James Harvey T.
Dinoy long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed
ARTICLES 2-3
DIGESTS
Topic: Introduction
De Joya vs. The Jail Warden of Batangas City and Hon
Ruben Galvez GR No. 159418-19
Facts:
Norma De Joya was convicted for violating BP22, the decision
was released March 21, 1997. She remained at large and was
arrested December 3, 2002. On November 21, 2000, the
Supreme Court issued Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
giving courts option to impose penalty over imprisonment.
Issue:
Norma De Joya contended that her detention was illegal and that
Administrative Circular No 12-2000 have erased the penalty of
imprisonment. This case also raises the issue: Are
Administrative Circulars or Jurisprudence sources of Criminal
Law.
Ruling:
No. Administrative Circulars or Jurisprudence are not sources
of Criminal Law. The courts are given the discretion to choose
whether to impose a penalty of fine or a penalty of imprisonment
only or both fine and imprisonment. Therefore, the petition was
dismissed due to lack of merit.
Topic: Introduction
People vs Gregorio Santiago GR No 17584 March 8, 1922
Facts:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy, by striking
him with an automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant
was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
imprudence and was sentenced to one year and one day
imprisonment. He was prosecuted in conformity with Act No.
2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.
Issue:
If Act 2886 is unconstitutional and does the Philippine
Legislature have power to pass laws.
Ruling:
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not
incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the
hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public
statutory law.
This power of the States of the North American Union was also
granted to its territories such as the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over
the territories and possessions of the United States may be
exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more often the case,
it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a legislature, the
organization of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in
the several States or in Congress, which is often taken as a
model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic Act; but
within the scope of such act is has complete authority to
legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within
the police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
Limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the
complaint in criminal matters, it is within the power of the
Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as
of the nature of the accusation is not violated.
The Court holds that the provisions of sections 2 of General
Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of
the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the
said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any
constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not commit
any of the errors assigned.
The sentence was therefore affirmed.
Gonzales vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006
Facts:
The Magdalo Group led by Antonio Trillanes IV stormed
Oakwood Premier Luxury Homes in Ayala and planted
explosives on the premises demanding that President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo & other corrupt AFP officials should
resign from their posts. After some peace talks, the
mutineers surrendered and returned to their barracks.
The Chief Prosecutor of the DOJ recommended the filing of
coup d’etat​ charges against the mutineers.
Meanwhile pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War,
respondent Gen. Narciso Abaya, ordered the arrest and
detention of the soldiers and directed the AFP to conduct its
own separate investigation.
The petitioners maintained that since the RTC had already
made a determination in its order, therefore the offense for
the violation of Article 63, 64, 67, 96, 97 of the Articles of
War as stressed by Gen. Abaya is not service connected but
is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the Military Tribunal
cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Military Tribunal may assume jurisdiction
over those who have been criminally charged of ​coup d’etat​?
Ruling:
Yes, In view of the clear mandate of Ra 7055, the RTC
cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction
over those charged with violations of Article 63 (Disrespect
Toward the President etc.) 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior
Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the
Articles of War as these are specifically included as
“service-connected offenses or crimes” under Section 1
thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military
courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.
Topic: Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code
US vs. H.N. Bull GR No. 5270 January 15, 1910
Facts:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a
violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of
Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to
this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends:
(1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial
court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3)
that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of
the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the
facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to
support the conviction. HN Bull was travelling with cattles and did
not observe proper care for the animals.
Issue:
Act 55 as passed by the Philippine Congress was deemed
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is
granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. The
general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain
subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the
restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred
upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of
legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain
other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as
enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and
ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen.
of U. S., April 16, 1908.) Therefore, Act 55 is not
unconstitutional.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and
judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Topic: Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code
People vs Wong Cheng GR No. L-18924
Facts:
Wong Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium,
aboard the merchant vessel while the said vessel was anchored
in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Issue:
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have
jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
Ruling:
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in
connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule,
according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless
their commission affects the peace and security of the territory;
and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in
the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of
this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction,
because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in
the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the United States.
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a
foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to
protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in
such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the
public order here established, because it causes such drug to
produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in
enacting the aforesaid repressive statute
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in
accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
Topic: Article 2
People vs Look Chaw GR No 5887
Facts:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, stated that he “carried, kept, possessed
and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of
opium,” and that “he had been surprised in the act of selling
1,000 pesos worth prepared opium.”
Issue:
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds
that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts
concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the
conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of
the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the
considerable amount of opium seized.
Ruling:
The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the
crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of
Cebu.
The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations
made therein by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere
possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of
the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of
the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
crime, only the court established in that said place itself had
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to
six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other
respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.
US vs Ah Sing GR No. 13005 October 10, 1917
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of
section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him
to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a
subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship ​Shun
Chang​. The ​Shun Chang ​is a foreign steamer which arrived at
the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the
port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in
Saigon, brought them on board the steamship ​Shun Chang​, and
had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25,
1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of
opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of
the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the
owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He
did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium.
He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or
indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import
illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.
Issue:
Whether Philippines has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of
the views just quoted, we return to an examination of the
applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of
Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or
bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import"
and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the
United States have held that the mere act of going into a port,
without breaking bulk, is prima facie ​evidence of importation.
(The ​Mary ​[U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the
importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom
house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the
importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S.
vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots ​vs. U. S.,
19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly
hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person's control on a vessel which has come
direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits
of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal
importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or
the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it
would be absorb to think that the accused was merely carrying
opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere
pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive
that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his
personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical
deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought
into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was
illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the
Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding,
let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign
vessels in transit, a situation not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the
trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that
the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 159615
Facts:
In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a
non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons
of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might
be brought against them in international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be
struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without
force and effect.
Issue:
[1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in concluding the RP-US Non Surrender
Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?
[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the
concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate?
Ruling:
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it
differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each
other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.
According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to
“be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the
primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes
committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory
states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference
between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is
only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines which is only a signatory
to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification
by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any
argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the
treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the
Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the
primacy of international agreements entered into between
States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the
Rome Statute.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our
history, we have entered executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the
settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been
seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such
concurrence. As the President wields vast power and influence,
her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan
would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the President to
enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been
confirmed by long practice​. DISMISSED.
REPUBLIC V. JUDGE EUGENIO G.R. NO. 174629, 14
FEBRUARY 2008
FACTS: ​After the Agan v. PIATCO ruling, a series of
investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to
PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the
Compliance and Investigation Staff (“CIS”) of the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (“AMLC”). The OSG wrote AMLC requesting
AMLC’s assistance “in obtaining more evidence to completely
reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3
Project,” and also noting that the Republic was presently
defending itself in two international arbitration cases. The CIS
conducted an intelligence database search on the financial
transactions of certain individuals involved in the award,
including Alvarez (Chairman of the Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Technical Committee). By this time, Alvarez had already
been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(J)
of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.1 The search
revealed that Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6
different banks The AMLC issued a resolution authorizing its
Executive Director to sign and verify an application to inquire into
the deposits or investments of Alvarez et al. and to authorize the
AMLC Secretariat to conduct an inquiry once the RTC grants the
application. The rationale for the resolution was founded on the
findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred from a Hong
Kong bank account to bank accounts in the Philippines
maintained by respondents. The Resolution also noted that by
awarding the contract to PIATCO (despite its lack of financial
capacity) Alvarez violated Section 3(E) of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.2 The MAKATI RTC rendered an Order
granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the
subject bank accounts of Alvarez et al. In response to a letter of
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, AMLC issued a Resolution
authorizing its Executive Director to inquire into and examine the
accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved
in the nullified contract. AMLC filed an application before the
MANILA RTC to inquire into the accounts alleged as 1 Sec. 3.
Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (j) Knowingly approving
or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any
person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license,
permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or
dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. 2 (e) Causing
any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. having been used to facilitate corruption in the
NAIA 3 Project. The ex parte application was granted and the
MANILA RTC issued a bank inquiry order. Alvarez alleged that
he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which was
issued following an ex parte application, and he argued that
nothing in the AntiMoney Laundering Act (“AMLA”) authorized
the AMLC to seek the authority to inquire into bank accounts ex
parte. After several motions, manifestations, orders and
resolutions the case went up to the SC. Alvarez et al.’s position:
The AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive
effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or
investments opened prior to the effectivity of the AMLA (17
October 2001). The subject bank accounts, opened in 1989 to
1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order without
violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws.3
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto
laws applies to Section 11 of the AMLA (a provision which does
not provide a penal sanction BUT which merely authorizes the
inspection of suspect accounts and deposits).
HELD: ​YES. It is clear that no person may be prosecuted under
the PENAL provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to
the enactment of the law (17 October 2001). With respect to the
AUTHORITY TO INSPECT, it should be noted that an ex post
facto law is one that (among others) deprives a person accused
of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. PRIOR to the AMLA: (1)
The fact that bank accounts were involved in activities later on
enumerated in the law did not, by itself, remove such accounts
from the shelter of absolute confidentiality. (2) In order that bank
accounts could be examined, there was need to secure either
the written permission of the depositor OR a court order
authorizing such examination, assuming that they were involved
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a
case where the money deposited or invested was itself the
subject matter of the litigation. 3 Please read the original for the
other issues aside from Art. 3, §22. 4 Section 11. Authority to
inquire into Bank Deposits. – Notwithstanding the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended; Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC
may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment
with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon
order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act
when it has been established that there is probable cause that
the deposits or investments involved are in any way related to a
money laundering offense: Provided, That this provision shall not
apply to deposits and investments made prior to the effectivity of
this Act. The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the
rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful
protection to the account holder. The application of the bank
inquiry order as a means of inquiring into transactions entered
into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally
infirm, offensive as to the ex post facto clause.
NEVERTHELESS, the argument that the prohibition against ex
post facto laws goes as far as to prohibit any inquiry into
deposits in bank accounts OPENED prior to the effectivity of the
AMLA even if the TRANSACTIONS were entered into when the
law had already taken effect cannot be sustained. This argument
will create a loophole in the AMLA that would result to further
money laundering. It is hard to presume that Congress intended
to enact a self-defeating law in the first place, and the courts are
inhibited from such a construction by the cardinal rule that “a law
should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than
destroying it.”
Vergara vs. People, GR No. 160328
February 4, 2005
FACTS:
The facts show that on June 13, 1988, Livelihood Corporation
(LIVECOR) granted Perpetual Garments Corporation
(PERPETUAL) a continuing credit line in the amount of
P750,000.00. The parties agreed that for each availment from
the line, PERPETUAL would execute a promissory note and
issue post-dated checks corresponding to the amount of the
loan. Petitioner, in her capacity as Vice President and General
Manager of PERPETUAL, signed the credit agreement and all
the postdated checks.
One of the checks issued and signed by petitioner was Check
No. 019972 for P150,000.00. When deposited on December 15,
1988, the check was dishonored for insuffiency of funds. On the
same month, LIVECOR verbally informed petitioner of the
dishonor of the check.
The prosecution claims that petitioner failed to pay the full
amount of Check No. 019972 or to make arrangements for its full
payment within 5 days from notice of dishonor thereof in
December 1988. Although petitioner made cash and check
payments after the dishonor, the same were treated by
LIVECOR as continuing payments of the outstanding loan. The
payments were applied first to the interests and penalties while
the rest were applied to the principal, pursuant to the terms of
the agreement. As of February 29, 1992, PERPETUAL's total
outstanding loan is P610,656.95.
Petitioner averred that she cannot be charged with violation of
BP 22 because she replaced Check No. 019972 on May 25,
1989, with 6 checks, each for P25,000.00 or for the total amount
of P150,000.00.[8] She claimed that from the time of dishonor up
to March 1992, PERPETUAL paid LIVECOR P542,000.00 thus
covering the full amount of the dishonored check.
ISSUE:
Should the defendant be held guilty for violating BP 22? What is
the equipoise doctrine?
HELD:
No​. ​Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The
equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is
found lacking.
In the case at bar, the constitutional presumption of innocence
tilts the scales in favor of petitioner considering that the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving the
evidentiary facts that would establish the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. In
criminal cases, the prosecution's cases must rise and fall on the
strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness of the
defense.
People vs. Valdez, et. al., GR Nos. 216007-09
December 8, 2015
FACTS:
Valdez was charged with 8 cases four of which were for Violation
of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining
half were for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Official Documents under Articles 217 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the RPC.
Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in 3 cases, Valdez, caused
the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and
to Fix the Amount of Bail. She argued that the 3 cases are
bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying
circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged
from 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying
Article 48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is 20 years, which
is the maximum of the medium period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused indicted for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
RULING:
Yes. The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. When there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal
laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. Since penal
laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must
determine whether their application is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law.
For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents that involves an amount in excess of
P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a summary
hearing on bail application is, therefore, unnecessary. Consistent
with Miranda v. Tuliao, an affirmative relief may be obtained from
the court despite the accused being still at-large. Except in
petition for bail, custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs sought by the defendant (such as a motion
to set aside no bail recommendation and to fix the amount of bail
in this case) where the mere application therefor constitutes a
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

ARTICLE 3-FELONIES
People vs Gonzales ​G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
Facts:
1 Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
In a decision ​ d​ ated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio
Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except
Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at
large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of ​reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of
P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and
2 Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but
to pay the costs." ​ The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44,
landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Custodio Gonzales was the only appellant in this case.
Issue:
Whether Custudio Gonzales has criminal liability. When can a
person incur criminal liability?
Ruling:
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant
of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police
authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the
36
Ajuy police force in his sworn statements ​ even gave the date
of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover,
37
the sketch ​ he made of the scene is of little help. While
indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their
locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however
no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for
the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions
proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood
stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to
which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense
puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales
spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the
couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And
this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the
claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other
hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed
in the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that
place would have been more than in any other place.
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and
specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the
trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize
the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the
prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph
2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under
paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing
did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment
imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal
liability is incurred.
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is
through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are
committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies (delitos).
also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent;
and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be
an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable
under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or
the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts
both found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as
to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that
"act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be
understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some
40
effect in the external world." ​ In this instance, there must
therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which
would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that
produced his death. This was not established by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. Costs ​de oficio.​
Topic : Article 3
People vs Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza GR No. L-
35748
Facts:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting
them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The
former as principal by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen
years, eight months, and one day of ​cadena temporal​, in
accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the
latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day
of​presidio mayor​; and both are further sentenced to the
accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose
houses were destroyed by the fire, jointly and severally, the
amount set forth in the information, with costs.
Issue:
Whether Romana Silvestre is criminally liable just because she
remained silent and did not report the crime?
Ruling:
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so
hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of another's
crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without
evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the
cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for
complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or
with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring
to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are
people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the
time, which results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of
arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal
Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as
follows: It is affirmed with reference to the accused-appellant
Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the
accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted
with
one-half of the costs ​de oficio​. So ordered.
Topic: Mistake of Fact vs Mistake of Law
Diego vs Castillo
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against Judge Castillo
for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a
criminal case and rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the
law. Lucena Escoto was acquitted of the crime of bigamy, she
contracted a second marriage after filing a divorce in the state of
Texas for her first marriage. The decision states that the main
basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused.
Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused
that she acted without any malicious intent. The combined
testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed
at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had
sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge
de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and
that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with
Manuel P. Diego.
In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned,
thus:
While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond
between Jorge de Perio and the accused are not yet annulled, it
remains undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in
th
the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247​ Judicial
District, effective February 15, 1978.
Issue:
Can Lucena Escoto be excused because of the misinterpretation
of the law? Is this case a mistake of fact or a mistake of law?
Ruling:
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: “That the
accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she
was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake
of fact.”
[4]
This Court, in ​People v. Bitdu,​ ​ carefully distinguished
between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the
defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law,
which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from
liability. ​Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had obtained a
divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that
in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any
violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same
does not justify her act. This Court further stated therein that
with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good
faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had
been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say
that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does
[5]
not exempt him from the consequences thereof.​
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for
[6]
bigamy, is ​People v. Schneckenburger​, where it was held that
the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried
in thePhilippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid,
is liable for bigamy.
These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is
whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross
ignorance of the law.
WHEREFORE​, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q.
Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Yapyuco vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay
Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy.
Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense
Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping
one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting
surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to
their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack
the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green
Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and
inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal
on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and
immediate death of the latter.
On the same day, and with the same intent to take life and
attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G.
Calma and Raul V. Panlican also, Noel C. Villanueva boarded on
the same colored green Toyota Tamaraw by using firing
weapons; although three are all same criminal cases, they were
filed directly to the above-named accused. The criminal cases
numbers; 16613 and 16614.
Yapyuco who was then allegedly adversed entered
individual pleas of not guilty. A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise
entered a negative plea.
Issue:
1) Whether or not Yapyuco and his men and the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right.
2) Whether or not they had deliberately ambushed the victims
with the intent of killing them.
Ruling:
With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno,
Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in
the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup
(instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and
of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva
(instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No.
16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of
them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613
in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty
or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in
the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right
or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is
the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The justification is
based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the
part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it
was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.
People vs Bindoy G.R. L- 34665
Facts:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of
reclusion temporal​, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the
costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide,
according to the following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of
Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with
his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon
the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused
his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the
Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and
his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in
finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting
him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a
disturbance arose in a ​tuba wineshop in the barrio market of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, started by some of the ​tuba​drinkers. There were
Faustino Pacas (​alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One
Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some ​tuba to Pacas'
wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an
interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from
Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which
attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his
family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what
was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the
bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the
latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such
violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's
chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
Issue:
Whether Bindoy is criminally liable when there is no intent to kill
Emigdio Omamdam.
Ruling:
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show
that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo
on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free
himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from
him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is
no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the
intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the
defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of
doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to
answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a
misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the
Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the
defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually
struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter
let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his
left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up,
who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him,
because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness
adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and
asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of
this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife
when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This
wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It
was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not
contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind,
which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution
of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in
United States ​vs.​ Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of
provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of
definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the
motives which actuated the commission of a crime
under investigation.
 In many criminal cases one of the most important aids
in completing the proof of the commission of the crime
by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold,
that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8,
No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted
with costs ​de oficio.​ So ordered.
ARTICLE 4
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Injurious Result is greater than that intended- praetor
intentionem
People VS. Cagoco, 58 PHIL 524
Facts::
About 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee,
father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk. Yu Lon was
standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the
street. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth
behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to
take leave of his father, approached Yu Lon from behind and
suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back
part of the head. Yu Lon fell backwards. His head struck the
asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk.
His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued but then
lost sight of him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung,
who were walking by, saw the incident and joined him in the
pursuit of Yu Lon’s assailant. The wounded man was taken to
the Philippine General Hospital, where he died about midnight. A
post-mortem examination was made the next day by Dr.
Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had sustained
a lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the occipital region,
and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage; that he had
tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and a tumor in
the left kidney.
Issue:
Is the accused liable for the death of the victim, although he had
no intent to kill?
Ruling:
Yes.In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the
appellant if guilty at all, should be punished for slight physical
injuries only instead of murder. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but in
order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different
from that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that
the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony
was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
offender.
In the Brobst case, ​supra,​ it was held that death may result from
a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region,
notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of
violence; that where death result as the direct consequence of
the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or
weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his
death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal
responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these
Islands, from criminal liability for the natural consequences of
one’s illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to
produce such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of
intention, while it does not exempt from criminal liability, is taken
into consideration as an extenuating circumstance. (U.S. vs.
Luciano, 2 Phil. 96.) The reasoning of the decisions cited is
applicable to the case at bar. There can be no reasonable doubt
as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to
indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly
the direct consequence of defendants felonious act, and the fact
that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does
not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is
merely a mitigating circumstance (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil.
22).
US vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil 22
August 17,1912
FACTS:
Rosalino Rodriguez is charged with having dealt Marciano
Magno two blows with the fist, one on the left side toward the
stomach and the other on the back, which knocked him down.
He got up by the assistance of two witnesses who were present
at the time of the occurrence and by their aid endeavored to
return to his home, which he did not reach, for the reason that,
having gone a distance of twenty brazas from the place, he
again fell to the ground, this time dead.
Two witnesses testified to having seen the defendant strike
those two blows.
The following were offered by the defendant as defenses:
(1)The testimony of his daughter and two other witnesses;
(2)the fact that his right hand was disabled; and (3) the medical
certificate issued by a physician as a result of the autopsy.
The defendant’s daughter averred that it was she who struck
Marciano Magno the blow with the fist, for the reason that the
deceased had caught hold of her hand with unchaste designs,
and testified that her father arrived after Magno had fallen to the
ground, which testimony was supported by two witnesses.
ISSUE:
Can the accused be held for the death of the victim?
RULING:
Yes. A blow with the fist or a kick, though causing no external
wound, may very well produced inflammation of the spleen and
peritonitis and cause death; and although the assaulted party
was previously affected by some internal malady, if, because of
a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened,
beyond peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced
the cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary and
unlawfully inflicted injury.
People vs.Gregorio Reyes 61 Phil. 341
March 29, 1935
FACTS:
Previous to the crime, the deceased for a couple of weeks had
been living with appellant, but her parents had persuaded her to
come home and were demanding that appellant pay a dowry of
P30 before the date of the celebration of the marriage could be
fixed.
That evening there had been a barrio procession, and after the
procession, they were gathered in one of the houses, where an
impromptu dance took place. The deceased and appellant were
talking in the yard of the house where the dance was taking
place, and she informed him that she could not return to him and
that she was going with her parents to Catanduanes. Appellant
dragged the deceased towards the street and stabbed her in the
chest with a fanknife. Deceased ran to the house of the barrio
lieutenant, a short distance away, falling dead at the foot of the
staircase, although the wound was only a slight one, it not having
penetrated the thoracic cavity, having hit a bone.
Immediately Andres Tapil, Tomas and Rufino, relatives of the
deceased, attempted to seize the appellant, but with the aid of
his knife, he escaped and ran from the scene of the affray.
Appellant as witness in his own behalf claimed that he was
attacked by the three relatives of the deceased, and if deceased
was wounded by him, it was in the midst of that affray and purely
accidental on his part.
ISSUE:
Can the defendant be held liable for homicide even if the wound
inflicted was a superficial wound of no intrinsic magnitude & that
the victim died as a result of shock?
RULING:
Yes. A person is responsible for the consequences of his
criminal act and even if the deceased had been shown to be
suffering from a diseased heart (which was not shown),
appellant's assault being the proximate cause of death, he would
be responsible, (U. S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96; U. S. vs. Lugo and
Lugo, 8 Phil., 80; U. S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U. S. vs.
Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22.)
The trial court appreciated the mitigating circumstances that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed and that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of
the offended party immediately preceded the act.
We have repeatedly held that when a person stabs another with
a lethal weapon such as a fan knife upon a part of the body, for
example, the head, chest, or stomach, death could reasonably
be anticipated, and the accused, must be presumed to have
intended the natural consequences of his wrongful act. The
means employed contradict the claim that appellant had lack of
intention to commit the crime of homicide.
PEOPLE VS NATALIO ILLUSTRE GR NO L 32076
Facts:
That on or about June 24, 1929, in the municipality of Balayan,
Province of Batangas, Philippine Islands, the above-named
defendant willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously dealt Juan
Magsino a blow with his closed fist in the right hypochondriac
region, bruising his liver and producing an internal hemorrhage
resulting in the death of said Juan Magsino.
Issue:
The victim already suffered tuberculosis and the question is
whether this affects the defendant’s criminal liability.
Ruling:
Doctors Ilagan, Agoncillo, and Roxas agree, with this exception,
that while the first two who performed the autopsy on the body,
with their own eyes saw the result thereof, the latter, that is,
Doctor Roxas, simply considered the data hypothetically. We are
therefore convinced there is no fundamental disagreement
among the medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim’s
death; and that is was caused by the defendant’s blow on the
deceased right hypochondrium, which bruised the liver and
produced an internal hemorrhage.
The appellant denies having hit Magsino, protesting that he had
no motive for doing so; but the evidence shows that he punched
Magsino in the abdomen a little to the right, felling him to the
ground.
The fact that the deceased had a delicate constitution and
suffered from incipient pulmonary tuberculosis does not affect
the defendant’s criminal liability, for eve if it rendered the blow
more fatal, the efficient cause of the death remains the same. (U.
S. vs. Fenix, 11 Phil. 95) And the circumstance that the
defendant did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the
victim does not exempt him from criminal liability, since he
deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, but simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with article 9, No. 3, of the
Penal Code. (U. S. vs. Samea, 15 Phil. 227.)
