January 23, 2017
Information filed before the RTC, charging
G.R. No. 218466
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and
SERVILLANO NACIONAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221425
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a
"JOHN," "KONYONG" SALONGA and
SERVILLANO NACIONAL @ "INONG" @
DIONISIO NACIONAL, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated cases 1 is the
Decision2 dated April 28, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05095,
which affirmed the Decision3 dated
December 8, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. B-243, convicting
accused-appellants Manny Ramos (Ramos),
Roberto Salonga (Salonga), and Servillano
Nacional (Nacional; collectively, accused-
appellants) of the crime of Murder
Aggravated with the Use of an Unlicensed
Firearm, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
in relation to Republic Act No. (RA) 8294.4
The Facts
1|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The instant cases stemmed from an
accused-appellants of the aforementioned
crime, the accusatory portion of which
states:
That on or about January 20, 2002, in the
evening, at Brgy. Cabanaetan, Municipality
of Mabini, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their
superior strength and at night time, armed
with an unlicensed firearm, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot ROLANDO NECESITO y F ABRIGAS
which caused his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs. 5
The prosecution alleged that between 9:00
to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January
20, 2002, eyewitness Reynaldo Necesito
(Reynaldo) was walking towards the store
of Leonida Fabrigas when he chanced upon
accused-appellants having an altercation
with the victim, Rolando Necesito
(Rolando). From his vantage point,
Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, "Okinam
patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I will kill you!)
and saw accused-appellants chase and
eventually surround Rolando at an area
around seven (7) meters away from where
Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard
four (4) successive gunshots, making him
hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for
fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the
fourth shot when Reynaldo witnessed
Rolando fall face down on the ground. To
ensure Rolando's demise, Ramos
approached Rolando and shot him again.
Thereafter, accused-appellants fled the
scene.6
The next day, Rolando's body was found
near the duhat tree, prompting police
officers to conduct an investigation from
which were gathered the following
evidence and information: (a) a piece of
bamboo was recovered three (3) meters
away from Rolando's corpse; (b) Rolando
purportedly had a previous
misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in
1997, yet the same was settled before the
barangay; and (c) Rolando allegedly had a
drinking spree with his friends at the time of
the incident. An autopsy was likewise
conducted on Rolando's body, revealing
that there were four (4) incised wounds on
his left hand, a stab wound on his left chest,
and five (5) gunshot wounds on his body;
that based on the nature and sizes of his
wounds, it was possible that the firearm
used was of the same caliber; and that his
injuries could not have been inflicted by a
single person. 7
For their respective parts, accused-
appellants similarly invoked the defenses of
denial and alibi.1âwphi1Essentially, they
insisted that they were somewhere else
when the incident occurred. In addition,
Ramos maintained that the declarations of
Reynaldo against him were motivated by a
personal grudge, while Nacional claimed
that the corpus delicti was not proven with
exact certainty since the cadaver that was
exhumed and examined was already in an
advanced stage of decomposition, having
been interred for more than a month. 8
2|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision9 dated December 8, 2010, the
RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of
parole, and ordered to pay jointly and
severally Rolando's heirs the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00
as death indemnity, and ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages. 10
In so ruling, the R TC gave credence to the
direct, straightforward, and categorical
eyewitness testimony of Reynaldo positively
identifying each of the accused-appellants
as co-perpetrators of the crime, further
noting that Reynaldo had no ill-motive to
falsely testify against them. On the other
hand, it found the defense testimonies to
be untenable, as they were riddled with
various inconsistencies and contradictions.
Further, the RTC found the presence of the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength
which qualified the killing to Murder,
considering that the accused-appellants
took advantage of their combined strength
and their several weapons to overcome
their unarmed victim and assure the
success of their felonious design. In view of
the foregoing, the RTC concluded that
accused-appellants "are equally guilty of the
crime of Murder aggravated with the use of
unlincensed firearm, there having been
proven the existence of implied conspiracy
between them." 11
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to
the CA.12
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 13 dated April 28, 2015, the CA
affirmed accused-appellants' conviction for
the crime of Murder with the Use of an
Unlicensed Firearm with modification,
increasing the awards of civil indemnity and
moral damages to ₱75,000.00 each and
imposing legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum on all monetary awards from
finality of the judgment until fully paid. 14 It
held that Reynaldo was able to positively
identify accused-appellants as Rolando's
killers, given that he was only seven (7)
meters away from the situs criminis. The CA
likewise held that the accused-appellants
took advantage of their combined superior
strength as they even used several weapons
to render the unarmed victim completely
defenseless. 15
Hence, the instant consolidated cases.
Dissatisfied, Nacional filed a Notice of
Appeal, 16(G.R. No.221425) while Ramos
and Salonga filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Court (G.R. No.
218466).
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the CA correctly upheld
accused-appellants' conviction for the crime
of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed
Firearm.
The Court's Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Nacional
elevated the matter before the Court thru a
3|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Notice of Appeal17(G.R. No. 221425) filed
before the CA; on the other hand, Ramos
and Salonga filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Court (G.R. No.
218466). 18As a general rule, appeals of
criminal cases shall be brought to the Court
by filing a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; 19
except when the CA imposed the penalty of
"reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty," in which case, the appeal
shall be made by a mere notice of appeal
filed before the CA.20 In this case, Ramos
and Salonga clearly availed of a wrong
mode of appeal by filing a petition for
review on certiorari before the Court,
despite having been sentenced by the CA of
reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, in the
interest of substantial justice, the Court will
treat their petition as an ordinary appeal in
order to resolve the substantive issue at
hand with finality.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire
case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.21
As will be explained hereunder, the
accused-appellants should only be held
liable for simple Murder, and not Murder
with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
To successfully prosecute the crime of
Murder, the following elements must be
established: (a) that a person was killed; (b)
the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is
not parricide or infanticide. 22
In the instant case, the prosecution,
through the testimony of eyewitness
Reynaldo, had established beyond
reasonable doubt that: the accused-
appellants chased, ganged up, and
eventually, killed Rolando, and likewise, it
was shown that they deliberately used
weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo stick), which
rendered Rolando defenseless from their
fatal attacks. Thus, such killing was
attended with the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength, 23 which
perforce warrants accused-appellants'
conviction for Murder.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a
quo erred in convicting accused-appellants
of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed
Firearm.
Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide
or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance." There are two
(2) requisites to establish such
circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the gun
4|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
did not have the corresponding license or
permit to carry it outside his residence. The
onus probandi of establishing these
elements as alleged in the Information lies
with the prosecution.24
In this case, while it is undisputed that
Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds
which led to his demise, it is unclear from
the records: (a) whether or not the police
officers were able to recover the firearm
used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming
arguendo that such firearm was recovered,
whether or not such firearm was licensed.
The Court notes that the disquisitions of the
courts a quo were silent regarding this
matter. As the Information alleged that
accused-appellants used an unlicensed
firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution
was duty-bound to prove this allegation.25
Having failed in this respect, the Court
cannot simply appreciate the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance.
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby
modifies accused-appellants' conviction to
simple Murder.
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended
by RA 7659,26 Murder is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance
present (except for abuse of superior
strength which was used to qualify the
killing to Murder), accused-appellants must
be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, to conform with existing
jurisprudence, accused-appellants must be
ordered to jointly and severally pay
Rolando's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages,
with six percent (6%) legal interest per
annum on all the monetary awards from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid. 27
WHEREFORE, the consolidated appeals are
DENIED. The Decision dated April 28, 2015
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05095 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows: accused-
appellants Manny Ramos, Roberto Salonga,
and Servillano Nacional are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered
to jointly and severally pay Rolando
Necesito's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages with
six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on
all the monetary awards from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
March 7, 2018
G.R. No. 232189
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner
vs.
CYNTHIA B. BANA, Respondent
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
5|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated February
23, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated June 6,
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 146138, which affirmed the Orders
dated May 29, 20154 and March 3, 20165 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 109 (RTC) in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-
17714-CV that: (a) granted petitioner Alex
Raul B. Blay’s (petitioner) Motion to
Withdraw; and (b) declared respondent
Cynthia B. Baña’s (respondent)
Counterclaim for independent adjudication.
The Facts
On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed
before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage,6 seeking that his
marriage to respondent be declared null
and void on account of his psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.7 Subsequently, respondent
filed her Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim8 dated December 5, 2014.
However, petitioner later lost interest over
the case, and thus, filed a Motion to
Withdraw9 his petition. In her
10
comment/opposition thereto, respondent
invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court (alternatively, Section 2, Rule 1 7),
and prayed that her counterclaims be
declared as remaining for the court's
independent adjudication.11 In turn,
petitioner filed his reply,12 averring that
respondent's counterclaims are barred from
being prosecuted in the same action due to
her failure to file a manifestation therefor
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
Motion to Withdraw, which - according to
petitioner - was required under the same
Rules of Court provision. In particular,
petitioner alleged that respondent filed the
required manifestation only on March 30,
2015. However, respondent's counsel
received a copy of petitioner's Motion to
Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence,
respondent had only until March 26, 2015
to manifest before the trial court her desire
to prosecute her counterclaims in the same
action.13
The RTC Ruling
In an Order14 dated May 29, 2015, the RTC
granted petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw
petition.15 Further, it declared respondent's
counterclaim "as remaining for independent
adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner
fifteen (15) days to file his answer thereto.16
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration,17 which was denied in an
Order18 dated March 3, 2016. Thus, he
elevated the matter to the CA via a petition
for certiorari, 19 praying that the RTC Orders
be set aside to the extent that they allowed
the counterclaim to remain for independent
adjudication before the same trial court.20
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated February 23, 2017, the
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.22
It found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC, holding that under Section
2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a
counterclaim has been filed by the
defendant before the service upon him of
the petitioner’s motion for dismissal, the
dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.23
6|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for
24
reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution25 dated June 6, 2017; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the CA erred in upholding
the RTC Orders declaring respondent's
counterclaim for independent adjudication
before the same trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious. Section 2, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court provides for the
procedure relative to counterclaims in the
event that a complaint is dismissed by the
court at the plaintiffs instance, viz. :
Section 2.Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff.
- Except as provided in the preceding
section, a complaint shall not be dismissed
at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval
of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of
the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the
dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
The dismissal shall be without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
motion he manifests his preference to
have his counterclaim resolved in the same
action. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall
be without prejudice. A class suit shall not
be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court.1âwphi1
As per the second sentence of the
provision, if a counterclaim has been
pleaded by the defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for
the dismissal - as in this case - the rule is
that the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. Commentaries on the subject
elucidate that "[i]nstead of an ‘action’ shall
not be dismissed, the present rule uses the
term ‘complaint’. A dismissal of an action is
different from a mere dismissal of the
complaint. For this reason, since only the
complaint and not the action is dismissed,
the defendant inspite of said dismissal may
still prosecute his counterclaim in the same
acton."26
However, as stated in the third sentence of
Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires
to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
action, he is required to file a manifestation
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be
prosecuted in a separate action. As
explained by renowned remedial law
expert, former Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in his treatise on the matter:
Under this revised section, where the
plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the
complaint to which a counterclaim has been
interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to
the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have
the same resolved in the same action.
Should he opt for the first alternative, the
7|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
court should render the corresponding
order granting and reserving his right to
prosecute his claim in a separate
complaint. Should he choose to have his
counterclaim disposed of in the same
action wherein the complaint had been
dismissed, he must manifest within 15
days from notice to him of plaintiff's
motion to dismiss. x x x27
In this case, the CA confined the application
of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its
second sentence which states that the
"dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored the
same provision's third sentence, which
provides for the alternatives available to the
defendant who interposes a counterclaim
prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be
clearly inferred therefrom, should the
defendant desire to prosecute his
counterclaim, he is required to manifest his
preference therefor within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim
may be prosecuted only in a separate
action.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult
to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-
day period triggers the finality of the court's
dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars
the conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the
prosecution of respondent's counterclaim,
in the same action. Thus, in order to obviate
this finality, the defendant is required to file
the required manifestation within the
aforesaid period; otherwise, the
counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a
separate action.
It is hornbook doctrine in statutory
construction that "[t]he whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole. A
statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible. In short,
every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and
its meaning may be modified or restricted
by the latter."28
By narrowly reading Section 2, Rule 1 7 of
the Rules of Court, the CA clearly violated
the foregoing principle and in so doing,
erroneously sustained the assailed RTC
Orders declaring respondent’s counterclaim
"as remaining for independent
adjudication" despite the latter's failure to
file the required manifestation within the
prescribed fifteen (15)-day period. As
petitioner aptly points out:
[I]f the intention of the framers of the Rules
of Court is a blanket dismissal of the
complaint ALONE if a counterclaim has been
pleaded prior to the service of the notice of
dismissal then there is NO EVIDENT
PURPOSE for the third (3rd) sentence of
Sec. 2, Rule 17.
x x x x29
[I]t is clearly an ABSURD conclusion if the
said provision will direct the defendant to
manifest within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice of dismissal his
8|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
preference to prosecute his counterclaim in
the SAME ACTION when the same
AUTOMATICALLY REMAINS. If the
automatic survival of the counterclaim and
the death of the complaint as being ruled by
the Court of Appeals in its questioned
Decision is indeed true, then the third
sentence should have required defendant
to manifest that he will prosecute his
counterclaim in a SEPARATE [and not - as
the provision reads - in the same] ACTION.30
(Emphases and underscoring in the original)
Petitioner's observations are logically on
point. Consequently, the CA rulings, which
affirmed the patently erroneous R TC
Orders, must be reversed. As it should be,
the RTC should have only granted
petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and hence,
dismissed his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, without prejudice to,
among others, the prosecution of
respondent's counterclaim in a separate
action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 23, 2017 and the
Resolution dated June 6, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146138 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
one is ENTERED solely granting petitioner
Alex Raul B. Blay’s Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-17714-
CV. The aforesaid dismissal is, among
others, without prejudice to the
prosecution of respondent Cynthia B.
Baña's counterclaim in a separate action.
SO ORDERED.
March 14, 2018
G.R. No. 230065
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee
vs.
MARCELINO CRISPO y DESCALSO alias
"GOGO" and ENRICO HERRERA y MONTES,
Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed
by accused-appellants Marcelino Crispo y
Descalso alias "Gogo" (Crispo) and Enrico
Herrera y Montes (Herrera; collectively,
accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2
dated March 17, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 0711 7,
which affirmed the Decision3 dated October
24, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 2 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos.
12-293828 and 12-293829 finding: (a)
accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"; and (b)
Crispo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 11, Article II of the same
law.
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2)
Informations5 filed before the RTC charging
accused-appellants of the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Crispo of the
9|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, the accusatory portions of which
state:
Crim. Case No. 12-293828
That on or about November 19, 2012, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said
[accused-appellants], conspiring and
confederating together and mutually
helping each other, not being then
authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or
give away to another any dangerous drug,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
knowingly and jointly sell one (1)
heatsealed transparent plastic sachet
containing ZERO POINT ZERO TWO THREE
(0.023) gram of white crystalline substance
containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.1âwphi1
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Crim. Case No. 12-293829
That on or about November 19, 2012, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, [Crispo], not
being then authorized by law to possess any
dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly possess
or have under his control three (3) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance
weighing zero point zero three seven
(0.037) gram, zero point zero two five
(0.025) gram and zero point zero one nine
(0.019) gram or in the total weight of zero
point zero eight one (0.081) gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around 1:30
in the afternoon of November 19, 2012,8 a
confidential informant (CI) tipped the
Manila Police District Station 4 (MPD) of the
alleged illegal drug activities of a certain
alias "Gogo" (later identified as Crispo) at
Ma. Cristina Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Thus,
after coordinating with the operatives of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,
the MPD organized a buy-bust operation at
the said area, with Police Officer (PO) 2
Dennis Reyes (P02 Reyes) as the poseur
buyer. Upon arrival at the area at around
5:30 in the afternoon of even date, the CI
and P02 Reyes saw Crispo talking to his
runner, Herrera, and decided to approach
them. As they went nearer, Herrera
approached the CI and P02 Reyes, while
Crispo remained about five (5) to six (6)
meters away. P02 Reyes then signified his
intention of buying shabu, prompting
Herrera to get the marked money from him,
and thereafter, approach Crispo in order to
remit the money and get a sachet
containing white crystalline substance from
the latter. When Herrera handed over the
sachet to P02 Reyes, the latter performed
the pre-arranged signal, directly causing his
backups to rush into the scene and
apprehend accused-appellants. Upon
frisking accusedappellants, the arresting
officers recovered three (3) other plastic
sachets containing white crystalline
substance from Crispo. The accused-
appellants and the seized items were then
taken to the barangay office where the
arresting officers, inter alia, conducted the
inventory and photography in the presence
10 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of two (2) barangay kagawads, as indicated
in the Receipt of Property/Evidence Seized.9
After examination10 at the Crime
Laboratory, it was confirmed that the
sachets seized from accused-appellants
contain methamphetamine hydrochloride,
or shabu.11
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to
the crimes charged12 and offered their
version of the events. According to Crispo,
he was just on board a tricycle going to his
niece's house when suddenly, a car with
five (5) policemen in civilian clothes blocked
the tricycle's path. One of the policemen
then poked a gun at Crispo, and told him,
"Mga pulis kami, sumama ka sa presinto."
Fearful for his life, Crispo complied. Upon
arrival at the police station, the policemen
demanded from him ₱30,000.00 for his
release; otherwise, they will plant evidence
against him. The policemen then proceeded
to show him four (4) sachets of shabu which
will be used against him. For his part,
Herrera averred that he was riding a bicycle
when he accidentally bumped a brown van.
Three (3) men then alighted from the van,
arrested him, and took him to the police
station. Thereat, an affidavit was
purportedly prepared for him and that he
signed the same even without reading it out
of confusion.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 24, 2014, the
RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged
and, accordingly, sentenced them as
follows: (a) for Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs, the RTC sentenced accused-
appellants to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine in the
amount of PS00,000.00; and (b) for Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the R TC
sentenced Crispo to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine
in the amount of ₱300,000.00.15
The RTC found that the prosecution was
able to establish all the elements of the
crimes charged as it was shown that
accused-appellants sold to P02 Reyes one (l)
sachet of shabu and that after their arrest,
three (3) more sachets of shabuwere found
in Crispo’s possession. On the other hand,
the RTC did not give merit to accused-
appellants' imputation of ill-motive against
their arresting officers after finding it
unsubstantiated.16
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed17
to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated March 1 7, 2016, the
CA affi1med the RTC ruling.19 It held that
the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the
crimes charged. Further, the CA ruled that
the absence of representatives from the
DOJ and the media during the conduct of
the inventory is not fatal to the prosecution
of accused-appellants, so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved.20
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the CA correctly upheld
accused-appellants' conviction for the
crimes charged.
The Court’s Ruling
I.
During the pendency of this appeal, the
Court received a letter21 dated September
7, 2017 from the Bureau of Corrections,
informing it that Herrera had already died
on April 3, 2017. Attached thereto is a
duplicate copy of Herrera's Certificate of
Death22 issued by the Officer of the Civil
Registrar General.
Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, the consequences of
Herrera's death are as follows:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Jao,23 the Court eloquently
summed up the effects of the death of an
accused pending appeal on his liabilities,24
as follows:

Hence, this appeal.

11 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
From this lengthy disquisition, we
summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. "25
Thus, upon Herrera's death pending appeal
of his conviction, the criminal action against
him is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
As such, the criminal case against him is
hereby dismissed, and declared closed and
terminated.26
II.
With respect to Crispo, the Court finds his
appeal meritorious.
It must be stressed that an appeal in
criminal cases opens the entire case for
review and, thus, it is the duty of the
reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned.27
"The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."28
12 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Here, Crispo was charged with the crimes of
Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly
secure the conviction of an accused charged
with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment.29 Meanwhile,
in instances wherein an accused is charged
with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
the prosecution must establish the
following elements to warrant his
conviction: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as
a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.30
Case law states that in both instances, it is
essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself
forms an integral part of the corpus delicti
of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over
the same and account for each link in the
chain of custody from the moment the
drugs are seized up to their presentation in
court as evidence of the crime.31
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the
procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in
order to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value.32 Under the said section,
prior to its amendment by RA 10640,33 the
apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person
from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.34 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,35 the Court stressed
that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the
[DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs), the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had
tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the[said drugs]
that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody."36
The Court, however, clarified that under
varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 may not always be possible.37
In fact, the Implementing Rules and
13 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now
crystallized into statutory law with the
passage of RA 1064038 - provide that the
said inventory and photography may be
conducted at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team in
instances of warrantless seizure, and that
non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under
justifiable grounds - will not render void
and invalid the seizure and custody over
the seized items so long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.39 In other
words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure
laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
and its IRR does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the items as void
and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.40 In
People v.Almorfe,41the Court explained that
for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved.42 Also, in People v. De Guzman,43
it was emphasized that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that
they even exist.44
After a judicious study of the case, the
Court finds that the arresting officers
committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby
putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs
allegedly seized from Crispo.
An examination of the records reveals that
while the inventory and photography of the
seized items were made in the presence of
two (2) elected public officials, i.e.,
Barangay Kagawads Ramon Amtolim and
Helen Tolentino, as evidenced by their
signatures on the Receipt of
Property/Evidence Seized,45 the same were
not done in the presence of representatives
from either the DOJ and the media. This
fact was confirmed by P03 Manolito
Rodriguez (P03 Rodriguez), a member of the
buy-bust team that apprehended Crispo, in
his testimony in direct and cross-
examinations, to wit:
[Asst. Pros. Alexander T. Yap]: What
happened at the barangay? What barangay
by the way?
[P03 Rodriguez]: I forgot the number of the
barangay, sir.
Q: Who was, was there an official of the
barangay with you?
A: I remember two Kagawad[s], sir.
Q: Tell the Court what happened at the
barangay?
A: They signed as witnesses in the
inventory receipt, sir.
Q: Who signed the inventory?
14 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
A: [The] Barangay Kagawad[s], sir.
xxxx
[Atty. Rosemarie G. Gonzales (Atty.
Gonzales)]: Mr. Witness, according to you,
you already proceeded to the barangay?
[P03 Rodriguez]: Yes, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, were you able to see when
the markings of the evidences (sic) were
done?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Where were you at that time?
A: At the barangay hall, ma'am.
Q: How about the accused at that time,
where were they?
A: They were with us also, ma'am.
Q: Were they assisted [by] any counsel at
that time?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: Were there any members of the DOJ?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: Were there any members of the media?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: According to you the inventory of the
evidences (sic) were witnessed by the
Kagawads?
A: Yes, ma' am.
Q: An these kagawads? Who called the
kagawads?
A: We, ma'am.
Q: They were already at the area when they
arrived?
A: Yes, ma'am.46 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The law requires the presence of an elected
public official, as well as representatives
from the DOJ and the media to ensure that
the chain of custody rule is observed and
thus, remove any suspicion of tampering,
switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence which could considerably affect a
case. However, minor deviations may be
excused in situations where a justifiable
reason for non-compliance is explained. In
this case, despite the non-observance of the
witness requirement, no plausible
explanation was given by the prosecution ..
In fact, the poseur-buyer, P02 Reyes, only
feigned ignorance as to the reason why no
representatives of the DOJ and the media
were present during the inventory of the
seized items:
[Atty. Gonzales): By the way, Mr. Witness,
prior to the operation considering that you
would be conducting a buy-bust operation,
was there any coordination with the DOJ?
[P02 Reyes): I do not know if [SP03 Agapito
Yadao, the buy-bust team leader,) did that,
ma'am.
15 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Q: How about with any media
representative?
A: I do not know, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, when these evidences (sic)
were likewise being marked was there any
presence of the DOJ now?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: How about the presence of the media
now?
A: None, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Why was there none?
A: When we arrested them we
immediately proceeded to the Barangay[.]
Q: That's the only your (sic) explanation?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Despite the fact that it is a buy-bust
operation which was prepared by your
office?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: With all documents prepared and Pre-
operation Report prepared?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: You just merely did not consider getting
all the required persons to comply with Sec.
21?
A: I do not know with Yadao, ma'am.47
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
At this point, it is well to note that the
absence of these required witnesses does
not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible.48 However, a justifiable reason
for such failure or a showing of any genuine
and sufficient effort to secure the required
witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 must be adduced.49 In People v.
Umipang,50 the Court held that the
prosecution must show that earnest
effortswere employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law
for "[a] sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable - without
so much as an explanation on whether
serious attempts were employed to look for
other representatives, given the
circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy
excuse."51 Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses
are unacceptable as justified grounds for
non-compliance.52 These considerations
arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning
from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest - to
prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well
that they would have to strictly comply with
the set procedure prescribed in Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165. As such, police officers
are compelled not only to state reasons for
their non-compliance, but mustin fact, also
convince the Court that they exerted
16 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
earnest efforts to comply with the
mandated procedure, and that under the
given circumstances, their actions were
reasonable.[[53]]
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to
provide justifiable grounds or show that
special circumstances exist which would
excuse their transgression, the Court is
constrained to conclude that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Crispo have been
compromised. It is settled that in a
prosecution for the sale and possession of
dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State
carries the heavy burden of proving not
only the elements of the offense, but also
to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti,
failing in which, renders the case for the
State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.54
Verily, the procedural lapses committed by
the arresting officers, which were
unfortunately left unjustified, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against Crispo, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised.55 It is well-settled that
the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored
as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects.56 As such, since the
prosecution failed to provide justifiable
grounds for noncompliance with the
aforesaid provision, Crispo’s acquittal is
perforce in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to
echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign
of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who
would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth.
