October 31, 1984 to
December 28, 1984, and HK$905 as fixed cost, with legal interests on the
aggregate amount from December 28, 1984, and to pay attorney's fees in
the sum of P80,000.00.
ASIAVEST moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an
award of judicial costs and an increase in attorney's fees in the amount of
US$19,346.45 with interest until full payment of the said obligations. On
the other hand, HERAS no longer opposed the motion and instead
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal
as CA-G.R. CV No. 29513.
In its order2 of 2 November 1990, the trial court granted ASIAVEST's
motion for reconsideration by increasing the award of attorney's fees to
"US$19,345.65 OR ITS EQUIVALENT IN PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, AND TO PAY
THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT," provided that ASIAVEST would pay the
corresponding filing fees for the increase. ASIAVEST appealed the order
requiring prior payment of filing fees. However, it later withdrew its appeal
and paid the additional filing fees.
On 3 April 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision3 reversing the
decision of the trial court and dismissing ASIAVEST's complaint without
prejudice. It underscored the fact that a foreign judgment does not of itself
have any extraterritorial application. For it to be given effect, the foreign
tribunal should have acquired jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter. If such tribunal has not acquired jurisdiction, its judgment is void.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that matters of remedy
and procedure, such as those relating to service of summons upon the
defendant are governed by the lex fori, which was, in this case, the law of
Hong Kong. Relative thereto, it gave weight to Lousich's testimony that
under the Hong Kong law, the substituted service of summons upon HERAS
effected in the Philippines by the clerk of Sycip Salazar Hernandez &
Gatmaitan firm would be valid provided that it was done in accordance
with Philippine laws. It then stressed that where the action is in personam
and the defendant is in the Philippines, the summons should be personally
served on the defendant pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.4 Substituted service may only be availed of where the defendant
cannot be promptly served in person, the fact of impossibility of personal
service should be explained in the proof of service. It also found as
persuasive HERAS' argument that instead of directly using the clerk of the
Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law office, who was not authorized
by the judge of the court issuing the summons, ASIAVEST should have
asked for leave of the local courts to have the foreign summons served by
the sheriff or other court officer of the place where service was to be made,
or for special reasons by any person authorized by the judge.
The Court of Appeals agreed with HERAS that "notice sent outside the state
to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him
personally for money recovery." Summons should have been personally
served on HERAS in Hong Kong, for, as claimed by ASIAVEST, HERAS was
physically present in Hong Kong for nearly 14 years. Since there was not
even an attempt to serve summons on HERAS in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong
Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over HERAS. Nonetheless it did
not totally foreclose the claim of ASIAVEST; thus:
While We are not fully convinced that [HERAS] has a meritorious defense
against [ASIAVEST's] claims or that [HERAS] ought to be absolved of any
liability, nevertheless, in view of the foregoing discussion, there is a need
to deviate front the findings of the lower court in the interest of justice and
fair play. This, however, is without prejudice to whatever action [ASIAVEST]
might deem proper in order to enforce its claims against [HERAS].
Finally, the Court of Appeals also agreed with HERAS that it was necessary
that evidence supporting the validity of the foreign judgment be
submitted, and that our courts are not bound to give effect to foreign
judgments which contravene our laws and the principle of sound morality
and public policy.
ASIAVEST forthwith filed the instant petition alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that
I.
. . . IT WAS NECESSARY FOR [ASIAVEST] TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
"SUPPORTING THE VALIDITY OF THE JUDGMENT";
II.
. . . THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON [HERAS] WAS DEFECTIVE UNDER
PHILIPPINES LAW;
III.
. . . SUMMONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY SERVED ON HERAS IN
HONG KONG;
IV.
. . . THE HONG KONG SUMMONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SERVED WITH LEAVE
OF PHILIPPINE COURTS;
V.
. . . THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT "CONTRAVENES PHILIPPINE LAWS, THE
PRINCIPLES OF SOUND MORALITY, AND THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
Being interrelated, we shall take up together the assigned errors.
Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,5 which
was the governing law at the time this case was decided by the trial court
and respondent Court of Appeals, a foreign judgment against a person
rendered by a court having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by the subsequent title. However, the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, Section 3(n) of Rule 131 of the New Rules of Evidence provides that
in the absence of proof to the contrary, a court, or judge acting as such,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, is presumed to have acted in the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the burden
to repel it on grounds provided for in paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court is on the party challenging the foreign judgment —
HERAS in this case.
At the pre-trial conference, HERAS admitted the existence of the Hong
Kong judgment. On the other hand, ASIAVEST presented evidence to prove
rendition, existence, and authentication of the judgment by the proper
officials. The judgment is thus presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. 6 Consequently,
the first ground relied upon by ASIAVEST has merit. The presumption of
validity accorded foreign judgment would be rendered meaningless were
the party seeking to enforce it be required to first establish its validity.
The main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the
Hong Kong Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
HERAS. This involves the issue of whether summons was properly and
validly served on HERAS. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to the service of process upon the defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the law of the forum, 7 i.e., the law of Hong
Kong in this case. HERAS insisted that according to his witness Mr. Lousich,
who was presented as an expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no valid
service of summons on him.
In his counter-affidavit,8 which served as his direct testimony per
agreement of the parties,9 Lousich declared that the record of the Hong
Kong case failed to show that a writ of summons was served upon HERAS
in Hong Kong or that any such attempt was made. Neither did the record
show that a copy of the judgment of the court was served on HERAS. He
stated further that under Hong Kong laws (a) a writ of summons could be
served by the solicitor of the claimant or plaintiff; and (b) where the said
writ or claim was not contested, the claimant or plaintiff was not required
to present proof under oath in order to obtain judgment.
On cross-examination by counsel for ASIAVEST, Lousich' testified that the
Hong Kong court authorized service of summons on HERAS outside of its
jurisdiction, particularly in the Philippines. He admitted also the existence
of an affidavit of one Jose R. Fernandez of the Sycip Salazar Hernandez &
Gatmaitan law firm stating that he (Fernandez) served summons on HERAS
on 13 November 1984 at No. 6, 1st St., Quezon City, by leaving a copy with
HERAS's son-in-law Dionisio Lopez. 10 On redirect examination, Lousich
declared that such service of summons would be valid under Hong Kong
laws provided that it was in accordance with Philippine laws. 11
We note that there was no objection on the part of ASIAVEST on the
qualification of Mr. Lousich as an expert on the Hong Kong law. Under
Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the New Rules of Evidence, the record of
public documents of a sovereign authority, tribunal, official body, or public
officer may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof, which must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. The certificate may be issued by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent, or any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer.
Nevertheless, the testimony of an expert witness may be allowed to prove
a foreign law. An authority 12 on private international law thus noted:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the
above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette
Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 13 that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the presentation
of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In
that case, the Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of an
attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a
section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force
at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the
Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., 14
upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of California as
proved by the respondents' witness. In that case, the counsel for
respondent "testified that as an active member of the California Bar since
1951, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of
California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California
law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness
cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue
Code as published in Derring's California Code, a publication of Bancroft-
Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited
section was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a
foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and
used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances,
the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." 15
Thus, in, a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held
to be competent proof of that law. 16
There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on
the specific law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in
actions in rem or in personam, and where the defendant is either a resident
or nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of the absence of proof of the Hong
Kong law on this particular issue, the presumption of identity or similarity
or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus
be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the
Philippine law. 17
As stated in Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals, 18 it will be helpful to
determine first whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem
because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature of the action.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself
instead of against the person. 19 An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
20
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over
the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in
court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served
with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made
in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the
country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1)
substituted service set forth in Section 8; 21 (2) personal service outside
the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave
of court; 22 or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 23
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-
resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. 24 This method of service is
possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not
found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. 25 An
exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker 26 wherein a non-
resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a resident
of the Philippines and who was his representatives and attorney-in-fact in
a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere
offshoot of the first case.
On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Nonetheless summons must be served upon the defendant not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the
due process requirements. 27 Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident
who is not found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of
which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from
any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property
of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines — service of
summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court, or (c) any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. 28
In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in
personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation
of the principal debtor. Before we can apply the foregoing rules, we must
determine first whether HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong.
Fortunata de la Vega, HERAS's personal secretary in Hong Kong since 1972
until 1985, 29 testified that HERAS was the President and part owner of a
shipping company in Hong Kong during all those times that she served as
his secretary. He had in his employ a staff of twelve. 30 He had "business
commitments, undertakings, conferences, and appointments until October
1984 when [he] left Hong Kong for good," 31 HERAS's other witness, Russel
Warren Lousich, testified that he had acted as counsel for HERAS "for a
number of commercial matters." 32 ASIAVEST then infers that HERAS was
a resident of Hong Kong because he maintained a business there.
It must be noted that in his Motion to Dismiss, 33 as well as in his
Answer 34 to ASIAVEST's complaint for the enforcement of the Hong Kong
court judgment, HERAS maintained that the Hong Kong court did not have
jurisdiction over him because the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in
personam over non-resident defendants, so as to sustain a money
judgment, must be based upon personal service of summons within the
state which renders the judgment. 35
For its part, ASIAVEST, in its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 36
contended: "The question of Hong Kong court's 'want of jurisdiction' is
therefore a triable issue if it is to be pleaded by the defendant to 'repel' the
foreign judgment. Facts showing jurisdictional lack (e.g. that the Hong Kong
suit was in personam, that defendant was not a resident of Hong Kong
when the suit was filed or that he did not voluntarily submit to the Hong
Kong court's jurisdiction) should be alleged and proved by the defendant."
37
In his Reply (to the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), 38 HERAS argued that
the lack of jurisdiction over his person was corroborated by ASIAVEST's
allegation in the complaint that he "has his residence at No. 6, 1st St., New
Manila, Quezon City, Philippines." He then concluded that such judicial
admission amounted to evidence that he was and is not a resident of Hong
Kong.
Significantly, in the pre-trial conference, the parties came up with
stipulations of facts, among which was that "the residence of defendant,
Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Quezon City." 39
We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the
enforcement of the Hong Kong court judgment is concerned, was never in
issue. He never challenged the service of summons on him through a
security guard in his Quezon City residence and through a lawyer in his
office in that city. In his Motion to Dismiss, he did not question the
jurisdiction of the Philippine court over his person on the ground of invalid
service of summons. What was in issue was his residence as far as the Hong
Kong suit was concerned. We therefore conclude that the stipulated fact
that HERAS "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers
to his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought
by the Hong Kong court. With that stipulation of fact, ASIAVEST cannot now
claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.
Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action
against him was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have
been personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in
the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong
court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court
judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for
having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of Hong Kong, he was
no longer so in November 1984 when the extraterritorial service of
summons was attempted to be made on him. As declared by his secretary,
which statement was not disputed by ASIAVEST, HERAS left Hong Kong in
October 1984 "for good." 40 His absence in Hong Kong must have been the
reason why summons was not served on him therein; thus, ASIAVEST was
constrained to apply for leave to effect service in the Philippines, and upon
obtaining a favorable action on the matter, it commissioned the Sycip
Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm to serve the summons here in the
Philippines.
In Brown v. Brown, 41 the defendant was previously a resident of the
Philippines. Several days after a criminal action for concubinage was filed
against him, he abandoned the Philippines. Later, a proceeding quasi in
rem was instituted against him. Summons in the latter case was served on
the defendant's attorney-in-fact at the latter's address. The Court held that
under the facts of the case, it could not be said that the defendant was
"still a resident of the Philippines because he ha[d] escaped to his country
and [was] therefore an absentee in the Philippines." As such, he should
have been "summoned in the same manner as one who does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines."
Similarly, HERAS, who was also an absentee, should have been served with
summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong.
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial
service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam.
Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a
resident defendant who is temporarily absent from the country, because
even if HERAS be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed
fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only "temporarily" but "for good."
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING
the petition in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed judgment of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29513.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in
view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member
of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the
acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country,
and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of
alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident
thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said
foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b),
shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to,
or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship
was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in
connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes
over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming
that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House
of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition
for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its
resolution dated April 27, 2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's
decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had
ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship
on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent
as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship
was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born
Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a
natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore
allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth
with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as
natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth"
in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two
kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A
person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth
Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act
No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses
all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law
to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship
becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when
the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has
(1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No.
63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On
the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a
former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19
services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic
necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and
2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not
even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to
take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register
that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had
last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which
provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides
or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan
in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which
he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born
citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable.
As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born
citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as
follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a
person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform
any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of
Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who
were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino
mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born
obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an
act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a
sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with
law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons
for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by
law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the
"sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over
the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
latter.30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to
substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason
that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave
abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part.
Panganiban, concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.
Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring opinion of J.
Panganiban
Ynares-Santiago, certify majority opinion of J. Kapunan.
Footnote
1 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.
2 Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands;
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship; and
5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
3 An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons
Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960).
4 Said provision reads:
No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
5 Rollo, p. 36.
6 Id., at 69.
7 Id., at 13.
8 Article IV, Section 1.
9 TOLENTINO, COMMETARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed.
10 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.
11 During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, thousands of aliens were naturalized by Presidential Decree
where the screening of the applicants was undertaken by special
committee under Letter of Instructions No. 270, dated April 11,1975, as
amended.
12 Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:
(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of
the petition;
(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not
less than ten years;
(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government
and well as with the community in which he is living;
(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the
principal languages; and
(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private
Schools of the Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic
are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire
period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
learning of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
13 Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:
(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing
all organized governments;
(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;
(c) He must not be polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;
(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;
(e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases;
(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of
not less than six months before filing his application), mingled socially with
the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideal s of the Filipinos;
(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the
Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;

(h) He must not be citizen or subject of foreign country whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
14 Section 1, R.A. 530.
15 Section 2, C.A. No. 63.
16 An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be
Lost or Reacquired (1936).
17 1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country or by express renunciation of his
citizenship (Sec. 1 [1] and [2], C.A. No. 63);
2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in
the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization (Sec.
3[1], C.A. No. 63);
3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the
filing of the application) in the Philippines, in his relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living
(Sec. 3[2], C.A. No. 63);
4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely
and perpetually al faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or
sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).
18 See note 13.
19 Sec 4, C.a. No. 63.
20 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 965 (1953).
21 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 (1960).
22 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 (1995).
23 Ibid.
24 314 SCRA 438 (1999)
25 Id., at 450.
26 Jovito R. Salonga, Private International Law, p. 165 (1995)
27 See Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution.
28 The date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
29 Article IV, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representative shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
30 Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353,
364 (1999).

EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that
the House Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling
that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino
citizen and is eligible to continue being a member of Congress. Let me just
add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San
Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen,
pursuant to Section 1 (2),1 Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not
having done any act to acquire or perfect the Philippine citizenship he
obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance
with Section 22 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service
to the United States Marine Corps from November 1958 to October 1993.
On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen, in connection
with his US military service. Consequently, under Section 1 (4)3 of CA No.
63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned
to the Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on
March 17, 1994, availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No.
2630, entitled "An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting
Commission in, the Armed Force of the United States,"4 Cruz took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed
an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason
of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his
original status as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that the
answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under
Section 1 of RA 2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may
"reacquire" it by " taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority
on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private
International Law.5 He defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original
nationality upon fulfillment of certain condition."6 Webster buttresses this
definition by describing the ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as "to
restore or return to one's country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x
x."7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration
of citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's
former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again."8 Ergo, since
Cruz, prior to his becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen,
he "reacquired" the same status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise –
that Cruz became a non-natural-born citizen – would not be consistent
whit the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to
naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New."
Because it is not the same as the with which he has previously been
endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in
favor of [its] claimant x x x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed
in favor of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be
deemed natural-born, because was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2)
naturalized citizens.10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be
acquired by direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who do
become citizens through such procedure would properly fall under the
second category (naturalized).11
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a
rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated
in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born citizen is a
citizen "who has become such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
explains clearly who are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces
the concept as first defined in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which
simply provided as follows:
"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino
citizen may be considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the
Philippines from birth, and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire
or perfect one's Philippine citizenship.13 Thus, under the 1973
Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship.14
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-
born citizens to include "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof," meaning those covered
under class (2) above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens are
not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent –
being clearly and concededly not naturalized – is, therefore, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.15
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them
separately, they naturally reacquire their original classification before the
loss of their Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C.
Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In
other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen, nothing less.

3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in
holding that Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is
qualified to be a member of Congress. I stress that the Court, in this
certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to determining whether the
HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to
reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply because it differs in its perception
of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an
independent, constitutional body with its own specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of
the chambers of Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications their respective members."16 In
several cases,17 this Court has held that the power and the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they remained in the
legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgment are beyond
judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.18 In the elegant words of
Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:19
"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct
perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in
only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for
remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation.
But, as earlier explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation
is the reacquisition of the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be
rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At best, I can concede that the
legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an
interpretation made in good faith and grounded o reason one way or the
other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any
settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely acting within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to
be the sole judge of the qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a
manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or nay judicial decision,
this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the
latter's actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged
upon it by our fundamental law.20 Even assuming that we disagree with
the conclusion of public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it
"grave abuse of discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived error
and grave abuse.21
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. "It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."22
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to
2 to issue its Decision upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz
could not in any wise be condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find
any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or
hostility" in such exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable
mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second
District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the District
have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for
private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. The
votes that Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections were much more
than those of all his opponents combined (66, 182).23 In such instances, all
possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's
eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people.24
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt,
political laws must be so constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot.25 Public interest and the
sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount considerations in
election controversies.26 For it would be better to err in favor of the
people's choice than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms.27
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect
to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In
any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely
sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are
the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote."28
5. Current Trend Towards Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards
globalization.29 Protectionist barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past,
governments frowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who
wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their citizens, the current era is
adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for
citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local
resources for themselves. They are now being considered potential
sources of developmental skills, know-how and capital.1âwphi1.nêt
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like
Congressman Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens
again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense of the law. They are actually
Filipino by blood, by origin and by culture, who want to reacquire their
former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for
naturalization in foreign countries, because of the great economic or social
opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizens
desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining Philippine
citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these
admirable Filipino is private respondent who, in only a year after being
absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted
municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for
just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their
representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial
interpretation of the law bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be
imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an
ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and
custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968,
Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate
and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their
petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's
foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the
petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half
of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure
from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's
new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission
which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a
new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner
registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for
Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport
No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently,
on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development
Studies at the University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988.
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario
de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband
who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days
after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel
(Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna)
and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998
and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14
She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with
Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July
2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed
back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical
condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The
petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her
father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his
estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe
blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving
mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19
The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of
their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
for the next semester;20 coordination with property movers for the
relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the
Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper
procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.22 As
early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and
without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while her
husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well
as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until
she and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at
One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of
2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the
unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City
to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her
children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the
U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32
Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived
in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine
company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot
in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home34 and
to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.35 A
Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the
couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed
with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered
from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions
and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the
Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs)
in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan
City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine
Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18
March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the
DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City
on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010
petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of
office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped
using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn
questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had
taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent,
among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same
questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the
U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991
and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a
"Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October
2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in
the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport
No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the
May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day
before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an
"Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections
triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the
subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo
(Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which
was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division.59 She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9
May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be
considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer
natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this
line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen to begin with.64 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a
natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she
became a naturalized American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-
born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that
petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC
for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for
only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo
likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to
regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the
ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could
only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired
Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that
petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is
of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it
was actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace
Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the
statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was
there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding
her citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings
were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of
citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to
the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the
same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-
born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile
in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator
was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on
her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of
the Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she
serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a
Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running
for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016
National and Local Elections, contained material representations which are
false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed
by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December
2015 Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S.
Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez
(Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated
and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that
petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for
the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot
be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact
that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in
the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude
them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a
natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or
treaties to support her claim that foundlings have a nationality.76
According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-
executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to
treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that
there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born
status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail
of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was
not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not
comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that
petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she
renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to
abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed
thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of
petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a
natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born
citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-
born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator
that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years
and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her.
Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished
her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten
(10) year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the
residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should
be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of
residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her
COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended
that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that
petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not
be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was
then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by
the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a
cause of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a
disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged
lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not
among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an
elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo
warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the
Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is
on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her
favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled
to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they
are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be
repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born
status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy
the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006
Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as
MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started
reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by
her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family
home in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of
choice in the Philippines even before she renounced her American
citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are
complied with.100 She reasoned out that there was no requirement that
renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a
new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of
her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First
Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed
to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she
committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May
2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National
Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC
En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the
present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex
parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining
orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its
representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second
Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division,
in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139
(DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc,
upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc,
upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the
9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner
should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that
she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity
of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain
it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the
position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by
the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its
provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory,
and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to
political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with
the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by
law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall
be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it
has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on
the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the
provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications
of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no
such provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc
decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin
reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15,
1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation
of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in
the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the
Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds
from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to
vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility
into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the
law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of
"ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based
on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in
§40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate
for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from
the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the
other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from
office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public
office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate
or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this
sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien
has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he
does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the
consequences of the respective proceedings, the importance of the
opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule".
Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected,
there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for
acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending,
commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be
determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his
disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the
grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted
for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and
if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not
be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g.,
his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino
v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still
pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is
contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of
candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is
satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are
eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination
of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations
made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of
the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as
reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution
No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993
version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party,
is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny
to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate
as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily
dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of
absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent
court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by
the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law
or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule
23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not
authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification
may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent
court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she
is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution,"
neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course
on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications,
without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such
prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are
self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against
which the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding
under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations
regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC
to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the
enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot
be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner
admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot
rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino
citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable,"
proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to
prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is
neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said,
there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents
and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of
proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did
not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities
are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule
128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends
in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of
the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners
born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born
in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child
born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%.
For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for
1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were
Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304
foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730
female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino
males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino
females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were
245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%.
COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim
admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found
in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are
the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church
in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal
bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the
foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of
the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more
than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible,
as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to
the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every
foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance
of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are
the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone
born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a
yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign
parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to
natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines
is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is
15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This
means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines
on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the
numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be
affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood
that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than
99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame.
We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the
Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable
for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple
has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless
just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the
thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two,
foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't
make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born
in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical
to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human
beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common
sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While
the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following
exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the
following is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino
mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the
amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of
unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes
consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered
Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage
is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a
child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required]
to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need
for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized
by one, or the children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of
unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude
the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child.
Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino
mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the
hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international
law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown
parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough
to merit specific mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of
delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also
foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion
of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of
international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children
followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the
nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during
the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was
declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence
is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed
that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were
legally correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based
on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn
existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas
were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no
more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are
already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of
linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it
is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3)
of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973
and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he
was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently
silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to
create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and
that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument
that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the
records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention
to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish
to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the
constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this
across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic
right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social
justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present
charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to
defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."
Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against
foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon
the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions,
legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even
though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis
and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought
to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem,
which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the
subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which
is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our
Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status
of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to
this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who
are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the
Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and
this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly
refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a
foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at
best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens
are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the
first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of
foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.121
Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an
alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an
act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that
petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in
her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which
approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her
"foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a
foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.125 International
customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination
of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of
reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal
systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the
general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle
against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education,
the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles
which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by
this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on
our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in
accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every
child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on
the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of
which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first
is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to
have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall
be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is
known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born
on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of
the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within
the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that
their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the
1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of
the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines
had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was
nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally
accepted principle of international law although the convention had been
ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which
needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as
petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of
international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin
America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not
determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries had
"either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also
pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common
Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited
U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all,
only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there
was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact
that "generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only
on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph
(c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of
Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the
notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition
of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted
principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North
and South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus
sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961
Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the
Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments
pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the
practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted
principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born
of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this
generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No.
8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to
"Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino
children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA
issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens.
This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the
1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the
empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than
99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the
matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of
a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own
making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country
which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The
Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court
that those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them
legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended
up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift
foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-
class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant
must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship
but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the
matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained
as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in
several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's
Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on
Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143 where we said that
"[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his
natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical
that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225),
he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of
natural citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at
birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225
was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine
how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree
that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once
lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be
continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the
phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person
who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or
perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out
that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution:
natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons
for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by
law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this
Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing
standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed
the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may
ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule,
recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that
petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to"
in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her
adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-
born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names
of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally
adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between
the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent
is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also
entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the
adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear
any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that
"[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files
of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any
other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall
be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to
state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what
would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of
strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to
disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it
cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to
opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or
not petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in
her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have
been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In
answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11
months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a
beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original
domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a
new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an
intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other
words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good.
These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her
arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she
travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to
September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of
their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-
mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship
their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing
enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding
years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for
condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation
of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal
Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the
First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on
27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S.
Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine
resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the
return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed
with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from
petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S.
only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by
the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and
Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had
been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two
requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but
maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC
disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the
basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have
started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application
under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied
on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v.
COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also
added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases
decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until
he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient.
Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) until her
reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005
to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very
different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence
presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and
his declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v.
COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence
prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing
that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In
Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work
was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes
v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who
had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship
issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said
that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four
cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that
residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident
visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the
evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no
other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting
quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the
Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after
selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and
actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N,
enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that
when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she
had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A.
No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a
Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat
balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included
in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes
or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the
balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon
their return to the country"164 in line with the government's
"reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary
transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and
help him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion
to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That
visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his
life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly
what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children
and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then
applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of
change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided
by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is
no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of
petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other
cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings
there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of
residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of
petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence
before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006.
In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the
date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from
April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and
her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised
by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period
of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the
time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the
COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that
the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the
sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the
evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat,
would include her passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as
a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence
made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period
of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We
said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence
presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the
Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would
have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the
pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that
petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that
domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under
R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in
reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay
permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident
for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide
anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed
against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the
COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to
repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months
in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the
media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist
Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also
in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this
point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the
media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of
public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the
SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1
September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when
she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the
question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer
in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be
said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012
COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at
an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's
pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground
for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as
already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not
only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office),
but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with
an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for
public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually
ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus
manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States
of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as
much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the
petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the
COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that
her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November
2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the
residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown,
ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the
statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of
compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election
as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on
questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on
the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance
than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we
consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even
considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When
petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been
a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the
13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared
years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before
us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did
not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the
general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that
she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-
of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts
of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator.
Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and
these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's]
husband however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange
the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan
City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and
Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in
Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough
to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F
of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family
lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that
her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to
secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of
Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents
are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States
Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a
Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in
Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention
to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to
consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for
Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner
for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions
of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased
with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second
Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating
that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby
GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division,
in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139
(DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National
Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for
President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
with preliminary injunction, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID), ordering the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated
January 29, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration.
I
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a
contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17,
1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned
to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year
old Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests"
of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family
of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him
during his stay in Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina
Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests,"
stating inter alia, that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs.
Djumantan, 42 years old, and her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old,
and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian citizens, who are coming as
temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the
hospitality they have accorded me during the few years that I have stayed
in Indonesia in connection with my employment thereat.
That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior
while they are in the Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they
will not become a public charge.
That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the
authorized stay granted them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary
visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband
and petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal
Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from
temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the
same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to
the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell. She later released pending the deportation proceedings
(DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16).
Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart
voluntarily from the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline
ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she a change of heart and moved for the
dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly
married to a Filipino citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public
respondents, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners
finds the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan
irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. We revoke
the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their
Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to
cease and desist from executing or implementing the Decision dated
September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp.
34-36).
On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died
on August 14, 1994 and that he and his mother were withdrawing their
objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo,
pp. 173-175).
II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of
P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice of
polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that under
Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family
Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the husband and wife are obliged
to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that
public respondents have no right to order the couple to live separately
(Rollo, pp. 5-7).
When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the
position that the CID could not order petitioner's deportation because its
power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act
of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).
III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under
the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien"
regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first
resolved is the question on petitioner's immigration status, particularly the
legality of her admission into the country and the change of her status from
temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not
lawfully admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire
permanent residency, the next question is whether the power to deport
her has prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's
entry into the country and the change of her immigration status from
temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained
through misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration
authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa and for
permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is
a matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the
immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be less
inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a
marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to another woman (Cf. Shiu
Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose
presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country
(Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact that since the
aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a
matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no
obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur.
2d. 72).
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to
continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may
choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d.
489).

