CHAPTER TWO

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POST-CONFLICT

PEACEBUILDING

Post-conflict peacebuilding, as noted in the previous chapter is one of the relatively new
domains where the increasing influence of international non-governmental organisations
(INGOs) is being witnessed. As a concept and strategy, peacebuilding has found positive
resonance not only amongst INGOs but also national governments and regional and
international intergovernmental organisations. 1 Essentially a means by which the
international community can contribute to the resolution of intrastate conflict and to the
reconstruction of a culture of peace in post-conflict situations (Keating and Knight 2004:
xxxi), peacebuilding has emerged as one of most expansive and critical aspects of
international involvement in conflict and post-conflict situations. In fact peacebuilding
has become a catchall concept encompassing multiple perspectives and agendas and is
often indiscriminately used to refer to preventive diplomacy, preventive development,
conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction (Tschirgi 2004:
2). Given these diverse and often contradictory connotations to peacebuilding, the
inevitable questions which arise include: What is peacebuilding? Is there a difference
between peacemaking and peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding? What are the
approaches to peacebuilding? What does peacebuilding include? Who are the actors
involved in peacebuilding? How and why are INGOs involved in the peacebuilding
process? Has peacebuilding been successful? These are some of the questions this
chapter will aim to address, while examining and analysing different facets of
peacebuilding.

PEACEBUILDING: CONCEPT, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

The term peacebuilding originated in the field of peace studies almost 35 years ago when
in 1975 Johan Galtung coined the term in his pioneering work, "Three Approaches to
Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding". In this article he stated that,

1
It may be noted that the terms peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding have been used
interchangeably as they both imply the same concept.

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 Peace has a structure different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and
ad hoc peacemaking ... The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built
into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw up ...
More specifically, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer
alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur (Galtung1975: 297).

These observations constitute the intellectual antecedents of the contemporary notion of

peacebuilding i.e. an endeavour aiming to create sustainable peace by addressing the root
causes of violent conflict and eliciting indigenous capacities for peaceful management
and resolution of conflict.

Interestingly even before the conceptualisation of the term peacebuilding, the practice of
external countries assisting war-tom societies in reconstruction and post-war rebuilding
existed. For example, after the Second World War, the United States (U.S.) played a
central role in helping the reconstruction of Europe and Japan. The Marshall Plan
involved the U.S. in a long-term commitment in the development of Europe by bringing
the U.S. financial and investment resources to Europe and the post-war European
countries to re-build their economies. In the case of Japan, the U.S. provided large-scale
humanitarian assistance in the earlier phase of reconstruction followed by support for
political reform and economic reconstruction (Timilsina 2007: 28). Likewise after the end
of the Cold War several countries including Cambodia, Afghanistan, El Salvador and
Sierra Leone received external assistance for the purpose of post-war reconstruction. In
fact traditionally, states intervened in the affairs of other states as part of their foreign
policy, i.e. where realpolitik permitted, intervention was undisguised and forceful and
where realpolitik blocked action, the UN and other multilateral institutions were
paralysed to act collectively (Tschirgi 2004: 2). However, conceptual clarity on
peacebuilding and its adoption as a distinctive approach to peace was not present before
1975. In fact, even though Galtung in 1975 illustrated the difference between
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding as three approaches to peace, these three
terms have often been used interchangeably and considerable confusion regarding their
usage and meaning exists. For a better understanding of the concept of peacebuilding, it
is essential to make a concrete differentiation between the above terms.

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Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding represent three distinct yet interlinked
phases in the peace process following violent conflict. Peacemaking is defined as 'action
to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means as those
foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the UN' (Boutros-Ghali 1992: Para 20). The
specific tools of peacemaking as outlined in Article 33 of the UN Charter include
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
Peacemaking is a strategy usually preceding peacekeeping but also pursued in tandem
with peacekeeping, which essentially aims at reconciliation and encourages the
negotiation and settlement of the political conflict underlying the violence.

Peacekeeping which is essentially a form of third party intervention aimed at facilitating

the peaceful settlement of disputes, is defined as the prevention, containment, moderation
and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful
third party intervention, organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces
of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace (Fetherston 1994: 124).
Peacekeeping refers to the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the
consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel
and frequently civilians as well (Boutros-Ghali 1992: Para 20).

Given these definitions of peacemaking and peacekeeping, there are two distinct ways to
understand peacebuilding. According to the United Nations, peacebuilding consists of a
wide range of activities associated with capacity building, reconciliation, and societal
transformation (Boutros-Ghali 1992). It is a long-term process that occurs after violent
conflict has slowed down or come to a halt and thus peacebuilding is the phase of the
peace process that takes place after peacemaking and peacekeeping. However many non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), on the other hand, understand peacebuilding as an
umbrella concept that encompasses not only long-term transformative efforts, but also
peacemaking and peacekeeping. In this view, peacebuilding includes early warning and
response efforts, violence prevention, advocacy work, civilian and military peacekeeping,

69
military intervention, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements, and the
establishment of peace zones (Maiese 2003).

An interesting manner by which the relation between peacemaking, peacekeeping and

peacebuilding can be analysed is by examining the linkages between them at two levels,
namely the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the linkage between
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding has been limited both in theory and in
practice. Effective coordination is difficult when there is no overall structure providing
direction for activities. The reality is that not only have the processes not been linked in
any consistent or comprehensive way to each other, but that they have not been related in
any concrete sense to an examination and analysis of the causes of conflict and of
approaches to relieving those cause (Fetherston 1994: 134). In fact peacemaking,
peacekeeping and peacebuilding at the macro level are described most often as separate
but interdependent activities. For, peacemaking is the area of activity in which diplomats
or specially appointed high level UN secretariat officials act as mediators and/or
negotiators in conflict situations. Further in relation to peacekeeping, peacemaking can
work in parallel with a peacekeeping mission, provide a settlement package prior to
peacekeeping and then continue involvement through the implementation phase, or work
without reference to peacekeeping. 2 However at the macro-level peacebuilding is
normally not linked explicitly to peacekeeping processes, although there are exceptions.
Boutros-Ghali (1992: Para 55) lists some of the functions carried out by peacekeepers
and peacemakers which contribute to peacebuilding:

Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the
previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible
destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory training support for
security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human
rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting
formal and informal processes of political participation.

2
The operation in Cyprus is an example of the two processes working in parallel. The peacekeeping
mission in Namibia shows how peacemaking can define the shape of the peacekeeping or implementation
process.

70
 On the other hand, the link between the processes of peacemaking, peacekeeping and
peacebuilding at the micro level is quite evident. For, peacekeepers at this level carry out
activities which approximate the definitions of peacemaking and peacebuilding. For
example, peacekeepers do negotiate, mediate, and facilitate, and perform several
humanitarian and other peacebuilding functions. The argument according to Fetherston
(1994: 137) is that peacekeepers do not only engage in micro-level peacemaking and
peace building, but that (1) such activity should provide a basic rationale for
peacekeeping, (2) peacekeepers are uniquely placed to begin processes of reconciliation
and reconstruction as well as facilitate communication at all levels in the conflict-tom
communities in which they operate, (3) a much more considered and controlled approach
which would legitimise these activities is needed, and (4) in order to carry out these
functions in an effective, coherent and testable manner, peacekeeping needs to be
directed from within a conceptual framework of peaceful third party intervention.

Commenting upon the linkages between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding,

Doyle and Sambanis (1999: 5) state,
Peacebuilding aims high on the spectrum of peace and depends on the prior
achievement of a minimum standard of peace. In other words, peacekeeping is
essential for better peacebuilding. Peacekeeping outcomes define the military
political context within which peacemaking and building take place.

Thus it can be said that peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are in fact not
separate activities. They are either mutually supportive or they are mutually corrosive
(Doyle and Sambanis 1999: 4). For, on the one hand, peacemaking negotiations create the
mandate for post-conflict peacebuilding as they define the actions and provide the
strategy that restores peace to a conflict inflicted region. And on the other hand,
peacebuilding can contribute to the peacemaking and peacekeeping processes.

Concept of Peacebuilding
The term peacebuilding became a part of the official discourse in 1992, when the then
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali used the term in "An agenda for peace:
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping". Initially the concept was linked

71
specifically to post conflict societies as Boutros-Ghali, defined peacebuilding in relation
to a co~flict continuum that passed through peacemaking and peacekeeping.
Peacebuilding was thus associated with the post-conflict phase and defined as "action to
identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a peace in order
to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros- Ghali 1992: Para 21 ).

Interestingly the concept of peacebuilding has also evolved considerably since 1992. For,
while in the early 1990s, the concept of peacebuilding became more expansive primarily
due to the growing awareness of the complexity of the post-conflict transitions along with
the increasing number of actors including the UN, governmental bodies and NGOs
becoming involved in the peacebuilding process. Consequently Boutros Boutros Ghali's
"Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" (1995) dismissed the notion of phases and
extended the peacebuilding term across the conflict spectrum of pre-conflict prevention,
actions during warfare and post-conflict measures. By the end of the 1990s, it became
common to view peacebuilding as a means of preventing and mitigating violent conflicts
within societies as well as helping them recover from such conflicts. Further in 2001, the
UN Security Council clarified the expansive notion of peacebuilding, by stating that
peacebuilding now 'aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of
armed conflict'. Thus peacebuilding now involved not only keeping former enemies from
going back to war, but also addressing the root causes of conflict and even fostering
development and the promotion of democracy in countries not affected by conflict
(Hanggi 2005: 11).

New possibilities surfaced for international peacebuilding action with the end of the cold
war. In the words of Tschirgi,

The promise of the new peacebuilding agenda was that the international community
would intervene collectively - as a third party to help resolve violent conflicts and
civil wars. And that, external actors would actively support the process of rebuilding
in the affected areas without the shadow of cold war politics or to suit the narrow
national interests of individual states. (Tschirgi 2004: 2)

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The origins of this new concept can be traced to three inter-related trends in the post cold
war era. Firstly with the erosion of the nonns of non-intervention along with the
development of the concept of human security, states demonstrated an increased
willingness to intervene within societies to stop civil wars and establish conditions of
peace. Furthennore the intervening states had an interest in the long tenn success of
efforts to tenninate intrastate conflicts. And finally, peacebuilding generally included
liberal political and economic strategies that enjoyed increasing support throughout the
world (Sens 2004: 144). Thus collectively, conflict prevention, humanitarian
intervention and post-conflict peacebuilding agendas became a part of the activist
international agenda.

In addition, the development of the peacebuilding nonn was built on the intellectual
origins of peacebuilding found in the academic work on conflict management and peace
research. In fact there are three main schools of thought on the nature and concept of
peacebuilding. The first school of thought is influenced by Boutros-Ghali's "An agenda
for peace" and views peacebuilding as post-conflict social and political reconstruction
activities aimed at avoiding "a relapse into conflict". Efforts at society wide
reconciliation and state building in societies emerging from aimed conflict are the
hallmarks of this approach (Call and Cook 2003: 235). The second school of thought is
based on the research conducted in the field of conflict and peace studies. It emphasises
on conflict prevention and resolution initiatives at levels beyond or below the state. It
essentially conceptualises social psychological, religions and other dimensions of conflict
resolution processes, as illustrated by Johan Galtung. The third school of thought views
peacebuilding in the context of peace keeping, peacemaking and conflict prevention.
According to Call and Cook (2003: 235), "These scholars reject the idea that prevention
activities in post conflict societies differ systematically from conflict prevention & war
tennination processes in any other society".

The international approach to peacebuilding is based on the concept of "liberal peace"

which derives from a long tradition of Western liberal theory and practice. The liberal
peace thesis views political and economic liberalisation as effective antidotes to violent

73
conflicts (Paris 2004). Thus, promotion of human rights, democracy, elections,
constitutionalism, rule of law, property rights, good governance etc have become
important components of the international peacebuilding strategy. This liberal
internationalism which is basically is interventionist in nature, promotes a normative
agenda while assisting individual countries emerging from war. This feature, according to
theorists including Tschirgi (2004: 5) stands in stark contrast with the widely declared
principle that peacebuilding ultimately requires the establishment of a non-violent
political authority which can legitimately guide a country's post-conflict reconstruction
on its own terms. While the merits of this feature would be addressed subsequently, it is
important to note that peacebuilding practice has been based on this framework.

In an attempt to map the concept of peacebuilding as it evolved and developed over the
years, Micheal Lund analyses how the practice of peacebuilding has broadened laterally
in terms of the policy sectors that are implicated, deepened in terms of engagement with
the internal workings of societies, and lengthened in terms of stages of conflict when it
operates. He concludes by stating that,

A unified concept of deliberate international peacebuilding has emerged that is

not only multi-lateral but also multi-sectoral in terms of what the international
community should be doing on the ground, multi-levelled in terms of how much
should be done, and multi-staged, in terms of when the international community
should be involved. (Lund 2003: 13)

This multidimensional concept of peacebuilding since its origin in 1992 has come to
exhibit certain characteristics which not only define the nature of peacebuilding but have
also shaped the manner in which peacebuilding practice has evolved. These
characteristics which have been identified by several scholars including Sens (2004),
Keating and Knight (2004), Maiese (2003) and Tschirgi (2004) include
a) Peacebuilding has five main dimensions, namely political, social, economic,
security and legal.
b) Security is central to the concept of peacebuilding and establishing security is
considered the pre-requisite for post-conflict peacebuilding.