The instant case comes under the provision of article 404 of the
Penal Code providing the penalty of​reclusion temporal,​ which
must be imposed in its minimum degree in view of the mitigating
circumstance just mentioned, or twelve years and one day,
reclusion temporal.​ Therefore, the judgment appealed from must
be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.1 So
ordered.
US VS. MARASIGAN, 27 PHIL 181
August 15, 1914
FACTS: A fight ensued between the accused-appellant,
Filomeno Marasigan and one Francisco Mendoza. As a result of
the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and
one in the left hand, the latter being the most serious. The middle
finger of the left hand was rendered useless. The accused
asserts that he should have a new trial upon the ground that if he
should be given another opportunity to present evidence he
would be able to show by a physician, Gregorio Limjoco, that the
finger which the court found to have been rendered useless by
the cut already described was not necessarily a useless
member, inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical
operation, the finger could be restored to its normal condition. He
also asserts that he could demonstrate, by the physician referred
to, that it was not the middle finger that was disabled but the third
finger instead.
ISSUE:
Is the offended party obliged to undergo a surgical operation to
relieve the accused from the natural & ordinary results of his
crime?
HELD: We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant
a new trial. It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether
the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the
middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers
of the left hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused.
It does not matter which finger it was.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the
original condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical
operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary
results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled
Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting
therefrom without aid from Mendoza.
People vs. MOLDES, GR NO. 42122
December 1, 1934
FACTS: There was a dance in a private house, and the
deceased was the master of ceremonies at that dance. The
appellant insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by
the deceased. Appellant then went to the porch of the house and
with his ​bolo began cutting down the decorations. He descended
into the yard of the house and challenged everyone to a fight.
Not attracting sufficient attention, he began chopping at the
bamboo trees and repeated his challenged for a fight. The
deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him in
a friendly manner, and as deceased had about reached the
ground, appellant struck at him with his ​bolo​, inflicting a wound
on his left arm. As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted
a slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene of
action. The wound was seen and treated the next morning by the
sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in the
care of a local “curandero.” This treatment failed to stop the
hemorrhage, and the deceased died.
ISSUE:
Was the cause of the death of the deceased by reason of
erroneous or unskillful medical surgery or surgical treatment?
HELD​: No. The cause of the death of the victim was through the
bolo wounds that were inflicted upon him. Every person is to be
held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a
deadly weapon in such manner as to put life in jeopardy, and
death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act,
it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that
other causes co-operated in producing the fatal result.
The general rule is “… that he who inflicts the injury is not
relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that
is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the
immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful
medical or surgical treatment … .”
​IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
PP VS. DOMASIAN, GR NO. 95322
FACTS: In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was
walking with a classmate, he was approached by a man who
requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a
medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man
in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the
man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became
apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to
the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside,
holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying
or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at
Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for the
municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here
the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope
addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then
boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still
firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused the
suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man
about his relationship with the boy. The man said he and the boy
were brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the
physical differences between the two and the wide gap between
their ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two
barangay ​tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle.
Grate and the ​tanods went after the two and saw the man
dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the
man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers might behead them.
Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind.
Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met
his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and
already looking for him. ​2
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's
return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note.
The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and
warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the
handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some
records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which
referred it to the NBI for examination. ​3
The test showed that it had been written by Dr. Samson Tan. ​4
On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the
police station so he could identify the man who had detained
him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the
sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he
says is not punishable. His reason is that the second paragraph
of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act which
would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the
crime alleged is not against persons or property but against
liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said provision.
HELD: Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraph of the same
article, which clearly applies to him, thus: Criminal liability shall
be incurred: By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been
committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective
means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the
victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.
The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only
of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of
Article 267 although this too would not have been possible under
the new Constitution.
INTOD VS. PP, GR NO. 103119
FACTS: Petitioner together with other men, all armed with
firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at bedroom of
Palangpangan. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law
and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired
the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted
murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed ​in toto the trial court's
decision. This petition questions the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding
that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks
from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him
liable only for an impossible crime,
HELD: Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised
Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal
Code where: it was necessary that the execution of the act has
been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should
have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in
order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the
result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible.
So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the
courts did not hold him criminally liable.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot
produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the offense cannot be
produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility
of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1)
the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical
act, (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already
dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual
impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in
the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty. The case at bar belongs to
this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in
said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
In the United States, where the offense sought to be committed
is factuallyor physically impossible of accomplishment, the
offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of
an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements
of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is
penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to
commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally
impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for
any crime — neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime.
The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such
thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes
impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible
crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by
itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is
found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. ​Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.​
The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
PP VS. ENOJA, GR NO. 102596
FACTS: The five appellants here, all farmers and residents of
Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, are related to each other.
The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of
the "New People's Army" (NPA). The provincial fiscal filed an
nformation for murder against herein appellants and their three
companions who remained at-large. They were arraigned and
entered pleas of not guilty. The trial court rendered a decision
finding appellants herein guilty as charged. The trial court did not
give credence to the claim of self-defense and found conspiracy
in committing the crime. The appellants filed this appeal before
the Supreme Court. DIET
In this case, circumstances indubitably showed that appellants
acted concertedly to kill Siegfred. Here, the Supreme Court
found that the trial court did not err in finding that conspiracy was
present in this case. Both the victim and the assailant knew each
other and the victim gave no provocation in the attack. Clearly
the qualifying circumstance was present in this case. The
defense of alibi did not prosper when the appellants failed to
prove the physical impossibility of their presence at the crime
scene at the time of its commission. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court was affirmed with modification that the award of
actual damages was deleted.
As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that
even assuming they participated in the killing of Siegfred, they
should only be held liable for the commission of an impossible
crime under Article 4, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
penalized under Article 59 thereof. Appellants theorize that the
shots fired by Armada already resulted in the death of the victim,
and hence, their subsequent shooting of the victim merely
constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already dead
person. The proposition not only completely contradicts their
defense of alibi and denial, it is also speculative as to cause of
death. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with
alibi.
Doctrine of Proximate Cause
VDA BATACLAN VS. MEDINA, 102 Phil 181
FACTS: There were about eighteen passengers, including the
driver and conductor. While the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the
right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to
be helped or pulled out, while four passengers could not get out
of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men,
one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick
on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak,
spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by
one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
HELD: There is no question that under the circumstances, the
defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree.
The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan and the other trapped passengers was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.
We disagree. Proximate Cause has been defined as 'that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.' It may be that
ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some
event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set
on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the
vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one
might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the
fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present
case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of
the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only
on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming
of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for
help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by
the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it
was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more
natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to
be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in
part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is
driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and
the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or
at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed
even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
URBANO VS. PP, GR NO. 182750
FACTS: The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) having just
arrived from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon,
Pangasinan, where, they drunk beer in a restaurant with some
other co-workers While inside the compound, the two had a
heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled
insulting remarks at petitioner. The exchange of words led to an
exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to
be pacified and continued throwing fist blows at each other. Then
petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by eyewitness
Orje Salazar, on Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple
down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on the
ground had their companions not caught him and prevented the
fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and
rendered him unconscious. The deceased told his wife of the
mauling incident. Thereafter, the deceased was still able to go to
work however, his complaints to his wife of severe pain in the
head, prompted him to be admitted at the community hospital.
Finally, Tomelden died on October 10, 1993 due, per Dr.
Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral
concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling
incident."
The defense presented petitioner who denied having any
intention to kill, asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden
was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s
death.Moreover, the Tomelden only died 12 days later after the
incident and was still able to report to work engenders doubt on
the proximate cause of victim’s death. Petitioner, thus, contends
that he could only be adjudged guilty of physical injuries.
HELD: The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about
petitioner’s lucky punch hitting Tomelden right smack on the
face. And even if Tomelden’s head did not hit the ground as his
co-workers averted that actuality, that punch gave him a
bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious right after the
September 28, 1993 fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and
out of the hospital complaining of headache, among other pains,
until his demise 12 days after the blow was made. Significantly,
Dr. Arellano opined that the fist blow which landed on
Tomelden’s head could have shaken his brain which caused the
cerebral concussion; and that the cause of the victim’s death
was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion
with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident." The
combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano,
buttressed by that of Rosario who related about her husband’s
post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly establish
beyond cavil the cause of Tomelden’s death and who was liable
for it. It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution
witnesses of the events that transpired during the fisticuff
incident more specifically the landing of the "lucky punch" on the
face of [Tomelden], taken together with the result of the medical
examinations and autopsy report which described the death of
the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral
concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling
incident" that we are convinced that the "lucky punch" was the
proximate cause of [Tomelden’s] death. The prosecution had
satisfactorily proven that it was only after the incident that
transpired on September 28, 1993 that the victim was
hospitalized on several occasions until he expired, twelve days
later. It is moreover of no consequence whether the victim was
able to report for work during the intervening days
SEGURITAN VS. PP, G.R. NO. 172896
FACTS: Petitioner was having a drinking session with his uncles
Lucrecio Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor Panis and Baltazar Panis
in the house of Manuel dela Cruz in Barangay Paradise,
Gonzaga, Cagayan. Petitioner, who was seated beside Lucrecio,
claimed that Lucrecio’s carabao entered his farm and destroyed
his crops. A heated discussion thereafter ensued, during which
petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was about to
stand up. Petitioner’s punches landed on Lucrecio’s right and left
temple, causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow
block which was being used as an improvised stove.
Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with the assistance
of Baltazar. Thereafter, Lucrecio rode a tricycle and proceeded
to his house. Upon his arrival, his wife noticed blood on his
forehead. Lucrecio explained that he was stoned, then went
directly to his room and slept.
At around 9 o’clock in the evening, Lucrecio’s wife and daughter
noticed that his complexion has darkened and foamy substance
was coming out of his mouth. Attempts were made to revive
Lucrecio but to no avail. He died that same night.
NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido exhumed
Lucrecio’s body and performed the autopsy. Dr. Vertido
concluded that Lucrecio’s cause of death was traumatic head
7 Moreover, there was no clear evidence connecting the act of
injury.​
HELD: Petitioner disputes the conclusion that the fracture on the
right middle fossa of the skull, beneath the area where a
hematoma developed was due to the blow he delivered because
according to the testimony of Dr. Vertido, the fracture may also
be caused by one falling from a height. Petitioner also maintains
that the punches he threw at Lucrecio had nothing to do with the
fatal head injuries the latter suffered. According to him, Lucrecio
sustained the head injuries when he accidentally hit the hollow
block that was used as an improvised stove, after falling from the
opposite end of the bench. Petitioner insists that Lucrecio died
due to a fatal heart attack.
We are not persuaded. It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two
external injuries and one internal injury in his head. The autopsy
report showed that Lucrecio died of internal hemorrhage caused
by head injuries. Melchor’s eyewitness account of the fist blows
delivered by petitioner to Lucrecio and the manner by which the
latter fell from the bench and hit his head on the improvised
stove is consistent with the autopsy findings prepared and
testified to by Dr. Vertido. The testimony of Dr. Vertido also ruled
out petitioner’s contention that Lucrecio died of a heart attack.
Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that Criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (​delito​)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. Petitioner committed an unlawful act by punching
Lucrecio, his uncle who was much older than him, and even if he
did not intend to cause the death of Lucrecio, he must be held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to the
above-quoted provision. He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused.
PP VS. RAFAEL MARCO, DEFENDANT APPELLANT, GR
NOS. L-28324-5
FACTS: Simeon Marco, son of appellant Rafael, approached
Constancio Sabelbero and after asking him if he were the one
who boxed his (Simeon's) brother the year before, brandished a
hunting knife, which caused Constancio to run away. While thus
running, he passed by appellant who hit him with a cane causing
him slight physical injuries. When Simeon was about to pursue
Constancio, the latter's father, Vicente, who was in the crowd,
grabbed Simeon's hand that was holding the knife. When
Vicente, however, saw that appellant, who was holding a round
cane and a hunting knife, was approaching them, he shouted to
Constancio and to his other son Bienvenido who appeared in the
scene to run away, which they did, as he himself released
Simeon and ran away. Appellant followed Bienvenido and
stabbed him, but the latter parried the blow which caused injuries
to his left hand. Bienvenido tried to run farther but his feet got
entangled with some vines and he fell down. Whereupon,
Beltran, who came from nowhere, stabbed him near the anus,
followed by Simeon who stabbed him on the left side of the
breast. Thereafter, Bienvenido died. On the theory that there was
obvious conspiracy among appellants Rafael, Simoen, and
Beltran, the trial court convicted them of murder. Only Rafael
appealed.
The Supreme Court ruled that the act of appellant stabbing the
victim which caused injuries to the latter's left hand is separate
from the fatal stabs inflicted by his two co-accused, because the
existence of bad blood between the families of the deceased and
the accused which could have established commonality of intent
on the part of the three accused was denied by both parties.
appellant in trying to stab the victim which caused the latter
injuries on the left hand, with the fatal stabs inflicted by his two
other co-accused.
HELD: Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent
under Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code​. "Article 4,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides that, 'criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.' U ​ nder this provision, one who commits an
intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which
may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not.
It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by the
appellant which caused a slight wound on the former's hand was
intentionally made; hence, felony. However, the ensuing death of
the decedent was not the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wound inflicted by the appellant. ​There was
an active intervening cause, which was no other than the sudden
and unexpected appearance and participation of Simeon Marco
and Dulcisimo Beltran. And there is authority that ​if the
consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the offender is not
responsible for such consequence.
PP VS. VILLACORTA, GR NO. 186412
FACTS: Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was
tending her ​sari-sari store located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan,
Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at
Mendeja’s store. At around two o’clock in the morning, while
Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly
appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left
side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The
bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately
after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase
but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her
store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo
stick from Cruz’s body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to
Tondo Medical Center.
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San
Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on
January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center,
where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought
to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died
the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he
did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to
determine, using Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz
died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
HELD: There is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that
in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should
only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound
he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is
the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.”
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in
the early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and
treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On
February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro
Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died
the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did
not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz
received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz
to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up
medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between
January 23 to February 14, 2002.
There are doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside
the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an
interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date
when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting
symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe
tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would
have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court
noted in ​Urbano​, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation
period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with
two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent
(100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s
stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent
infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of
Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was
stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.
Villacorta is guilty of slight physical for the stab wound he
inflicted upon Cruz.
ARTICLE 6
Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated Stages
ATTEMPTED STAGE
PP VS. LAMAHANG, GR NO. L-43530
FACTS: At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose
Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and CR
Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act
of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of
cheap goods located on the last named street. At the time the
owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another
Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one
board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed
him under custody.
HELD: There is no doubt in the case at bar it was the intention of
the accused to enter Tan Yu’s store by means of violence,
passing through the opening which he has started to make in the
wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the arrival of
policeman Tomambing did not develop beyond the first steps of
execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing
penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a
mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of
the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its
consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and
punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in
the case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by
means of force or violence another person’s dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown
that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the
purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another.
In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which
such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. The
fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery
but attempted trespass to dwelling.

Rivera vs People GR No. 16632
FACTS: The accused, all surnamed Rivera, attacked and
assaulted one Ruben Rudil, hitting him with a piece of hollow
block while the latter went to a nearby store to buy food together
with his daughter. People who saw the incident called for them to
stop. Policemen arrived in the scene prompting the three
accused to fled to their house. Ruben was rushed to the hospital
where the attending physician declared that the wounds
sustained by Ruben were slight and superficial and would heal in
about 7 days. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of
attempted murder. Accused, now petitioners, aver that the
prosecution had failed to prove that they had intention to kill
Ruben. They aver that based on the testimony of the attending
physician, the victim did not sustained a fatal wound.
HELD: As stated by the attending physician, appellants could
have killed the victim had the hollow block hit his head and had
the police not promptly intervened. When a wound is not
sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is
attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three
brothers helped each other maul the defenceless victim, and
even if he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them
proceeded to hit the victim with a hollow block had not the police
arrived. The accused commenced of the felony directly by overt
acts, but failed to perform all acts of execution which would
produce the crime of murder by reason of some causes other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, Ruben Rodil was
able to run away and the timely response of the policemen.
Furthermore, petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the
injury sustained by victim was superficial and thus not life
threatening. However, the nature of the injury does not negate
the intent to kill. An essential element of murder and homicide,
whether, consummated, frustrated or attempted, is intent of the
offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injury. Intent to kill is a specific intent which
the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence
while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of
a felony by dolo.
PEOPLE VS LIZADA GR NO 143468-71, JANUARY 24, 2003
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with four (4) counts of qualified
rape under four separate Information for raping his stepdaughter.
The words used in the complaints were:
First: “sometime in August 1998
Second: “on or about September 15, 1998”
Third: “on or about October 22, 1998”
Fourth: “on or about November 5, 1998”
A couple in Bohol had 3 children, one of them being Analia (born
1985). They separated and the wife left to settle in Manila, took
with her the kids, and worked as a waitress.
1994: Wife met Lizada and lived together. The wife put up a
video shop in the house and sold Avon products door to door.
When she was out, her kids tended to thevideo shop.
1996: By this year, Analia was about 11 yrs old. One night,
Lizada entered Analia’s room and removed her clothes, had
intercourse with her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone
what happened. This happened in less than an hour.This
happened again the following year.
And from 1996-98, Lizada sexually abused Analia twice a week.
1998: Lizada, wearing only shorts, entered Analia’s room. Analia
was not afraid because her younger brother was just around the
house. However, Lizada was still able to have intercourse with
her. The brother passed by Analia’s room and saw Lizada on top
of her. Lizada dismounted and berated the brother, told him to go
to his room and sleep.
4 days later, Analia was in the video shop when Lizada ordered
her to go to the sala. She refused because no one would tend to
the video shop. They fought.
When the mother arrived, she sided with Lizada which prompted
Analia to shout “Ayoko na, ayoko na.” Analia then left to retrieve
unreturned tapes.
When she got home, the mother asked her what she meant by
“ayoko na” so Analia told her that
Lizada had been touching her private parts.
They then went to the police and made a report.
She was examined by a doctor who found her hymen intact.
Later on, she also told her mother of the rapes. Analia then
executed a “Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla” and charged
Lizada with rape.
Issue:
Will Lizada be charged with attempted rape or act of
lasciviousness
Principles Applied:
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no
introduction of the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture
or within the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant.
Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally liable for
consummated rape.[36]
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not
accused-appellant is guilty of consummated acts of
lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as
amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence on record, we
believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and
not of acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.—Any person who shall commit
any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under
any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prision correccional.”
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.”
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
“1. The offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to
cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.”
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two
elements, namely:
“(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime
intended to be committed.”
Ruling:
In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby
found guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended in relation to Article 6 of the said Code
and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from six years
of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to ten
years of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
Accused-appellant
ARANETA VS CA JULY 30, 1990
Facts:
In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila,
6th Judicial District on May 14, 1973, Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y
Macute, herein petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza, also a
petitioner, Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago
were charged with murder for the death of one Manuel Esteban,
Jr. due to multiple gun shot wounds on March 23, 1972.
Issue:
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown
to have inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the
death of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his
co-accused?
Principles Applied:
The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a
slight wound which did not cause the death of the victim nor
materially contributed to it in order that he may be held liable for
18​
homicide. ​ His liability should therefore be limited to the slight
injury he caused. However, the fact that petitioner Araneta Jr.
inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to kill.
The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other
conclusion than that there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable
for the crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight
physical injury.
Ruling:
Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
without any other attendant circumstances, petitioner Araneta,
Jr. is imposed the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) months of
prision correccional.​ Although, he is still guilty of attempted
homicide.
BALEROS, JR. vs People, GR NO. 138033
FACTS​: About 1:50 in the morning of December 13, 1991 in
Manila, the accused Renato Baleros Jr., forcefully covered the
face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical with dizzying effects, and commenced the commission
of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal
knowledge with he but was unable to perform all acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against
her will and consent to her damage and prehudice. The
petitioner argues, however, that the above mentioned
information, does not allege the complained act of covering the
face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical
caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress and
disturbance.
HELD: Malice, compulsion, or restraint need not be alleged in an
information for unjust vexation. The paramount question (in a
prosecution for unjust vexation) is whether the offender’s act
causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to
the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That the victim,
after the incident, cried while relating to her classmates what she
perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case
for attempted rape proved beyond reasonable doubt that she
was disturbed, if not, distressed, by the acts of the petitioner.
FRUSTRATED STAGE
US VS. EDUAVE, GR NO L-12155
FACTS: The accused rushed upon the girl, suddenly an struck
her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo. A deadly
weapon was used. The motive of the crime was that the accused
was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore
charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped
her and causing her pregnancy.
HELD: The crime was frustrated, not attempted murder. A felony
is frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence, but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator. There is no intervention of a foreign
or extraneous cause between the beginning of the commission
of the act and the moment when all the acts have been
performed which would result in the consummate crime. In other
words, the subjective phase had been passed. In the case at
bar, the blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The
aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed and
threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up, he
declared that he had killed the complainant. Subjectively, the
crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was
passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not
consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was
necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a
consequence it was due to something beyond his control. In this
case, he thought he already killed the victim.
PP VS. DAGMAN, et al GR NO. L-23133
nd
FACTS: ​On the 2​ of May, 1924, Elias Magbual, was attacked
by a crowed of persons and was nearly killed. The motive of the
crime was that the persons who harbored enmity against
Magbual had previously been dispossessed of portions of the
land by judicial order. Magbual managed to escape death from
his tormentors by the use of feigning death.
HELD: The murder should be regarded as frustrated because
the offenders performed all acts of execution which should
precede the felony as consequence but which nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by Magbual.
There was an intent upon the part of the assailants to take the
life of the person attacked, which intent may be gathered from
the circumstances surrounding the attack; in this instance, the
nature of the wounds, the cry of the accused and their fingering
of the nose of Magbual to see if respiration continued. Deadly
weapons were used, blows were directed at the vital parts of the
body, the aggressors stated their purpose to kill and thought they
had killed. The subjective phase of the crime was entirely
passed, and subjectively speaking, the crime was complete. The
particular parts of the body of the person struck during the
assault, the deadly character of the weapons used, the violence
of the attack, and the accomplishment of the crime with alevosia,
classifies the crime as frustrated murder. And finally, the victim
did not die, was owing to a chance or accident or reason
independent of the criminal act performed.
ROGELIO ROQUE vs. PEOPLE
ROGELIO ROQUE vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Rogelio Roque was charged with the crime of
frustrated homicide. When arraigned on March 23, 2003,
petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”The prosecution averred that day
while brothers Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo
Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos
(Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz and
shouted to him to join them. At that instant, petitioner and his
wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo’s
shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and
cursed the former. Reynaldo apologized for the
misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving,
he warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would
happen to them if they continue to perturb him. Bothered,
Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao
to ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Then
Reynaldo just proceeded to petitioner’s house to follow Tayao
and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at
petitioner’s residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner
but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house
and when he came out, he was already holding a gun which he
suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner
then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the
nape. Fortunately, Reynaldo’s parents arrived and took him to a
local hospital for emergency medical treatment. He was later
transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila.
Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that
day, the petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a tricycle
to fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed by brothers
Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner
ignored the two and just went home. Later, however, the
brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives
against him. Petitioner requested Tayao tos top and pacify them
but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his gun.
Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice. On
March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 84, rendered its Decision2 finding petitioner
guilty as charged
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in
an Order4 dated August 16, 2007. Undaunted, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision dated
February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTC’s Decision,
Hence, the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration thereto was
likewise denied in a Resolution dated July 30, 2010. Hence, this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Courtwhere petitioner imputes upon the CA the following errors
all pertain to “appreciation of evidence” or factual errors.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SC can entertain petition for certiorari
wherein the issues imputed pertains to “appreciation of
evidence” or factual errors?
HELD:
NO. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of
the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a
criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for
review on certiorari. A petition for review on certiorari raises only
questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so
provides
VALENZUELA vs. Pp, GR NO. 160188
FACTS: Petitioner was seen outside the Super Sale Club within
the SM Complex by security guard, Lorenzo Lago. Petitioner was
seen unloading cased of Tide detergent with an accomplice.
Valenzuela then haled a taxi, loaded the detergent inside and
boarded the same. Lago proceeded to stop the taxi and asked
for the receipt of the merchandise. Petitioner and accomplice
was about to flee when Largo fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards. Valenzuela and accomplice was then
apprehended at the scene. The trial convicted the two with
consummated theft. Only Valenzuela appealed to the CA
asserting that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft. CA
affirmed decision of the trial court hence the present petition.