But as demanding as this campaign may be,
it cannot be more so than the compulsions
of the Bill of Rights for the protection of
liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness
from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x
x.57
In this light, prosecutors are strongly
reminded that they have the positive duty
to prove compliance with the procedure set
forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as
amended. As such, they must have the
initiative to not only acknowledge but also
justify any perceived deviations from the
said procedure during the proceedings
before the trial court. Since compliance
with the procedure is determinative of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty
of the accused, the fact that any issue
regarding the same was not raised, or even
17 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
threshed out in the court/s below, would
not preclude the appellate court, including
this Court, from fully examining the records
of the case if only to ascertain whether the
procedure had been completely complied
with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons
exist to excuse any deviation. If no such
reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's
bounden duty to acquit the accused, and
perforce, overturn a conviction.58
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as
follows: (a) Crim. Case No. 12-293828 is
hereby DISMISSED and declared CLOSED
and TERMINATED insofar as accused-
appellant Enrico Herrera y Montes is
concerned due to his supervening death
pending appeal; and (b) The appeal of
accused-appellant Marcelino Crispo y
Descalso is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 1 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07117 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, he is ACQUITTED of
the crimes charged. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause
his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held in custody for any other
reason.
SO ORDERED.
March 14, 2018
G.R. No. 230070
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee
vs.
NESTOR AÑO y DEL REMEDIOS, Accused-
Appellant
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the
Decision2 dated December 4, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
06127, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
October 1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 11427 finding accused-
appellant Nestor Año y Del Remedios (Año)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,4 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information5
filed before the RTC, charging Año with
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
Criminal Case No. 11427
That on or about the 3rd day of August
2009 in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been
authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell,
deliver and give away to poseur buyer, P02
Ruel T. Ayad, 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet which substance
was found positive to the tests for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in
consideration of the amount of Php.200.00,
in violation of the above-cited law.
18 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The prosecution alleged that at around five
(5) o’clock in the afternoon of August 3,
2005 and after receiving information about
Año’s drug activities at Daangbakal,
Guitnangbayan II, Police Officer (PO) 2 Ruel
T. Ayad (P02 Ayad), PO1 Aldwin Ortilla (POl
Ortilla), and POl Jenesis A. Acuin7 (PO1
Acuin) formed a buy-bust team designating
P02 Ayad as the poseur-buyer, with POl
Ortilla and PO1 Acuin as back-ups, and
marked two (2) ₱100.00 bills to be used in
the operation.8 Thereafter, the team
headed to the house of Año where P02
Ayad knocked on the door and upon seeing
Año, whispered that he "wants to score"
worth P200.00. Año replied that he has
drugs with him and gave P02 Ayad a
transparent plastic sachet, while the latter
simultaneously handed the marked money
as payment. As Año placed the money
inside his pocket, P02 Ayad introduced
himself as a policeman, causing Año to flee.
Fortunately, P02 Ayad caught Año and
asked him to empty his pockets which
produced the two (2) ₱100.00 bills. Due to
the commotion caused by Año's relatives
who were preventing his arrest, the team
moved at a distance of around 100 meters
from the place of arrest, marked the
confiscated sachet, and completed the
inventory thereat. Barangay Captain Leo S.
Buenviaje (Brgy. Captain Buenviaje)
witnessed and signed the Inventory of
Seized/Confiscated Items,9 photographs
were also taken in the presence of Año, P02
Ayad, and PO1 Acuin.10 On the same day,
P02 Ayad delivered the seized sachet to the
Crime Laboratory where it was turned over
to Police Inspector Forensic Chemist
Beaune V. Villaraza (FC Villaraza) for
examination. In Laboratory Report No. D-
198-09,11 FC Villaraza confirmed that the
seized sachet was positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
a dangerous drug.12
Upon arraignment, Año pleaded not guilty
and denied the charges leveled against him.
He claimed that on said date, he was at
home celebrating the 4th birthday of his
nephew when suddenly, three police
officers whom he identified to be P02 Ayad,
PO1 Ortilla, and PO1 Acuin, forcibly arrested
him and brought him to the police station
for inquiry. The following day, he learned
that he was being charged of drug
pushing.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 1, 2012, the
RTC found Año guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
under Section 5 of RA 9165, sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of ₱500,000.00.15
The RTC found all the elements for the
prosecution of sale of dangerous drugs
present, noting that the identity of Año as
the seller of the illegal drug was clearly
established when he was arrested in
fiagrante delicto during a buy-bust
operation.16
Aggrieved, Año elevated his conviction
before the Court of Appeals (CA).17
The CA Ruling
19 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In a Decision18 dated December 4, 2015, the
CA upheld the RTC ruling,19 likewise finding
that all the elements constituting the crime
of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs were
present. Moreover, it ruled that the
apprehending officers duly complied with
the chain of custody rule under Section 21
(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as P02 Ayad
testified in detail the links in the chain of
custody of the seized drug from the time of
its confiscation until its presentation in
court as evidence.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not Año is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an
appeal in criminal cases opens the entire
case for review and, thus, it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned.20
"The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."21
Here, Afio was charged with the crime of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA
9165. In order to secure the conviction of
an accused charged with Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment.22 It is likewise essential for a
conviction that the drugs subject of the sale
be presented in court and its identity
established with moral certainty through an
unbroken chain of custody over the same.
In cases like this, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in
court as evidence of the corpus delicti.23
In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 provides the chain of custody rule,
outlining the procedure that police officers
must follow in handling the seized drugs in
order to ensure that their integrity and
evidentiary value are preserved.24 Under
the said section, prior to its amendment by
RA 10640,25 the apprehending team shall,
among others, immediately after seizure
and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and take photographs of the
seized items in the presence of the accused
or theperson from whom such items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall then sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy of the same; and the seized drugs
must be turned over to the PNP Crime
20 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours
from confiscation for examination
26
purposes. In the case of People v.
27
Mendoza, the Court stressed that
"[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the
[DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs], the evils of switching, ‘planting’ or
contamination of the evidence that had
tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs]
that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody."28
The Court, however, clarified that under
varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21of
RA9165 may not always be possible.29 In
fact, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now
crystallized into statutory law with the
passage of RA 1064030- provide that non-
compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under
justifiable grounds - will not automatically
render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.31 In other
words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure
laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR
does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily
proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and(b) the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.32 In People v.
Almorfe,[[33]] the Court explained that for
the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved.34 Also, in People v. De Guzman,35
it was emphasized that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that
they even exist.36
After a judicious study of the case, the
Court finds that there are substantial gaps
in the chain of custody of the seized items
from Año which were unfortunately, left
unjustified, thereby putting into question
their integrity and evidentiary value.
As the prosecution submits, upon Año's
arrest, PO1 Ortilla called Brgy. Captain
Buenviaje to witness the marking and to
sign the inventory. After which, P02 Ayad
marked the sachet of shabu subject of the
sale with Año's intials, "NDRA," while PO1
Ortilla prepared an inventory of the seized
items, which was signed by Brgy. Captain
Buenviaje as witness, and had them
photographed. Thereafter, the buy-bust
team escorted Año to the police station and
turned over the sachet for examination to
FC Villaraza.
21 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
While the fact of marking and inventory of
the seized item was established by the
attached Inventory of Seized/Confiscated
Items,37 the records are glaringly silent as to
the presence of the required witnesses,
namely, the representatives from the media
and the DOJ. To reiterate, Section 21 (1) of
RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA
10640, as well as its IRR requires the
presence of the following witnesses during
the conduct of inventory and photography
of the seized items: (a) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel; (b) any elected
public official; and (c) a representative from
the media and the DOJ.38 In their absence,
the prosecution must provide a credible
explanation justifying the noncompliance
with the rule; otherwise, the saving clause
under the IRR of RA 9165 (and now, the
amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165)
would not apply.
Here, no such explanation was proffered by
the prosecution to justify the procedural
lapse. It then follows that there are
unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of
the items seized from Año, thereby
militating against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which resultantly
warrants his acquittal.39 It is well-settled
that the procedure under Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law,
and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse ignored as
an impediment to the conviction of illegal
drug suspects.40
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to
echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign
of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who
would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth.
But as demanding as this campaign may be,
it cannot be more so than the compulsions
of the Bill of Rights for the protection of
liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness
from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x
x.41
In this light, prosecutors are strongly
reminded that they have the positive duty
to prove compliance with the procedure set
forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to
not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said
procedure during the proceedings before
the trial court. Since compliance with this
procedure is determinative of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the
accused, the fact that any issue regarding
the same was not raised, or even threshed
22 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
out in the court/s below, would not
preclude the appellate court, including this
Court, from fully examining the records of
the case if only to ascertain whether the
procedure had been completely complied
with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons
exist to excuse any deviation. If no such
reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's
bounden duty to acquit the accused, and
perforce, overturn a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated December 4, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
06127 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Nestor Año
y Del Remedios is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The Director of Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held in custody for any other
reason.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.
July 17, 2017
G.R. No. 225054
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee
vs.
AGAPITO DIMAALA y ARELA, Accused-
Appellant
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Decision1 dated May 8, 2012, the
Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 4994-C found
accused-appellant Agapito Dimaala y Arela
(accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
court renders judgment finding AGAPITO
DIMAALA y Arela GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged for
the treacherous killing of Rodrigo
Marasigan. Said accused is hereby
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua without
eligibility for parole.
He is likewise ordered to pay the family of
Rodrigo Marasigan the following:
PhP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages;
PhP 36,000.00 as actual damages;
PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
PhP 25,000.00 as temperate damages. SO
ORDERED.2
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction
before the Court of Appeals (CA). In a
Decision3 dated September 23, 2015 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 05595, the CA affirmed the
RTC's decision finding accused-appellant
guilty of the crime charged but deleted the
award of temperate damages.4
Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed a Notice
of Appeal5 from the CA's Decision, but later
on decided not to pursue his
23 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
appeal.1avvphi1 Thus, he filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal with Prayer for
Immediate Issuance of Entry of Judgment,6
which the Court granted in its Resolution7
dated September 21, 2016. Following the
closure and termination of the case, the
Court declared the finality of the aforesaid
Resolution and issued an Entry of
Judgment.8
Meanwhile, the Court received a Letter9
dated February 23, 2017 from the Bureau of
Corrections informing it that accused-
appellant had died on August 23, 2016 at
the New Bilibid Prison Hospital, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Death10
attached thereto.
In view of this development, the criminal
action, as well as the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability ex delicto, is
ipso facto extinguished.11
It is settled that the death of accused-
appellant prior to his final conviction by the
Court renders dismissible the criminal case
against him.12 Article 89 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death
of the accused, to wit:
Article 89.How criminal liability is totally
extinguished - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Culas,13 citing People v. Layag,14
the Court explained the effects of the death
of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death of the
accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. x
x x.
xxxx
In this relation, the Court stresses that
accused-appellant's civil liability based on
sources other than the subject delict
survives, and the victim may file a separate
civil action against the estate of accused-
appellant, as may be warranted by law and
procedural rules.15
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a)
DISMISS Crim. Case No. 4994-C before the
Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon by
reason of the death of accused-appellant
Agapito Dimaala y Arela; and (b) DECLARE
the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
24 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
November 29, 2017
G.R. No. 229335
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS (DPWH)
vs.
BELLY H. NG, represented by ANNABELLE
G. WONG
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July
1, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated January
23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 102033, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated November 26, 2013 and the
Order5 dated January 16, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City,
Branch 270 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 38-V-13,
fixing the just compensation for the subject
lots at ₱15,000.00/square meter (sq. m.)
and the replacement cost of the
improvements thereon at ₱12.000.00/sq.
m, hut deleting the award of consequential
damages and reducing the legal rate of
interest on the obligation from twelve
percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per
annum (p.a.).
The Facts
On February 12, 2013, petitioner the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH; petitioner), filed before
the RTC a complaint6 against respondent
Belly H. Ng (respondent), represented by
Annabelle G. Wong7 , seeking to expropriate
the lots registered in the name of
respondent under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. V-921888 and V-921919 with
a total area of 1,671 sq. m. (subject lots),
together with the improvements thereon
with an aggregate surface area of 2,121.7
sq. m. (collectively, subject properties),
located in Kowloon Industrial Compound,
Tatalon Street, Brgy. U gong, Valenzuela
City,10 for the construction of the Mindanao
Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C
(Valenzuela City to Caloocan City).11
Petitioner manifested that it is able and
ready to pay respondent the amounts of
₱6,684,000.00 (i.e., at ₱4,000.00/sq. m.)
and ₱ll,138,362.74,12 representing the
combined relevant zonal value of the
subject lots and the replacement cost of the
improvements thereon, respective1y.13
In her answer,14 respondent contended that
the offer price is unreasonably low, and that
she should be compensated the fair market
value of her properties at the time of
taking, estimated to be at ₱25,000.00/sq.
m. Moreover, the fair and just replacement
cost of the improvements on the subject
lots should be in the amount of
₱22,276,724.00,15 pursuant to Section 10 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. (RA) 8974.16
Petitioner was eventually granted a Writ of
Possession,17 after respondent received the
amount of ₱l 7,822,362.74, representing
100% of the zonal value of the subject
properties.18
The RTC appointed a board of
commissioners to determine the just
compensation for the properties19 which,
25 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
thereafter, submitted its Commissioner's
Report20 dated June 10, 2013,
recommending the amounts of
₱7,000.00/sq. m. and ₱12,000.00/sq. m. as
the just compensation for the subject lots
and the improvements thereon,
respectively, and the payment of six
percent (6%) legal interest therefor,
reckoned from the time of taking.21
Dissatisfied, respondent objected22 to the
recommended just compensation of
₱7,000.00/sq. m. for the subject lots,
contending that the same "is not [the] real,
substantial, full, ample[,] and fair market
value" of her lots,23 considering that the just
compensation for nearby properties24
expropriated for the C-5 Northern Link
Project25 had been fixed by the same RTC at
₱15,000.00/sq. m.26 She likewise objected
to the imposition of six percent (6%)
interest, insisting that the same should be
pegged at twelve percent (12%) interest
p.a.,27 in line with the rulings in Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) v. Imperial28 and in
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) v. Ker
& Company, Limited.29 However, she
accepted the value of ₱l2,000.00/sq. m.
fixed as the replacement cost of the
improvements.30
On the other hand, petitioner filed its
comment,31 interposing no objection to the
₱7,000.00/sq. m. valuation for the subject
lots and the imposition of six percent (6%)
legal interest recommended by the board of
commissioners,32 citing the letter33 dated
July 30, 2013 of the Office of Director
Patrick B. Gatan, Project Director,
Infrastructure Right-of-Way and
Resettlement - Project Management Office,
DPWH.34 However, it failed to attach a copy
of the said letter.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision35 dated November 26, 2013,
the RTC fixed the just compensation for the
subject lots at ₱15,000.00/sq. m. or the
total amount of ₱25,065,000.00, taking into
account: (a) the classification of the subject
lots as industrial, their location, shape, and
their being not prone to flood;36 and (b) a
previous case37 involving a neighboring
property expropriated for the C-5 Northern
Link Project which was valued at
₱15,000.00/sq. m. by the same RTC.38 It
adopted the replacement cost of
₱12,000.00/sq. m. recommended by its
appointed commissioners or the total
amount of ₱25,460,400.00, noting that
respondent accepted said
recommendation.39 Consequently, it
ordered petitioner to pay respondent the
aforesaid amounts with twelve percent
(12%) legal interest p.a., reckoned from the
time of taking of the properties, less the
provisional deposit of ₱l7,822,362.74, plus
consequential damages and attorney's
fees.40
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for
reconsideration,41 but was denied in an
Order42 dated January 16, 2014, prompting
it to file an appeal43 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision44 dated July 1, 2016, the CA
affirmed the RTC rulings, but deleted the
award of consequential damages and
reduced the legal interest to six percent
26 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(6%) p.a., computed from the date of the
RTC Decision until full satisfaction.45
The CA upheld the just compensation of
₱15,000.00/sq. m. fixed by the RTC for the
subject 1,671-sq. m. lots on the basis of
relevant factors, such as the BIR zonal
valuation of the land, tax declarations and
the Commissioner's Report, as well as the
market value of the properties within the
area.46 It likewise sustained the value of
₱12,000.00/sq. m. fixed as the replacement
cost of the improvements with an aggregate
surface area of 2,121.7 sq. m. or the total
amount of ₱25,460,400.00, holding that: (a)
the amount of ₱l1,138,362.74 proposed by
petitioner was inconceivably lower than the
current construction cost of a
commercial/warehouse which was at
₱32,000.00/sq. m., even as early as
November 2009; and (b) petitioner did not
interpose any objection to the said
amount.47
However, the CA ruled that the award of
consequential damages was improper,
considering that the entirety of the subject
properties is being expropriated, hence,
there is no remaining portion that may
suffer an impairment or decrease in value.48
It likewise reduced the legal interest to six
percent (6%) p.a., in line with the
amendment introduced by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-
MB Circular No. 799,49 Series of 2013.50
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,51 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution52 dated January 23,
2017; hence, the instant petition.
 The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's
resolution is whether or not the CA
committed reversible error in affirming the
replacement cost for the improvements
fixed by the RTC, and the award of
attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The construction of the Mindanao Avenue
Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela
City to Caloocan City) involves the
implementation of a national infrastructure
project. Thus, for purposes of determining
the just compensation, RA 897453 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR),
which were effective at the time of the
filing of the complaint, shall govern.54
Under Section 10 of the IRR, the
improvements and/or structures on the
land to be acquired shall be appraised using
the replacement cost method, thus:
Section 10.Valuation of Improvements
and/or Structures. - Pursuant to Section 7 of
[RA 8974], the Implementing Agency shall
determine the valuation of the
improvements and/or structures on the
land to be acquired using the replacement
cost method. The replacement cost of the
improvements/structures is defined as the
amount necessary to replace the
improvements/structures, based on the
current market prices for materials,
equipment, labor, contractor's profit and
overhead, and all other attendant costs
27 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
associated with the acquisition and
installation in place of the affected
improvements/structures. In the valuation
of the affected improvements/structures,
the Implementing Agency shall consider,
among other things, the kinds and
quantities of materials/equipment used, the
location, configuration and other physical
features of the properties, and prevailing
construction prices. (Emphasis supplied)
The replacement cost method is premised
on the principle of substitution, which
means that "all things being equal, a
rational, informed purchaser would pay no
more for a property than the cost of
building an acceptable substitute with like
utility."55
Accordingly, the Implementing Agency
should consider: (a) construction costs or
the current market price of materials,
equipment, labor, as well as the
contractor's profit and overhead; and (b)
attendant costs or the cost associated with
the acquisition and installation of an
acceptable substitute in place of the
affected improvements/structures.56 In
addition, the case of Republic v. Mupas
(Mupas)57 instructs that in using the
replacement cost method to ascertain the
value of improvements, the courts may also
consider the relevant standards provided
under Section 558 of RA 8974, as well as
equity consistent with the principle that
eminent domain is a concept of equity and
fairness that attempts to make the
landowner whole. Thus, it is not the amount
of the owner's investment, but the "value of
the interest" in land taken by eminent
domain, that is guaranteed to the owner.59
While there are various methods of
appraising a property using the cost
approach, among them, the reproduction
cost, the replacement cost new, and the
depreciated replacement cost, Mupas
declared that the use of the depreciated
replacement cost method60 is consistent
with the principle that the property owner
shall be compensated for his actual loss,61
bearing in mind that the concept of just
compensation does not imply fairness to
the property owner alone, but must
likewise be just to the public which
ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
The property owner is entitled to
compensation only for what he actually
loses, and what he loses is only the actual
value of the property at the time of the
taking.62 Hence, even as undervaluation
would deprive the owner of his property
without due process, so too would its
overvaluation unduly favor him to the
prejudice of the public.63
It must be emphasized that in determining
just compensation, the courts must
consider and apply the parameters set by
the law and its implementing rules and
regulations in order to ensure that they do
not arbitrarily fix an amount as just
compensation that is contradictory to the
objectives of the law.64 Be that as it may,
when acting within the parameters set by
the law itself, courts are not strictly bound
to apply the formula to its minutest detail,
particularly when faced with situations that
do not warrant the formula's strict
application. Thus, the courts may, in the
exercise of their discretion, relax the
formula's application,65subject to the
28 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
jurisprudential limitation that the factual
situation calls for it and the courts clearly
explain the reason for such deviation.66
In this case, the RTC and the CA upheld the
recommendation of the court-appointed
commissioners, fixing the just
compensation for the improvements on the
expropriated properties at ₱12,000.00/sq.
m., which merely considered their location,
classification, value declared by the owner,
and the zonal valuation of the subject lots.
However, there is no competent evidence
showing that it took into account the
prevailing construction costs and all other
attendant costs associated with the
acquisition and installation of an acceptable
substitute in place of the affected
improvements/structures as required by
the IRR. Consequently, the Court cannot
uphold and must, perforce, set aside the
said valuation as the just compensation for
the subject improvements.
On the other hand, it is unclear how the
parameters set by the IRR have been
factored-in in petitioner's proposed
valuation of ₱l1,138,362.74.67 Thus, the
Court cannot automatically adopt
petitioner's own computation as prayed for
in the instant petition. Neither can the
Court accept respondent's submitted
valuation68 which claimed to have used the
prevailing replacement cost method for lack
of proper substantiation to support the
correctness of the values or data used in
such computation.
It must be emphasized that the veracity of
the facts and figures which the parties used
in their respective computations involves
the resolution of questions of fact which is,
as a rule, improper in a petition for review
on certiorari since the Court is not a trier of
facts. Thus, a remand of this case for
reception of further evidence is necessary in
order for the RTC to determine just
compensation for the subject
improvements in accordance with the
guidelines set under RA 8974 and its IRR.
In relation thereto, the Court deems it
proper to correct the award of legal interest
to be imposed on the unpaid balance of the
just compensation, which shall be
computed at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) p.a. from the date of taking, i.e., from
April 10, 2013 when the RTC issued a writ of
possession69 in favor of petitioner,70 until
June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July
1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due respondent shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
p.a.,71 in line with the amendment
introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013.1âwphi1
Finally, the Court finds the award of
attorney's fees to be improper and should
be, accordingly, deleted. Even when a
claimant is compelled to incur expenses to
protect his rights, attorney's fees may still
be withheld where no sufficient showing of
bad faith could be reflected in a party's
persistence in a suit other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness
of his cause.72 The case of Republic v. CA
(Republic)73 cited by the CA to justify the
award is inapplicable because, unlike in this
case where petitioner only acquired
possession of the expropriated properties
after paying respondent the amount of
29 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
₱l7,822,362.74, representing the 100%
zonal valuation thereof, the petitioner in
Republic took possession of the landowner's
real property without initiating
expropriation proceedings, and over the
latter's objection.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated July 1, 2016
and the Resolution dated January 23, 2017
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
102033 are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it
upheld the just compensation fixed by the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City,
Branch 270 (RTC) for the subject 1,671-
square meter (sq. m.) lots at ₱15,000.00/sq.
m. However, the valuation of ₱12,000.00/
sq. m. fixed by the lower courts as the
replacement cost of the subject
improvements with an aggregate surface
area of 2,121.7 sq. m. is hereby SET ASIDE,
and Civil Case No. 38-V-13 is REMANDED to
the RTC for reception of evidence on the
issue of just compensation therefor in
accordance with the guidelines set under
Republic Act No. 8974 and its implementing
rules and regulations. Legal interest is
hereby imposed on the unpaid balance of
the just compensation, as determined by
the RTC, at twelve percent (12%) per annum
(p.a.) reckoned from April 10, 2013 to June
30, 2013 and, thereafter, at six percent (6%)
p.a. until full payment. Finally, the award of
attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of
factual and legal bases.
The RTC is directed to conduct the
proceedings in said case with reasonable
dispatch, and to submit to the Court a
report on its findings and recommended
conclusions within sixty (60) days from
notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
January 10, 2018
G.R. No. 227215
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH)
vs.
LEONOR MACABAGDAL, represented by
EULOGIA MACABAGDAL PASCUAL
(formerly John Doe "DDD")
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1assailing the Decision2 dated
September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104473, which
affirmed the Decision3 dated October 30,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City, Branch 172 (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 49-V-08, imposing legal interest on
the unpaid balance of the just
compensation for the subject lot at the rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.)
computed from the time of the taking of
the property until full payment.
The Facts
On January 23, 2008, petitioner the
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
represented by the Department of Public
30 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Works and Highways, filed4 before the RTC
a complaint5 against an unknown owner for
the expropriation of a 200-square meter
(sq. m.) lot located in Barangay Ugong,
Valenzuela City, identified as Lot 1343-A-2-
A-2-G, (LRC)Psd-315943 (subject lot),6 for
the construction of the C-5 Northern Link
Road Project, otherwise known as North
Luzon Expressway (NLEX) Segment 8.1,
traversing from Mindanao A venue in
Quezon City to the NLEX in Valenzuela City.7
Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was
granted8 a writ of possession over the
subject lot on May 5, 2008, and was
required9 to deposit with the court the
amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e., at
₱2,750.00/sq. m.) representing the zonal
value thereof (provisional deposit).10
On August 28, 2012, respondent Leonor
Macabagdal (respondent), represented by
Eulogia Macabagdal Pascual, was
substituted as partydefendant upon
sufficient showing that the subject lot is
registered in her name under Transfer
Certificate Title No. (TCT) V-103067.