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to
be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the
Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from
the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and
exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537
94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56
L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of
an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the
country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin
v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the
CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into
the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13
of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of
status and "may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those
considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or
husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The
entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a
matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of
public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b)
of the Immigration Act of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph
(a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under
any clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
five years after the cause for deportation arises. Deportation under clauses
3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge thereof, when sentencing
the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the
alien be not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for
the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designating port of entry or
at any place other than at a designated port of entry.
2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in
the Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year or more for a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry, is so
convicted and sentenced more than once;
4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law
governing prohibited drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of
prostitution or is connected with the management of a house of
prostitution, or is a procurer;
6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after
entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to
entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted a non-immigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the
overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the Philippines, or
of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to
organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault
or assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or
teaching such doctrines, or who on any manner whatsoever lends
assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;
9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-
five and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be
brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an alien who, for any
reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and
deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his
imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, however, That the
imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with
the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien
concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by
the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such
amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department
Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);
10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have
been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth
Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-three, otherwise known as the
Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic Act No. 562), or
who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more than once of
violating the provisions of the same Act;
11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-
marketing, independent of any criminal action which may be brought
against him;
12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or
any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating
properties, to prevent them from being attached or executed.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after
the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements
or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of
entry" is subject to deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a
prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from
the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152
[1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we
held that under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, the
deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after the
cause of deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion,
qualified the broad statement of the law as follows:
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year
limitation is applicable only where deportation is sought to be effected
under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that
where deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses of
Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that to the contrary,
deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."
Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and
12, the limitation does not apply.
In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she
had gained entrance into the Philippines fraudulently by making use of the
name of a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of her lawful
husband. The Court, however, held that she could no longer be deported
"for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date
of her admission."
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January
13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading statements in her application
and in the other supporting documents submitted to the immigration
authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November
19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was admitted into the country and
asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he
sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-
complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo
C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country,
more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her
deportation on September 27, 1990.
In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under
Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed that what they
ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation
of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p.
102).
The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the
purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior
to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country.
When public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to
petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an
overstaying alien.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order
issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990
revoking the issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and the
Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.
 dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
SO ORDERED. COMELEC's Second Division said:

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of
vs. Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of
respondents. the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B.
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the
election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who
alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of
the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a
dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent
admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino
father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent
Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual
citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from
the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for
the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo
Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati
City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3
The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May
11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10,
1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast
for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the
winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC
en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner
abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division
and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City
of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.5 The pertinent portions of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the
United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time
of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines
using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered
him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued
an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss
of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship
and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority,
he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American
law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second
Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano
obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-
mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight
hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S.
Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine
(2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand
two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would
be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in
complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be
settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections,
257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of
the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of
the respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as
a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11,
1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of
Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim
the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate
for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of
canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private
respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution
of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to
hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when
he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of
majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered
himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of
Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that,
effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that
Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-
Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private
respondent Manzano — whether petitioner Mercado his personality to
bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for
leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no
right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the
ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any
person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during
the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its
discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion
for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its
discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the
matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated
candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought
to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already
been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty
contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only
second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought
to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,6 reiterated in several cases,7
only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested,
and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time
petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998,
there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose
was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for
[an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati
City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he
filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as
the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en
banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly
deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but
also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged
disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent
Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified
from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under
§40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares
as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those
with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the
City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor
General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of
the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms
the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective
office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states.9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art.
IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers
if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that
country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may,
without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the
above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides:
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at
the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as
follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee
according to which a dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual allegiance —
is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which
is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function
of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do
not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional
cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know
what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all
over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not
widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is
represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And
until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's
Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin
countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years
because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also
represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind
of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by
their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking
or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some
Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were
concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and
especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about
minority claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan,
Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the
great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by
Filipino-Chinese — it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a
tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also
means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on
Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO
CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these
citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about
dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a
double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling
debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the
Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which
elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations
exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to
the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In
the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of
the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good
number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every
October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of
the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern
about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which
is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what
the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on
the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great
numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will
prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship"
in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect
to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas,
one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission,
pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we
have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize
a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and
thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the
point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel
clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41,
page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any
elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President,
someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a
foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement
that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must
elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one
belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to
run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate
one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries
in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a
Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim
the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then
he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the
first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am
a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law,
Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the
citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts
that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will
probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must
renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state,
or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he
can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines.
In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath
that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies
with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and
is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the
requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our
Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government
has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be
resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment
upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows
the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a
national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in
1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine
national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in
Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in
any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent
was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made
when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent
renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which
provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a
political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure
this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to
regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy
when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained
the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR
"NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY
SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE
LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND
THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer
this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo
was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even
before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but
before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19,
1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long
before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee.
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive
upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of
allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is
insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching
the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine
citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he
is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his
last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this.
Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had
dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the
assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies
mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and
an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification
that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no
express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that
the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express,"
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship
when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of
this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship
and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election
of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ,
respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule
64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17,
1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections
in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to
settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at
the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously
participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate,
as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected
governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent,
Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54,
alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However,
finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition,
ratiocinating thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned
resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary
proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently,
prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus
Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary
notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents .
. . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the
allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a
Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship
under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with
full awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence adduced
by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent
contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship".1
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat,
filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the
COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said
petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially
its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue
when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11,
1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner,
Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a Resolution
dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to
dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table
definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to
disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present
petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed
upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the
Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and
matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently
provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the
present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and
issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation
to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in
EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby
RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED."2
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en
banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition;
questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public
office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by
virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the
1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby
making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly
cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4)
furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA
Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the
elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an
Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate
of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances,
the private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He
contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and
immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared
under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said
declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify
her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced
her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport
cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy
here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically
restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to
petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship
she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office
did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private
respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged
renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively
become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public
office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in
applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing
the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3 that:
"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. xxx"
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus
soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July
1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known
as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the
Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become
citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or
who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte,
a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of
Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 19734 and 19875
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession
of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private
respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her
Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private
respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the
issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign
country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of
the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation
must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar
vs. COMELEC6 and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and
COMELEC.7
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent
Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not
mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on
April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-
mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before
the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a
holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration
are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not
militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.8 As
held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien
certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere
acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual
citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino
parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground
for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose
or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent
must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private
respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor
of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx xxx xxx
Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual
citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same
with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.9
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing
any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained
that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
"xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No.
7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore,
it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy,
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.11 This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and
that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is
under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of
candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992,
the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to
by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in
Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were
enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no
water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in
judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon
is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding
challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner
of Immigration.12 He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be
threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the
principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the
issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,13 an
exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case
that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in
the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the
case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It
elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent
official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or
simpler.14 Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings
of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which
resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent.
The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence
presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new
evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior
resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered
on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA
No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to
run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR
PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and
JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed
with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein
petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his
decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID,
respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the
parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were
allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In
its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus,
the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over
a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and
detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining
order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court
resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and
further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining
order dated 28 November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for
restraining order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to
lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment
of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2
December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral
argument on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8
was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in
furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed
on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of
the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7
December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was
ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu
pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December
1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13
December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for
release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument
dated 8 December 1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7
December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13 and the vigorous opposition
to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to
give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice
within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a
citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese
passport.15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988
on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary
release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her
comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining
order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a
Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for
the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular
officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February
1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese
Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the
Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as Portuguese
in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of
Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute
an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired
through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go
Gallano, 21 express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine
citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented
himself as such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the
Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this
Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that
petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material
facts are not only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by
petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary
and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when
petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of
continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his
Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in
adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less,
upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself
on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to
be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. This then
resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other
motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from
detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining
order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does
not meet the traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due
process clause. Petitioner herein is being effectively deprived of his Filipino
citizenship through a summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary
evidence that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative
for the purpose and conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting
opinion that "(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the
correct procedures according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it
has been held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged
alien claims citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he
is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial, as
distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United
States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a
full blown trial under the more rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court
proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised by this
Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said powers of review
cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the
light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the
majority to be inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has
renounced his Filipino citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear
and express evidence and not left to inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a
Filipino of his citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far
from being the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with
us. But precisely for this reason, I believe that a petition for
denaturalization should have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial
court instead of the shortcut methods we are sustaining in the majority
opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause, and
other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government power find
their fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or
undesirable characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct
procedures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a
Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand in the way of the
respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where a person
pleads with all his might that he has never formally renounced his
citizenship and that he might die if thrown out of the country, he deserves
at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his actions may be
explored and all the facts fully ascertained. The determination that a
person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous
and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal
evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino
has "renounced" his citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a
citizen of another country (assuming that other country does not reject
him because he formally renounced citizenship therein when he became a
Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso
facto express renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a
foreign passport for convenience, employment, or avoidance of
discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he
may do so because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship. Whatever
the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is
conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most summary
nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and
been given alien certificates of registration by our Commission on
Immigration and Deportation or who have in the past, performed acts even
more indicative of "express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport
or the signing of a commercial document where a different citizenship has
been typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent
Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be immediately
deported for lack of lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can
a summary administrative determination override the voice of hundreds of
thousands or even millions of voters who put them in public office? It is
likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and to arrive at
conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino
being denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his
full day in court. I . therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to
overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized
Filipino by his obtention of a Portuguese passport. Passports are generally
issued by a state only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he
comes under the exception and was granted the Portuguese passport
despite his Philippine citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has
expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point
is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode
of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and
deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I
do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in
deportation proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings
being subject to judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the
loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence
on record, consisting of the photocopy of a memorandum from the
Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a
Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies
of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese,
without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind,
do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has
lost his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of
such renunciation.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does
not meet the traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due
process clause. Petitioner herein is being effectively deprived of his Filipino
citizenship through a summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary
evidence that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative
for the purpose and conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting
opinion that "(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the
correct procedures according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it
has been held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged
alien claims citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he
is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial, as
distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United
States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a
full blown trial under the more rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court
proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised by this
Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said powers of review
cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the
light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the
majority to be inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has
renounced his Filipino citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear
and express evidence and not left to inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a
Filipino of his citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far
from being the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with
us. But precisely for this reason, I believe that a petition for
denaturalization should have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial
court instead of the shortcut methods we are sustaining in the majority
opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause, and
other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government power find
their fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or
undesirable characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct
procedures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a
Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand in the way of the
respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where a person
pleads with all his might that he has never formally renounced his
citizenship and that he might die if throw out of the country, he deserves
at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his actions may be
explored and all the facts fully ascertained. The determination that a
person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous
and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal
evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino
has "renounced" his citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a
citizen of another country (assuming that other country does not reject
him because he formally renounced citizenship therein when he became a
Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso
facto express renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a
foreign passport for convenience, employment, or avoidance of
discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he
may do so because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship. Whatever
the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is
conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most summary
nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and
been given alien certificates of registration by our Commission on
Immigration and Deportation or who have in the past, performed acts even
more indicative of "express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport
or the signing of a commercial document where a different citizenship has
been typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent
Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be immediately
deported for lack of lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can
a summary administrative determination override the voice of hundreds of
thousands or even millions of voters who put them in public office? It is
likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and to arrive at
conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino
being denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his
full day in court. I . therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to
overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized
Filipino by his obtention of a Portuguese passport. Passports are generally
issued by a state only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he
comes under the exception and was granted the Portuguese passport
despite his Philippine citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has
expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point
is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode
of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and
deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I
do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in
deportation proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings
being subject to judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the
loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence
on record, consisting of the photocopy of a memorandum from the
Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a
Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies
of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese,
without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind,
do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has
lost his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of
such renunciation.
G.R. No. L-24530 October 31, 1968
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS and COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION, petitioners,
vs.
BEATO GO CALLANO, MANUEL GO CALLANO, GONZALO GO CALLANO,
JULIO GO CALLANO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Frine C. Zaballero and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On July 13, 1962, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed the
Commissioner of Immigration that, on the basis of the findings made by
the National Bureau of Investigation, the signatures of former Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, amongst
them cable authorization No. 2230-V (File No. 23617) authorizing the
documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic.
Thereupon, the Department declared several documents among them the
cable authorization just mentioned to be null, void and of no effect, and
the documentation made by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong
pursuant to said cable authorization consisting of the certificates of
registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano and his brothers
Manuel, Gonzalo and Julio for travel to the Philippines were cancelled. All
this was done without previous notice served nor hearing granted to said
parties.
On August 21 of the same year, the Board of Immigration Commissioners,
exercising its power of review under Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 613, as amended, issued, also without any previous notice and hearing,
an order reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated
January 4, 1962, admitting Beato and his three brothers for entry as
citizens; ordering their exclusion as aliens not properly documented for
admission pursuant to Section 27 (a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended, and ordering that they be returned to the port
whence they came or to the country of which they were nationals, upon
the ground that they had been able "to enter this country and gain
admission as Filipino citizens by the fraudulently secured authorization."
On the same date (August 21, 1962) the Commissioner of Immigration
issued a warrant of exclusion commanding the deportation officer "to carry
out the exclusion of the above-named applicants (the Go Callano brothers)
on the first available transportation and on the same class of
accommodation in which they arrived to the port whence they came or to
the country of which they are nationals."
The warrant of exclusion, for one reason or another, was not served
immediately upon the parties ordered deported, who, on November 16,
1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for injunction
to restrain the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner
of Immigration from executing the order of exclusion or deportation
already mentioned. They based their action on the following grounds: (1)
that the Board had no jurisdiction to exclude them from the Philippines
because they were not aliens but Filipino citizens, and (2) that the order of
exclusion was issued by the Board without due process and in violation of
the Constitution. Months later, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the respondents in the case from
deporting the petitioners. After trial, the Court rendered judgment finding
that, according to petitioners' undisputed evidence, "the petitioners herein
are the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her
common-law husband — a Chinese citizen," and concluding that "until the
petitioners left for China in 1947, they must be considered as citizens of
the Philippines as they were born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
who, however, was not married to their mother."
Notwithstanding the above finding and conclusion, however, the Court
dismissed the case holding that "the petitioners are citizens of the Republic
of China and not being properly documented for entry into the Philippines
as found by the Immigration Commissioner, the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued by this Court shall be deemed dissolved upon
finality of this decision." The grounds upon which the Court based its
decision were: (1) because petitioners stayed in China for a period of
fifteen years before returning to the Philippines, they must be considered
as citizens of the Chinese Republic; (2) as petitioners were recognized by
their alien father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the
Chinese law of nationality. While the Court also found that the cable
authorization mentioned heretofore was a forgery, it held that, for the
purpose of the petition before it, "it was immaterial to determine the
genuineness or falsity of the cable authorization. For if the petitioners are
Filipino citizens, they are entitled to remain within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Republic in whatever way they might have entered."
After the denial of herein respondents' motion for re-consideration, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals where they raised the following issues:
(a) that being Filipino citizens by birth, they did not lose their citizenship
nor acquire Chinese citizenship, neither by their prolonged stay in China
nor by their alleged recognition by their Chinese father, and (b) that the
cablegram authorization was not a forgery.