HELD: Valenzuela invoked the Diño and Flores cases. In both
cases, the accused were convicted of frustrated theft, of which it
was held “the fact determinative of consummation is the ability of
the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were
more or less momentary. Under Article 308 of the RPC, “Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons not force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent. Reading the Diño and Flores cases, the ability of the
offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a
constitutive element of the crime of theft defined under Article
308 of the RPC. In the present case, for the purpose of
ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the
frustrated stage, the question is, when is the crime of theft
produced? Theft is produced when there is the deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain.
Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of
the felony that the offender, once having committed all acts of
execution for theft, is able to unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has
already ensued from such acts of execution. Unlawful taking is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to dispose
of the same. Hence, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, it can
only be consummated or attempted.
ARTICLE 8
CONSPIRACY
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
PP VS. ALETA, ET AL, GR NO. 179708
Marcelo, Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all surnamed
Aleta was charged for the murder of Celestino Duldulao y Yadao
and Ferdinand Acob. All above-named accuse club with the use
of hard objects both the victims. The Court upholds the version
of the prosecution: While the deceased Acob’s mother, Marina,
went to the community center, she heard a commotion on the
yard of the appellants. Returning home, she told Acob of the
quarrel. Acob went to the appellants’ compound. Upon following
her son, Marina witnessed Rogelio striking Acob with a piece of
wood, causing the latter to fall. She thereafter saw Rogelio
striking Duldulao causing the latter’s eyes to pop out. Rogelio
then ran towards the family house whereupon Marina heard
gunshots. Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand continued to hit them.
When Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another piece of
wood and clubbed the victims.
Held: Conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or
more persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part of their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred. And where there is
conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.
PP VS. LOPEZ, REGALADO AND ARAGON GR NO. 177302
FACTS: Appellant Rogelio Regalado who was outside a tailoring
shop, called out to victim, Edencito Chu and prompted him to
come out of his mother’s bakery. Chu thereupon emerged from
the bakery, put his arms around Regalado’s shoulders and
asked forgiveness. Regalado however pushed his arms aside,
drew a curved knife and stabbed Chu on the left nipple. As Chu
ran towards Villaluz Street, Regalado chased him and picked up
two pieces of firewood along the way with which he hit Chu.
Appellant Jaime Lopez in the meantime surfaced from the back
of the tailoring shop and also joined the chase. Soon appellant
Aragon also surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and
joined the chase. The three caught up with Chu. Aragon boxed
Chu, causing the latter to fall. He then kicked the victim. Lopez
stabbed Chu several times as Regalado looked on. When Chu
was no longer moving, the three appellants left.
HELD: Appellants’ disclaimer of the presence of conspiracy fails.
The evidence shows that they cooperated in a common design
to kill Chu. Regalado initiated the killing when he stabbed Chu on
the chest, and the two other appellants joined Regalado in
chasing Chu, with Regalado hitting Chu with firewood along the
way. Then, when the three of them had cornered Chu, Aragon
boxed and kicked Chu enabling Lopez to stab him several times.
These indicates a conspiracy.
DIRECT PROOF OF CONSPIRACY IS NOT REQUIRED
PP vs. PABLO AMODIA, accused-appellant, GR NO. 17391
FACTS: Romildo Ceno testified that he along with two friends
were talking and watching television when he heard a noise
coming somewhere below the C-5 Bridge, located 40-50 meters
away from their house. He also heard somebody shouted “may
away doon.” Curious, he and Mario went to the bridge and saw
five persons whom he identified as the victim (Felix Olandria
Bergaño), Pablo Amodia, Arnold Partosa, George Palacio and
Damasio Amodia. He knew these men as they were neighbors.
Illuminated by light coming from a post, he saw the victim being
held in the right hand by Pablo, while the other hand was held by
Arnold. George was positioned at the victim’s back and clubbed
the victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and
stabbed him three times. Luther Caberte who happened to be
passing by the C-5 bridge at that time, also saw what happened.
He testified that he saw men fighting under the C-5 bridge which
was illuminated by a light from a lamppost. He saw Pablo,
Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up on the victim. He saw
Pablo holding the victim’s hand while Damaso was stabbing
him. He also affirmed that George was positioned behind the
victim. He personally knew both the victim and Pablo as they
have been neighbors. Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the
stabbing; Romildo was chased away by George and Damaso
while Luther went on home immediately.
The accused-appellant Pablo Amodia invoked the defense of
alibi. In his appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court and the CA
erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to his alibi. He
alternatively argues that granting that he was part of Damaso’s
group and that the group killed the victim, the prosecution failed
to establish the conspiracy among them. There was no evidence
adduced to establish how the incident that led to the stabbing
began.
HELD: As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the
failure of the prosecution’s evidence to establish the conspiracy
between him and his other co-accused to make him liable for
murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified by the
eyewitnesses, only relate to events during and not prior to the
assault and the stabbing of the victim. He argues that no
evidence was adduced to show that the accused all agreed to kill
the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It arises the very instant the plotters agrees, expressly
or impliedly, to commit a felony and forthwith decide to pursue it.
It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct
proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is
often resorted to in order to prove its existence. Absent of any
direct proof as in the present case, conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves,
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest. An accused participates as a
conspirator if he or she has performed some overt acts as a
direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Stated otherwise, it
is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement
and decision to commit the crime, it is sufficient that the
malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a
priot agreement of Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso, the
following chain of events however show their commonality of
purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused surrounded the
victims on all sides; Damaso at the front, George at the victim’s
rear; while Pablo and Arnold flanked the victim on each side;
second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim and
restrained his movement; while Arnold did the same to the left
arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victim’s head with a
piece of wood; and fourth. Damaso stabbed the victim three
times.
PP vs. LAGAT and PALALAY, GR No. 187044
FACTS: The accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of
Qualified Carnapping and the crime of Homicide for the killing of
one Jose Biag, owner of the tricycle which the
accused-appellants stole. Prosecution witness SPO2 Arthur
Salvador testified that he was on duty with other colleagues
when they received a report from one Jimmy Esteban that the
cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at the Alice Palay
Buying Station in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified
male persons. The police then proceeded to verify the report. At
the buying station they saw the tricycle described to them with
the cavans of palay and the two accused. They then brought the
two to the police station together with the tricycle and its
contents. Salvador then contended that when they unloaded the
contents of the tricycle, they saw bloodstains inside and outside
of the vehicle. They also found a wallet containing the tricycle’s
Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued by the LTO
in the name of Jose Biag. The accused voluntarily admitted that
the name in the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle whom
they killed and dumped along the Agadanan and Guillermo Road
when they carnapped the tricycle. Prosecution witness P02
Ignacio testified that the accused told the police that they rented
a tricyle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to
Angadanan. And upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife to
the driver and the driver ran away. They chased him and
stabbed him.
HELD: Circumstancial evidence is that evidence which proves a
fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Such evidence is founded on
experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and the proven facts and the
facts sought to be proved. Hence, to justify a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances
must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. An exhaustive examination
of the evidence presented show that the circumstantial evidence
when viewed as a whole establishes the guilt of Lagat and
Palalay beyond reasonable doubt:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle,
the same day that, together with its owner Biag, was reported
missing. Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay
buying station, with the stolen tricycle packed with the cavans of
palay allegedly stolen. Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then
on board the tricycle jumped and ran the moment they saw the
Alicia PNP approaching them. Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could
not explain to the police why they were in possession of Biag’s
tricycle. Fifth, Biags wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers
were found in the tricycle upon its inspection. Sixth, Biag’s body
bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy
done on him, while the tricycle had bloodstains.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the
conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order
to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two conspired is not
essential as it may be inferred from their conduct before, during,
and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a
common purpose and design. The pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution are consistent with one another and the only
rational proposition that can be drawn therefore is that the
accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
PP VS. MUIT, PANCHO JR., HERMANO, DEQUILLO,
PANCHO, AND FAERRER, GR NO. 181043
FACTS: Accused appellants were convicted with the crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and carnapping. Conviction
was established by the direct testimony of Faerrer and the
witnesses of the prosecution, Seraspe and Chavez. Faerrer
testified on how the group approached and convinced him to let
them use his house to keep the victim they planned to kidnap.
They planned the crime in Faerrer’s house and waited for the call
from Romeo to inform them when the victim was already at the
construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on
December 2,1997 informing them that the victim was already at
the construction site and so they went there to carry out their
plan. At the construction site, as testified by Seraspe and
Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group pointer their
guns at the victim and his companions and ordered them to lie
prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to the Pajero from
Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit
driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim
to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted. The
kidnappers refused to surrendered and engaged the police in a
shoot out in which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was
one of the two persons who survived the shoot out, but was
apprehended by the police. Pancho Jr. and Pancho Sr. learned
from the news that the group engaged the police in a shoot out
and most of them were killed and that Muit was arrested by the
police. After investigation, the police were able to apprehend
appellants Pancho Jr., Romeo and Dequillo who all took part in
the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the
investigation, Pancho Jr., Dequillo and Muit with the assistance
of their counsels and family members, executed extra-judicial
confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and
execution of the crimes. In their respective briefs, one of the
errors assigned by defendants to court is the finding of the RTC
that they acted in conspiracy in the commission of the crimes
against them.
HELD: Even though Pancho Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not
participate in the actual abduction of the victim, they should still
be held liable because of the existence of conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission
of a crime. Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality
or extent of the participation of each individual conspirator
becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all. The
degree of participation in the commission of the crime is
immaterial. The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven
through circumstantial evidence. The group thoroughly planned
the kidnapping in Faerrer’s house and patiently waited for the
day when the victim would be at the construction site and upon
victim’s arrival at the site, the group received a call from Romeo
so they proceeded to the construction and carried out their plan.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and
performed different roles to consummate their common plan. The
roles which Muit and his other companions played in the actual
abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was the
one who procured the guns used by the group. Pancho Jr.
served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the
group’s informant.
PP vs. AGACER, GR No. 177751
FACTS: Cesario was a farmer and owner of a ricefield. He was
then clearing a section of section of his farm and preparing the
beddings for the rice seedling intended for the coming planting
season. Farm laborers, were nearby in a separate section of the
same ricefield harvesting Cesario’s palay. According to
prosecution witnesses and farm laborers, Genesis and Roden, it
was at that moment while Cesario was tending to his farm that
appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana plantation
and surrounded Cesario. Intimidated, Cesarion retreated to
where the other farm laborers were working. However, Franklin
Agacer set fire to the rice straw which prompted the Cesarion to
return and save his seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric
started throwing stones at him. Thereafter, Florencio motioned
for Cesario to come closer upon which the latter did. Eric Agacer
then shot at Cesario. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took aim at
Cesario with his bow and arrow. Thereafter, a short firearm was
thrown from where appellants ran towards the direction of
Cesario’s body. Appellants immediately left the scene of the
crime. In their present appeal, appellants contend that the RTC
erred in finding that conspiracy existed among the appellants in
the killing of Cesario Agacer.
HELD "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it." ​In conspiracy, it is not necessary to adduce direct
evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It "may be
shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest." ​25 ​Proof of a previous agreement and decision to
commit the crime is not essential but the fact that the malefactors
acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among
appellants to commit the crime and while it was established
during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of all
appellants before, during and after the incident establish the
existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt.
First, all of them emerged at the same time from a banana
plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised Cesario by
immediately surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed at
the time of the incident. Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a
sack, Florencio was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a bow and
arrow, while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth,
Eric and Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments before the
shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario at close range
while the latter was approaching the group of appellants upon
being summoned by Florencio. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric
and Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot
Cesario, but did not do anything to stop or dissuade Eddie from
the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants
departed from the scene of the crime together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their
unanimity in design, intent and execution. ​27 ​They "performed
specific acts with closeness and coordination as to unmistakably
indicate a common purpose and design" ​to ensure the death of
Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts' finding that appellants
conspired to commit the crime of murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants' assertion that each of
them can only be made liable for his own acts deserves no merit.
Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the fatal
blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a
person may be convicted for the criminal act of another. ​29 ​In a
conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.
PP vs. MALIBIRAN, GR No. 178301
FACTS: Rolando "Botong" Malibiran and Beverly Tibo-Tan were
convicted of Murder and Parricide, respectively, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction
arose from the death of Reynaldo Tan on February 5, 1995. The
antecedents that led to Reynaldo's death, however, go way back
in the 70's when Reynaldo left his common-law wife, Rosalinda
Fuerzas and their two children, Jessie and Reynalin, in Davao,
and went to Manila to seek greener pastures. While in Manila,
Reynaldo met and had a relationship with appellant. They
eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant begot three
children — Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R. In 1984, Reynaldo's
and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their
relationship. This led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship
with appellant; and in 1991, Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal
house and started living again with Rosalinda, although
Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal ties with his
children. On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and
appellant were in Greenhills with their children for their usual
Sunday gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura restaurant,
the family separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to do
some shopping. Later, they regrouped and purchased groceries
at Unimart. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the family
stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the
parking lot to get his red Honda Accord, while the rest of his
family stayed behind and waited. Immediately thereafter, the
family heard an explosion coming from the direction where
Reynaldo parked his car. Appellant and Renevie got curious and
proceeded to the parking lot. There, they saw the Honda Accord
burning, with Reynaldo lying beside the driver's seat, burning,
charred and bleeding profusely. A taxi driver named Elmer Paug
(Elmer) appeared and pulled Reynaldo out of the car. Reynaldo
was then rushed to the Cardinal Santos Medical Hospital where
he eventually died because of the severe injuries he sustained. ​3
The underlying cause of his death was Multiple Fracture &
Multiple Vascular Injuries Secondary to Blast Injury.
HELD: The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Janet and
Oswaldo clearly link appellant to the planning of the crime. True,
as intimated by appellant, she may not have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of the explosion; but then again, if she
was, then she would have suffered the same fate as Reynaldo.
Moreover, the nature of the crime and the manner of its
execution, i.e., via a booby trap, does not demand the physical
presence of the perpetrator at the very time of its commission. In
fact, the very manner in which it was carried out
necessitated prior scheming and execution for it to succeed.
Thus, appellant's absence from the actual scene of the crime
does not negate conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of
her husband. A conspiracy exists even if not all the parties
committed the same act, but the participants performed specific
acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal
design. Moreover, direct proof of previous agreement to commit
an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy — conspiracy
may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the following
set of circumstances which, if taken collectively, show the guilt of
appellant: that appellant and Rolando conspired, planned and
agreed to kill Reynaldo using a grenade; that appellant
duplicated the key to the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that
Rolando could gain access to the car; that appellant thereafter
gave the duplicate key to Rolando; that on February 5, 1995,
appellant told Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord of
Reynaldo until the latter parked the car; that appellant told
Oswaldo to thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring
the latter to where Reynaldo parked his red Honda Accord.
Reynaldo died soon after due to injuries he sustained from an
explosion caused by grenades planted in his car.
Another notable fact is that according to the expert opinion of
Inspector Selverio Dollesin, Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of
the Eastern Police District, the perpetrator had information about
the victim's movements. Dollesin also observed that the
perpetrator knew his intended victim, since the grenade was
specifically placed in between the driver's seat and the front
door. That the perpetrator knew the victim's movements was
further corroborated by the affidavits executed by the Tan
children, Renevie ​37 ​and Jag Carlo, ​38 ​attesting that while they
spent their Sundays with their father, this was the only time that
they spent a Sunday in Greenhills. Only someone who had close
personal contact with Reynaldo would know his movements,
where the car would be parked, and that he was the one who
usually drove the red Honda Accord, such that it was precisely
positioned to ensure damage to the intended victim.
PP vs. REYES, ARNALDO and FLORES, accused-appellants
GR NO. 178300
FACTS: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua
Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny
(daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene
(grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea
(housemaids).
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay
Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at
about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van,
arrived at the their poultry farm. Yao San alighted from the van to
open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes and
a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their
guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant
Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with
guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores
took the driver's seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the
Yao family inside the van with packaging tape. After about 30
minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of
appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the
van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their
male companions. ​Appellant Flores, with the other male
companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the
Yao family inside the vehicle.
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male
companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million
pesos as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant
Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao
San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside
the van. Yao San then drove the van towards the poultry farm
and sought the help of relatives.
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo,
Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the
mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they
spent the whole night.
On the morning of the following day, the kidnappers tried to
contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter
could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to
look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein,
Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be
found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind
Yao San about the ransom. Thereafter, appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry
farm and went back to the safe-house.
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release
him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San.
Abandoned by the appellants and upon arriving at the poultry
farm, Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom
demanded by the appellants for the remaining held victims.
A series of calls were made between Yao San and the
kidnappers in which he was instructed to deliver the ransom and
not tell the authorities. However, kidnappers did not show up
when Yao San delivered the ransom money.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon
City. Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.
HELD: Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend
that the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in
kidnapping the Yao family. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective among the accused. ​When the accused by
their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and
the other performing another part as to complete the crime, with
a view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists.
As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn
statements of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and
Pataray approached and poked their guns at Yao San, and
thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then
took the driver's seat and drove the van, while each member of
the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo
and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores
instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as
ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and
appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded
Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the
safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in
going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about
the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions ​how they
planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their
extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular
role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts
in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual
acts of appellants and their cohorts demonstrated their unity of
purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose
of extorting ransom.
PP vs. EVANGELIO, GR No. 18902
FACTS: Appellant Joseph Evangelio (Joseph), accused Edgar
Evangelio y ​Gallo (Edgar), Atilano Agaton y O ​ bico (Atilano) and
Noel Malpas y ​Garcia (Noel) are charged with the crime of
Robbery with Rape.
On October 3, 2001, at 6:30 in the evening, while AAA, a
17-year-old househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the
house of BBB, four persons, suddenly barged inside the house
through the open kitchen door. She was brought to the living
room. There, they herded all the other members of the
household and bound their hands and feet, and thereafter,
placed masking tapes over their captives' eyes. With her eyes
partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant
inside the comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the
robbers stripped off AAA's clothes and removed her panty. AAA
resisted and fought back but they slammed her head twice
against the concrete wall, causing her to lose consciousness.
When she regained her senses, appellant and the other robbers
were already gone, and she found herself lying on the side on
the floor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands
still tied behind her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn
at her side. She suffered pain in her knees, head, stomach, and
her vagina, which was bleeding. Later on, AAA was freed from
the comfort room by the other occupants of the house, who were
earlier freed.
Prosecution witness Evelyn was in the living room when the
incident happened. She was tutoring her nieces when the four
men barged inside the house. Upon the instruction of accused
Edgar, Edelyn was divested of her earrings, bracelet, watch, and
ring. Thereafter, appellant tied her hands and feet, and
blindfolded her with masking tape. She was hit on the head with
a firearm, causing a cut and her losing consciousness. When
she regained her senses, she found herself in the maids' room.
She heard accused Edgar ask her nieces where their father kept
their pieces of jewelry and firearm. When her nieces told him that
the valuables were kept upstairs, accused Edgar brought one of
them there.
BBB came home around 7:00 in the evening and when he
entered the sliding door facing the garage, he saw the four
accused inside. When he entered, he was immediately accosted
and warned to keep quiet. Upon accused Edgar's command, the
other three accused, tied him up. Accused Edgar, then struck
him with the gun on his head, causing him to fall face down on
the floor with blood oozing from his left eyebrow. After a while,
appellant and the three accused went out of the house, through
the kitchen door, carrying two traveling bags and the jewelry box
of his wife.
CCC, the wife of BBB, came home from the office in the early
evening of October 3, 2001. Upon arriving thereat, she tried to
open the door but was not able to do so. She then called out the
names of her children, but nobody responded. She peeped
through the window screen and saw people inside the house
with whom she did not recognize. One of the accused then
poked a gun at her head and told her to come inside. She ran
away from their house, and cried out for help from the neighbors.
They called the police. Shortly thereafter, the policemen arrived.
They found the house in complete disarray, the cabinets were
forcibly opened, CCC's jewelry box and her pieces of jewelry
stolen, and the members of the household traumatized. An
inventory was taken of the stolen valuables which amounted to
PhP336,000.00, more or less. Some of the stolen items were
later recovered from the house of accused Edgar.
HELD: For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to
stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason
or on the occasion o ​ f a robbery and not the other way around.
This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of
the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion
thereof or as an accompanying crime. ​29 In the case at bar, the
original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the
victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery.
The trial court also found the presence of conspiracy between
the perpetrators. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code,
there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after
the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would
be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof
of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances. ​30 To be a conspirator, one need not participate
in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in
every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which
may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a
whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal
objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals. ​31
In the instant case, conspiracy was shown by the coordinated
acts of the four persons. From the time they gained entry into the
victims' residence, they tied and blindfolded the members of the
household; inflicted physical injuries on some of the victims;
some went upstairs and proceeded to ransack the house; the
others brought AAA in the comfort room and sexually abused
her; they then left the house together carrying the loot. With the
foregoing circumstances, there can be no other conclusion than
that the successful perpetration of the crime was done through
the concerted efforts of the four armed men. EScAID
In People v. Suyu​, we ruled that once conspiracy is established
between several accused in the commission of the crime of
robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape
committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery,
unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the
others from committing rape. There is no showing that the other
accused prevented appellant from sexually abusing AAA.
PP VS. BOKINGO, GR No. 187536
FACTS: The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa,
pawnshop, which formed part of his house and a series of
apartments. Appellants were among the 13 construction workers
employed by Pasion.
Witness Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment
when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and went
out of the back door. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion
from Apartment No. 3 and headed to said unit to check. He
peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting
something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco
proceeded attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle
ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit
Bokingco's neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried
to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker.
Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that
Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3.
Vitalicio went back said apartment and saw Pasion's body lying
flat on the kitchen floor.
Elsa testified that she was in the master's bedroom on the
second floor of the house when she heard banging sounds and
her husband's moans. She immediately got off the bed and went
down. Before reaching the kitchen, the accused-appellant, Col,
blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house
but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes
and poked a sharp object under her chin. Col then instructed her
to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she
does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering him
money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her
neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door,
Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col:
"tara, patay na siya." Col immediately let her go and ran away
with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3 where she
saw her husband lying on the floor.
HELD: Bockingco was convicted of Homicide by the lower court.
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He
contends that to hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be
established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
Col asserts that Bokingco's uncounselled testimony that
appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering
the fact that there was no other evidence which will prove the
conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa's statements during trial,
such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her
to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged
statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," a ​ re
not adequate to support the finding of conspiracy. This decision
was affirmed by the OSG. We disagree.
In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the
case, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco
be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of
conspiracy. As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as
clearly as the commission of the crime.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's testimony that
appellants fled together after killing her husband and the
extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed the
commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment
where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at
Elsa's house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop
vault.
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col
conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col's
actuations can be equated to attempted robbery.
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion
had been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does
not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation
of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes
committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to
escape from the crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion.
Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col.
Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was
killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting
to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically
where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as
hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta
rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of
the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided
that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act
or declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may
be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary
that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the
common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have
previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial
confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in
evidence against Col.
Bokingco's judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco
admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in
the head. All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no
sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.
ARTICLE 12-CASES
INSANITY OR IMBECILITY
PP VS. AMBAL
FACTS: ​The accused was convicted of parricide for the death
his wife, Felicula. In the morning of January 20, 1977, the
barangay captain found Felicula Vicente-Ambal, mortally
wounded. She was subsequently brought to the hospital where
she died forty minutes after arrival thereat. On that same
morning, Honorato Ambal went to the house of the barangay
captain and informed the latter's spouse that he had killed his
wife. After making that oral confession, Ambal went to the
municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, also confessing
to the latter that he had liquidated his wife. The killing was the
climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and
bickering. The immediate provocation for the assault was a
quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine for Ambal
who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated
alteration. Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he
were dead. That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to
attack his wife. Accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the
defense of Ambal was insanity.
HELD: A doctor attending to Ambal is of opinion that he was
normal before and after the commission of the crime and that he
suffered from prsychosis. Another doctor testified that Ambal
suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional
nervous system which is not insanity. ​The doctor concluded that
Ambal was not insane. He was normal and had no mental
disorder whatsoever.
For his part, Ambal said that at the time of the killing he did not
know what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full
possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to
know that he was charged with the capital offense of having
killed his wife. But he admitted that he knew that his wife was
dead because he was informed of her death. During his
confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his
fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza or was
sent unescorted to buy food in the market. He recalled incidents
prior to the commission of the crime. The trial court concluded
from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was
not insane and that he acted like a normal human being.
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the trial court. in order
that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of
the will at the time of committing the crime. In order that insanity
may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be
complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act
or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary. The burden is upon the
defendant to overcome this presumption. In the instant case, the
alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient
evidence. The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He
was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom
of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering
from any mental disease or defect. The fact that immediately
after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing
authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had
done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
PP VS. BASCOS
FACTS: The accused Donato Bascos was convicted of homicide
for the death Victoriano Romero. The proof for the prosecution
established that the accused was the one who had killed
Victoriano Romero, while the latter was sleeping. The defense
was that of insanity.