Respondent did not oppose the
expropriation, and received the provisional
deposit.11
The RTC appointed a board of
commissioners to determine the just
compensation for the subject lot, which
thereafter submitted its Commissioners'
Report (Re: Just Compensation)12 dated
May 23, 2014, recommending a fair market
value of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. as the just
compensation for the subject lot, taking
into consideration its location,
neighborhood and land classification,
utilities, amenities, physical characteristics,
occupancy and usage, highest and best
usage, current market value offerings, as
well as previously decided expropriation
cases of the same RTC involving properties
similarly situated in the same barangay.13
The RTC Ruling
14
In a Decision dated October 30, 2014, the
RTC found the recommendation of the
commissioners to be reasonable and just,
and accordingly: (a) fixed the just
compensation for the subject lot at
₱9,000.00/ sq. m.; (b) directed petitioner to
pay the same, less the provisional deposit of
₱550,000.00; and (c) imposed legal interest
at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on
the unpaid balance, computed from the
time of the taking of the subject lot until full
payment.15
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed16 before
the CA, questioning the just compensation
of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. and the award of
twelve percent (12%) interest rate p.a.,
instead of six percent (6%) p.a.17 as
provided under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013.18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated September 13, 2016,
the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding
that the commissioners, in their
recommendation, observed the
20
parameters set forth under Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8974,21 and the findings of
the RTC was amply supported by the
evidence on record.22
31 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Hence, the instant petition claiming that the
CA did not rule on the issue of the
applicable rate of interest which, in this
case, should be at twelve percent (12%) p.a.
from the filing of the complaint until June
30, 2013, and thereafter, at six percent (6%)
p.a. until full payment.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's
resolution is whether or not the CA
committed reversible error in affirming the
RTC's imposition of interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the unpaid
balance, computed from the time of the
taking of the subject lot until full payment.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The purpose of just compensation is not to
reward the owner for the property taken,
but to compensate him for the loss thereof.
As such, the true measure of the property,
as upheld in a plethora of cases, is the
market value at the time of the taking,
when the loss resulted.23 Indeed, the State
is not obliged to pay premium to the
property owner for appropriating the
latter's property; it is only bound to make
good the loss sustained by the landowner,
with due consideration to the
circumstances availing at the time the
property was taken.24
In addition, the Court also recognizes that
the owner's loss is not only his property, but
also its income-generating
potential.1âwphi1 Thus, when property is
taken, full compensation of its value must
be immediately paid to achieve a fair
exchange for the property and the potential
income lost.25 The value of the landholdings
should be equivalent to the principal sum of
the just compensation due, and interest is
due and should be paid to compensate for
the unRaid balance of this principal sum
after taking has been completed.26 This
shall comprise the real, substantial, full, and
ample value of the expropriated property,
and constitutes due compliance with the
constitutional mandate of just
compensation in eminent domain. 27
In this case, from the date of the taking of
the subject lot on May 5, 2008 when the
RTC issued a writ of possession28 in favor of
petitioner,29 until the just compensation
therefor was finally fixed at ₱9,000.00/sq.
m., petitioner had only paid a provisional
deposit in the amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e.,
at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus, this left an
unpaid balance of the "principal sum of the
just compensation," warranting the
imposition of interest. It is settled that the
delay in the payment of just compensation
amounts to an effective forbearance of
money, entitling the landowner to interest
on the difference in the amount between
the final amount as adjudged by the court
and the initial payment made by the
government.30
However, as aptly pointed out by
petitioner,31 the twelve percent (12%) p.a.
rate of legal interest is only applicable until
June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest
shall be at six percent (6%) p.a. in line with
BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
Prevailing jurisprudence32 has upheld the
32 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
applicability of BSP-MB Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013 to forbearances of money in
expropriation cases, contrary to
33
respondent's contention. The cases of Sy
v. Local Government of Quezon City34 and
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,35
cited by respondent are both inapplicable
because they were all decided prior to the
effectivity of BSP-MB Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013 on July 1, 2013.36
Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal
interest shall run not from the date of the
filing of the complaint but from the date of
the issuance of the Writ of Possession on
May 5, 2008, since it is from this date that
the fact of the deprivation of property can
be established. As such, it is only proper
that accrual of legal interest should begin
from this date.37 Accordingly, the Court
deems it proper to correct the award of
legal interest to be imposed on the unpaid
balance of the just compensation for the
subject lot, which shall be computed at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the
date of the taking on May 5, 2008 until June
30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1,
2013, until fully paid, the just compensation
due respondent shall earn legal interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) p.a.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated September
13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 1044 73 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION imposing legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance of
the just compensation, as determined by
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City,
Branch 172, reckoned from the date of the
taking on May 5, 2008 to June 30, 2013 and,
thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full
payment. The rest of the CA Decision
stands.
SO ORDERED.
November 14, 2016
G.R. No. 219510
MARLON CURAMMENG y PABLO,
Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated
October 20, 20142 and June 30, 20153 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
36802, which dismissed petitioner Marlon
Curammeng y Pablo's (Curammeng) petition
for review for his failure to attach, inter alia,
a certification of non-forum shopping.
The Facts
The instant case arose from an Information4
filed before the Municipal Trial Court of
Bauang, La Union (MTC), charging
Curammeng of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that on
the night of September 25, 2006, a Maria
De Leon bus going to Laoag, Ilocos Norte
33 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
being driven by Francisco Franco y Andres
(Franco) was traversing the northbound
lane of the national highway along Santiago,
Bauang, La Union, when its rear left tire
blew out and caught fire. This prompted
Franco to immediately park the bus on the
northbound side of the national highway,
and thereafter, unloaded the cargoes from
the said bus. At a little past midnight of the
next day, an RCJ bus bound for Manila being
driven by Curammeng traversed the
southbound lane of the road where the
stalled bus was parked and hit Franco,
resulting in the latter's death.5
In his defense, Curammeng averred that he
was driving the RCJ bus bound for Manila
and traversing the southbound side of the
national highway at less than 60 kilometers
per hour (kph) when he saw from afar the
stalled Maria De Leon bus at the road's
northbound side which was not equipped
with any early warning device, thus,
prompting him to decelerate. When the RCJ
bus was only a few meters away from the
stalled Maria De Leon bus, a closed van
suddenly appeared from the opposite
direction, causing petitioner to steer his bus
to the west shoulder, unfortunately hitting
Franco and causing the latter's death. Out
of fear of reprisal, petitioner surrendered to
the Caba Police Station in the next town.
Eventually, petitioner was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charge.6
The MTC Ruling
In a Decision7 dated November 26, 2013,
the MTC found Curammeng guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and ordered him to pay Franco's
heirs the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and ₱200,000.00 as actual
damages.8
The MTC found that Curammeng showed an
inexcusable lack of precaution in driving his
bus while passing through the stalled Maria
De Leon bus, which resulted in Franco's
death. Moreover, it found untenable
Curammeng's assertion that he decreased
the speed of his bus when he was nearing
the stalled bus, considering that the
evidence on record showed that he was still
running at around 60 kph when he hit
Franco. In this relation, the MTC pointed
out that if Curammeng had indeed
decelerated as he claimed, then he should
have noticed the barangay tanods near the
stalled bus who were manning the traffic
and signalling the other motorists to slow
down.9
Aggrieved, Curammeng appealed to the
Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union,
Branch 33 (RTC).
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated June 3, 2014, the RTC
affirmed Curammeng's conviction in toto.11
It found that as a professional public utility
vehicle driver, his primary concern is the
safety not only of himself and his
passengers but also that of his fellow
motorists. However, he failed to exhibit
34 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
such concern when he did not slow down
upon seeing the Maria De Leon bus stalled
on the northbound side of the national
highway, especially so that the area where
the incident happened was hardly
illuminated by street lights and that there is
a possibility that he might not be able to
see oncoming vehicles because his view of
the road was partially blocked by the said
stalled bus. In view of the foregoing
circumstances, the RTC concluded that
Curammeng was negligent in driving his
bus, and such negligence was the proximate
cause of Franco's death. As such, his liability
for the crime charged must be upheld.12
Curammeng moved for reconsideration but
was denied in an Order13 dated July 22,
2014. Dissatisfied, he filed a petition for
review14 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated October 20, 2014,
the CA dismissed outright Curammeng's
petition based on procedural grounds.
Specifically, the CA found that Curammeng
violated Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court as he failed to attach a certification of
non-forum shopping as well as material
portions of the record (e.g., affidavits
referred to in the MTC Decision, transcript
of stenographic notes of the MTC,
documentary evidence of the parties).16
Undaunted, Curammeng filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Compliance17 dated
November 6, 2014, praying for the
relaxation of procedural rules so that his
petition will be reinstated and given due
course. He explained that the failure to
comply with the rules was only due to a
plain oversight on the part of his counsel's
secretary. To show that such failure was
unintentional, he attached his certification
of non-forum shopping as well as copies of
the pertinent records of the case.18
In a Resolution19 dated June 30, 2015, the
CA denied Curammeng's motion for lack of
merit. It held that Curammeng failed to give
any convincing explanation which would
constitute a compelling reason for a liberal
application of the procedural rules on
appeal.20
Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's
resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly dismissed Curammeng' s petition
for review based on procedural grounds.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction are
taken by filing a petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.21 Section 2,
thereof, provides that such petitions shall
be accompanied by, inter alia, material
portions of the record which would support
the allegations of said petitions as well as a
certification of non-forum shopping, viz.:
35 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SEC. 2.Form and contents.-The petition
shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies,
with the original copy intended for the
court being indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names
of the parties to the case, without
impleading the lower courts or judges
thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the specific
material dates showing that it was filed on
time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of
the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or
both, allegedly committed by the Regional
Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments
relied upon for the allowance of the appeal;
(d) be accompanied by clearly legible
duplicate originals or true copies of the
judgments or final orders of both lower
courts, certified correct by the clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court, the
requisite number of plain copies thereof
and of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support
the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together
with the petition a certification under oath
that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency; if there is such other
action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the
aforesaid courts and other tribunal or
agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
It must be stressed that since a petition for
review is a form of appeal, non-compliance
with the foregoing rule may render the
same dismissible.1âwphi1 This is in
furtherance of the well-settled rule that
"the right to appeal is not a natural right or
a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. A party who seeks to
avail of the right must, therefore, comply
with the requirements of the rules, failing
which the right to appeal is invariably
lost."22 Verily, compliance with procedural
rules is a must, "since they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in
the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice."23
Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the
rules of procedure will tend to obstruct
rather than serve the broader interests of
justice in light of the prevailing
circumstances of the case, such as where
strong considerations of substantive justice
are manifest in the petition, the Court may
relax the strict application of the rules of
procedure in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.24 The Court's pronouncement
in Heirs of Zaulda v. Zaulda25 is instructive
on this matter, to wit:
The reduction in the number of pending
cases is laudable, but if it would be attained
36 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
by precipitate, if not preposterous,
application of technicalities, justice would
not be served. The law abhors technicalities
that impede the cause of justice. The court's
primary duty is to render or dispense
justice. "It is a more prudent course of
action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the
case on appeal rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause a grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases
while actually resulting in more delay, if
not miscarriage of justice."
What should guide judicial action is the
principle that a party-litigant should be
given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty,
honor, or property on technicalities. The
rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. At this juncture, the
Court reminds all members of the bench
and bar of the admonition in the often-cited
case of Alonso v. Villamar [16 Phil. 315, 322
(1910)]:
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by
a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities.26 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Otherwise stated, procedural rules may be
relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons
in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule,
which states that the mistakes of counsel
bind the client, may not be strictly followed
where observance of it would result in the
outright deprivation of the client's liberty or
property, or where the interest of justice so
requires.27
In the instant case, the Court notes that the
dismissal of Curammeng's appeal is based
solely on his counsel's negligence in failing
to attach a certification of non-forum
shopping as well as material portions of the
record. Notwithstanding the filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration with
Compliance dated November 6, 2014, the
CA upheld its earlier dismissal, ratiocinating
that the reasons presented by Curammeng'
s counsel were not compelling enough to
relax the technical rules on appeal.
While the Court understands and applauds
the CA' s zealousness in upholding
procedural rules, it cannot simply allow a
man to be incarcerated without his
conviction being reviewed due to the
negligence of his counsel. To note,
Curammeng, a public utility vehicle driver
and his family's sole breadwinner, is
appealing his conviction for the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
where he stands to be sentenced with
imprisonment for the indeterminate period
of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision
37 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
correccional, as maximum, among others. In
view of these circumstances, as well as his
counsel's eventual - albeit irregular -
compliance with the technical rules of
appeal, the CA should have disregarded the
rules and proceeded to make a full review
of the factual and legal bases of
Curammeng's conviction, including the
attendance of modificatory circumstances
(e.g., the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender which Curammeng
argues to be existent in his case), if any,
pursuant to the principle that an appeal in
criminal cases opens the entire case for
review.28
In sum, the Court deems it appropriate to
relax the technical rules of procedure in
order to afford Curammeng the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his
appeal, rather than to deprive him of such
and make him lose his liberty on procedural
blunders which he had no direct hand in.
Accordingly, the case should be remanded
to the CA for resolution of the appeal on its
merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Resolutions dated October
20, 2014 and June 30, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36802 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
resolution of the appeal on its merits.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
August 8, 2017
G.R. No. 225442
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG
KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE
LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA,
RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS
REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS,
minor, for herself and as represented by
her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR.,
Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR
HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as
represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA,
and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by
MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1
assails the constitutionality of the curfew
ordinances issued by the local governments
of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The
petition prays that a temporary restraining
order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents
Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John
Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective
local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and
desist from implementing and enforcing
these issuances, pending resolution of this
case, and eventually, declare the City of
Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being
contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or
the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as
amended, and all curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional for violating the
constitutional right of minors to travel, as
38 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
well as the right of parents to rear their
children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a
nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to
strictly implement their curfew ordinances
on minors through police operations which
were publicly known as part of "Oplan
Rody."3
Among those local governments that
implemented curfew ordinances were
respondents: (a) Navotas City, through
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated
August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang
'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang
Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan
ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through
Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance
Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00
A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay
Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths
Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for
Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002
(Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City,
through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of
2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a
[sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for
Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M.,
Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for
Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes"
dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan
ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) -
an association of young adults and minors
that aims to forward a free and just society,
in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this
present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall
under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b)
suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of
the right to liberty and the right to travel
without substantive due process; and (d)
deprive parents of their natural and primary
right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.11 In addition,
petitioners assert that the Manila
Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the
Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as there are no
clear provisions or detailed standards on
how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged
curfew violators.13 They further argue that
the law enforcer's apprehension depends
only on his physical assessment, and, thus,
subjective and based only on the law
enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged
curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew
Ordinances contain provisions indicating
the activities exempted from the operation
of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of
working students or students with evening
39 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
class, they contend that the lists of
exemptions do not cover the range and
breadth of legitimate activities or reasons
as to why minors would be out at night,
and, hence, proscribe or impair the
legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew
Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
deprive minors of the right to liberty and
the right to travel without substantive due
process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict
scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored
and for employing means that bear no
reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They
argue that the prohibition of minors on
streets during curfew hours will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the
Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419
thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA
9344, as amended, given that the cited
curfew provision imposes on minors the
penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and
admonition. They contend that the
imposition of penalties contravenes RA
9344's express command that no penalty
shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no
compelling State interest to impose curfews
contrary to the parents' prerogative to
impose them in the exercise of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the
youth, and that even if a compelling interest
exists, less restrictive means are available to
achieve the same. In this regard, they
suggest massive street lighting programs,
installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit
televisions) in public streets, and regular
visible patrols by law enforcers as other
viable means of protecting children and
preventing crimes at night. They further
opine that the government can impose
more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory
parental counseling and education seminars
informing the parents of the reasons behind
the curfew, and that imprisonment is too
harsh a penalty for parents who allowed
their children to be out during curfew
hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's
resolution in this case is whether or not the
Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the
procedural issues raised in this case.
Respondents seek the dismissal of the
petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances;
(b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court,
contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine;
and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition
Certiorari and Prohibition.
40 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice not
only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Case law explains that the present
Constitution has "expanded the concept of
judicial power, which up to then was
confined to its traditional ambit of settling
actual controversies involving rights that
were legally demandable and
enforceable." 25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that
for petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed
before the Court "are the remedies by
which the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government may be determined
under the Constitution."27 It was explained
that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and
the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and
restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the
text of the second paragraph of Section 1,
[Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited
above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for
Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was
expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no
specific procedural rule has been
promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
constitutional definition of judicial power
and because of the commonality of 'grave
abuse of discretion' as a ground for review
under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on
its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65
to be used as the medium for petitions
invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.
]"30
41 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In this case, petitioners question the
issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the
legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila,
and Navotas in the exercise of their
delegated legislative powers on the ground
that these ordinances violate the
Constitution, specifically, the provisions
pertaining to the right to travel of minors,
and the right of parents to rear their
children. They also claim that the Manila
Ordinance, by imposing penalties against
minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended,
which prohibits the imposition of penalties
on minors for status offenses. It has been
held that "[t]here is grave abuse of
discretion when an act is (1) done contrary
to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill
will or personal bias. "31 In light of the
foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition,
although these governmental actions were
not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-
judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are allowed as remedies to assail the
constitutionality of legislative and executive
enactments, the next question to be
resolved is whether or not petitioners'
direct resort to this Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts
"[r]equires that recourse must first be made
to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with
the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the
[Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation
of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when
there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and especially set out in
the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to
resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a
law or regulation at the first instance [if it]
is of paramount importance and
immediately affects the social, economic,
and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in
this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort
to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional
litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing
to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case."34 In this case, respondents
assail the existence of the first two (2)
requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power -
whether under the traditional or in the
42 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
expanded setting - is the presence of an
actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual
case or controversy is one which 'involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."36
According to recent jurisprudence, in the
Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction
under the 1987 Constitution, this
requirement is simplified "by merely
requiring a prima facie showing of grave
abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual
case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds
that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident
clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly
on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair
the minors' and parents' constitutional
rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance
goes against the provisions of RA 9344.
Based on their asseverations, petitioners
have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a
prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion, which perforce impels this Court
to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The
case is likewise ripe for adjudication,
considering that the Curfew Ordinances
were being implemented until the Court
issued the TRO39 enjoining their
enforcement. The purported threat or
incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely
speculative or hypothetical but rather, real
and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal
standing focuses on the determination of
whether those assailing the governmental
act have the right of appearance to bring
the matter to the court for adjudication.
[Petitioners] must show that they have a
personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that they have sustained or are
in immediate danger of sustaining, some
direct injury as a consequence of the
enforcement of the challenged
40
governmental act." "' [I]nterest' in the
question involved must be material - an
interest that is in issue and will be affected
by the official act- as distinguished from
being merely incidental or general."41
43 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing
is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions. Unless
a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is
anchored on the alleged breach of two (2)
constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of
minors to freely travel within their
respective localities; and (2) the primary
right of parents to rear their children.
Related to the first is the purported conflict
between RA 9344, as amended, and the
penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners,
only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has
legal standing to raise the issue affecting
the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a)
she was still a minor at the time the petition
was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a
proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances;
and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila
to Quezon City at night after school and is,
thus, in imminent danger of apprehension
by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the
other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace
Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel
Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos
Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition
that they are all of legal age, and therefore,
beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus,
they are not proper subjects of the Curfew
Ordinances, for which they could base any
direct injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to
raise the issue of whether the Curfew
Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear
their children as they have not shown that
they stand before this Court as parent/s
and/or guardian/s whose constitutional
parental right has been infringed. It should
be noted that Clarissa is represented by her
father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who
could have properly filed the petition for
himself for the alleged violation of his
parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not
question the Curfew Ordinances based on
his primary right as a parent as he only
stands as the representative of his minor
child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was
supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated
association and, consequently, has no legal
personality to bring an action in court.45
Even assuming that it has the capacity to
sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed
to allege that it was authorized by its
members who were affected by the Curfew
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case
on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not
have the required personal interest in the
controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has
standing only on the issue of the alleged
violation of the minors' right to travel, but
not on the alleged violation of the parents'
right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it
proper to relax the standing requirement
insofar as all the petitioners are concerned,
in view of the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case. "In a
44 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
number of cases, this Court has taken a
liberal stance towards the requirement of
legal standing, especially when paramount
interest is involved. Indeed, when those
who challenge the official act are able to
craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, the Court may
exercise its sound discretion and take
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite
of the inability of the petitioners to show
that they have been personally injured by
the operation of a law or any other
government act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the
constitutionality of juvenile curfew
ordinances is placed under judicial review.
Not only is this Court asked to determine
the impact of these issuances on the right
of parents to rear their children and the
right of minors to travel, it is also requested
to determine the extent of the State's
authority to regulate these rights in the
interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this
case is of overarching significance to the
public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation
of procedural rules, including, among
others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to
the substantive aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the
rights of minors to travel and of parents to
rear their children, this Court must first
tackle petitioners' contention that the
Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the
Curfew Ordinances are void for not
containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing
authorities with unbridled discretion to
carry out their provisions. They claim that
the lack of procedural guidelines in these
issuances led to the questioning of
petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even
though they were already of legal age. They
maintain that the enforcing authorities
apprehended the suspected curfew
offenders based only on their physical
appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily.
Meanwhile, although they conceded that
the Quezon City Ordinance requires
enforcers to determine the age of the child,
they submit that nowhere does the said
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask
for proof or identification of the child to
show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the
void for vagueness doctrine is improper,
considering that they do not properly
45 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
identify any provision in any of the Curfew
Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning
and notice to the public of what is
prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly.49The void for vagueness
doctrine is premised on due process
considerations,which are absent from this
particular claim. In one case, it was opined
that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of
"unconstitutional uncertainty," which may
involve "procedural due process uncertainty
cases" and "substantive due process
uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
uncertainty" involves cases where the
statutory language was so obscure that it
failed to give adequate warning to those
subject to its prohibitions as well as to
provide proper standards for adjudication.
Such a definition encompasses the
vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly
integrates the vagueness doctrine with the
due process clause, a necessary
interrelation since there is no constitutional
provision that explicitly bars statutes that
are "void-for-vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack
of enforcement parameters to guide the
local authorities in the proper apprehension
of suspected curfew offenders. They do not
assert any confusion as to what conduct
the subject ordinances prohibit or not
prohibit but only point to the ordinances'
lack of enforcement guidelines. The
mechanisms related to the implementation
of the Curfew Ordinances are, however,
matters of policy that are best left for the
political branches of government to resolve.
Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled
enforcement is not the sole consideration in
a void for vagueness analysis; rather,
petitioners must show that this perceived
danger of unbridled enforcement stems
from an ambiguous provision in the law that
allows enforcement authorities to second-
guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or
not prohibited. In this regard, that
ambiguous provision of law contravenes
due process because agents of the
government cannot reasonably decipher
what conduct the law permits and/or
forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown,51 it was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on ad hoc and
subjective basis, and vague standards result
in erratic and arbitrary application based on
individual impressions and personal
predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to
point out any ambiguous standard in any of
the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances,
but rather, lament the lack of detail on how
the age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation
to any vague legal provision, the Curfew
Ordinances cannot be stricken down under
the void for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in
claiming that there are no sufficient
standards to identify suspected curfew
violators. While it is true that the Curfew
Ordinances do not explicitly state these
parameters, law enforcement agents are
still bound to follow the prescribed
46 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
measures found in statutory law when
implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA
9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7.Determination of Age. - x x x The
age of a child may be determined from the
child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. (Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction
with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA
10630 (the law that amended RA 9344)
repeals all ordinances inconsistent with
statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54minors
caught in violation of curfew ordinances
are children at risk and, therefore, covered
by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing
principle that "[c]onformity with law is one
of the essential requisites for the validity
of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by
necessary implication, ordinances should be
read and implemented in conjunction with
related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as
petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was
perceived to be a minor violating the
curfew, may therefore prove that he is
beyond the application of the Curfew
Ordinances by simply presenting any
competent proof of identification
establishing their majority age. In the
absence of such proof, the law authorizes
enforcement authorities to conduct a visual
assessment of the suspect, which - needless
to state - should be done ethically and
judiciously under the circumstances. Should
law enforcers disregard these rules, the
remedy is to pursue the appropriate action
against the erring enforcing authority, and
not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the
Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is
denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear
Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth
without substantive due process. In this
regard, they assert that this right includes
the right to determine whether minors will
be required to go home at a certain time or
will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given
that the right to impose curfews is primarily
with parents and not with the State, the
latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot
logically be compelling.57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Constitution articulates the State's policy
relative to the rights of parents in the
rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and
47 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the
rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the
"youth") for civic efficiency and the
development of their moral character are
their characterized not only as parental rights,
but also as parental duties. This means that
parents are not only given the privilege of
exercising their authority over their
children; they are equally obliged to
exercise this authority conscientiously. The
duty aspect of this provision is a reflection
of the State's independent interest to
ensure that the youth would eventually
grow into free, independent, and well-
developed citizens of this nation. For
indeed, it is during childhood that minors
are prepared for additional obligations to
society."[T]he duty to prepare the child for
these [obligations] must be read to include
the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of
teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept
and example is essential to the growth of
young people into mature, socially
responsible citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role
implies a substantial measure of authority
over one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New
York,61 the Supreme Court of the United
States (US) remarked that "constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized
that the parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of our
society."62 As in our Constitution, the right
and duty of parents to rear their children is
not only described as "natural," but also as
"primary." The qualifier "primary"
connotes the parents' superior right over
the State in the upbringing of their
children.63 The rationale for the State's
deference to parental control over their
children was explained by the US Supreme
Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as
follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their
upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from
adverse governmental action and from their
own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. But an additional and
more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children
is that "the child is not [a) mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."65
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in
child-rearing, it should be stressed that
"when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-
being of the child, the [Sltate may act to
promote these legitimate interests."66
Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the
physical or mental health of the child or to
public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
48 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
demonstrated, these legitimate state
interests may override the parents'
qualified right to control the upbringing of
their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State
is mandated to support parents in the
exercise of these rights and duties. State
authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but
rather, complementary to parental
supervision.In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court
acknowledged the State's role as parens
patriae in protecting minors, viz. :
[Where minors are involved, the State acts
as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or
individual who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position,
vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are
to take due care of what concerns them,
they have the political community to look
after their welfare. This obligation the state
must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion
of the United States Supreme Court: "This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in
the supreme power of every State, x x x."69
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the
inherent right and duty to aid parents in
the moral development of their children,70
and, thus, assumes a supporting role for
parents to fulfill their parental obligations.