In due time the Court of Appeals rendered the decision now under review
by certiorari, reversing that of the lower court.
Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals found that herein respondents
were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia
Callano, a Filipino citizen, who started living maritally in Malitbog, Leyte, in
1934; that out of their illegitimate union were born the following: Beato,
in Sugod, Leyte, on September 28, 1936; Manuel, in Libagon, Leyte, on June
17, 1941; Gonzalo, in Malitbog, Leyte, on April 17, 1943, and Julio in
Malitbog, Leyte, on January 31, 1945. The Court of Appeals also found that
in 1946, Go Chiao Lin, Emilia and their four sons went to Amoy, China, on
vacation, but Go died there the same year. In 1948, Emilia had to return to
the Philippines as the maid of Consul Eutiquio Sta. Romana because she
was penniless, leaving her children behind. Subsequently the latter were
able to go to Hongkong, where they sought and obtained employment. In
1961, they applied with the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong for
entry into the Philippines as Filipino citizens. On December 12 of that year,
the Consulate received a cablegram from the Department of Foreign
Affairs authorizing it to investigate whether the petitioners for entry were
the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano a Filipino citizen, and, if satisfied,
after a thorough screening, to issue the corresponding document certifying
that they were Filipino citizens. The Consulate made thereafter the
appropriate investigation, and on the basis of evidence presented
consisting of the sworn statements of the applicants, their birth certificates
and blood test reports, said office issued late that month a certificate of
registration and identity to the effect that the applicant had submitted
sufficient evidence of their citizenship and identity and had been allowed
to register in the Consulate as Filipino citizens and to travel directly to the
Philippines.
On December 26 of the same year 1961, they arrived in Manila by plane
from Hongkong. As the Immigration Inspector at the airport was of the
opinion that their travel documents did not constitute conclusive proof of
citizenship, he referred their case to the Board of Special Inquiry No. 2.
Thereupon the latter conducted an investigation at which the respondents
presented oral and documentary evidence to sustain their right to
admission as Filipinos (Exhs. B, D, E and H; pp. 93-98; 99-100; 101-102; 104
of the Record). Upon these evidence, the Board on January 4, 1962,
promulgated a decision finding the Go Callano brothers to be the
illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, and entitled to
admission, as they were in fact admitted, as Filipino citizens.
That Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano a Filipino, lived
maritally in several municipalities of Leyte since 1934 and that out of their
union the four private respondents were born, are facts found, after
appropriate proceedings, first, by the Philippine Consulate General in
Hongkong; second, by the Board of Special Inquiry who investigated their
case in Manila upon their arrival thereat in 1961; third, by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and lastly, by the Court of Appeals. These facts,
according to well settled jurisprudence, are not reviewable by Us in this
appeal by certiorari.
In this appeal, the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the
Commissioner of Immigration maintain the following propositions: (1)
that, in view of the fact that the cable authorization referred to heretofore
is a forgery, all the proceedings had in connection therewith are void and,
as a result, the private respondents must be deported as aliens not
properly documented; (2) that, granting that they were Filipino citizens
when they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that citizenship, firstly, by
staying in China for a period of fifteen years, and secondly, because they
were recognized by their common-law father, they became citizens of the
Republic of China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law.
The Court of First Instance of Manila declared the cablegram authorization
a forgery on the strength of the testimony of Mr. Logan — a handwriting
expert. This finding, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals, the
pertinent portion of its decision being the following:
The next question raised by the petitioners-appellants is whether the
Government has satisfactorily proved that the signature of the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs on the cable authorization, Exhibit 1, is a forgery. Felipe
P. Logan, chief of the questioned documents division of the National
Bureau of Investigation, testified that he made a comparative examination
of the signature of the Department Secretary on Exhibit 1 and the
signatures of the same official on the detail orders, Exhibits 3-G to 3-L, and
from the significant differences in the writing characteristics which he
observed and concluded that the signature on Exhibit 1 was not written by
the Department Secretary.
Before it can be said that the questioned signature is a forgery there must
be competent proof that the specimens are the genuine signature of the
Secretary. According to witness, Logan, he knows that the signatures on
the detail orders are genuine "because they were submitted to me by an
agent who took them from the files of the Department of Foreign Affairs"
(p. 52, transcript). The foregoing testimony of the witness does not prove
the genuineness of the specimen signatures, more so because the agent
who allegedly took the detail others from the files of the Foreign Affairs
Department was not presented as a witness. The NBI expert concluded,
from his observation that there are significant differences between the
questioned signature and the specimen signatures on the detail orders,
that the former is a forgery. But the conclusion is stultified by the
admission of the same witness that even between the specimen signatures
there are variations in the handwriting characteristics of the signatory (p.
24, transcript). Our appreciation of the evidence showed that there are
variations indeed between the specimen signatures (Exhibits S-1 to S-5);
there are distinct similarities even between the questioned signature and
the specimen signatures (cf. Q-5, S-4 and S-5). Upon the evidence
presented by the Government, it cannot be said that the forgery of the
questioned signature has been satisfactorily proven.
Even if the competent proofs were presented showing that the questioned
signature is a forgery, the forgery of the signature on the cable
authorization would not have nullified the documentation of the
petitioners by the consulate in Hongkong. We were not cited to any specific
rule or regulation of the Department of Foreign Affairs stating that the
prior authorization of this Department is necessary before the consular
official abroad can act in documentation cases. On the other hand, as per
resolution of the Cabinet of August 24, 1948, the President suggested and
the Cabinet "resolved to restore the prewar practice of entrusting to our
respective consular officials abroad the duty of receiving all visa
applications and investigating the qualifications of the applicants." (cited
in Espina, Immigration Laws, 1956 Ed., p. 142.) It is evident from the
aforequoted resolution that the Executive branch of the Government
intended that the right to screen applicants for entry into this country
should be lodged in the consular officials abroad. Giving effect to this
intention, the Supreme Court stated in Ng Gioc Lin vs. The Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. L-2175, March 31, 1950, "that
although the foreign service has been placed under the over-all direction
and supervision of the Department of Foreign Affairs by Executive Order
No. 18 (42 Off. Gaz., 2064), this does not necessarily mean that the
Department Secretary takes the place of the consular officers abroad in the
matter of the issuance of passport visas, for the Secretary cannot relieve
those officers of their responsibility under the law. ... The reason of the law
in conferring upon the consuls themselves the duty and power to grant
passports and visas is obvious. The applicant for visa is in a foreign country
and the Philippine consular officer there is naturally in a better position
than the home office to determine through investigation conducted on the
spot whether or not the said applicant is qualified to enter the Philippines."
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the documentation of the
petitioners in Hongkong was not vitiated by a substantial defect even
assuming that it was done without prior authorization from the Foreign
Affairs Department.
It must be stated in this connection that the petitioners became Philippine
citizens because of their relation with their mother who is a Filipino. Their
status was conferred on them neither by the documentation by the
consulate in Hongkong nor by the finding of the Board of Special Inquiry in
Manila. Consequently, whatever defects there are in the proceedings
before the consulate and the board of inquiry cannot affect their status.
Therefore, even assuming that the petitioners were not properly
documented, there is no basis for the finding of the respondent Board that
they are aliens who can be excluded.
Due, therefore, to the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals
regarding the insufficiency of the evidence presented by herein petitioners
to prove the alleged forgery — again, a matter not now within our power
to review — the questioned cablegram must be deemed to be authentic.
But be that as it may, we agree with both the Court of First Instance of
origin and the Court of Appeals that, even assuming that said document
was forged, this would not automatically render void all the proceedings
had before the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong and the Board of Special
Inquiry, both of which ended with a definite finding that the Callanos were
Filipino citizens. That these proceedings and finding can not be nullified by
the Department of Foreign Affairs summarily and without giving the parties
concerned an opportunity to be heard is too evident to require any
demonstration.
To the other questions relied upon by herein petitioners, the following
portions of the decision of the Court of Appeals would seem to be sufficient
answer:
The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at
birth subsequently acquired Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of
Nationality by reason of recognition or a prolonged stay in China, is a fit
subject for the Chinese law and the Chinese court to determine, which
cannot be resolved by a Philippine court without encroaching on the legal
system of China. For, the settled rule of international law, affirmed by the
Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by
the International Court of Justice, is that "Any question as to whether a
person possesses the nationality of a particular state should be determined
in accordance with laws of that state ." (quoted in Salonga, Private
International Law, 1957 Ed., p. 112.) There was no necessity of deciding
that question because so far as concerns the petitioners' status, the only
question in this proceeding is: Did the petitioners lose their Philippine
citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or the happening of
certain events in China? In deciding this question no foreign law can be
applied. The petitioners are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their
status must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in
conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which
provides as follows: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2,
of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law," which implies that the
question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be
determined by no other than the Philippine law.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No.
106, provides that a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship;
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
a foreign country; rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the
armed forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization; declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of
the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman by
marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by their
alien father is not among the ground for losing Philippine citizenship under
Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former
status by reason of such recognition. About the only mode of losing
Philippine citizenship which closely bears on the petitioners is
renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be cited in support of the
conclusion that petition lost their Philippine citizenship because the law
requires an express renunciation which means a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication; a
renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. (Opinion No. 69 of
the Secretary of Justice, Series of 1940.) Indeed, as the Supreme Court held
in U.S. v. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, a case for deportation, where Ong, a
natural child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, born in the
Philippines, was brought by his parents to China when he was 4 years old,
where he remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to the Philippines at 25
years of age, "The fact that a minor child in those conditions was taken to
China and remained there for several years is not sufficient ground upon
which to hold that he has changed his nationality, when, after reaching his
majority, he did not express his desire to choose the nationality of his
father." The import of the foregoing pronouncement is that of itself a
protracted stay in a foreign country does not amount to renunciation.
Moreover, herein petitioners were all minors when they where brought to
China in 1446. They were without legal capacity to renounce their status.
Upon their return to the Philippines only Beato Go Callano had attained
the age of majority, but even as to him there could not have been
renunciation because he did not manifest by direct and appropriate
language that he was disclaiming Philippine citizenship. On the contrary,
after he has attained the age of majority, he applied for registration as a
Philippine citizen and sought entry into this country, which are clear indicia
of his intent to continue his former status. The foregoing shows that the
petitioners have not lost their Philippine citizenship.
Lasty, petitioners claim that the private respondents are barred from
questioning the decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners dated
August 21, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration on the same date, because they did not appeal from either
to the Secretary of Justice.
We find this to be without merit for the reason that, as stated before, both
orders were issued without previous notice and hearing and were,
therefore, in violation of due process. As a matter of fact, even in the case
of an alien,decisions of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, like that
of any other administrative body, do not constitute res judicata so as to bar
a re-examination of the alien's right to enter or stay (Ong Se Lun, et al. vs.
Board of Immigration, G.R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954), and the
courts can grant relief if said Board abused its powers, or committed
serious legal errors, or denied the alien a fair hearing (Lao Tang Bun vs.
Fabre, 81 Phil. 682).
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs. It is
so ordered.
G.R. No. 179851 April 18, 2008
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EPHRAIM M. TUNGOL, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court filed by petitioner Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., pursuant to Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution, challenging the May 8, 2007 and September
28, 2007 Resolutions1 of the public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) First Division and En Banc, respectively.
The facts:
Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the
May 14, 2007 elections. Both filed their respective Certificates of
Candidacy (COC).
On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that
Ugdoracion's declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material
misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a "green card" holder or
a permanent resident of the United States of America (USA). Specifically,
Ugdoracion stated in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol,
Philippines for forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a
permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country.
It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on
September 26, 2001. Accordingly, the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Services2 (USINS) issued him Alien Number 047-894-254.3
For his part, Ugdoracion argued that, in our jurisdiction, domicile is
equivalent to residence, and he retained his domicile of origin
(Albuquerque, Bohol) notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of
permanent residency in the USA. Ugdoracion then pointed to the following
documents as proof of his substantial compliance with the residency
requirement: (1) a residence certificate dated May 5, 2006; (2) an
application for a new voter's registration dated October 12, 2006; and (3)
a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status dated
October 18, 2006.
On May 8, 2007, the COMELEC First Division promulgated one of the herein
questioned resolutions canceling Ugdoracion's COC and removing his
name from the certified list of candidates for the position of Mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. Posthaste, on May 11, 2007, Ugdoracion filed a
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution arguing in the main
that his status as a "green card" holder was not of his own making but a
mere offshoot of a petition filed by his sister. He admitted his intermittent
travels to the USA, but only to visit his siblings, and short working stint
thereat to cover his subsistence for the duration of his stay.
In yet another setback, the COMELEC En Banc issued the other questioned
resolution denying Ugdoracion's motion for reconsideration and affirming
the First Division's finding of material misrepresentation in Ugdoracion's
COC.
Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC.
Subsequently, Tungol and the COMELEC filed their respective Comments4
on the petition. On March 7, 2008, Ugdoracion filed an Extremely Urgent
Motion to Reiterate Issuance of an Injunctive Writ.5 On March 11, 2008,
we issued a Status Quo Order. The next day, March 12, 2008, Ugdoracion
filed a Consolidated Reply to respondents' Comments.
Ugdoracion's argument focuses on his supposed involuntary acquisition of
a permanent resident status in the USA which, as he insists, did not result
in the loss of his domicile of origin. He bolsters this contention with the
following facts:
1. He was born in Albuquerque, Bohol, on October 15, 1940 and as such, is
a natural-born Filipino citizen;
2. He was baptized in the Catholic Church of Sta. Monica Paris in
Albuquerque, Bohol on February 2, 1941;
3. He was raised in said municipality;
4. He grew up in said municipality;
5. He raised his own family and established a family home thereat;
6. He served his community for twelve (12) years and had been the former
Mayor for three (3) terms;
7. From 1986 to 1988, he was appointed as Officer-in-Charge;
8. He ran for the same position in 1988 and won;
9. He continued his public service as Mayor until his last term in the year
1998;
10. After his term as Mayor, he served his people again as Councilor;
11. He built his house at the very place where his ancestral home was
situated;
12. He still acquired several real properties at the same place;
13. He never lost contact with the people of his town; and
14. He secured a residence certificate on May 5, 2006 at Western
Poblacion, Albuquerque, Bohol and faithfully paid real property taxes.6
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in canceling Ugdoracion's COC for material
misrepresentation. Essentially, the issue hinges on whether the
representations contained in Ugdoracion's COC, specifically, that he
complied with the residency requirement and that he does not have "green
card" holder status, are false.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's cancellation of
Ugdoracion's COC for material misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petition
must fail.
Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
unmistakable terms, requires that the facts stated in the COC must be true,
and any false representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for
cancellation thereof, thus:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before
the election.
The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains
to material fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact
refers to a candidate's qualification for elective office such as one's
citizenship and residence.7 Our holding in Salcedo II v. COMELEC8
reiterated in Lluz v. COMELEC9 is instructive, thus:
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy,
the Comelec is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate
upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. x x x
xxxx
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation
mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed
by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate- the
right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of
candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as
a "material representation," the court has interpreted this phrase in a line
of decisions applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation
contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for
elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave-to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the
law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be
voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.
xxxx
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under
Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other
words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications for public office.
Viewed in this light, the question posed by Ugdoracion is hardly a novel
one.
Ugdoracion urges us, however, that he did not lose his domicile of origin
because his acquisition of a "green card" was brought about merely by his
sister's petition. He maintains that, except for this unfortunate detail, all
other facts demonstrate his retention of residence in Albuquerque, Bohol.
Believing in the truth of these circumstances, he simply echoed in his COC
a truthful statement that he is a resident of Albuquerque, Bohol, and,
therefore, eligible and qualified to run for Mayor thereof.
We are not convinced. Ugdoracion's assertions miss the mark completely.
The dust had long settled over the implications of a "green card" holder
status on an elective official's qualification for public office. We ruled in
Caasi v. Court of Appeals10 that a Filipino citizen's acquisition of a
permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. In short, the "green card" status
in the USA is a renunciation of one's status as a resident of the
Philippines.11
We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of election
laws, is synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return (animus
revertendi) and remain (animus manendi).12 It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.13
Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every
person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon
abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of
law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or
intention.
In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties' naturally
conflicting perspectives on domicile, we are guided by three basic rules,
namely: (1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; and
(3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.14
The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only
when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one,
and acts which correspond with such purpose.15 In the instant case,
however, Ugdoracion's acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status
in the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his
status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his
domicile of origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of
choice, which is the USA.
The contention that Ugdoracion's USA resident status was acquired
involuntarily, as it was simply the result of his sister's beneficence, does
not persuade. Although immigration to the USA through a petition filed by
a family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA immigration laws,16 the
petitioned party is very much free to accept or reject the grant of resident
status. Permanent residency in the USA is not conferred upon the
unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is not bestowed by operation of law.17 And
to reiterate, a person can have only one residence or domicile at any given
time.
Moreover, Ugdoracion's contention is decimated by Section 6818 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 40(f)19 of the Local Government Code,
which disqualifies a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign
country, unless said person waives his status. Corollary thereto, we are in
complete accord with the COMELEC's ruling on the validity and effect of
the waiver of permanent resident status supposedly executed by
Ugdoracion, to wit:
Following the Caasi case, in order to reacquire residency in the Philippines,
there must be a waiver of status as a greencard holder as manifested by
some acts or acts independent of and prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, [Ugdoracion] presented a photocopy of a
document entitled Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status
dated October 18, 2006. A close scrutiny of this document however
discloses that it is a mere application for abandonment of his status as
lawful permanent resident of the USA. It does not bear any note of
approval by the concerned US official. Thus, [w]e cannot consider the same
as sufficient waiver of [Ugdoracion's] status of permanent residency in the
USA. Besides, it is a mere photocopy, unauthenticated and uncertified by
the legal custodian of such document.
Assuming arguendo that said application was duly approved, [Ugdoracion]
is still disqualified for he failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement. [Ugdoracion] has applied for abandonment of residence only
on 18 October 2006 or for just about seven (7) months prior to the May 14,
2007 elections, which clearly fall short of the required period.
 election does not substitute for the specific requirements of law on a
The Permanent Resident Card or the so-called "greencard" issued by the person's eligibility for public office which he lacked, and does not cure his
US government to respondent does not merely signify transitory stay in the material misrepresentation which is a valid ground for the cancellation of
USA for purpose of work, pleasure, business or study but to live there his COC.
permanently. This is the reason why the law considers immigrants to have
lost their residency in the Philippines.20 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
COMELEC Resolutions dated May 8, 2007 and September 28, 2007 are
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not AFFIRMED. The STATUS QUO Order issued on March 11, 2008 is hereby
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground LIFTED.
for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as
already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not SO ORDERED.
only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office),
but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for
public office.21 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
Ugdoracion claims that he did not misrepresent his eligibility for the public The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
office of Mayor. He categorically declares that he merely stated in his COC FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
that he is a resident of the Philippines and in possession of all the
qualifications and suffers from none of the disqualifications prescribed by x-----------------------------x
law. Unfortunately for Ugdoracion, Section 74 specifically requires a
statement in the COC that the candidate is "not a permanent resident or G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
an immigrant to a foreign country." Ugdoracion's cause is further lost
because of the explicit pronouncement in his COC that he had resided in ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,
Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines before the May 14, 2007 elections for vs.
forty-one (41) years.22 Ineluctably, even if Ugdoracion might have been of RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
the mistaken belief that he remained a resident of the Philippines, he hid
the fact of his immigration to the USA and his status as a "green card" x-----------------------------x
holder.
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
Finally, we are not unmindful of the fact that Ugdoracion appears to have
won the election as Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. Sadly, winning the VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes
are deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an
inestimable acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either
by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to
hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment
of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver
screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-
born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and
American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and
common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself
to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09
January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission
on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based
the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -
first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January
2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary
exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy
of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her
having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a
certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the
National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that
no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by
Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that
there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan
F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification
issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan
Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name
of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a
copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office
during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed
during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of
merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision
of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G.
R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would
include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other,
docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-
born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code –
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false" –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section
52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution,
the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 653
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987
Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was
aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A
contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental
right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or
should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No.
161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead
take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional
provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in
the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole
judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this
Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as "not (being) justiciable"
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An
Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try,
Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect
and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members
of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary
form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly
affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would
now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or
a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or
Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5 In such context, the election
contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al.,
vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would
have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by
Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer
to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of
an office.6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the
constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and
be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty
could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and
entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the
other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest
of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In
the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship,
which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as
rights to property, personal liberty and justice.9 Its meaning expanded
during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed
the right to participate in the exercise of political power.10 The 20th
century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social
security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final
stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village,
might well be the internationalization of citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime
but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In church records, the
natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of
the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during
the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however,
were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was
extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;15 however, three royal decrees were undisputably made
applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining
the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and finally,
the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine
Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which
the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included,
would be governed by special laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of
who were Spanish citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside
of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in
the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole
colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An
accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in
force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain
and the United States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the
United States would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry
on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in
the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory
in which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United
States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws
and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in
the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of
the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April
1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3)
an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from
11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was
extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus
soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."26

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by
William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he
initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos."
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law
restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided
for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of
the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus
soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to
an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with
existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to
their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship
to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
–
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes
of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis28 – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis,
could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.
Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would
now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that
the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal
grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in
evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father,
Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of
their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan
F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino
citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was
born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some
of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with
some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that
FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and
Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate
of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the
last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the
admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative
to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos,
Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those
material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified
true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or
is recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ,
constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries
made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed
to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most
such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely
the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could
thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870
when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue
that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of
from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about
such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place
during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo
Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death
was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the
Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete
records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or
civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship
or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules
under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil
Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the
Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge
the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered
the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.33 In
Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which
is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of
both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone
swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that
might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in
any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there
must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the
child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties,
nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There
being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs.
Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a document as
proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means
by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when
the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and
might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,
"authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of
voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of
the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a
private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173,
and Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or

"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have
a period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x xxx x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of
the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child
should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a
natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was
born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950.
Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and
non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely
govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any,
to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil
Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the
domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a society for the
protection of private interests."37
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of
the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of
their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division
of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general,
the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties
of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national
law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant
in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on
successional rights and family relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his political
status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property
laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members
of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign
blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the
Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil
law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil
Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and
family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is
in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has
occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister
of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might
be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing
in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do
hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x xxx xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our
mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate
until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between
1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x xxx xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate
child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,42
this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now
the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from
the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to
Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a
certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced
by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was
born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who
were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner
contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of
his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the
ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44
and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G.
Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of
them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under
the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look
closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan.
Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got
his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore
was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an
obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father,
were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter
dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs.
Vivo.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child,
and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established
long ago by People vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x
But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child
from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion
of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of
this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at
bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure
a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with
the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help
the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that
the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month
and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is.
Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the
position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his
certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve
a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly
be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter
of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place
of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend
to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship
to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that
he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation,
which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA
No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008
NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner,
vs.
ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361,
affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division2 disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on
the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United
States (US) citizenship.
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a
naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. 3
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate
General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19
June 2006 an Order of Approval4 of petitioner’s request, and on the same
day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006,
the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.6
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman,
Camiguin. 7
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for
Disqualification8 before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against
petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as
required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as
follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In his Answer9 dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper10 dated 8 May 2007,
petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his
Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his
foreign citizenship.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held.
Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice
Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite
renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained
that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any
elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The COMELEC Second Division did not consider Valles v. COMELEC12 and
Mercado v. Manzano13 applicable to the instant case, since Valles and
Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner who lost his
Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus,
decreed in the aforementioned Resolution that:
ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus
assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such
disqualification.14
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating
his position that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before the Los Angeles PCG and his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy
sufficed as an effective renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to the
said Motion was an "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 27 June
2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship.15 The
COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner’s Motion in a Resolution16 dated
28 September 2007 for lack of merit.
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil
Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, where he
presented for the first time an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship"17 dated 7 February
2007. He avers that he executed an act of renunciation of his US citizenship,
separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he
took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of the case during the appeal. He
attributes the delay in the presentation of the affidavit to his former
counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that said piece
of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an
identical document entitled "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" on 27
June 2007 after he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy.18
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "CITIZENSHIP
RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003," SPECIFICALLY SECTION
5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC
OFFICE;
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS
THE PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND
III
WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT
WOULD RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF
CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.19
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is
whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14
May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of his US citizenship.

This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his
Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement
of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these
are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of
the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country,
must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears
allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under
Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also
reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign
citizenship.
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one
contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any
person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such an
oath reads:
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the
facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who
either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with
or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.20
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath
of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the
Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to
accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably
complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720
and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic
Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.
Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel
Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of
foreign citizenship:
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath." I think it’s very good, ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER. … I think it’s already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. Ah… but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No…no, renouncing foreign citizenship.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. What’s your problem, Boy?
Those seeking elective office in the Philippines.
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking
that ano…
CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship.
When he runs for office, he will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not
only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if
they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a
candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship,
namely, Philippine citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3
of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn
renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears
to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for
all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those
who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles21 and Mercado,22
wherein the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of
candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of this Court in Valles and
Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially
governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.
In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein
private respondent Manzano was sought under another law, Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code, which reads:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term "dual
citizenship" vis-à-vis the concept of "dual allegiance." At the time this Court
decided the cases of Valles and Mercado on 26 May 1999 and 9 August
2000, respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our legislature.23
Lopez v. Commission on Elections24 is the more fitting precedent for this
case since they both share the same factual milieu. In Lopez, therein
petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired
his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225. Thereafter,
Lopez filed his candidacy for a local elective position, but failed to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This Court
unequivocally declared that despite having garnered the highest number
of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a candidate for
a local elective position due to his failure to comply with the requirements
of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant
Petition for Certiorari, an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship,"25 which he supposedly
executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts
forward in the Petition at bar a new theory of his case–that he complied
with the requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of his
foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of Candidacy. This new
theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took before
the COMELEC–that he complied with the requirement of renunciation by
his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the
Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no
more need for a separate act of renunciation.
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative
agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court,
as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule.26 Courts have
neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to
go to trial haphazardly.27
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of
evidence.28 Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February
2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In
the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by
analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence
not formally presented:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC,
respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this
document would be contrary to due process. 29 Additionally, the
piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.30
The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the
COMELEC an identical document, "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship"
executed on 27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27 June
2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The
COMELEC en banc eventually refused to reconsider said document for
being belatedly executed. What was extremely perplexing, not to mention
suspect, was that petitioner did not submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007
or mention it at all in the proceedings before the COMELEC, considering
that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on and in
existence before the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance
with law.
The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him
against presenting this crucial piece of evidence, is lame and unconvincing.
If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioner’s
counsel, and even petitioner himself, could have easily adduced it to be a
crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for
petitioner to submit as much evidence as possible in support of his case,
than the risk of presenting too little for which he could lose.
And even if it were true, petitioner’s excuse for the late presentation of the
Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not change the outcome of petitioner’s
case.
It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct,
negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be
heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer
proceeded differently.31 The only exceptions to the general rule -- that a
client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds
acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results
in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality.32
These exceptions are not attendant in this case.
The Court cannot sustain petitioner’s averment that his counsel was
grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7
February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of
attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof,
failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case
-- unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly
presenting his case -- do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence,
such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel.33
Also belying petitioner’s claim that his former counsel was grossly
negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously used his former
counsel’s theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an
adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court that his oaths
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG
and in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign
citizenship which the law requires. Having asserted the same defense in
the instant Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his continued reliance
on and complete belief in the position taken by his former counsel, despite
the former’s incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly
negligent.
Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his
counsel was inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as
discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his
Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a
decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing
his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the
blame on his former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to
escape the consequences of his former counsel’s acts, because, otherwise,
it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to
reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. 34
Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,35 where therein petitioner
De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer
proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan’s
denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in
filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any
chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly
not the case in the Petition at bar.
Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel
actively defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings,
and presenting evidence on petitioner’s behalf. Moreover, petitioner’s
cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken
reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to
an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that
clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel.36
Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number
of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local
elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election
requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the
highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or
amount to a waiver of, such requirement.37 The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on
citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person
seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to
this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.38 The application of the constitutional and statutory
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.39
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28
September 2007 of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the
Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, is
AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local
Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of
said municipality by virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and
WILMA P. PAGADUAN, Respondents.
SERENO,*
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ *
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor
of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen
ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.
The Case
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court seeking to nullify Resolution2 dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010.
The assailed resolution (a) reversed the Order3 dated November 30, 2010
of COMELEC Second Division dismissing petitioner’s appeal; and (b)
affirmed the consolidated Decision4 dated October 22, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, declaring
petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and
ineligible to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.
The Undisputed Facts
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino
parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant
to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved
and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn
issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased
to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the
2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during
the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She
obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P.
Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered
voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions
similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective
post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute
a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since
September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed
that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed
in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that
her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
Ruling of the RTC
In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held
that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the
petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she
filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the
document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath.
Consequently, the RTC’s decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR
of [private respondents] and AGAINST (petitioner):
1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and
ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union;
2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor
of said municipality; and
3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the COMELEC
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by
the Second Division in its Order10 dated November 30, 2010 for failure to
pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for
reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its
Resolution11 dated September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the
substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The COMELEC en
banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also
granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private
respondents.
The decretal portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby
RESOLVES as follows:
1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;
2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and
3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the
COMELEC en banc.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen
on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a
Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the
2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens
seeking elective office does not apply to her.
She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a
mandatory requirement. In support thereof, she cites portions of the
Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing
the sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A.
No. 9225.
She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her
eligibility since they failed to do so when she filed certificates of candidacy
for the 2007 and 2010 elections.
Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take
cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal instead of remanding
the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the
appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the
RTC’s judgment.
The Issues
Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en
banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement;
II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment
rendered by a trial court in an election case; III) Whether the private
respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the
petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the petitioner’s eligibility
to run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma
requirement.
The Court’s Ruling
I. An appeal may be simultaneously
reinstated and definitively resolved
by the COMELEC en banc in a
resolution disposing of a motion for
reconsideration.
The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is
arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, viz:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions,
and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition
of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on
interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division
which issued the order.
Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the
COMELEC en banc’s prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration,
there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the
substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of
remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it.
We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC en banc when it proceeded to decide the substantive
merits of the petitioner’s appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.
Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc, the petitioner not only proffered arguments on the
issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting
documents13 to her contention that she is no longer an Australian citizen.
The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable decision, cannot be
permitted to disavow the en banc’s exercise of discretion on the
substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the
first place.
The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the
Division that initially dismissed them cannot serve as a precedent to the
disposition of the petitioner’s appeal. A decision or resolution of any
adjudicating body can be disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioner’s
argument would be virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC en
banc’s adjudicatory powers.
More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second
Division would be unnecessarily circuitous and repugnant to the rule on
preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, Section
15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.14
II. The COMELEC en banc has the
power to order discretionary
execution of judgment.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s submission that the COMELEC en banc
has no power to order the issuance of a writ of execution and that such
function belongs only to the court of origin.
There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order
discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory
application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule
41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.15
Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal
may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost
jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision
vis-à-vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases
which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial
courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its
original or appellate jurisdiction.
III. Private respondents are not
estopped from questioning
petitioner’s eligibility to hold public
office.
The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she
filed certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate
as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.
Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are
two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a
registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of
candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
– A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election; and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of
any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer
on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. (Emphasis ours)
Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain
candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever
reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has
another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of
the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code.17
The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and
their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot
serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto
petition under Section 253.
IV. Petitioner is disqualified from
running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey
the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in
the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
(Emphasis ours)
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly
re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she
held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public
office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra,
Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to
the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner
pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in
conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission
on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor
deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to interpret the law
according to its true intent is exercised only when the law is ambiguous or
of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to
apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there
is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for
application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at
the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of
two or more possible meanings.20