HELD: The wife of the accused and his cousin testified that the
accused had been more or less continuously out of his mind for
many years. The assistant district health officer, who examined
the accused and conducted an investigation, found that the
accused is a violent maniac, and that from the information he
had received from the neighbors of the accused, the latter had
been insane for some time. The physician expressed the opinion
that the accused was probably insane when Victoriano Romero
was killed. The total lack of motive of Bascos to kill Romero
bears out the assumption that the former was insane. The Court
is convinced that the accused was a lunatic when he committed
the grave felony described in the record and that consequently
he is exempt from criminal liability, and should be confined in an
insane asylum.
PP v BONOAN
FACTS: The defendant Celestino Bonoan was charged with
murder for the killing of one Carlos Guison. Accused was
subsequently confined in the Psychopathic Hospital. Trial was
suspended as the doctors who examined the accused testified
that the accused was not in at condition to defend himself. Trial
resumed upon the report of the attending doctor that he
defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for
trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." The accused
was convicted of the crime charged against him. Upon appeal,
counsel for the accused averred that the trial court erred in
finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had
dementia praecox only occasionally and intermittently and has
not had it immediately prior to the commission of the offense.
HELD:​ As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant
is admitted, it does not seen necessary to indulge in any
extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the only
question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant. Proof of insanity at the time of committing
the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit
the accused on the ground of insanity. To ascertain a person's
mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both
before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required nor
are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler,
supra) to establish insanity as a defense. Mind can only be
known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the
motives and emotions of a person and come to determine
whether this acts conform to the practice of people of sound
mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if
clear and convincing, suffice. Courts should be careful to
distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment.
The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar,
however, we are not concerned with connecting two or more
attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the
intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a
particular and isolated attack, beginning with the demonstration
of symptoms thereof prior to the commission of the crime
charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity
immediately following the commission of the act complained of.
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental
normalcy of the accused at the time of the commission of the
crime, the prosecution called on policeman D. A. who testified as
to certain statements made to him by the defendant-appellant
after his arrest. A detective corroborated the policeman's
testimony. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of
the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense.
Expert findings concluded that the accused is suffering from a
type of dementia praecox called manic depressive psychosis. In
the type of dementia praecox "the crime is usually preceded by
much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal
attacks are common, because of delusions that they are being
interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken." The
Court is of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was
demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged
in the information and that consequently he is exempt from
criminal liability.
PP vs. LIBAO
FACTS: ​Accused-appellant Libao was charged with the crimes
of rape and robbery. The victim, Honorata Ong, while sleeping
with her daughters, was awakened by a man armed with a knife
standing by her feet. The man already had his pants and briefs
down on his knees and he was pointing to her eldest daughter.
Alarmed, Honorata told the man not to touch her daughter. The
man poked his knife at her and told her to stand up and then was
made to lie down on the adjacent sofa where he raped her. All
this time, he had his knife at Honorata's neck. Honorata noticed
that the man reeked of alcohol. Afterwards, Honorata's assailant
stood up then asked for money. The trial court convicted the
accused of the crimes charged against him. In
accused-appellant's last assignment of error, he claims that the
trial court erred in not ruling that he is entitled to the exempting
circumstance of insanity.
HELD:​ For insanity to be considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code requires a complete deprivation of
rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be
deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of
responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of
the power to discern. The defense of insanity or imbecility must
be clearly proved, however, for there is a presumption that acts
penalized by law are voluntary. To prove his insanity,
accused-appellant's counsel points to his confinement at the
National Center for Mental Health prior to the incident in
question. Likewise, his counsel claims that when Honorata saw
accused-appellant, the latter's pants and briefs were already
down on his knees. He takes this to be an indicium of insanity.
Mere prior confinement does not prove that accused-appellant
was deprived of reason at the time of the incident. Firstly,
accused-appellant did not submit proof that he was adjudged
insane by the National Center for Mental Health, only that he had
been confined therein. Accused-appellant had already been
discharged from the Center prior to the incident. Even if
accused-appellant were adjudged insane prior to the incident, his
discharge implies that he was already considered well. In fact,
the psychiatric evaluation report of accused-appellant states that
his disorder "runs a chronic course with periods of exacerbations
and remissions." If the insanity is only occasional or intermittent
in nature, the presumption of its continuance does not arise. He
who relies on such insanity proved at another time must prove its
existence also at the time of the commission of the offense.
Neither does having one's pants and briefs on one's knees
indicate deprivation of reason. If anything else, it shows the
lechery and moral depravity of accused-appellant which results
not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition
of the moral system. The Court cannot, therefore, appreciate the
defense of insanity brought by accused-appellant.
Pp vs. MADARANG
FACTS:​ Accused-appellant Fernando Madarang y Magno was
charged with parricide for killing his wife. Appellant put up
insanity as his defense. Accused was previously confined in the
National Center for Mental Health and was diagnosed with
schizophrenia.The accused claimed that he had absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember
where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the
whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings
when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a
coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not
aware of the cause of her demise. The trial court convicted
appellant as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of
sanity at the time he committed the offense. Hence, the present
appeal. Appellant insisted that at the time he stabbed his wife, he
was completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act
involuntary. He further contended that the fact that he and his
wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be
considered. The marked change in his behavior when he
uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and
suddenly turned violent on her confirmed that he was mentally
disturbed when he committed the crime.
HELD:​ The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. In
the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from
schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH months
after he killed his wife. None of the witnesses presented by the
appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or
simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is
bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior
on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although
there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering
from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, the doctor who
diagnosed him also declared that schizophrenics have lucid
intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right
from wrong. Hence the importance of adducing proof to show
that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he
committed the offense. Although the appellant was diagnosed
with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the
evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense
may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission
of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the
time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment
of its execution. In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced
by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the
time he killed his wife. The arguments advanced by the appellant
to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. His claim
that he had absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident
was to a mere general denial that can be made with facility.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude
immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged
insanity because even criminals of stable mental condition take
this non-remorseful stance. That the appellant and his wife were
never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself
prove the appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be
said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant
spouse because jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives
had been terminated for the flimsiest reason.
PP VS. OPURAN
FACTS:​ Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts
of murder for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan
Dacles. The accused invokes the exempting circumstance of
insanity. The defense relied on testimonies of witness that could
show the abnormal behaviour of the accused as constituting
insanity and the expert testimony of Dr. Verona who diagnosed
that the accused was psychotic before and during the
commission of the crime and even up to the present. Her
diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.
HELD:​ A careful scrutiny of the records, indicates that Anacito
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the defense of
insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambi's personal perception
that there was no reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong
Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence,
and his acts of laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and
stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient
proof that he was insane immediately before or at the time he
committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be
considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which
will not exclude imputability Insanity is evinced by a deranged
and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. However, not every
aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity.
Anacito's psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent
yardstick established by case law. What it shows is that Anacito
was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable
medicine to remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." It was
never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that
deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an
out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial
Hospital. The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not
subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While Remedios
insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock
allegedly in 1990, there was no proof that Anacito needed the
medicine during that period. Moreover, as found by the trial
court, the results of Dr. Verona's examinations on Anacito were
based on incomplete or insufficient facts. She failed to
demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to
show her method of testing. Further, she did not have Anacito's
complete behavioral and psychiatric history. The most that we
can conclude is that her findings refer to the period after the
stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Anacito's mental
condition only for said time. It could be that Anacito was insane
at the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. Moreover, Anacito
failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked the
defense of insanity only after he had already testified on his
defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation
of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in
full control of his mental faculties. Further, the trial judge
observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive,
well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to
him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of
insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility
of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a
mere concoction​ ​or an afterthought.
INJURY BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR
INTENTION OF CAUSING IT
PP vs. GENITA
FACTS:​ While the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon
were loading firewood in a truck, appellant who was drunk and
armed with an M-14 rifle, asked for a Christmas gift. He was told
to come back because they were still loading firewood.
Appellant left the place. Not long after, he returned and fired his
gun at the victims. Appellant, relying on the exempting
circumstance of accident as his defense, presented a different
version. He testified that he was a member of the CAFGU
hence, he was officially issued an M-14 rifle. On the evening of
the incident, while on his way to his camp, he saw a truck parked
at the right side of the road with its rear lights on. While
approaching the vehicle, somebody grasped his neck. As a
consequence, he accidentally pulled the trigger of the M-14 rifle
slung on his shoulder. The weapon automatically fired. At this
instance, his assailant set him free. Immediately he rushed to
the camp and reported the incident. Appellant stayed in the
camp during the entire evening. The following morning, he
learned that two persons were killed.
HELD:​ Apellant’s version that he “accidentally shot” the two
victims is incredible. For accident to be an exempting
circumstance, appellant must show with clear and convincing
proofs that: 1) he was performing a lawful act with due care, 2)
the injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) he had no fault
or intention of causing the injury. Considering appellant’s
evidence, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an
exempting circumstance were not proven. ​First​, appellant’s
manner of carrying his M-14 rifle negates his claim of “due care”
in the performance of an act. Knowing that his rifle was
automatic, he should have seen to it that its safety lock was
intact. Worse, he admitted that his finger was constantly on the
trigger. With the safety lock released and his finger on the
trigger, how can we conclude that he acted with due care? We
cannot accept his version that he was just following his trainer’s
instruction to release the safety lock while in a critical area. For
one, he never presented his trainer to corroborate his statement;
and for another, he was not in a critical area. ​Second, t​ he
number of wounds sustained by the victims shows that the
shooting was not merely accidental. Both victims sustained
more than one wound. While it could have been possible that
the first wound sustained by both victims was by accident,
however, the subsequent wounds sustained by them in different
parts of their bodies could not have been similarly inflicted. And
third​, appellant manifested an unmistakable intent to kill the
victims when he reloaded his rifle after his first unsuccessful
attempt to kill them. Jesus had already sought refuge by
jumping into the truck when another bullet hit his right leg.
Reynaldo was already running away when he was shot on his
nape and right hand. That appellant chased the victims and shot
them several times clearly show that he had the intent to kill
them. His defense must necessarily fail.
Moreover, if it were true that someone attacked appellant, thus
causing him to accidentally pull the trigger of his rifle, then his
natural reaction should have been to defend himself. Instead, he
rushed towards the camp. Furthermore, he did not present any
evidence to support his allegation that the CAFGU was placed
on alert. And not a single witness corroborated his version of
accidental shooting, an indication that it is fabricated
PP VS. AGLIDAY
FACTS:​ Appellant was convicted of parricide for fatally shooting
his own son with a shotgun. Appellant, however, alleged that he
was cleaning his homemade shotgun when the same
accidentally went off and hit his son. Thus, he should be
exempted from criminal liability under par. 4 of Art. 12 of the
RPC.
HELD:​ The Court found no reason to reverse the ruling of the
trial court. Before the accused may be exempted from criminal
liability by reason of Article 12 (paragraph 4), the following
elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2)
with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to another by mere
accident and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. For
an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act has
to be lawful. The act of firing a shotgun at another is not a lawful
act. An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the
sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act
of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." It connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent
is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a person's
overt acts. In the case at bar, appellant got his shotgun and
returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had intervened in
the quarrel between the former and his wife. It must also be
pointed out that the firearm was a shotgun that would not have
fired off without first being cocked. Undoubtedly, appellant
cocked the shotgun before discharging it, showing a clear intent
to fire it at someone. Appellant cannot claim the exempting
circumstance of accident.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
POMOY VS. PP
FACTS:​ The version of the prosecution is as follows: The
deceased, was a suspect of a robbery that took place in the
municipality. He was arrested and thereby detained. While in
detention, Balboa was directed by the petitioner to come out of
his cell, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation
room. When petitioner and Balboa were near the investigation
room, two gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots
was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol,
facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two feet
away. The version of defense is as follows: Petitioner (Pomoy)
testified that he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical
interrogation; as he was already holding the door knob of their
investigation room and about to open and enter it, all of a sudden
he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold or grab the
handle of his gun. The deceased was not able to take actual hold
of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from
holding the handle of his gun. Tomas Balboa was not able to
take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in preventing
him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun. His gun was
already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his
house, and it was locked when it fired; during the grappling he
used his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while
the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the
gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell.
Findings of the Rural Health Physician who conducted the
autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas Balboa revealed that the
location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did
not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a
grappling for the gun. The trajectory of the wounds was
front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that he and the
victim were side-by-side each other when the grappling ensued.
Furthermore, a deformed slug in the pocket of the jacket of the
victim. Petitioner claims that the shooting was a mere accident.
He also invokes self-defense as alternative.
HELD:​ In determining whether an "accident" attended the
incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of lack
of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in
the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol
at the very moment the shots were fired? Petitioner did not have
control of the gun during the scuffle. The deceased persistently
attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely
tried to thwart those attempts. In the course of grappling for the
gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged. It would be
difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner
would coolly and effectively be able to release the safety lock of
the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim. It is
undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for
possession of the gun. The eyewitness account amply illustrated
the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the
course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been
accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired. Ordinarily,
the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of
the parties at the precise moment when the gun was fired. Their
positions would in turn be relevant to a determination of the
existence of variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.
In the present case, however, the location of the wounds
becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim
and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the
direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process,
such that the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires
becomes unpredictable and erratic.
All these elements were present. At the time of the incident,
petitioner was a member PNP thus, it was in the lawful
performance of his duties as investigating officer that to fetch the
victim for a routine interrogation. Thus there is the lawfull
exercise of duty. Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence
either. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm as he had kept his
service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its
holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working
area. At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit
to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim's death was
limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful
performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law.
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting
arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so
to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of
accident, in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand,
self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to
kill in order to defend oneself from imminent danger. Apparently,
the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any
conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the
victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression;
rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental
result of both parties' attempts to possess the firearm.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE COMPULSION OF
AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
PP VS. LORENO
FACTS:​ Eustaquio Loreno Malaga and Jimmy Marantal Londete
were charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Rape.
Appellants Loreno and Marantal claimed that they acted under
the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse
of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted
that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of
January 7, 1978, ​4 ​but they were only forced by a man wearing
black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be
members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the
locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and
their families would be killed.
HELD:​ The Court finds the contention untenable. A person who
acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who
acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act
with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a
mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his
will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the appellants' statement of the
robbery-rape incident as, summarized in their joint brief, showed
that they admitted their participation in the commission of the
crime of robbery and rape against Elias Monge and his family on
January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with
appellant's claim of having acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury. The records likewise revealed that
on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to
the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her
open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the
contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala,
appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and assistance
of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in the dark
sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the
teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge lying on the floor,
Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss her and touch her private
parts.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the
conspiracy of the appellants.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER
INJURY
PP VS. SALDAÑA
FACTS:​ Fernando Morales and Arturo Malit, and their
co-accused Narciso Saldaña and Elmer Esguerra were found
guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and imposing on
them the penalty of death. Appellant Fernando Morales similarly
maintains that he acted due to an uncontrollable fear of an equal
or greater injury. He argues that Romeo Bautista's threat against
him and appellant Malit constituted a clear and imminent danger
to their lives and instilled fear in them which made them
incapable of acting with deliberate or criminal intent. This fear
existed even at the time they received the ransom from Feliciano
Tan because at that time, accused Narciso Saldaña, Elmer
Esguerra, and Romeo Bautista were only one (1) kilometer
away. Had he not joined the group that met Feliciano Tan to get
the ransom money as instructed, or had anything gone wrong at
that time, their lives or the lives of their families would have been
endangered.
HELD:​ Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code,​ ​a person is
exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of
an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act
with freedom. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear
or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death
or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury
is not enough.
In this case, the evidence on record shows that at the time the
ransom money was to be delivered, appellants Arturo Malit and
Fernando Morales, unaccompanied by any of the other accused,
entered the van wherein Feliciano Tan was. At that time, the
other accused were waiting for both appellants from a distance
of about one (1) kilometer. By not availing of this chance to
escape, appellants' allegation of fear or duress becomes
untenable. We have held that in order that the circumstance of
uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Appellant Morales' contention that their families were similarly
threatened finds no support in the evidence. The records are
bereft of any showing that such threats to appellants' families
were made at all. Duress as a valid defense should not be
speculative or remote. Even granting arguendo that the other
accused threatened to harm appellants' families to coerce
appellants to receive the ransom money, such threats were not
of such imminence as to preclude any chance of escape. In fact,
as already discussed, appellants had a real chance to escape
when they went to Feliciano's van. Under the circumstances,
even if true, the fear that appellants allegedly suffered would not
suffice to exempt them from incurring criminal liability.
Moreover, kidnap victim Jefferson Tan categorically testified that
each of the kidnappers acted of his own accord and that nobody
commanded anyone. The trial court found Jefferson's testimony
worthy of credence. Based on the evidence at hand, we find no
sufficient reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the
defense presented by appellants. The crime of kidnapping is not
committed on impulse. It requires meticulous planning to
determine who would be the prospective victim or victims. Its
execution needs precise timing and coordination among the
malefactors. It is improbable that a group of kidnappers would
risk the success of their well-planned criminal scheme by
involving unwilling persons, much less strangers, who could
abort the kidnapping by refusing to cooperate in its execution.
Worse, such unwilling companions could easily expose their plan
to the authorities and subsequently even testify against them in
court. Thus, we find the defense claimed by appellants neither
logical nor satisfactory, much less consistent with human
experience and knowledge.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSTIGATION AND ENTRAPMENT
PP VS. VALENCIA
FACTS:​ Accused-appellants were charged with violation of
Section 15 of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, for unlawfully selling or offering to sell
634.0 grams of Psuedoephedrine Hydrochloride which is a
regulated drug, after a buy-bust operation was conducted by
police officers. The trial court convicted accused of the crime
charged and sentenced each of them to death.
HELD:​ In affirming the conviction of appellants, the Supreme
Court ruled that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly
employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending
law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the
police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense
in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to
public policy and considered an absolutory cause. In this case,
appellants apparently have, for some time, been engaged in
drug dealing. They were in fact the subject of a surveillance
conducted by the operatives of the PNP Narcotics Group. The
police engaged the services of a confidential informant to lead
them to transact with them. The confidential agent facilitated the
meeting of appellants and the poseur buyer. Hence, it was not
the police nor the confidential agent who induced appellants to
commit a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. They were
already violating the law and the police only used the buy-bust
operation to apprehend them in the act of unlawfully selling
drugs. This is certainly a legitimate entrapment operation and not
instigation.
PP VS. TIU
FACTS:​ Accused William Ong Li, Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu
were charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for offering for sale
980.50 grams of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.
The prosecution, sought to establish a confidential informant (CI)
of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group,
reported to the Chief Inspector about the alleged illicit drug
activities of a certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese
male partner. Chief Inspector Ferro decided to conduct a
buy-bust operation. He constituted a team of eight with SPO1
Gonzales as poseur-buyer and the rest as back-up support.
According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged
pusher, placed an order for one kilo of shabu. The CI likewise
agreed to meet with his contact. The boodle money was
prepared. The team, together with the CI, proceeded to the
meeting place. The CI rode with SPO1 Gonzales. They parked
their car along 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue while the rest of
the team posted themselves at their back and their right side.
A little while, accused Ong approached their car. SPO1
Gonzales showed him the slightly opened plastic bag containing
the boodle money. SPO1 Gonzales then demanded to see the
shabu. Accused Ong went out of the car and then waved his
right hand to somebody. A green Toyota Corolla parked in front
of their car and a Chinese-looking male, later identified as
accused Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu alighted, approached
accused Ong and handed to him a gift-wrapped package.
Accused Ong then demanded for its payment. SPO1 Gonzales
gave to accused Ong the boodle money. Thereafter, the SPO1
Gonzales arrested accused Ong while the CI and the back-up
agents arrested accused De Ming. Accused foisted the defense
of instigation which is in sharp contrast to the claim of
entrapment by the prosecution.
HELD:​ A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in
recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed
by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law
offenders in the act of committing a crime.​ ​In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the
police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense
in order to prosecute him. ​ ​Instigation is deemed contrary to
public policy and considered an absolutory cause.
To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether
proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust
operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the
details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out
through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the
courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied
restraint the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption should
not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the
constitutionally protected rights of the individual. ​27 ​It is the duty
of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the
prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.
Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of
abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust
operation is incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole
knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and
how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His
testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no
personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales'
testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it
can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the
hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would
be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the
witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine
him for his truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all the
material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was
a valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.
Appellants are hereby acquitted from the crime of violation R.A.
No. 6425.
PP V. LEGASPI
FACTS:​ Accused-appellant Nenita Legaspi Lucas was charged
for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 having sold, delivered and
give away to Police Officer Arturo San Andres, a police poseur
buyer, one plastic sachet containing of shabu, a dangerous drug.
A confidential informant, approached San Andres to report about
the rampant incidence of drug abuse at Centennial Village, Pasig
City and about the drug pusher who was identified as Legaspi. A
buy-bust operation was thereby conducted by the Mayor Special
Action Team. San Andres was to act as the poseur-buyer. San
Andres, together with the informant, proceeded to Legaspi's
house, while the rest of the team strategically placed themselves
in the entrapment area. Upon seeing Legaspi, the informant
introduced San Andres to her as a "scorer." Legaspi asked them
how much they wanted to "score," to which San Andres replied
"P200.00 panggamit lang." Afterwards, San Andres gave
Legaspi the buy-bust money. As soon as San Andres got the
sachet, he signalled his team that the transaction was over.
Legaspi was thereafter arested. Legaspi contends that she was
instigated to commit the crime, as she was not the one who
sought out San Andres to sell him shabu. She avers that San
Andres's own testimony clearly shows that he had suggested the
commission of the crime by offering her P200.00 for the
purchase of shabu. Legaspi claims that this is supported by her
testimony wherein she denied selling shabu to San Andres or to
anyone for that matter. This, she says, is confirmed by the fact
that she has no police or criminal record.
HELD:​ Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate
method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and
capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.
Instigation, on the other hand, involves the inducement of the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such a
case, the instigators become co-principals themselves. Where
the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person
and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no
conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent
originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is
completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for the state, or
public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for the
commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence
necessary to prosecute him, there is no instigation and the
accused must be convicted. Instigation is recognized as a valid
defense that can be raised by an accused. To use this as a
defense, however, the accused must prove with sufficient
evidence that the government induced him to commit the
offense.​ ​Legaspi claims that she was induced into committing the
crime as charged, as she was the one approached by San
Andres, who was then looking to buy shabu. We find, however,
that Legaspi's defense of instigation must fail.
In the case at bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of
drug trafficking from their confidential informant, immediately
set-up a buy-bust operation to test the veracity of the report and
to arrest the malefactor if the report proved to be true. The
prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi agreed to
sell P200.00 worth of shabu to San Andres, who was then
posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced, coerced, or
induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact,
San Andres did not even have to ask her if she could sell him
shabu. Legaspi was merely informed that he was also a "scorer";
and as soon as she learned that he was looking to buy, she
immediately asked him how much he needed. Under the
circumstances, the police officers were not only authorized but
were under an obligation to arrest Legaspi even without an arrest
warrant as the crime was committed in their presence.
Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was
one of denial and not instigation. While instigation is a positive
defense, it partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance.
In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the accused,
except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducer.
Thus, it is incompatible with the defense of denial, where the
theory is that the accused did not commit the offense at all.
Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present concurrently.
Article 13
1. ALL REQUISITES NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY OR TO
EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARE NOT
ATTENDANT
PP VS. LIBRANDO
FACTS:​ On their way home from the market, Edwin Labandero,
his 8-year old daughter, Aileen, and a relative, Fernando de los
Santos, traversed a hilly portion of the trail leading to Barangay
Purok Maisan when they met accused-appellants Raelito
Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima. Raelito inquired
from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando and without any
warning hit Edwin with a piece of wood. Eddie Purisima followed objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor
suit and delivered another blow to Edwin. Edwin ran but he was any contrary evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and
chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns hitting the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the
Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. Although accused-appellant's minority in ascertaining the appropriate
it was already dark at that time, Aileen had no trouble identifying penalty.
the accused-appellants since Edwin was carrying a lighted torch.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before
Thereby, accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, provisions
murder. Accused-appellant Raelito Librando claims that the trial
under the Act is still applicable to the case at bar.
court erred in failing to appreciate the mitigating circumstances
of incomplete self defense in his favour. Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which was allegedly
committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant
​HELD:​ Accused-appellant Raelito Librando claims that he was
sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that time.
"waylaid" by the deceased, Edwin Labandero, on his way home.