74
 c) A commitment to local capacity building from the earliest stages is vital for
sustainability of peacebuilding.
d) Support from external actors is critical for post-conflict reconstruction because of
the fragility of societies emerging from war. However proper mechanisms need to
be established to ensure that external and internal actors work within a coherent
strategy, establish priorities, and mobilise the necessary resources.
e) Timely, opportunistic and quick-impact interventions are critical in influencing
peacebuilding outcomes.
f) Adequate, predictable and flexible funding is essential to support post-conflict
reconstruction.
g) Post-conflict reconstruction involves appropriate responses at the local, national,
regional and international levels.

These characteristics, which can also be termed as the operational principles of post-
conflict peacebuilding signify that peacebuilding both as a concept and as a field of
practice has evolved considerably since its inception in the early 1990s. Interestingly, the
broadening scope of the term and practice of peacebuilding has resulted in it not only
being widely used but also often ill-defined and contested, resulting in deficiencies in
analysis, policy and practice.

Defining Peacebuilding
The term peacebuilding has been used copiously by intergovernmental
organisations (IGOs), including the UN, INGOs, and NNGOs, states and theorists.
Applied to various practices by states, NGOs and individuals, peacebuilding refers to
practices as diverse as governments' foreign policy objectives, UN mandates and also the
programmes created by many NGOs. As a result, peacebuilding has emerged as a very
confusing and misused term in the field of international relations and peace research. In
the words of Cousens et al,
Some definitions are so general as to include virtually all forms of international
assistance to societies that have experiences or are at risk of armed conflict, some
are more precise but show greater interest in clarifying international mandates
than conditions for peace in a target country; others are more willing to ask tough

75
 questions about the comparative value of international efforts vis-a-vis one
another and in contrast with domestic initiatives. (Cousens et al 2001: 5)

Given this assessment, one of the largely accepted definitions of peacebuilding continues
to be the one provided in the "An agenda for peace". The former UN Secretary General
defined peacebuilding as

Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict - rebuilding the institutions
and infrastructures of nations tom by civil war and strife (and tackling the)
deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political
oppression. (Boutros- Ghali 1992: Para 55)

In fact this definition along with its clarified version provided in the "Supplement to an
agenda for peace", have guided most organisational, academic and practitioner
contributions to the conceptual and practical dimensions of peacebuilding. However it is
important to note that confusion is present in the definition of peacebuilding provided in
"An agenda for peace". For, while the Secretary-General made it clear that peacebuilding
consisted of "sustained, co-operative work to deal with underlying economic, social,
cultural and humanitarian problems ..... " (Boutros-Ghali 1992: Para 57), yet, the
measures listed including disarming, restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating
refugees, training security forces, monitoring elections, advancing the protection of
human rights, reforming institutions and promoting political participation, are mostly
associated with short to medium term international interventions. In fact these measures
do not carry the notion of being sustained efforts that address underlying causes to put an
"achieved peace on a durable foundation" (Haugerudbraaten 1998: 17).

This blurred nature and definition of peacebuilding has been acknowledged by several
scholars who have tried to bring conceptual clarity to the concept by attempting to re-
define peacebuilding. For example, Dan Smith (2004) in his report on the Joint Utstein
Study ofPeacebuilding states,

Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the structural

conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that may permit peaceful,

76
 stable and ultimately prosperous social and economic development.
Peacebuilding activities are designed to contribute to ending or avoiding armed
conflict and may be carried out during armed conflict, in its wake, or as an
attempt to prevent an anticipated armed conflict from starting. Peacebuilding
activities fall under four main headings:

1. to provide security,
2. to establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace,
3. likewise to establish the political framework of long-term peace,
4. and to generate reconciliation, a healing of the wounds of war,
and justice. (Smith 2004: 19)

Rebecca Spence (200 1) provides a comprehensive definition of peacebuilding and

defines the concept as

those activities and processes that: focus on the root causes of the conflict, rather
than just the effects, support the rebuilding and rehabilitation of all sectors of the
war tom society; encourage and support interaction between all sectors of society
in order to repair damaged relations and start the process of restoring dignity and
trust; recognise the specifics of each post conflict situation, encourage and
support the participation of indigenous resources in the design, implementation
and sustainment of activities and processes; and promote processes that will
endure after the initial emergency recovery phase has passed. (Spence 2001: 13 7)

Roland Paris in his seminal work, "At Wars End", narrows the definition of
peacebuilding to

...... action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and
prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peace building mission involves the
deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international agencies,
with a mandate to conduct peace building in a country that is just emerging from a
civil war. (Paris 2004: 38)

John Paul Lederach, an important scholar in the field of peace studies adds to the above
understanding of peacebuilding by stating,

Peacebuilding is more than post-accord reconstruction and is understood as a

comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array
of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more
sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of
activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically,

77
 peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social
construct. (Lederach 1997: 20)

In an attempt to provide an overview of the concept of peacebuilding, Kenneth Bush

( 1996) states,
In the broadest terms, peacebuilding refers to those initiatives which foster and
support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for
peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or
continuation, of violent conflict. The process entails both short-term
humanitarian operations and long term developmental, political, economic and
social objectives. (Bush 1996: 29)

Interestingly Galtung who first coined the term peacebuilding and defined it as
"encompassing the practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through
socio-economic reconstruction and development" (Galtung 1975), redefined
peacebuilding as " part of 'third generation' of peace approaches evident after the Cold
War, when a reaction against simplistic approaches to building peace finally recognised
the deep-rooted nature of conflict and its links to development" (Galtung et al. 2002:
xvi).

In addition to these theorists and academics, several organisational practitioners have also
developed diverse explanations and definitions of peacebuilding. For example, the World
Bank defines peacebuilding as

Activities aimed at preventing and managing armed conflict, and sustammg

peace after large-scale organised violence has ended. The scope of peacebuilding
covers all activities that are directly linked to this objective within a 5-l 0 year
period. Peacebuilding should create conducive conditions for reconstruction and
development efforts, but should not be equated and thus confused with these
concepts. There are three phases of peacebuilding: prevention prior to the
outbreak of violence, conflict management during armed conflict, and post-
conflict peacebuilding for up to 10 years after the conflict end. (World Bank
2006: 5)

The European Union's vision ofpeacebuilding is similarly detailed and entails,

Long-term efforts aimed at preventing armed conflict from erupting in the first
place by addressing its deep-rooted structural causes. This includes broader
measures in the political, institutional, economic and developmental fields, such
as combating poverty, promoting an equitable distribution of resources, pursuing

78
 justice and reconciliation, upholding the rule of law and human rights, supporting
good governance and human rights, including accountability and transparency in
public decision-making, political pluralism and the effective participation of civil
society in the peace-building process. (EU 2001)

While the World Bank and European Union have defined peacebuilding in a broad and
comprehensive manner, NATO on the other hand adopts a narrower and more focused
definition ofpeacebuilding. NATO views peacebuilding as

Building bridges between communities and not only about preventing violence,
securing freedom of movement for vulnerable populations, ensuring the safe
return of IDPs and refugees that are very effective confidence building measures.
(NATO 2003)

Likewise the Department of National Defense and Canadian Forces adopt a more precise
definition of peacebuilding and defines it as

Actions to support political, economic, social and military measures aimed at

strengthening political stability, which include mechanisms to identify and
support structures that promote peaceful conditions, reconciliation, a sense of
confidence and well-being and support economic growth. (http://www.cfd-
cdf.forces.gc.ca/cfwc-
cgfc/Index/JD/Pub_ Eng/J3%20Publications/CF%20Joint%20Doctrine%20-
%20B-GJ-005-307%20FP-030%20-%20Peace%20Support%200ps%20-
%20EN.pdf accessed 5 July 2009)

Thus it is seen that peacebuilding can be defined in several different ways. Scholars,
policy makers and field practitioners have developed varied conceptions of
peacebuilding, the activities it includes, the time line associated with it, as well as its
main priorities and objectives. This is primarily because, more often than not, the
definition used and the approach adopted largely depends upon the institutional interests
of the actors involved (Hanggi 2005:1 0).

In an interesting study, Barnett et al (2007) tabulate the different definitions and

connotations allotted to peacebuilding by diverse actors and agencies (See Table 2.1 ).
The authors then identify four groupings of actors and agencies which perceive and

79
define peacebuilding in accordance with their respective organisational mandates and
networks. These are the UN Secretariat, the UN specialised agencies, European
organisations, and member states. This differentiation, according to the authors is
primarily because the core mandates heavily influence the organisation or actor's
reception to, and definition and revision of, the concept of peacebuilding. Thus while the
UN Secretariat continues to build on former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali's original formulation and definition of peacebuilding, the UN's specialised
agencies have adopted other concepts and definitions in accordance with how
peacebuilding fits into their broader core mandates. For example, the UNDP uses both
peacebuilding and conflict prevention because it has a mandate in both, the World Bank
prefers the use of post conflict reconstruction and post conflict recovery, and the IMF
post conflict recovery (Barnett 2007: 42). The European agencies including the
European Union favour concepts of conflict prevention and management, and
rehabilitation and reconstruction over that of peacebuilding, and agencies within the
governments of different states adopt variations of the term peacebuilding including
stabilisation, post conflict recovery and post conflict reconstruction.

Table 2.1
Different Concepts and Definition of Peacebuilding across Agencies
Agency Concept Definition

US Agency for Post conflict recovery and Immediate interventions to build momentum
International Development transition assistance in support of the peace process including
(USAID) supporting peace negotiations; building
citizen security; promoting reconciliation;
and expanding democratic political
processes.

UK Foreign and Post conflict reconstruction An umbrella term covering a range of

Commonwealth Office activities required in the immediate aftermath
(UKFCO) of conflict.

UK Department for Conflict reduction and post Conflict reduction includes conflict
International Development conflict peacebuilding management (activities to prevent the spread
(DFID) of existing conflict); conflict prevention
(short-term activities to prevent the outbreak
or recurrence of violent conflict); conflict
resolution (short-term activities to end violent
conflict); and peacebuilding (medium-and
long-term actions to address the factors
underlying violent conflict). Essential post
conflict peacebuilding measures include

80
 disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration programs, and building the
public institutions that provide security,
transitional justice and reconciliation, and
basic social services.

German Federal Foreign Civilian crisis prevention The concept of civilian cnsts prevention
Office (FFO) encompasses conflict resolution and post
conflict peacebuilding and is understood
through a number of strategic leverage
points, such as the establishment of stable
state structures (rule of law, democracy,
human rights, and security), and the creation
of the potential for peace within civil society,
the media, cultural affairs, and education.

German Federal Ministry Multidimensional peace missions Multidimensional peace missions aim to
of Defense (FMD) redress the destruction of a country's
infrastructure resulting from intrastate
conflict. In addition to their military aspect,
they undertake a variety to tasks ranging
from reform of the security forces and
demobilisation of combatants to the
rebuilding of the justice system and
government structures and preparations for
elections.

German Federal Ministry Development and peacebuilding Development policy seeks to improve
for Economic Cooperation economic, social, ecological, and political
and Development (BMZ) conditions so as to help remove the structural
causes of conflict and promote peaceful
conflict management. Goals include poverty
reduction, pro-poor sustainable economic
growth, good governance, and democracy.
Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the
development of the structural conditions,
attitudes, and modes of political behavior that
may permit peaceful, stable, and ultimately
prosperous social and economic
development. As conceptualised in the joint
Utstein study, peacebuilding activities fall
under four main headings: security,
socioeconomic foundations, political
framework of long term peace, and
reconciliation.

French Ministry of Foreign Crisis management Policy primarily pursued through multilateral
Affairs (MOF A) organisations: peacekeeping, political and
constitutional processes, democratisation,
administrative state capacity, technical
assistance for public finance and tax policy,
and support for independent media.

French Ministry of Defense Peace consolidation Activities in support of peace consolidation

(MOD) include monitoring compliance with arms
embargoes, deployment of peacekeeping

81
 troops, DDR, and deployment of police and
gendarmerie in support of the rule of law

Agence Franrancaise de Crisis prevention The French government's international

Developpement (AFD) solidarity policy is pursued in the areas of
humanitarian action and developments.

Canada Department of Conflict prevention Activities to prevent the emergence of violent

Foreign Affairs and conflict through an open, inclusive, coherent,
International Trade and comprehensive frame work that takes
(DFAIT) into account all phases of the peace and
conflict cycle.

Department of National Peacebuilding Actions to support political, economic,

Defense and Canadian social, and military measures aimed at
Forces (DND/CF) strengthening political stability, which
include mechanisms to identify and support
structures that promote peaceful conditions,
reconciliation, a sense of confidence and
well-being, and support economic growth.

Canadian International Peacebuilding Efforts to strengthen the prospects for

Development Agency internal peace and decrease the likelihood of
(CIDA) violent conflict in order to enhance the
indigenous capacity of a society to manage
conflict without violence.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Conflict prevention Activities to prevent violent conflict by

Affairs (MOF A) promoting a peace process, securing
domestic stability and security, and providing
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

Japan Development Reconstruction Assistance Efforts to prevent a regional conflict from

Agency (JDA) recurring after a ceasefire agreement, which
include an engagement in relief and
reconstruction activities for victims of
conflicts from the view point of stabilising
the situation in affected areas.