In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal
restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the
State can properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who
have the primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the
support of the laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of
legal restrictions designed to aid parents in
their role of promoting their children's well-
being. As will be later discussed at greater
length, these ordinances further compelling
State interests (particularly, the promotion
of juvenile safety and the prevention of
juvenile crime), which necessarily entail
limitations on the primary right of parents
to rear their children. Minors, because of
their peculiar vulnerability and lack of
experience, are not only more exposed to
potential physical harm by criminal
elements that operate during the night;
their moral well-being is likewise imperiled
as minor children are prone to making
detrimental decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized
that the Curfew Ordinances apply only
when the minors are not - whether actually
or constructively (as will be later discussed)
- accompanied by their parents. This serves
as an explicit recognition of the State's
deference to the primary nature of parental
authority and the importance of parents'
role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively
given unfettered authority over their
children's conduct during curfew hours
when they are able to supervise them. Thus,
in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting
that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the
parents' prerogative to allow minors to
49 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours.73
In this respect, the ordinances neither
dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the
parents to apply to their minors nor force
parents to abdicate their authority to
influence or control their minors'
activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances
only amount to a minimal - albeit
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's
right to bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the
Curfew Ordinances positively influence
children to spend more time at home.
Consequently, this situation provides
parents with better opportunities to take a
more active role in their children's
upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court
observed that the city government "was
entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal
curfew would promote parental
involvement in a child's upbringing. A
curfew aids the efforts of parents who
desire to protect their children from the
perils of the street but are unable to control
the nocturnal behavior of those children."76
Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents
who prefer their children to spend time on
their studies than on the streets."77 Reason
dictates that these realities observed in
Schleifer are no less applicable to our local
context. Hence, these are additional
reasons which justify the impact of the
nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not
be declared unconstitutional for violating
the parents' right to rear their children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances
based on the minors' right to travel. They
claim that the liberty to travel is a
fundamental right, which, therefore,
necessitates the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even
if there exists a compelling State interest,
such as the prevention of juvenile crime and
the protection of minors from crime, there
are other less restrictive means for
achieving the government's interest.78 In
addition, they posit that the Curfew
Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities
of minors during curfew hours.79
Petitioner's submissions are partly
meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners'
invocation of the overbreadth doctrine,
considering that petitioners have not
claimed any transgression of their rights to
free speech or any inhibition of speech-
related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism
Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court
explained that "the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable
only to free speech cases,"81 viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has
to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always
under situations not before the court, that
50 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to
facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the
overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away
the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a
case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to
a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their
own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties;
and the court invalidates the entire statute
"on its face," not merely "as applied for" so
that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The
factor that motivates courts to depart from
the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring
suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
law's "very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect
on the speech of those third parties.82
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out
that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth
doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in
at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the
US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment,83 and that
claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was
held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed
to speech or speech-related conduct.
Attacks on overly broad statutes are
justified by the 'transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected
expression. "'85
In the more recent case of SpousesImbong
v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial
challenges can only be raised on the basis
of overbreadth and not on vagueness.
Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how
vagueness relates to violations of due
process rights, whereas facial challenges
are raised on the basis of overbreadth and
limited to the realm of freedom of
expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper
to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this
case, there being no claimed curtailment of
free speech. On the contrary, however, this
Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and
guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under
51 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers
to the right to move freely from the
Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within
the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a
birthright of every person - includes the
power of locomotion91 and the right of
citizens to be free to use their faculties in
lawful ways and to live and work where
they desire or where they can best pursue
the ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables
individuals to access and exercise their
other rights, such as the rights to education,
free expression, assembly, association, and
religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to
travel with other fundamental rights was
briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v.
Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of
freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and
association require one to move about,
such movement must necessarily be
protected under the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those
circumstances to the extent that First
Amendment Rights cannot be exercised
without violating the law is equivalent to a
denial of those rights. One court has
eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment
to freedom of travel and movement. If, for
any reason, people cannot walk or drive to
their church, their freedom to worship is
impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot
walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom
of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any
reason, people cannot safely walk the
sidewalks or drive the streets of a
community, opportunities for freedom of
speech are sharply limited. Freedom of
movement is inextricably involved with
freedoms set forth in the First
Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding
considerations of public interest justify
restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the
freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this
right is not absolute.95 As the 1987
Constitution itself reads, the State96 may
impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided that they: (1) serve the
interest of national security, public safety,
or public health; and (2) are provided by
law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew
Ordinances, specifically the promotion of
juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of
52 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
public safety. The restriction on the minor's
movement and activities within the
confines of their residences and their
immediate vicinity during the curfew period
is perceived to reduce the probability of the
minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As
to the second requirement, i.e., that the
limitation "be provided by law," our legal
system is replete with laws emphasizing the
State's duty to afford special protection to
children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA
977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA
10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106
and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as
amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article
139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes
local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for
children. It reads:
Article 139.Curfew Hours for Children. - City
or municipal councils may prescribe such
curfew hours for children as may be
warranted by local conditions. The duty to
enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve
upon the parents or guardians and the local
authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are
authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as
what respondents have done in this case)
and enforce the same through their local
officials. In other words, PD 603 provides
sufficient statutory basis - as required by
the Constitution - to restrict the minors'
exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew
Ordinances that apply solely to minors are
likewise constitutionally permissible. In this
relation, this Court recognizes that minors
do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,108but the exercise of these rights is
not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They
are always subject to the authority or
custody of another, such as their parent/s
and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As
parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a
certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise
of their rights, such as in their affairs
concerning the right to vote,111 the right to
execute contracts,112 and the right to
engage in gainful employment.113 With
respect to the right to travel, minors are
required by law to obtain a clearance from
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development before they can travel to a
foreign country by themselves or with a
person other than their parents.114 These
limitations demonstrate that the State has
broader authority over the minors' activities
than over similar actions of adults,115 and
overall, reflect the State's general interest
in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the
State may impose limitations on the minors'
exercise of rights even though these
limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court
identified three (3) justifications for the
differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the
peculiar vulnerability of children; second,
their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed and mature manner; and
53 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
third, the importance of the parental role
in child rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that
although children generally are protected
by the same constitutional guarantees
against governmental deprivations as are
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its
legal system to account for children's
vulnerability and their needs for 'concern,
... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings
are] grounded [on] the recognition that,
during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them.x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of
parents in the upbringing of their children
justifies limitations on the freedoms of
minors. The State commonly protects its
youth from adverse governmental action
and from their own immaturity by requiring
parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially
those supportive of the parental role, may
be important to the child's chances for the
full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the
US Supreme Court acknowledged the
heightened dangers on the streets to
minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its
continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It
may secure this against impeding restraints
and dangers within a broad range of
selection. Among evils most appropriate for
such action are the crippling effects of child
employment, more especially in public
places, and the possible harms arising from
other activities subject to all the diverse
influences of the [streets]. It is too late now
to doubt that legislation appropriately
designed to reach such evils is within the
state's police power, whether against the
parent's claim to control of the child or one
that religious scruples dictate contrary
action.
It is true children have rights, in common
with older people, in the primary use of
highways. But even in such use streets
afford dangers for them not affecting
adults. And in other uses, whether in work
or in other things, this difference may be
magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in
setting restrictions on the minors' exercise
of their travel rights, provided, they are
singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed
three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to
determine the reasonableness of
54 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test
applies when a classification either (i)
interferes with the exercise of fundamental
rights, including the basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii)
burdens suspect classes.123 The
intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect
classes or fundamental rights, but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in
classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test
applies to all other subjects not covered by
the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a
fundamental right in our legal system
guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the
strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable
test.127 At this juncture, it should be
emphasized that minors enjoy the same
constitutional rights as adults; the fact that
the State has broader authority over minors
than over adults does not trigger the
application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In
Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the
US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have
recognized that juvenile curfews implicate
the fundamental rights of minors, the
parties dispute whether strict scrutiny
review is necessary. The Supreme Court
teaches that rights are no less
"fundamental" for minors than adults, but
that the analysis of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution
and possess constitutional rights. The
Court[,] indeed, however, [has long]
recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities
of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors'
rights are not coextensive with the rights of
adults because the state has a greater
range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three
specific factors that, when applicable,
warrant differential analysis of the
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x
x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not
establish a lower level of scrutiny for the
constitutional rights of minors in the
context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the
Bellotti framework enables courts to
determine whether the state has a
compelling state interest justifying greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a
compelling interest in regulating minors
differently than adults, we do not believe
that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is
appropriate to review burdens on minors'
fundamental rights.x x x.
According, we apply strict scrutiny to our
review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases
supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors
entails a consideration of the peculiar
circumstances of minors as enumerated in
Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as
parenspatriae to protect and preserve their
well-being with the compelling State
55 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
interests justifying the assailed government
act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a
legislative classification that interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect
class is presumed unconstitutional.131Thus,
the government has the burden of proving
that the classification (1) is necessary to
achieve a compelling State interest, and
(i1) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the
interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State
interests include constitutionally declared
policies.133This Court has ruled that
children's welfare and the State's mandate
to protect and care for them as
parenspatriae constitute compelling
interests to justify regulations by the
State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest
of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way.135 As explained in
Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that
the State has a compelling interest in
imposing greater restrictions on minors
than on adults. The limitations on minors
under Philippine laws also highlight this
compelling interest of the State to protect
and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently
established that the ultimate objective of
the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours
of night time off of public areas, so as to
reduce - if not totally eliminate - their
exposure to potential harm, and to insulate
them against criminal pressure and
influences which may even include
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas
clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the
State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on
minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors,
appear to be neglected of their proper care
and guidance, education, and moral
development, which [lead] them into
exploitation, drug addiction, and become
vulnerable to and at the risk of committing
criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor
children become out-of-school youth,
unproductive by-standers, street children,
and member of notorious gangs who stay,
roam around or meander in public or
private roads, streets or other public places,
whether singly or in groups without lawful
purpose or justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law
enforcement agencies reveal that minor
children roaming around, loitering or
wandering in the evening are the frequent
personalities involved in various infractions
of city ordinances and national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public
order and safety to regulate the movement
of minor children during night time by
setting disciplinary hours, protect them
from neglect, abuse or cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions
56 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
prejudicial or detrimental to their
development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental
control on these minor children, there is a
need to put a restraint on the tendency of
growing number of youth spending their
nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in
the face of the unabated rise of criminality
and to ensure that the dissident elements
of society are not provided with potent
avenues for furthering their nefarious
activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in
Schleifer,137 as regards the information
gathered by the City Council to support its
passage of the curfew ordinance subject of
that case, may serve as a guidepost to our
own eatment of the present case.
Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court
recognized the entitlement of elected
bodies to implement policies for a safer
community, in relation to the proclivity of
children to make dangerous and potentially
life-shaping decisions when left
unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified
in believing that its curfew would materially
assist its first stated interest-that of
reducing juvenile violence and crime. The
City Council acted on the basis of
information from many sources, including
records from Charlottesville's police
department, a survey of public opinion,
news reports, data from the United States
Department of Justice, national crime
reports, and police reports from other
localities. On the basis of such evidence,
elected bodies are entitled to conclude
that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the
streets late at night will make for a safer
community. The same streets may have a
more volatile and less wholesome
character at night than during the day.
Alone on the streets at night children face
a series of dangerous and potentially life-
shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure
them to use narcotics or aid in their sale.
Gangs may pressure them into membership
or participation in violence. "[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them." Those who succumb
to these criminal influences at an early age
may persist in their criminal conduct as
adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to
these theories is beside the point. Those
elected officials with their finger on the
pulse of their home community clearly did.
In attempting to reduce through its curfew
the opportunities for children to come into
contact with criminal influences, the City
was directly advancing its first objective of
reducing juvenile violence and crime.138
(Emphases and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in
Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon
City and Manila presented statistical data in
their respective pleadings showing the
alarming prevalence of crimes involving
juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators,
in their respective localities.139
Based on these findings, their city councils
found it necessary to enact curfew
ordinances pursuant to their police power
57 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
under the general welfare clause.140 In this
light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but,
in fact, attempted to substantiate
legitimate concerns on public welfare,
especially with respect to minors. As such,
a compelling State interest exists for the
enactment and enforcement of the Curfew
Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict
scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now
proceeds to determine if the restrictions set
forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are
narrowly tailored or provide the least
restrictive means to address the cited
compelling State interest - the second
requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly
Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict
scrutiny test stems from the fundamental
premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate
activities in the exercise of their
constitutional rights. While rights may be
restricted, the restrictions must be minimal
or only to the extent necessary to achieve
the purpose or to address the State's
compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more
narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so
narrowly drawn.141
Although treated differently from adults,
the foregoing standard applies to
regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any
legitimate activity, whether it be social,
religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present
case, each of the ordinances must be
narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal
constraint not only on the minors' right to
travel but also on their other constitutional
rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a
curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly
for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in
unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to
freely exercise their religion and to free
speech.145 It observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor
from attending alone Christmas Eve
Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic
Church or Christmas Eve services at the
various local Protestant Churches. It would
likewise prohibit them from attending the
New [Year's] Eve watch services at the
various churches. Likewise it would prohibit
grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult
brothers and sisters from taking their minor
relatives of any age to the above mentioned
services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of
the year a minor could not even attend the
city council meetings if they ran past 10:30
(which they frequently do) to express his
views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
58 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)]
was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of
many pages with eleven exceptions and was
very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass
constitutional muster. It specifically
excepted [the] exercise of First
Amendment rights, travel in a motor
vehicle and returning home by a direct
route from religious, school, or voluntary
association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the
ordinances' respective provisions, this Court
finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance
meets the above-discussed requirement,
while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances
do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4)
exemptions from the coverage of the
curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by
their parents, family members of legal age,
or guardian; (b) those running lawful
errands such as buying of medicines, using
of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like; (c) night
school students and those who, by virtue of
their employment, are required in the
streets or outside their residence after
10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at
night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides
more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with
night classes; (b) those working at night; (c)
those who attended a school or church
activity, in coordination with a specific
barangay office; (d) those traveling towards
home during the curfew hours; (e) those
running errands under the supervision of
their parents, guardians, or persons of legal
age having authority over them; (j) those
involved in accidents, calamities, and the
like. It also exempts minors from the curfew
during these specific occasions: Christmas
eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New
Year's day, the night before the barangay
fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and
All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday,
Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two
ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that
their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting
the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be
fair, both ordinances protect the rights to
education, to gainful employment, and to
travel at night from school or work.148
However, even with those safeguards, the
Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent,
the Manila Ordinance still do not account
for the reasonable exercise of the minors'
rights of association, free exercise of
religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and
of free expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance
are too limited, and thus, unduly trample
upon protected liberties. The Navotas
Ordinance is apparently more protective of
constitutional rights than the Manila
Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides
insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail
below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in
school or church activities, it hinders them
from engaging in legitimate non-school or
nonchurch activities in the streets or going
to and from such activities; thus, their
59 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
freedom of association is effectively
curtailed. It bears stressing that
participation in legitimate activities of
organizations, other than school or church,
also contributes to the minors' social,
emotional, and intellectual development,
yet, such participation is not exempted
under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance
does not impose the curfew during
Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it
effectively prohibits minors from attending
traditional religious activities (such as
simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults, similar to the
scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This
legitimate activity done pursuant to the
minors' right to freely exercise their religion
is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not
accommodate avenues for minors to
engage in political rallies or attend city
council meetings to voice out their concerns
in line with their right to peaceably
assemble and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the
Navotas Ordinance to engage in these
activities outside curfew hours, but the
Court finds no reason to prohibit them from
participating in these legitimate activities
during curfew hours. Such proscription does
not advance the State's compelling interest
to protect minors from the dangers of the
streets at night, such as becoming prey or
instruments of criminal activity. These
legitimate activities are merely hindered
without any reasonable relation to the
State's interest; hence, the Navotas
Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so,
the Manila Ordinance, with its limited
exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances
should be completely stricken down since
their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of
the curfew regulations, are inadequate to
ensure protection of the above-mentioned
fundamental rights. While some provisions
may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence150 of
any separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark
contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it
sufficiently safeguards the minors'
constitutional rights. It provides the
following exceptions:
Section 4.EXEMPTIONS - Minor children
under the following circumstances shall not
be covered by the provisions of this
ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their
parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a
party, graduation ceremony,
religious mass, and/or other extra-
curricular activities of their school or
organization wherein their
attendance are required or
otherwise indispensable, or when
such minors are out and unable to go
home early due to circumstances
beyond their control as verified by
60 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the proper authorities concerned;
and
(c) Those attending to, or in
experience of, an emergency
situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road
accident, law enforcers encounter,
and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an
authorized employment activity, or
going to or returning home from the
same place of employment activity
without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor
vehicle or other travel accompanied
by an adult in no violation of this
Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an
emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her
residence attending an official
school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, community or
other similar private activity
sponsored by the city, barangay,
school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that
supervises the activity or when the
minor is going to or returning home
from such activity, without any
detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present
papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from
 his/her class/es in the evening or that
he/she is a working student.152
(Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances,
the list of exceptions under the Quezon City
Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, travel,
to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and
(g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the
protection of these aforementioned rights.
These items uphold the right of association
by enabling minors to attend both official
and extra-curricular activities not only of
their school or church but also of other
legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression
are also covered by these items given that
the minors' attendance in the official
activities of civic or religious organizations
are allowed during the curfew hours.
Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right
to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently
safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
by exempting attendance at religious
masses even during curfew hours. In
relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance
allows the minor-participants to move to
and from the places where these activities
are held. Thus, with these numerous
exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in
truth, only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the
well-being of minors who publicly loaf and
loiter within the locality at a time where
danger is perceivably more prominent.
61 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
To note, there is no lack of supervision
when a parent duly authorizes his/her
minor child to run lawful errands or engage
in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the
deliberations on this case, parental
permission is implicitly considered as an
exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the
Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian",
as accompaniment should be understood
not only in its actual but also in its
constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this
should be the reasonable construction of
this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile
curfew measure with the basic premise that
State interference is not superior but only
complementary to parental supervision.
After all, as the Constitution itself
prescribes, the parents' right to rear their
children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that
this Court, in passing judgment on these
ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of
minors who are presumed by law to be
incapable of giving proper consent due to
their incapability to fully understand the
import and consequences of their actions.
In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract
under our civil laws. This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as
she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is
under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years
deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of
a minor's inherent lack of full rational
capacity, and balancing the same against
the State's compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime,
this Court finds that the curfew imposed
under the Quezon City Ordinance is
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn
exceptions and hence, constitutional.
Needless to say, these exceptions are in no
way limited or restricted, as the State, in
accordance with the lawful exercise of its
police power, is not precluded from
crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in
similar laws/ordinances for as long as the
regulation, overall, passes the parameters
of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the
Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this
Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to
further discuss the validity of its penal
provisions in relation to RA 9344, as
amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance,
while penalizing the parent/s or guardian
under Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose
any penalty on the minors. For its part, the
Navotas Ordinance requires the minor,
along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s,
to render social civic duty and community
62 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
service either in lieu of - should the
parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be
unable to pay the fine imposed - or in
addition to the fine imposed
155
therein. Meanwhile, the Manila
Ordinance imposed various sanctions to
the minor based on the age and frequency
of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4.Sanctions and Penalties for Violation.
Any child or youth violating this ordinance
shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years
of age and below, the sanction shall
consist of a REPRIMAND for the
youth offender and ADMONITION to
the offender's parent, guardian or
person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years
of age and under Eighteen (18) years
of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE,
Manila Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE,
Reprimand and Admonition,
and a warning about the legal
impostitions in case of a third
and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES,
Imprisonment of one (1) day
to ten (10) days, or a Fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the
Court,PROVIDED, That the
 complaint shall be filed by the
PunongBarangay with the
office of the City Prosecutor.156
(Emphases and underscoring
supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local
governments could validly impose on
minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community
.service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c)
fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently,
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, prohibit the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses
such as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57.Status Offenses. - Any conduct not
considered an offense or not penalized if
committed by an adult shall not be
considered an offense and shall not be
punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. -
Ordinances enacted by local governments
concerning juvenile status offenses such as
but not limited to, curfew violations,
truancy, parental disobedience, anti-
smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as
light offenses and misdemeanors against
public order or safety such as, but not
limited to, disorderly conduct, public
scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism,
gambling, mendicancy, littering, public
urination, and trespassing, shall be for the
protection of children. No penalty shall be
imposed on children for said violations,
and they shall instead be brought to their
residence or to any barangay official at the
barangay hall to be released to the custody
of their parents. Appropriate intervention
63 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
programs shall be provided for in such
ordinances. The child shall also be recorded
as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in
conflict with the law." The ordinance shall
also provide for intervention programs,
such as counseling, attendance in group
activities for children, and for the parents,
attendance in parenting education
seminars. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit
the enactment of regulations that curtail
the conduct of minors, when the similar
conduct of adults are not considered as an
offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses).
Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition
of penalties on minors for violations of
these regulations. Consequently, the
enactment of curfew ordinances on minors,
without penalizing them for violations
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment
imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form
of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p ]unishment
imposed by lawful authority upon a person
who commits a deliberate or negligent
act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as
"[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty,
confinement, or loss of property, right, or
privilege - assessed against a person who
has violated the law."160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended,
should not be read to mean that all the
actions of the minor in violation of the
regulations are without legal consequences.
Section 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate
intervention programs, such as community-
based programs161 recognized under
Section 54162 of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to
perform community service is a valid form
of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this
case) could appropriately adopt in an
ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors. For one, the community service
programs provide minors an alternative
mode of rehabilitation as they promote
accountability for their delinquent acts
without the moral and social stigma caused
by jail detention.
In the same light, these programs help
inculcate discipline and compliance with the
law and legal orders. More importantly,
they give them the opportunity to become
productive members of society and thereby
promote their integration to and solidarity
with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the
City of Manila is likewise consistent with
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is
merely a formal way of giving warnings and
expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally
defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or
"counsel or warning against fault or
oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary
defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively
issued warning or censure";164 while the
Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a
"gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke,
warning or reminder, [counseling], on a
fault, error or oversight, an expression of
authoritative advice or warning."165
Notably, the Revised Rules on
64 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in
administrative cases explicitly declare that
"a warning or admonition shall not be
considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of
community-based programs and
admonition are clearly not penalties - as
they are not punitive in nature - and are
generally less intrusive on the rights and
conduct of the minor. To be clear, their
objectives are to formally inform and
educate the minor, and for the latter to
understand, what actions must be avoided
so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached
with regard to reprimand and fines and/or
imprisonment imposed by the City of
Manila on the minor. Reprimand is
generally defined as "a severe or formal
reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary
defines it as "a mild form of lawyer
discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's
ability to practice law";168 while the
Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a
"public and formal censure or severe
reproof, administered to a person in fault
by his superior officer or body to which he
belongs. It is more than just a warning or
admonition."169 In other words, reprimand
is a formal and public pronouncement made
to denounce the error or violation
committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke
the erring individual, and to sternly warn
the erring individual including the public
against repeating or committing the same,
and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring
individual or violator to unwarranted
censure or sharp disapproval from others.