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v.
COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino
American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in
the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all
foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also
expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an
officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear
and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that
Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run
for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who
either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with
or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath
of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the
Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to
accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably
complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720
and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic
Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.
Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel
Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of
foreign citizenship;
xxxx
The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or
retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take
their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to
explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections,
Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.23
(Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours)
Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be
disqualified from running for the position of vice-mayor for his failure to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the
above rulings to the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of the
provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning and must thus be read literally.25 The foreign citizenship
must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.
It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has
intended to convey.26 Even a resort to the Journal of the House of
Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:
INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER
Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only
limited to natural-born Filipinos and not to naturalized Filipinos.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.
Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides
that natural-born Filipinos who have dual citizenship shall continue to
enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought
clarification as to whether they can indeed run for public office provided
that they renounce their foreign citizenship.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only
have to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship
before any authorized public officer.
Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the
Bill provides them with full civil and political rights as Filipino citizens, the
measure also discriminates against them since they are required to make
a sworn renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when they run
for public office. He thereafter proposed to delete this particular provision.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts
regarding any issues that might be raised pertaining to the citizenship of
any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein
the United States considered a naturalized American still as an American
citizen even when he cast his vote in Israel during one of its elections.
Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different
because in voting, one is not required to renounce his foreign citizenship.
He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office must
renounce their foreign citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a
contradiction in the Bill.
Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired
foreign citizenship and are now entitled to reacquire their Filipino
citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he likewise
inquired whether they will also be considered qualified to run for the
highest elective positions in the country.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is
that they make a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that
they comply with the residency and registration requirements as provided
for in the Constitution.
Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens at the time of birth without having to
perform an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship.
Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill
seeks the repeal of CA No. 63. The repeal, he said, would help Filipino
citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With
regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had
decided to include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the
Constitution provides for the accountability of public officers.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn
renunciation of a foreign citizenship will only become a pro forma
requirement.
On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born
Filipino citizens who became foreign citizens and who have reacquired
their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born
citizens, and therefore qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-
presidency or for a seat in Congress. He also agreed with the observation
of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
country at the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in effect,
return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status
of being a natural-born citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino
citizenship.
As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating
against naturalized Filipino citizens and Filipino citizens by election who are
all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then suggested that the
Bill be amended by not considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos
who had renounced their Filipino citizenship and acquired foreign
citizenship. He said that they should be considered as repatriated citizens.
In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note
of the latter’s comments on the matter. He however stressed that after a
lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and
Foreign Affairs had decided to revert back to the status of being natural-
born citizens those natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign
citizenship but now wished to reacquire their Filipino citizenship.
Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship
by virtue of her marriage to a foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino
citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply taking her oath
before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair
to other Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born. He
reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their
citizenship by pledging allegiance to another sovereignty should not be
allowed to revert back to their status of being natural-born citizens once
they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored that this
will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.
On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the
position of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan stated that this will defeat the purpose
of the Bill.
Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens
who acquired foreign citizenships and later decided to regain their Filipino
citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.
Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme
Court had ruled that only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered as
natural-born citizens.
In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those
whose mothers are Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution and who
elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not
deemed as natural-born citizens.
In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case,
repatriation results in the recovery of one’s original nationality and only
naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.
On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of
being natural-born citizens to natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired
foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary session
will decide on the matter.27
The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative
Javier’s statement; she conveniently disregards the preceding and
succeeding discussions in the records.
The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that
Representative Javier’s statement ought to be understood within the
context of the issue then being discussed, that is – whether former natural-
born citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed
law will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens and thus be
qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-born
Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.
It was Representative Javier’s position that they should be considered as
repatriated Filipinos and not as natural-born citizens since they will have
to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect
their citizenship. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they
will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To reconcile the
renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born
citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their
citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.
Petitioner’s argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with
respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino so as
to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not
perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or
even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those
who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office
has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to
complement Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public officers’
primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:
Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a
revered person or thing, that one’s statement is true or that one will be
bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites
punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal
effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the
testimony is false.28
Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an
oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officer’s abandonment
of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines.
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is
only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified
or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution
and the legislature clearly demand otherwise.
Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under
which she is already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to
judicial notice. We disagree.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proven.29 To prove a foreign law, the party invoking
it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that
the existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a
testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in
the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a
section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time
material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization
cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country
on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not
meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis
for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
"satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a
number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization
Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a
competent proof of that law.30
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948
through any of the above methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and
COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the law
during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing
that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was
unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding
the same.
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as
competent evidence the said letter in view of the photocopy of a
Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School
Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong31 that the
framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the
actual status of the other citizenship.
This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of
the legislature must do so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans
the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian
Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we
would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise
to require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign
will and power of the people of this Republic.32
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as
an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has
previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign
citizenship,33 such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the
additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.34
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter
of popularity.35
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-
acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized
public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.36 The rule
applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like
petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not.
It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public
office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific
only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for
public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance
with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18,
2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office.
Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she
is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections
en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the
COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the
COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding
that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is
solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado

is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he
lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which
states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and
perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of
all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the
following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws,
legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado
has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing
the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14
April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July
2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco"
appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM
listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring
the respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within
three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in
default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010
elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
submitting the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia
Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado,
attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has
been conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral
house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of
his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work
and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr.
served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from
15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying
that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First
Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding
that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16
whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government
Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division
disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with
the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his
US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that
Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he
only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.
We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s
unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As
noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an
official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending
to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested
himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved
solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification
and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby
GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of
1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En
Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the
Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the
following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the
evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of
Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his
American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country
other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the
issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport
after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed
out of time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for
disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the
elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from
jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for
quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for
mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of
votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling
argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order
of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of
Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as
the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes,
should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for
Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all
motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a
decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or
benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that
under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the
proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is
questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for
disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been
rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer,
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the
dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order
of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take
effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of
the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed
well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April
2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the
First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the
following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the
respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never
became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that
the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a
dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More
succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce"
what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al.
is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who,
after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens
who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus
discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict
conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present
case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who
chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate
to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours
with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US
passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was
only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance
of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three
(3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine
passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified
true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on
the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010,
January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that
the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine
passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs
might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control
during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes
cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided
for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of
citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a
person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed
that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until
he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant
case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be
presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American
passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly
abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use
of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite
his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary
to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship.
Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only
for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National
and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the
office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time
he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent
obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s
failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law,
his having received the highest number of votes does not validate his
election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed
before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not
make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle
of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional
and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who
expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected
their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring
Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US
passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the
2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of
the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his
continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding
of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to
affirm the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks
the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code,
claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in
order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will
be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of
the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a
disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier
made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use
of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s
qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when
respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division
Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered
the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an
interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that
in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be
considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC
is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or
disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc
correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the
Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for
the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this
provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that
the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that
the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in
Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced
by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to
elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original
petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the
intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification
case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation
but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for
an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public
office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to
run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice:
first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American
citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his
American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is
open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to
travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on
30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and
30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four
times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had
earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and
voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen,
with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply
be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court
declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated
in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very
oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days
after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American
citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as
a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US
passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed
on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is
distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand,
are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009,
Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and
American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he
was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a
period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which
date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It
must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that
"Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his
"Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply
with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive
acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public
office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens
from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were
to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but
who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any
public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation
that he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18
June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine
passport three (3) months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese
national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for
the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less
of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a
positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration
officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he
was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used
the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the
COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used
his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not
have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not
correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to
filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way
that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation,
his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use
of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that
comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance
to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign
citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office
demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing
his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he
took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation.
He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which
is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-
examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-
recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province
of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe
Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for
that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was
reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June
4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory
prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four year
interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The
Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not
entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x
with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison
and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from
that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the
former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality
by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes,
in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to
correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding
the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it
cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots.
In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the
manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power,
and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a
plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real
victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there
is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality
of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the
personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis
supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other
case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier
statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the
word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the
Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case
based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of
votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of
the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June
1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was
eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the
second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those
proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all
subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect;
and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the
order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional
issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So
ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not
even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the
Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects
thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible
candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter
established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible
candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner
and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a
wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been
a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or
any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been
passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the
opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly
qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility
does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor
cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements
for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law
requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain
disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective
public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes
a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually
garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications
of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder
the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to
occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51
(Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52
where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be
interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be
considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be
disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate
of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon
v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to
fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket
and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with
dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections.
For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the
law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the
electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a
candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is
Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local
government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is
Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section
78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the
petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the
obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know
that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have.
Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly
valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to
delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself
to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard
of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through
the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow
the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is
not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are
disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is
made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for
electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the
election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered
at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will
of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in
favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total
expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the
qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate
as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their
victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not
possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set
in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when
the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible
ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a
prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified
one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count
is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has
assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on
a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under
this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his
disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after
the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves
his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as
provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier
discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he
filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run
for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition
serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate
of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have
produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible
to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he
was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory
character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's
disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have
been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210164 August 18, 2015
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents,
CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, CJ:
In Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 1 we emphasized the
variable nature of a person's citizenship, which cannot be determined with
finality or become the basis of rules that can be applied to any and all
proceedings thereafter. We said:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. 2
In election contests, this pronouncement gains significance, as elective
local officials are constitutionally allowed to run and serve for three
consecutive terms. 3 While citizenship is a continuing requirement that
must be possessed not only at the time of election or assumption of office,
but also during the entire tenure of the official,4 it is not a continuing
disqualification to run for and hold public office.5
As such, each case involving the question of an elective official's citizenship
must be treated anew in accordance with the surrounding relevant facts
and applicable laws.
In this regard, I agree with some of the statements of J Brion in his
Dissenting Opinion. Indeed, the Court's ruling in Maquiling v. COMELEc6
went only so far as to determine whether Rommel C. Arnado (Amado) was
qualified to run for public office in the 2010 elections. It did not operate as,
nor was it intended to be, a final determination of Amado's citizenship that
would forever derail his career as a public official.
In Maquiling, we reiterated that natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country may qualify to run for public office upon taking the
Oath of Allegiance 7 and making a sworn renunciation of their foreign
citizenship.8 Arnado subjected his citizenship to attack when he continued
to use his United States (US) passport to travel in and out of the country
despite previously renouncing his US citizenship. The Court ruled that his
use of his US passport nullified the effect of his previous renunciation of
US citizenship. While he did not lose his Philippine citizenship in the
process, he reverted to his status as a dual citizen and remained as such at
the time that he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 2010 elections. Under Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code, those with dual citizenship are disqualified
from running for any elective local position.
Considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Amado's oath of
renunciation, the simple act of taking the oath anew would have been
enough compliance with the requirement of the law.
The Decision found that from the time Amado used his US passport to
travel in and out of the country up to the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy for the succeeding elections in 2013, there had been no change
in his circumstances. 9 He still had not made a sworn renunciation of his
US citizenship. Thus, the ruling in Maquiling still applies: that Arnado had
dual citizenship when he filed for his candidacy on 1 October 2012.
It did not matter that Maquiling was promulgated months after Arnado
had filed for candidacy. Since he was not totally unaware that the use of
his US passport might have adverse consequences on his candidacy for the
2013 elections, the Decision concludes that he should have been prudent
enough to remedy whatever defect there might have been in his
citizenship.10
Even J. Brion concedes that Amado could have been more circumspect in
order to secure his qualification to run for public office. 11 However, it is
insisted that the members of this Court should remove the present case
from the shadow of Maquiling and arrive at its resolution based merely on
the attendant factual and legal considerations specific to it.12
It cannot be denied that by virtue of its being a decision of the Court that
joins the country's body of laws as jurisprudence, Maquiling serves as a
"legal consideration" in the resolution of the present case. Maquiling' s
application cannot be helped, especially since the Decision therein hinged
not only on relevant laws, but largely on the facts then presented before
the Court. Thus, while the legal conclusion in Maquiling was not a final
determination of Amado's citizenship - as it applied only for purposes of
the 2010 elections - the facts on which its legal conclusion was founded
cannot be totally ignored.
A person's citizenship may be "threshed out again and again"13 in every
proceeding as long as it becomes relevant and necessary. Except for some
clearly unmeritorious cases, it is always a good idea to decide on the
merits, especially in election controversies in which the law is sometimes
placed at odds with the will of the people. At the same time, the Court puts
a premium on economy, and where previous declarations of one's
citizenship become pertinent, those cases may be used as a take-off point
if only to emphasize the differences and similarities, as well as the
measures that were taken in the interim.
One point of contention between the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion
is the finding that Arnado used his US passport for his travels in and out of
the country on 12 January 2010 and 23 March 2010.
One point of contention between the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion
is the finding that Arnado used his US passport for his travels in and out of
the country on 12 January 2010 and 23 March 2010.
Maquiling indeed made a finding that Arnado used his US passport for
travel on those dates. In the Court Resolution dated 2 July 2013, we said:
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will
not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.1âwphi1 They are
accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this
Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily
disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to
compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly
appreciated.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First
Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he
renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC
En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times,
and which agreed with Amado's claim that he only used his U.S. passport
on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The
COMELEC En Banc argued that Amado was able to prove that he used his
Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January 2010,
31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June
2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21
January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines
using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his
nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel
record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also
presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009,
upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and upon
arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him
for his use." This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts.
Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The
records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he
already received his Philippine passport. Arnado's travel records show that
he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010,
and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of
the facts that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Amado
obtained his Philippine passport.14 (Emphases supplied)
It is important to clarify that the certification from the Bureau of
Immigration indicated that Amado arrived in the country using his US
passport on 12 January 2010 and 23 March 2010.15 The Court gave full
credence to the certification, not only because it carried with it the
presumption of regularity, but more important, Arnado never bothered to
refute the contents thereof.
On the basis of this finding, the Court rejected the claim that Amado's use
of his US passport several times were mere isolated acts that were done
only because he was not yet issued his Philippine passport.16
To my mind, this is the turning point of Maquiling that regrettably still
applies in this case: that whatever professions of faith and allegiance to the
Republic that Amado claims when his citizenship is in question, the fact
remains that during the instances that he used his US passport despite
having a Philippine passport in his possession, those same professions
became hollow. And, that up to the filing of Amado's Certificate of
Candidacy for the 2013 elections, he failed to remedy the fatal blow that
such repeated use of his US passport dealt on his electoral qualifications.
I therefore concur with the DISMISSAL of the PETITION.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 148-B Phil. 773 (1971).
2 Id. at 855.
3 CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.
4 Republic v. De la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 104654, 105715 & 105735, 6 June 1994,
232 SCRA 785; Labo. Jr. v. COMELEC, 257 Phil. 1 (1989); Frivaldo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989, 174 SCRA 245.
5 Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 327 Phil. 521 (1996).
6 G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
7 Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of2003) states:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I , solemnly swear (or affirm) that .I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines,
and 1 hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
8 Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
9 Decision, G.R. No. 210164, p. 14.
10 Id. at 15.
11 Dissenting Opinion of J Brion, G.R. No. 210164, p. 22.
12 Id. at 2.
13 Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, supra.
14 Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 2 July 2013, 700 SCRA 367,
377-378.
15 Maquiling v. COMELEC, supra note 6. The certification from the Bureau
of Immigration dated 23 April 20 I 0 certifies that the name "Amado,
Rommel Cagoco" appears in the Computer Database/Passenger
Manifest/IBM Listing on file as of 21 April 20 l 0 with the following pertinent
travel records:
DATE of Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN case. The present case involves an election period (2013) separate and
PASSPORT : 057782700 distinct from the election period covered by the Maquiling ruling (2010).
DATE of Arrival : 03/23/2010 The factual circumstances and consequent legal considerations also vary,
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN as will be explained below, so that the present case need not necessarily
PASSPORT : 057782700 follow the governing ruling in Maquiling.
16 Supra note 14.
Thus, at the outset, I invite the Court: to keep an open mind and remove
any initial impression that the present case is a re-run of Maquiling; to
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation recognize that at some point, the present case diverges from and must be
viewed independently of Maquiling; and to resolve it from the perspective
DISSENTING OPINION solely of the attendant factual and legal considerations specific to it.

BRION, J.:
The present certiorari petition,1filed under Rule 64 in relation with Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, involves the disqualification of the present petitioner,
Rommel C. Amado (Arnado), in the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections (May 2013 Elections).
This case traces its roots to the earlier disqualification case [docketed as
SPA No . .J0-109 (DC)] filed against Amado in relation with the May 10,
2010 Elections, that led to the Court's decision in Maquiling v. Comelec
disqualifying Arnado.2To some extent, the present case is factually linked
to the earlier disqualification case.
As in Maquiling, Amado and his qualification to run for public office are at
the center of the present petition. Private re8pondent Florante Capitan
seeks to strengthen the linkage with the earlier Maquiling case by adopting
the Maquiling positions and considering the present case as a seamless
continuation of Maquiling.
The Court must not also forget that this is an election case where the
electorate has its own separate interest to protect. This is an interest that
the Court must not ignore when the issues posed carry the potential of
setting aside the electorate's expressed choice.
Notably, the present controversy involves .a candidate whose
disqualification (to run for elective office) has twice been sought based on
the same cited facts and grounds, but who nevertheless has twice been
elected by a clear and overwhelming majority of the voters - in the May
2010 and May 2013 Elections. In 2013, he garnered 84% of the votes of the
people of Kauswagan.
This clear and undeniably overwhelming voice of the electorate, to my
mind, renders it necessary for the Court to consider and apply deeper
democratic principles.3 The circumstances of the present controversy call
for this kind of consideration, particularly when the electorate's already
limited democratic decision making process runs the risk of being negated
for no clear and conclusive reason, as discussed below.