Japan International Peacebuilding A general approach extending from conflict

Cooperation Agency prevention to reconciliation and post conflict
(JICA) reconstruction, in which peace is pursued
through across-the-board endeavors that
include development assistance in addition to
traditional efforts within military and
political frameworks.

Source: Barnett et al (2007), "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name", Global Governance, (13) 1:

38-41.

As is evident from the definitions and connotations of peacebuilding listed above,

peacebuilding is a multi dimensional concept. Commenting upon the diversity of post
conflict peacebuilding, Keating and Knight are of the opinion that,

82
 Peacebuilding as it has been practiced to date, involves a number of diverse
instruments and players and much like an orchestra, the instruments must be
finely tuned and the players must work in concert in order to produce anything
resembling a coherent approach to post conflict reconciliation and sustainable
peace.( Keating and Knight 2004: xxxii)

For the purpose of this study, peacebuilding will be defined as a set of actions and
initiatives which seek to achieve and consolidate peace by preventing the continuation or
recurrence of armed conflict, encompassing a wide range of activities, measures and
actors across diverse sectors, entailing both short term humanitarian operations and long
term post-conflict political, social and economic development objectives. This definition
assumes that peacebuilding has several components including diverse activities, measures
and actors. The following sections will examine each of these in detail.

PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES
As a multi dimensional exercise, peacebuilding encompasses a wide variety of activities
including disarming warring parties, decommissioning and destroying weapons,
demining, repatriating refugees, providing humanitarian relief and advancing efforts to
protect human rights, reconstructing, reforming and strengthening institutions of
governance as well as civil society organisations. However as each post-conflict
situation represents a unique set of circumstances and there is "no one-size fits all"
peacebuilding model, the scope of activities and measures undertaken in different
peacebuilding operations vary considerably. In fact different actors pursue different
activities in situations requiring peacebuilding efforts and these practices and measures
are essentially based on the specific requirements of the given situation. Thus, while
some post-conflict societies require broad based peacebuilding efforts including social,
political, economic and ecological foundations that serve the welfare of the people
(Regehr 1996), peacebuilding efforts in other societies may suffice with only specific
measures.

83
Given the broad scope of activities that can be undertaken in any peacebuilding
operation, several theorists have suggested classifications of activities comprising
peacebuilding. Sens (2004: 146), for example puts forward a "menu of strategies and
tasks" which he states to be the standard practices and activities guiding peacebuilding.
These include

o stabilisation of the internal political and security situation

o development of regional engagement with neighbouring states and regional actors
o demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration
o return of refugees and Internally displaced persons
o democratisation
o strengthening civil society
o capacity building and security sector reform
o technical assistance for reconstruction and economic development
o promotion ofhuman rights
o demining and awareness

Lund (2001: 17-18) on similar lines suggests a peacebuilding 'toolbox' with a list of
activities categorised under seven headings:

o Official Diplomacy including mediation, negotiation, conciliation, good offices,

peace conferences, coercive diplomacy, diplomatic sanctions, etc;
o Non-official Conflict Management Methods, supporting indigenous dispute
resolution mechanisms, peace commissions, non-official facilitation and problem-
solving workshops;
o Military Measures, such as deterrence, restructuring and professionalisation of
military forces, demobilisation/reintegration of ex-combatants, confidence-
building and security, demilitarised zones, peace enforcement;
o Economic and Social Measures, like humanitarian assistance, development
assistance, economic reforms, inter-communal trade, private investment,
agricultural programs, aid conditionality, economic sanctions;

84
 o Political Development and Governance Measures, including political party and
institution building, election reform, support and monitoring, civic society
development, training of officials, power-sharing arrangements, constitutional
reform;
o Judicial and Legal Measures, such as inquiry commissions, war crimes tribunals,
judicial/legal reforms, arbitration, police reform, adjudication;
o Communications and Education Measures, for example peace radio/TV, media
professionalisation, journalist training, international broadcast, peace education,
exchange visits, conflict resolution training.

An interesting categorisation of peacebuilding activities has been suggested by the

Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC). 3 Presented in the form of a
chart, the CPCC includes the following twelve activities under peacebuilding.
o Conflict Resolution
o Early Warning
o Environmental Security
o Physical Security
o Economic Reconstruction;
o Personal Security
o Human Rights
o Institutional/Civil Capacity Building
o Governance and Democratic Development
• Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Assistance
• Training,
• Policy Development, Assessment and Advocacy (http://peacebuild.ca/about-what-
is-pb-e.php accessed 10 May 2010).

3
The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee is a network of Canadian non-governmental
organisations and institutions, academics and individuals engaged in a wide range of activities related to
addressing the causes and consequences of violent conflict. It was established in 1994 with the vision to
promote and further develop a vibrant and robust Canadian peacebuilding constituency in the interest of
advancing just and lasting peace internationally, this network was renamed Peacebuild in 2008. For more
information see http://peacebuild.ca/about-e.php.

85
While the above mentioned categorisations indicate some similarities in the type of
peacebuilding activities envisioned by theorists along with the objectives they aim at
achieving, the categorisations also portray the vastness and complexity of activities
included within the ambit of peacebuilding. As a result, most theorists and policy makers
analysing peacebuilding measures, tend to organise peacebuilding activities according to
four or five pillars or dimensions. While various actors define these pillars differently,
there is consensus that peacebuilding has political, social, economic, security and legal
dimensions (Tschirgi 2004: 9).
Fig. 2.1
Peacebuilding Palette

Figure 2:The Peace building Palette

Sodo-ea:monJic
Foundations ' . :" ' .' . ' ~ . :; . ' '

• physical re(.""<mst:t'uc:.tio-n.
• e:conm:nic inf:rnst.rueture
• infrustnK.":tuJ"f..'!c of lu..'!&hh
·.=~~~~f~
: •.:ltQOd go~a.n~;{a~ntabiJUy~
and eclucatiun ·.< ~~~m.:m ~f ~,P:t~~ s~r~~~,-~ :~
• .n"..Jnd:ri:at!ion and return o-f
retuaees and IDPa.
• fnod $e!CUt'i1<V

Source: Smith, Dan (2004), "Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting their Act
Together: Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study ofPeacebuilding", Evaluation report, Oslo:
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p 28.

In fact most of the peacebuilding literature tends to divide peacebuilding activities

broadly on the basis of three core dimensions to the more elaborate that list four to five
different dimensions. For example, Barnett et al.(2007: 49) refer to three dimensions of

86
peacebuilding namely stability creation, restoration of state institutions and socio-
economic recovery. Dan Smith (2004) suggests an organisation of four pillars namely,
security, political framework, socio-economic foundations; and reconciliation and justice
(See Figure 2.1). Hamre and Sullivan (2002: 91) suggest security, justice and
reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and political
participation as the four distinct pillars of peacebuilding.

Interestingly, the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan's "No Exit without

Strategy" argues that peacebuilding should be understood as fostering the capacity to
resolve future conflicts by: (1) consolidating security, (2) strengthening political
institutions and (3) promoting economic and social reconstruction (United Nations 2001).

However the more recent report of the present UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon on
"Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict" lists five areas of action, namely:
(1) basic safety and security, (2) political processes, (3) basic services, (4) core
government services and (5)economic revitalisation (United Nations 2009). However the
UN's integrated approach to peacebuilding opts for a more elaborate list that includes:
political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security
aspects (De Coning 2010:7).

However, a comprehensive way to categorise peacebuilding measures is by identifying

the key areas where peacebuilding assistance is usually critically required in any given
conflict situation. These areas include among others, refugees and internally displaced
persons, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, democratic development and
economic and social development. The corresponding peacebuilding activities can be
grouped into three main categories. These are:

(a) Peace and security activities

(b) Political activities

87
 (c) Socio-economic activities4

The peace and security situation is very vulnerable and fragile in post-conflict settings.
Often characterised by anned non-state actors and former combatants waiting for
reintegration into civilian life, the state security apparatus is undergoing reconstruction or
being ill-prepared to provide security for the state and its population and potential peace
spoilers; the nature of peace is rather precarious. Given this, peacebuilding activities aim
at creating and maintaining peace and security of both the region and personal security of
its inhabitants.

In addressing these challenges, post-conflict peacebuilding in the security dimension

must involve both the direct provision of basic security in fragile environments as well as
the broader tasks of building up domestic capacity to provide security. The main
activities undertaken include:

a) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants into the

local community including special programmes for women and children
b) Humanitarian mine action including mine clearance, stockpile destruction,
support to victims of landmines, and awareness programmes.
c) Improving control of small arms and light weapons including measures to prevent
misuse and illegal trade, providing incentives to hand in weapons, and dealing
with the underlying causes of demand for such weapons.

d) Security sector reform (SSR) emphasising the importance of civilian control,

transparency and accountability as regards the military, the police, the justice and
the penal services.

The political activities which need to be taken in order for effective peacebuilding to take
place are directly linked to the underlying or triggering causes of conflict. Illegitimate or
weak government institutions, lack of good governance, violations of human rights, and a

4
This categorisation of peacebuilding measures is influenced by the work of Bryden and Hanggi (2005)
and the OECD issue brief on Peacebuilding (OECD 2005).

88
widespread sense of injustice and impunity constitute the political legacy of conflict and
thus the measures should aim at addressing these issues. The main activities undertaken
under this category include:

a) Rebuilding of national political authorities and support for political and

administrative authorities and structures
b) Humanitarian assistance
c) Assistance to institutions and processes that promote good governance,
democracy and human rights;
d) Civil society empowerment; and
e) Reconciliation and transitional justice

Similarly the socio-economic activities comprising peacebuilding are also linked to the
causes of conflict. Increasing socio-economic differences, unequal distribution of benefits
or burdens, marginalisation of vulnerable groups or geographical regions, and relative
deprivation are all factors that may cause or trigger conflict. Efforts to build peace must
address these fundamental or triggering drivers of conflict. Thus the socio-economic
measures of peacebuilding include:

a) Repatriation and reintegration of refugees,

b) Reconstruction of infrastructure and important public functions,
c) Development of education
d) Development of health services;
e) Private sector development, employment, trade and investment including legal
and economic reforms, institutional co-operation and technical co-operation.

Given the diverse measures that contribute in making peacebuilding a comprehensive

exercise, an inevitable question which arises is whether any hierarchy or prioritisation of
measures is present or needed. In other words, does any category of measures supersede
the others or should peacebuilding give preference to any one category of measures. In

89
fact these questions form the basis for one of the most widely debated issues in the field
of peacebuilding i.e. how to prioritise and sequence the range of necessary interventions.

Interestingly when the international community first became involved in peacebuilding in

the early I990s, the primary emphasis was on economic and social reconstruction while
the political tasks of building up domestic capacity to provide security were often
neglected (Hanggi 2005: 4). Gradually the focus shifted to political and security
measures. For example, according to Kumar (1997), peacebuilding efforts should be
initiated with political measures, followed by social rehabilitation and economic
measures .should be given the least priority. However there is an increasing agreement
among several academics, policy makers and practitioners that in post-conflict situations,
the immediate need for security is paramount and without security, all other
peacebuilding interventions are likely to fail (Baker 200 I, Zeeuw 200 I, Lund 2003,
Llamazares 2005, Timilsina (2007). Thus it is now largely believed that the setting for
peacebuilding must be secured before other peacebuilding activities are initiated. In other
words, the "hawks" must be "boxed" before the "doves" are "released" (Baker 200 I:
763). Although the peacebuilding literature now increasingly reflects the priority
assigned to security related activities within the larger sphere of peacebuilding activities,
the assessment is still not unanimous. For, some theorists such as Hanggi (2005) and Ball
(I996) are of the opinion that sequencing of peacebuilding activities should not be
attempted and peacebuilding should pursue development in all three dimensions
simultaneously and in a balanced way. According to Bryden and Hanggi (2005: I2), the
experience in peacebuilding has proved that the linear sequencing of peacebuilding
activities is not recommendable due to the close relationship between the three main
categories of peacebuilding measures. Ball (1996) further explains the importance and
interdependence of security, political and socio-economic measures by stating,

There can be no sustainable socio-economic development without security of

individuals and society and accountable political institutions, no political
development without a basic level of security and improvement in the standard of
living, finally no long-term security without progress in political and socio-economic
development. (Ball I996: 7I9)

90
Given these divergent views on the prioritisation of peacebuilding activities, in practice,
different agencies and actors pursing peacebuilding activities, often tend to prioritise
measures and activities undertaken by them. This trend, according to Tschirgi (2004: 9)
has in fact become an operational principle of peacebuilding, and a review of
peacebuilding practice throughout the 1990s reveals that a hierarchy in peacebuilding
activities is often established in the context of any given situation. Explaining this trend,
Barnett et al (2007: 45) opine that different agencies and actors depending upon their
knowledge, mandates and expertise in the post-conflict field prioritise different activities.
While this explanation does justify the activities of different actors involved in
peacebuilding, actors and agencies involved in peacebuilding should exercise flexibility
and judgement while devising peacebuilding strategies prioritising specific activities
based on the needs of the individual situation, given the unique nature of post-conflict
societies, the wide range of peacebuilding activities and the lack of a universal model for
peacebuilding. The next section will examine the actors involved in the peacebuilding
process.