In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence
explicitly indicate that reprimand is a
penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-
A of RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other
hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as
provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A
is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It
states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed
on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile
status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or
imprisonment on minors for curfew
violations, portions of Section 4 of the
Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably
conflict with the clear language of Section
57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence,
invalid. On the other hand, the impositions
of community service programs and
admonition on the minors are allowed as
they do not constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three
Curfew Ordinances have passed the first
prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that
the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City
Ordinance has passed the second prong of
the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only
issuance out of the three which provides for
the least restrictive means to achieve this
65 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
interest. In particular, the Quezon City
Ordinance provides for adequate
exceptions that enable minors to freely
exercise their fundamental rights during the
prescribed curfew hours, and therefore,
narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance,
i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents
or guardian", has also been construed to
include parental permission as a
constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew
measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local
government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances
are declared unconstitutional and thus, null
and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance
is declared as constitutional and thus, valid
in accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that
the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions
imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Hence, following the rule that ordinances
should always conform with the law, these
provisions must be struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby
declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the
local government of the City of Manila, and
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
2002-13 issued by the local government of
Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No.
SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local
government of the Quezon City is declared
CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
April 24, 2017
G.R. No. 189950*
BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA
BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG,
REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF LOURDES
S. BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-
HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE BILAG,
Petitioners,
vs.
ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR.,
FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO AP-AP, JOHN
NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR., and MA.
TERESA A. RAMIREZ, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March
19, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated
September 3, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266, which set
aside the Order4 dated October 10, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 61 (RTC Br. 61), and consequently,
66 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
remanded the case to the latter court for
trial.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a
Complaint5 dated August 12, 2004 for
Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction filed by respondents Estela Ay-
Ay, Andres Acop, Jr., Felicitas Ap-Ap, Sergio
ApAp, John Napoleon A. Ramirez, Jr., and
Ma. Teresa A. Ramirez (respondents)
against petitioners Bernadette S. Bilag,
Erlinda BilagSantillan, Dixon Bilag, Reynaldo
B. Suello, Heirs of Lourdes S. Bilag, Heirs of
Leticia Bilag-Hanaoka, and Heirs of Nellie
Bilag before the RTC Br. 61, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5881-R. Essentially,
respondents alleged that Iloc Bilag,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, sold to
them separately various portions of a
159,496-square meter parcel of land
designated by the Bureau of Lands as
Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147
situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio City (subject
lands), and that they registered the
corresponding Deeds of Sale6 with the
Register of Deeds of Baguio City. According
to respondents, Iloc Bilag not only
acknowledged full payment and guaranteed
that his heirs, successors-in-interest, and
executors are to be bound by such sales,
but he also caused the subject lands to be
removed from the Ancestral Land Claims.
Respondents further alleged that they have
been in continuous possession of the said
lands since 1976 when they were delivered
to them and that they have already
introduced various improvements thereon.
Despite the foregoing, petitioners refused
to honor the foregoing sales by asserting
their adverse rights on the subject lands.
Worse, they continued to harass
respondents, and even threatened to
demolish their improvements and
dispossess them thereof. Hence, they filed
the instant complaint to quiet their
respective titles over the subject lands and
remove the cloud cast upon their ownership
as a result of petitioners' refusal to
recognize the sales.7
For their part, petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss8 dated November 4, 2004 on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
prescription/laches/estoppel, and res
judicata. Anent the first ground, petitioners
averred that the subject lands are untitled,
unregistered, and form part of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation which were long
classified as lands of the public domain. As
such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case as it is the Land Management Bureau
(formerly the Bureau of Lands) which is
vested with the authority to determine
issues of ownership over unregistered
public lands.9
As to the second ground, petitioners argued
that it is only now, or more than 27 years
from the execution of the Deeds of Sale,
that respondents seek to enforce said
Deeds; thus, the present action is already
barred by prescription and/or laches. 10
Regarding the final ground, petitioners
pointed out that on January 27, 1998,
respondents had already filed a complaint
against them for injunction and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3934-R before
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 5 (RTC Br. 5), wherein they
67 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
principally asserted their ownership over
the subject lands. However, RTC Br. 5
dismissed Civil Case No. 3934-R for lack of
merit on the ground of respondents' failure
to show convincing proof of ownership over
the same, 11 which Order of dismissal was
then affirmed by the CA on appeal. 12
Eventually, the Court issued a Resolution
dated January 21, 200413 declaring the case
closed and terminated for failure to file the
intended petition subject of the Motion for
Extension to file the same. In view of the
foregoing, petitioners contended that due
to the final and executory ruling in Civil
Case No. 3934-R, the filing of Civil Case No.
5881-R seeking to establish the ownership
thereof is already barred by res judicata. 14
The RTC Br. 61 Ruling
In an Order 15 dated October 10, 2005, the
RTC Br. 61 ruled in petitioners' favor, and
consequently, ordered the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 5881-R on the following grounds:
(a) it had no authority to do so; (b) the
Deeds of Sale in respondents' favor could
not as yet be considered title to the subject
lands, noting the failure of respondents to
perfect their title or assert ownership and
possession thereof for the past 27 years;
and (c) the filing of the instant case is
barred by res judicata considering the final
and executory Decision dismissing the
earlier filed Civil Case No. 3934-R where
respondents similarly sought to be declared
the owners of the subject lands.16
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.
17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated March 19, 2009, the
CA set aside the dismissal of Civil Case No.
5881-R, and accordingly, remanded the case
to the court a quo for trial. 19 It held that
Civil Case No. 3934-R was an action for
injunction where respondents sought to
enjoin petitioners' alleged entry into the
subject lands and their introduction of
improvements thereat; whereas Civil Case
No. 5881-R is an action to quiet title where
respondents specifically prayed, inter alia,
for the removal of the cloud upon their
ownership and possession of the subject
lands. In this light, the CA concluded that
while these cases may involve the same
properties, the nature of the action differs;
hence, res judicata is not a bar to the
present suit. On the issue of laches,
prescription or estoppel, the CA pointed out
that in view of respondents' allegation that
they have been in possession of the subject
lands since 1976, their action to quiet title is
imprescriptible.20
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for
21
reconsideration which was, however,
denied in a Resolution22 dated September 3,
2009; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in
setting aside the Order of dismissal of Civil
Case No. 5881-R due to the inapplicability
of the grounds of res judicata and
prescription/laches, the CA notably omitted
from its discussion the first ground relied
upon by petitioners, which is lack of
jurisdiction.
68 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Jurisprudence has consistently held that
"[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and
authority of a court to hear, try, and decide
a case. In order for the court or an
adjudicative body to have authority to
dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
power to hear and determine the general
class to which the proceedings in question
belong; it is conferred by law and not by the
consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the court
that it exists. Thus, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
only power it has is to dismiss the action." 23
Perforce, it is important that a court or
tribunal should first determine whether or
not it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter presented before it, considering that
any act that it performs without jurisdiction
shall be null and void, and without any
binding legal effects. The Court's
pronouncement in Tan v. Cinco,24 is
instructive on this matter, to wit:
A judgment rendered by a court without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be
attacked anytime. It creates no rights and
produces no effect.1âwphi1It remains a
basic fact in law that the choice of the
proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a
court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a
total nullity. A void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. 25
Now, on the issue of jurisdiction, a review
of the records shows that the subject lands
form part of a 159,496-square meter parcel
of land designated by the Bureau of Lands
as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147
situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio City. Notably,
such parcel of land forms part of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation, a portion of which, or
146, 428 square meters, was awarded to
Iloc Bilag due to the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No.
211, as evidenced by a Decision 26 dated
April 22, 1968 promulgated by the then-
Court of First Instance of Baguio City.
In a catena of cases, 27 and more
importantly, in Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1271,28 it was expressly declared that all
orders and decisions issued by the Court of
First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in
connection with the proceedings for the
reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
GLRO Record 211, covering lands within the
Baguio Town site Reservation are null and
void and without force and effect. While PD
1271 provides for a means to validate
ownership over lands forming part of the
Baguio Town site Reservation, it requires,
among others, that a Certificate of Title be
issued on such lands on or before July 31,
1973. 29 In this case, records reveal that the
subject lands are unregistered and untitled,
as petitioners' assertion to that effect was
not seriously disputed by respondents.
Clearly, the award of lots 2 and 3 of the
159,496-square meter parcel of land
designated by the Bureau of Lands as
Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 -
which includes the subject lands - to Iloc
Bilag by virtue of the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, is
covered by the blanket nullification
69 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
provided under PD 1271, and consistently
affirmed by the prevailing case law. In view
of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to
conclude that the subject lands should be
properly classified as lands of the public
domain as well.
Therefore, since the subject lands are
untitled and unregistered public lands, then
petitioners correctly argued that it is the
Director of Lands who has the authority to
award their ownership.30 Thus, the RTC Br.
61 correctly recognized its lack of power or
authority to hear and resolve respondents'
action for quieting oftitle.31 In Heirs of
Pocdo v. Avila,32 the Court ruled that the
trial court therein correctly dismissed an
action to quiet title on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction for lack of authority to
determine who among the parties have
better right over the disputed property,
which is admittedly still part of public
domain for being within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation, viz.:
The DENR Decision was affirmed by the
Office of the President which held that
lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation belong to the public domain
and are no longer registrable under the
Land Registration Act. The Office of the
President ordered the disposition of the
disputed property in accordance with the
applicable rules of procedure for the
disposition of alienable public lands within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation,
particularly Chapter X of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and
other applicable rules.
Having established that the disputed
property is public land, the trial court was
therefore correct in dismissing the
complaint to quiet title for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court had no
jurisdiction to determine who among the
parties have better right over the disputed
property which is admittedly still part of
the public domain. As held in Dajunos v.
Tandayag:
x x x The Tarucs' action was for "quieting of
title" and necessitated determination of the
respective rights of the litigants, both
claimants to a free patent title, over a piece
of property, admittedly public land. The
law, as relied upon by jurisprudence, lodges
"the power of executive control,
administration, disposition and alienation of
public lands with the Director of Lands
subject, of course, to the control of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources."
In sum, the decision rendered in civil case
1218 on October 28, 1968 is a patent
nullity. The court below did not have
power to determine who (the Firmalos or
the Tarucs) were entitled to an award of
free patent title over that piece of property
that yet belonged to the public domain.
Neither did it have power to adjudge the
Tarucs as entitled to the "true equitable
ownership" thereof, the latter's effect being
the same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in
favor of the Tarucs.
In an action for quieting of title, the
complainant is seeking for "an adjudication
that a claim of title or interest in property
adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free
70 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
him from the danger of hostile claim, and to
remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land
where stale or unenforceable claims or
demands exist." Under Articles 476 and 477
of the Civil Code, the two indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1)
that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable
title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) that there is a
cloud on his title by reason of any
instrument, record, deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of
validity.
In this case, petitioners, claiming to be
owners of the disputed property, allege that
respondents are unlawfully claiming the
disputed property by using void documents,
namely the "Catulagan" and the Deed of
Waiver of Rights. However, the records
reveal that petitioners do not have legal or
equitable title over the disputed property,
which forms part of Lot 43, a public land
within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. It
is clear from the facts of the case that
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, the
heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not even granted
a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over
Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus,
the trial court had no other recourse but to
dismiss the case.33 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In conclusion, RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs
therein (herein respondents) seek to quiet
title over lands which belong to the public
domain. Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881- R
must be dismissed on this ground. It should
be stressed that the court a quo's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the case
renders it without authority and necessarily
obviates the resolution of the merits of the
case. To reiterate, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
only power it has is to dismiss the action, as
any act it performs without jurisdiction is
null and void, and without any binding legal
effects. In this light, the Court finds no
further need to discuss the other grounds
relied upon by petitioners in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated March 19, 2009 and the
Resolution dated September 3, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 5881-R is
DISMISSED on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 61.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE,
Associate Justice
March 11, 2015
G.R. No. 212054
ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
71 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
November 21, 2013 and the Resolution3
dated April 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 which
affirmed the Decision4 dated November 19,
2012 and the Resolution5 dated January 14,
2013 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 06-
001858-12, declaring the dismissal of
respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez
(Sanchez) illegal.
The Facts
On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by
petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc.
(SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and was eventually
assigned at SLMC, Quezon City's Pediatric
Unit until her termination on July 6, 2011
for her purported violation of SLMC's Code
of Discipline, particularly Section 1, Rule 1
on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft,
Pilferage, and Misappropriation of Funds.6
Records reveal that at the end of her shift
on May 29, 2011, Sanchez passed through
the SLMC Centralization Entrance/Exit
where she was subjected to the standard
inspection procedure by the security
personnel. In the course thereof, the
Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade
(SG Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag
and asked her to open the same.7 When
opened, said pouch contained the following
assortment of medical stocks which were
subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl
[4 pieces]; (b) Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c)
Syringe 3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore [1
piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon
g26 [1 piece]; (g) Venofix 25 [2 pieces]; and
(h) Gloves [4 pieces] (questioned items).8
Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she could
just return the pouch inside the treatment
room; however, she was not allowed to do
so.9 Instead, she was brought to the SLMC
In-House Security Department (IHSD) where
she was directed to write an Incident
Report explaining why she had the
questioned items in her possession.10 She
complied11 with the directive and also
submitted an undated handwritten letter of
apology12 (handwritten letter) which reads
as follows:
To In-House Security,
I am very sorry for bringing things from
[SLMC] inside my bag.
Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong
humihingi ng tawad sa aking pagkakasala,
Alam ko po na ako ay nagkamali. Hindi ko
po dapat dinala yung mga gamit sa hospital.
Hindi ko po alam kung [paano] ako
magsisimulang humingi ng patawad. Kahit
alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong makapag
uwi ng gamit. Marami pang gamit dahil sa
naipon po. Paisa-isa nagagawa kong
makakuha pag nakakalimutan kong isoli.
Hindi ko na po naiwan sa nurse station dahil
naisip kong magagamit ko rin po pag
minsang nagkakaubusan ng stocks at
talagang may kailangan.
Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa.
Isinakripisyo ko ang hindi pagiging "toxic" sa
pagkuha ng gamit para sa bagay na alam
kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako'y naging
madamot, pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna
ko ang comfort ko keysa gumawa ng tama.
Manikluhod po akong humihingi ng tawad.
72 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga.13
In a memorandum14 of even date, the IHSD,
Customer Affairs Division, through Duty
Officer Hernani R. Janayon, apprised SLMC
of the incident, highlighting that Sanchez
expressly admitted that she intentionally
brought out the questioned items.1awp++i1
An initial investigation was also conducted
by the SLMC Division of Nursing15 which
thereafter served Sanchez a notice to
explain.16
On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an
Incident Report Addendum17 (May 31, 2011
letter), explaining that the questioned items
came from the medication drawers of
patients who had already been discharged,
and, as similarly practiced by the other staff
members, she started saving these items as
excess stocks in her pouch, along with other
basic items that she uses during her shift.18
She then put the pouch inside the lowest
drawer of the bedside table in the
treatment room for use in immediate
procedures in case replenishment of stocks
gets delayed. However, on the day of the
incident, she failed to return the pouch
inside the medication drawer upon getting
her tri-colored pen and calculator and,
instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually,
she forgot about the same as she got
caught up in work, until it was noticed by
the guard on duty on her way out of SMLC's
premises.
Consequently, Sanchez was placed under
preventive suspension effective June 3,
2011 until the conclusion of the
investigation by SLMC's Employee and
Labor Relations Department (ELRD)19 which,
thereafter, required her to explain why she
should not be terminated from service for
"acts of dishonesty" due to her possession
of the questioned items in violation of
Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline.20 In response, she submitted a
letter21 dated June 13, 2011, which merely
reiterated her claims in her previous May
31, 2011 letter. She likewise requested for a
case conference,22 which SLMC granted.23
After hearing her side, SLMC, on July 4,
2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to
terminate her employment effective closing
hours of July 6, 2011.24 This prompted her
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal
before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR
Case No. 07-11042-11.
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained
her innocence, claiming that she had no
intention of bringing outside the SLMC's
premises the questioned items since she
merely inadvertently left the pouch
containing them in her bag as she got
caught up in work that day. She further
asserted that she could not be found guilty
of pilferage since the questioned items
found in her possession were neither
SLMC's nor its employees' property. She
also stressed the fact that SLMC did not file
any criminal charges against her. Anent her
supposed admission in her handwritten
letter, she claimed that she was unassisted
by counsel when she executed the same
and, thus, was inadmissible for being
unconstitutional.26
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez
was validly dismissed for just cause as she
had committed theft in violation of Section
73 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline,29
which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
robbery, theft, pilferage, and
misappropriation of funds, with termination
from service.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the
Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Sanchez was
validly dismissed31 for intentionally taking
the property of SLMC's clients for her own
personal benefit,32 which constitutes an act
of dishonesty as provided under SLMC's
Code of Discipline.
According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft
was evinced by her attempt to bring the
questioned items that did not belong to her
out of SLMC's premises; this was found to
be analogous to serious misconduct which
is a just cause to dismiss her.33 The fact that
the items she took were neither SLMC's nor
her co-employees' property was not found
by the LA to be material since the SLMC
Code of Discipline clearly provides that acts
of dishonesty committed to SLMC, its
doctors, its employees, as well as its
customers, are punishable by a penalty of
termination from service.34 To this, the LA
opined that "[i]t is rather illogical to
distinguish the persons with whom the
[said] acts may be committed as SLMC is
also answerable to the properties of its
patients."35 Moreover, the LA observed that
Sanchez was aware of SLMC's strict policy
regarding the taking of hospital/medical
items as evidenced by her handwritten
letter,36 but nonetheless committed the
said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out
that SLMC's non-filing of a criminal case
against Sanchez did not preclude a
determination of her serious misconduct,
considering that the filing of a criminal case
is entirely separate and distinct from the
determination of just cause for termination
of employment.37
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012,
the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA
ruling, and held that Sanchez was illegally
dismissed.
The NLRC declared that the alleged
violation of Sanchez was a unique case,
considering that keeping excess hospital
stocks or "hoarding" was an admitted
practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric
Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC
management for a long time.40 The NLRC
held that while Sanchez expressed remorse
for her misconduct in her handwritten
letter, she manifested that she only
"hoarded" the questioned items for future
use in case their medical supplies are
depleted, and not for her personal
benefit.41 It further held that SLMC failed to
establish that Sanchez was motivated by ill-
will when she brought out the questioned
items, noting: (a) the testimony of SG
Manzanade during the conference before
the ELRD of Sanchez's demeanor when she
was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya
masyado nataranta,"42 and her consequent
offer to return the pouch;43 and (b) that the
said pouch was not hidden underneath the
bag.44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the
74 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
punishment of dismissal was too harsh and
the one
(1) month preventive suspension
already imposed on and served by
Sanchez was the appropriate
penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC
ordered her reinstatement, and the
payment of backwages, other
benefits, and attorney's fees.46
Unconvinced, SLMC moved for
reconsideration 47
which was, however,
denied in a Resolution48 dated January 14,
2013. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49
before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013,
the CA upheld the NLRC, ruling that the
latter did not gravely abuse its discretion in
finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not
qualify as serious misconduct, given that:
(a) the questioned items found in her
possession were not SLMC property since
said items were paid for by discharged
patients, thus discounting any material or
economic damage on SLMC's part; (b) the
retention of excess medical supplies was an
admitted practice amongst nurses in the
Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC;
(c) it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the
pouch in her bag since she would be
subjected to a routine inspection; (d)
Sanchez's lack of intention to bring out the
pouch was manifested by her composed
demeanor upon apprehension and offer to
return the pouch to the treatment room;
and (e) had SLMC honestly believed that
Sanchez committed theft or pilferage, it
should have filed the appropriate criminal
case, but failed to do so.51 Moreover, while
the CA recognized that SLMC had the
management prerogative to discipline its
erring employees, it, however, declared
that such right must be exercised humanely.
As such, SLMC should only impose penalties
commensurate with the degree of
infraction. Considering that there was no
indication that Sanchez's actions were
perpetrated for self-interest or for an
unlawful objective, the penalty of dismissal
imposed on her was grossly oppressive and
disproportionate to her offense.52
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for
53
reconsideration, but was denied in a
Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue to be resolved is whether or
not Sanchez was illegally dismissed by
SLMC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The right of an employer to regulate all
aspects of employment, aptly called
"management prerogative," gives
employers the freedom to regulate,
according to their discretion and best
judgment, all aspects of employment,
including work assignment, working
methods, processes to be followed, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work
75 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
supervision, lay-off of workers and the
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.55
In this light, courts often decline to interfere
in legitimate business decisions of
employers. In fact, labor laws discourage
interference in employers' judgment
concerning the conduct of their business.56
Among the employer's management
prerogatives is the right to prescribe
reasonable rules and regulations necessary
or proper for the conduct of its business or
concern, to provide certain disciplinary
measures to implement said rules and to
assure that the same would be complied
with. At the same time, the employee has
the corollary duty to obey all reasonable
rules, orders, and instructions of the
employer; and willful or intentional
disobedience thereto, as a general rule,
justifies termination of the contract of
service and the dismissal of the employee.57
Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the
Labor Code provides:58
Article 296.Termination by Employer. - An
employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or his representative
in connection with his work;
xxxx
Note that for an employee to be validly
dismissed on this ground, the employer's
orders, regulations, or instructions must be:
(1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently
known to the employee, and (3) in
connection with the duties which the
employee has been engaged to
59
discharge."
Tested against the foregoing, the Court
finds that Sanchez was validly dismissed by
SLMC for her willful disregard and
disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the
SLMC Code of Discipline, which reasonably
punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., "theft,
pilferage of hospital or co-employee
property, x x x or its attempt in any form or
manner from the hospital, co-employees,
doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external
and internal)" with termination from
employment.60 Such act is obviously
connected with Sanchez's work, who, as a
staff nurse, is tasked with the proper
stewardship of medical supplies.
Significantly, records show that Sanchez
made a categorical admission61 in her
handwritten letter62 - i.e., "[k]ahit alam
kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi]
ng gamit"63 - that despite her knowledge of
its express prohibition under the SLMC
Code of Discipline, she still knowingly
brought out the subject medical items with
her. It is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be
faulted in construing the taking of the
questioned items as an act of dishonesty
(particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its
attempt in any form or manner) considering
that the intent to gain may be reasonably
presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property appertaining to another.64 Note
that Section 1, Rule 1 of the SLMC Code of
Discipline is further supplemented by the
company policy requiring the turn-over of
excess medical supplies/items for proper
handling65 and providing a restriction on
76 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
taking and bringing such items out of the
SLMC premises without the proper
authorization or "pass" from the official
concerned,66 which Sanchez was equally
aware thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez
failed to turn-over the questioned items
and, instead, "hoarded" them, as
purportedly practiced by the other staff
members in the Pediatric Unit. As it is clear
that the company policies subject of this
case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently
known to the employee, and evidently
connected with the latter's work, the Court
concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for
a just cause.
On a related point, the Court observes that
there lies no competent basis to support
the common observation of the NLRC and
the CA that the retention of excess medical
supplies was a tolerated practice among the
nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there
were previous incidents of "hoarding," it
appears that such acts were - in similar
fashion - furtively made and the items
secretly kept, as any excess items found in
the concerned nurse's possession would
have to be confiscated.68 Hence, the fact
that no one was caught and/or sanctioned
for transgressing the prohibition therefor
does not mean that the so-called
"hoarding" practice was tolerated by SLMC.
Besides, whatever maybe the justification
behind the violation of the company rules
regarding excess medical supplies is
immaterial since it has been established
that an infraction was deliberately
committed.69 Doubtless, the deliberate
disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced as it
may encourage him or her to do even worse
and will render a mockery of the rules of
discipline that employees are required to
observe.70
Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential
that SLMC has not suffered any actual
damage. While damage aggravates the
charge, its absence does not mitigate nor
negate the employee's liability.71 Neither is
SLMC's non- filing of the appropriate
criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An
employee's guilt or innocence in a criminal
case is not determinative of the existence of
a just or authorized cause for his or her
dismissal.72 It is well- settled that conviction
in a criminal case is not necessary to find
just cause for termination of employment,73
as in this case. Criminal and labor cases
involving an employee arising from the
same infraction are separate and distinct
proceedings which should not arrest any
judgment from one to the other.
As it stands, the Court thus holds that the
dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause,
supported by substantial evidence, and is
therefore in order. By declaring otherwise,
bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC
issued a patently and grossly erroneous
ruling tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion, which, in turn, means that the
CA erred when it affirmed the same. In
consequence, the grant of the present
petition is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated November 21, 2013 and the
Resolution dated April 4, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor
77 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Arbiter's Decision dated May 27, 2012 in
NLRC Case No. NCR 07-11042-11 finding
respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez to
have been validly dismissed by petitioner St.
Luke's Medical Center, Inc. is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
March 11, 2015
G.R. No. 212054
ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
November 21, 2013 and the Resolution3
dated April 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 which
affirmed the Decision4 dated November 19,
2012 and the Resolution5 dated January 14,
2013 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 06-
001858-12, declaring the dismissal of
respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez
(Sanchez) illegal.
The Facts
On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by
petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc.
(SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and was eventually
assigned at SLMC, Quezon City's Pediatric
Unit until her termination on July 6, 2011
for her purported violation of SLMC's Code
of Discipline, particularly Section 1, Rule 1
on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft,
Pilferage, and Misappropriation of Funds.6
Records reveal that at the end of her shift
on May 29, 2011, Sanchez passed through
the SLMC Centralization Entrance/Exit
where she was subjected to the standard
inspection procedure by the security
personnel. In the course thereof, the
Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade
(SG Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag
and asked her to open the same.7 When
opened, said pouch contained the following
assortment of medical stocks which were
subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl
[4 pieces]; (b) Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c)
Syringe 3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore [1
piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon
g26 [1 piece]; (g) Venofix 25 [2 pieces]; and
(h) Gloves [4 pieces] (questioned items).8
Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she could
just return the pouch inside the treatment
room; however, she was not allowed to do
so.9 Instead, she was brought to the SLMC
In-House Security Department (IHSD) where
she was directed to write an Incident
Report explaining why she had the
questioned items in her possession.10 She
complied11 with the directive and also
submitted an undated handwritten letter of
apology12 (handwritten letter) which reads
as follows:
To In-House Security,
78 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
I am very sorry for bringing things from
[SLMC] inside my bag.
Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong
humihingi ng tawad sa aking pagkakasala,
Alam ko po na ako ay nagkamali. Hindi ko
po dapat dinala yung mga gamit sa hospital.
Hindi ko po alam kung [paano] ako
magsisimulang humingi ng patawad. Kahit
alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong makapag
uwi ng gamit. Marami pang gamit dahil sa
naipon po. Paisa-isa nagagawa kong
makakuha pag nakakalimutan kong isoli.
Hindi ko na po naiwan sa nurse station dahil
naisip kong magagamit ko rin po pag
minsang nagkakaubusan ng stocks at
talagang may kailangan.
Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa.
Isinakripisyo ko ang hindi pagiging "toxic" sa
pagkuha ng gamit para sa bagay na alam
kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako'y naging
madamot, pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna
ko ang comfort ko keysa gumawa ng tama.
Manikluhod po akong humihingi ng tawad.
Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga.13
In a memorandum14 of even date, the IHSD,
Customer Affairs Division, through Duty
Officer Hernani R. Janayon, apprised SLMC
of the incident, highlighting that Sanchez
expressly admitted that she intentionally
brought out the questioned items.1awp++i1
An initial investigation was also conducted
by the SLMC Division of Nursing15 which
thereafter served Sanchez a notice to
explain.16
On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an
Incident Report Addendum17 (May 31, 2011
letter), explaining that the questioned items
came from the medication drawers of
patients who had already been discharged,
and, as similarly practiced by the other staff
members, she started saving these items as
excess stocks in her pouch, along with other
basic items that she uses during her shift.18
She then put the pouch inside the lowest
drawer of the bedside table in the
treatment room for use in immediate
procedures in case replenishment of stocks
gets delayed. However, on the day of the
incident, she failed to return the pouch
inside the medication drawer upon getting
her tri-colored pen and calculator and,
instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually,
she forgot about the same as she got
caught up in work, until it was noticed by
the guard on duty on her way out of SMLC's
premises.
Consequently, Sanchez was placed under
preventive suspension effective June 3,
2011 until the conclusion of the
investigation by SLMC's Employee and
Labor Relations Department (ELRD)19 which,
thereafter, required her to explain why she
should not be terminated from service for
"acts of dishonesty" due to her possession
of the questioned items in violation of
Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline.20 In response, she submitted a
letter21 dated June 13, 2011, which merely
reiterated her claims in her previous May
31, 2011 letter. She likewise requested for a
case conference,22 which SLMC granted.23
After hearing her side, SLMC, on July 4,
2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to
79 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
terminate her employment effective closing
hours of July 6, 2011.24 This prompted her
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal
before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR
Case No. 07-11042-11.
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained
her innocence, claiming that she had no
intention of bringing outside the SLMC's
premises the questioned items since she
merely inadvertently left the pouch
containing them in her bag as she got
caught up in work that day. She further
asserted that she could not be found guilty
of pilferage since the questioned items
found in her possession were neither
SLMC's nor its employees' property. She
also stressed the fact that SLMC did not file
any criminal charges against her. Anent her
supposed admission in her handwritten
letter, she claimed that she was unassisted
by counsel when she executed the same
and, thus, was inadmissible for being
unconstitutional.26
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez
was validly dismissed for just cause as she
had committed theft in violation of Section
1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline,29
which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
robbery, theft, pilferage, and
misappropriation of funds, with termination
from service.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the
Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Sanchez was
validly dismissed31 for intentionally taking
the property of SLMC's clients for her own
personal benefit,32 which constitutes an act
of dishonesty as provided under SLMC's
Code of Discipline.
According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft
was evinced by her attempt to bring the
questioned items that did not belong to her
out of SLMC's premises; this was found to
be analogous to serious misconduct which
is a just cause to dismiss her.33 The fact that
the items she took were neither SLMC's nor
her co-employees' property was not found
by the LA to be material since the SLMC
Code of Discipline clearly provides that acts
of dishonesty committed to SLMC, its
doctors, its employees, as well as its
customers, are punishable by a penalty of
termination from service.34 To this, the LA
opined that "[i]t is rather illogical to
distinguish the persons with whom the
[said] acts may be committed as SLMC is
also answerable to the properties of its
patients."35 Moreover, the LA observed that
Sanchez was aware of SLMC's strict policy
regarding the taking of hospital/medical
items as evidenced by her handwritten
letter,36 but nonetheless committed the
said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out
that SLMC's non-filing of a criminal case
against Sanchez did not preclude a
determination of her serious misconduct,
considering that the filing of a criminal case
is entirely separate and distinct from the
determination of just cause for termination
of employment.37
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012,
the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA
80 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
ruling, and held that Sanchez was illegally
dismissed.
The NLRC declared that the alleged
violation of Sanchez was a unique case,
considering that keeping excess hospital
stocks or "hoarding" was an admitted
practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric
Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC
management for a long time.40 The NLRC
held that while Sanchez expressed remorse
for her misconduct in her handwritten
letter, she manifested that she only
"hoarded" the questioned items for future
use in case their medical supplies are
depleted, and not for her personal
benefit.41 It further held that SLMC failed to
establish that Sanchez was motivated by ill-
will when she brought out the questioned
items, noting: (a) the testimony of SG
Manzanade during the conference before
the ELRD of Sanchez's demeanor when she
was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya
masyado nataranta,"42 and her consequent
offer to return the pouch;43 and (b) that the
said pouch was not hidden underneath the
bag.44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the
punishment of dismissal was too harsh and
the one
(1) month preventive suspension
already imposed on and served by
Sanchez was the appropriate
penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC
ordered her reinstatement, and the
payment of backwages, other
benefits, and attorney's fees.46
Unconvinced, SLMC moved for
reconsideration47
which was, however,
denied in a Resolution48 dated January 14,
2013. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49
before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013,
the CA upheld the NLRC, ruling that the
latter did not gravely abuse its discretion in
finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not
qualify as serious misconduct, given that:
(a) the questioned items found in her
possession were not SLMC property since
said items were paid for by discharged
patients, thus discounting any material or
economic damage on SLMC's part; (b) the
retention of excess medical supplies was an
admitted practice amongst nurses in the
Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC;
(c) it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the
pouch in her bag since she would be
subjected to a routine inspection; (d)
Sanchez's lack of intention to bring out the
pouch was manifested by her composed
demeanor upon apprehension and offer to
return the pouch to the treatment room;
and (e) had SLMC honestly believed that
Sanchez committed theft or pilferage, it
should have filed the appropriate criminal
case, but failed to do so.51 Moreover, while
the CA recognized that SLMC had the
management prerogative to discipline its
erring employees, it, however, declared
that such right must be exercised humanely.
As such, SLMC should only impose penalties
commensurate with the degree of
infraction. Considering that there was no
indication that Sanchez's actions were
perpetrated for self-interest or for an
unlawful objective, the penalty of dismissal
81 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
imposed on her was grossly oppressive and
disproportionate to her offense.52
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for
53
reconsideration, but was denied in a
Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue to be resolved is whether or
not Sanchez was illegally dismissed by
SLMC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The right of an employer to regulate all
aspects of employment, aptly called
"management prerogative," gives
employers the freedom to regulate,
according to their discretion and best
judgment, all aspects of employment,
including work assignment, working
methods, processes to be followed, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers and the
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.55
In this light, courts often decline to interfere
in legitimate business decisions of
employers. In fact, labor laws discourage
interference in employers' judgment
concerning the conduct of their business.56
Among the employer's management
prerogatives is the right to prescribe
reasonable rules and regulations necessary
or proper for the conduct of its business or
concern, to provide certain disciplinary
measures to implement said rules and to
assure that the same would be complied
with. At the same time, the employee has
the corollary duty to obey all reasonable
rules, orders, and instructions of the
employer; and willful or intentional
disobedience thereto, as a general rule,
justifies termination of the contract of
service and the dismissal of the employee.57
Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the
Labor Code provides:58
Article 296.Termination by Employer. - An
employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or his representative
in connection with his work;
xxxx
Note that for an employee to be validly
dismissed on this ground, the employer's
orders, regulations, or instructions must be:
(1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently
known to the employee, and (3) in
connection with the duties which the
employee has been engaged to
discharge." 59
Tested against the foregoing, the Court
finds that Sanchez was validly dismissed by
SLMC for her willful disregard and
disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the
SLMC Code of Discipline, which reasonably
punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., "theft,
pilferage of hospital or co-employee
property, x x x or its attempt in any form or
manner from the hospital, co-employees,
doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external
82 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and internal)" with termination from
employment.60 Such act is obviously
connected with Sanchez's work, who, as a
staff nurse, is tasked with the proper
stewardship of medical supplies.
Significantly, records show that Sanchez
made a categorical admission61 in her
handwritten letter62 - i.e., "[k]ahit alam
kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi]
ng gamit"63 - that despite her knowledge of
its express prohibition under the SLMC
Code of Discipline, she still knowingly
brought out the subject medical items with
her. It is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be
faulted in construing the taking of the
questioned items as an act of dishonesty
(particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its
attempt in any form or manner) considering
that the intent to gain may be reasonably
presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property appertaining to another.64 Note
that Section 1, Rule 1 of the SLMC Code of
Discipline is further supplemented by the
company policy requiring the turn-over of
excess medical supplies/items for proper
handling65 and providing a restriction on
taking and bringing such items out of the
SLMC premises without the proper
authorization or "pass" from the official
concerned,66 which Sanchez was equally
aware thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez
failed to turn-over the questioned items
and, instead, "hoarded" them, as
purportedly practiced by the other staff
members in the Pediatric Unit. As it is clear
that the company policies subject of this
case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently
known to the employee, and evidently
connected with the latter's work, the Court
concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for
a just cause.
On a related point, the Court observes that
there lies no competent basis to support
the common observation of the NLRC and
the CA that the retention of excess medical
supplies was a tolerated practice among the
nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there
were previous incidents of "hoarding," it
appears that such acts were - in similar
fashion - furtively made and the items
secretly kept, as any excess items found in
the concerned nurse's possession would
have to be confiscated.68 Hence, the fact
that no one was caught and/or sanctioned
for transgressing the prohibition therefor
does not mean that the so-called
"hoarding" practice was tolerated by SLMC.
Besides, whatever maybe the justification
behind the violation of the company rules
regarding excess medical supplies is
immaterial since it has been established
that an infraction was deliberately
committed.69 Doubtless, the deliberate
disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced as it
may encourage him or her to do even worse
and will render a mockery of the rules of
discipline that employees are required to
observe.70
Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential
that SLMC has not suffered any actual
damage. While damage aggravates the
charge, its absence does not mitigate nor
negate the employee's liability.71 Neither is
SLMC's non- filing of the appropriate
criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An
employee's guilt or innocence in a criminal
case is not determinative of the existence of
83 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
a just or authorized cause for his or her
dismissal.72 It is well- settled that conviction
in a criminal case is not necessary to find
just cause for termination of employment,73
as in this case. Criminal and labor cases
involving an employee arising from the
same infraction are separate and distinct
proceedings which should not arrest any
judgment from one to the other.
As it stands, the Court thus holds that the
dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause,
supported by substantial evidence, and is
therefore in order. By declaring otherwise,
bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC
issued a patently and grossly erroneous
ruling tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion, which, in turn, means that the
CA erred when it affirmed the same. In
consequence, the grant of the present
petition is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated November 21, 2013 and the
Resolution dated April 4, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor
Arbiter's Decision dated May 27, 2012 in
NLRC Case No. NCR 07-11042-11 finding
respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez to
have been validly dismissed by petitioner St.
Luke's Medical Center, Inc. is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
March 13, 2017
G.R. No. 225965
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee
vs
PUYAT MACAPUNDAG y LABAO, Accused-
Appellant
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed
by accused-appellant Puyat Macapundag y
Labao (Macapundag) assailing the Decision2
dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06224, which
affirmed the Joint Decision3 dated June 13,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 127 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos.
81014 and 81015, finding Macapundag
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2)
Informations filed before the RTC accusing
Macapundag of violating Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165, viz.:
Criminal Case No. 81014
That on or about the 14th day of March,
2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without
84 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to P0[3] GEORGE ARDEDON5 who
posed, as buyer, EPHEDRINE weighing 0.01
gram, a dangerous drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription
therefore, knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.6
Criminal Case No. 81015
That on or about the 14th day of March,
2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control three
(3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
each containing
EPHEDRINE weighing 0.02 gram, 0.01 gram
& 0.02 gram, when subjected for laboratory
examination gave positive result to the tests
of Ephedrine [sic], a dangerous drug.
Contrary to Law.7
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00
to 8:30 in the morning of March 14, 2009,
an informant tipped the Caloocan City
Police that a certain individual known as
alias "Popoy" was selling shabu in Baltazar
Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan City. Acting
on the tip, Police Chief Inspector (PCI)
Christopher Prangan (PCI Prangan) ordered
the conduct of a buy-bust operation in
coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), with Police
Officer 3 (P03) George Ardedon (P03
Ardedon) designated as poseur-buyer, and
Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO 1) Amel
Victoriano (SPOl Victoriano) and Police
Officer 2 (P02) Jeffred Pacis (P02 Pacis), as
back-up officers.8 After the team's final
briefing, they proceeded to the target area
where they saw Macapundag, who was
then identified by the informant as
"Popoy." Consequently, P03 Ardedon
approached Macapundag and retorted
"Brod, pakuha," followed by "Brod, paiskor
naman." Macapundag replied "Magkano?,"
to which P03 Ardedon responded "Tatlong
piso fang," and simultaneously handed the
three (3) marked ₱l00.00 bills. Macapundag
then took four (4) plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance, gave one to P03
Ardedon, and returned the other three (3)
back to his pocket. Upon receiving the
sachet, P03 Ardedon gave the pre-arranged
signal by holding his nape and then held
Macapundag, as the back-up officers rushed
to the scene. P03 Ardedon marked the
plastic sachet he purchased from
Macapundag, while SPO 1 Victoriano
marked the other three (3) recovered from
his pocket.9
Thereafter, they brought Macapundag to
the police station, where the seized items
were turned over to P02 Randulfo Hipolito
(P02 Hipolito), the investigator on duty.10
Later, P02 Hipolito brought the items to the
crime laboratory for physical examination.11
Eventually, Forensic Chemical
Officer-PC! Stella Ebuen (PCI Ebuen)
examined the specimen, which tested
positive for ephedrine, a dangerous drug.12
85 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In his defense, Macapundag denied the
charges against him. He testified that he
was arrested on March 12, 2009, and not on
March 14, 2009 as alleged by the
prosecution. At around noon of the said
date, he claimed that he was just sitting in
his house when three (3) armed men
suddenly entered and looked for a certain
"Rei." He told them that "Rei" lived in the
other house, but one of the men held and
handcuffed him. He was then brought to
the Sangandaan Police Station where he
was detained in a small cell. Later, he was
asked to call some relatives. When he
replied that he only has his daughter, SPO 1
Victoriano hit him on the chest. After a few
days, the police demanded ₱50,000.00 from
Macapundag's daughter for his release.
When he told them that he did not have
that amount, he was hit again. On March
15, 2009, he was brought to the house of
the fiscal for inquest.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision14 dated June 13, 2013,
the RTC found Macapundag guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165, for illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
respectively, finding that all the necessary
elements thereof have been proven. In
particular, the prosecution was able to
establish that P03 Ardedon indeed
purchased a sachet of ephedrine from
Macapundag in the amount of ₱300.00.
Likewise, it was shown that three (3) other
sachets of ephedrine were recovered from
Macapundag upon his arrest.15 The RTC
further observed that the prosecution was
able to demonstrate an unbroken chain of
custody over the seized items.16 Meanwhile,
the RTC gave no credence to the latter's
defenses of denial and alibi in light of his
positive identification as the culprit, as well
as the presumption of regularity accorded
to police officers in the performance of
their duties.17
Aggrieved, Macapundag elevated his
conviction before the CA.18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated April 22, 2015, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, finding
that the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt that Macapundag
illegally sold and possessed dangerous
drugs in violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165. In the same vein, the
CA found that the integrity of the seized
drugs was aptly preserved and the chain of
custody was not broken, notwithstanding
the fact that the procedural requirements in
Section 21 of RA 9165 were not faithfully
observed.20
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not Macapundag's conviction
for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized
under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165, should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that an
appeal in criminal cases opens the entire
86 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
case for review, and it is the duty of the
reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned.21
The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.22
Macapundag was charged with illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165.1avvphi1 In order to secure the
conviction of an accused charged with
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.23 On the other hand,
the prosecution must establish the
following elements to convict an accused
charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as
a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.24
Notably, it is essential that the identity of
the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over
the same. It must be able to account for
each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug from the moment of
seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.25
In the Appellant's Brief,26 Macapundag
prayed for his acquittal in view of the police
officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of
RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR). Particularly, he claims
that they did not make any inventory and
failed to take pictures of the confiscated
drugs along with him at the scene of his
arrest. There was also no justification given
as to why they failed to comply with these
requirements of law.27
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides
the chain of custody rule, outlining the
procedure police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.28 Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were
seized, his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy of the same, and the seized drugs
must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours
from confiscation for examination.29
In this case, the prosecution was able to
establish that P03 Ardedon (with respect to
the sachet handed over by Macapundag to
87 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
him) and SPOl Victoriano (with respect to
the three sachets recovered from
Macapundag upon his arrest) marked the
seized items immediately at the place of
arrest. However, the prosecution's
witnesses failed to state whether or not the
police officers inventoried and
photographed the seized sachets in the
presence of Macapundag or his
representative. Likewise, they were silent as
to the presence of the other required
witnesses, i.e., a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), any elected
public official, and a member of the press.30
In fact, the prosecution did not even offer
any inventory of the seized items or
photographs thereof as evidence.31 In this
relation, it is observed that the Evidence
Acknowledgement Receipt32 and the
Affidavit of Attestation,33 which form part of
the evidence of the prosecution, likewise
failed to disclose that the seized items were
actually inventoried or photographed in
accordance with the parameters provided
by Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR; thus,
their submission cannot constitute
compliance with the law.
In People v. Sanchez,34the Court recognized
that under varied field conditions, strict
compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of 9165 may not always be
possible, and ruled that under the
implementing guidelines of the said Section,
"non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items." However, the
Court added that the prosecution bears the
burden of proving justifiable cause.35
Thus, in People v. Almorfe,36the Court
stressed that for the above-saving clause to
apply, the prosecution must explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and
that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been
preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman,38
37
21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive
law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse,
ignored as an impediment to the conviction
of illegal drug suspects.42
With the foregoing pronouncement, the
Court finds petitioner's acquittal in order.
As such, it is unnecessary to delve into the
other issues raised in this case.

it was emphasized that the justifiable WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
ground for noncompliance must be proven Decision dated April 22, 2015 of the Court
as a fact, because the Court cannot of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06224 is
presume what these grounds are or that hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
they even exist.39 Accordingly, petitioner Puyat Macapundag y
Labao is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged.
In the present case, the prosecution did not The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
even bother to explain why the inventory ordered to cause his immediate release,
and photograph of the seized evidence unless he is being lawfully held in custody
were not made either in the place of seizure for any other reason.
and arrest or at the police station, as
required by the IRR in case of warrantless SO ORDERED.
arrests, or why the marking of the seized
item was not made at the place of seizure in ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
the presence of Macapundag. It was also Associate Justice
silent on the absence of a representative
from the DOJ, the media and an elected
public official to witness the inventory and
receive copies of the same. Similarly
unexplained was the lack of inventory and
photographs of the seized items.40
Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of
procedure committed by the police officers,
unacknowledged and unexplained by the
State, militate against a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the
accused, as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.41 It has been repeated in
jurisprudence that the procedure in Section
88 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
January 13, 2016
G.R. No. 174113
PAZ CHENG y CHU, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March
28, 2006 and the Resolution3 dated June 26,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 24871, which affirmed the
conviction of petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu
(Cheng) for three (3) counts of the crime of
Estafa defined and penalized under Article
315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
The instant case arose from the filing of
three (3) separate Informations4 charging
Cheng of the crime of Estafa defined and
penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
RPC before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 226 (RTC), docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75440, Q-98-75441
and Q-98-75442. According to the
prosecution, private complaint "Rowena
Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng entered
into an agreement whereby Rodriguez shall
deliver pieces of jewelry to Cheng for the
latter to sell on commission basis. After one
month, Cheng is obliged to either: (a) remit
the proceeds of the sold jewelry; or (b)
return the unsold jewelry to the former. On
different dates (i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16,
1997, and August 12, 1997), Rodriguez
89 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
delivered various sets of jewelry to Cheng in
the respective amounts of P18,000.00,
P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon
delivery of the last batch of jewelry, Cheng
issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full
security for the first two (2) deliveries and
as partial security for the last. When Cheng
failed to remit the proceeds or to return the
unsold jewelry on due date, Rodriguez
presented the check to the bank for
encashment, but was dishonored due to
insufficient funds. Upon assurance of
Cheng, Rodriguez re-deposited the check,
but again, the same was dishonored
because the drawee account had been
closed. Rodriguez then decided to confront
Cheng, who then uttered "Akala mo,
babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was
constrained to file the instant charges.5
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any
jewelry from Rodriguez or signing any
document purporting to be contracts of sale
of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a
usurious moneylender. She then admitted
having an unpaid loan with Rodriguez and
that she issued a check to serve as security
for the same, but was nevertheless
surprised of her arrest due to the latter's
filing of Estafa charges against her.6
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision7 dated December 7, 2000, the
RTC found Cheng guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa and,
accordingly, sentenced her as follows: (a)
for the first count, Cheng is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4)
years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to
six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty-
one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision
correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period
(maximum); (b) for the second count, Cheng
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year, eight (8) months, and
twenty (20) days of prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods to six (6)
years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one
(21) days to eight (8) years of prision
correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period
(maximum); and (c) for the third count,
Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year, eight (8) months,
and twenty (20) days of prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods to four
(4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day
to five (5) years, five (5) months, and ten
(10) days of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period (minimum).8
The RTC found that the prosecution has
sufficiently proven through documentary
and testimonial evidence that: (a) Rodriguez
indeed gave Cheng several pieces of jewelry
for the latter- to either sell and remit the
proceeds or to return said jewelry if unsold
to the former; and (b) Cheng neither
returned the jewelry nor remitted their
proceeds to Rodriguez within the specified
period despite the latter's demands. In
contrast, Cheng failed to substantiate her
claims through the documentary evidence
she presented while her testimony was
deemed to be incredible and not worthy of
belief.9
90 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Aggrieved, Cheng appealed10 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision11 dated March 28, 2006, the
CA affirmed Cheng's conviction for three (3)
counts of Estafa, with modification as to the
penalties, as follows: (a) for the first count
of Estafa where the amount
misappropriated is P257,950.00, Cheng is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; (b) for the second count of
Estafa where the amount misappropriated
is P36,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years of prision
mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third
count of Estafa where the amount
misappropriated is Pl8,000.00, Cheng is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20)
days of prision mayor, as maximum.12
The CA agreed with the RTC's findings that
the prosecution had sufficiently established
Cheng's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
pointing out that Rodriguez's testimony was
"'more candid, credible and straightforward
and that 'her demeanor in the witness
stand is worthy of belief" as opposed to
that of Cheng which is highly self-serving
and uncorroborated.13 Further, the CA
found that a modification of Cheng's
penalties is in order to conform with
prevailing law and jurisprudence on the
matter.14
Undaunted, Cheng moved for
15
reconsideration but was denied in a
Resolution16 dated June 26, 2006; hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the CA correctly affirmed
Cheng's conviction for three counts of
Estafa defined and penalized under Article
315 (1) (b) of the RPC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit. Article 315 (1)
(b) of the RPC states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person
who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud
is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other
91 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be[.]
xxxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to
the prejudice of another, money, goods or
any other personal property received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other
property;
xxxx
The elements of Estafa under this provision
are as follows: (1) the offender's receipt of
money, goods, or other personal property
in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or
to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or
property received, or denial of receipt of
the money or property; (3) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (4) demand
by the offended party that the offender
return the money or property received.17 In
the case of Pamintuan v. People,18 the Court
had the opportunity to elucidate further on
the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well
as the proof needed to sustain a conviction
for the same, to wit:
The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the
appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the
entity to whom a return should be made.