Despite some commonalities, the present disqualification case, however, To disregard the electorate's voice once can perhaps be excused by
is separate and substantively distinct from the Maquiling disqualification invoking the rule of law; to ignore the people's voice a second time can
only be justified by clear reasons from this Court that the people can
readily understand.
I submit this Dissenting Opinion to object to the ponencia's conclusion that
Arnado is disqualified from running in the May 2013 Elections and that his
proclamation as elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, should
now be set aside.
I specifically find the ponencia 's conclusions grossly erroneous and tainted
with grave abuse of discretion based on the following considerations:
(1) Amado became a "pure" Philippine citizen on April 3, 2009, after he
took his oath of allegiance and executed his affidavit of renunciation. That
he was subsequently deemed to have recanted his renunciation is
unfortunate, but even the Maquiling ruling recognizes that for some eleven
(11) days (i.e., from April 3 to 14, 2009), he was qualified to run for public
office because he was a "pure" Filipino.
Arnado more than reconfirmed and regained this status and was qualified
to run for public office in the May 2013 Elections based on his persistent
assertions of sole allegiance to the Republic and his repeated renunciation
of his US citizenship.
a. Separately from the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation that
Maquiling said Amado recanted, Arnado executed on May 9, 2013, another
Affidavit of Renunciation affirming the terms of his April 3, 2009 Affidavit
and thus cured any defect in his qualification to run in the May 2013
Elections.
(2) The legal consequences of the Maquiling ruling is limited to Arado's
qualification for public office in the May 2010 elections.
a. The intervening 2010 Maquiling disqualification ruling did not and could
not have invalidated Arnado's status as a "pure" Philippine citizen who was
qualified to run for public office after having complied with the RA No. 9225
requirements in the May 2013 Elections.
(3) The Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the May 9, 2013
Confirmation of the Oath of Affirmation was filed out of time.
a. The Comelec grossly failed to consider (i) the circumstances of the filing
of the October 1, 2012 Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), and (ii) the
circumstances and the dynamics between the 2010 Maquiling case and
ruling, and the present 2013 disqualification case, in terms of the
retroactive application of the Maquiling ruling.
b. When Amado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 (for the 2013 Elections),
the prevailing Comelec en bane ruling [in its February 2, 2011 resolution in
SPA No. 10-109 (DC)] was that he was not disqualified to run for elective
public office; hence, Amado did not need to execute another affidavit of
renunciation.
c. Based solely on the Maquiling Decision (that pertained to Arnado's
disqualification for the 2010 elections), the Comelec disqualified Arnado
for the May 2013 elections because his October 1, 2012 CoC was not
supported by any Affidavit of Renunciation (since Maquiling considered his
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation for the 2010 elections effectively
recanted). This Comelec ruling disregards the unusual consequences of the
April 3, 2009 Affidavit and the unique circumstances under which the
October 1, 2012 CoC was filed.
d. Since the Comelec did not accept the Affidavit of Renunciation that
Arnado filed on May 9, 2013 (for the 2013 Elections) in the light of the 2010
Maquiling ruling, he was placed in an impossible situation of being
disqualified in 2013 for a ruling applicable to the 2010 elections, without
being given the opportunity to submit his compliance for the May 2013
elections.
e. Notably, his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, submitted to comply
with his May 2013 candidacy, was rejected because it should have been
filed on October 1, 2012 (i.e., when he filed his CoC for the May 2013
elections). If the Maquiling ruling, made on April 16, 2013, was made to
retroactively apply to October 1, 2012, so should the opportunity to
comply be similarly made retroactive. To the extent he was denied this
opportunity is grave abuse of discretion.
(4) Af any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favour of Arnado's
qualification:
a. Arnado' s unequivocal acts and show of allegiance to the Republic and
renunciation of other citizenships, taken together, should have resolved all
doubts in favor of his qualification;
b. the mandate of the people of Kauswagan that twice elected Amado as
their Mayor should be respected and upheld.
I. Roots of the Present Petition
A. Factual Background
For a· fuller understanding of the present disqualification case, I reiterate
below the important antecedent facts.
Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship
after becoming a naturalized citizen of the United States of America (US.)
in 1985.
In 2003, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003).4
Arnado opted to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA No.
9225 and soon filed the required application before the Philippine Consul
General in San Francisco, U.S.A. On July 10, 2008, Arnado took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; the Approval of his Citizenship
retention and re-acquisition was issued on the same date.
On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship (interchangeably referred to, from here on, as April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation or 2009 express renunciation).
On April 14, 2009, Arnado left the country for the US using his US passport
- US passport (No. 057782700) - which identified his nationality as "USA-
American." He returned to the country on June 25, 2009, using the same
US passport. He again left for the US on July 29, 2009, and returned to the
country on November 24, 2009, still using his US passport.
Unknown to Amado, however, the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, USA, had approved and issued in his favor a Philippine Passport
(No. XX 3979162) on June 18, 2009.5 He only received this Philippine
passport three months later.6
From then on, he used his Philippine passport in his travels on the following
dates: December 11, 2009 (departure); January 12, 2010 (arrival); January
31, 2010 (departure); March 31, 2010 (arrival); April 11, 2010 (departure);
April 16, 2010 (arrival); May 20, 2010 (departure); and June 4, 2010
(arrival).7
B. The Maquiling Case and its Incidents
On November 30, 2009, Amado filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, for the May 2010 Elections. On the same day,
he executed another Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance.8
Notably, this Affidavit of Renunciation came after his travel using an
American passport.
Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed with the Comelec a
petition to disqualify Amado and/or to cancel his CoC (2010
Disqualification case) on the ground that Arnado remained a US citizen: he
continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines
after executing the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Balua's petition
was docketed as SPA No. 10-109 (DC).
Arnado was proclaimed the winning candidate in the May 2010 Elections.
In a resolution dated February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc ruled [in SPA
No. 10-109 (DC)) that Arnado's use of his US passport, subsequent to his
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, did not have the effect of reverting him to
his status as a dual citizen. The Comelec En Banc found believable and
plausible Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his US passport
because he only knew of and received his Philippine passport three months
after it was issued on June 18, 2009. As soon as he received his Philippine
passport, he used it in his subsequent travels abroad.
The 2010 disqualification case eventually reached this Court via the
petition for certiorari filed by Maquiling; the case was. docketed as GR No.
195649 entitled Maquiling v. Comelec.
a. The Court's Maquiling Decision.
In its April 16, 2013 Decision, the Court annulled and set aside the Comelec
En Banc 's February 2, 2011 Resolution; disqualified Amado from running
for the position of Mayor; and declared Maquiling the duly elected mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, in the May 2010 Elections. The Court ruled
that by his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively
disavowed or recanted his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
In ruling on the case, the Court significantly acknowledged that:
i. The "act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he re-acquired by repatriation. By representing himself
as an American citizen, however, Amado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport. "
ii. "In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a
period of eleven days, or from April 3, 2009, until 14 April 2009, on which
date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship."10
C. The Present Disqualification Case
On October l, 2012, and while the Maquiling case was still pending before
this Court (so that the existing standing rule was the Comelec ruling that
he was qualified to be a candidate), Arnado filed his CoC11 for the same
mayoralty post for the May 2013 Elections. Thus, Arnado saw no need to
undertake another Renunciation.
Respondent Florante Capitan also filed his CoC12 for the same position.
On April 16, 2013, the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling v. Comelec,
disqualifying Arnado for the May 2010 Elections.
Apparently in response to the Maquiling ruling, Arnado executed on May
9, 2013, an Oath of Allegiance and Oath of Renunciation affirming the
terms of his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation(herein referred to as
2013 Affidavit).13 Arnado undertook the required acts as soon as he was
aware that they had to be done to perfect his May 2013 candidacy.
On May 10, 2013, Capitan filed a petition to disqualify14 Arnado from
running for the Kauswagan mayoralty post and/or to cancel his CoC (2013
Disqualification case) based on the Court's Maquiling ruling. The case was
docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was raffled to the Comelec
Second Division (Second Division).15
On May 14, 2013, during the pendency of the 2013 Disqualification case
before. the Second Division, Arnado was proclaimed the duly elected
Mayor of Lanao del Norte in the May 2013 Elections.16
Capitan responded to the proclamation by filing a petition to nullify
Arnado's proclamation, arguing that pursuant to the Maquiling ruling
(which declared Amado disqualified from running for any local elective
office), Arnado's proclamation was void and carried no legal effect.
In a resolution dated July 2, 2013, the Court denied Arnado's motion for
reconsideration of the April 16, 2013 Maquiling Decision.
II. The Proceedings before the Comelec
A. Comelec Second Division Ruling
In its resolution dated September 6, 2013, in SP A No. 13-309(DC), the
Comelec Second Division disqualified Amado from running in the May 2013
Elections.
The Second Division declared that at the time he filed his CoC on October
1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with RA No. 9225's requirement of
making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship, as his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation had been deemed
withdrawn or recalled pursuant to Maquiling. His 2013 Affidavit did not
rectify this failure as this subsequent affidavit should have been executed
on or before the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012
B. The Comelec En Banc Ruling
In its December 9, 2013 resolution, the Comelec En Banc fully affirmed the
Second Division's ruling; annulled Arnado's proclamation; and declared
Capitan the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan..
III. The Issues
The issues raised for the Court's consideration are:
A. Whether the Comelec En Banc and the Second Division violated
procedural due process and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing
to dismiss the petitions filed by Capitan for forum shopping and/or late
filing;
B. Whether the Comelec En Banc violated due process and committed
grave abuse of discretion by allowing . Commissioner Elias Yusoph to
review the decision he wrote for the Second Division;
C. Whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
disenfranchising 84o/o of the voters ofKauswagan in the May 2013
elections; and
D. Whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying Arnado who had fully complied with the requirements of RA
No. 9225 before the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.
IV. Refutation of the Ponencia
A. Re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225; purposes and legal
effect of the oath of allegiance and oath
of renunciation
RA No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens who lost
their Philippine citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country, to
expeditiously re-acquire Philippine citizenship. 17 It is a unique mode of re-
acquiring Philippine citizenship and is a far departure from the citizenship
re-acquisition procedure under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 63,18 the law
in place before RA No. 9225 was enacted.
Under CA No. 63, Philippine citizenship may be re-acquired by: (1)
naturalization; (2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy, or Air Corps,
or of a woman who has lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to an
alien after the termination of her marital status; and (3) direct act of the
National Assembly.19
Notably, re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship under the first mode (i.e.,
by naturalization) involves the more stringent procedure laid down in CA
No. 473.20 The reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the second
mode (i.e., by repatriation), on the other hand, provides for an easier
procedure as it requires only the taking of the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry; it
applies, however, only to the specific group of persons enumerated
therein.
Under the procedure currently in place under RA No. 9225, the re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in a manner similar to the
second mode under CA No. 63. But, RA No. 9225 provides for a deeper
effect by declaring it a State policy that under its terms "all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship"21 under the conditions provided therein.
The full implication of the effects of RA No. 9225 can fully be appreciated
by considering Section 3 of the law, which reads:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"'I , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that
I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion." [emphases supplied]
By its express terms, this oath is one of allegiance that recognizes the
"supreme authority" of the Philippines and the obligation to "maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto."
These terms, while seemingly allowing dual citizenship for natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens in a foreign country,22 carry the implicit effect of
renouncing their foreign citizenship and allegiance because of the renewed
allegiance that is accorded to the supreme authority of the Republic.23
In effect, the problem of dual allegiance created by dual citizenship is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country. Since the latest
oath that the person takes is one of allegiance to the Republic, whatever
treatment the foreign country may have on his or her status is a matter
outside the concern and competence of the Philippine government!.24
The congressional exchanges on dual citizenship and the potential problem
of dual allegiance (which under the Constitution is inimical to public
interest), attest to this interpretation as these exchanges reconciled the
possession of dual citizenship and the dual allegiance that the Constitution
states to "be inimical to public interest."
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two
situations exist - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two
citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the
Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter
asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention
of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there
will now be a violation of the Constitution ....
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the
constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest.
He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one
sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking
of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred
from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will
be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and
not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter
which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence
over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern,
when dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original
version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the
measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he
explained.
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not
denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the
foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the
Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship
and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However,
he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress
because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the
House.
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance
contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said
that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited
the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize
Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is
created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of
allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and
absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears
allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage,
he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to
take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He
then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of
the Philippines but of the other foreign country. [emphases supplied]
Jurisprudence confirms this interpretation of RA No. 9225 in AASJS v. Hon.
Datumanong25 when the Court pointedly declared:
By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden
of confronting the issue of whether OF not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not
made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.26 [emphasis supplied]
The oath of allegiance taken under RA No. 9225 entitles a person to enjoy
full civil and political rights that include the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the government. 27
He or she may now vote.
To be voted upon to an elective office, however, a natural-born Filipino
citizen who has implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or she
swears allegiance to the Republic under RA No. 9225 must still make his or
her previous implicit renunciation "express." In the words of the law, he
must "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship." [Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225]
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws, and at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; ....
[emphases and underscoring supplied]
The requirement of an express renunciation, however, does not negate the
effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit renunciation of citizenship
and allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance. Thus, persons
availing of RA No. 9225 do not renounce their foreign citizenship for the
first time by executing the Affidavit of renunciation that Section 5(2) of the
law requires; they have implicitly made this renunciation when they swore
allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic.
What the oath of renunciation simply does is to make express what
natural-born. Filipino citizens have already implicitly renounced. The
requirement of express renunciation highlights the implication that it is not
the exclusive means by which natural-born Filipino citizens may renounce
their foreign citizenship. In reality, the oath of renunciation is a
requirement simply for the purpose of running for elective public office,
apparently to ensure that foreign citizenship and mixed loyalties are kept
out of the elective public service.
To paraphrase Japzon v. Comelec, 28 the oath of renunciation makes these
natural-born potential candidates for public office "pure" Philippine
citizens29 from the perspective of the election laws.
In sum, the oath of allegiance not only allows these natural-born Filipinos
to re-acquire Philippine citizenship; thereby, they also implicitly renounce
their citizenship and allegiance to any and all foreign country as they assert
allegiance to the "supreme authority of the Philippines and xx x maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto". The oath of renunciation, on the other
hand, complements their oath of allegiance through the express
manifestation, for purpose of running for public office, that the candidate
is a "pure" Filipino.
B. Arnado's attainment, loss of "pure"
Filipino citizen status, and subsequent
Developments
Based on the above discussions, I find - as the ponencia and the majority
in Maquiling did - that Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines on July 10, 2008, and his oath
of renunciation on April 3, 2009.30 With his oath of renunciation, he
became solely a Filipino citizen with total allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
He could have, at that point, validly run for public office, except that
subsequent to his renunciation, he travelled using his U.S. passport - a
development that the Maquiling ruling unfortunately characterized as a
recantation of his previous renunciation of American citizenship.
Had the developments that transpired in Amado's political life simply
stopped with his candidacy in the May 2010 Elections, then the present
case and its complications would have been avoided. But as subsequent
developments showed, a confluence of complicating factors arose.
First, Arnado ran again for the same office in the May 2013 Elections, and
events overlapped. His disqualification case was not resolved with dispatch
so that the period for the filing of the CoC for the May 2013 Elections (in
October 2012) was set while the present case was still pending with this
Court.
Second, at that time, the standing ruling was the Comelec en bane decision
that Arnado was not disqualified and had perfected the required
submissions for his candidacy. No restraining order or any other ruling
from this Court intervened to prevent this Comelec ruling from being the
governing rule in the interim.
As a result, Amado saw no need to undertake remedial measures
addressing the matters complained about in the 2010 Maquiling
disqualification case. But at that point, he had already filed two oaths of
renunciation - on April 3, 2009 and on November 30, 2009 - when he filed
his CoC for the May 2010 Elections.
Third, he did not submit any oath of renunciation together with his October
1, 2012 CoC since, to his knowledge, he had complied with the
requirements of RA No. 9225 and the Local Government Code, and had
attained "pure" Filipino citizen status. (That he did attain this status based
on the 2008 oath of allegiance and his 2009 affidavit of renunciation is in
fact confirmed by Maquiling, although his subsequent recantation
intervened.)
Arnado's political world was overturned when the Court resolved the May
2010 disqualification case on April 16, 2013, or a few days before the May
2013 elections. But Arnado did not fully dwell on the past. While filing a
motion for reconsideration of the Maquiling ruling, he also acted on his
October 1, 2012 CoC by executing and submitting, on May 9, 2013, an Oath
of Allegiance and Oath of Renunciation affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit
of Renunciation.
Thus, from the perspective of the laws governing natural-born Filipinos
who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who wish to run for public
office, Amado did not only comply with the twin requirements of RA No.
9225 as of April 3, 2009; he even exceeded the requirements of the law by
asserting his oath of allegiance to the Republic four times, while also
impliedly renouncing any and all foreign citizenships for the same number
of "times, and twice expressly renouncing any and all other citizenships
(with one express renunciation declared recanted by Maquiling).
All these are material considerations that should be taken into account in
resolving the present case and are more fully discussed under separate
headings below.
C. The Comelec gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that the May 9,
2013 Confirmation of Oath of
Affirmation was out of time.
After the promulgation of the Maquiling Decision disqualifying Amado for
the May 2010 elections and relying solely on its terms, the Comelec
disqualified Amado for the May 2013 elections because his October 1, 2012
CoC was not supported by any Affidavit of Renunciation (since Maquiling
considered his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation for the May 2010
elections effectively recanted).
The Comelec ruling and its underlying reasons are, on their face, patently
unreasonable since they did not consider at all the surrounding
circumstances of the filing of the October 1, 2012 CoC and the
circumstances that led to the absence of any oath of renunciation after the
Maquiling ruling. The Comelec approach is in fact simplistic to the point of
grave abuse of discretion. Apparently, it considered that with the oath of
renunciation·recanted and with no oath filed with the October 1, 2012 CoC,
then the CoC should be considered fatally deficient. The ponencia 's
reasoning also runs this way.
Subject to fuller discussions below, I submit that the Comelec missed out
on at least three (3) basic considerations.
First, at the time the October 1, 2012 CoC was filed, the prevailing ruling,
although then contested before the Court, was the Comelec en bane ruling
that did not consider Arnado disqualified. To reiterate, no intervening
restraining order was issued by this Court addressing this Comelec ruling.
Hence, there was no immediate need, at the time of the CoC's filing, for a
replacement supporting oath of renunciation.
Second, since the Comelec did not accept Amado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit
of Renunciation (for the May 2013 Elections) in the light of the Maquiling
11Jling (affecting the May 2010 elections), he was placed in an impossible
situation of being disqualified in the May 2013 Elections for a ruling
applicable only to the May 2010 Elections, without being given the
opportunity to submit his compliance for the May 2013 Elections.
Third, along the same line of thought, Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation, submitted to comply with his May 2013 candidacy, was
rejected because it should have been filed on October 1, 2012 (i.e., when
he filed his CoC for the May 2013 elections).
If the Maquiling ruling of April 16, 2013, which addressed the separate
2010 disqualification case, was made to retroactively apply to October 1,
2012, in the separate 2013 disqualification case, then a retroactive
opportunity should also be given in the 2013 disqualification case to
comply with what retroactively applied in Maquiling.
To the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a replacement
·oath of renunciation in 2013, there was an unfair and abusive denial of
opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.
D. The Maquiling ruling is limited to
Arnado 's qualification to run for public
office and only for the purpose of the
May 2010 elections
I submit that the ponencia 's ruling, insofar as it adopts the Maquiling
ruling, is an overreach that runs counter to the policy behind RA No. 9225.
I submit that the extent of the legal consequences of the Maquiling ruling
affect solely Arnado 's qualification to run for public office and only for the
purpose of the May 2010 elections. These consequences should not be
extended to situations outside of and not contemplated by Maquiling.
The following reasons support my view:
First, the Maquiling ruling only considered the material facts surrounding
the May 2010 Elections. The critical facts on which the Maquiling case
turned dwelt with the travels of Amado using his U.S. passport. These facts
are not contested in the present case. Nor am I contesting that for eleven
days in April 2009, Amado was a "pure" Filipino, until a recantation of his
renunciation oath took place. These are settled and accepted facts.
The Maquiling ruling left out, because these are facts that it did not
consider material for its resolution (such as the overlaps in the filing of the
October 1, 2012 CoC and the resolution of Maquiling; the effect of
Maquiling on the 2013 disqualification case; the oath of allegiance and
renunciation that accompanied the November 30, 2009 CoC for the May
2010 elections) or because they were outside the scope of the relevant
facts of Maquiling (such as the prevailing Comelec en bane ruling on
October 1, 2012 when Amado filed his CoC; the facts surrounding the filing
of the CoC on October 1, 2012; and the May 9, 2013 filing of the Oath of
Allegiance and Oath of Renunciation affirming his April 3; 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation).
From these perspectives, how can the 2010 Maquiling case be a seamless
continuation of the 2013 disqualification case now before this Court?
Second, the implied renunciation of foreign citizenship that Amado made
on several occasions is different from and has distinct legal implications
separate from the express renunciation he made on April 3, 2009.
The implied renunciation of foreign citizenship proceeds from the oath of
allegiance that natural-born Filipino citizens take to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship. This is patent from the terms of the oath of allegiance and is a
consequence of the resulting re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The express renunciation, in contrast, is an after-the-fact requirement that
arises only if these natural-born Filipino citizens choose to run for public
office. The requirement of an express renunciation of foreign citizenship
arises only after they have re-acquired Philippine citizenship for the
exclusive purpose of qualifying them for elective public office.
Note in this regard that Maquiling declared as recanted only the express
renunciation that Arnado executed on April 3, 2009, not the implied
renunciation that Amado made on several occasions when he swore
allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic.
This Maquiling declaration and the distinction that it signifies are crucial:
first, the implied renunciation of foreign allegiance that Amado made on
several occasions still stands as valid, as Maquiling affected only his April
3, 2009 express renunciation; second, the implied renunciation must be
valid because it did not affect Amado's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship;
and third, Arnado's express renunciation was declared recanted solely for
the purpose of the May 2010 Elections, not for any and all other purposes.
In short, Maquiling did not declare Arnado 's renunciation of his US
citizenship invalid for all purposes; it certainly could not have done so as
that case involved an election disqualification case that challenged
Amado's candidacy for the mayoralty post by reason of an alleged defect
in his qualification, i.e., Amado's isolated acts that, to the majority,
effectively recanted his express renunciation.
In ruling as it did, Maquiling did not and could not have gone beyond the
confines of the underlying election disqualification case and could not have
ruled on Arnado 's Philippine citizenship per se without exceeding the
confines of the Court's jurisdiction.
Citizenship and its loss, acquisition, and re-acquisition are much broader
concepts that cannot definitively be affected by a Court ruling in an
election disqualification case, even if the disqualification case touches on
the citizenship qualification of the candidate. Thus, I submit that Maquiling
invalidated Arnado 's renunciation oath solely for the purpose of his
qualification/or the May 2010 elections.
Third, Amado became a "pure" Philippine citizen as of April 3, 2009, a legal
consequence that Maquiling recognized and conceded as it declared that
"he in fact did" comply with the "twin requirements under RA No. 9225"
for the purpose of election qualification.
What made the Court rule against Amado's qualification for the May 2010
Elections was the finding of positive, albeit isolated, acts that effectively
"disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Otherwise stated, Amado, in the Maquiling sense, was indisputably already
a "pure" Philippine citizen as of April 3, 2009. He reverted to a dual citizen
status (and only from the perspective of the concerned foreign country)
only on the date subsequent to April 3, 2009, and only by virtue of the
ruling that considered his use of his US passport on isolated occasions as a
"voluntar[y] and effective[] [act of] revert[ing] to [the] earlier status [of] a
dual citizen."
To quote and highlight the majority's pronouncement on this point: "[s]uch
reversion was not retroactive as it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. ,,31
Thus, even if only for qualification purposes, the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was a valid and Court-recognized express declaration of
Amado's renunciation of his US citizenship that the Court cannot lightly
disregard in the present disqualification case.
Fourth, even Maquiling did not perpetually and absolutely disqualify
Arnado from running for any elective public office, or from running in any
elections as they declared that "[h]e is disqualified xx from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections. "32
In other words, Maquiling declared Amado as disqualified from running
only in the May 2010 Elections; they did not declare him as disqualified for
any and all other elections, including the May 2013 Elections.
E. Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation, affirming his April 3,
2009 Affidavit, cured any alleged defect
in his qualification to run for public
office during the May 2013 Elections
I take exception to the ponencia 's ruling that ignores Amado's May 9, 2013
Affidavit of Renunciation simply because it was executed after Amado filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012. I submit that Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit
of Renunciation bears crucial significance to Amado's qualification to run
for the May 2013 Elections which the Court cannot and should not lightly
ignore.