In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date
He was forced to defend himself when the deceased tried to hit
and year of the first incident of rape, any doubt therein "should
him with a piece of wood but, unfortunately, in the process of
be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to
defending himself from the blows delivered by the deceased, he
the latter." The Court, thus, ​exempts​ the accused-appellant from
accidentally killed the latter. The Court, however, is not inclined
criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to RA No.
to consider the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self
9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable
defense in Raelito Librando's favor. To avail of the mitigating
therefor. For the second and third counts of rape that were
circumstance of incomplete self defense, there must be unlawful
committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was already
aggression on the part of the victim. In the case at bar,
17 years old. We likewise find that in the said instances, the
prosecution witness Aileen testified that it was in fact the said
accused-appellant acted with discernment. In this case, the fact
accused-appellant who after inquiring from Edwin the
that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was
whereabouts of Fernando, delivered the first blow without any
satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which we had
warning to the deceased. The severity of the injuries inflicted on
already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first
the deceased as well as the fact that Raelito who admitted that
did not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the
he was of bigger built than the deceased, could hardly present
hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told her that
any evidence of injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the
he would kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant
deceased belie his claim of self defense.
had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts
only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong
and that he was aware of the consequences thereof. For
2. MINORITY
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
PP V. ARPON privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
Facts:​ Accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, for the
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable
(7) counts of rape against the private complainant AAA. The upon the accused-appellant is​ reclusion perpetua ​for each count.
victim testified that she was born on November 1, 1987. In one D
afternoon in 1995, when she was only eight years old, she stated
that the accused-appellant raped her inside their house. AAA
3. OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO
also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July
GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED
1999 for five times on different nights AAA further related that the
accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at US V. REYES
nighttime. The trial court and the Court of Appeals sentenced the
FACTS:​ For stabbing Alfredo Senador from behind, done in a
accused to death penalty. In the present case, the
sudden and unexpected manner while the latter was sitting close
accused-appellant asserted that the trial court failed to consider
to the ground and while his attention was focused on the ongoing
his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in
cara y cruz​ game, Elbert Callet was convicted of the crime of
his direct examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he
murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of​reclusion perpetua.​
was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17
The accused also claims that his liability should be mitigated by
years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995
the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
and 1999, respectively.
HELD:​ The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so grave is an
HELD:​ Article 355 of the RPC provides that rapes when
internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part
committed to a woman below 18 years of age is punishable by
of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is
death and the offender is a relative by consanguinity or affinity
inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in
within the third civil degree. In the case at bar, the victim was
attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an
below 18 and the accused was a relative of the victim.
opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order. In the
do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible
instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on
therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.
February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the
first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995. Other than his URBANO V. PP
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of
his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any
FACTS: The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) having just
arrived from a picnic in the nearby town where, they drunk beer
in a restaurant with some other co-workers While inside the
compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of
which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. The
exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads
succeeded in breaking up the fight, but only for a brief moment
as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued
throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a
"lucky punch," as described by eyewitness Salazar, on
Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden
was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their
companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow,
however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him
unconscious. The deceased told his wife of the mauling incident.
Thereafter, the deceased was still able to go to work however,
his complaints to his wife of severe pain in the head, prompted
him to be admitted at the community hospital. Finally, Tomelden
died on October 10, 1993 due, per Dr. Arellano, to
"cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with
resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
With the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
convicting the accused of homicide, the petitioner now contends
that the trial Court and the CA erred in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstances the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong in favor of the petitioner
HELD:​ The mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should
also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be
presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating
factor may still be considered when attendant facts and
circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.
Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much
smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of Tomelden,
albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch
that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped
carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWAD's
general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be
expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one intending to
commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-knuckle
fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was
commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It
was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch,
an eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had
the financial means to get the proper medical attention.
Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be
appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him guilty of
homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at Tomelden's
face while their co-workers were trying to separate them is a
compelling indicium that he never intended so grave a wrong as
to kill the victim. TI
PENALTY:​ With no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating
circumstances appreciable in favor of petitioner, we apply par. 5
of Art. 64, RPC, which pertinently provides: When there are two
or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.
The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC is
reclusion temporal ​or from 12 years and one day to 20 years.
With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and of
sufficient provocation from the victim, and the application of par.
5 of Art. 64, RPC, the imposable penalty would, thus, be the next
lower penalty prescribed for homicide and this should be​ prision
mayor ​or from six years and one day to 12 years.
PP. VS. GONZALES
FACTS:​ The vehicles of the accused and the victim’s family
almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial park. A
heated exchange of remarks followed the near collision in which
case, the accused-appellant, was augmented by the improvident
use of a firearm resulting to the death of Feliber Andres, wife of
Noel Andres and their children, sustaining injuries. The trial court
found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two
counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to
death.
HELD:​ The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is
devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when
there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed.
The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the
crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack
employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant's
use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in
the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on
guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun
is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
PP V. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:​ The accused-appelant Candido Enriquez bordered
enmity towards the victim Ciriaco Gines. Enriquez was the son of
the owner of a bus-operating company which has been filed with
various complaints before the Public Service Commission for
infractions of its rules. The victim was an inspector of the rival
bus Co. who was allegedly the one who had supplied the
material for these complaints. He hired ruffians in Manila who
would beat up Gines so that he would not interfere in the future
with the business of the Mallorca Transportation. Gines was left
unconscious upon the ground as his assailants fled. As he
recovered consciousness, he called for help, and his cries
attracted the attention of his father and other who came to his
aid. After he was mauled by the ruffians, Gines died from shock
and loss of blood.
HELD:​ Upon the circumstances that the wound made with the
knife on the leg of the person assaulted was the primarily cause
of death and that the author of this injury has not been identified,
the attorney for the accused chiefly plant their defense, and in
this connection it is insisted that the conspiracy to attack Gines
contemplated only beating him up and did not include the
infliction of injury by means of a cutting instrument. Such an Act,
so it is said, was not within the scope of the agreement; and it is
insisted that only the individual who inflicted the cut could be
held responsible for the death, if that person were known. It
resulted, in this view, that none of the appellants can be held
liable further than for the bruises inflicted by means of the iron
bars. These injuries, so it is claimed, would in the natural course
of events have been curable in a few days. The accused had
undoubtedly conspired to do grave personal injury to the
deceased, and now that the injuries actually inflicted have
resulted in death, they cannot escape from the legal effect of
their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a
different way from that which had been intended. The crime
committed in this case was murder but all of the accused are
entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. The
estimation of this circumstance was proper, and its allowance
was not inconsistent with the finding that the crime was murder.
PP VS. PAJENADO
FACTS​: Eyewitnesses for the prosecution testified they saw
appellant holding the now deceased Carlos Tapong by the neck.
As the two were apparently wrestling with each other, Carlito
Pajenado, appellant's cousin, intervened and the two Pajenados
were able to throw Tapong to the ground. Carlito Pajenado held
Tapong by the shoulder and pinned him down to the ground,
while appellant held him by one leg. As they thus held Carlos
Tapong helpless, appellant drew his gun and fired at him.
Thereupon, Carlito Pajenado stood up and ran away, while
appellant remained at the scene of the crime until he
4. SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT OF THE
OFFENDED PARTY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED
THE ACT
PP VS. URBANO
FACTS​ (​see facts in PP vs. URBANO in no. 3)
HELD:​ Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at petitioner and
uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient
provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements
made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon.
Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
Petitioner's unrebutted testimony on the events immediately
preceding the fisticuff and earlier dovetails with the testimony of
Salazar.
In gist, petitioner testified being, in the afternoon of September
28, 1993, in the nearby town of Bugallon for a picnic. He was
with Tomelden and several others, including Dominador Navarro,
Chairperson of LIWAD. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group
ordered goat's meat and drank beer. When it was time to depart,
Navarro asked petitioner to inform Tomelden, then seated in
another table, to prepare to leave.
When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter
he had no business stopping him from further drinking as he was
paying for his share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner returned to
his table to report to Navarro. At that time, petitioner saw that
Tomelden had already consumed 17 bottles of beer. In all, the
group stayed at the picnic place for three and a half hours before
returning to the LIWAD.
Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly
slapped and hurled insults at him, calling him "​sipsip"​ just to
maintain his employment as Navarro's tricycle driver. Tomelden
allegedly then delivered several fist and kick blows at petitioner,
a couple of which hit him despite his evasive actions. Petitioner
maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation, landing
that lucky punch in the course of parrying the latter's blows.
Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating
circumstance should not be considered in favor of petitioner.
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
PP VS. PARANA
FACTS:​ The deceased took part in said game where the
appellant was designated to attend to the players. A discussion
ensued between him appellant and one Lamay. As both raised
their voices, they were admonished by the deceased. As the
appellant disregarded said admonition, the deceased slapped
him and ordered him to leave the house. The following day, the
deceased took part in another game of monte, this time in
another house. As he was about to leave the place in his car, the
chauffer, who saw the appellant behind the deceased in the
attitude of stabbing him with a dagger, shouted to warn him of
the danger. The deceased, looking behind, really saw the
appellant about to stab him. Defending himself, he retreated until
he fell on his back into a ditch two meters wide and 1.7 meters
deep. Without lessening the aggression the appellant mounted
astride of the deceased and continued to stab him with the
dagger.
HELD:​ The mitigating circumstance that he had acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against him
a few hours before, when he was slapped by the deceased in the
presence of many persons, must likewise be taken into
consideration. Although this offense, which engenders
perturbation of mind, was not so immediate, this court is of the
opinion that the influence thereof, by reason of its gravity and the
circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until the
moment the crime was committed.
PP VS. VENTURA
FACTS: ​When appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental
from Manila where he had been working as a security guard, he
noticed that his wife, Johanna, who had previously been
employed as a house helper of the Bocateja spouses, was
wearing a new ring. When he confronted her, she said that it
came from Jaime (the deceased) who was courting her, and that
it was because Jaime's wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit
relationship that she had been dismissed from the Bocateja
household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife
whereupon she left the conjugal home. That same day,
appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two
spoke at length and appellant Flores, who had previously worked
for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja spouses, confirmed
that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair. Since appellant
Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant
Ventura asked him to go with him to their residence so he could
confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna. Appellants, armed
with an unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the
Bocateja residence where the killing took place.
HELD:​ No mitigating circumstances are present in the case at
bar. While the trial Court noted that appellants were apparently
motivated by their belief that Johanna and Jaime were carrying
on an illicit relationship, it nevertheless ruled out immediate
vindication of a grave offense as mitigating circumstance.
While "immediate" vindication should be construed as
"proximate" vindication in accordance with the controlling
Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, still this mitigating
circumstance cannot be considered where sufficient time
elapsed for the accused to regain his composure. In this case,
appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as
February 17, almost a week before the stabbing incidents on
February 23, when he first confronted his wife about her ring.
Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the
time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, weapons in hand,
to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City.
Within that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change
his clothes at a relatives' house in a neighboring barangay and
both appellants were able to take their dinner at the Burgos
Market in Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside
the Bocateja residence before carrying out their plan. Without
question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to
cool and for them to recover their equanimity.
6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
PP vs. NOYNAY
FACTS:​ A carabao belonging to Martin Noynay was destroying
sugar cane planted by the deceased Silvestre Arriesgado. The
deceased caught the carabao and took it to the house of Martin
Noynay. The deceased was accompanied by his son, Jose.
When they reached the house of Martin Noynay, they found him
and the appellant Buenaventura Ruiz. The deceased told
Noynay that his carabao had destroyed the sugar cane and that
he had to pay the damages. Noynay replied that he did not have
to pay anything because his carabao was tied. The deceased
then told Noynay that if he did not wish to pay, he would take the
carabao to the lieutenant of the ​barrio,​ and started to do so.
Thereupon Noynay grabbed a spear from the azotea of his
house, and he and Buenaventura Ruiz pursued the deceased.
The deceased began to run, but he was over taken and stabbed
by the accused.
HELD:​ The finding that the defendants acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation
was not justified by the evidence of record. The deceased, was
clearly within his right in what he did. The defendants, without
any rational cause for provocation, pursued the deceased and
deliberately killed him. In order to be entitled to this mitigating
circumstance, it must appear that the obfuscation of the accused
arose from lawful sentiments. “The fact that an offense was
committed in an uncontrollable burst of passion should not be
taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance unless
it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper acts.”
PP VS. LAYSON
FACTS:​ Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed
Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a
number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang because
the latter spat on him a week before. The four plotted to kill
Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying. In the early
morning of that hapless day, the four accused, armed with
bladed weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim,
prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the door of the
room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly
took turns in stabbing Gasang.
HELD:​ Three of the accused admitted that they harbored
ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten days
before the actual slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before
the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill Gasang a
few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these
circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed
during which the accused regained their equanimity. They
moved their evil scheme forward to consummation after
obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid they had
solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the presence
of passion and obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the
attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation.
PP VS. GRAVINO
FACTS​: The defendant-appellant Nonceto Gravino, a 27 year
old farmer at the time the offenses were committed, had been
courting Zosima Diagbel, a 20 year old student, for about a year.
In fact the two had been sweethearts until Zosima told the
accused-appellant that she did not wish to marry him because
her parents did not want him to be Zosima's husband. In the
evening of June 10, 1969, accused-appellant went to the house
of the Diagbels. He entered the house surreptitiously, but he was
discovered or in his own words "I was noticed by the parents"
whereupon he committed the crimes that led to the deaths of two
persons and almost led to the death of the third victim. The
accused was held guilty of murder in the trial court.
HELD:​ Accused-appellant argues that he was in love with
Zosima and that she reciprocated this love; that for almost a
year, they were sweethearts; that he once asked her hand in
marriage; that the refusal caused the tragedy and that this
tragedy was the product of legitimate passion and obfuscation.
There is no merit in this contention.
To appreciate the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, the following requisites must concur: (1) that there
be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition
of mind; and (2) that said act which produces the obfuscation
was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. The only provocative act which
the records reveal came from the parents of Zosima who did not
approve of the accused appellant's proposal to marry their
daughter. Clearly, this act was not unlawful. Neither was it
sufficient to sustain passion and obfuscation. Accused-appellant
was actuated more by a spirit of lawlessness and revenge rather
than any sudden and legitimate impulse of natural and
uncontrollable fury.
Passion and obfuscation as affecting the mind and resulting in
lack of reason and self-control must originate from lawful
sentiments. The Solicitor-General also correctly observed that
the said act of Anita Diagbel in refusing the proposal of the
accused-appellant to marry her daughter was far removed from
the commission of the crimes. There was more than enough time
for accused-appellant to have recovered his personal
equanimity.
US VS. HICKS
FACTS:​ For about five years, Augustus Hicks and Agustinal
Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together, until after
the trouble arising between them in 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's
house, and, separating from him, she contracted new relations
with another negro named Wallace Current. Thereafter, Hicks
shot Agustina to death.
HELD:​ The alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor
was the convict's vexation disappointment and anger
engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in
illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do, his
reason for killing her being merely that she had elected to leave
him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another.
PP VS. DE LA CRUZ
FACTS: ​The accused, killed the deceased, who had theretofore
been his ​querida​ (concubine or lover) upon discovering her ​in
flagrante​ in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance..
HELD:​ The facts in this case distinguished from those in the
case of U. S. ​vs.​ Hicks (14 Phil. Rep., 217), wherein the
defendant was held not to be entitled to the benefits of the
provisions of the above-mentioned article of the code.In the
former case the cause of the alleged "passion and obfuscation"
of the aggressor was the convict's vexation disappointment and
anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live
in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do, his
reason for killing her being merely that she had elected to leave
him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another. In the
case at bar the impulse upon which the defendant acted, and
which naturally produced 'passion and obfuscation," was not that
the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the
sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery
of her ​in flagrante​ in the arms of another.
PP VS. HERRERA
FACTS​: The accused wounded Silvestre Bautista at the moment
when the latter was getting into his vehicle after a fight between
them, in which they wrestled together without using any weapon.
After they were separated for the third time, Silvestre Bautista
recovered his hat, and just as he was getting into his vehicle
Ciriaco followed him up and wounded him in the right
sacrolumbar region, causing a lesion which necessitated medical
attendance for more than eight days.
HELD:​ Where two individuals have been wrestling together and
after being separated one of them follows up the other and
wounds him on the buttock with a penknife as he was entering a
vehicle, and without the wounded party noticing it until after he
was so wounded, the aggressor can not claim in his favor that
the previous struggle produced in him entire loss of reason or
self-control, for the existence of such excitement as is inherent in
all who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute said
mitigating circumstance; it is necessary that the guilty party must
have acted under the impulse of special motives which may be
classified according to the attending circumstances.
ROMERA vs. PP
FACTS:​ Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit
of anger when the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at him
without warning as petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by
hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his house, and
endangering the lives of his children, the victim also obfuscated
his thinking and reasoning processes.
HELD:​ Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him,
and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view,
sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and
obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and
children are in danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of
those provocations, and while petitioner was still in a fit of rage.
In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the
circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission
of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation
are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the
rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts,
they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.
From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both
circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned.
Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating
circumstances.
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
PP VS. OBLIGADO
FACTS:​ Appellant Alejo Obligado was charged with murder in
the RTC. The defense presented SPO4 David Sarto, police
community officer of the PNP Buhi station. According to SPO4
Sarto, he and his fellow police officers were ordered to arrest
appellant on March 13, 2000. They met appellant while
traversing the lone footpath leading to his residence. Appellant
surrendered his person and the bolo. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the guilt of the appellant but modified the civil liabilities
imposed by the RTC. Because SPO4 Sarto testified that
appellant intimated a desire to surrender, the appellate court
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
HELD: ​There was no voluntary surrender. For this mitigating
circumstance to be appreciated, the defense must prove that:
(a)the offender had not been actually
arrested;
(b)the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority;
(c)the surrender was spontaneous and
voluntary.
In this case, SPO4 Sarto testified that appellant’s residence
could be accessed only through a footpath where they met
appellant. Inasmuch as he was intercepted by the arresting
officers there, appellant had no means of evading arrest. His
surrender therefore was neither voluntary nor spontaneous. On
the contrary, the aforementioned circumstances revealed that he
had no option but to yield to the authorities.
PP VS. CONCILLADO
FACTS: Diosdado Pado was shot, stabbed and hacked by
Edgar, Erlito and Dolores, all surnamed Concillado, Deceased
sustained a total of 26 wounds. He instantly died from the blows
sustained. Edgar, one of the accused and appellant herein
invoked self-defense. He admitted that he was the one who
inflicted all 26 injuries and that he acted in self-defense after
deceased suddenly appeared before him and challenged him to
a fight while he was urinating near the fence of his house.
Contrary to the prosecution’s version, Edgar testified that it was
the deceased who attacked first using a bolo hitting accussed on
the right chest. Getting his surit from inside his house, he fired at
the deceased who continued on hacking him. Accussed was
able to parry his blows and grab a bolo. Concillado and
Diosdado continued exchanging blows and after some time, the
deceased turned his back on Edgar. Thinking that Diosdado was
already fleeing, Edgar went back to his house and eventually
surrendered himself at the police station and have his wound
treated by a Dr. De Veyra.
PP VS. VERGES
FACTS:​ Inmates of Dormitory 5-B of the New Bilibid Prisons, all
members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik gang, were on their way to
Dormitory 4-D where they were to be transferred, when the
prisoners confined at Dormitory 4-C, members of the rival
Sigue-Sigue Commando gang, suddenly bolted out and attacked
them with improvised weapons, killing three of them. Accused
claimed surrender of weapons as mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
HELD:​ Surrender of weapons is not analogous to voluntary
surrender to a person in authority or his agent. Moreover, in the
case at bar, there is nothing in the record to show that the
surrender was made voluntarily or with spontaneity. In fact, the
surrender of the weapons did not take place where the incident
took place but in Dormitory 4-C which was occupied by the
appellants.
PP VS. PALO
FACTS:​ Ildefonso Palo and his brother Pedro were charged for
the murder of Candido Catapang, their own brother-in-law. The
trial court sentenced each of them to life imprisonment. The
defense invokes the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender as the accused Ildefonso Palo handed the gun used in
shooting the victim to the barrio lieutenant upon the latter's
demand.
HELD:​ Murder was undoubtedly committed, qualified by
treachery. It is said that voluntary surrender may mitigate
defendants' offense. Although Ildefonso Palo handed the gun to
the barrio lieutenant upon the latter's demand, there is no
evidence that he willingly delivered himself to the authorities. On
the contrary, Pedro Palo denied having voluntarily surrendered,
alleging he had been taken from his house the following morning
by some policemen. Anyway this mitigation is compensated by
the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the deceased
being brother-in-law of the offenders (Art. 15 Revised Penal
Code).Therefore in the absence of other modifying
circumstances, life imprisonment was properly imposed upon
these appellants.
PP VS. LAGRANA
FACTS:​ Accused LAgrana and his nephew, Salazar were found
guilty of the crime of murder by the trial court, the former as
principal and the latter as accomplice. Only Lagrana appealed
the decision of the lower court. On appeal, Lagrana did not
question his conviction nor the characterization of the crime, but
merely assigned the error to the trial court’s decision of not
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Lagrana claimed they went to the police station to report but that
they were both sent home.
HELD:​ The evidence on record does not support voluntary
surrender, as contended. As aptly pointed out by the Trial Court:
"Although both accused reported to the police
authorities the following day after the commission of
the crime, it was not for the purpose of submitting
themselves unconditionally. Accused Carlo Lagrana
claimed self-defense when interrogated, while
accused Frangeline Salazar did not give any
statement, either verbal or written. Accused did not go
to the police authorities to surrender but merely to
report the incident. Indeed, they never evinced any
desire to own the responsibility for the killing of the
deceased.
Indeed, wanting in this case are the following requisites for
voluntary surrender to be considered mitigating:
"A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the
intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either (1) because he acknowledges his guilt, or (2)
because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses
necessarily incurred in his search and capture."
PLEA OF GUILTY
PP v. CRISOSTOMO
FACTS:​ Eugenio Crisostomo was convicted of the crime of
murder in the trial court. Accused assigns the error that the lower
court failed to appreciate his plea of guilty as a mitigating
circumstance.
HELD:​ He cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of homicide as
invoked under the sixth assigned error. The requisites of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that
the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the
confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the
competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the
confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution.
In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty
to the lesser offense of homicide only after some evidence of the
prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer after the
prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating.
PP V. ORTIZ
FACTS:​ Appellant was charged with murder and frustrated
murder. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. After two
witnesses for the prosecution had testified, appellant manifested
his willingness to plead guilty to the lesser offenses of homicide
and frustrated homicide. Consequently, the Fiscal, with leave of
court, amended the information accordingly, and upon new
arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the amended
information.
HELD:​ The amended information was an entirely new
information and no evidence had been presented to prove the
charges made therein when appellant entered his plea of guilty.
Therefore, he was entitled to have the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty considered in his favor in connection with the
imposition of the corresponding penalty.
PP vs. ESPIDO
FACTS:​ Appellant Dalacat was arraigned and with the
assistance of his counsel, he pleaded not guilty. At the ensuing
trial, the prosecution presented its two witnesses. Shortly after
the prosecution's third witness was sworn in, appellant changed
his tune and his counsel manifested in open court about
appellant's desire to change his plea to guilty. Appellant was
re-arraigned and to the charge of robbery with homicide in a
Band, he pleaded guilty.
The trial court set another hearing to assess appellant's
comprehension of his plea and inquired from appellant if his new
counsel clearly explained to him the legal effects and
consequences of his plea of guilty. He answered in the
affirmative. The trial court deemed the case submitted for
decision and rendered the assailed decision finding the accused
guilty of the crime charged against him and sentencing him to
the penalty of death.
On appeal, Dalacat waxes lyrical on the lower court's imposition
of the penalty of death upon him on the basis of his plea of guilty
sans​ his full comprehension of its sense and substance. He
bemoans the trial court's failure to propound sufficient questions
to ascertain if he had indeed intelligently understood such plea.
He remonstrates that the trial court did not proceed with the
reception of his evidence, which he says was in flagrant violation
of law and jurisprudence concerning a plea of guilt to a capital
offense.
HELD:​ Based on Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, there are three conditions that the trial court
should kowtow to in order to forestall the entry of an improvident
plea of guilty by the accused:
1.The court ​must​ conduct a ​searching
inquiry​ into the voluntariness
and full comprehension [by the
accused] of the consequences
of his plea;
2.The court ​must​ require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability;
and
3.The court ​must​ ask the accused whether
he desires to present evidence
on his behalf, and allow him to
do so if he so desires.