PEACEBUILDING ACTORS
The actors involved in peacebuilding are as diverse as the measures and activities.
adopted in the peacebuilding process. They range from governments, IGOs, civil society,
NNGOs and INGOs and regional organisations to truth and reconciliation commissions
and ad hoc criminal tribunals, and prominent individuals like the special representatives
of the UN Secretary General (Keating and Knight 2004: xxxiii). This is primarily because
peacebuilding measures, as noted earlier, involve all levels of society and target all
aspects of the state structure and thus require a wide variety of agents for their
implementation.

However, in spite of the fact that a wide array of peacebuilding actors and agents exist
and participate in the peacebuilding process, there is no universally accepted criterion for
their classification or categorisation. Nonetheless some of the peacebuilding literature
(Maiese 2003, Anderson and Olson 2003, Tschirgi 2004, Keating and Knight 2004,
Culbertson and Pouligny 2007) distinguishes and categorises peacebuilders primarily on

91
the basis of their origin. Thus the corresponding categories of peacebuilders include
insiders-outsiders and locals-foreigners. As suggested by the names of the
classifications, insiders and locals are actors who are "vulnerable to conflict, because they
are from the area and living there, and who in some way must experience the conflict and
live with its consequences personally while outsiders, foreigners and external actors are
actors who choose to become involved in the conflict and who have personally little to
lose" (Maiese 2003).

According to these classifications, peacebuilding actors can broadly be divided into two
main groups - namely internal and external. Internal actors include all the actors I agents
which are a part of the conflict inflicted state. This group essentially consists of political
actors including leaders of the main political parties, governments, legislative bodies
(where they exist) and all the agents of these entities, military actors including leaders
and members of constituted armies or para-military groups of different nature, economic
entrepreneurs, members of the indigenous civil society including formal social
organisations such as trade unions, NNGOs, community and religious actors. Another
important way in which internal actors in peacebuilding can be identified and examined
is by applying John Paul Lederach's model of hierarchical intervention levels at which
peacebuilding efforts occur (Fig 2.2).

According to the model which is essentially a peacebuilding pyramid, peacebuilding

occurs at three levels namely the top leadership, middle-range leadership and the
grassroots leadership. Different groups of internal actors undertake peacebuilding
activities in each of the three levels. Thus the first level consists of the top political,
military and religions leaders, followed by networks of community leaders and groups
including academics, intellectuals and indigenous NGOs, while the third and bottom
levels consist of grassroots leadership such as local leaders, community developers etc.
Thus the internal actors involved in peacebuilding, according to Lederach's model can be
divided into three main categories.

92
 Fig. 2.2
Peacebuilding Pyramid

Types of Actors Approaches to

Building Peace

level h Top leHe..,hip

MiJitary/politic<tl/rellglous
leaders with hiqh visibility

Level2: Middle-Range Le,.dership

Leaders respected in sectors
Ethnic/religious luders
AcademicJ/intellec'tl.lals
Hum<m~rian luders (NGO

Derived from John P~ul L<tder~ch, SIJilding Puce: S1JsUin1ble Riacom:ililt:ion ir>
Divi<le.d Sodetks (Washin9ton, D.C.: United St~tes Institute of P ... ce Press, 1997), 39.

Source: Lederach, John Paul (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation m Divided
Societies, Washington D.C. :United States Institute of Peace Press pp 39.

The external actors on the other hand primarily include foreign governments (through
their embassies and different cooperation bodies), international and regional
governmental and non-governmental organisations, international financial institutions,
multinational corporations and trans-national churches and other religious movements.

However a more elaborate and comprehensive categorisation of peacebuilding actors

would be their division into two main groups- governmental actors and non-
governmental actors. While the governmental actors would include the conflict-driven
state, other states and international and regional governmental organisations, the non-
governmental actors would comprise of local, national and international NGOs, civil
society organisations, the private sector, media and local groups. While each
peacebuilding process will have both governmental and non governmental as well as

93
external and internal actors operating at all levels of society, four main groups of actors
can be identified in a given peacebuilding operation. These are namely states including
the conflict-ridden state with its agencies, international agencies, civil society and the
private sector.

States and their Agencies

Two sub-categories of state actors can be identified within the broader category of states
and their agencies as actors in the peacebuilding process. These are (a) the conflict-
affected state and its agencies and (b) other states and their agencies

The conflict-affected state and its agencies are not only the object of peacebuilding but
also the subject of the peacebuilding process (Maiese 2003). For, while peacebuilding
aims to rebuild and transform various state structures and government agencies and
institutions, the government typically oversees and engages in this reconstruction process.
In doing so, the state is assisted by a range of local community specialists including
statesmen, economists, politicians, advocates and academics, the local population, the
private sector along with international agencies.

An important partner of the conflict affected state in the peacebuilding process is the state
military. Often termed as the logical partner of the state for security provision (Franke
2006: 9), the military possesses several tools that are not available to others. For example,
the military provides an essential element of force and the application of this force to
create a secure environment in which other actors can build peace (Keating and Knight
2004: xlv).

Interestingly in the 1990s, peacebuilding operations and research tended to focus only on
external actors, undermining and at times ignoring the war-tom state along with its local
actors. It was only in the mid-l990s after the work of Lederach that the focus of
peacebuilding shifted from external actors to the important role of actors from within the
conflict country (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 18). There is now a near-consensus on the

94
central role of the state in setting rules, particularly where these govern the provision of
physical security, the rule oflaw, and financial frameworks.

The sub-category of other states involved in peacebuilding includes regional neighbours

of the conflict-affected state, major world powers, middle-range powers and regional
powers. These states along with their agencies undertake a range of peacebuilding
functions individually or collectively. For example, major powers such as the U.S.
provide substantial financial and material support for peacebuilding activities in war-
affected countries. In fact the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
figures prominently in several peacebuilding missions as providers of financial aid and
other forms of assistance (Paris 2002: 640). Major powers along with middle range
powers such as Japan, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands are able to provide material
support for peacebuilding activities. These states are mostly recognised as donors and are
also actively involved in development projects that nurture peace in post-conflict
societies (Keating and Knight 2004: 368). Justifying the involvement of major and
middle range states in peacebuilding operations, Daudelin ( in Keating and Knight 2004:
5) is of the opinion that given the scope, high costs and logistical capacity required for
some peacebuilding operations, it is only the rich and materially endowed states that van
"arm, organise and finance them".

Regional powers such as South Africa and former colonial powers such as France along
with neighbouring states of the conflict affected state also participate in the peacebuilding
process. For few peacebuilding plans can work unless regional neighbours and other
significant international actors support the peace process through economic development,
aid and humanitarian relief (Maiese 2003).

The most common justification for the involvement of different states and their agencies
in peacebuilding activities in conflict affected societies is the view that peacebuilding is
instrumental to the broader international peace and security agenda (Barnett eta! 2007:
43). In addition, the growing concern and influence of the concept of human security and
its relation to peacebuilding has also contributed to the involvement of diverse states in

95
peacebuilding activities. For, while on the one hand several states including Canada,
Norway and South Africa have adopted human security as a foreign policy priority; on
the other hand the view that post conflict conditions disrupt human security for people
who lack protection under international law, has also gained popularity (Keating and
Knight 2004: xlvii). As a result states are increasingly becoming involved in
peacebuilding operations.

However the increasing involvement of diverse states and their agencies m vanous
peacebuilding operations have also raised doubts about the motivation and mandates of
these actors. Accused of being self-interested, media driven and having vested interests in
peacebuilding activities, states have often been at the receiving end of strong criticism
(Paris 2004). Nonetheless, in spite of this criticism, states and their agencies are a vital
part of the peacebuilding process. In fact without the participation of state, more so in
their capacity as donors (financial and material support), sustainable peacebuilding
operations would not be possible.

International Agencies
There are four main types of organisations that constitute the category of international
agencies involved in peacebuilding processes. These are IGOs such as the UN and the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD), international
financial organisations including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF), regional organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and INGOs such as CARE and
International Alert. 5 Playing a vital role in peacebuilding operations, these actors have
been instrumental in the planning and execution of peacebuilding operations all over the
world. While some of these actors such as the UN and its agencies have been involved in

5
In additio~ to these four main categories, international networks, linking individuals and organisations on
a regional and global basis can also be considered to be important international actors in the peacebuilding
processes. Examples include Action for Conflict Transformation, which comprises regional networks in
Asia, Africa (Coalition for Peace in Africa) and Latin America, and networks emanating from organisations
such as Transcend and the Mennonite Central Committee.

96
peacebuilding and related activities from the Cold War era, other actors such as the OAU
and INGOs have developed their peacebuilding mandates only in the post-cold war era. 6

In fact since the end of the Cold War, international agencies individually and collectively
have been the most active participants in diverse peacebuilding operations. Three main
factors have primarily been responsible for this increased participation of these
international institutions Firstly, according to Tschirgi (2003: 2) the end of the Cold War
offered an opportunity for international actors to revisit dominant conceptions of security
and development at both the international and domestic levels, and to devise integrated
and coherent policy instruments and programmes to address violent conflicts from a
peacebuilding perspective". As a result, international actors began including
peacebuilding activities in their respective mandates. Secondly, the spill over effect of
civil conflict made it essential for the international community to consider civil conflict
as a part of regional conflict and develop appropriate peacebuilding strategies involving
regional neighbours of the conflict affected state. In addition the recognition that the
developments within the sovereign domain of states had an impact on international peace
and security further enhanced the international and regional interventions in support of
peacebuilding operations (Tschirgi 2004: 3). Finally, the broadening scope and scale of
peacebuilding activities and operations make the involvement of regional and
international governmental and non-governmental institutions imperative. For no
international or regional agency can individually undertake a sustainable peacebuilding
operation and thus there is a growing trend towards inter-agency co-operation amongst
international agencies involved in peacebuilding.

International agencies, individually and/or collectively undertake a range of

peacebuilding activities across the peace and security, political and socio-economic
measures of peacebuilding. In addition these actors are also responsible for planning,
funding, implementing and monitoring peacebuilding activities. Interestingly while some

6
It is important to note that although the World Bank was initially created in 1944 to serve as a bank for
reconstruction, the Bank was hesitant to get involved in peacebuilding activities. Clinging to its formal
mandate that precludes it from playing a political vote; the World Bank limited its involvement in post-
conflict societies to infrastructure reconstruction activities. However from the late 1990s, the World Bank
began to actively participate in a range of peacebuilding activities (Tschirgi 2004:8)

97
organisations such as the UN, EU and World Bank have emerged as the principal
sponsors and central actors in peacebuilding operations, actively participating in all
aspects of planning and execution of peacebuilding interventions, other organisations
such as NATO, ECOWAS and a host of INGOs have developed specific competencies in
well defined areas of peacebuilding. In fact most IGOs and regional organisations have
expanded their peacebuilding activities during the 1990s, adding multi-dimensional peace
operations in addition to their traditional focus on humanitarian relief, infrastructure
restoration and political rehabilitation (Timilsina 2007: 2). Thus, for example, the UN is
responsible for the overall peacebuilding operations in Cambodia, Eastern Slovenia,
Baranja and Western Sirmium, East Timor and Kosovo, where it undertook a host of
peacebuilding activities ranging from reintegrating ex-rebels to laying the. groundwork
for elections and from brokering security sector reform to broadening development. On
the other hand NATO has developed expertise in security and military training and the
OSCE in elections, democratic institutions capacity-building, rule of law, and police
reform (Cutillo 2006: 48).

International agencies as a category of actors involved in peacebuilding possess several

advantages over other actors including material and personnel resources, and technical
and managerial expertise. In addition, these organisations also have international
credibility and legitimacy and thus their presence and participation in peacebuilding
operations is more acceptable to the conflict-affected state. In fact, conflict affected states
often invite international organisations to intervene at the governmental level during
peacebuilding operations (http://www.sais-
jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/approaches/peacebuilding/index.htm accessed 20 July 2009). The
involvement of international agencies in a range of peacebuilding activities is one of the
defining features of peacebuilding operations. In fact no peacebuilding operation could be
implemented or sustainable peace be achieved without the active presence and
involvement of these external actors.

Civil Society
Encompassing a broad range of members, including NGOs, social justice advocacy
groups and peace networks, special or collective interest group organisations such as

98
faith-based organisations, professional associations and trade unions, community-based
organisations (CBOs), institutions and initiatives and informational and educational
CSOs such as independent media, journalist associations, research and academic
institutions and think tanks, civil society is an important actor in the field of
peacebuilding. However the involvement of civil society in peace processes in general
and peacebuilding in particular is a relatively new phenomenon. For it was only with the
changing international paradigms in the 1990s, including the changing nature of conflict,
growing complexity of peacebuilding activities and the resulting helplessness of the
international community in the face of increased international peacebuilding failures in
the early and middle 1990s, that civil society peacebuilding was visualised to be an
alternative and a supplement to the peacebuilding efforts (Barnes 2006, Paffenholz 201 0).