Maquiling unequivocably held that by using an American passport, he
effectively recanted his express renunciation of his US citizenship.
Jurisprudence defines the act of recantation to mean to "withdraw or
repudiate formally and publicly;" "to renounce or withdraw prior
statement." To "retract" means to "take back;" "to retract an offer is to
withdraw it before acceptance. "33
That Arnado took back his statement disavowing allegiance to the US
government, however, does not render invalid his status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen; neither does it negate the fact that he had impliedly
renounced his US citizenship, and had subsequently made an express
renunciation of his US citizenship.
Granting that Amado's use of his US passport amounted to a withdrawal of
the express renunciation he made of his allegiance to the US, this
withdrawal does not erase the fact that he did make an express
renunciation of his US citizenship.
To my mind, this express renunciation, even if recanted, may still be re-
affirmed, ·in the same way a statement already made and subsequently
denied, can be re-confirmed. Thus, Arnado's 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation
can validly re-affirm the 2009 express renunciation that the Court held to
have been recanted in Maquiling.
Note that in the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, Amado
categorically stated that he renounces his US citizenship, as well as any and
all foreign citizenship; swears allegiance to the Republic; and confirms the
renunciation (of his US citizenship). he had previously made in the April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Note, likewise, that as explained above, the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation is a valid and Court-confirmed oath that Amado had validly
confirmed in his May 9, 2013 Affidavit. To confirm means "to make firm:
strengthen in a resolution, conviction, loyalty, position; to give new
assurance of the truth or validity; to state or imply the truth,"34 and
implies a prior existing act.
Finally, note that the Maquiling ruling was issued after Amado took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic four times - on July 10, 2008, April 3, 2009
(when he executed the affidavit of renunciation); November 30, 2009
(when he filed his CoC for the May 2010 Elections); and October 1, 2012
(when he filed his CoC for the May 2013 Elections). It was also issued after
Arnado renounced his US citizenship expressly on April 3, 2009, and
impliedly on four occasions - on July 10, 2008; April 3, 2009; November 30,
2009; and October 1, 2012 - when he swore allegiance to the supreme
authority of the Republic.
In fact, in his October 1, 2012 CoC, Amado made the following oath:
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey all laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities. I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation
and purpose of evasion.
Taken together, all these facts undeniably show that Amado's May 9, 2013
Affidavit of Renunciation was not entirely new, nor completely different
and independent from the oath of renunciation that Arnado took on April
3, 2009. Rather, it affirmed and revalidated the Court-recognized
renunciation oath that he had earlier taken.
Indisputably, Maquiling found that Amado's express renunciation had
been validly made. This express renunciation, having been disavowed, can
be re-affirmed by subsequent acts - through his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation and through the statement in his October 1, 2012 CoC.
The statement in Amado's October 1, 2012 CoC, for instance, is
substantially similar to the oath of allegiance required in RA No. 9225. This
oath not only recognizes Amado's Filipino citizenship, but impliedly
renounces his US citizenship. That he swore sole allegiance to the
Philippine Republic in his October 1, 2012 CoC in effect affirmed his express
renunciation of US citizenship; and thus dispenses with the need for
another express renunciation.
Rather than an oath that should simply be brushed aside as the Comelec
did, the May 9, 2013 Affidavit served: first, to repair his reverted dual
citizen status as declared in Maquiling; and second, to re-assert and
emphasize his clear intent to renounce his US citizenship which he had
expressly done once and impliedly done four times.
In this sense, the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation retroacted to April
3, 2009, and cured any alleged defect in Amado's October 1, 2012 CoC.
More importantly, it cured any defect that the intervening Maquiling ruling
introduced on Amado's qualification to run for public office during the May
2013 Elections.
That Amado executed his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation while
Maquiling was still under the Court's consideration (it was not confirmed
on reconsideration until July 2, 2013) is not without significance. While the
May 9, 2013 Affidavit was filed for purposes of the present disqualification
case, it could have, had the Court been so inclined, considered as a factor
in ruling on Maquiling's reconsideration; but apparently it was not at all
considered since Amado's use of his US passport was the focal point of the
controversy.
F. The intervening Maquiling ruling did
not and could not have invalidated his
status as a "pure" Philippine citizen
who was qualified to run and had filed a
valid CoC for the May 2013 Elections
As the legal consequences of the Maquiling. ruling on Amado's
renunciation of his US citizenship did not extend beyond his qualification
to run for public office during the May 2010 elections; and that the May 9,
2013 Affidavit of Renunciation cured any alleged defect in Amado's
qualification to run for the May 2013 Elections, I submit that the Maquiling
ruling on April 16, 2013 did not affect and could not have affected
Armado's qualification to run for public office for the purpose of the May
2013 Elections.
Under the circumstances, Amado had effectively become a "pure" natural-
born Philippine citizen again on October 1, 2012, when he executed the
retroactive and curative May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, and which
status continued well beyond the May 2013 Elections. In this way, Arnado
qualified for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and
filed a valid CoC.
G. When Arnado filed his CoC on October
1, 2012, the Comelec En Banc, in its
February 2, 2011 Resolution in SPA
No. 10-109(DC), declared him as
qualified to run/or the elective office;
hence, Arnado did not need to execute
another Affidavit of Renunciation
because of this standing Comelec ruling
I likewise strongly object to the ponencia for faulting Amado for not
executing another oath of renunciation at the time of or prior to the filing
of his CoC on October 1, . 2012, reasoning out that as "early as 2010 x x x
Amado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a
problem to his candidacy."
It should be remembered that in the February 2, 2011 Resolution in SP A
No. 10-109(DC), the Comelec En Banc declared Arnado as a "pure"
Philippine citizen again, qualified to run for elective public office. This
Comelec ruling still stood and had not yet been overturned at the time
Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for the May 2013 Elections.
Arnado, therefore, had every right and reason to rely on this Comelec
ruling and to believe that he was not disqualified to run in the May 2013
Elections.
I concede that, as the events have shown, he should, in retrospect, have
exercised greater care and have taken every. step to secure his
qualification to run for public office. His failure, however, should not and
cannot affect his qualification which then stands and is authoritatively
affirmed by the Comelec.
Indeed "there is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation every election period" as the ponencia puts it. But, note that
there is equally no law that requires him to constantly and consistently·
assert his renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. Neither is there
any law that expressly or impliedly imposes on natural-born Filipino
citizens the obligation to constantly assert their allegiance to the Republic
and perform positive acts to assert this allegiance.
In fact, as the law stands, natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country need only to take an oath of allegiance to the supreme
authority of the Republic to re-acquire Philippine citizenship as they are
"deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." Once they re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship after complying with these legal steps,
they no longer need to perform any positive act to assert Philippine
citizenship or to elect citizenship.35
H. Arnado 's persistent assertions of his
allegiance to the Republic and
renunciation of his US citizenship more
than sufficiently proved his determined
resolve to profess allegiance only to the
Republic; these continuing assertions
should have resolved any doubt in favor
of his qualification
RA No. 9225 is a relatively new statutory enactment whose provisions have
not been exhaustively interpreted and ruled upon by this Court, through
an appropriate case. In this respect, I submit that in situations of doubt
where the strict application of the equivocal letter of the law would clearly
and undoubtedly disregard the legislative intent, the Court must and
should tread lightly as it rules on the relatively uncharted area of
application where RA No. 9225 overlaps with our elections laws.
The unique factual situation of this case presents such situation of doubt
which the Court must resolve in the light of the clear legislative intent,
rather than from the strict application of the equivocal letter of the law. I
find that Amado's persistent assertion of his allegiance to the Republic and
renunciation of his US citizenship more than sufficiently prove his
determined resolve to profess allegiance only to the Republic and to none
other.
I submit that the following considerations should not be missed.
At the time Amado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he had fully satisfied
all of the requirements of RA No. 9225 to run for elective public office: he
has re-acquired Philippine citizenship after having filed the Oath of
Allegiance and secured the order of approval on July 10, 2008; he has also
met all of the qualifications under the Constitution and the law for the local
elective office; and he has already executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
on April 3, 2009.
Likewise, as of October 1, 2012, Amado had sworn allegiance to the
Republic four times, i.e., on July 10, 2008; April 3, 2009; November 30,
2009; and October 1, 2012. He had also renounced his US citizenship
expressly on April 3, 2009, and impliedly thrice on July 10, 2008, November
30, 2009, and October 1, 2012.
Additionally, on October 1, 2012, the Comelec en bane, via the February 2,
2011 resolution in SPA No. 10-109(DC), had ruled in his favour, affirmed
the existence and validity of his oath of renunciation, and confirmed his
continuing qualification for the elective post. At that time, the February 2,
2011 Comelec ruling had not yet been reversed by this Court and stood as
the final and most recent ruling as regards his qualification to run for the
local elective post. As it had not yet been reversed, he clearly and rightfully
had every reason to rely on this Comelec ruling when he filed his CoC on
October 1, 2012.
In these lights, Amado's allegiance to the supreme authority of the
Republic and his renunciation of any and all foreign allegiance, including
those to the US government, cannot be doubted. From the time he had re-
acquired "pure" Philippine citizenship under the terms of RA No. 9225,
Arnado has persistently asserted these oaths even while the law does not
require him to do so.
In this situation, any doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in favor of his
full Filipino citizenship - with his qualification to run for the May 2013
Elections - since the thrust of RA No. 9225 is to encourage the return to
Filipino citizenship of natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine
citizenship through their acquisition of foreign citizenship. 36 Note in this
regard that Amado consciously and voluntarily gave up a very much
sought-after citizenship status in favor of returning to full Filipino
citizenship and of participating in Philippine governance.37
I. Maquiling did not say that Arnado used
his US passport again on January 12,
2010, and on March 23, 2010
A minor matter, asserted by the ponencia, which should be corrected is the
claim that Amado "used his US passport on January 12, 2010, and on March
23, 2010, as found by this Court in Maquiling."
I strongly object to this observation as the ponencia clearly misread
Maquiling.
Nowhere in Maquiling did the Court make a finding that Arnado used his
US passport again on January 12, 2010, and March 23, 2010 - months after
he had received his Philippine passport. Rather, the alleged use by Arnado
of his US passport on these dates was a mere assertion of Balua, before the
Comelec First Division in the Maquiling case; interestingly, Balua was no
longer a party when the case reached this Court. In fact, the Court in
Maquiling, quoting a portion of the Comelec En Banc decision, noted that
on January 12, 2010, what Arnado used was his Philippine passport, not his
US passport.
J. Under the circumstances, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion
In this Rule 64-Rule 65 petition, the Court's review is limited to the
jurisdictional issue of whether the Comelec acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
As a concept, grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.
The Court's review power is also limited by the condition, under Section 5,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the Comelec,
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. In
this respect, the Court does not ordinarily review the Comelec' s
appreciation and evaluation of evidence as any misstep by the Comelec in
this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional situations, however, where the assailed judgment is based
on misapprehension or erroneous apprehension of facts or on the use of
wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue38 -situations that
are tainted with grave abuse of discretion - the Court is not only obliged
but has the constitutional duty to intervene. 39 When grave abuse of
discretion is present, the resulting errors mutate from error of judgment
to one of jurisdiction.
I find that, based on the reasons discussed above, the Comelec' s action in
this case as it disqualified Amado from running for the May 2013 Elections,
was clearly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when: first, it relied
completely and indiscriminately on the Maquiling ruling - the wrong and
irrelevant, or at the very least, incomplete - consideration in deciding the
underlying disqualification case; and second, it did not make its own
finding of facts and evaluation of the evidence, independent of Maquiling,
and disregarded relevant facts and evidence subsequent to Maquiling - a
clear misapprehension of the facts. Note that the Comelec, both in the
September 6, 2013, and December 9, 2013 resolutions, quoted heavily
portions of the Maquiling ruling and drew its discussions and conclusion
largely from Maquiling.
For these reasons, and under the circumstances of this case, I submit that
the assailed Comelec actions must be struck down for grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
K. At any rate, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of Arnado 's
qualification: the mandate of the people
of Kauswagan that twice elected Arnado
as their Mayor should be respected and
upheld
Independently of all these issues - of Amado's qualification to run for the
May 2013 Elections and the intervention of the Maquiling ruling - the
Court cannot and should not now ignore the undeniable fact that the
people of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, have themselves responded to the
situation of doubt that might have arisen because of the factual link
between the present disqualification case and the intervention of the
Maquiling ruling.
The people themselves made their own ruling when they elected Arnado
as their mayor in the two successive elections - the May 2010 and the May
2013 elections - despite the "foreigner" label his rivals, even the ponencia,
sought to continuously pin on him.
Arnado received an overwhelming 8,902 votes as against the meager 1,707
votes of his opponent Capitan in the May 2013 Elections; in the May 2010
Elections, he received the majority 5,952 of the total 11,309 votes cast. At
this point, "even this Court should heed this verdict by resolving all doubts
regarding Arnado's eligibility in his favor.". This is not a novel approach.40
To reiterate what Sinaca v. Mula41 teaches us:
[When] a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and
clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the
candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the
people. Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the
electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone
else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to
hold sacred.
In the words of another leading case - Frivaldo v. Comelec42- the law and
the courts, including this Court, must give serious consideration to the
popular will.
"In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely
sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are
the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility
is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will
of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote.43
Under the evidentiary and unique factual situation of this case, the alleged
eligibility of Amado is not antagonistic, patently or otherwise, to
constitutional and legal principles such that giving effect to the sovereign
will would create prejudice to our democratic institutions.
Notably, the Office of the Sanggunianng Bayan, through Resolution No.
002-201444 dated January 2, 2014, and the Liga ng Mga Barangay, through
Resolution No. 001-201445 dated January 2, 2014, expressed their
continuing and overwhelming support for Amado, notwithstanding the
Comelec rulings disqualifying him from the May 2013 Elections, and
implores the Court to heed the Kauswagan people's voice under the
principle vox populi, vox dei.
Under the circumstances of this case, the ponencia 's action that resolves
all doubts against Amado's eligibility undoubtedly defeats the will of the
Kauswagan electorate. 46 In ruling as it does, the ponencia effectively
disenfranchises an undoubtedly overwhelming majority of the Kauswagan
people as "[t]he rights of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."
47 The Court should respect and uphold the will of the electorate.
For the above reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
G.R. No. 199113
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1
dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed by
Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March
22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro
denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.
The factual antecedents:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian
citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife
returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004,
they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public
land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3
(MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground
that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed
a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General
of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application,
he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He
further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they
have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact
led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private
respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of
Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition
for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It
ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by
petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to
warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any
proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing the
act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a
warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his
arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable
Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by
petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes
a distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its
effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its
enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA
63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and
admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was
at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and
for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing
order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted
that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application
had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B
office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant
(petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he
applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused
cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by
the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011
Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen
who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship
under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been
lost on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act
of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his
criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition
for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not
left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where
he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be
adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the
lower court has disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status
under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction "deemed not to have lost" it at
the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was
said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in
Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant
for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-
empted the right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question the
validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before the same is
implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument
regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit.1âwphi1 It is
contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the
retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of
filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein
petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine
applies in the present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause
for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved, that he
had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he
made the declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino.
Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public document, it is not
necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present.
As to petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense
which may be properly raised and proved in a full- blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the
Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC
when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause,
petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s
jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly
ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal
evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their respective
pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted
for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied
petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey
the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become
citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the
conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall
re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took
effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same
oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of
natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but
the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and
"retain" for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine Citizenship",
the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms "re-acquire" and
"retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law
using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost
pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one
of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares,
R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and
retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation
of the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent
with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it
becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is
expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at
the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the
letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to
his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed
by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator
Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of Representative Exequiel
Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of
the Senate version, "Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their
citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act
are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity
of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-
born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this
act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you
mean to say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American
citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?

Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their
citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born
citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to
know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely
retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost
their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the
effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this
new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their
citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon
the effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to
future instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making
distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very important
for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born citizens are
only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of
the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman
Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously
lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention
for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to
the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows
dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by
taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of
filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and
Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself
treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring
the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section
3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases
after the new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without
any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition
and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused
is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the
accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.23
R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to
Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of
falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee
who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC; and
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document,
that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when
in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law
at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen
loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article
172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination of
probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However,
custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than
an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion
to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in
Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of
the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required
before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required
for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is
accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash
the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in
the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to
the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of
the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in
the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court
even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29
(Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for
re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that
it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous
ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave
abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion
for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No.
SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective
operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the election."2 The mischief which this provision —
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the
possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven
Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same
position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on
the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-
No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order
be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item
no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the
filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or
before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No.
95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said
Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her
original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking
her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District
of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by
writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up
to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He
also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation
of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First
District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for
the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First
District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on
May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding
private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of
Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of
amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance
with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed
word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should
subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was
asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence
of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have
responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that
her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit
petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although
she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months.
She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of
Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in
Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban
City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention
was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not
to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She
never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering
in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of
"residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical
presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate
of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the
explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be
made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance
of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to
the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the
election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely
and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case
considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant
case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence
in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter
which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended
to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate
which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to
condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate,
of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of
her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is
to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated
in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that
she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by
her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August
24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she
has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila
only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August
1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the
respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that respondent has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside
in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil
294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case,
when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was
not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is
pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the
First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot
hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her
affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959,
after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of
Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the
office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a
letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for
the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she
may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These
facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila.
This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was
a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on
several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she
spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned
such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In
the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how
one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and
(3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her
intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly
declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days,
as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise
be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the
effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show
that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside
in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the
First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident
of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly
pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at
precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter
Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her
failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to
her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had
been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of
the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition
for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District
of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she
was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat
in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995.
Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of
70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's
Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for
relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions.
The principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a
startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and
"Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement
with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency
to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting
the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights
and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is
their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took
the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends
to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and
animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a
given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One
may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a
person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to
leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various
places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction
quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used
to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place
of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated
by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in
our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact
that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same
doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to
the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs.
Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is
the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other
election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an
individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon
it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification
for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that
when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually
means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence
of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept
of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period
of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to
reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court
concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to
the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as
having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda
Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by
Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the
questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her
residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual
has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The
said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest
mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa,
Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was
"since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events
are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to
make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently
noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate
would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the
constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual
residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or
domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled
with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in
Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which
she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of
paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly
be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its
assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time
when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution
additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's
domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades
except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in
1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the
Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter.
In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa
and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions
if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed.
Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose
his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different
places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a
given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places"
flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever
had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone
or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the
other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various
insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of
the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as
the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in
other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an
election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot
may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to
run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why
the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has
not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every
person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to
the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements
supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not
her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional
commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish
the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the
COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in
the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School,
still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin,
the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos
when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she
and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as
a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic
of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines
and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor
she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in
Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during
her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers,
petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions
of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either
her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of
origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos
power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S
Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of
the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not
petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was
eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she
"abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not)
re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention
to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired
is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of
origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her
father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's
averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change
of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced
by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required
to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor
of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile
with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her
domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence."
39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's
domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the
use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo
Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but
in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of
domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically
loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence
upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code
of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de
esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a
pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the
aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to
establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual
residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the
phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision
which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to
domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of
transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the
husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent
with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the
intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact
that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles
(of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled
only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under
the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband
and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are
physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple
has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has
to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is
illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife
is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons,
stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with
reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question
of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a
consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences,
such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by
living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living
in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has
been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and
the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying
the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses
could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either
allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for
obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from
being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court
held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage
where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court
allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new
domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under
the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the
wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt.
In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal
right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he
experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights
at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by
process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such
orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a
decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884)
abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution
of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may
serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so
far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in
the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring
a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her
failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest
which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the
marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other
penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect
to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos,
in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code
— to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte.
There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as
the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile"
appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New
Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69)
distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product
of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one
thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in
political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the
term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former
President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new
"domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new
one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her
domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to
"rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . .
to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate
in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the
PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan,
as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals.
Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of
Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not
domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out
specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile
of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it
would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her
original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of
selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the
marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile
enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts
established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995,
fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which
has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution.
This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within
a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that
non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory
that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is
often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by
several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of
the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim
and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus,
in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have
abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus
Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts
and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments
merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.
perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these
sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending
established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or
she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves
to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives
in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated
April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the
First District of Leyte.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in SO ORDERED.
relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed vs.
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.
the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and x-----------------------x
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not G.R. No. 193536
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner,
vs.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in Respondents.
law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously
a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established DECISION
principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake
CARPIO, J.:
These are two special civil actions for certiorari1 questioning the
resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076
(DC). In G.R. No. 193237, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul
the 10 May 2010 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division and the 11
August 2010 Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc, which both ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material
representation. In G.R. No. 193536, Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges
the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which applied the
rule on succession under the Local Government Code in filling the vacancy
in the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte created
by the cancellation of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy.
The Facts
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for
his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a
false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy,
Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and
sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of
Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that
Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction
but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered
that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987.
Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5
February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of
probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the
COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the
same grounds.4
The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal
record as follows:
As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime
of robbery on January 22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge
Francisco Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found
him and his co-accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum.
Jalosjos appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was
dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only after a lapse of several years or
more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for
Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the
court. But then, on motion filed by his Probation Officer, Jalosjos’
probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the
corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on December
19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a
Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the
terms and conditions of his probation. This Certification was the one used
by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case
filed against him by Adasa in 2004, docketed as SPA No. 04-235.
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the
decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio
F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and Probation
Administration, guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a
falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that
respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and conditions of
his probation. A portion of the decision of the Sandiganbayan is quoted
hereunder:
The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer
Dominador Jalosjos, Jr., unwarranted benefits and advantage because the
subject certification, which was issued by the accused without adequate or
official support, was subsequently utilized by the said probationer as basis
of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that
he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said
court to issue the Order dated February 5, 2004 in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-
140-CEBU, declaring that said probationer has complied with the order of
probation and setting aside its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the
warrant or [sic] arrest; and that said Certification was also used by the said
probationer and became the basis for the Commission on Elections to deny
in its Resolution of August 2, 2004 the petition or [sic] private complainant
James Adasa for the disqualification of the probationer from running for
re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City in the National and Local Elections of
2004.5
The COMELEC’s Rulings
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition
and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under
oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact
he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of
which he has not yet served."6 The COMELEC First Division found that
Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued;
thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. The penalty imposed on
Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months and
twenty days of prisión correccional as minimum, to four years, two months
and one day of prisión mayor as maximum. The COMELEC First Division
ruled that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as
provided for in Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160."7
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for
reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution
read:
With the proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear
showing that he has not yet served the terms of his sentence, there is
simply no basis for Jalosjos to claim that his civil as well as political rights
have been violated. Having been convicted by final judgment,
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office.
His proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does
not deprive the Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition
to its finality, and to oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is
denied for utter lack of merit. Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and
ordered to CEASE and DESIST from occupying and discharging the functions
of the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions
of the Local Government Code on succession apply.
SO ORDERED.8
Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237,
while Cardino filed his petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R.
No. 193536.
On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No.
193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari
is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution
dated August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-
076 (DC) are hereby AFFIRMED.9
Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court
take judicial notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a
Motion for Reconsideration10 on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this
Court resolved11 to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No.
193237.Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated
that "he has resigned from the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan
effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was accepted by the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E. Yebes."12 Jalosjos’
resignation was made "in deference with the provision of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to his candidacy as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."13
These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos’ resignation. In resolving
Jalosjos’ Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardino’s
Petition in G.R. No. 193536, we address not only Jalosjos’ eligibility to run
for public office and the consequences of the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy, but also COMELEC’s constitutional duty to enforce and
administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1)
ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was
disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a
finding that Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his
qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good faith upon a previous COMELEC
decision declaring him eligible for the same position from which he is now
being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August
2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
added to the dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the
provisions of the Local Government Code on succession should apply.
This Court’s Ruling
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his
criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility
which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start
since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all
votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate,
actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. The dissenting opinions erroneously
limit the remedy against Jalosjos to disqualification under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and apply the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to
run for public office is a false material representation which is a ground for
a petition under Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
– A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of
candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he
has a right to run for the public office.14 If a candidate is not actually
eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from
running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition
under Section 78.
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for
disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving
the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for
a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity
or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty
of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance
his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the
penalties of prisión mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six
years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall
be that of the principal penalty.
xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the
offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular
elective office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the
exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the
sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office
formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the
following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling
affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of
such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual
or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in
any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión
mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and
that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which
the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of
law,15 the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal
Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On
the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to
hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for
elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he
states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered
that appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized with prisión mayor which
carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42,
Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code
disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies
the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification
to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, &
Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have
expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be
elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the
sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual
or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in
any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence"
should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the
word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification,
while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary
special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the
temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision,
instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such
duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means
according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special
disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected
to or hold public office perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The
effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the
principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not.
The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his perpetual
special disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it
is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding
at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment,
and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office
perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to
hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of
conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an
ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public
office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state
under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the
right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications
and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held in
Fermin v. Commission on Elections,17 the false material representation
may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual
special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person
suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of
candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office,"
as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As
this Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of
the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for
the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the
Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the
fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor,
to which perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is
not a ground for a petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of
the offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned,
Section 68 refers only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code and not to crimes under the Revised Penal Code. For ready reference,
we quote again Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty
of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89,
95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify
including the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this
Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under
the Omnibus Election Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely
errs when it holds that Jalosjos’ conviction for the crime of robbery under
the Revised Penal Code is a ground for "a petition for disqualification under
Section 68 of the OEC and not for cancellation of COC under Section 78
thereof." This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws other
than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a petition under
Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,19 the Court declared:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal
and not administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath
four statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or
naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a
permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement
that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a
statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines.20
We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy when he stated under oath that he was eligible to
run for mayor? The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that
Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded
that Jalosjos made a false material representation that is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes,
however, concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification
which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under Section 78.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of
Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78 without,
however, saying under what specific provision of law a petition against
Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate of candidacy.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of
Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the
false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión
mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section
40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner
has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of
which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void
certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy
was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor.
Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the
elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he
was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he
filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed.
There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections – Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be
proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible22
should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the
first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be
cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal
impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who
filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the
elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-
placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled
on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence
holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.23 If a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all
votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate
of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and
logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void
ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy
for the same position.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment
of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of
the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law
itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but
also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final
judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed
to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty
bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the SO ORDERED.
conduct of an election."24 The disqualification of a convict to run for public
office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a ANTONIO T. CARPIO
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all Associate Justice
laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
WE CONCUR:
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely Chief Justice
exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was
elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public Associate Justice
office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a ARTURO D. BRION
final judgment. Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DENIED, and the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and Associate Justice
the COMELEC En Bane, respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED ROBERTO A. ABAD
with the MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
2010 elections and thus received the highest number of votes for Mayor. Associate Justice
The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board of JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor of Associate Justice JOSE C. MENDOZA
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte. Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
of Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government so they Associate Justice
can cause the arrest of, and enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. CERTIFICATION
Jalosjos, Jr. due to his conviction for the crime of robbery in a final
judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 40-48; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp. 29-37.
Signed by Presiding Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, and Commissioners
Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 49-56; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp. 22-28.
Signed by Chairman Jose A.R. Melo, and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento,
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R.
Yusoph, and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal.
4 James A. Adasa v. Dominador Jalosjos, Jr., SPA No. 04-235. The Resolution
of the COMELEC Second Division was promulgated on 2 August 2004, while
the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc was promulgated on 16 December
2006. Rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp. 45-46.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 50-51.
6 Id. at 46; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), p. 35.
7 Id. at 47; id. at 36.
8 Id. at 55-56; id. at 27-28.
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), p. 360.
10 Id. at 373-393.
11 Rollo (G.R. No. 193536), p. 178.
12 Id. at 215.
13 Id. at 218.
14 The Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press 2010) defines
the word "eligible" as "having a right to do or obtain something."
15 People v. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636 (1935).
16 133 Phil. 770, 773-774 (1968).
17 G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 782.
18 Id. at 792-794.
19 442 Phil. 139, 177-178 (2002).
20 I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey
the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities. I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
21 Bautista v. Commission on Elections, 359 Phil. 1, 16 (1998). See Miranda
v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 (1999); Gador v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil.
395 (1980).
22 Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 467 (1995); Labo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, 257 Phil. 1 (1989).