The words "convert" and "misappropriate"
connote the act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one's own use includes
not only conversion to one's personal
advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without
right. In proving the element of conversion
or misappropriation, a legal presumption
of misappropriation arises when the
accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or to return the items to be sold and
fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.19 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this case, a judicious review of the case
records reveals that the elements of Estafa,
as defined and penalized by the afore-cited
provision, are present, considering that: (a)
Rodriguez delivered the jewelry to Cheng
for the purpose of selling them on
commission basis; (b) Cheng was required
to either remit the proceeds of the sale or
to return the jewelry after one month from
delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what was
required of her despite the lapse of the
aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez attempted
to encash the check given by Cheng as
security, but such check was dishonored
twice for being drawn against insufficient
92 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
funds and against a closed account; (e)
Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply
with her undertaking, but the latter
disregarded such demand; (j) Cheng's acts
clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the
jewelry and/or its value.
In a desperate attempt to absolve herself
from liability, Cheng insists that Rodriguez
admitted in her own testimony that the
transaction between them is not an agency
on commission basis, but a plain sale of
jewelry with Rodriguez as the seller and
Cheng as the buyer.1âwphi1 As such,
Cheng's non-payment of the purchase price
of the jewelry would only give rise to civil
liability and not criminal liability.20 The
pertinent portion of Rodriguez's testimony
is as follows:
Q. After the delivery of these several items
totaling P257,950.00, what happened next?
A. She issued a check worth P120,000.00.
Q. What check is that?
A. PDCP Bank, sir.
Q. What is this check for, Ms. Witness?
A. As payment for the first and second
transactions, sir, for Pl8,000.00 and
P36,000.00 and the excess amount is
applied for the third transaction.
xxxx
Q. So, all in all, you have sixty (60) days
period with respect to this item, and the
first delivery expired I am referring to July
12, 1997 worth P18,000.00 which will
mature on September 11, so, from
September 11, what happened?
A. These were considered paid because she
issued me a check for the period of August
13, so I was expecting that.21 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Essentially, Cheng posits that since
Rodriguez "admitted" in her testimony that
the check issued by the former in the
amount of Pl20,000.00 constituted full
payment for the first and second batch of
jewelry and partial payment for the last
batch, the transactions entered into by the
parties should be deemed in the nature of a
sale.
Cheng is sadly mistaken.
The foregoing "admission" on the part of
Rodriguez did not change the fact that her
transactions with Cheng should be properly
deemed as an agency on a commission
basis whereby Rodriguez, as the owner of
the jewelry, is the principal, while Cheng is
the agent who is tasked to sell the same on
commission. In the eyes of the Court,
Rodriguez merely accepted the check as full
security for the first and second batches of
jewelry and as partial security for the last
batch. It was only when Cheng defaulted in
her undertaking pursuant to their
agreement that Rodriguez was constrained
to treat the check as the former's
remittance of the proceeds of the sale of
jewelry - albeit deficient - by presenting it
for encashment on October 20, 1997, or
more than two (2) months after the delivery
of the last batch of jewelry.22 However, the
check was dishonored for being drawn
93 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
against insufficient funds.23 This
notwithstanding and with the assurance
from Cheng that the check will be cleared,
Rodriguez presented such check for the
second time on November 4, 1997; but it
.was again dishonored - this time for being
drawn against a closed account.24 As such,
the fact that Rodriguez loosely used the
words "payment" and "paid" should not be
taken against her and should not in any way
change the nature of her transactions with
Rodriguez from an agency on a commission
basis to a full-fledged sale. Moreover, even
Cheng does not consider such check as
payment for the jewelry, but rather, as
security for the loan she allegedly obtained
from Rodriguez.
Indisputably, there is no reason to deviate
from the findings of the RTC and the CA as
they have fully considered the evidence
presented by the prosecution and the
defense, and they have adequately
explained the legal and evidentiary reasons
in concluding that Cheng is indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of Estafa by misappropriation
defined and penalized under Article 315 (1)
(b) of the RPC. It is settled that factual
findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the
CA, are entitled to great weight and respect
by this Court and are deemed final and
conclusive when supported by the evidence
on record,25 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated March 28, 2006 and the
Resolution dated June 26, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24871 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa defined and penalized under Article
315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and is
SENTENCED as follows: (a) for the first
count of Estafa where the amount
misappropriated is P257,950.00, Cheng is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; (b) for the second count of
Estafa where the amount misappropriated
is P36,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years of prision
mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third
count of Estafa where the amount
misappropriated is Pl 8,000.00, Cheng is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20)
days of prision mayor, as maximum. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201892 JULY 22,
2015
NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner,
vs.
MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
94 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
November 4, 2011 and the Resolution 3
dated May 14, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81258 which recalled
and set aside the Orders dated November 3,
2003 4 and January 14, 2004 5 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City,
Branch 202 (court a quo) in Civil Case No.
980156, and reinstated the Decision 6 dated
August 28, 2003 directing petitioner
Norlinda S. Marilag (petitioner) to return to
respondent Marcelino B. Martinez
(respondent) the latter's excess payment,
plus interest, and to pay attorney's fees and
the costs of suit.
The Facts
On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez (Rafael),
respondent's father, obtained- from
petitioner a loan in the amount of
₱160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly
interest of five percent ( 5% ), payable
within a period of (6) months. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-208400.
Rafael failed'. to settle his obligation upon
maturity and despite repeated demands,
prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for
Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 7
(RTC-lmus) on November 10, 1995, 8
docketed as Civil Case No. 1208-95 (judicial
foreclosure case).
Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon
petitioner's motion, was declared in default.
After an ex parte presentation of
petitioner's evidence, the RTC-lmus issued a
Decision 9 dated January 30, 1998, (January
30, 1998 Decision) in the foreclosure case,
declaring the stipulated 5% monthly
interest to be usurious and reducing the
same to 12% per annum (p.a.). Accordingly,
it ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the
amount of ₱229,200.00, consisting of the
principal of ₱160,000.00 and accrued
interest of ₱59,200.00 from July 30, 1992 to
September 30, 1995. 10 Records do not
show that this Decision had already
attained finality.
Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the
above decision, respondent agreed to pay
Rafael's obligation to petitioner which was
pegged at ₱689,000.00. After making a total
payment of ₱400,000.00,11 he executed a
promissory note 12 dated February 20, 1998
(subject PN), binding himself to pay on or
before March 31, 1998 the amount of
₱289,000.00, "representing the balance of
the agreed financial obligation of [his]
father to [petitioner]." 13 After learning of
the January 30, 1998 Decision, respondent
refused to pay the amount covered by the
subject PN despite demands, prompting
petitioner to file a complaint 14 for sum of
money and damages before the court a quo
on July 2, 1998, docketed as Civil Case No.
98-0156 (collection case).
Respondent filed his answer, 15 contending
that petitioner has no cause of action
against him. He averred that he has fully
settled Rafael's obligation and that he
committed a mistake in paying more than
the amount due under the loan, i.e., the
amount of ₱229,200.00 as adjudged by the
95 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
RTC-Imus in the judicial foreclosure case
which, thus, warranted the return of the
excess payment. He therefore prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint, and
interposed a compulsory counterclaim for
the release of the mortgage, the return of
the excess payment, and the payment of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses. 16
The Court A Quo's Ruling
In a Decision 17 dated August 28, 2003
(August 28, 2003 Decision), the court a quo
denied recovery on the subject PN. It found
that the consideration for its execution was
Rafael's indebtedness to petitioner, the
extinguishment of which necessarily results
in the consequent extinguishment of the
cause therefore. Considering that the RTC-
Imus had adjudged Rafael liable to
petitioner only for the amount of
₱229,200.00, for which a total of
₱400,000.00 had already been paid, the
court a quo found no valid or compelling
reason to allow petitioner to recover
further on the subject PN. There being an
excess payment of Pl 71,000.00, it declared
that a quasi-contract (in the concept of
solution indebiti) exists between the parties
and, accordingly, directed petitioner to
return the said amount to respondent, plus
6% interest p.a.18 reckoned from the date
of judicial demand 19 on August 6, 1998
until fully paid, and to pay attorney's fees
and the costs of suit. 20
In an Order 21 dated November 3, 2003
(November 3, 2003 Order), however, the
court a quo granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, and recalled and set aside
its August 28, 2003 Decision. It declared
that the causes of action in the collection
and foreclosure cases are distinct, and
respondent's failure to comply with his
obligation under the subject PN justifies
petitioner to seek judicial relief. It further
opined that the stipulated 5% monthly
interest is no longer usurious and is binding
on respondent considering the suspension
of the Usury Law pursuant to Central Bank
Circular 905, series of 1982. Accordingly, it
directed respondent to pay the amount of
₱289,000.00 due under the subject PN, plus
interest at the legal rate reckoned from the
last extra judicial demand on May 15, 1998,
until fully paid, as well as attorney's fees
and the costs of suit.22
Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration 23 which was denied in an
Order 24 dated January 14, 2004, prompting
him to elevate the matter to the CA. 25
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 26 dated November 4, 2011,
the CA recalled and set aside the court a
quo 's November 3, 2003 and January 14,
2004 Orders, and reinstated the August 28,
2003 Decision. It held that the doctrine of
res judicata finds application in the instant
case, 27 considering that both the judicial
foreclosure and collection cases were filed
as a consequence of the non-payment of
Rafael's loan, which was the principal
obligation secured by the real estate
mortgage and the primary consideration for
the execution of the subject PN. Since res
judicata only requires substantial, not
actual, identity of causes of action and/or
identity of issue, 28 it ruled that the
96 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
judgment in the judicial foreclosure case
relating to Rafael's obligation to petitioner
is final and conclusive on the collection
case.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution 29 dated May 14,
2012; hence, this petition.
The Issue before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's
resolution is whether or not the CA
committed reversible error in upholding the
dismissal of the collection case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
A case is barred by prior judgment or res
judicata when the following elements
concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; ( b) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) the disposition of the case must
be a judgment on the merits; and ( d) there
must be as between the first and second
action, identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action.30
After a punctilious review of the records,
the Court finds the principle of res judicata
to be inapplicable to the present case. This
is because the records are bereft of any
indication that the August 28, 2003 Decision
in the judicial foreclosure case had already
attained finality, evidenced, for instance, by
a copy of the entry of judgment in the said
case. Accordingly, with the very first
element of res judicata missing, said
principle cannot be made to obtain.
This notwithstanding, the Court holds that
petitioner's prosecution of the collection
case was barred, instead, by the principle of
litis pendentia in view of the substantial
identity of parties and singularity of the
causes of action in the foreclosure and
collection cases, such that the prior
foreclosure case barred petitioner's
recourse to the subsequent collection case.
To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a
ground for the dismissal of a civil action,
refers to that situation where in another
action is pending; between the same
parties for the same cause of action, such
that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of
litis pendentia to be invoked, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions; ( b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and ( c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful
would amount to res judicata in the other.
31
The underlying principle of litis pendentia
is the theory that a party is not allowed to
vex another more than once regarding the
same subject matter and for the same
cause of action. This theory is founded on
the public policy that the same subject
matter should not be the subject of
controversy in courts more than once, in
order that possible conflicting judgments
may be avoided for the sake of the stability
97 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of the rights and status of persons, and also
to avoid the costs and expenses incident to
numerous suits. 32 Consequently, a party
will not be permitted to split up a single
cause of action and make it a basis for
several suits as the whole cause must be
determined in one action.33To be sure,
splitting a cause of action is a mode of
forum shopping by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action, but
with different prayers, where the ~round
of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res
judicata, as the case may be).34
In this relation, it must be noted that the
question of whether a cause of action is
single and entire or separate is not always
easy to determine and the same must often
be resolved, not by the general rules, but by
reference to the facts and circumstances of
the particular case. The true rule, therefore,
is whether the entire amount arises from
one and the same act or contract which
must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the
several parts arise from distinct and
different acts or contracts, for which a party
may maintain separate suits.35
In loan contracts secured by a real estate
mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-
mortgagee has a single cause of action
against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to
recover the debt, through the filing of a
personal action for collection of sum of
money or the institution of a real action to
foreclose on the mortgage security. The two
remedies are alternative,36 not cumulative
or successive, 37 and each remedy is
complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-
mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate
mortgage, he waives the action for the
collection of the unpaid debt,38 except only
for the recovery of whatever deficiency may
remain in the outstanding obligation of the
debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid
price in the public auction sale of the
mortgaged properties. 39 Accordingly, a
deficiency judgment shall only issue after it
is established that the mortgaged property
was sold at public auction for an amount
less than the outstanding obligation.
In the present case, records show that
petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted
an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the
availment of such remedy thus bars
recourse to the subsequent filing of a
personal action for collection of the same
debt, in this case, under the principle of litis
pendentia, considering that the foreclosure
case only remains pending as it was not
shown to have attained finality.
While the ensuing collection case was
anchored on the promissory note executed
by respondent who was not the original
debtor, the same does not constitute a
separate and distinct contract of loan which
would have given rise to a separate cause of
action upon breach. Notably, records are
bereft of any indication that respondent's
agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation
and the execution of the subject PN
extinguished by novation 40 the contract of
loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the
absence of express agreement or any act of
equal import. Well-settled is the rule that
novation is never presumed, but must be
clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in
98 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
order for a new agreement to supersede
the old one, the parties to a contract must
expressly agree that they are abrogating
their old contract in favor of a new one, 41
which was not shown here.
On the contrary, it is significant to point out
that: (a) the consideration for the subject
PN was the same consideration that
supported the original loan obligation of
Rafael; (b) respondent merely assumed to
pay Rafael's remaining unpaid balance in
the latter's behalf, i.e., as Rafael's agent or
representative; 42 and (c) the subject PN
was executed after respondent had
assumed to pay Rafael's obligation and
made several payments thereon. Case law
states that the fact that the creditor accepts
payments from a third person, who has
assumed the obligation, will result merely in
the addition of debtors, not novation, and
the creditor may enforce the obligation
against both debtors. 43 for ready reference,
the subject PN reads in full:
February 20, 1998
PROMISSORY NOTE
₱289, 000.00
===========
I, MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ son of Mr.
RAFAEL MARTINEZ, of legal age, Filipino,
married and a resident of No. 091 Anabu I-
A, Imus, Cavite, by these presents do
hereby specifically and categorically
PROMISE, UNDERTAKE and bind myself in
behalf of my father, to pay to Miss
NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Mortgagee-Creditor
of my said father, the sum of TWO
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS
(₱289,000.00), Philippine Currency, on or
before MARCH 31, 1998, representing the
balance of the agreed financial obligation of
my said father to her. (Emphases supplied)
Executed at Pamplona I, Las Piñas City,
Metro Manila, this 20th day of February,
1998.
Sgd.
MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ
Promissory 44
Petitioner's contention that the judicial
foreclosure and collection cases enforce
independent rights 45 must, therefore, fail
because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
46
and the subject PN both refer to one and
the same obligation, i.e., Rafael's loan
obligation. As such, there exists only one
cause of action for a single breach of that
obligation. Petitioner cannot split her cause
of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation
by filing a petition for the judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a
personal action for the collection of the
unpaid balance of said obligation not
comprising a deficiency arising from
foreclosure, without violating the
proscription against splitting a single cause
of action, where the ground for dismissal is
either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in
this case.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark
case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v.
lcaranga!.47
99 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
For non-payment of a note secured by
mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of
action against the debtor. This single cause
of action consists in the recovery of the
credit with execution of the security. In
other words, the creditor in his action may
make two demands, the payment of the
debt and the foreclosure · of his mortgage.
But both demands arise from the same
cause, the nonpayment of the debt, and, for
that reason, they constitute a single cause
of action. Though the debt and the
mortgage constitute separate agreements,
the latter is subsidiary to the former, and
both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause
of action for a single breach of that
obligation. Plaintiff.then, by applying the
rule above stated, cannot split up his single
cause of action by filing a complaint (or
payment of the debt, and thereafter
another complaint (or foreclosure of the
mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the
first complaint will bar the subsequent
complaint. By allowing the creditor to file
two separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, we will,
in effect, be authorizing him plural redress
for a single breach of contract at so much
cost to the courts and with so much
vexation and oppression to the debtor.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Further on the point, the fact that no
foreclosure sale appears to have been
conducted is of no moment because the
remedy of foreclosure of mortgage is
deemed chosen upon the filing of the
complaint there for.48 In Suico Rattan & Buri
Interiors, Inc. v. CA, 49 it was explained:
x x x x In sustaining the rule that prohibits
mortgage creditors from pursuing both the
remedies of a personal action for debt or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage, the
Court held in the case of Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc. v. Esteban Icarangal, et al. that a
rule which would authorize the plaintiff to
bring a personal action against the debtor
and simultaneously or successively another
action against the mortgaged property,
would result not only in multiplicity of suits
so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law
and equity, but also in subjecting the
defendant to the vexation of being sued in
the place of his residence or of the
residence of the plaintiff, and then again in
the place where the property lies. Hence, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of
the suit for collection or upon the filing of
the complaint in an action for foreclosure of
mortgage, pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is
deemed elected by the mortgage creditor
upon filing of the petition not with any
court of justice but with the office of the
sheriff of the province where the sale is to
be made, in accordance with the provisions
of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118. (Emphases supplied)
As petitioner had already instituted judicial
foreclosure proceedings over the
mortgaged property, she is now barred
from availing herself of an ordinary action
for collection,regardless of whether or not
the decision in the foreclosure case had
attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the
100 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
collection case is in order. Considering,
however, that respondent's claim for return
of excess payment partakes of the nature of
a compulsory counterclaim and, thus,
survives the dismissal of petitioner's
collection suit, the same should be resolved
based on its own merits and evidentiary
support. 50
Records show that other than the matter of
interest, the principal loan obligation and
the payments made were not disputed by
the parties.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, the Court
finds the stipulated 5% monthly interest to
be excessive and unconscionable. In a
plethora of cases, the Court has affirmed
that stipulated interest rates of three
percent (3°/o) per month and higher are
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and
exorbitant, 51 hence, illegal 52 and void for
being contrary to morals.53 In Agner v. BPI
Family Savings Bank, Inc., 54 the Court had
the occasion to rule:
Settled is the principle which this Court has
affirmed in a number of cases that
stipulated interest rates of three percent
(3%) per month and higher are excessive,
iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant.
While Central Bank Circular No. 905-82,
which took effect on January 1, 1983,
effectively removed the ceiling on interest
rates for both secured and unsecured loans,
regardless of maturity, nothing in the said
circular could possibly be read as granting
carte blanche authority to lenders to raise
interest rates to levels which would either
enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. Since the
stipulation on the interest rate is void for
being contrary to morals, if not against the
law, it is as if there was no express contract
on said interest rate; thus, the interest rate
may be reduced as reason and equity
demand. (Emphases supplied)
As such, the stipulated 5% monthly interest
should be equitably reduced to l % per
month or 12% p.a. reckoned from the
execution of the real estate mortgage on
July 30, 1992. In order to determine
whether there was any overpayment as
claimed by respondent, we first compute
the interest until January 30, 1998 55 when
he made a payment in the amount of
₱300,000.00 on Rafael's loan obligation.
Accordingly, the amount due on the loan as
of the latter date is hereby computed as
follows:
Principal
Add: Interest from
07/30/1992 to
01/30/1998
(₱160, 000.00 x 12% x
105,600.00
5.5 yrs.)
Amount due on the ₱265,
loan 600.00
Less: Payment made
(300,000.00)
on 01/30/98
Overpayment as of (P
01/30/98 34,400.00)
Thus, as of January 30, 1998, only the
amount of ₱265,600.00 was due under the
loan contract, and the receipt of an amount
more than that renders petitioner liable for
101 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the return of the excess. Respondent,
however, made further payment in the
amount of Pl 00,000.0057 on the belief that
the subject loan obligation had not yet been
satisfied. Such payments were, therefore,
clearly made by mistake, giving rise to the
quasi-contractual obligation of solutio
indebiti under Article 2154 58 in relation to
Article 2163 59 of the Civil Code. Not being a
loan or forbearance of money, an interest
of 6% p.a. should be imposed on the
amount to be refunded and on the damages
and attorney's fees awarded, if any,
computed from the time of demand 60 until
its satisfaction. 61 Consequently, petitioner
must return to respondent the excess
payments in the total amount of
₱134,400.00, with legal interest at the rate
of 6% p.a. from the filing of the Answer on
₱160,000.00 August 6, 1998 62 interposing a
counterclaim for such overpayment, until
fully settled.
However, inasmuch as the court a quo
failed to state in the body of its decision the
factual or legal basis for the award of
attorney's fees to the respondent, as
required under Article 2208 63 of the New
Civil Code, the Court resolves to delete the
same. The rule is well-settled that the trial
court must clearly state the reasons for
awarding attorney's fees in the body of its
decision, not merely in its dispositive
56 portion, as the appellate courts are
precluded from supplementing the bases
for such award. 64
Finally, in the absence of showing that the
court a quo 's award of the costs of suit in
favor of respondent was patently
capricious, 65 the Court finds no reason to
disturb the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated November 4, 2011 and the
Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81258
reinstating the court a quo's Decision dated
August 28, 2003 in Civil Case No. 98-0156
are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS: (a) directing petitioner
Norlinda S. Marilag to return to respondent
Marcelino B. Martinez the latter's excess
payments in the total amount of
₱134,400.00, plus legal interest at the rate
of 6% p.a. from the filing of the Answer on
August 6, 1998 until full satisfaction; and (b)
deleting the award of attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M.PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

102 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 169461 September
2, 2013
FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION,
PETITIONER,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
December 6, 2004 and Resolution3 dated
August 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67635 which
annulled and set aside the Decision4 dated
February 28, 2001 and Amended Order5
dated September 4, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 3 (RTC)
in Land Reg. Case No. N-1554 (LRA Rec. No.
N-69624), setting aside the final decree of
registration issued in favor of petitioner
First Gas Power Corporation (petitioner)
over the parcels of land subject of this case.
The Facts
Through a Petition dated April 17, 1998 filed
before the RTC, petitioner sought for the
original registration of two parcels of land
situated at Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City,
denominated as Lot Nos. 1298 and 1315
(subject lots), both of Cad. 264 of the
Batangas Cadastre, which consist of 4,155
and 968 square meters, respectively.6 The
case was docketed as Land Reg. Case No. N-
1554 (LRA Rec. No.N-69624) and, as a
103 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
matter of course, was called for initial
hearing. No oppositor appeared during the
said hearing except Prosecutor Amelia
Panganiban who appeared in behalf of the
Office of the Solicitor General (respondent).
Consequently, the RTC issued the
corresponding Order of Special Default and
the reception of evidence was delegated to
the Branch Clerk of Court.7
For land registration purposes, the subject
lots were both investigated and inspected
separately by Special Land Investigator
Rodolfo A. Fernandez and Forester I Loida Y.
Maglinao of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
CENRO of Batangas City. Based on their
findings, the subject lots are within the
alienable and disposable zone under project
no. 13, lc map no. 718 issued on March 16,
1928. Also, in a letter dated January 18,
1999 from Robert C. Pangyarihan, Chief of
the Surveys Division of the DENR Region IV
– Land Management Sector, copy furnished
the RTC, it is stated that the subject lots are
not portion of/nor identical to any
approved isolated survey.8
During the reception of evidence, the
government, through respondent, was
given the opportunity to examine the
authenticity of the documents presented by
petitioner in support of its application for
land registration as well as cross-examine
the latter’s witnesses. Without any
objection from the former, all exhibits
offered by petitioner were admitted by the
RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not
present any evidence to contradict
petitioner’s application.9

The RTC Ruling and Subsequent
Proceedings
In a Decision10 dated February 28, 2001, the
RTC granted petitioner’s application for the
registration of the subject lots. It found that
petitioner was able to substantiate its bona
fide claim of ownership over the subject lots
as it was shown, inter alia, that: (a)
petitioner purchased Lot No. 1298 from its
previous owner, Pio Benito Aguado, by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 23, 1995, while Lot No. 1315 was
purchased from its previous owner, Glenn
Manipis, as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 2, 1995; (b) petitioner and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
peaceful, continuous, public, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject lots
even before 1945; and (c) the subject lots
had already been declared for taxation
purposes under the name of petitioner and
the corresponding realty taxes have been
equally paid by it.11 Finding petitioner’s
application to be well-founded and fully
substantiated by evidence sufficient under
the law, the RTC directed the registration of
the subject lots in favor of petitioner and
the issuance of the corresponding decree by
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon
finality of its decision.12
On July 17, 2001, petitioner filed a
Manifestation with Motion (manifestation
with motion), manifesting to the RTC the
existence of an LRA Report dated November
24, 1998 (LRA Report) which states that the
subject lots were previously applied for
registration and were both decided under
104 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Cadastral Case No. 37 (Cad. Case No. 37)
and, in this regard, moved that the
aforesaid decision be set aside. The said
manifestation with motion reads in part:
2. LRA Record Book of Cadastral Lots on file
in this Authority shows that lots 1298 and
1315, Cad. 264, Batangas Cadastre were
previously applied for registration of title in
the Cadastral proceedings and were both
decided under Cadastral Case No. 37, GLRO
Record No. 1696, and are subject of the
following annotation, to quote:
"Lots 1298 (45-1)
1315 (61-1) Pte.De Nueva doc."
xxxx
WHEREFORE, to avoid duplication in the
issuance of titles covering the same parcels
of land, the foregoing is respectfully
submitted to the Honorable Court with the
recommendation that x x x should the
instant application be granted, an order be
issued setting aside the decision in the
cadastral proceeding with respect to lots
1298 and 1315, Cad[.] 264, under Cad. Case
No. 37.13 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the same pleading, petitioner maintained
its prayer for the issuance of a decree of
registration in its favor.14 Subsequently, the
RTC issued an Amended Order15 dated
September 4, 2001, (a) setting aside any
decision affecting the subject lots in Cad.