Given the diverse composition of civil society, this actor has the potential to undertake a
wide range of peacebuilding activities spanning across all dimensions of peacebuilding.
More specifically, civil society can promote reconciliation, serve as a corrective to
political and military elites, enhance local ownership, foster democracy, monitor and
advocate in favor of peace, and against human rights violations and social injustices,
build bridges, trust and interdependence between groups and enhance local capacities
(Douma and Klem 2004; Barnes 2005; van Tongerene at al. 2005; Harpviken and
Kjellman 2004). In addition, civil society can also help shape peace policy by identifying
overlooked problems and policy gaps, analysing issues and recommending solutions
(Barnes 2006: 9).

In view of the diversity m functions performed by civil society m the field of

peacebuilding, the World Bank, in order to provide a comprehensive framework for
disaggregating and mapping civil society contributions to peacebuilding has identified
seven main peacebuilding functions performed by civil society. These are protection (of
citizens against violence), monitoring of human rights violations, specific conflict issues,
implementation of agreements, etc.), advocacy (agenda setting for conflict and peace
related issues), socialisation (for democratic and peace values as well as for in-group
identity ofmarginalised groups), social cohesion (to bring people together from adversary
groups), intermediation (on the local and national level between all sorts of actors), and

99
service provision (as an entry point for peacebuilding) (World Bank 2006: 12).
Interesting! y the relevance of these functions varies in different phases of conflict and the
overall effectiveness of civil society in promoting peacebuilding also varies from
function to function at different phases and stages of peacebuilding.

However in spite of this, recent research has proved that civil society can make important
contribution to peacebuilding in the short, medium and long-run (Barnes 2006,
Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Fischer 2006). In addition the advantages that this sector
possesses vis-a-vis other peacebuilding actors including vast geographical access and
reach across conflict fault lines, community-based interventions and flexibility in
approach and action, helped civil society actors to effectively reduce violence, negotiate
7
settlements and sustain peace after large-scale peace has ended (Paffenholz 2010).

Recognising the potential and significance of civil society actors, states, international
agencies including international financial institutions and the private sector are
increasingly formulating partnerships and meaningful relations with civil society actors.
Affirming the importance of civil society in peacebuilding processes, many multilateral
agencies and bilateral donors have adjusted their policy frameworks and increased their
operational support to civil society in peacebuilding (World Bank 2006: 8)

Private Sector
The potential role and significance of the private sector i.e. micro-entrepreneurs, local
manufacturing companies, domestic, regional and international business associations,
international business associations, multinational corporations and transnational
corporations, in peacebuilding processes has been contentious. Often referred to as the
negative drivers of conflict (Schwartz and Gibb 1999, Berdal and Malone 2000, De
Soysa 2000, Singer 2003, Killick et all 2005, Shankelman 2007), the private sector has
also been accused of spoiling peacebuilding operations 8 (Rettberg 2007).Furthermore

7
However it is to be noted that civil society also possesses several inherent weaknesses which limit these
overall potential. Some of the weaknesses of civil society have been identified by the World Bank as 1)
limited financial and management expertise; 2) limited institutional capacity; 3) low levels of self-
sustainability; 4) isolation/lack of inter-organisational communication and/or coordination; 5) small-scale
interventions; and 6) lack of understanding of the broader social or economic context (World Bank 2005).
8
While most of the accusations and criticisms levied on the private sectors role in peacebuilding are
targeted on regional, multinational and transnational companies, in practice there is no clear divide between

100
allegations of prolonging the conflict, obstructing peacemaking, exploiting natural
resources and being detrimental to sustainable peace have also be levied against the
private sector (Berdal and Mousavizadeh 2010: 37).

However in spite of these negative connotations, the private sector IS increasingly

participating in peace processes. Tripathi and Gunduz (2008: 16) cite three main reasons
for the increasing involvement of the private sector in peacebuilding. These include the
presence of the private sector in contexts of armed conflict along with exposure to its
risks and impacts, which frequently compel the private sector to initiate action, the
capacities of the sector including human resources, managerial and technical capacities to
intervene and participate in peacebuilding processes and the growing trend of
'privatisation of peace' i.e. privatising services and functions traditionally provided by
the state or the international community. In addition, the recognition of the costs of
conflict to the private sector including destruction of infrastructure, loss of skilled workforce
and employees, reduction or complete collapse of foreign investment, loss of markets etc., along
with the belief that sustainable peace and prospects for future stability would improve
economic opportunities, motivates the private sector to participate in the peacebuilding
process.

As a result the private sector has become an important actor in peacebuilding processes.
In fact there exist multiple ways in which private sector actors can contribute to
peacebuilding. These relate to socio-economic, security and political dimensions of
peacebuilding discussed earlier. For the private sector can generate employment
opportunities, address socioeconomic exclusion, participate in DDR processes, undertake
peace advocacy and lobbying, and participate in multi-stakeholder political peace-
processes.

the "local" and "international" aspects of the private sector. In fact according to Bray (2007), the private
sector should be considered to be a "spectrum with small, parochial operators at one end and truly
transnational companies at the other end".

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While undertaking the above mentioned peacebuilding activities the private sector
exhibits certain advantages over other actors. For, according to Killick et al (2005) the
private sector constitutes a powerful section of society in terms of political leverage and/
or the kinds of services provided) with a variety of linkages to different social and
political actors and strata, through business relations (with staff, business partners, etc.).
Because of this highly 'networked' position, the private sector has added advantages of
resources, credibility, legitimacy, and good offices vis-a-vis other peacebuilding agents
(Tripathi and Gi.indi.iz 2008: 25).

The involvement of the private sector in peacebuilding activities along with the host of
advantages enjoyed by the sector in this field has resulted in growing recognition of the
potential and importance of these actors in peacebuilding processes. In addition there is
now documented evidence of the success of this sector in peacebuilding activities (Azam
et al. 1994, Gerson 2001, Pearce 1999, Rettberg 2004 Godnick and Klein 2009). As a
result, there is now increasing conviction among governments and international agencies
that without a central private sector role, sustainable peace cannot be achieved and these
agencies are seeking partnerships with the private sector to undertake and implement
peacebuilding operations.

The above examination of the four main types of actors i.e. states, international agencies,
civil society and the private sector, involved in peacebuilding, while demonstrating the
diversity and complexity of the field of peacebuilding, also raises two important
questions. Firstly, is there any particular actor or set of actors which are more important
participants in the field of peacebuilding, when compared to other actors? In other words,
who is responsible for leading the peacebuilding operation? Secondly, how are the
activities of different actors involved in peacebuilding co-ordinated so as to avoid
duplication and inefficiency in the peacebuilding process?

There is considerable debate among theorists and practitioners of peacebuilding with

regards to the question of who should lead the peacebuilding process. While the basic
theoretical premise of peacebuilding, as suggested by Tschirgi (2004: 9) is that peace

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cannot be imposed by external forces, military or otherwise, but must rather be nurtured
through patient, flexible strategies carefully calibrated to the domestic political context;
the empirical record suggests that peacebuilding in practice more closely resembles an
externally driven exercise in both state building and social engineering (Donais 2009: 3).
In fact scholars while highlighting the primacy of external actors in the peacebuilding
process, base their arguments on empirical evidence. For example, Hampson (1996: 23)
studied eight peace settlements to conclude that third party intervention contributed
greatly to successful post settlement peacebuilding. On the other hand, scholars including
Diamond ( 1999) and Stiefel (200 1) attach primary significance to local actors in
peacebuilding processes. Their arguments are based on the premise that unique resources
that local actors bring to the process makes it imperative that meaningful participation
takes place and peace must be built "from the inside out" and that interventions may only
hope to catalyse change that must be brought about by local peacebuilders (Diamond
1999: 84). Interestingly the UN and the OECD also re-inforce the central role and
significance of internal actors in the peacebuilding process (United Nations 2009, OECD
2005: 4). In fact the question of leadership amongst the peacebuilding actors is linked to
one of the central debates in the field of peacebuilding i.e. the issue of national
ownership. Suggesting that peacebuilding is the primary responsibility of national actors,
advocates of national ownership believe that only national actors can address their
society's needs and goals in a sustainable way. 9 However as has been noted elsewhere in
this chapter, peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional process involving a range of activities
and actors, each of which plays a key role in the peacebuilding operation and the role of
any actor cannot be undermined. Thus while the significance of local actors in the
peacebuilding process is not questioned, the role played by the international community
also cannot be ignored. It can thus be said that the actors involved in a peacebuilding
operation should play a complementary role with the aim of establishing security,
expanding core national capacities and ultimately achieving sustainable peace.

The second question which relates to the issue of coordination among the different actors
involved in the peacebuilding process, is also central to the policy and practice of

9
For a detailed discussion on the issue of national ownership see Cutillo (2006) and Donais (2009).

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peacebuilding. For, the lack of coordination amongst the different peacebuilding actors
often results in inter-agency rivalry, working at cross purposes, duplication of efforts,
competition for funding, low quality of service, reduced capacity for delivery and less
than optimal economies of scale (Fukuyama 2004, De Coning 2009). As a result,
theorists and practitioners of peacebuilding have tried to effectively address the problem
of coordination by identifying areas where coordination is needed and then suggesting
mechanisms to achieve the same. 10

One of the most comprehensive studies on the issue has been undertaken by De Coning
(2008, 2009) who has identified four elements of coherence and coordination amongst
actors involved in peacebuilding. 11 These are agency coherence, i.e. consistency among
the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a
specific policy or programme; whole-of-government coherence, i.e. consistency among
the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country; external
coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies pursued by the various external actors in a
given country context; and internal/external coherence, i.e. consistency between the
policies of the internal and external actors in a given country context (De Coning 2009:
90-91 ). However in order to achieve coherence amongst the activities of diverse
peacebuilding actors, there is a vital need for an effective strategy which would provide
the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference. In fact the
importance of an overall strategic process is widely recognised and accepted (Paris 2004,
De Coning 2009). For a peacebuilding strategy to be a meaningful vehicle for system-
wide coherence, it needs to be transparent, readily available to all agencies, open for
input and consultation, and regularly revised and updated and closely monitored .. It is
also critical that the overall effect of the strategy needs to be closely monitored. For,
according to De Coning (2009: 98), "if every peacebuilding agency has access to the
strategic framework, and information related to the effect it is having on the peace

1
°For example, see De Coning (2009).
11
De Coning states the relation between coordination and coherence to be one of means and ends, whereby
coherence is the aim and coordination is the activity through which coherence needs to be pursued. The
various tools of coordination as identified by De Coning include developing strategies, determining
objectives, planning, sharing information, dividing of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources.
For more details see De Coning (2009: 92).

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process, they would be able to use this information to inform and adjust their own
strategic processes and implementation planning". Thus the activities of all the
peacebuilding actors would be coordinated and coherent.

Linked to the twin questions discussed above, is the issue of independence and
interdependence among peacebuilding actors. As noted earlier, the various peacebuilding
actors exist as independent agents with their own mandates, programmes and resources.
Further these agents are independent in the sense that they are legally constituted in their
own right, have their own organisational goals and objectives, have their own access to
resources, and are in control of those resources, i.e. they have the power to make
decisions about the allocation of those resources (De Coning 2009: 95). However these
actors are nonetheless interdependent on each other to achieve their respective objectives,
and those of the overall peacebuilding undertaking. This is because no single agency or
actor can achieve the ultimate goal of addressing the root causes of the conflict and
laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace on its own and "each
agency independently undertakes activities that address specific facets of the conflict
spectrum, but a collective (combined) and cumulative (sustained over time) effect is
needed to achieve the overall peacebuilding goal" (De Coning 2009: 95). In fact most
peacebuilding-related programmes only make sense as part of a larger system of related
programmes. For example, DDR programmes rely on the assumption that other actors
will provide a series of reintegration programmes, and those actors in tum rely on the
assumption that there are other programmes in place that will create security, improve
opportunities for education and healthcare, and create employment for ex-combatants or
alternative opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. This duality between the
independence and interdependence of the various programmes, agents and dimensions
that constitute peacebuilding is of one the defining features of peacebuilding processes,
both in the theory and practice ofpeacebuilding.

EVALUATING THE PRACTICE OF PEACEBUILDING

Evaluation of the peacebuilding process is perhaps as challenging as the concept and
process of peacebuilding itself. This is primarily because of two factors: conceptual and

105
operational. Conceptually it is difficult to evaluate the success of peacebuilding as there
is little consensus on the definition and ultimate goals of peacebuilding. As a result
analysts differ amongst themselves in accessing peacebuilding outcomes as divergent
concepts of peacebuilding have meant that there is not yet a generally accepted measure
for success. Consequently it is difficult to define what measures success in peacebuilding.

Operationally there is a lack of rigourous, systematic, comparative and comprehensive

peacebuilding evaluations. In fact scholars consider the area of peacebuilding evaluations
to be an underdeveloped one (Menkhaus 2003). This lack of reliable data at the national
/regional level makes the comprehensive analysis and assessment of peacebuilding
difficult.
As a result, the UN system, donor governments, regional organisations, INGOs and other
international actors have individually and collectively started to document what are
collectively called "Policy Guidelines," "Lessons Learned," and "Best Practices" in
Peacebuilding. These include, for example, sectoral studies on peace implementation and
peace enforcement, security sector reform, gender and peacebuilding, governance and
participation. They also include operational lessons on inter-agency collaboration and
coordination, institutional and individual skills development and training, new funding
mechanisms, timing of interventions and exit strategies (Tschirgi 2003). However,
peacebuilding evaluations still remain an underdeveloped area.