23 Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736, 24
April 2007, 522 SCRA 23.
24 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(1).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. and Agapito Cardino were rivals in the mayoralty
race in Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Before election day, Cardino filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy against Jalosjos, alleging that the latter made a material
misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) when he declared
that he was eligible for the position of mayor when, in fact, he was
disqualified under Section 40 of the Local Government Code for having
been previously convicted by a final judgment for a crime (robbery)
involving moral turpitude.
In his defense, Jalosjos admitted his previous, conviction but argued that
he had been admitted to probation, which allegedly restored him to all his
political rights. Cardino rebutted Jalosjos' defense, citing a court order
revoking the grant of probation for Jalosjos' failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of the grant of probation.
On the very day of the election, the COMELEC resolved to grant Cardino's
petition and ordered the cancellation of Jalosjos' CoC. The COMELEC ruled
that the rules on succession would then apply. Both Cardino and Jalosjos
came to the Court for redress.
On February 22, 2011, the Court denied Jalosjos’ petition, prompting
Jalosjos to move for reconsideration. During the pendency of his motion,
Jalosjos manifested that he had already tendered his resignation from his
office and that the same was duly accepted by the governor of the province
of Zamboanga del Norte.
I dissent from the majority’s (i) position that the present case involves a
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy (CoC) rather than a case of
disqualification and (ii) conclusion that Cardino, the "second placer" in the
2010 elections for the mayoralty post of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte, should be the rightful Mayor. I submit that while Cardino intended
to cancel Jalosjos’ CoC, his petition alleged acts constituting
disqualification as its ground. Thus, the case should be resolved under the
rules of disqualification, not from the point of a cancellation of a CoC.
I point out in this Dissenting Opinion, as I did in the cases of Mayor Barbara
Ruby C. Talaga v. Commission on Elections, et al.1 and Efren Racel Aratea
v. Commission on Elections, et al.,2 that this case is best resolved through
an analytical approach that starts from a consideration of the nature of a
CoC; the distinctions between eligibility or lack of it and disqualification;
the effects of cancellation and disqualification; and the applicable
remedies.
The CoC and the Qualifications for its Filing.
As I discussed in Talaga and Aratea, a basic rule and one that cannot be
repeated often enough is that the CoC is the document that creates the
status of a candidate. In Sinaca v. Mula,3 the Court described the nature of
a CoC as follows –
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the
whole world of the candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is
a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he
announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for
the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs
to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well
stated.
Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions left to Congress the task of providing
the qualifications of local elective officials. Congress undertook this task by
enacting Batas Pambasa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337 (Local Government Code or
LGC), B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code or OEC) and, later, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC 1991).4
Under Section 79 of the OEC, a political aspirant legally becomes a
"candidate" only upon the due filing of his sworn CoC.5 In fact, Section 73
of the OEC makes the filing of the CoC a condition sine qua non for a person
to "be eligible for any elective public office"6 – i.e., to be validly voted for
in the elections. Section 76 of the OEC makes it a "ministerial duty" for a
COMELEC official "to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy"7 filed.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides what a CoC must contain or state:8
Section 2. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of
candidacy shall be under oath and shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office and constituency stated therein;
that he is eligible for said office, his age, sex, civil status, place and date of
birth, his citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized; the registered
political party to which he belongs; if married, the full name of the spouse;
his legal residence, giving the exact address, the precinct number,
barangay, city or municipality and province where he is registered voter;
his post office address for election purposes; his profession or occupation
or employment; that he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a
foreign country; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, decrees, resolution, rules
and regulations promulgated and issued by the duly-constituted
authorities; that he assumes the foregoing obligations voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate are true and correct to the best of his own knowledge. [italics
supplied]
From the point of view of the common citizen who wants to run for a local
elective office, the above recital contains all the requirements that he must
satisfy; it contains the basic and essential requirements applicable to all
citizens to qualify for candidacy for a local elective office. These are their
formal terms of entry to local politics. A citizen must not only possess all
these requirements; he must positively represent in his CoC application
that he possesses them. Any falsity on these requirements constitutes a
material misrepresentation that can lead to the cancellation of the CoC. On
this point, Section 78 of the OEC provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
– A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election. [italics, emphases and underscores ours]
A necessarily related provision is Section 39 of LGC 1991 which states:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. [italics ours]
Notably, Section 74 of the OEC does not require any negative qualification
except only as expressly required therein. A specific negative requirement
refers to the representation that the would-be candidate is not a
permanent resident nor an immigrant in another country. This
requirement, however, is in fact simply part of the positive requirement of
residency in the locality for which the CoC is filed and, in this sense, is not
strictly a negative requirement. Neither does Section 74 require any
statement that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground for
disqualification specifically enumerated by law, as disqualification is a
matter that the OEC and LGC 1991 separately deal with, as discussed
below.
With the accomplishment of the CoC and its filing, a political aspirant
officially acquires the status of a candidate and, at the very least, the
prospect of holding public office; he, too, formally opens himself up to the
complex political environment and processes. The Court cannot be more
emphatic in holding "that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy
rests at the very core of the electoral process."9
Pertinent laws10 provide the specific periods when a CoC may be filed;
when a petition for its cancellation may be brought; and the effect of its
filing. These measures, among others, are in line with the State policy or
objective of ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public service,"11
bearing in mind that the limitations on the privilege to seek public office
are within the plenary power of Congress to provide.12
The Concept of Disqualification vis-a-vis
Remedy of Cancellation; and Effects of
Disqualification.
To disqualify, in its simplest sense, is (1) to deprive a person of a power,
right or privilege; or (2) to make him or her ineligible for further
competition because of violation of the rules.13 It is in these senses that
the term is understood in our election laws.
Thus, anyone who may qualify or may have qualified under the general
rules of eligibility applicable to all citizens (Section 74 of the OEC) may be
deprived of the right to be a candidate or may lose the right to be a
candidate (if he has filed his CoC) because of a trait or characteristic that
applies to him or an act that can be imputed to him as an individual,
separately from the general qualifications that must exist for a citizen to
run for a local public office.
In a disqualification situation, the grounds are the individual traits or
conditions of, or the individual acts of disqualification committed by, a
candidate as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC and Section 40
of LGC 1991, and which generally have nothing to do with the eligibility
requirements for the filing of a CoC.14
Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC (together with Section 40 of LGC 1991,
outlined below) cover the following as traits, characteristics or acts of
disqualification: (i) corrupting voters or election officials; (ii) committing
acts of terrorism to enhance candidacy; (iii) overspending; (iv) soliciting,
receiving or making prohibited contributions; (v) campaigning outside the
campaign period; (vi) removal, destruction or defacement of lawful
election propaganda; (vii) committing prohibited forms of election
propaganda; (viii) violating rules and regulations on election propaganda
through mass media; (ix) coercion of subordinates; (x) threats,
intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of
coercion; (xi) unlawful electioneering; (xii) release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds; (xiii) solicitation of votes or undertaking any
propaganda on the day of the election; (xiv) declaration as an insane; and
(xv) committing subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Section 40 of LGC 1991, on the other hand, essentially repeats those
already in the OEC under the following disqualifications:
a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded.
Together, these provisions embody the disqualifications that, by statute,
can be imputed against a candidate or a local elected official to deny him
of the chance to run for office or of the chance to serve if he has been
elected.
A unique feature of "disqualification" is that under Section 68 of the OEC,
it refers only to a "candidate," not to one who is not yet a candidate. Thus,
the grounds for disqualification do not apply to a would-be candidate who
is still at the point of filing his CoC. This is the reason why no representation
is required in the CoC that the would-be candidate does not possess any
ground for disqualification. The time to hold a person accountable for the
grounds for disqualification is after attaining the status of a candidate, with
the filing of the CoC.
To sum up and reiterate the essential differences between the eligibility
requirements and disqualifications, the former are the requirements that
apply to, and must be complied by, all citizens who wish to run for local
elective office; these must be positively asserted in the CoC.
The latter refer to individual traits, conditions or acts applicable to specific
individuals that serve as grounds against one who has qualified as a
candidate to lose this status or privilege; essentially, they have nothing to
do with a candidate’s CoC.
When the law allows the cancellation of a candidate’s CoC, the law
considers the cancellation from the point of view of those positive
requirements that every citizen who wishes to run for office must
commonly satisfy. Since the elements of "eligibility" are common, the vice
of ineligibility attaches to and affects both the candidate and his CoC. In
contrast, when the law allows the disqualification of a candidate, the law
looks only at the disqualifying trait or condition specific to the individual; if
the "eligibility" requirements have been satisfied, the disqualification
applies only to the person of the candidate, leaving the CoC valid. A
previous conviction of subversion is the best example as it applies not to
the citizenry at large, but only to the convicted individuals; a convict may
have a valid CoC upon satisfying the eligibility requirements under Section
74 of the OEC, but shall nevertheless be disqualified.
Distinctions among (i) denying due course to or
cancellation of a CoC, (ii) disqualification,
and (iii) quo warranto
The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local elective office and the
disqualifications that may apply to candidates necessarily create
distinctions on the remedies available, on the effects of lack of eligibility
and on the application of disqualification. The remedies available are
essentially: the cancellation of a CoC, disqualification from candidacy or
from holding office, and quo warranto, which are distinct remedies with
varying applicability and effects. For ease of presentation and
understanding, their availability, grounds and effects are topically
discussed below.
As to the grounds:
In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC, the ground is
essentially lack of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office;15 the
governing provisions are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC.16
In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the grounds are traits,
conditions, characteristics or acts of disqualification,17 individually
applicable to a candidate, as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC;
Section 40 of LGC 1991; and Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. As
previously discussed, the grounds for disqualification are different from,
and have nothing to do with, a candidate’s CoC although they may result
in disqualification from candidacy whose immediate effect upon finality
before the elections is the same as a cancellation. If they are cited in a
petition filed before the elections, they remain as disqualification grounds
and carry effects that are distinctly peculiar to disqualification.
In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his
office are ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This
is provided under Section 253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of
Court as to procedures. While quo warranto and cancellation share the
same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the time these grounds are
cited. A cancellation case is brought before the elections, while a quo
warranto is filed after and may still be filed even if a CoC cancellation case
was not filed before elections.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78,
the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of
candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections,
whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on
the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the
proclamation of the election results. Under section 253, a candidate is
ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified
if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.18
Note that the question of what would constitute acts of disqualification –
under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC and Section 40 of LGC 1991 – is best
resolved by directly referring to the provisions involved. The approach is
not as straight forward in a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
and also to a quo warranto petition, which similarly covers the ineligibility
of a candidate/elected official. In Salcedo II v. COMELEC,19 we ruled that –
In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under
Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein
pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision
would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for
the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although
the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material
representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions
applying Section 78 of the Code.
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation
contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective
office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from
running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a
person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public
office upon just any innocuous mistake. [emphases ours, citation omitted]
Thus, in addition to the failure to satisfy or comply with the eligibility
requirements, a material misrepresentation must be present in a
cancellation of CoC situation. The law apparently does not allow material
divergence from the listed requirements to qualify for candidacy and
enforces its edict by requiring positive representation of compliance under
oath. Significantly, where disqualification is involved, the mere existence
of a ground appears sufficient and a material representation assumes no
relevance.
As to the period for filing:
The period to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC depends
on the provision of law invoked. If the petition is filed under Section 78 of
the OEC, the petition must be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the
filing of the CoC.20 However, if the petition is brought under Section 69 of
the same law, the petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last
day of filing the CoC.21
On the other hand, the period to file a disqualification case is at any time
before the proclamation of a winning candidate, as provided in COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696,22 while a quo warranto petition must be filed within
ten (10) days from proclamation.23
As to the effects of a successful suit:
A candidate whose CoC was denied due course or cancelled is not
considered a candidate at all. Note that the law fixes the period within
which a CoC may be filed.24 After this period, generally no other person
may join the election contest. A notable exception to this general rule is
the rule on substitution. The application of the exception, however,
presupposes a valid CoC. Unavoidably, a "candidate" whose CoC has been
cancelled or denied due course cannot be substituted for lack of a CoC, to
all intents and purposes.25 Similarly, a successful quo warranto suit results
in the ouster of an already elected official from office; substitution, for
obvious reasons, can no longer apply.
On the other hand, a candidate who was simply disqualified is merely
prohibited from continuing as a candidate or from assuming or continuing
to assume the functions of the office; substitution can thus take place
under the terms of Section 77 of the OEC.26
As to the effects of a successful suit on the right of the second placer in the
elections:
In any of these three remedies, the doctrine of rejection of the second
placer applies for the simple reason that –
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the
other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.
The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections.1âwphi1 He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of
voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the
results under such circumstances.27
With the disqualification of the winning candidate and the application of
the doctrine of rejection of the second placer, the rules on succession
under the law accordingly apply, as provided under Section 44 of LGC 1991.
As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second
highest number of votes (second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the
winner in the elections should the winning candidate be disqualified by
final judgment before the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646.28 The same effect obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in
fact and in law and within the realm of notoriety, of the disqualification,
yet they still voted for the disqualified candidate. In this situation, the
electorate that cast the plurality of votes in favor of the notoriously
disqualified candidate is simply deemed to have waived their right to
vote.29
In a CoC cancellation proceeding, the law is silent on the legal effect of a
judgment cancelling the CoC and does not also provide any temporal
distinction. Given, however, the formal initiatory role a CoC plays and the
standing it gives to a political aspirant, the cancellation of the CoC based
on a finding of its invalidity effectively results in a vote for an inexistent
"candidate" or for one who is deemed not to be in the ballot. Although
legally a misnomer, the "second placer" should be proclaimed the winner
as the candidate with the highest number of votes for the contested
position. This same consequence should result if the cancellation case
becomes final after elections, as the cancellation signifies non-candidacy
from the very start, i.e., from before the elections.
Application of Above Rulings and Principles to the Case.
While it is apparent from the undisputed facts that Cardino did indeed file
a petition for denial and/or the cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC, it is obvious
as well, based on the above discussions, that the ground he cited was not
appropriate for the cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC but for his disqualification.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is expressly a ground for
disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC. As a ground, it applies only to
Jalosjos; it is not a standard of eligibility that applies to all citizens who may
be minded to run for a local political position; its non-possession is not a
negative qualification that must be asserted in the CoC. Hence, there can
be no doubt that what Cardino filed was effectively a petition for
disqualification. This conclusion, of course, follows the rule that the nature
of a petition is determined not by its title or by its prayers, but by the acts
alleged as basis for the petition.
Unfortunately for Cardino, the position of a second placer is not given
preference, both in law and in jurisprudence with respect to the
consequences of election disputes (except with well-defined exceptional
circumstances discussed above), after election has taken place.30
This approach and its consequential results are premised on the general
principle that the electorate is supreme; it registers its choice during the
election and, after voting, effectively rejects the candidate who comes in
as the second placer. Under the rule that a disqualified candidate can still
stand as a candidate unless his disqualification has been ruled upon with
finality before the elections,31 Jalosjos validly stood as a candidate in the
elections of May 2010 and won, although he was subsequently
disqualified. With his disqualification while already sitting as Mayor, the
winning vice-mayor, not . Cardino as a mere defeated second placer,
should rightfully be seated as mayor under Section 44 of LGC 1991 on the
law on succession.
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to set aside the Resolution1 dated November 6,
2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed
in toto the Resolution2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division
canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin
Caballero.
Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.4 were
both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan,
Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed
a Petition5 to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate
of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he
declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-resident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel,
manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and
the petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition
during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a
Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations
in his petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on
October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225.6 He claimed
that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite
becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to
pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to
Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally
in Canada.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding
that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within
one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the resolution
reads:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED.7chanrobleslaw
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised
by petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also in
consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the
qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found that while
petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had
taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced
his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements
provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons
who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one
year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen
resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes;
thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to
prove that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be
eligible to run for elective office in said locality which he failed to do.
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns
showed that petitioner won over private respondent.8 Private respondent
filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.9
On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the
COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.
On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul
Proclamation.10
On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution11 of the
May 3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the
En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the
appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes
in favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's
proclamation and proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a
Writ of Execution.12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office13 on
December 20, 2013.
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following
assignment of errors, to wit:cralawlawlibrary
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAR
IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN SEVERAL
FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE
DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION
OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON
13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON
RESIDENCY.14chanrobleslaw
Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny
due course or to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election
Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not personally served on
him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by
registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why
registered mail as a mode of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that
private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs (1)15 and (4),16 Rule 23
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution
No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright.
We are not convinced.
While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned
requirements, the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC
may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section
4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to
obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission,
these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.chanrobleslaw
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not
square with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time,
provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired.17
In Hayudini v. COMELEC,18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment
of respondent's petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC
despite its failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, i.e.,
pertaining to the period to file petition and to provide sufficient
explanation as to why his petition was not served personally on petitioner,
respectively, and held that:cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither
fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it
is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be
immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake
of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where
the Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by
its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes."
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to
liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or
even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including
obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of its objectives - ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil
action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not
only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates,
but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds
the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding
duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly
chose as their rightful leader.19chanrobleslaw
Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held
on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification
and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public
interest, which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We
adopt the COMELEC's s ratiocination in accepting the petition, to
wit:cralawlawlibrary
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with
the procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which
requires service of a copy of the petition to respondent prior to its filing.
But then, we should also consider the efforts exerted by petitioner in
serving a copy of his petition to respondent after being made aware that
such service is necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for
petitioner to personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he
was in Canada at the time of its filing as shown in respondent's travel
records.
The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford
the latter an opportunity to answer the allegations contained in the
petition even prior to the service of summons by the Commission to him.
In this case, respondent was given a copy of the petition during the
conference held on 10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded the
occasion to rebut all the allegations against him. He even filed a
Memorandum containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due
process which is the very essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to
bow to substantive considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at
promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding, x x x
xxxx
When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the
application of the rules is in order, x x x.
Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which
warrants the relaxation of the application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure,
consistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in several
cases.20chanrobleslaw
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He
argues that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had
worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax
certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right
of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he
usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work
abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the
requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate
running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the
place where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the
candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and
that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election
is a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.21 The law does not
provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition
or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino.22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.23 This is only
logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.24
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an
elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.
Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
chanrobleslaw
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of
1991, provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective local
official. Section 39 thereof states:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.chanrobleslaw
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year
immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for
cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made
material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident
of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceeding the day
of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence,25 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."26
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the
place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists
not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian
citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is
required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner
had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred
his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes
during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver
of such abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC,30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in issue, we
had the occasion to state, thus:cralawlawlibrary
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He
could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain
his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place
becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein
shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it
shall not retroact to the time of his birth.31chanrobleslaw
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan,
Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on
September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new
domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence
to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a
period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It
found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of
RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that
he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was
accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent
to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13,
2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required
by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings
of fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the
instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such
factual determinations/~ Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned
Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor
substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.33
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding
the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan,
Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial
compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on
Elections,34 we held:cralawlawlibrary
x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of
the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.35chanrobleslaw
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC
that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year
immediately proceeding the day of the election, thus, a ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in
relation to Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or
denial of due course to COCs, to wit:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election.chanrobleslaw
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section
78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains
to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would
affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective
post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.36 We concluded that
material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to
qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age,
citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local
elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.37
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the
misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.38 We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed
by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material
misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated
November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc and are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Perez, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., with separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., on official leave.
Reyes, J., on leave.
Jardeleza, J., no part prior OSG action..
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 23-28.
2 Composed of Presiding Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle, Commissioner
Christian Robert S. Lim and Commissioner Al A. Parreño; Docketed as SPA
No. 13-196 (DC) (F); id. at 67-72.
3Rollo, p. 146.
4 Id. at 144.
5 Id. at 117-121.
6Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x.
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
7Rollo, p. 72.
8 Id. at 128-129.
9 Id. at 130-133.
10 Id. at 135-142.
11 Id. at 181-187.
12 Id. at 204-207.
13 Id. at 209.
14 Id. at 8.
15 Section 4. Procedure to be observed. — Both parties shall observe the
following procedure:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the
Petition, through personal service to the respondent. In cases where
personal service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the
Petition, or the respondents' whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the
petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating the reason or circumstances
therefor and resort to registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of
service or the affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be filed.
16 4. No Petition shall be docketed unless the requirements in the
preceding paragraphs have been complied with.
17 See Mentang v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 110347, February 4,
1994, 229 SCRA 666, 675.
18 G.R. No. 207900, April 22,2014, 723 SCRA 223.
19Hayudini v. COMELEC, supra, at 242-243.
21 Sees. 2 and 3.
22Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 596 Phil. 354, 367 (2009).
23 Id.
24 Id.
20Rollo, pp. 25-26. (Citations omitted)

25Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, A3A Phil. 861, 871-872 (2002),
citing Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453
(1941); Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, September
14, 1993, 226 SCRA408.
26 Id. at 872, citing Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18,
1965, 248 SCRA 400, 420.
27 Id. citing 25 Am. Jur. 2d, §11.
28 Id. at 873. Citizenship Act (Canada)
Section 5. (1) The Minister shall grant citizenship to any person who
(a) makes application for citizenship;
(b) is eighteen years of age or over;
(c) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, has, within the four years
immediately preceding the date of his or her application, accumulated at
least three years of residence in Canada calculated in the following
manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(i) for every day during which the person was resident in Canada before his
lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be
deemed to have accumulated one-half of a day or residence, and
(ii) for every day during which the person was resident in Canada after his
lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be
deemed to have accumulated one day of residence;
xxx
30Japzon v. Commission on Elections, supra note 22, at 367.
31 Id. at 347. (Emphasis supplied)
32Pangkat Laguna v. Commission on Elections, 426 Phil. 480, 486 (2002).
33Domingo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 372 Phil. 188, 202 (1999), citing
Nolasco v. Commission on Elections, 341 Phil. 761 (1997); Lozano v. Yorac,
G.R. No. 94521, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 256; Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia, 276 Phil. 301 (1991).
34318 Phil. 467(1995).
35 Aquino v. Commission on Elections, supra, at 509.
36 Salcedo IIv. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 386 (1999).
37Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, February 25,
2014, 717 SCRA312, 323, citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,
supra, at 389, citing RA 7160, Section 39 on qualifications.
38 Id. at 323.chanrobleslaw
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia's dismissal of the petition since the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when
it cancelled the certificate of candidacy (CoC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin
Caballero for the mayoralty post of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013
Elections.
I agree that the issue of Caballero's residency1 in Uyugan — an issue tains
to Caballero's qualification and eligibility to run for public office - is imbued
with public interest. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, this
characterization is sufficient to justify the Comelec's move to suspend its
own rules of procedure in handling Caballero's case.
I also agree with the ponencia's conclusion that Caballero failed to comply
with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local
government Code (LGC). Likewise, I hold that Caballero's reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 92252 did
not have the effect of automatically making him a resident of Uyugan since
RA 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. As I will discuss
below, citizenship and residency are distinct from one another and are
separate requirements for qualification for local elective office; thus, they
must be considered under the laws respectively governing them.
I concur as well with the ponencia's conclusion that, by stating in his Coc
that he had completed the required one-year residency when he actually
did not, Caballero made a material misrepresentation that justified the
comelec's cancellation of his CoC.
I submit this Separate Concurring Opinion to add that, as the loss and
acquisition of residence involve the determination of intent, the action
taken pursuant to the intent and the applicable laws and rules on residency
and immigration, these laws and rules must necessarily be considered to
ascertain Caballero's intent and to determine whether Caballero had
actually complied with the one-year residency requirement.
As well, given Caballero's undisputed Canadian citizenship by
naturalization, due notice of the conditions required for Canadian
naturalization should assist the Court in examining Caballero's intention
and in resolving any perceived doubt regarding the loss of his domicile of
origin in Uyugan and the establishment of a new domicile of choice in
Canada.
To be sure, Canadian laws are not controlling and cannot serve as basis for
the resolution of the loss and re-acquisition of domicile issue; the Court,
too, cannot take cognizance of foreign laws as these must first be properly
proven to be given recognition. Nonetheless, I believe that the Court can
look up to them, not as statutory basis for resolving the residency issue,
but as supporting guides in determining Caballero's intent.
As the ponencia defined, the issues for the Court's resolution are: first,
whether the Comelec should have denied outright the petition to deny due
course or to cancel private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud's CoC,
as Caballero failed to personally serve him a copy of the petition and to
attach an affidavit explaining the use of service by registered mail, in
violation of Section 4, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.3
And second, whether Caballero abandoned his Philippine domicile when
he became a Canadian citizen; assuming that he did, whether his nine-
month residency in Uyugan prior to the May 13, 2013 elections constitutes
substantial compliance with the residency requirement.
I shall no longer touch on the first issue as I fully agree with the ponencia
on this point. My subsequent discussions will deal only with the issue of
Caballero's residence in Uyugan for the required duration.
My Positions
a) RA 9225 does not touch on residency;
citizenship and residency are separate
and distinct requirements for qualification
for local elective office

RA 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipinos (who lost their
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country) to
expeditiously re-acquire their Filipino citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Upon taking the oath, they re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship and the accompanying civil and political
rights that attach to citizenship.
RA 9225 does not touch on a person's residence; does not mention it; and
does not even require residence in the Philippines prior to or at the time
he or she takes the oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship. In fact, RA
9225 allows former natural-born citizens to re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship while still residing in the country that granted them naturalized
citizenship status.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Residency in the Philippines becomes material only when the natural-born
Filipino availing of RA 9225, decides to run for public office. As provided
under Section 5 of this law, those who seek elective public office shall, in
addition to taking the oath of allegiance, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship and meet the qualifications
for holding such public office that the Constitution and existing laws
require.
The qualifications for holding local elective office are found in Section 39
of the LGC. Among others, Section 39 requires a candidate for a local
elective post to be a citizen of the Philippines and a resident of the locality
where he or she intends to be elected for at least one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
RA 9225 provides the citizenship requirement when the former natural-
born Filipino re-acquires Philippine citizenship under this law's terms.
Residency, on the other hand, is the domain of Section 39 of the LGC. These
two laws complement each other in qualifying a Filipino with a re-acquired
citizenship, for candidacy for a local elective office.
Notably under this relationship, RA 9225 does not require any residency
allegation, proof or qualification to avail of its terms. RA 9225 does not
even require Filipinos with re-acquired citizenship to establish or maintain
any Philippine residence, although they can, as Filipinos, come and go as
they please into the country without any pre-condition other than those
applicable to all Filipino citizens. By implication, RA 9225 (a dual citizenship
law) allows residency anywhere, within or outside the Philippines, before
or after re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under its terms. Re-
acquisition of citizenship, however, does not - by itself - imply nor establish
the fact of Philippine residency. In these senses, RA 9225 and the LGC are
complementary to, yet are independent of, one another.
Another legal reality that must be kept in mind in appreciating RA 9225 and
residency is that entitlement to the civil and political rights that come with
the re-acquired citizenship comes only when the requirements have been
completed and Filipino citizenship has been re-acquired. Only then can re-
acquiring Filipinos secure the right to reside in the country as Filipinos and
the right to vote and be voted for elective office under the requirements
of the Constitution and applicable existing laws. For would-be candidates
to local elective office, these applicable requirements include the taking of
an oath of renunciation of all other citizenships and allegiance, and
allegation and proof of residency for at least a year counted from the date
of the election.
b) Principles governing loss of domicile of
origin and change or acquisition of new
domicile
Under our election laws, the term "residence" is synonymous with domicile
and refers to the individual's permanent home or the place to which,
whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.5
Domicile is classified into three, namely: (1) domicile of origin, which is
acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired
upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation
of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence
or intention.
Caballero's indisputable domicile of origin is Uyugan, Batanes. He
subsequently went abroad for work, established his residence in Canada
beginning 1989, and acquired Canadian citizenship in 2007. On September
12, 2012, and while still residing in Canada, he applied with the Philippine
Consul General of Toronto, Canada for the re-acquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225.
Jurisprudence provides the following requirements to effect a change of
domicile or to acquire a domicile by choice:cralawlawlibrary
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) a bonafide intention to remain there; and
(3) a bonafide intention to abandon the old domicile.chanrobleslaw
These are the animus manendi and the animus non revertendi that
jurisprudence requires to be satisfied.
Under these requirements, no specific unbending rule exists in the
appreciation of compliance because of the element of intent6 - an abstract
and subjective proposition that can only be determined from the
surrounding circumstances. Separately from intent is the question of the
actions taken pursuant to the intent, and the consideration of the
applicable laws, rules and regulations.
Jurisprudence has likewise laid out three basic foundational rules in the
consideration of domicile:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Second, when once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and
Third, a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.7
As jurisprudential foundational rules, these should be fully applied in
appreciating Caballero's circumstances.
c) Permanent residency is a requirement
for naturalization as Canadian citizen
Under Section 5 (1), Part I of the Canadian Citizenship Law,8 Canadian
citizenship may be granted to anyone who, among other requirements:
makes an application for citizenship; IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT; and who,
if granted citizenship, intends to continue to reside in Canada.9
d) Caballero lost his domicile of origin
(in Uyugan) when he established a new
domicile of choice in Canada; to transfer
his domicile back to Uyugan, he has to
prove the fact of transfer and the consequent
re-establishment of a new domicile in Uyugan.
Given the Canadian citizenship requirements, Caballero (who had been
living in Canada since 1989 prior to his naturalization as Canadian citizen in
2007) would not have been granted Canadian citizenship had he not
applied for it and had he not shown proof of permanent residence in that
country. This is the indicator of intent that I referred to in considering the
question of Caballero's Philippine residency and his factual claim that he
never abandoned his Philippine residence.
Parenthetically, the requirement that a foreign national be a resident of
the State for a given period prior to the grant of the State's citizenship is
not unique to the Canadian jurisdiction. The requirement proceeds from
the State's need to ensure that the foreign applicant is integrated to the
society he is embracing, and that he has actual attachment to his new
community before citizenship is granted. The requirement can be said to
be a preparatory move as well since the grant of citizenship carries with it
the right to enjoy civil and political rights that are not ordinarily granted to
non-citizens.
Even the Philippines, through our laws on naturalization, recognizes these
requirements prior to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Our existing laws
require continued residency in the Philippines for a given period10 before
any foreign national who wishes to become a Philippine citizen is conferred
this status.
In this limited sense, I believe that the Court may look into the Canadian
citizenship laws to get an insight into Caballero's intent. To reiterate,
Caballero would not have been granted Canadian citizenship had he not
applied for it and had he not been a Canadian permanent resident for the
required period. Under the foundational rule that a man can only have one
domicile, Caballero's moves constitute positive, voluntary, overt and
intentional abandonment of his domicile of origin. His moves signified, too,
the establishment of a new domicile of choice in Canada.
Thus, to comply with Section 39 of the LGC by transferring his domicile
anew to Uyugan, Caballero has to prove the fact of transfer and his re-
established domicile by residing in Uyugan for at least one year
immediately before the May 13, 2013 elections. In accordance with the
jurisprudential rules on change of domicile, he must establish substantial
physical presence in Uyugan during the required period.
Moreover, under the terms of RA 9225 and its provisions on the grant of
civil and political rights,11 Caballero can be said to have acquired the right
to reside in and re-establish his domicile in Uyugan (or any part of the
Philippines) only from September 12, 2012, i.e., when he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.
Unfortunately for him, his Uyugan residency, even if counted from
September 12, 2012, would still be short of the required one-year
residency period. And he was not simply absent from Uyugan before
September 12, 2012 during the period the law required him to be in
residence; he never even claimed that he was in Uyugan then as a resident
who intended to stay.
Of course, existing immigration laws allow former natural-born Filipinos,
who lost their Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country,
to acquire permanent residency in the Philippines even prior to, or without
re-acquiring, Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.
Under Section 13 (f) of Commonwealth Act No. 61312 (the Philippine
Immigration of 1940), as amended, "a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign country and is returning
to the Philippines for permanent residence x x x shall be considered a non--
quota immigrant for purposes of entering the Philippines." The returning
former Filipino can apply for a permanent resident visa (otherwise known
as Returning Former Filipino Visa) which, when granted, shall entitle the
person to stay indefinitely in the Philippines.13 Other than through such
permanent resident visa, Caballero could have stayed in the Philippines
only for a temporary period.14 Any such temporary stay, of course, cannot
be considered for purposes of Section 39 of the LGC as it does not fall
within the concept of "residence."

In the present case, the records do not contain any evidence that Caballero
ever secured a permanent resident visa and has been residing in the
Philippines prior to his re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA
9225. Thus, Caballero's re-established domicile in Uyugan can be counted
only from the time he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. This period, as
earlier pointed out, is less than the required one-year residency.
e) The nature of a CoC cancellation
proceeding should be considered in the
resolution of the present certiorari
petition
The present Rule 65 petition for certiorari,15 filed in relation with Rule 64
of the Rules of Court, arose from the petition to cancel the CoC of
Caballero. In this context, the nature and requisites of CoC cancellation
proceedings are and should be the primary considerations in the resolution
of the present petition.
A petition to cancel CoC is governed by Section 74 in relation with Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). As these provisions operate, the
would-be candidate must state only true facts in the CoC, as provided by
Section 74; any false representation of a material fact may lead to the
cancellation or denial of his or her CoC, under Section 78, These provisions
read:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth: residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before
the election. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]chanrobleslaw
In Mitra v. Comelec,16 the Court explained that the false representation
that these provisions mention necessarily pertains to material facts, or
those that refer to a candidate's qualification for elective office. The false
representation must also involve a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible, as provided under Section 78 of the OEC.
Notably, the positive representation in the CoC that the would-be
candidate is required to make under Section 74 of the OEC, in relation with
the residency requirement of Section 39 of the LGC, complements the
disqualifying ground of being an immigrant or permanent resident in a
foreign country under Section 40 of the LGC.17 In plainer terms, the
assertion that the would-be candidate is a resident of the locality where he
intends to be elected carries with it the negative assertion that he has
neither been an immigrant nor a permanent resident in a foreign country
for at least one year immediately preceding the election.
In the present case, Caballero filed his CoC on October 3, 2012. He asserted
in his CoC that he is a resident of Uyugan (and impliedly, not a permanent
resident of a foreign country) for at least one year immediately preceding
the May 13, 2013 elections. By making this assertion, Caballero committed
a material misrepresentation in his CoC since he effectively re-established
his domicile in Uyugan and could have been a permanent resident only
from September 12, 2012.
f) Under the circumstances,
the Comelec did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in cancelling
Caballero 's CoC
Jurisprudence has consistently defined grave abuse of discretion as a
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment x x x equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion, to be grave, must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility."18
Based on this definition, the grave abuse of discretion that justifies the
grant of certiorari involves an error or defect of jurisdiction resulting from,
among others, an indifferent disregard for the law, arbitrariness and
caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, or lack of rational
deliberation in decision making.19
It should also be remembered that the remedy of certiorari applies only to
rulings that are not, or are no longer, appealable. Thus, certiorari is not an
appeal that opens up the whole case for review; it is limited to a
consideration of the specific aspect of the case necessary to determine if
grave abuse of discretion had intervened.20
In short, to assail a Comelec ruling, the assailing party must show that the
final and inappealable ruling is completely void, not simply erroneous,
because the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in considering the case
or in issuing its ruling.
It. is within this context that I fully concur with the ponencia's dismissal of
the petition. Caballero's assertion in his CoC that he has been a resident of
Uyugan for at least one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections - a clear material misrepresentation on his qualification for the
mayoralty post - undoubtedly justified the Comelec in cancelling his CoC
pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. In acting as it did, the Comelec simply
performed its mandate and enforced the law based on the established
facts and evidence. Clearly, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed
to its actions.
In closing, I reiterate that RA 9225 is concerned only with citizenship; it
does not touch on and does not require residency in the Philippines to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship. Residency in the Philippines becomes
material only when the natural-born Filipino who re-acquires or retains
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of RA 9225 decides to run for
public office. Even then, RA 9225 leaves the resolution of any residency
issue to the terms of the Constitution and specifically applicable existing
laws.
For all these reasons, I vote to dismiss Rogelio Batin Caballero's petition for
lack of merit.
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective;
the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of
January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a
permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated
January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3)
petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No.
87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of
Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for
review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo
Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a
green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card
issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green
card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States
for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He
alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he
voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987
for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional
elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the
exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on
the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has
sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as
shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As
the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence
for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42
of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy
for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a
foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card
holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has
not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito
Miguel, respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision
dated June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
"Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc.,
respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which
denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by
Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and
desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of
Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning
the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the
COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements
of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic)
and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner,
considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto
cases under the Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22,
Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is
proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2)
whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident
of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18,
1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971,
EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive
public officials in the present administration of President Corazon C.
Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the
holders' right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a question
that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the
"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No.
230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting
and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the
United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's
answer was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United
States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to
the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a
RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following
information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in
the United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States
in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his
children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the
intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of
his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes
give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance
to the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for
the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain,
are in general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their
rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to
remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to
their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that
no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law, and
the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood
by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the
protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire
the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the
status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public
office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and
presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January
18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without
such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec.
68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves
that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but
the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his
status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on
January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become
a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office
for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is
one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must
possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not
possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the
United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3)
months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987
and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are
permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus
Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to
hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens
who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or
purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens
of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest
and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here,
they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent
residents thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent
residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there
permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to
come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court
believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses;
that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his
other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow
itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and
giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the
U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his
occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that
he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he
was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto
was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of
Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C.
Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled.
Costs against the said respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,1 dated July 19,
2001, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the
May 14, 2001 elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the
COMELEC en banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in
Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he
joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S.
citizen.2 From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while
on leave from the U.S. Navy.3 Otherwise, even after his retirement from
the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a
residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until
August 5, 2000.4 Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under
R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application
was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took
his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of
Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of
Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election
Registration Board on January 12, 2001.6 On February 27, 2001, he filed
his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."7
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent
mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection, sought the cancellation
of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating
that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had
resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when
he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the
elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and
received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondent’s
5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was
proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.8 He
subsequently took his oath of office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private
respondent’s petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following findings:
Respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras,
Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be
considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
. . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would qualify him to
acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance with the one-
year residency requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code
of 1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The one (1) year residency requirement contemplates of the actual
residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be
elected.
All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or
stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen and
permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 when he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation] cannot be added to
his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001
to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him
eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such
circumstances, by whatever formula of computation used, respondent is
short of the one-year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001
elections.9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
I.
Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this
case: (a) whether the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the
COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by
petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide
this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that
the petition in this case should be dismissed because it was filed late; that
the COMELEC en banc had denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
for being pro forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, §4 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-
day period for filing this petition. He points out that petitioner received a
copy of the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELEC’s Second
Division on July 28, 2001, so that he had only until August 27, 2001 within
which to file this petition. Since the petition in this case was filed on
February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late
and should be dismissed.
Private respondent’s contention has no merit.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed
within five days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-
forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision,
resolution, order, or ruling.
Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. – A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling, when not pro-
forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court.
The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19,
§2 should be counted from the receipt of the decision, resolution, order,
or ruling of the COMELEC Division.10 In this case, petitioner received a
copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELEC’s Second Division
on July 28, 2001. Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for
reconsideration. On February 6, 2002, he received a copy of the order,
dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for
reconsideration. Five days later, on February 11, 2002, he filed this petition
for certiorari. There is no question, therefore, that petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as well
as his petition for certiorari to set aside of the order of the COMELEC en
banc, was filed within the period provided for in Rule 19, §2 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art. IX(A), §7 of the Constitution.
It is contended, however, that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running of the period for
filing this petition because the motion was pro forma and, consequently,
this petition should have been filed on or before August 27, 2001. It was
actually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. Private respondent
cites the finding of the COMELEC en banc that —
An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for
Reconsideration shows that the same [are] a mere rehash of his averments
contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum. Neither did
respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently warrant a reversal of
the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This makes the said Motion
pro forma.11
We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration
was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the
petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the
court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy
would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some
other remedy.12 But, as we have held in another case:13
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one
is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper,
contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to
dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion
for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would
be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to
filing only motions for reopening and new trial.
Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro
forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for
reconsideration,14 or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion
must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or
not supported by the evidence,15 or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged
errors,15 or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary
to law,17 or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof.18 The 16-
page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en
banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the
COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehash" of
his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new matters." Hence, the filing of the
motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in
this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary
period provided by law.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondent’s
petition for cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy before the
elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were canvassed and
petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of 379 votes over private
respondent. Did the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition
filed by private respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis added)
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in
Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment
before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall
not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of
disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed,
unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their
proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation
of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings
for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of
certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections,
should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the
winners. In Abella v. COMELEC19 and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,20 the
candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions
for cancellation were voted for and, having received the highest number
of votes, were duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case,
affirmed and, in the second, reversed the decisions of the COMELEC
rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the
latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates’ proclamation
but on the merits.
II.
On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May
14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. We find that he
had not.
First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added)
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"21 but rather to "domicile" or
legal residence,22 that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi)."23 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues
until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice).24
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming
a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until
November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner
was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our
immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident
alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization
as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, §1427(a) of the United States Code provides:
Requirements of naturalization. – Residence
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be
naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of
filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at
least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date
of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling
at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within
the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed
the application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously
within the United States from the date of the application up to the time of
admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this
subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached
to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed
to the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court ruled that immigration to the
United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside
permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country
result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American
citizenship" only by reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces.26 It is
noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which
applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under
R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation
of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by
having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with
it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal
residence in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished
residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the
mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that
year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to
seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.27 The
status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately,
when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship.
As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §1328 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR)29 and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other
hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A.
No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress,30
in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as
a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered
the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999,
and June 23, 2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration [–] Balikbayan"
in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the
stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay."31 Under §2 of
R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term
balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a
foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is
entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period
of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered
the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan
visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner
can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident
only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.32 He lacked the requisite residency to
qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections33 in
support of his contention that the residency requirement in §39(a) of the
Local Government Code includes the residency of one who is not a citizen
of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and
this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in
Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the
same day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995,
complied with the citizenship requirement under §39(a). It was held that
he had, because citizenship may be possessed even on the day the
candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted,
§39(a) of the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must
have been a resident of the municipality "for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election."
Nor can petitioner invoke this Court’s ruling in Bengzon III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.34 What the Court held in that case was
that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga,
Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a
candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a
voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,35 however,
registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case
questioning a candidate’s lack of residency.
Petitioner’s invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot
avail him any. As held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:36
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of
the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed
to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under §5(d), in
relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987),
proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur.
In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since
he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated
March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents
relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are
complete and intact in the records.
III.
The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two years" at the time he filed such
certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified
in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason.
We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false representation of a material
fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to
cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
– A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election.
Indeed, it has been held that a candidate’s statement in her certificate of
candidacy for the position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident of
Kananga, Leyte when this was not so37 or that the candidate was a
"natural-born" Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen38
constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On
the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC39 that a candidate who
used her husband’s family name even though their marriage was void was
not guilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at
bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s
qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the
order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag
and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The
decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal
properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99,
over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-
8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved
that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother,
Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More
particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without
rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their
deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City
either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s
actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother
used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated
due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia
Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment
and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously
executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s
affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments,
motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their
permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually
resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a
matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that
their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon
City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death
certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the
said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding
the decedents’ residence on the death certificates in good faith and
through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference,
considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the
Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in
his house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were taken at
different times for the same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi
Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be
deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence in light of the
other documents showing otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the
position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that
the petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8
After the parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the
trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of
the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was
denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately
in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the
last place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing
on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo
V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore,
cannot disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position
other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for
lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court
a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals
in the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition
for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE
APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593,
WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1
OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A
PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S
RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING
SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A
DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE
CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING
NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be
had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence,
or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or
letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et
al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the
place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the
time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following
factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen;
and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the
decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for
medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon
City as their permanent residence.1âwphi1.nêt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The
decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of
transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then
suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While
he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before
he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his
domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot
be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his
physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have
transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to
sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed
in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they
were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise.
Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death
certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least,
petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City.
Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death
certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence,
were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a
quo. We agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death
certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent
quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the
true situation at the time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence
at the time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented
by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained
not to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court,
but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like
the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the
decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and
for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by
the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows
that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not
only the decedents’ physical presence in Quezon City, but also other
factors indicating that the decedents’ stay therein was more than
temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower
courts’ factual findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the
evidence presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding
upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in
Rule 4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which
applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue
in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the
decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that
venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence
or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are
kept and where most of the decedents’ properties are located.
Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are
kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be
presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place
where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a
place different from that where he keeps his records, or where he
maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations
can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep
records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s
choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates
between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings.
In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we
ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals
correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate
estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4,
1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which
reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3
Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP.
Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court
of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the
United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which
was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of
his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs
are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior
to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public
office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue
was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed
moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was
substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November
16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20
from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it
does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by
Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity
of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23
that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo
filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995,
respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also
ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27
of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and
the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there
is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family
Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to
remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34
which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for
review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to
adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void
and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the
latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In
the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile
– of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.
In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained
a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine
Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46
and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990
sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as
per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case,
it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn
applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has
long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed
marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating
that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio,
60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article
26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background
and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect
on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article
26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-
Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound
to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in
fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said
law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file
the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79
we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The
Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as
the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.