The mandatory nature of these three requisites for a valid plea of
guilty to a capital offense is easily deducible from the letter of the
law. Lamentably, the court ​a quo​ failed to play the rules of the
game.
In the case at bar, a cursory look at the transcripts easily reveal
the fact that appellant's plea of guilty was far from spontaneous
and persistent as envisioned by Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court not only
failed to probe into the spontaneity of appellant's plea, it made
no effort to apprise him of the impact of his change of plea as the
accused herein was merely told that he could face the penalty of
reclusion perpetua​ to death. A mere warning that the accused
faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient, for more often
than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because
he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.
Like the first requirement of a searching inquiry, the second and
third indispensable requirements have, likewise, remained intact
through the years.
Given the unchanging state of the three-tiered requisites in
Section 3, Rule 116, there is, indeed, no justification for the trial
court's failure to observe them.
Thus, we purge the decision under review of its errors and
remand the case to the trial court for further re-arraignment, a
more incisive searching inquiry and the reception of evidence for
the prosecution and the defense, if the latter so desires.
8. THE OFFENDER IS DEAF, DUMB, BLIND OR SUFFERING
FROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT
PP V. FRANCISCO
FACTS​: Accused-appellants Ricardo, Reynaldo, and Teodoro,
all surnamed Francisco, and Antonio Sioco were convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon of the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder. The accused-appellants fault the RTC for not
appreciating as mitigating circumstances accused RICARDO's
physical disability.
HELD​: After a careful assessment of the established facts, we
find that these circumstances cannot be appreciated in their
favor. The limp allegedly suffered by RICARDO has not been
shown to restrict his means of action, defense or communication
with his fellow beings as required by Article 13(8) of the Revised
Penal Code as no evidence was presented in relation thereto
other than the bare allegation that he suffered from such a
physical defect.
PP V. DEOPANTE
FACTS:​ Rogelio Deopante was convicted of the crime of murder
and sentenced to ​reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant stabbed
one Dante Deopante with a fan-knife. Witnesses presented by
the prosecution testified that ​appellant and victim grappled with
each other and both fell on the ground. Appellant was able to
assume the dominant position and as Dante lay flat on his back
the former proceeded to stab the latter twice with his fan knife.
Immediately thereafter, appellant stood up and fled the scene
leaving Dante mortally wounded. Appellant assigns the error that
the RTC has failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of
physical defect as attendant to the crime, appellant having only
one hand.
HELD:​ The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a
severed left hand, does not mean that he should automatically
be credited with the mitigating circumstance contained in
paragraph 8, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. In order for
this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that such
physical defect limited his means to act, defend himself or
communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that he did
not have complete freedom of action, consequently resulting in
diminution of the element of voluntariness. Such cannot be
appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant's physical
condition clearly did not limit his means of action, defense or
communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite his
handicap, appellant nevertheless managed to attack, overcome
and fatally stab his victim.
At this point, one might wonder how a one-handed attacker can
open a fan knife and grapple with and overcome his two-handed
prey. This was answered by the testimony of Renato Molina who
revealed that at the time the accused closed in for the kill, his
balisong​ was already open and ready for use in his back pocket,
and that he had already drawn the same even during the chase.
Hence, at the time the accused-appellant chased the victim, the
former already had the ​balisong​ in hand. Clearly, the fact that he
had only one hand in no way limited his freedom of action to
commit the crime.
9. ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER
PP V. FORMIGENES
FACTS:​ The accused, without any previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house
and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the
right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her
death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the
stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband
Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the
house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because
according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife
for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his
brother Zacarias.
HELD:​ The appeal is based merely on the theory that the
appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. His counsel
presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where
Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was
rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person. In
order to be appreciated, imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability. After a careful
study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an
imbecile. As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his
confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse
at having killed his wife. fact that the accused is feebleminded
warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance
provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of
the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is "suffering
some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action,
defense or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness
"as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we
may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same
article, — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused
evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
PENALTY:​ The penalty applicable for parricide under article 246
of the Revised Penal Code is composed only of two indivisible
penalties, to wit, ​reclusion perpetua​ to death. Although the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset
them, article 63 of the said code is the one applicable and must
be applied where the lesse penalty should be applied. Article 64
is not applicable as it refers to the application of penalties which
contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a
period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77,
which is not true in the present case where the penalty
applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible
penalties. Appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
10. ANALOGOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
PP V. VENTURA
FACTS:​ In the midst of their merriment, petitioner's wife arrived
and started an argument with him. The argument turned violent
and his wife lunged at him with a chair, but he was able to parry
the blow. The scene was witnessed by his neighbors who were
next door playing ​"panya."​ They began laughing at him and
petitioner felt humiliated as a result. Because of his annoyance,
petitioner said he kicked the ​"panya"​ table. This incensed his
neighbors and a melee erupted with three of his nighbors
ganging up on him. Petitioners said he received a beating, but he
was able to run home. Once home, the enraged petitioner got
hold of a knife. He soon went out of the assailants where he
went bersek and killed one of his assailants.
HELD:​ Passion and obfuscation exist when (1) there is an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of the
mind, and (2) the said act which produced the obfuscation was
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. There is passion and obfuscation
when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In this
case it was established that petitioner and his wife had a violent
altercation and that petitioner was mauled by his neighbors after
he kicked some of them for laughing at him. These events and
circumstances prior to the killing of Alfredo Gonzales could have
caused unusual outbursts of passion and emotion on petitioner's
part. These resulted in the tragic stabbing of the victim thus
entitling petitioner to the mitigating circumstance analogous to
passion and obfuscation.
PENALTY:​ Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, whose
duration in its entirety is from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years.
Since there is one mitigating circumstance, under Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum period, or from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months of imprisonment.
Article 14
DWELLING
PP VS. ALCALA
FACTS: About midnight, his wife, who was sleeping within the
house, was awaked by the noise produced by a blow. She got
up, looked out, and saw at the foot of the staircase of the house,
the accused Valentine Alcala upon Eugenio Rubion, holding the
latter by the neck, while the appellant, Paulo Alcala, who had a
club in his hand, held the knees of the deceased.
HELD: The foot of the staircase of a house is considered an
integral part thereof for the purposes of the aggravating
circumstance of the crime being committed in the dwelling of the
offended part of the house, said circumstance must be taken into
consideration.
PP VS.DEQUIÑA
Appellant's attorney contends that the fact that the deceased
was killed in his own dwelling should not constitute an
aggravating circumstance in the present case, because that fact
or circumstance was likewise inherent in the qualifying
circumstance of treachery or premeditation, and for the further
reason that the offended party provoked the crime by his illicit
relations with the defendant's wife.
HELD: Although the Code provides that the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling cannot be properly taken into account if
the provocation was given by the offended party, this is only true
when there exists a close relation between the provocation and
the commission of the crime in the dwelling of the person from
whom the provocation came. The provocation was not given
immediately prior to the commission of the crime and had no
particular relation to the house of the deceased. If the defendant
had entered the house of the deceased and surprised the
deceased and the wife of the defendant in the act of adultery, the
aggravating circumstance of ​morada​ would not exist.
Obiter: Dwelling is not included in treachery.
PP VS. AGONCILLO
FACTS: While she was sleeping in their house, the victim was
roused to look at their wall clock if it is already time to prepare
their breakfast; when suddenly, somebody covered her mouth
and told her not to shout or else, he will cut off her head; that
the said person was armed with a scythe; that she was then
dragged to the banana plantation where she was raped by the
accused.
HELD: We agree with accused-appellant that the trial court erred
in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of dwelling,
nighttime, and uninhabited place in order to justify the imposition
of the death penalty.
Dwelling is considered as an aggravating circumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to the human
abode. ​ ​However, in the present case, Rosalyn was not raped
therein. Although she was abducted therefrom,
accused-appellant was not charged with forcible abduction with
rape but only with rape. Considering that she was not raped in
her home, dwelling cannot be appreciated.
NIGHTTIME
PP VS. SILVA
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance,
however, it becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially
sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or
(3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the
offender's immunity from capture. ​33 ​In this case, the trial court
correctly appreciated nighttime as aggravating considering that
nighttime facilitated the abduction of the Ceriales brothers, the
killing of Manuel Ceriales and the attempt to kill Edmundo
Ceriales. Evidence shows that accused-appellants took
advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their
plans. The fact that they brought with them a flashlight clearly
shows that they intended to commit the crime in darkness
PP VS. CARIÑO
The records reveal that the crime was committed during
nighttime. This circumstance is considered aggravating only
when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially
sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of
impunity. The essence of this aggravating circumstance is
the​obscuridad a ​ fforded by, and not merely the chronological
onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night,
nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when the place is
adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the
offender’s immunity from identification or capture. ​56 ​In the case
at bar, it was not shown that nighttime was especially sought for
or used to insure the offender’s immunity from identification or
capture.
BAND
PP VS. MAGDAMIT
The aggravating circumstance of band was properly appreciated
​ hen
by the trial court. An offense is committed ​en cuadrilla w
more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in
the commission thereof. In the present case, there were seven
armed conspirators involved in the commission of the composite
crime.
PP VS. DINAMLING
The trial court correctly appreciated band as an aggravating
circumstance. Whenever more than three armed malefactors
shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it
shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. All four
accused-appellants were armed, three with long firearms and the
other with a short one. They all took part in the commission of
the robbery with homicide, poking their guns at their victims'
heads, tying them up, ransacking the house, and killing the two
victims.
PP VS. LOZANO
We find that the offenses were not committed by a band. A crime
is deemed to have been committed by a band or ​en cuadrilla
when more than three armed malefactors take part in its
commission. The four armed persons contemplated in this
circumstance must all be principals by direct participation who
acted together in the execution of the acts constituting the crime.
The Code does not define or require any particular arms or
weapons; any weapon which by reason of its intrinsic nature or
the purpose for which it was made or used by the accused, is
capable of inflicting serious or fatal injuries upon the victim of the
crime may be considered as arms for purposes of the law on
cuadrilla.​ In the case at bar, the prosecution alleged that the
accused and his three other co-conspirators used unlicensed
firearms in the perpetration of the offenses. However, the
evidence on record shows that only two of them carried firearms.
En cuadrilla,​ as an aggravating circumstance, cannot therefore
be appreciated.
AID OF ARMED MEN
PP VS. LOZANO
There was also no evidence presented to show that the offenses
were committed with the aid of armed men. Aid of armed men or
persons affording immunity requires that the armed men are
accomplices who take part in minor capacity, directly or
indirectly. We note that all four accused were charged as
principal. The remaining suspects —John Doe, Jane Doe and
Peter Doe — were never identified and charged. Neither was
proof adduced as to the nature of their participation.
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
PP VS. DREW
Antonio Cordial, Jr., was walking towards an eatery. Suddenly,
appellants Drew and Ramos, with the 11 other accused waylaid
him. Drew was armed with a 2" x 2" piece of wood with which he
clubbed the unarmed Cordial. Ramos then struck him on the
back of his head with a lead pipe, followed by several blows on
the body. The victim fell. As he lay prostrate on the ground, the
others joined in beating him with blows and kicks. Appellants and
their co-accused then fled.
For the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength to be appreciated, the prosecution must show that the
accused were physically stronger than the victim, and that they
abused such superiority by taking advantage of their combined
strength to consummate the offense. In the present case, we find
that appellants and their 11 confederates took advantage of their
collective strength to inflict fatal injuries upon the victim by
rendering him defenseless and preventing his escape from the
attackers. The unarmed victim could not match the combined
strength of the 13 maulers. Appellants Drew and Ramos, who
were armed with a wooden club and a lead pipe, respectively,
reduced the unarmed victim into helplessness. The weapons
used by appellants negated any defense the victim could put up.
Alone and unarmed, the victim was no match to appellants and
their co-accused.
PP VS. BARCELON
To take advantage of superior strength means to use purposely
excessive force, out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. The aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength depends on the age, size and
strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. ACEIac
As held in ​People vs. Ocumen,​ an attack by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed woman constitutes the circumstance
of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used
in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable
to defend herself.
The disparity in age between the assailant and the victim, aged
29 and 69, respectively, indicates physical superiority on
appellant's part over the deceased. It did not matter that
appellant was "dark" with a "slim body build" or "​medyo mataba.​ "
What mattered was that the malefactor was male and armed with
a lethal weapon that he used to slay the victim. Thus, abuse of
superior strength was present in the commission of the crime.
But should it be considered as qualifying or aggravating? We
note that the amended information states: "That in the
commission of the crime, the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength were
present." In its decision, the trial court considered abuse of
superior strength as a generic aggravating circumstance and
deemed it absorbed in treachery. We agree that here abuse of
superior strength should be treated as merely aggravating. And
we find it is present in this case, although there is no treachery.
PP VS. VENTURA
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both
appellants guilty of murder qualified not by evident premeditation
but by taking advantage of superior strength, ​58 ​to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified
by the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. ​The accused
Arante Flores who delivered the
stabbing blow is big and strong,
standing about five feet and six (5'6")
inches tall.​ ​ His weapon was a 14 inch
dagger.​ ​ Aileen Bocateja [stood] only
about five (5'0") feet tall.​ ​ The disparity of
their strength is enormous.​ ​59
(Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. ​60​ The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength
of the parties, and is considered whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assuming a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous to
the aggressor, which is selected or taken advantage of by him in
the commission of the crime. ​61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant
Arante Flores is taller, and probably stronger than the victim
Aileen Bocateja because of their difference in sex as well as the
fact that the accused appellant Flores was armed at that time . .
." ​ ​Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's death was not attended
by abuse of superior strength since: (1) though ultimately
unsuccessful, she was able to put up a defense against
appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show that
appellant Flores deliberately took advantage of the disparity in
their size and sex in order to facilitate the commission of the
crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity
to defend himself or repel the aggression, ​ ​taking advantage of
superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of
the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of both and the employment
of means weakening the defense, ​although not annulling it.​
Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on
her and her husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an
electric cord, at appellant Flores does not automatically negate
the possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of his
superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has
consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes
the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and
the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the
woman was unable to defend herself.
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen,
appellant Flores clearly took advantage of the superiority which
his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
PP VS. HILARIO
Keyword: White Shirt
It is to be noted that the lower court, in finding the appellant guilty
of murder, qualified the killing by evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation, however, may not properly be taken into account
when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was
different from the one who became his victim. ​12 ​When the
person decided to kill a different person and premeditated on the
killing of the latter, but when he carried out his plan he actually
killed another person, it cannot properly be said that he
premeditated on the killing of the actual victim. Thus
premeditation was not aggravating in the case of​People vs.​
Guillen​, ​13​ where the accused had deliberately intended to
assassinate former President Manuel Roxas but he killed instead
Simeon Varela and wounded others. This doctrinal rule applies
here.
PP VS. TOBECHUKWU
Keywords: Nigerian, sex worker
Similarly, the elements of evident premeditation must be
established with equal certainty as the criminal act itself before it
can be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. These employment of means of execution that gives the person
elements are: (1) the time when the accused determined to attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b)
commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that they the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) a adopted. ​25​ The CA, therefore, did not err when it ruled that the
sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime killing of the victim was neither attended by evident
and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon premeditation nor treachery, thus: HI
the consequences of their act. The essence of evident The element of evident premeditation is
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded manifested by the careful planning and
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the preparation undertaken by the offender
criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm prior to the commission of the crime. ​A
judgment. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the killing perusal of the evidence on record
of Atin was the product of cool thought and reflection. There is shows that the altercation between
absolutely no showing how and when the plan was hatched or appellant Duavis and Dante Largado,
how much time elapsed before the crime was carried out. On the Sr. took place at around 3:00 o'clock
contrary, what appears very much evident is that he was killed in the afternoon of May 2, 2003, and
on the occasion of an altercation with accused-appellant in the the hacking incident took place at
latter's rented room. Suffice it to state that without such around 5:30 in the afternoon of the
evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how same day​. To the mind of the Court, ​the
logical and probable, will not suffice. In other words, the lapse of time between the decision
evidence falls short of proving evident premeditation. cDTSHE and the execution is not sufficient to
allow appellant to fully reflect upon
PP VS. CONCILLADO
the consequences of his act and to
Keywords: 26 wounds
effectively and efficiently prepare and
Evident premeditation "requires proof showing: (1) the time when
plan his actions prior to the
the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) the overt act
commission of the crime​. Although it
manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; (3) a
may be argued that there was some
sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution,
kind of premeditation on the part of
allowing the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his
appellant Duavis, it was not proved to
act. Such proof must be based on external acts that are not
be evident.
merely suspicious but also notorious, manifest, evident and
This Court further finds that the
indicative of deliberate planning. The evidence must show [that]
qualifying circumstance of treachery is
the decision to kill prior to the moment of its execution was the
not present in the instant case because
result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempts.
evidence on record show that​appellant
Absent such evidence, mere presumptions and inferences are
Duavis chased Dante Largado, Sr.
insufficient. Evident premeditation may not be appreciated where
before the latter was hacked; hence,
there is no proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched
it cannot be concluded that appellant
or the time that elapsed before it was carried out. The
Duavis employed means of execution
premeditation must be evident and not merely suspected."
which gives Dante Largado, Sr. no
In the instant case, the testimony of Lorenzo having been
opportunity to retaliate or escape​.
properly discredited by the CA, the prosecution has no evidence
Moreover, the ​location of the hack
to show how the attack was commenced or how it was
wound on the left side of the face of
perpetrated. There is also no evidence to show that Edgar
the victim will also show that a
decided to kill Diosdado and has clung to such determination
frontal attack was made​.
even after a sufficient time has elapsed. Consequently, there is
Thus, in the absence of any
no basis for us to appreciate the qualifying aggravating
circumstance which would qualify the
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
killing of Dante Largado, Sr., appellant
PP VS. DUAVIS
Duavis can only be convicted of
Keywords: long bolo about twenty-four (24) inches in length
Homicide, not murder.
In finding that appellant is guilty of homicide, instead of murder,
TREACHERY
the CA ruled that there was an absence of the qualifying
PP VS. SICAD
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection
against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space
execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the
of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. ​23​ For it to be
defense which the offended party might make. Here, the
appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable
accused-appellants attacked the victim from behind in a swift,
doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the
deliberate and unexpected manner. Without warning and
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to
without risk to themselves, they threw a dynamite at him and
his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such
shot him even as he had already fallen to the ground. The
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
attack was thus treacherous, affording the victim no
circumstances of his act. ​24​ On the other hand, to appreciate
opportunity to resist or escape or defend himself.
treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the

PP VS. YANSON
Both the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery. "There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery
to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment
of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted." ​44
The prosecution established that appellant suddenly stabbed the
victim from behind thereby giving him no opportunity to resist the
attack or defend himself. As correctly observed by the appellate
court: SEcTHA
It is apparent that there was treachery in
the killing of [Magan]. As surely testified
by [Galfo], [appellant] followed the
unsuspecting victim when he was going
home and thereafter, deliberately
stabbed him in the back which resulted
in the falling of [Magan] to the ground
and rendering him defenseless to
[appellant's] further attacks. Verily,
[appellant] employed means which
insured the killing of [Magan] and such
means assured him from the risk of
[Magan's] defense had he made any. It
must also be noted that [Magan] was
stabbed four times in the back and two
of these wounds were the proximate
cause of his death. Stabbing from
behind is a good indication of treachery.
PP. VS. ABDULLAH
Treachery and evident premeditation, the circumstances alleged
in the informations, cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to
murder, considering that these were not proven during the trial. It
is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating
circumstances before being taken into consideration, for the
purpose of increasing the penalty to be imposed, must be proved
with equal certainty as those which establish the commission of
the criminal offense. It is not only the central fact of a killing that
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying or
aggravating circumstance alleged to have been present and to
have attended such killing must similarly be shown by the same
degree of proof.
PP. VS. GIDOC
As to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
we find the same to be present in these cases.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that
the offender might make. ​21​ The essence of treachery is a swift
and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the latter's part. ​22
In these cases, the circumstances showing how the victims were
stabbed reveal that they had no opportunity to defend
themselves. They were unarmed and unsuspecting, as they
were just singing and drinking when accused-appellant stabbed
them. As properly observed by the trial court, the swift and
unexpected attack by the accused rendered them helpless.
There was also no provocation on their part to justify the ire of
appellant. Treachery thus qualifies the killings to Murder.
PP VS. LOPEZ
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that
renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by
reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. ​21
In the case at bar, Chu was caught off-guard when, after he was
asking forgiveness from Regalado, the latter suddenly drew a
curved knife and stabbed and pursued the following victim. And
once Regalado and his co-appellants cornered Chu, Aragon
kicked and punched him while Lopez stabbed him several times
to thus preclude Chua * from defending himself.
PP V. DELA PEÑA
The RTC also correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing,
thus:
It is undisputed that the gunshot wound sustained by
the victim was located at the left back portion of the
chest and he has no other injuries apart from this
wound. Thus, it is evident that the victim was shot
from behind, with his back towards the assailant. It
has many times been held that treachery exists when
the defenseless victim was shot from behind and that
this shows that accused had employed means of
attack which offered no risk to himself from any
defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might
have taken. It is clear, therefore, that the victim has
not even thought that he will be shot by the accused
while scooping with a laddle ​(sic)​ rice inside the pot.
Accused employed deliberately the kind of attack
which offered no risk to himself what the victim might
do.
Treachery was employed by the accused because he
sought the cover of darkness to shot ​(sic)​ the victim to
avoid his recognition. Accused likewise shot the victim
while he was behind the railings of the kitchen and it
would be hard for the victim to retaliate even if he had
the knowledge that he could be shot by the accused.
With all these circumstances attendant to the instant
case no doubt could be entertained by this court that
the accused shot the victim treacherously. SaAcHE
Nighttime, however, as aggravating circumstance is
absorbed by treachery. ​43
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter
of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. ​44​ In this case, the
victim was unarmed; and was attacked from behind and at close
range. The assailant further hid behind the window to mask his
presence and identity.
PP VS. AGACER
We are also unimpressed with appellants' contention that both
the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that treachery
qualified the killing of Cesario to murder. They maintain that
since the attack on Cesario was frontal, there was therefore no
element of surprise on the victim or suddenness of the assault
that characterizes treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make." ​31​ Two conditions must concur
for treachery to be appreciated. First, is the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Second, the means
of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted. ​32​ "The
essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor." ​33
In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances
we have already discussed above. From the facts, Cesario could
not have been aware that he would be surrounded, attacked and
killed by the appellants who were all related to him. He could not
have also been aware that Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a
sack because if he was, he would not have casually approached
Florencio when the latter summoned him. Unfortunately, while
Cesario was advancing towards Florencio, Eddie shot him at
close range without any warning whatsoever. Evidently, the
crime was committed in a manner that there was no opportunity
for Cesario to defend himself. Also, the mode of attack did not
spring from the unexpected turn of events but was clearly
thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer matters that the
assault was frontal since its swiftness and unexpectedness
deprived Cesario of a chance to repel it or offer any resistance in
defense of his person. ​34
Appellants' contention that treachery was not alleged with
certainty in the Information is also devoid of merit. In ​People v.
​ 5​ the Court appreciated treachery as an aggravating
Villacorta 3
circumstance, it having been alleged in the Information and
proved during trial that the ". . . accused, armed with a
sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR
CRUZ . . . ."
Similarly, we hold that treachery was sufficiently alleged in the
Information
PP VS. MANINGDING
There is treachery when "the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make." ​39​ These means or
methods are made in the form of a swift, deliberate and
unexpected attack, without any warning and affording the victim,
which is usually unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance at all to
resist or escape the impending attack. ​40
In this case, it is undisputed that it was accused-appellant who
stabbed and killed the victim, which is neither a crime of parricide
nor infanticide. We are, therefore, left with the issue of whether
there was treachery in the attack. Going over the records of the
case, We are convinced that, indeed, treachery was employed
and present in the stabbing by accused-appellant of the victim,
which led to the latter's ultimate death.
From the testimonies of Aladino and Rommel, it cannot be
gainsaid that accused-appellant without any warning or
suspicion, and taking advantage of the circumstances,
immediately attacked the victim. The victim did not have any
suspicion that could have alerted him of the impending attack. As
clearly demonstrated in the trial court, the attack was swift and
unexpected, even to the eyewitnesses, Aladino and Rommel.
We, therefore, agree with the RTC's ruling and finding, and We
find no reason to veer away from them.
PP VS. GUEVARRA
It is settled that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the information and proven during the trial before they
can be appreciated. ​51
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make. ​52​ The essence of
treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the
victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the
suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential elements
are required in order that treachery can be appreciated: (1) The
employment of means, methods or manner of execution that
would ensure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the
part of the offended party who has, thus, no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice
of means, methods or manner of execution. ​53
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and
all its elements were duly established by the prosecution.