In the face of these twin difficulties, peacebuilding can be evaluated or success can be
measured by three approaches, namely maximalist, minimalist and moderate. The
maximalist approach which is rather ambitious, measures success by searching for
evidence of structural transformation of the economic, social and political factors that
lead to war (Tschirgi 2004: 11 ). In other words, it expects peacebuilding to redress the
root-causes of conflict. At the other end of the spectrum is the minimalist approach
which defines success as the avoidance of a return to violence. This approach accepts the
most readily visible indicator of success for efforts to consolidate peace (Call and
Cousens 2007: 3). The moderate approach which is also referred to as the instrumentalist

106
approach by some scholars (Tschirgi 2004: 11) assesses peacebuilding by looking at both
war recurrence and the quality of post war governance.

Given these three approaches along with the absence of reliable peacebuilding
evaluations based on a common framework which allows for a systematic examination of
different dimensions of peacebuilding, the record of peacebuilding according to Tschirgi
(2004: 11) can be evaluated by using two complementary bodies of literature. The first is
the broader academic literature dealing with civil wars, conflict resolution, peacemaking,
peace implementation, and post-conflict reconstruction and the second is the operational
evaluations undertaken or commissioned by external actors of their own peacebuilding
programs, projects and activities.(Tschirgi 2004: 11) Admitting the fact that these two
bodies of work employ different methodologies and approaches, Tschirgi is of the
opinion that when viewed together, they provide useful insights into the peacebuilding
efforts since the 1990s. She further adds that ultimately peacebui1ding needs to be judged
by its outcomes rather than its objectives.

However, what can prove helpful in evaluating the record of peacebuilding is a collective
assessment of individual peacebuilding case studies and research undertaken by political
scientists and academics. Independent studies to evaluate the implementation and impact
of international peacemaking and peacebuilding including peace agreements have been
carried out in some countries on a national scale in post conflict situations. Some of the
major studies include those by Paris (2004), Durch (2006), Lund(2003), Doyle and
Sambanis(2000), Cousens et al.(2001), Hampson(1996), Sens (2004) and Stedman et al.
(2002). These researchers have adopted one of the following methods to analyse
peacebuilding.

1) Extensively exammmg a single country case, taking into account all

factors associated with that case without using any comparative
framework.

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 2) Examining a limited number of cases in depth, comparing and contrasting
the process of building peace, conducting research on the basis of
structured framework
3) Examining a large number of cases of post-conflict peacebuilding in the
post-World War II or post-Cold War periods through statistical analysis of
the correlations of conflict features and intervention characteristics etc.

Commenting upon the nature of such research, Michael Lund states,

Reflecting one of the virtues of academic research, examples of this genre are
often cumulative, for the authors feel obliged to review previous research and to
test explicitly-stated hypotheses with specified methods for collecting data.
(Lund 2003: 25)

In order to comprehensively analyse the record of peacebuilding and evaluate its success,
this study will use the findings of five major research projects. These are Roland Paris
(2004), Fen Osler Hampson (1996), Allen Sens (2004), Michael Doyle and Nicholas
Sambanis (2000), and S.J Stedman et al. (2002).

Roland Paris in his book, At War's End (2004) examined 11 peacebuilding missions
between 1989 and 1999, which were deployed to a country where civil war had just
ended. His research was based on the thesis that peacebuilding missions in the 1990s
were guided by the notion that promoting liberalisation in countries that had recently
experienced civil war would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace.
However he argues that this approach turned out to be more problematic than anticipated
and states,

If the test of "successful" peacebuilding is simply whether large-scale conflict

resumed in the aftermath of a peacebuilding mission, then most of the operations
conducted in the 1990s were successful, because in all but three cases (Angola,
Rwanda, and Liberia), large-scale hostilities have not resumed. But if we use
instead the standard of success articulated by Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-
Ghali - namely, the establishment of a "sustainable" peace, or a peace that will
endure long after the peacebuilders depart from the country - then the picture
becomes less favourable. (Paris 2004: 5)

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He finds that out of the 11 peacebuilding missions, only two were successful and the
others either achieved partial success or were complete failures and states,

In most of the eleven cases, the process of political liberalisation, or economic

liberalisation, or both, produced destabilising side effects that worked against the
consolidation of peace. In some countries, liberalisation exacerbated societal
tensions; and in others it reproduced traditional sources of violence. (Paris 2004:
157)

Fen Osler Hampson in his book, Nurturing Peace (1996) analysed five cases where
peacebuilding had been carried out. While admitting to the fact that the ultimate success
of peacebuilding process in situations of civil conflict is "directly related to a society's
ability to make an effective transition from a state of war to a state of peace", marked by
the restoration of civil order, the re-emergence of civil society and the establishment of
participatory political institutions, Hampson preferred to use the short term
considerations for his evaluation. He states,

In the short term, if societies are to make this transition, the key considerations
are: did civil strife and violence end? And did the parties fulfil the commitment
they agreed to under the settlement. (Hampson 1996: 10)

Using this criterion Hampson found that peacebuilding had been successful in two cases,
achieved partial success in one case and had failed in the remaining two cases.

In another study, Allen G Sens (2004) undertook an evaluation of 22 cases which were
post Cold War UN missions with prominent peacebuilding components. Sens found that
in 3 out of the 22 cases, a positive self sustaining peace had been achieved, 15 cases
indicated the maintenance of a negative peace and in 8 cases, recidivism into large scale
violence had occurred. He concluded his study by stating,

Taken together, the peacebuilding record has not been particularly successful in
attaining the key measure of success: the building of a sustainable positive peace.
(Sens 2004: 152)

One of the most comprehensive studies of international peacebuilding has been

undertaken by Doyle and Sambanis (2000). In their study titled, "International

109
Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis", these theorists examined 124
cases of terminated civil wars since 1945 to see how many resulted in peace. Their main
argument is based on the hypothesis that

The probability of successful peacebuilding is a function of a country's

capacities, the available international assistance and the depth of war-related
hostility. (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 782)

Doyle and Sambanis apply both a "lenient" and a "strict" or more demanding definition
of sustainable peace to measure success. The lenient version implies an end to the war
and to the residual low-level violence and uncontested sovereignty. It represents a
minimum measure of peace focussed on the absence of war. According to this measure,
they find 71 failures and 53 successes. The stricter version of peacebuilding also requires
a minimum standard of democratisation. It reflects a higher order of peace but requires
only a minimum standard of political openness. There are 81 failures and 43 successes
according to Doyle and Sambanis if this measure is adopted.

Stedman et al (2002) search for instances of sustainable peace among 16 cases of post-
conflict peace agreements. They chose to judge mission success on the basis of two
factors, namely, reduction or recurrence in violence and the achievement of self-enforced
restraint. Elaborating this, the editors state,

We assessed each case of peace implementation by these measures and then

further subjected the cases to an informal, counterfactual analysis about specific
contribution of implementers to the result. (Stedman et. al 2002: 51)

Based on this criterion, Stedman et al come to the conclusion that out of the 16 analysed
cases, peacebuilding succeeded in 6, failed in 6 and achieve partial success in 4 cases.

As is evident from the multi-country studies mentioned above, peacebuilding has a mixed
track record. For, although peacebuilding had proved successful in some cases, the over
all trend indicated partial success in most and complete failure in many cases.

110
In addition, comprehensive research studies including Dahrendorf (2003, Collier et al
(2003 ), Dobbins et al (2005) and Cutillo (2006) have also indicated the poor
sustainability rate of peacebuilding operations. Most argue that between one-third and
one-half of all ended conflicts revert to warfare within five years (Call and Cousens 2007:
4). Collier et al for example state that nearly 50 percent of all countries receiving
assistance slide back into conflict within five years, and 72 percent of peacebuilding
operations leave in place authoritarian regimes (Collier et al 2003: 83). Given these
statistics along with the findings of the studies examined above, the record of
peacebuilding appears to be rather grim. This is primarily due to the challenges and
shortcomings present in the field of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding as a concept, practice and strategy suffers from several shortcomings as a

result of which it has been able to achieve only limited success. These shortcomings and
challenges can be broadly divided into two categories, namely conceptual and practical.
Conceptually the shortcomings and challenges that peacebuilding faces are two-fold. The
first shortcoming relates to the normative and theoretical underpinnings of peacebuilding
and the second shortcoming, which is linked to the first one, relates to the legitimacy of
peacebuilding. As stated earlier, peacebuilding is built on the premise that political and
economic liberalisation will promote stability and consolidate peace in states emerging
out of conflict. However this liberal economic model has the potential to cause more
harm than good. According to Sens, this model can widen inequalities, create economic
dislocation and consolidate the power of those who benefited from the black market
activities during the conflict (Sens 2004: 14 7). Furthermore political liberalisation can
reinforce and entrench political differences and divide people. In fact there is now
growing evidence that a liberal peacebuilding package might be fundamentally ill-suited
for post-conflict contexts (Tschirgi 2004: 14). Studies by analysts like Boyce (1996),
Chesterman (2004) and Paris (2004) all point towards this.

Explaining how the liberal peacebuilding model actually jeopardises the peace process
and poses a threat to peacebuilding, Paris argues that economic and political liberalisation

111
are particularly ill-suited and counterproductive in post-conflict peacebuilding since they
promote economic and political competition at a difficult and fragile phase. He states,

Both democracy and capitalism encourage conflict and competition -indeed they
thrive on it. Their values may be precisely the wrong qualities to introduce into
post-conflict societies without due care and diligence since they can undermine
the spirit of national reconciliation. (Paris 2004: 74)

The second conceptual challenge peacebuilding faces is its' own legitimacy. Directly
linked to the first challenge, there is a growing concern that peacebuilding can entail an
imposition of foreign ways which in tum can result in the marginalisation of the
developing world. For, some view peacebuilding as a component of a larger agenda of
western political and economic supremacy (Sens 2004: 148). Thus developing countries
are often suspicious of peacebuilding, regarding it as another manifestation of western
intervention and cultural imperialism.

This suspicion that the hidden agendas of the maJOr power basically animate
peacebuilding, according to Lund (2003: 19) has grown not only as its liberal premises
become more exposed but also in response to recent exercises in "humanitarian
intervention." For example, the peace enforcement action in the name of humanitarianism
in Kosovo was criticised for its heavy-handedness and underlying service to Western
interests and the agendas of certain organisations (Lund 2003: 19). As a result of these
concerns, the legitimacy of the peacebuilding process is put to question. This poses a very
serious threat to the implementation and success of peacebuilding.

In addition to these conceptual challenges, peacebuilding also faces several practical

shortcomings. These shortcomings arise in the operationalisation phase of peacebuilding.
As examined earlier peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional process involving diverse
measures, activities and actors. The main practical challenge that peacebuilding faces, is
the magnitude of the peacebuilding task itself. For, the exercise of creating and
maintaining conditions for positive peace in war-inflicted societies is extremely difficult
as these societies are characterised by widespread political, economic and social
problems. Political infrastructure for effective governance is lacking, social and human

112
security problems are prevalent and massive development challenges exist. Further in
some cases there is local resistance to peacebuilding as well. Peacebuilding efforts, thus
according to Sens (2004: 149) must confront the tensions between state sovereignty and
human security, universalism and relativism, and order and justice.

Furthermore, the divergent interests and priorities of the different actors promoting
diverse peacebuilding activities, measures and mandates, also pose a serious difficulty in
the efficient implementation of peacebuilding. For, not only does the co-ordination
between the efforts of different actors prove difficult; the efforts are often aimed at
different outcomes. At times, this lack of co-ordination and coherence results in inter-
agency rivalry, working at cross purposes, competition for funding and the duplication of
efforts by diverse actors (Fukuyama 2004: 40).As a result, effective peacebuilding cannot
take place. Interestingly the same features which make peacebuilding a unique and viable
process for sustaining peace, also pose a threat to its' success.

Another serious challenge to effective peacebuilding is the lack of adequate financial

resources. Coupled with this is the fact that the actors implementing peacebuilding
including the UN, regional organisations and NGOs are seriously under-resourced and
suffer from a serious disconnect between policies promoted at headquarters and the
implementation in the field (Tschirgi 2003: 12). As a result of both these factors the
challenge ofpeacebuilding increases multi-fold.

In addition to these factors, two recent developments have contributed in further

increasing the threat to effective peacebuilding. These are the growth of security threats
due to terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and post 9/11 power
politics. Security threats posed by terrorism are often viewed as hard threats to the
national interest of states. As a result, when exposed to such threats, states tend to re-
categorise their international concerns, priorities, diplomatic energies and financial
resources. This is tum affects the peacebuilding commitments and objectives undertaken
by states. Elaborating this phenomenon, Tschirgi (2004) states,

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 Certain conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq are seen as national security
issues, they will continue to attract external assistance motivated largely by the
geo-strategic and security interests of powerful external actors. Other
peacebuilding needs, as in the Sudan, Burundi and the DRC, are therefore
relegated to "second tier" international concerns attracting limited political
attention and resources despite their urgency and gravity. (Tschirgi 2004: 17)

The other significant threat to the peacebuilding endeavour in recent times is the post
9/11 international power politics especially after the US led war against terror. In fact this
development poses both conceptual and operational difficulties to the process of
peacebuilding. Conceptually, we have seen earlier that the peacebuilding is based on the
premise that physical security, political stability, social reconciliation, and economic
reconstruction are integrated elements of a domestically owned enterprise in which
external actors need to play a supportive role. (Tschirgi 2004: 17) However, since 9/11
several ideological changes have taken place as a result of which forcefully securing the
stability of weak or failing states to avoid the negative fall-out from state failure has
become a reality in international politics theory. Such a formulation, according to
theorists including Tschirgi (2004) and Sens (2004) is likely to undermine the basic
premise of peacebuilding that peace, security and stability cannot be imposed from
outside but need to be nurtured internally through patient, flexible, responsive strategies
that are in tune with domestic realities.

In addition to this conceptual threat, the post 9111 world, also poses an operational threat
to peacebuilding. For, the deep political divisions that have emerged within the
international community following the US-led war on terrorism and the war in Iraq,
undermine ongoing efforts to define a common and collective framework for
international action in the early years of the 21st century. For example, within the
Security Council, at the General Assembly, within regional organisations, and even
among allies, there are deep differences as to what constitutes the top priorities for the
international community and how to address them. These political cleavages in the
international community, according to Tschirgi (2004: 18) are already beginning to
reflect themselves in the priorities and operations of the main bilateral and multilateral
donors with the risk of the "securitisation" of development aid.

114
Alongside these challenges and threats to the international peacebuilding efforts and
process, the overall scenario for effective peacebuilding has witnessed several positive
developments also. These developments have made the case for peacebuilding as an
effective and viable option for sustainable peace much stronger. Some of these
developments include a greater and more comprehensive understanding of complexities
of peacebuilding, more self-critique about the limits of international assistance, and
increasing appreciation of the unique demands of specific situations. More specifically
the growth and enhancement of the international architecture for peacebuilding with the
establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the
Peacebuilding Support Office in 2005 along with the growing influence and significance
of INGOs in the practice of peacebuilding, have improved the prospects of peacebuilding
as an effective approach to peace. The next section will examine the UN and INGOs as
significant practitioners of peacebuilding.

The United Nations and Peacebuilding

The United Nations has evolved as the principal practitioner of building peace within
states. In fact while the impetus for peacebuilding came from multiple and diverse
sources, it found its strongest expression at the UN (Tschirgi 2004:2). This was primarily
because of the vast experience and expertise of the UN in peacekeeping along with its
involvement in the civil conflicts after the end of the Cold war, as a result of which the
IGO provided the rationale and operational principles of peacebuilding since the 1990s.

Interestingly the practice of UN peacebuilding precedes the emergence of a

comprehensive definition. For example, the United Nations Operation in the Congo
(Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC), which took place in the Republic of
the Congo from July 1960 until June 1964 performed several peacebuilding activities.
For, originally established to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the
Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance, the
function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial
integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war

115
and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not
under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries
(http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm accessed 10 October 201 0).

Similarly the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Nicosia Master Plan
Project of 1980 dealing with the redevelopment of the Cypriot capital which was divided
into the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot zones is an early example of a long term,
inter agency approach to the resolution of conflict. In fact the 1987 UNDP leaflet which
outlined the aims of the plan bears resemblance to the current aims of UN peacebui1ding
efforts. The aims of the plan as stated in the leaflet included, 'to transcend immediate
political difficulties through technical collaboration designed to find solutions to common
social-economic, physical and environmental problems affecting the city'
(http://www.undp-unopspff.org/News.asp?CiD=97 accessed 10 February 2009).

Moreover the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989-
90), whose mandate included the supervision of elections, policing and demilitarisation,
is considered to be the first peacebuilding operation of the UN. 12 For the UN was
actively responsible for the creation of a democratic sovereign state through a peace
operation (Ponzio 2007: 6).

However as we have seen earlier, it was only in the 1992 that the then UN Secretary
General brought clarity and coherence to the concept. 13 An agenda for peace, its
Supplement and the Agenda for development guided the UN' s approach to peacebuilding
in the 1990s. In 1997, the first UN peacebuilding office was established in Liberia. 14 The

12
Established to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early
independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the UN,
UNT AG was also to help the Special Representative to ensure that: all hostile acts were ended; troops were
confined to base, and, in the case of the South Africans, ultimately withdrawn from Namibia; all
discriminatory laws were repealed, political prisoners were released, Namibian refugees were permitted to
return, intimidation of any kind was prevented, law and order were impartially maintained
(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagM.htm).
13
Other peacebuilding operations undertaken by the UN before 1992 included Nicaragua (1989), Angola ·
(I 991 ), Cambodia (I 991) and El Salvador (1991 ). For details on these operations see
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/pastops.shtml.
14
For more information on the UNOL see www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/Liberia.pdf.

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Peace-building Office in Liberia (UNOL, 1997-2003) was mandated to support the
Government of Liberia in its efforts to consolidate peace following the July 1997
multiparty elections, promote national reconciliation and good governance and strengthen
democratic institutions. 15 There was in fact a strong tendency to put the building and
strengthening of democratic institutions at the core of the peacebuilding tasks in the
mandates ofpeacebuilding support offices (Teran 2007: 4).

In the year 2000, the Report of the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations (also
known as the Brahimi Report) further elaborated and clarified the UN policy and
approach to peacebuilding. Acknowledging the linkages between peacekeeping and
peacebuilding, the Panel recommended various specific peacebuilding tools and
strategies in peace operations, including the adoption of quick impact projects (QIPs), the
creation of a fund for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), the adoption
of a "doctrinal shift" away from international civilian policing to "rule of law teams" in
complex peace operations, the establishment of a pilot Peacebuilding Unit, and
regularised funding for the Electoral Affairs Division (United Nations 2000). With its
aim of strengthening the overall strategic and operational capacity of the UN system in
peace operations, the Brahimi Report also noted the need for a focal point for
peacebuilding and concluded that, "United Nations should be considered the focal point
for peacebuilding activities by the donor community".

The next major development in the UN vis-a-vis peacebuilding took place in 2003, when
the then UN Secretary General, in response to the resource shortfalls and organisational
and operational weaknesses of the international community in peacebuilding including
the problem of lack of coordination and integration of diverse actors in the international
peacebuilding process, asked a high level panel to propose major reforms to the UN
institutions that seek to promote peace and security. This panel i.e. the High-level panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change, recommended the creation of two new bodies

15
The establishment ofUNOL was followed by three other peacebuilding offices in Guinea-Bissau (1999),
Central African Republic (2000) and Tajikistan (2000) For more information on these offices see
http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/GuineaBissau.pdf , http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/CAR.pdf and
http://www.untop.org.

117
namely a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support office. The new
organs would have two core objectives: namely to help states avoid collapse and the slide
to war, and to assist states in their transition from war to peace. The Secretary-General
subsequently endorsed the proposal in his March 2005 report entitled, "In Larger
Freedom", setting the stage for its consideration at the 2005 UN World Summit.

During the World Summit in September 2005, the Heads of State and Government
followed the Secretary-General's proposals and decided to set up the Peacebuilding
Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body. It was decided that the Secretary-
General should establish a Peacebuilding Support Office and a standing Peacebuilding
Fund. On the basis of these preparatory works, the Peacebuilding Commission was
established on 20 December 2005 by concurrent resolutions of the Security Council
(S/RES/1645) and General Assembly (A/RES/60/180) as an inter-governmental advisory
body with an Organisational Committee of 31 member countries to coordinate and
reinforce the UN peacebuilding architecture. The Commission held its inaugural session
on 23 June 2006 in New York.

An intergovernmental advisory that supports peace efforts in countries emerging from

conflict, the main purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission are to (a) To bring together
all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies
for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; (b) To focus attention on the reconstruction
and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the
development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable
development; (c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the
coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best
practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to
extend the period of attention given by the international community to post conflict
recovery (G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 2 (Dec. 20, 2005).

In the first year of its existence, the PBC focused on Burundi and Sierra Leone and made
considerable contributions not only in terms of its own systems and processes but also in

118
marshalling international resources and focusing attention on two countries that needed
assistance in their transition from peacekeeping to development (Security Council Report
Inc: 1: 2007). Although the Peacebuilding Commission is a very recent development, its
working has proved the potential for its contribution. Furthermore the contributions of the
Peacebuilding Commission have not only been limited to the countries where the
Commission has been active, but has also indirectly the broader peacebuilding
community. Reviewing the performance of the Commission and commenting on its
potential, a comprehensive study by the NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
and the International Peace Institute notes,

UN agencies working on peacebuilding will benefit from a more coherent

system-wide approach, through the actions of the Support Office directly, and the
PBC. Non-UN actors, who have been working in the peacebuilding arena for
more than a decade, are seeing the beginnings of a more focused and articulated
approach to peacebuilding. This will be a long process, but an important and
valuable beginning has been made (Slotin and Jones 2008: 9).

In 201 0 the Peacebuilding Commission was reviewed to assess its progress and determine
its future direction. In a statement at the launch of the 2010 Review, the Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon said that in "its short existence, the PBC had shown its worth but
looking ahead, Member States must consider how to make its impact more tangible at the
country level" (http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/ accessed 10 November 2010).
However, the co-facilitators of the review were of the opinion that in the five years after
the establishment of the Commission, despite committed and dedicated efforts, the hopes
that accompanied that body's groundbreaking founding resolutions have yet to be
realised. 16 "We are now at a crossroads: either there is a conscious recommitment to
peacebuilding at the very heart of the work of the United Nations, or the Peacebuilding
Commission settles into the limited role that has developed so far"
(http://www. un.org/ apps/news/story. asp ?N ewsiD= 36613 &Cr=peacebuilding&Cr 1=
accessed 10 November 201 0).

16
The co-facilitators of the review process were Ambassadors Anne Anderson oflreland, Claude Heller of
Mexico and Baso Sangqu of South Africa. Their report of can be accessed at
http://www. un.org/ga/presiden t/64/issues/pbc/PBCReport. pdf

119
 Fig. 2.3
On oin Peacebuildin Missions around the World

ONGOING POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS

UNOWA BINUCA UNSCO UNRCCA UN MIN

WoatAfrlca Comnll Attica Rlfpubllc Mlddl& Eaot ConlllllAsla Nepal
UNPOS UNAMI UNAMA*
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UNIPSIL UNIOGBIS BINUB UNSCOL

Sleml.9on& Guiflea.Blnau Burundl Ll!bancn

!dap No. 4147 Rw. 32(E) UNITED NATIONS

"' Mission directed and supported by the Doportmont of Fl•td SUpport
January 21>10 Department of Peacekeeping Operations C..rt<>t~rapl>lo s.otion

Source: http://www. un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/ppbm. pdf accessed 10 October 2010.

The fonnation of the Peacebuilding Commission which marked a watershed in the history
of the UN enhanced the capability and capacity of the organisation to make significant
advances in peacebuilding and in addressing the development needs of fragile states. The
present the UN architecture for peacebuilding, as a result now comprises the 31-member
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) which is a state subsidiary advisory body of both the
General Assembly and Security Council, a multi-year standing trust fund for post-conflict
peacebuilding i.e. the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office
(PBSO), which is part of the UN Secretariat that services the PBC, manages the PBF, and
supports UN system peacebuilding efforts. Presently the UN has 12 ongoing
peacebuilding missions around the world. (Figure 2.3)

120
Interestingly the UN also acknowledges the significance of partnerships and coordination
among the various actors and agencies involved in the international peacebuilding
processes. This is also reflected in the present UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki-Moon's
recent report on "Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict", in which he
states,

Within the international community, the United Nations has a critical and
significant role to play in peacebuilding. At the same time, the United Nations
system is only one of several actors working to support post-conflict countries,
and the coherence of this broader international effort is key to helping countries
to succeed in their efforts to construct a viable peace. Partnerships and
coordination among the main regional and international actors is essential since
no single actor has the capacity to meet the needs in any of the priority areas of
peacebuilding. (United Nations 2009).

This importance given to partnerships reinforces the principle of interdependence of

independent actors in the field of peacebuilding which was identified as one of the
operational principles of peacebuilding in an earlier section.

INGOs and Peacebuilding

The roots of INGO involvement in humanitarian and conflict areas can be traced to 1848
when Henri Dunant established the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
which emerged as and remains one of the most important humanitarian organisations in
the field of conflict. However it was only after the Second World War, when the second
generation INGOs emerged that these organisations became involved in post-war
reconstruction as opposed to being service oriented organisations dedicated to addressing
the consequences of war on its victims (Fitzduff and Church 2004: 4). INGOs such as
YMCA, YWCA and CARE in the 1950s thus expanded their scope of operation to
include post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction but remained neutral on conflict
policy and political issues. The 1970s witnessed a blossoming of INGOs focusing on
peace, human rights, development and humanitarian relief and organisations like
Amnesty International, Oxfam and MSF adopted a more assertive if not confrontational,
approach in their operations. These INGOs according to Fitzduff and Church (2004: 5)
decided that they had to address not only the ravages of conflict and war but also their

121
causes through advocacy, campaigning and lobbying. As a result, limited presence of
INGO activity in conflict areas and issues was noted during the Cold War era.