Inspector Barte was sitting inside the jeep when appellant
suddenly appeared and approached him. Appellant asked
Inspector Barte if he was "Major Barte". However, before
Inspector Barte could respond or utter a word, appellant quickly
shot him several times in the head and chest with a caliber .45
pistol. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the appellant's
attack rendered Inspector Barte defenseless and without means
of escape. There is no doubt that appellant's use of a caliber .45
pistol, as well as his act of waiting for Inspector Barte to be
seated first in the jeep before approaching him and of shooting
Inspector Barte several times on the head and chest, was
adopted by him to prevent Inspector Barte from retaliating or
escaping. Considering that Inspector Barte was tipsy or drunk
and he was seated inside the jeep where the space is narrow,
there was absolutely no way for him to defend himself or escape.
cTAaDC
PP VS. TRINIDAD
The crime committed was murder with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, as characterized by the fact that the
victim was shot at close range while she was asleep, thus
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
assailants [​People v. Dequina​, 60 Phil. 279 (1934)]. That Juan
Angel, and not his mother, was apparently the intended victim is
not incompatible with the existence of treachery. Treachery may
be taken into account even if the victim of the attack was not the
person whom the accused intended to kill.
IGNOMINY
PP VS. ABAIGAR
The circumstance of ignominy was not present because no
means were employed nor did any circumstances surround the
act tending to make the effects of the crime more humiliating.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which
adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the
crime. The fact that the deceased was killed in the presence of
his wife certainly could not have such a signification, and this is
the circumstance which the court below had in view when
declaring that this circumstance had concurred.
PP VS. ACAYA
Neither should the aggravating circumstance of ignominy be
appreciated, defined as "a circumstance pertaining to the moral
order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime" (​U.S. vs. Abaigar,​ 2 Phil. 417 [1903]). The
fact that the crime was committed in a public place and in the
presence of many persons did not necessarily tend to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating or put the offended party to
shame.
PP VS. SIAO
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon, which is punishable by ​reclusion perpetua​ to
death. ​23 ​But the trial court overlooked and did not take into
account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and
sentenced accused-appellant to the single indivisible penalty
of​reclusion perpetua​. It has been held that where the accused in
committing the rape used not only the missionary position, ​i.e.
male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs
do, ​i.e.​ entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in
the instant case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy
attended the commission thereof​.
Article 15 Case Digests
-Relationship-
Pp v. Calongui
FACTS:​ Accused-appellant was guilty of two-counts of rape.
Accused-appellant and the victim were first cousins.
HELD:​ relationship is not aggravating because the relationship
between Marinel and the appellant as first cousins is not within
the concept contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code.
PP v. Capareda
FACTS:​ Accussed-appellant was guilty of four counts of rape.
The victim was the step-granddaughter of the accused.
HELD:​ The alternative aggravating circumstance of relationship
under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
considered in the instant case considering that the relationship
between a step-grandniece and her step-grandfather is not one
of the relatives specifically enumerated therein
Pp v. Orillosa
FACTS:​ Accused-appellant was found guilty of acts of
lasciviousness and two counts of rape. Accused was the father
of the victim.
HELD:​ The alternative circumstance of relationship under Article
15 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated against
appellant. In crimes of chastity such as acts of lasciviousness,
relationship is considered as aggravating. Inasmuch as it was
expressly alleged in the information and duly proven during trial
that the offended party is the daughter of appellant, relationship,
therefore, aggravated the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Penalty: Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime
of acts of lasciviousness is punished by​ prision correccional​.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and appreciating
relationship as an aggravating circumstance, appellant could be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six months of
arresto mayor,​ as minimum, to six years of ​prision correccional,​
as maximum, and to pay the victim P30,000.00 as moral
damages.
PP v. Glodo
FACTS:​ Appellant was found guilty of rape by the trial court. The
victim was appellant’s own daughter.
HELD: ​The Information alleges that Maricel was only 15 years
old at the time the crime was committed and that she is the
daughter of appellant. However, the prosecution merely
presented the oral testimony and sworn statement of Maricel. It
failed to present independent evidence proving the age of the
victim and her relationship with appellant so as to warrant the
imposition of death penalty. In ​People vs.​ ​ Viajedor,​ ​ ​we held:
The minority of the victim and the
offender's relationship to the victim, which
constitute only one special qualifying
circumstance, must be alleged in the
Information and proved with certainty.
Recent rulings of the Court relative to the
rape of minors invariably state that in order
to justify the imposition of the penalty of
death, there must be independent
evidence proving the age of the victim,
other than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses and the absence of denial by the
accused . . . The prosecution has the
burden of proving all the elements of a
crime, including the qualifying
circumstances, especially in death penalty
cases.
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to present independent
evidence to prove the age of victim Maricel and her
relationship with appellant, the trial court erred in
considering the special qualifying circumstance of minority
and relationship as basis for the imposition of the death
penalty. Appellant should have been found guilty of simple
rape and the penalty that should be imposed on appellant
is ​reclusion perpetua​ by virtue of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code.
-Intoxication-
PP v. Borbon
FACTS:​ Appellant was in front of the house of a certain Aling Pet
Pingol having conversation with one Jaime Talibangan and
Cristina David, appellant’s neice. The appellant reeked of liquor
and appeared to be drunk. The group of the deceased arrived
and talked about the basketball game they had seen earlier.
Cristina took leave of the group. Appellant meanwhile, did not
take part in the conversation. Suddenly he expressed to Jaime
his intention to kill. The latter went inside the house of Aling Pet
for fear. The group of the deceased remained in conversation.
Appellant then went into the house and brought back with him
two knives. Immediately and without warning, he stabbed the
deceased at the right side of the belly with one of the knives. The
victim died along the way to the hospital. The trial court
convicted the appellant of murder with the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication.
HELD:​ In its decision, the court ​a quo​ appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication in favor of the appellant. This Court,
however, disagrees with such finding. Under the third paragraph
of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication is
considered as an alternative circumstance, it may either be taken
as an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance. For intoxication
to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, the following
conditions must be present: (1) the same is not habitual or is not
subsequent to a plan of the commission of a felony; otherwise, it
is aggravating if it is habitual and intentional; and (2) the
consumption of alcoholic drinks was in such quantity as to blur
the accused's reason and deprive him of certain degree of
control.
Jaime testified that he noticed that the appellant was drunk as
his movement was swaying and he smelled of liquor. Nothing
else was mentioned about the appellant's drunkenness during
the incident. For his part, the appellant presented nothing to
prove that he was, indeed, not drunk. Having failed to prove that
intoxication was neither habitual nor intentional, the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication cannot be appreciated against or in
favor of the appellant.
PP v. Inggo
FACTS:​ Accused bought a bottle of beer from the store of the
deceased’s father. The helper tried to give him his change but
the accused refused saying that he wanted the original amount
back. Heated words were exchanged between accused and the
helper. Afterwards, the victim arrived and offered to give the
accused his change. The accused, however, refused and an
argument between accused and deceased ensued. While
appellant and the deceased were thus arguing, appellant
suddenly rushed to the deceased. When he was already near
her, he loosened his belt and removed it from his waist.
Rosemarie Reinante consequently ran. Appellant chased her
and when he caught up with her, appellant stabbed her. The
helper tried to separate the two. Rosemarie then ran to the road
but appellant continued to chase her. When he failed to catch up
to the deceased, he ran instead towards the cemetery.
Rosemarie was rushed to the hospital where she was
pronounced dead on arrival. The trial court found the evidence
for the prosecution credible and sufficient to convict appellant of
murder beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:​ We find the alternative circumstance of intoxication in
existent. Intoxication to be aggravating must have been the
source of bravado that propelled the accused to commit the
crime. As we have previously held:
Our penal laws do not look kindly on
habitual drunkards, or if the accused
already resolved to commit the crime,
then got intoxicated so as to fortify that
resolve with false courage dictated by
liquor, his liability should be aggravated.
Although there is no hard and fast rule
on the amount of liquor that the accused
imbibed on that occasion, but the test is
that it must have sufficed to affect his
mental faculties, to the extent of blurring
his reason and depriving him of
self-control.
Here, appellant's degree of intoxication was not proved with
certainty. He had allegedly been drinking ​tuba e ​ arlier that day,
and he did buy a bottle of beer at the store of the victim's in-laws.
But these facts are not sufficient to establish that indeed
appellant was intoxicated at the time he committed the crime,
much less that he sought intoxication to fortify his resolve in
committing it. Absent clear and convincing proof as to appellant's
state of intoxication, we are unable to agree that the alternative
circumstance of intoxication was present to aggravate the
offense.
In any event, intoxication as well as disregard of sex were not
alleged in the information, hence, these may not be considered
to aggravate the crime for the imposition of a higher penalty,
whether by degrees or periods. This is pursuant to the
amendments made to the Revised Rules of Court, particularly
toSec. 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
PP v. Bernal
FACTS:​ Accused-appellant was found guilty by the trial court of
the crime of murder for which he was sentenced to death,
violation of the gun ban and illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition for which he was sentenced to suffer indeterminate
prison terms. Appellant together with deceased and a group of
men, were on board a tricycle on their way to the Benedisco pub
house. Upon reaching the pub house, the deceased, Pedrito,
invited the group to go inside to dance. Pedrito, Rey and the
appellant, Arnel, went inside while Felix and Fernando were left
outside. Later, Fernando went inside to look for the three and
found them asleep. He brought each to the tricycle where Felix
was waiting to bring them home. Fernando first fetched the
deceased and then the accused. Upon fetching Rey, he heard a
gunshot and upon returning to the tricycle, he saw appellant
holding a gun. He heard another gunshot. It turned out the
accused had shot Pedrito. Fernando and the appellant grappled
with the gun where at that point, policemen arrived.
HELD:​ Accused-appellant argues that the trial court committed
an error when it imposed the death penalty on him on account of
the alternative aggravating circumstance of habitual
drunkenness. He claims that the prosecution was not able to
prove the same at the trial, much less that he intentionally got
drunk to commit the crime. We agree.
The general rule is that intoxication may be considered either as
aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances
attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication is mitigating
and therefore has the effect of decreasing the penalty if the
intoxication is not habitual or attendant to the plan to commit the
contemplated crime. On the other hand, when intoxication is
habitual or done intentionally to embolden the malefactor and
facilitate the plan to commit the crime,​ ​it is considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
In the instant case, accused-appellant's intoxication cannot be
considered aggravating because there was no showing that it
was habitual or intentional. As testified to by prosecution witness
Felix Bernal, their group drink liquor only occasionally, that is, if
they had visitors. His testimony that if they had visitors everyday,
they drank everyday does not suffice to prove that
accused-appellant was a habitual drunkard. Nor should such
statement be taken against the accused-appellant. Undeniably,
accused-appellant was a mere visitor at that time. He came to
Bangued to attend a hearing and from there went to Barangay
Dangdangla, Bangued to visit his relatives.
Further, the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant
got drunk on the day the murder occurred for the purpose of
committing the same. Neither did accused-appellant initiate the
drinking spree. He merely acceded to the invitation of the victim
to join his group in their drinking spree. Thus, in the absence of
clear and convincing proof that the intoxication was habitual or
intentional on the part of accused-appellant, it is improper to
consider the same as an aggravating circumstance.
But his intoxication cannot likewise be considered mitigating
because accused-appellant failed to show that his intoxication
impaired his will power or his capacity to understand the
wrongful nature of his acts. The person pleading intoxication
must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage,
prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason.
This accused-appellant failed to do. No proof was presented by
accused-appellant that the amount of liquor he had taken was of
such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. The mere claim of
intoxication does not entitle him to the mitigating circumstance of
intoxication.
-Lack of Instruction-
PP v. Mangsant
FACTS:​ The defendant appealed from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Manila finding him guilty of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to ​reclusion perpetua​. The
information against him alleged that the said accused attack
Demetria Ferrer, a girl 14 years of age, stabbing her from behind
with a knife and inflicting upon her various wounds in different
parts of the body which produced her instantaneous death.
HELD:​ As to the mitigating circumstances, it is not proper to
consider lack of instruction in favor of the defendant, inasmuch
as he admitted that he had studied in the first grade in a public
elementary school. Lack of instruction cannot apply to one who
has studied in the first grade in a public school, but only to him
who really has not received any instruction (art. 15, first
paragraph, Revised Penal Code).
Article 17-Principals
Indicators of conspiracy
PP V. SICAD
FACTS: Accused-appellant, Melchor Sicad went to his parents'
house to attend to his ailing mother who suffered a stroke.
Present in the house were his co-accused, namely, Jimmy
Asturias, Rudy Sicad and Camelo Lobaton. The deceased,
Roberto Asturias, Sr., Melchor's cousin, also arrived. Melchor
offered Roberto a bottle of beer, but he refused. This resulted in
a verbal clash and an exchange of fist blows between them.
Roberto finally left, while Melchor returned to the bedside of his
mother who, shortly thereafter, died.
Later that evening, Roberto Asturias, Sr. was found dead near
his fishing banca. The victim's 11-year old son, and Jimmy
Asturias pointed to accused-appellants Rudy Sicad, Camelo
Lobaton, Melchor Sicad, and the latter's employees, Paquito
Bernil and Johnny Guiñez, as the assailants.
Roberto Asturias, Jr. testified that he saw Paquito Bernil throwing
a dynamite at his father which exploded and hit his father's back.
Then Rudy Sicad fired a gun at his father. While his father was
already lying on the ground with his face down, Camelo Lobaton
also shot him. All the while, Melchor Sicad and Johnny Guiñez
stood as lookouts under a nearby. Thereafter, the five
accused-appellants escaped toward the house of Melchor.
Jimmy Asturias corroborated the testimony of Roberto Asturias,
Jr.
HELD: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. As a rule, conspiracy must be proved as
convincingly and indubitably as the crime itself. It is not
necessary, however, that conspiracy be proved by direct
evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted
action and a community of interest among the accused.
This Court holds that the trial court did not err when it found that
conspiracy exists in this case. While there is no direct evidence
to show that accused-appellants agreed to commit the crime,
however, their acts and the attendant circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime disclose a common design that
would make all of them co-principals in the crime committed.
As shown by the records, accused-appellants Paquito Bernil,
Rudy Sicad and Camelo Lobaton threw a dynamite and fired at
the victim, while accused-appellants Melchor Sicad and Johnny
Guiñez stood guard and acted as lookouts. All of them
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as
to unmistakably indicate a common purpose of bringing about
the death of the victim. Moreover, the simultaneous convergence
of the accused-appellants at the crime scene, their specific acts
in the commission of the crime, and their simultaneous flight
toward the house of Melchor Sicad pointed to a conspiracy
among them.
The contention of Melchor Sicad and Johnny Guiñez, who acted
as lookouts, that their mere presence in the scene of the crime
did not make them co-conspirators does not persuade us. One
who participates in the material execution of the crime by
standing guard or lending moral support to the actual
perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent
as the latter. In a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all
the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Indeed, the
accused-appellants' synchronous presence at the place was not
a mere coincidence but was in pursuance of a design to kill
Roberto Asturias, Sr., with whom Melchor Sicad had a previous
fight.
There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they are
liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of
their participation since, in point of law, the act of one is the act
of all.
The trial court's appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation cannot be sustained. Proof of conspiracy
does not imply the existence of evident premeditation. The rule is
that evident premeditation may not be taken into account where,
as here, conspiracy is not based on direct proof but is inferred
from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the crime.
The Court sustains the trial court's finding that the
accused-appellants are guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.
PP vs. REYES
FACTS: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua
Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny
(daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene
(grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea
(housemaids).
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay
Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at
about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van,
arrived at the their poultry farm. Yao San alighted from the van to
open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes and
a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their
guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant
Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with
guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores
took the driver's seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the
Yao family inside the van with packaging tape. After about 30
minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of
appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the
van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their
male companions. ​Appellant Flores, with the other male
companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the
Yao family inside the vehicle.
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male
companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million
pesos as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant
Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao
San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside
the van. Yao San then drove the van towards the poultry farm
and sought the help of relatives.
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo,
Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the
mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they
spent the whole night.
On the morning of the following day, the kidnappers tried to
contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter
could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to
look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein,
Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be
found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind
Yao San about the ransom. Thereafter, appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry
farm and went back to the safe-house.
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release
him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San.
Abandoned by the appellants and upon arriving at the poultry
farm, Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom
demanded by the appellants for the remaining held victims.
A series of calls were made between Yao San and the
kidnappers in which he was instructed to deliver the ransom and
not tell the authorities. However, kidnappers did not show up
when Yao San delivered the ransom money.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon
City. Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.
HELD: Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend
that the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in
kidnapping the Yao family. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective among the accused. ​When the accused by
their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and
the other performing another part as to complete the crime, with
a view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists.
As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn
statements of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and
Pataray approached and poked their guns at Yao San, and
thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then
took the driver's seat and drove the van, while each member of
the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo
and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores
instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as
ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and
appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded
Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the
safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in
going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about
the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions ​how they
planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their
extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular
role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts
in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual
acts of appellants and their cohorts demonstrated their unity of
purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose
of extorting ransom.
PP VS. ALETA, ET AL
FACTS: Marcelo, Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all
surnamed Aleta was charged for the murder of Celestino
Duldulao y Yadao and Ferdinand Acob. All above-named accuse
club with the use of hard objects both the victims. The Court
upholds the version of the prosecution: While the deceased
Acob’s mother, Marina, went to the community center, she heard
a commotion on the yard of the appellants. Returning home, she
told Acob of the quarrel. Acob went to the appellants’ compound.
Upon following her son, Marina witnessed Rogelio striking Acob
with a piece of wood, causing the latter to fall. She thereafter
saw Rogelio striking Duldulao causing the latter’s eyes to pop
out. Rogelio then ran towards the family house whereupon
Marina heard gunshots. Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand continued
to hit them. When Rogelio emerged from the house, he got
another piece of wood and clubbed the victims.
HELD: Conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or
more persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part of their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred. And where there is
conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.
PP vs. PABLO AMODIA
FACTS: Romildo Ceno testified that he along with two friends
were talking and watching television when he heard a noise
coming somewhere below the C-5 Bridge, located 40-50 meters
away from their house. He also heard somebody shouted “may
away doon.” Curious, he and Mario went to the bridge and saw
five persons whom he identified as the victim (Felix Olandria
Bergaño), Pablo Amodia, Arnold Partosa, George Palacio and
Damasio Amodia. He knew these men as they were neighbors.
Illuminated by light coming from a post, he saw the victim being
held in the right hand by Pablo, while the other hand was held by
Arnold. George was positioned at the victim’s back and clubbed
the victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and
stabbed him three times. Luther Caberte who happened to be
passing by the C-5 bridge at that time, also saw what happened.
He testified that he saw men fighting under the C-5 bridge which
was illuminated by a light from a lamppost. He saw Pablo,
Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up on the victim. He saw
Pablo holding the victim’s hand while Damaso was stabbing
him. He also affirmed that George was positioned behind the
victim. He personally knew both the victim and Pablo as they
have been neighbors. Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the
stabbing; Romildo was chased away by George and Damaso
while Luther went on home immediately.
The accused-appellant Pablo Amodia invoked the defense of
alibi. In his appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court and the CA
erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to his alibi. He
alternatively argues that granting that he was part of Damaso’s
group and that the group killed the victim, the prosecution failed
to establish the conspiracy among them. There was no evidence
adduced to establish how the incident that led to the stabbing
began.
HELD: As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the
failure of the prosecution’s evidence to establish the conspiracy
between him and his other co-accused to make him liable for
murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified by the
eyewitnesses, only relate to events during and not prior to the
assault and the stabbing of the victim. He argues that no
evidence was adduced to show that the accused all agreed to kill
the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It arises the very instant the plotters agrees, expressly
or impliedly, to commit a felony and forthwith decide to pursue it.
It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct
proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is
often resorted to in order to prove its existence. Absent of any
direct proof as in the present case, conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves,
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest. An accused participates as a
conspirator if he or she has performed some overt acts as a
direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Stated otherwise, it
is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement
and decision to commit the crime, it is sufficient that the
malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a
prior agreement of Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso, the
following chain of events however show their commonality of
purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused surrounded the
victims on all sides; Damaso at the front, George at the victim’s
rear; while Pablo and Arnold flanked the victim on each side;
second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim and
restrained his movement; while Arnold did the same to the left
arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victim’s head with a
piece of wood; and fourth, Damaso stabbed the victim three
times.
PP VS. REGALARIO
FACTS: Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are
barangay officials and related to one another. Appellants Sotero
and Bienvenido Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla
several times with their nightsticks. The blows caused Sevilla to
fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he was able
to get up. He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant
Mariano Regalario, the barangay captain. Bienvenido and Sotero
Regalario chased Sevilla. When Sevilla was already near
Marciano's house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon
Regalario and at this point, Marciano Regalario and his son Noel
Regalario came out of their house​. N ​ oel was carrying a
seven-inch knife. The five appellants caught the victim in front of
Marciano's house. Armed with their nightsticks, they took turns in
hitting the victim until he slumped to the ground face down. In
that position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a
while, when Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano first ordered
the others to kill the victim and to tie him up. Upon hearing the
order, Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands
and feet of the victim with a nylon rope used by farmers for tying
carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching.
HELD: The Court agrees with the findings of the lower courts as
to the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is
rarely found. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may
be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the
offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of intent. It does not
matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act
of all, and each incurs the same criminal liability. We quote with
approval the findings and observations of the CA, thus:
The eyewitnesses' account surrounding Rolando Sevilla's death
shows that the accused-appellants performed concerted acts in
pursuit of a common objective. Sotero, Bienvenido, and Ramon,
armed with nightsticks, and Noel armed with a knife, seven
inches in length, beat Rolando Sevilla. All five
accused-appellants caught up with the victim, blocked all means
through which the victim could escape and ensured the
achievement of their plan to kill Rolando Sevilla even as the
latter already fell to the ground. Accused-appellant Marciano hit
the victim on his jaw and later, ordered his co-accused to kill and
tie the victim. Upon hearing Marciano's instruction, Bienvenido
Regalario tied Rolando's neck, hands and feet with a rope. The
collective act of the accused-appellants is sufficient to make
them co-principals to the killing.
Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the
attack against Rolando was carried out, and the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses positively identifying the
accused-appellants as the assailants, we concur in the rulings of
the CA, affirming those of the trial court, in (a) disregarding
Ramon Regalario's declaration that he attacked the victim in
self-defense and (b) holding that all the accused-appellants
acted in concert and killed Rolando.
PP vs. MALIBIRAN
FACTS: Rolando "Botong" Malibiran and Beverly Tibo-Tan were
convicted of Murder and Parricide, respectively, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction
arose from the death of Reynaldo Tan on February 5, 1995. The
antecedents that led to Reynaldo's death, however, go way back
in the 70's when Reynaldo left his common-law wife, Rosalinda
Fuerzas and their two children, Jessie and Reynalin, in Davao,
and went to Manila to seek greener pastures. While in Manila,
Reynaldo met and had a relationship with appellant. They
eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant begot three
children — Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R. In 1984, Reynaldo's
and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their
relationship. This led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship
with appellant; and in 1991, Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal
house and started living again with Rosalinda, although
Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal ties with his
children. On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and
appellant were in Greenhills with their children for their usual
Sunday gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura restaurant,
the family separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to do
some shopping. Later, they regrouped and purchased groceries
at Unimart. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the family
stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the
parking lot to get his red Honda Accord, while the rest of his
family stayed behind and waited. Immediately thereafter, the
family heard an explosion coming from the direction where
Reynaldo parked his car. Appellant and Renevie got curious and
proceeded to the parking lot. There, they saw the Honda Accord
burning, with Reynaldo lying beside the driver's seat, burning,
charred and bleeding profusely. A taxi driver named Elmer Paug
(Elmer) appeared and pulled Reynaldo out of the car. Reynaldo
was then rushed to the Cardinal Santos Medical Hospital where
he eventually died because of the severe injuries he sustained.
The underlying cause of his death was Multiple Fracture &
Multiple Vascular Injuries Secondary to Blast Injury.
HELD: The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Janet and
Oswaldo clearly link appellant to the planning of the crime. True,
as intimated by appellant, she may not have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of the explosion; but then again, if she
was, then she would have suffered the same fate as Reynaldo.
Moreover, the nature of the crime and the manner of its
execution, i.e., via a booby trap, does not demand the physical
presence of the perpetrator at the very time of its commission. In
fact, the very manner in which it was carried out necessitated
prior scheming and execution for it to succeed. Thus, appellant's
absence from the actual scene of the crime does not negate
conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of her husband. A
conspiracy exists even if not all the parties committed the same
act, but the participants performed specific acts that indicated
unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design. Moreover,
direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not
necessary to prove conspiracy — conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.