However, it was only with the end of the Cold War that INGOs emerged as significant
actors in the field of peacebuilding. This is primarily because the altered international
landscape, new insecurities, vast humanitarian crises, extended normative frameworks,
and increased funding incited established and INGOs to expand their engagement in
peace processes. In fact the end of the Cold War witnessed a proliferation of INGOs
engaged in responding to conflict. For conflicts since the end of the Cold War, have
increasingly taken place within rather than between states, exacerbated or fuelled by
regional and inter-state dynamics and this explosion of intra-state conflicts has
challenged those INGOs (along with other agencies) which directly or indirectly, offer
assistance to people affected by disasters. Thus as INGOs struggle to address human
needs arising from conflict, in the process becoming operational in more war zones than
ever before, they have increasingly found themselves on the frontlines of conflict. As a
result while providing humanitarian and development assistance to affected populations,
INGOs have become more aware of the inevitable two-way relationship between violent
conflict and their programmes which in tum has resulted in the expansion of their
humanitarian mandate beyond emergency relief interventions. In other words, relief and
development INGOs in the post-cold war era chose to adopt peacebuilding mandates
because they considered it to be a natural outflow of the values they represent in their
relief work and in order to accomplish their primary task in a better manner (Gerstbauer
2002: 8).

Besides there has been a growing tendency amongst states and IGOs, particularly in the
last decade to subcontract elements of peacebuilding to INGOs. This is because of the
growing complexity of peacebuilding operations along with the realisation that no
individual agency can single-handedly manage or implement a sustainable peacebuilding
operation. This trend is evident from the gradual decrease in government official
developm~nt assistance (ODA) mirrored in the increase in government allotments to
INGOs and NNGOs for peacebuilding activities (Knight 2004: 369). As a result, several
INGOs have digressed from providing relief during emergencies and post-conflict

122
situations to perfonning more politicised roles such as monitoring human rights
violations, and conducting and monitoring elections.

Consequently, INGOs have in recent years begun to undertake a more structured and
conscious reflection on and review of their work in conflict-affected areas and have now
emerged as vital actors perfonning significant roles in the peacebuilding process. While
some INGOs like CARE have a long history of involvement in conflict resolution and
peacebuilding, many existing INGOs have expanded their mandates to specific
peacebuilding activities and operations. INGOs such as World Vision now insist on not
only taking action to relieve the effects of anned conflicts, i.e. provide humanitarian aid;
but also responding to the conflict itself, by assuming the role of peacebuilders. Further,
some INGOs have been specifically created as "niche" organisations with a
peacebuilding focus (Goodhand and Goodhand 2000). In fact INGOs now have been
hailed as the new conflict managers for their emerging role in peacebuilding in violent
conflicts (Aall 2000, Gerstbauer 2005).

Roles and Functions of INGOs in Peacebuilding

INGOs working in the field of conflict have played an important role in the post-conflict
reconstruction and rehabilitation of conflict inflicted states and have thus emerged as
peacebuilders. Delivering emergency aid, building peace constituencies, contributing to
relief and rehabilitation efforts, mediation, arbitration, advocacy and development efforts
are some of the activities that these organisations have actively participated in, in the
peacebuilding process. In addition, INGOs play a role in counteracting pro-war
propaganda, encouraging cross-communal social relations and inclusive institutions,
creating employment opportunities for fighters, reducing economic competition for
scarce resources and reducing anns flows (Lewer 1999, White 2000, Goodhand and
Hulme 2000, Fitzduff 2004, Neubert 2004). Given the diverse activities undertaken and
roles perfonned by INGOs in the field of peacebuilding, several analysts have compiled
lists of activities undertaken by these actors (van Tongeren et al. 2005; van Tongeren
1998, European Centre for Conflict Prevention 1999, Fischer 2006). Goodhand and
Hulme (2000) based on a study of INGO roles in peacebuilding activities in three

123
countries namely Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Liberia, have compiled a list of roles played
by these organisations. These include

o Meditation/conflict resolution
o Building peace constituencies
o Demobilisation
o Human rights monitoring/protection
o Constitutional reform
o Local capacity building/civil society strengthening
o Socio-economic development
o Reconciliation
o Judicial reform
o Supporting local leadership
o Advocacy/education

A more exhaustive list has been compiled by Ropers (2002) who states INGO functions
to include:
o Establishing alternative media, war and peace reporting
o Monitoring of elections and state institutions and activities related to
democratisation
o Youth work (community-based social policy, income generation, education and
empowerment)
o Support for education sector reforms and initiatives for peace education
o Establishing peace cultures: incentives for overcoming cultures of war via arts,
music, films and cultural events
o Strengthening local "peace constituencies"
o Initiatives for inter-religious dialogue
o Empowerment of women, campaigns for women's rights and against human
trafficking
o Initiatives for demobilisation, disarmament and demilitarisation

124
 o Protection of endangered individuals, and providing security for minority groups
or refugees and returnees
o Re-integration of returnees and community building
o Human rights monitoring
o Documentation of war crimes, fact-finding and support to identify missing people
o Dealing with trauma and psycho-social support for war victims, refugees and
returnees
o Initiatives for dealing constructively with the past (fact-finding, story-telling,
reconciliation initiatives)

However, in spite of the broad range of activities and roles performed by INGOs in the
field of peacebuilding, a single integrated approach or policy framework for INGO
participation in peacebuilding is not available. As a result, different INGOs depending
upon their orientation and mandate perform different roles in post-conflict peacebuilding.
More specifically INGO efforts at peacebuilding and their specific roles and activities can
be categorised as
1) Humanitarian assistance including emergency relief aid
2) Security sector activities
3) Advisory activities including advocacy and capacity building activities

In performing the above mentioned activities, INGOs become important actors in

implementing all the measures of peacebuilding - peace and security, political and socio-
economic which been discussed in the previous section. Thus it is seen that INGOs
perform vital roles and functions in the peacebuilding process. These organisations have
been able to perform such diverse roles and emerge as significant actors in the
peacebuilding process because of their inherent advantages as non-state entities. The
following section will examine some of these.

Advantages and Limitations ofJNGOs in Peacebuilding

The basic advantages that INGOs possess vis-a-vis IGOs, governments and other state
actors and institutions have been examined in the chapter one. However, INGOs also

125
have certain inherent strengths while working in conflict and post-conflict scenarios, as a
result of which INGOs gain advantage over other organisations and actors in terms of
their capacity to perform a range of activities in the peacebuilding process. The strength
to respond quickly to crisis situations, ability to reach the most remote areas, capacity to
promote local participation and implement programmes in direct collaboration with target
beneficiary groups, means to operate on low costs and the aptitude to strengthen local
institutions, are some of the main advantages of INGOs in conflict and post conflict
situations (Abiew and Keating 2004). It is due to these advantages that INGOs have been
able to perform vital peacebuilding tasks. In addition, Goodhand and Hulme (2000) are of
the opinion that these INGOs, in theory also have a number of advantages which equip
them to support peacebuilding processes. They state,

They are mid level actors with linkages upwards to political leadership and
downwards to communities; they have the potential to play a bridging role
between identity groups in contexts characterised by extreme horizontal
inequalities; they have the ability to work across lines and gain access to
communities living on the 'wrong side' of a conflict; they have relatively high
'comfort levels' and can work in high risk environments; and, at their best they
can be flexible, adaptive and innovative.

Furthermore in many cases, INGO participation in peacebuilding operations is a natural

extension of their engagement in social and development work. This factor proves
advantageous to NGOs. For, as noted by Abiew and Keating (2004),

Many humanitarian NGOs have a commitment to long-term projects in support

of economic and social development. This includes working in societies affected
by conflict. As a result, NGOs are often inside the country or among the first
outsiders to enter post-conflict environments. Additionally, they are often able to
react more quickly and efficiently than the UN or other IGOs.

Another distinct advantage that NGOs possess is noted by the Carnegie Commission on
Preventing Deadly Conflict. The Commission in a 1997 report stated, "Governments and
IGOs often lack the mechanisms for acquiring the systematic information that NGOs
possess from years of involvement in conflict situations". As a result NGOs are
considered more reliable and credible than their governmental counterparts.

126
The above mentioned strengths of INGOs grant them a comparative advantage over
government and other state actors and enables them to effectively perform vital
peacebuilding activities. However this is not to state that INGOs do not face any
difficulties or hindrances in their peacebuilding endeavours. On the contrary, INGOs
often face severe limitations and challenges in their capacity as peacebuilders. In fact
these organisations face more difficulties and challenges than their counterparts working
in other areas. For, in addition to the limitations due to the lack of funding, inadequately
trained personnel, lack of transparency, inadequate evaluation component, cultural
insensitivity and accountability and legitimacy issues, which are common to most
INGOs; INGOs with a peacebuilding mandate face several additional challenges.

In the first instance, the involvement of diverse INGOs along with other actors and
agencies in the peacebuilding process results in problems of duplication and co-
ordination. The mere presence of a large number of INGOs in a conflict or post-conflict
situation implies varying and at times conflicting mandates, goals and techniques. Further
in the absence of any type of co-coordinated or monitored approach to peacebuilding,
which is characteristic in post-conflict scenarios; the lines of co-ordination, responsibility
and accountability become blurred. For example, the Bosnia intervention included nine
agencies and departments of the United States government, a dozen other governments,
seven international organisations, and 13 major INGOs (Abiew and Keating 2004).
Commenting upon this situation, Shenstone (2003) states,

As agencies engage in rivalry with each other for control and management of the
peace effort, NGOs become vulnerable for manipulation by host belligerents,
confused over roles and run the risk of a great deal of misplaced activity.

Furthermore the involvement of INGOs in peacebuilding can also give rise to a number
of unintended and negative consequences. These include freeing up local relief resources
for the continuation of war; diversion of aid to warring factions that supports their
activities; escalating violence by attracting raiding; creating false economies; facilitating
the isolation or displacement of particular populations and conferring unrepresentative

127
legitimacy on warlords and leaders of particular factions prosecuting the war (Abiew and
Keating 2004).

It is due to these difficulties that INGOs with peacebuilding mandates face the challenge
of becoming increasingly politicised. Explaining this challenge, Hutchison (2000) is of
the opinion that

At the most basic level, the very presence of a foreign individual or organisation
in a conflict zone is a political gesture. However, it is the nature of recent
conflict, where control, manipulation, and even extermination of entire
populations are the very means of war, which makes the impartial stance of
NGOs increasingly difficult to maintain. The confusing nature of intrastate
conflict is one where belligerents are rarely concentrated or visible; and where it
is often difficult to distinguish between civilians and soldiers or enemies and
allies. Unfortunately, NGOs, with the best of intentions, can be caught in the
middle and the doctrine of neutrality is challenged.

Coupled with the concern of politicisation of INGOs is the challenge posed by the
potential loss of the autonomy and credibility that may result from cooperating too
closely with officialdom and participating in the decision making process (Abiew and
Keating: 2004).

In addition to these difficulties and challenges, INGOs active in peacebuilding have been
criticised on several grounds. These organisations have been accused of being counter-
productive in situations of conflict, responsible for the underdevelopment of local
government and thus inhibiting the development of participatory activities which have
adversely affected sustainable recovery in post-conflict societies and also succumbing to
government agendas (Eagen 1991 ).

INGOs have also been criticised for promoting the agendas of their respective donor
countries and at times for being supportive to particular political or group agendas. A
more recent and serious criticism levied against INGOs role in peacebuilding according
to Fitzduff and Church (2004) is the accusation that

The peacebuilding agenda of the NGOs can serve as a fig leaf for the political
inaction of international actors, helping to mask the local and global political and

128
 economic dynamics that are in fact the driving forces of violent conflict in peripheral
countries.

Thus it is seen that INGOs active in the field of peacebuilding not only face several
limitations and challenges but are also subject to severe criticism. However in spite of
this, INGO are increasingly proving themselves to be vital and indispensable players in
the peacebuilding realm. In fact, INGOs have on several occasions overshadowed major
UN agencies in peacebuilding activities. For example, World Vision spent over US$180
million in post-conflict Mozambique between 1993 and 1994, while the total five-year
budget of UNDP for the country was estimated to be about US$60 million. (Abiew and
Keating 2004). Likewise NGOs working in Afghanistan in 1997 had more resources than
the UN- the total aid budget for Afghanistan was US$200 million, of which NGO share
was US$136 million(West 2001).

Interestingly this increased prominence of INGOs in peacebuilding operations has

coincided with a gradual withdrawal on the part of states and IGOs from long-term
sustainable peace projects and a greater delegation of peacebuilding functions to NGOs
(Abiew and Keating 2004). This development has led to increased expectations from
INGOs in the peacebuilding realm and provided the justification for increased presence
and involvement of INGOs in peacebuilding.

Given the fact that peacebuilding is one of the main challenges facing the world today
and that INGOs have the potential to carry out effective peacebuilding, the question
which arises now is- How and under what conditions can INGOs practice and contribute
to sustainable peacebuilding? In order words, is there a framework by means of which
INGOs can be active and effective players in peacebuilding? In order to formulate an
objective and accurate framework, there is a need to examine and analyse specific INGOs
that have been involved in performing peacebuilding activities in the past and have
shown the potential to contribute to the long term success of peacebuilding. The
following chapter will identify and examine three such INGOs.

129