The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the following
set of circumstances which, if taken collectively, show the guilt of
appellant: that appellant and Rolando conspired, planned and
agreed to kill Reynaldo using a grenade; that appellant
duplicated the key to the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that
Rolando could gain access to the car; that appellant thereafter
gave the duplicate key to Rolando; that on February 5, 1995,
appellant told Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord of
Reynaldo until the latter parked the car; that appellant told
Oswaldo to thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring
the latter to where Reynaldo parked his red Honda Accord.
Reynaldo died soon after due to injuries he sustained from an
explosion caused by grenades planted in his car.
Another notable fact is that according to the expert opinion of
Inspector Selverio Dollesin, Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of
the Eastern Police District, the perpetrator had information about
the victim's movements. Dollesin also observed that the
perpetrator knew his intended victim, since the grenade was
specifically placed in between the driver's seat and the front
door. That the perpetrator knew the victim's movements was
further corroborated by the affidavits executed by the Tan
children, Renevie and Jag Carlo, ​attesting that while they spent
their Sundays with their father, this was the only time that they
spent a Sunday in Greenhills. Only someone who had close
personal contact with Reynaldo would know his movements,
where the car would be parked, and that he was the one who
usually drove the red Honda Accord, such that it was precisely
positioned to ensure damage to the intended victim.
Where there is no conspiracy
PP vs. GENSOLA
FACTS: Rufino Gensola was the driver, while Fidelina Tan and
Felicisimo Tan were the conductors, of a passenger truck. They
suspected Miguel Gayanilo of having punctured the tires of the
truck while it was parked in front of his ​carinderia. ​Passengers
overheard Fidelina Tan mutter to herself, obviously referring to
someone she did not name: "He does not appear because I will
kill him." A day later, Miguel Gayanilo was crossing the street
from the public market in the direction of his ​carinderia with
Rufino Gensola, holding in his right hand a stone as big as a
man's fist, following closely behind. At this time, Felicisimo and
Fidelina Tan were standing in the middle of the street After
Miguel Gayanilo had crossed the middle of the street near the
two, Fidelina Tan shouted, "Rufino, strike him." Upon hearing the
shout Miguel looked back and Rufino suddenly struck him on the
left face with the stone. Felicisimo then struck Miguel with a
piece of iron on the back of the head causing serious wounds
and fracture of the skull. Not content with the two blows already
given, Fidelina struck Miguel with another piece of iron on the left
forehead causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull.
Miguel fell to the ground near the canal along the side of the
street. Rufino Gensola immediately left for his house situated on
Gonzales St. Felicisimo and Fidelina observed the prostrate
body for a few seconds until Fidelina muttered: "He is already
dead." The two then left the scene of the crime. The lower court
found the three defendants guilty as principals of the crime of
murder.
HELD: Let us now consider the criminal liability of the three
appellants. The lower court found them guilty as principals of the
crime of murder on the assumption that there was conspiracy
among them. We do not agree, for the following reasons: (1)
Fidelina Tan's intention revealed by the words she muttered to
herself, "He does not appear because I will kill him," was not
shared by Felicisimo Tan who kept silent. Silence is not a
circumstance indicating participation in the same criminal design.
With respect to Rufino Gensola, he was not even in the truck at
the time (2) When Miguel Gayanilo was crossing Gerona St., it
was only Rufino Gensola who followed closely behind Fidelina
Tan and Felicisimo Tan were in the middle of the street. The
words shouted by Fidelina Tan, "Rufino, strike him," were meant
as a command and did not show previous concert of criminal
design. (3) The blows given with pieces of iron on the back of the
head and on the forehead by Felicisimo and Fidelina after Rufino
had struck with a piece of stone the left face of Miguel, do not in
and by themselves show previous concert of criminal design.
Particularly when it is considered that Rufino immediately left
thereafter while Felicisimo and Fidelina remained for a few
seconds observing the prostrate body of Miguel until Fidelina
muttered, "He is already dead."
In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three appellants
is individual, that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act.
Appellant Rufino Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds
inflicted by him on the left face of Miguel Gayanilo.
Is appellant Fidelina Tan also liable for the offense considering
that she gave the command "Rufino, strike him"? The second
class of principals, according to Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code, comprises "those who directly force or induce others to
commit it (the act)." Those who directly induce others to commit
the act are called "principals by inducement" or "principals by
induction," from the Spanish "autores por inducción." The word
"inducement" comprises, in the opinion of Viada and the
Supreme Court of Spain, reward, promise of reward, command,
and pacto.​ With respect to command, it must be the moving
cause of the offense. In the case at bar, the command shouted
by Fidelina, "Rufino, strike him," was not the moving cause of the
act of Rufino Gensola. The evidence shows that Rufino would
have committed the act of his own volition, even without said
words of command.
PP VS. PADRONES
FACTS: The victim was at the MGR Family Disco and
Restaurant, celebrating his birthday. Biare arrived thereafter and
about ten minutes later, Alex Padrones appeared. It seems that
the two had been old acquaintances who, up to then, had not
seen each other. The two apparently exchanged pleasantries,
shook hands, but separated immediately. Padrones sat at a table
where he met certain women while Biare sat alone on another
table. The victim then approached Padrones and apparently
challenged him to a fight. A brawl ensued where both Padrones
and Sison struggled in possession of a knife. A while later, the
companions of the victim ganged up on Padrones. Biare, all the
while, remained seated. When the dust settled and the lights
went on, Padrones lay crawling on the dis co floor, bloodied and
his head bowed. According to Biare, Padrones had his hands
raised in surrender and he allegedly pleaded.Biare then allegedly
offered to bring him to a hospital, but the latter declined and
instead asked that he be brought home. What turned out,
however, is that while Padrones nursed his injuries, Lorenzo
Sison had also in fact been wounded, as a result also of a
knifing, although both Padrones and Biare denied harming him.
Meanwhile, Lorenzo Sison signed a handwritten statement in his
hospital bed to the Surallah police accusing Padrones of having
inflicted one stab wound on him. He also implicated Biare and
charged him with stabbing him once. He later on expired due to
respiratory failure and internal bleeding.
The star witness for the prosecution, Llaneta, testified that he
was involved in that brawl that he was one of those who ganged
up on Padrones. He testified that as he beat up Padrones, the
latter slipped out a knife and so did Biare. He allegedly retreated
whereupon, saw Padrones bury his knife on Sison. Dr.
Velasquez, testifying for the prosecution, added that the victim
had been stabbed by two different instruments, belonging to two
different persons, "or one person, if he changed his instrument.
The trial court found the existence of conspiracy and convicted
both accused of murder.
HELD: The trial judge portrays the accused-appellants' "chance
meeting" as an effort "to establish no conspiracy between them
took place." What he, the trial judge, loses sight of is the fact that
the accused were not called upon to discredit the prosecution's
theory of conspiracy. It was the prosecution's duty to establish
the existence of what the prosecution alleged to be conspiracy.
The trial judge also expresses doubts whether or not the
accused, Joseph Biare, indeed just minded his own business
while the Sisons ganged up on his co-accused. "Would one
permit his friend molested," he inquired, "without raising a voice
of protest?" His rich imagination is fascinating, but that hardly
belongs to a judge. As Biare averred, he did come to the aid of
his co-accused, although after the damage had been done and
the latter lay battered on the ground. What the judge would make
out, however, from the defense's version is that either Padrones
or Biare merely contrived the whole yarn, and that the melee
never occurred at all (because as he states, if there indeed was
one, Biare would have allegedly stood up for a friend in distress).
But the very testimony of Antonio Llaneta, witness for the
prosecution, is arrayed against him, the latter having admitted
"that he boxed [sic] Alex [Padrones]."
Padrones' parting statement: "Diputa kamo, lenti kamo,
magkita-ay kita buas," and the fact that both accused left
together can not be accepted by the Court as a piece of
evidence of conspiracy. It has been held that conspiracy, like the
offense itself, must be shown to exist beyond reasonable doubt.
So also has it been held that conspiracy "transcends
companionship." Hence, the fact that the two accused may have
happened to leave together, and one of them left a closing
warning, can not instantly support a finding of conspiracy. The
prosecution is, in addition, hard put to adduce evidence
demonstrating facts that the parties had priorly come to an
agreement to commit the crime with which they are charged.
Although the act of agreeing need not be demonstrated,
evidence of the fact of agreement must nonetheless be
convincingly shown. The accused's acts after the fact, by
themselves, are inadequate to show that previous agreement.
Principal by Induction
PP VS. YANSON-DUMANCAS
FACTS: Of the 13 accused charged with Kidnapping for Ransom
with Murder of one Rufino Gargar, Jr., 3 accused were acquitted,
9 were convicted as principals and 1 accused was convicted as
accessory. On appeal, the Supreme Court acquitted 3 more
accused including Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas.
HELD: On the case of accused-appellant Jeanette
Yanson-Dumancas, the information charged her of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom with murder as principal by induction
together with her husband, Charles, who was found by the trial
court not guilty of the crime.
What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient
evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the
following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to commit the crime,
or (b) directly ​inducing ​them to commit the crime.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime,
namely: (i) by using ​irresistible force,​ or (​ii​) by causing
uncontrollable fear.​ Upon review of the testimony of all the
witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to conclude that
Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear
upon the other accused-appellants. From the factual findings of
the trial court, it is patent that the plan to abduct and liquidate the
victims was hatched on August 5, 1992 (10:30 A.M.) without
Jeanette's involvement or participation whatsoever. The record is
entirely bereft of any evidence to show that Jeanette directly
forced the participants of the said meeting to come up with such
plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable
fear. The only basis relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its
conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by
inducement, is the supposed "commands" or order given by her
to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche on two occasions. By
no stretch of the imagination may these so-called "commands",
standing alone, be considered as constituting irresistible force or
causing uncontrollable fear.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit
a crime, namely: (​i)​ by giving a price​, or offering ​reward or
promise​, and (​ii)​ by using​words of command​. The Court finds no
evidence, as did the trial court, to show that Jeanette offered any
price, reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants
should they abduct and later kill the victims in this case. If at all,
the prosecution witness mentioned the name of Ricardo Yanson
as having lent money to accused-appellant Col. Torres to be
used for paying the latter's debts or obligations. But definitely, no
money ever came from Jeanette herself. The trial court's surmise
that the money delivered by Ricardo Yanson to the group was
with the knowledge and approval of Jeanette is completely
baseless.
The only matter left for consideration is whether the order
supposedly given by Jeanette to accused-appellant Geroche "to
take care of the two" constitutes words of command which may
be considered sufficient basis to convict Jeanette as principal by
inducement. prLL
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by
inducement, the following must be present: (1) the inducement
be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the
crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission by the material executor. To constitute inducement,
there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive
resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the
commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the
person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to
commit the crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care
of the two" does not constitute the command required by law to
justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. “A
chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a
situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to
a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind of one for
some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one
who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation
that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it
produce the result. In such case, while the expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one
who spoke the word or performed the act) would not be guilty of
the crime committed."
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of
inducement, should precede the commission of the crime itself.
In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element
of the crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with murder) has
already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told
accused-appellant Geroche to "take care of the two." Said
utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to
commit the crime charged in this case.
Most importantly, it was duly proven by no less than the
prosecution witness himself, Moises Grandeza, that the intention
of Jeanette was but to allow the law to its course.
Principal by Indispensible Cooperation
PP VS. CARIAGA
FACTS: The victim Ernesto de Guzman, Sr. confided to his
brother, Balbino de Guzman, that appellants Cosme and Nestor
Carriaga were grabbing his land and that they threatened to kill
him. Ernesto became the object of their ire since he started to
improve the river as a source of livelihood. On one occasion, the
appellants Carriaga brothers told Ernesto not to continue working
the area or else something might happen to him and his family.
Appellant Ben Palis accused Ernesto of informing the police that
the Carriaga brothers owned guns.
On the night of December 3, 1933, accused-appellants
proceeded to the house of the victim. The wife of the accused
testified that she then saw appellants Cosme and Nestor, each
holding a ​bolo​, and Palis, standing by the door, with both hands
placed at his back. Nestor and Cosme went directly to where
Ernesto was sleeping and immediately began hacking him. Both
the wife and the son of the victim escaped from the house for
fear. As they were escaping, they heard a vehicle approaching.
Thinking that the killers might have boarded the same, they hid
among the tall grasses. When they peeped, they saw the three
appellants in the front seat of a blue passenger jeepney. After
the vehicle passed, the two continued to run until they reached
the ​poblacion.​
HELD​: Conspiracy having been established, the Court deems it
necessary to distinguish the nature of the participation of
appellants Nestor, Cosme and Palis. in the commission of a
crime by two or more persons, those who take direct
participation are principals by direct participation; those who
directly force or induce others to commit the crime are principals
by induction; while those who cooperate in the commission of the
crime by another act without which the commission of the
offense would not have been accomplished are principals by
indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 of Article 17.
In the present case, it is clear that appellants Nestor and Cosme
are principals by direct participation. Both of them with the same
purpose and design hacked Ernesto repeatedly to kill the victim.
The question is: What is the nature of participation of appellant
Palis? It is an established fact borne by the prosecution evidence
that the three appellants went inside the house of Ernesto
without prior notice or permission from the occupants of the
house; that appellant Palis merely stood by the door of the house
while his co-appellants hacked Ernesto to death; that he left the
scene of the crime together with the other appellants; and that
they were altogether found riding in a jeepney and arrested by
the police. That Palis just stood by the door without saying
anything cannot therefore be considered as a mere passive
presence that would have negated his participation as a
conspirator. However, there are no other facts established by the
prosecution that would prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant Palis committed acts in the killing of Ernesto that would
categorize him as a principal by induction, by direct participation
or by indispensable cooperation. What is certain from the facts
established by the prosecution, is that he had the same purpose
and design as the other appellants as shown by the fact that he
went inside the house of the victim, uninvited and unannounced
together with his co-appellants Nestor and Cosme who were
armed with ​bolos​; and that after the hacking, he left the house
together with appellants Nestor and Cosme and rode a jeepney
together.
​ here we
In such case, we apply our ruling in ​People vs. Ubiña w
held that when an accused does not fall under any of the three
concepts defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, he
may only be considered guilty as an accomplice.
Penalties
PEOPLE VS. LUCAS
FACTS: In the decision in this case, the First Division touched
on the nature of the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua in the light of
​ in Article 63 assumes serious proportions since it does not
Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 which amended Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code by specifically fixing the duration of
reclusion perpetua at twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
(40) years. It opined that since no corresponding amendment to
Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code was made, the said law
has not made explicit an intention to convert ​reclusion perpetua
into a divisible penalty. Nevertheless, it applied Article 65 of the
​ and plunder (Section 12). Now then, if Congress had intended to
Revised Penal Code​ and stated:
"Accordingly, the time included in the
penalty of ​reclusion perpetua (twenty
[20] years and one [1] day to forty [40]
years) can be divided into three equal
portions with each composing a period.
The periods of ​reclusion perpetua would
then be as follows:
minimum—20 years and 1
day to 26 years and 8 months
medium—26 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 33 years and 4
months
maximum—34 years, 4
months and 1 day to 40
years.
Taking into account the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship
in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, the
accused may finally be sentenced to
thirty-four (34) years, from (4) months
and one (1) day of ​reclusion perpetua.​ "
In a motion for clarification seasonably filed by the appellee on
28 June 1994 which was not opposed by the accused-appellant
in his comment, the appellee asks the Court to correct the
duration of the maximum period of ​reclusion perpetua from
thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty
(40) years, as stated in the decision, to thirty-three (33) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
HELD: After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the
legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that
although Section 17 of R.A No. 7659 has fixed the duration of
reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its
original classification as an indivisible penalty. [I]f ​reclusion
perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for
existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the
amended R.A. No. 6425 provides for the penalty of ​reclusion
perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs involved are of
any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code were
no longer applicable because ​reclusion perpetua is supposed to
be a divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for
determining when either ​reclusion perpetua or death should be
the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no occasion for
imposing ​reclusion perpetuaa ​ s the penalty in drug case,
regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances.
This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules
involve only drug cases, as aforesaid. Under the amendatory
sections of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua to
death is also imposed on treason by a Filipino (Section 2),
qualified piracy (Section 3), parricide (Section 5), murder
(Section 6), kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Section 8),
robbery with homicide (Section 9), destructive arson (Section
10), rape committed under certain circumstances (Section 11),
reclassify reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty, then it should
have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal
Code. The latter is the law on what are considered divisible
penalties under the Code and what should be the duration of the
periods thereof. There are, as well, other provisions of the
Revised Penal Code involving ​reclusion perpetua,​ such as
Article 41 on the accessory penalties thereof and paragraphs 2
and 3 of Article 61, which have not been touched by a
corresponding amendment. What then may be the reason for the
amendment fixing the duration of ​reclusion perpetua? ​ The
deliberations in the Bicameral Conference Committee and in
both Chambers of Congress do not enlighten us on this, except
the cryptic statement of Senator Tolentino adverted to above on
the elimination of the "new penalty" of ​life imprisonment by the
Bicameral conference Committee. It may however, be pointed
out that although the Revised Penal Code did not specify the
maximum of ​reclusion perpetua,​ it is apparent that the maximum
period for the service of this penalty shall not exceed forty (40)
years. At most then, in fixing a specific duration for ​reclusion
perpetua Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 merely restated the
existing jurisprudence.
PDEA V. BRODETT
FACTS: Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph were
charged with a violation of Section 5, in relation to
Section 26 (b), of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act in the Regional
Trial Court in Muntinlupa City. Likewise, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City; filed another
information charging only Brodett with a violation of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence.
He averred that during his arrest, PDEA had seized
several personal non-drug effects from him, including
a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no.
XPF-551; and that PDEA refused to return his
personal effects despite repeated demands for their
return.
The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the
return of the car because it appeared to be the
instrument in the commission of the violation of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle
used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous
drugs. The RTC directed the release of the car.
PDEA contend that Brodett’s ​Motion to Return Non-Drug
Evidence ​did not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to
a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms.
Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto
authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to
prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission
of the crime.
HELD:
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car
belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs
involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the
criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal
proceedings.
The Court agrees with the finding of the CA that:
A careful reading of the above provision
shows that ​confiscation and forfeiture
in drug-related cases pertains to "all the
proceeds and properties derived from
the unlawful act, including but not limited
to, ​money and other assets obtained
thereby, and ​the instruments or tools
with which the particular unlawful act
was committed unless they are the
property of a third person not liable
for the unlawful act."​ Simply put, ​the
law exempts from the effects of
confiscation and forfeiture any
property that is owned by a third
person who is not liable for the
unlawful act​.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the
Honda Accord subject of this petition is
owned by and registered in the name
of Myra S. Brodett, not accused
Richard Brodett​. Also, it does not
appear from the records of the case that
said Myra S. Brodett has been charged
of any crime, more particularly, in the
subject cases of possession and sale of
dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20
of the law to the dispute at bar, We
therefore see no cogent reason why the
subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and
forfeiture.
Even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165 relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code,​ which provides that “Such
proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government, ​unless they be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense​, but those
articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.”
To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a
third person, therefore, there must be an indictment charging
such third person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice.
Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools
and instruments to the third person, for a mere suspicion of that
person's participation is not sufficient ground for the court to
order the forfeiture of the goods seized.
However, the Court also agrees with PDEA and the Office of the
City Prosecutor that the release was premature:
We note that the RTC granted accused B ​ rodett's Motion to
Return Non-Drug Evidence ​on November 4, 2009 when the
criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to
be completed. Ordering the release of the car ​at that point ​of the
proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph
of Section 20, supra​, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation,
or transfer ​of any property, or income derived therefrom, that has
been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165
during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial
Court. S​ ection 20 further expressly requires that such property or
income derived therefrom should remain in custodia legis ​in all
that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code ​and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be
a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of
whether or not the car (or any other article confiscated in relation
to the unlawful act) would be ​subject of forfeiture could be made
only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings.
Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation
to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTC as
being in custodia legis i​ s primarily intended to preserve it as
evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it
before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and
the parties access to it as evidence.
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts
shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20
of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles,
whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the
trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even if
owned by a third person who is not liable for the
unlawful act.
PP VS. MATEO
FACTS: Accused-appellant was convicted of ten
counts rape. The trial court imposed the penalty of
death.
HELD: While the Fundamental Law requires a
mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is ​reclusion perpetua​, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure
utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death,​reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is
imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling
to provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible
avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be
accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation
of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly,
the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an
error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should
affirm the penalty of death, ​reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing
the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate
the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court
for its final disposition.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within
the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the
law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced
additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a
procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section
13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar
as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, ​reclusion perpetua​ or life imprisonment, as well as the
resolution of the Supreme Court ​en banc​, dated 19 September
1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly
involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent
records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with
the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.
PEOPLE V. DE LOS SANTOS
FACTS: The accused was charged with the crimes of
Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and
Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City for
having run over with a vehicle, several members of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) who were
undergoing an "endurance run" as part of the Special
Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training.
HELD: Considering that the incident was not a product of a
malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless
driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48
speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence
in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or
omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of
deceit (​dolo​) or fault (​culpa)​ .
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other
victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been
intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies,
which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and
punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should
have, therefore, been filed.
It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was
filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record
that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a
motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to
have waived such defect. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to
it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each of them.
Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony shall suffer the penalty of ​arresto mayor i​ n its
maximum period to prision correccional ​in its medium period;
and if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor ​in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last
paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot
to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give.
This failure to render assistance to the victim, therefore,
constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence
thereof raises the penalty by one degree. Moreover, the fifth
paragraph thereof provides that in the imposition of the penalty,
the court shall exercise its sound discretion without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies The trial court denied the Motion to Quash hence the present
through imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances petition.
need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty. HELD: The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person
In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and
arrested. Petitioner's reliance on ​Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista,
proved during the trial that GLENN "escaped from the scene of
Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and Bernal i​ scmisplaced. In each
the incident, leaving behind the victims." It being crystal clear
one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal
that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty
possession of firearms because of their commission, as shown
provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree.
by their conviction, of some other crime. In the present case,
Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide
however, petitioner has only been accused of committing a
with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries,
violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not
the penalty would be prision correccional ​in its maximum period
synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did
to prision mayor ​in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the
in fact commit the other crime charged.
maximum of said penalty, which is prision mayor ​in its medium
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those
period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless
enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be
possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal
sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty of ​arresto mayor
possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such
in its minimum period.
other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance
Although it was established through the testimonies of in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion,
prosecution witness Lemuel Pangca ​and of GLENN that the insurrection, sedition or attempted ​coup d'etat.​ Conversely, when
latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental, such the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under
mitigating circumstance need not be considered pursuant to the R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of
aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365. firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may
be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
whose minimum is within the range of the penalty PP VS. REYNES
next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, FACTS: For shooting one Claro Bernardino to death, appellant
and whose maximum is that which could properly be Celso was convicted of murder aggravated by treachery. He was
imposed taking into account the modifying sentenced to suffer the penalty of death and hence, this appeal.
circumstances. Hence, for the complex crime of
HELD: The Court sustained the conviction of appellant for the
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide
crime of murder, it ruled that the penalty imposed should be
with serious physical injuries and less serious
reduced to ​reclusion perpetua.​ Murder exists when one of the
physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render
circumstances described in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to
Code, as amended by RA 7659, is present. When more than one
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ​arresto
of said circumstances is proven, the others must be considered
mayor ​in its maximum period to prision correccional i​ n
as generic aggravating. However, when the other circumstances
its medium period, as minimum, to prision mayor ​in its
are ​absorbed or ​included in one qualifying circumstance, they
medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of
can not be considered as generic aggravating. Certainly, once a
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
circumstance is used to qualify a crime, the same could no
injuries, since the maximum term for each count is
longer be considered as generic aggravating. Since treachery
only two months the Indeterminate Sentence Law will
qualified the commission of the crime to murder, this
not apply.
circumstance could no longer be appreciated anew as a generic
aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
PP VS. CELINO supreme penalty of death.

FACTS: Two separate informations were filed before the The penalty for the crime of murder is ​reclusion perpetua ​to
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging petitioner with death. The two penalties being both indivisible, and there being
violation of Section 2 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
ban), and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) commission of the deed, the lesser of the two penalties should
8294 (illegal possession of firearm). be applied pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban
violation charge. Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms . . . if he was also charged of
having committed another crime of violating the Comelec gun
ban under the same set of facts.
Petitioner, citing Agote v. Lorenzo,​ ​People v. Ladjaalam,​ ​and
other similar cases, ​25 contends that the mere filing of an
information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his
prosecution for illegal possession of firearm.