Case No. 37 in view of petitioner’s
manifestation and motion and upon the
LRA’s recommendation; and (b) reiterating
the issuance of the corresponding decree of
registration in favor of petitioner due to the
finality of the RTC Decision, to wit:
In view of the Manifestation and Motion
filed by the applicant thru counsel and upon
recommendation of the Land Registration
Authority in its Report dated November 24,
1998 together with the letter dated June
18, 1999 from Robert C. Pangyarihan, Chief
Survey[s] Division, DENR, Region IV, Land
Management Sector, stating that Lots 1298
and 1315 are not portion of/nor identical to
any approved isolated survey, this Court
hereby sets aside any decision in the
cadastral proceedings for Lots 1298 and
1315, Cad. 264, under Case No. 37, and
hereby reiterates that the Land Registration
Authority may now issue the corresponding
decree of registration and certificate of title
as stated in the Decision dated February 28,
2001 which had attained finality. This
amends the Order dated August 6, 2001.
SO ORDERED.16 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Claiming that the RTC’s Amended Order was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari
(certiorari petition) before the CA which
was initially denied due course on
November 26, 2001. Upon reconsideration,
the CA admitted respondent’s certiorari
petition and directed petitioner to file its
comment thereto. The parties thereafter
filed their respective memoranda.17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated December 6, 2004, the
CA granted respondent’s certiorari petition
105 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and thereby, annulled and set aside the RTC
Decision and Amended Order as well as the
final decree of registration issued in favor of
petitioner over the subject lots.1âwphi1
At the outset, it noted that while the issue
of the propriety of setting aside the decision
in Cad. Case No. 37 was raised, the CA was
not furnished a copy of the said decision.
Thus, in a Resolution dated September 30,
2004, it directed the LRA to submit a copy
of the same and, in relation thereto, the
LRA submitted a certification of status and
certification of non-availability of the record
for the subject lots.19 The LRA further
informed the CA that decrees of registration
had already been issued for the subject
lots.20 In view of these considerations, the
CA proceeded and ruled that petitioner
should have raised in its application for
registration the existence of a decision in
Cad. Case No. 37 as it is required to prove
its absolute ownership over the same and
that no controversy regarding the matter of
its ownership exists.21 Moreover, the CA
pronounced that the RTC’s Amended Order
which set aside the decision in Cad. Case
No. 37 was in utter disregard of the policy
of judicial stability, stating further that only
the CA can annul judgments of the RTC.22
Finally, the CA held that it was erroneous
for the RTC to direct the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of titles without
determining the bearing of the previous
decision in Cad. Case No. 37 to petitioner as
the applicant.23
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for
reconsideration which was, however,
denied in a Resolution dated August 23,
2005.24 Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or
not the CA erred in annulling and setting
aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order
as well as the final decree of registration
issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
lots.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
It is a long-standing rule that an applicant
who seeks to have a land registered in his
name has the burden of proving that he is
its owner in fee simple, even though there
is no opposition thereto. As held in Republic
v. Lee:25
The most basic rule in land registration
cases is that "no person is entitled to have
land registered under the Cadastral or
Torrens system unless he is the owner in
fee simple of the same, even though there
is no opposition presented against such
registration by third persons. x x x In order
that the petitioner for the registration of his
land shall be permitted to have the same
registered, and to have the benefit resulting
from the certificate of title, finally, issued,
the burden is upon him to show that he is
the real and absolute owner, in fee
simple."26 (Citation omitted)
In this case, records disclose that petitioner
itself manifested during the proceedings
before the RTC that there subsists a
decision in a previous cadastral case, i.e.,
Cad. Case No. 37, which covers the same
lots it applied for registration. Petitioner
106 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
even posits in the present petition that it
was apprised of the existence of the
foregoing decision even before the
rendition of the RTC Decision and Amended
Order through the LRA Report dated as
early as November 24, 1998 which, as
above-quoted, states that the subject lots
"were previously applied for registration of
title in the [c]adastral proceedings and were
both decided under [Cad. Case No. 37,
GLRO Record No. 1969, and are subject to
the following annotation x x x: ‘Lots 1298
(45-1) [and] 1315 (61-1) Pte. Nueva doc.’"27
Since it had been duly notified of an existing
decision which binds over the subject lots, it
was incumbent upon petitioner to prove
that the said decision would not affect its
claimed status as owner of the subject lots
in fee simple.
To note, the fact that the RTC did not order
petitioner to address the matter or that it
did not properly determine the effects of
the existing decision to petitioner’s
application does not justify the latter’s
entitlement to have the subject lots
registered in its name. Neither can the
recommendation of the LRA to have the
case set aside be perceived as an ample
justification for the RTC’s dispositions since
this action is precluded by the doctrine of
judicial stability as will be discussed below.
These missteps just magnify the patent and
gross errors of the RTC in these
proceedings.
Further, as the CA correctly pointed out,
land registration proceedings are in rem in
nature and, hence, by virtue of the
publication requirement, all claimants and
occupants of the subject property are
deemed to be notified of the existence of a
cadastral case involving the subject lots.28 In
this regard, petitioner cannot, therefore,
take refuge on the lack of any personal
knowledge on its part previous to its
application. Case law dictates that a
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and
binds the whole world.29 Under this
doctrine, parties are precluded from re-
litigating the same issues already
determined by final judgment.30
Moreover, as amply addressed by the CA,
the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in
violation of the doctrine of judicial stability.
This doctrine states that the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction may not be
interfered with by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction.31 The rationale for the same is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction –
verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for
its execution and over all its incidents, and
to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment.32 Therefore,
as the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in
stark contravention of this rule, the CA
correctly ordered its nullification.
Finally, while petitioner points out to the
fact that respondent belatedly filed its
certiorari petition before the CA, it must be
observed that the CA had already exercised
its discretion in giving due course to the
same. Jurisprudence dictates that the strict
application of the rules on filing a petition
for certiorari may be relaxed, among others,
in the exercise of the sound discretion by
107 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the judge (or the CA) as guided by all the
attendant circumstances,33 as in this case.
Indeed, the Court can only commiserate
with petitioner as it has already gone
through the rigors of proving its cause
before the RTC only to fall short of its
ultimate objective. Yet, the Court’s duty to
uphold the principles of law and
jurisprudential pronouncements as herein
discussed remains staunch and unyielding.
Definitively, the Court cannot sanction the
registration of the subject lots when there
stands an existing decision binding over the
same. Neither can the Court allow the RTC
to set aside the ruling of a co-equal and
coordinate court. Based on these reasons,
the Court is therefore constrained to
sustain the nullification of the RTC Decision
and Amended Order as well as the final
decree of registration issued in favor of
petitioner. Notably, this course of action is
without prejudice to the re-filing of another
application for registration wherein
petitioner can prove, among others, that
the decision in Cad. Case No. 37 does not
affect its title to the subject lots. Petitioner
may also choose to pursue any other
remedy available to it under the law.
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it
unnecessary to delve into the other
ancillary issues raised before it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated December
6, 2004 and the Resolution dated August
23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 67635 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 179267 June
25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-
Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of
minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia,
the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million
Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population
of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings
of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for
husbands to love their wives as their own
bodies just as Christ loved the church and
gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent,
or even to curb, the pervasiveness of
violence against Filipino women. The
National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the
years 2000-2003, "female violence
comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of
abuse and violence and more than 90% of
these reported cases were committed by
the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners."3
108 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years
of spirited advocacy by women's groups,
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and
for Other Purposes." It took effect on March
27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that
defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners,
i.e, husband; former husband; or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has
a common child.5 The law provides for
protection orders from the barangay and
the courts to prevent the commission of
further acts of VAWC; and outlines the
duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and
court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government
officials in responding to complaints of
VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due
process clauses, and an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia
(private respondent) filed, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified
petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262.
She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in
2002 when she was 34 years old and the
former was eleven years her senior. They
have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child
of petitioner but whom private respondent
adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years
old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years
old.8
Private respondent described herself as a
dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved
around her husband. On the other hand,
petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese
descent, is dominant, controlling, and
demands absolute obedience from his wife
and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately
isolated her from her friends. When she
took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office,
petitioner trivialized her ambitions and
prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He
was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some
men, at one point threatening that he
would have any man eyeing her killed.9
109 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Things turned for the worse when
petitioner took up an affair with a bank
manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City,
who is the godmother of one of their sons.
Petitioner admitted to the affair when
private respondent confronted him about it
in 2004. He even boasted to the household
help about his sexual relations with said
bank manager. Petitioner told private
respondent, though, that he was just using
the woman because of their accounts with
the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of
fights that left private respondent physically
and emotionally wounded. In one of their
quarrels, petitioner grabbed private
respondent on both arms and shook her
with such force that caused bruises and
hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit
private respondent forcefully on the lips
that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter,
Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he
sent to his paramour and whom he blamed
for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the
chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave
petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to
stay for fear that if the latter leaves,
petitioner would beat her up. Even the
small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old
son said that when he grows up, he would
beat up his father because of his cruelty to
private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil
drove private respondent to the brink of
despair. On December 17, 2005, while at
home, she attempted suicide by cutting her
wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on
the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house
instead of taking her to the hospital. Private
respondent was hospitalized for about
seven (7) days in which time petitioner
never bothered to visit, nor apologized or
showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy
almost every week and is taking anti-
depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the
management of Robinson's Bank that she
intends to file charges against the bank
manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager's job. He then
packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for
good. He even told private respondent's
mother, who lives with them in the family
home, that private respondent should just
accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to
separate from petitioner but she is afraid
that he would take her children from her
and deprive her of financial support.
Petitioner had previously warned her that if
she goes on a legal battle with him, she
would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses
involving mostly the construction of deep
wells. He is the President of three
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc.,
Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation – of which he and
private respondent are both stockholders.
In contrast to the absolute control of
110 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
petitioner over said corporations, private
respondent merely draws a monthly salary
of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only,
the Negros Rotadrill Corporation.
Household expenses amounting to not less
than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by
private respondent through the use of
credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the
same corporation together with the bills for
utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a
monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited
cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the
corporations.16 After private respondent
confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building,
Mandalagan, where all the businesses of
the corporations are conducted, thereby
depriving her of access to full information
about said businesses. Until the filing of the
petition a quo, petitioner has not given
private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had
helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the
private respondent and her children exists
or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18
on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30)
days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua
Garcia, is hereby:
 a) Ordered to remove all his personal
belongings from the conjugal
dwelling or family home within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary
Restraining Order and if he refuses,
ordering that he be removed by
police officers from the conjugal
dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is
under the name of 236 Realty
Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262
states "regardless of ownership"),
this is to allow the Petitioner (private
respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger
from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is
removed from the conjugal dwelling,
or anytime the Petitioner decides to
return to the conjugal dwelling to
remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-
entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the
Petitioner police assistance on
Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of
the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her
when he arrives from Manila and
finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner
and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a
distance of 1,000 meters, and shall
not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioner may be
temporarily residing.
111 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone,
contact or otherwise communicate
with the Petitioner, directly or
indirectly, or through other persons,
or contact directly or indirectly her
children, mother and household help,
nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters
and the like. Visitation rights to the
children may be subject of a modified
TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms
including a .9MM caliber firearm and
a Walther PPK and ordering the
Philippine National Police Firearms
and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the
Respondent's firearm licenses. He
should also be ordered to surrender
any unlicensed firearms in his
possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the
Petitioner and the children, including
rental of a house for them, and
educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal
business.
g) To render an accounting of all
advances, benefits, bonuses and
other cash he received from all the
corporations from 1 January 2006 up
to 31 March 2006, which himself and
as President of the corporations and
his Comptroller, must submit to the
Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these
funds shall be reported to the court
by the Comptroller, copy furnished to
 the Petitioner, every 15 days of the
month, under pain of Indirect
Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially
with the order granting support
pendente lite, and considering the
financial resources of the Respondent
and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo,
the Respondent is ordered to put up
a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the
amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in
two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of
private respondent, the trial court
issued an amended TPO,20 effective
for thirty (30) days, which included
the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private
respondents herein) are given the
continued use of the Nissan Patrol
and the Starex Van which they are
using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the
continued use and occupation of the
house in Parañaque, the continued
use of the Starex van in Metro
Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to
immediately post a bond to keep the
peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the
petitioner provisionally fixed in the
sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month
112 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
plus rental expenses of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per
month until the matter of support
could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006,
petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21
seeking the denial of the renewal of the
TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and
(2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
asked that the TPO be modified by (1)
removing one vehicle used by private
respondent and returning the same to its
rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading
Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing
the amount of the bond from
₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level
at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner
moved22 for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed
and extended yet again, but subject only to
the following modifications prayed for by
private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner
herein) return the clothes and other
personal belongings of Rosalie and
her children to Judge Jesus Ramos,
co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel,
otherwise be declared in Indirect
Contempt of Court;
 b) Respondent shall make an
accounting or list of furniture and
equipment in the conjugal house in
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision,
Bacolod City within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's
Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent
from the conjugal dwelling within
eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, and that he cannot return
until 48 hours after the petitioners
have left, so that the petitioner
Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal
home and make an inventory of the
household furniture, equipment and
other things in the conjugal home,
which shall be submitted to the
Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of
Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for
rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes
of the three petitioners (sic) children
within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two
firearms and all unlicensed firearms
to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;
113 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
f) That respondent shall pay
petitioner educational expenses of
the children upon presentation of
proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to
deprive them of financial support; failed to
faithfully comply with the TPO; and
committed new acts of harassment against
her and their children, private respondent
filed another application24 for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit
against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of
which the latter was purportedly no longer
president, with the end in view of
recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van
used by private respondent and the
children. A writ of replevin was served upon
private respondent by a group of six or
seven policemen with long firearms that
scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone
and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old,
was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident
traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal
to go back to school. On another occasion,
petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter,
Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26
The incident was reported to the police, and
Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal
complaint against her father for violation of
R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's
lawyers initiated the filing by the
housemaids working at the conjugal home
of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal
detention against private respondent. This
came about after private respondent,
armed with a TPO, went to said home to get
her and her children's belongings. Finding
some of her things inside a housemaid's
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room,
private respondent filed a case for qualified
theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28
effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua
Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or
through another, acts of violence
against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating in any
form with the offended party, either
directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally
or through his friends, relatives,
employees or agents, from all the
Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three
brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype,
cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo
Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard
Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's
other household helpers from a
distance of 1,000 meters, and shall
114 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioners are temporarily
residing, as well as from the schools
of the three children; Furthermore,
that respondent shall not contact the
schools of the children directly or
indirectly in any manner including,
ostensibly to pay for their tuition or
other fees directly, otherwise he will
have access to the children through
the schools and the TPO will be
rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his
firearms including .9MM caliber
firearm and a Walther PPK to the
Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial
support of Php200,000.00 a month
and Php50,000.00 for rental for the
period from August 6 to September 6,
2006; and support in arrears from
March 2006 to August 2006 the total
amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational
expenses for 2006-2007 the amount
of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued
use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No.
FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate
No. FFD 991 and should the
respondent fail to deliver said
vehicles, respondent is ordered to
provide the petitioner another
vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;
 8) Ordered not to dissipate,
encumber, alienate, sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the conjugal
assets, or those real properties in the
name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and
those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have
an interest in, especially the conjugal
home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City,
and other properties which are
conjugal assets or those in which the
conjugal partnership of gains of
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and
listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2,"
including properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds
of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona
shall be served a copy of this
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER
and are ordered not to allow the
transfer, sale, encumbrance or
disposition of these above-cited
properties to any person, entity or
corporation without the personal
presence of petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia, who shall affix her signature
in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner
Rosalie that her signature will be
forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these
properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006,
the trial court extended the aforequoted
115 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave
petitioner a period of five (5) days within
which to show cause why the TPO should
not be renewed, extended, or modified.
Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however,
that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the
TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31
dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be
furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier,
October 5, had already been issued
renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006.
The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing
could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on
August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and
continuously extended and renewed for
thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until
further orders, and subject to such
modifications as may be ordered by the
court.
After having received a copy of the
foregoing Order, petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment to private
respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO
arguing that it would only be an "exercise in
futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-
797, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition
(CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 for being violative of the due process
and the equal protection clauses, and (2)
the validity of the modified TPO issued in
the civil case for being "an unwanted
product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued
a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36
(TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO,
the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24,
2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
constitutional issue in his pleadings before
the trial court in the civil case, which is
clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the
same. Secondly, the challenge to the
validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for
prohibition seeking to annul the protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted
a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing Decision having been denied in
the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007,
petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY
THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
116 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE
THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A.
9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO
THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE
FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE
BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments
propounded by petitioner against the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first
tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the
appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698)
filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity so that if not raised in
the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised in the trial, and if not raised in the
trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the
RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that
the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that
Family Courts are special courts, of the
same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under
R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family
Courts Act of 1997," family courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children.42 In accordance with
said law, the Supreme Court designated
from among the branches of the Regional
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in
each of several key cities identified.43 To
achieve harmony with the first mentioned
law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as
117 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Family Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC
defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7.Venue. – The Regional Trial Court
designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of
such court in the place where the offense
was committed, the case shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant. (Emphasis
supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court,
the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed
of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings,
land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It
is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45
"this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to
the fundamental law."46 The Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that,
"plainly the Constitution contemplates that
the inferior courts should have jurisdiction
in cases involving constitutionality of any
treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate
review of final judgments of inferior courts
in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as
follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of
petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the
petition for protection order before the RTC
of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to
determine the same, subject to the review
of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the
Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file
an opposition to the petition and not an
answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20.Opposition to petition. – (a) The
respondent may file an opposition to the
118 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
petition which he himself shall verify. It
must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the
opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint, but any cause of
action which could be the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory
espoused by petitioner that, since a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the
opposition, the issue of constitutionality
cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for
money or other relief which a defending
party may have against an opposing party.50
A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein.51
Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim
that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to
the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of
his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of
a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited
from being raised in the opposition in view
of the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this
issue affects the resolution of the case a
quo because the right of private respondent
to a protection order is founded solely on
the very statute the validity of which is
being attacked53 by petitioner who has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. The alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all
intents and purposes, a valid cause for the
non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-
797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in
his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law
which does not need to be supported by
evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows
the conduct of a hearing to determine legal
issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25.Order for further hearing. - In case
the court determines the need for further
hearing, it may issue an order containing
the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be
resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and
documents that have been marked
and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be
ordered to present their direct
testimonies in the form of affidavits;
and
119 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(e) Schedule of the presentation of
evidence by both parties which shall
be done in one day, to the extent
possible, within the 30-day period of
the effectivity of the temporary
protection order issued. (Emphasis
supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise
concomitant to the conduct of a hearing
when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, the
trial court may extend or renew the said
order for a period of thirty (30) days each
time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the parties.
With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to
litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very
purpose for the adoption of the rules on
summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate
court correctly dismissed the petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB -
SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have
proceeded upon an honest belief that if he
finds succor in a superior court, he could be
granted an injunctive relief. However,
Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
expressly disallows the filing of a petition
for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by
the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO
issued by the appellate court in this case
against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal
course in an expeditious and summary
manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by
appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a
judgment granting permanent protection
shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more
reason that a TPO, which is valid only for
thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be
enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the
Supreme Court of the United States
declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal
statutes, either in their entirety or with
respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a
matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of
the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged
criminal acts. The imminence of such a
prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which
exerts its extraordinary powers only to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff
who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to
preserve the status quo until the trial court
hears fully the merits of the case. It bears
120 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
stressing, however, that protection orders
are granted ex parte so as to protect
women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the
law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws,
we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications.
We have, time and again, discharged our
solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional
issues, and with more reason now, in view
of private respondent's plea in her
Comment59 to the instant Petition that we
should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so
we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is
intended to prevent and criminalize spousal
and child abuse, which could very well be
committed by either the husband or the
wife, gender alone is not enough basis to
deprive the husband/father of the remedies
under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress
on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became
R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor,
Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better
known as Senator Loi Estrada), had
originally proposed what she called a
"synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation
of two measures, namely, the "Anti-
Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse
of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 –
providing protection to "all family
members, leaving no one in isolation" but at
the same time giving special attention to
women as the "usual victims" of violence
and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually
agreed that men be denied protection
under the same measure. We quote
pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place
this on record, Mr. President. Some
women's groups have expressed concerns
and relayed these concerns to me that if we
are to include domestic violence apart from
against women as well as other members of
the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken
the efforts to address domestic violence of
which the main victims or the bulk of the
victims really are the wives, the spouses or
the female partners in a relationship. We
would like to place that on record. How
does the good Senator respond to this kind
of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is
this group of women who call themselves
"WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship.
They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are
also being abused by women. I am playing
safe so I placed here members of the family,
prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This
includes the men, children, live-in,
common-law wives, and those related with
the family.65
xxx
121 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that
there was the discussion whether to limit
this to women and not to families which
was the issue of the AWIR group. The
understanding that I have is that we would
be having a broader scope rather than just
women, if I remember correctly, Madam
sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by
Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation
period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say
to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I
am in support of the measure. Do not get
me wrong. However, I believe that there is a
need to protect women's rights especially in
the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless,
countless, voiceless women who have not
had the opportunity to file a case against
their spouses, their live-in partners after
years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If
we broaden the scope to include even the
men, assuming they can at all be abused by
the women or their spouses, then it would
not equalize the already difficult situation
for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our
earlier conversations, concurs with this
position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their
lives so dearly will agree with this
representation. Whether we like it or not, it
is an unequal world. Whether we like it or
not, no matter how empowered the women
are, we are not given equal opportunities
especially in the domestic environment
where the macho Filipino man would
always feel that he is stronger, more
superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the
sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before
accepting this, the committee came up with
this bill because the family members have
been included in this proposed measure
since the other members of the family other
than women are also possible victims of
violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally
why the measure focuses on women, the
fact remains that in some relatively few
cases, men also stand to be victimized and
that children are almost always the helpless
victims of violence. I am worried that there
may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children
who are excluded. Although Republic Act
No. 7610, for instance, more or less,
addresses the special needs of abused
children. The same law is inadequate.
Protection orders for one are not available
in said law.
122 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
I am aware that some groups are
apprehensive about granting the same
protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior
against women. However, we should also
recognize that there are established
procedures and standards in our courts
which give credence to evidentiary support
and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically
entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to
harmonize family relations and to protect
the family as the basic social institution.
Though I recognize the unequal power
relations between men and women in our
society, I believe we have an obligation to
uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
husband and wife and their immediate
family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I
was compelled to include other family
members as a critical input arrived at after a
series of consultations/meetings with
various NGOs, experts, sports groups and
other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the
permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of
the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen.
Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of
the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda would be removing the "men and
children" in this particular bill and focus
specifically on women alone. That will be
the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor,
Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not
sure now whether she is inclined to accept
the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting
this or not because if she is going to accept
this, I will propose an amendment to the
amendment rather than object to the
amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment
accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any
objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an
amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act
on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please
proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined
to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to
123 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang
iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong
mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that
we remove the children from this particular
measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore.To the
amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the
children are very much abused. As a matter
of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse
is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old
children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old
children being abused by their fathers, even
by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to
is find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on
abuse of children, this particular measure
will update that. It will enhance and
hopefully prevent the abuse of children and
not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment
that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men
in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President,
with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively
then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr.
President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any
objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and
wisdom of the members of Congress in
limiting the protection against violence and
abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said
grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice
and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as
erroneous but even then, the remedy
against it is to seek its amendment or repeal
by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative
that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We
only step in when there is a violation of the
Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69
is instructive:
124 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The guaranty of equal protection of the
laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated
in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of
the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is
the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and
is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
Measured against the foregoing
jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A.
9262 is based on a valid classification as
shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such,
did not violate the equal protection clause
by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State
extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between
women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias
and prejudice against women all make for
real differences justifying the classification
under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, "the accommodation of
differences ... is the essence of true
equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between
men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on
Women (the National Machinery for
Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women
(VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between
125 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
women and men otherwise known as
"gender-based violence". Societal norms
and traditions dictate people to think men
are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and
take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions
and supporters, and take on subordinate
roles in society. This perception leads to
men gaining more power over women. With
power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's
expression of controlling women to retain
power.71
The United Nations, which has long
recognized VAW as a human rights issue,
passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence
Against Women on December 20, 1993
stating that "violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which
have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and
to the prevention of the full advancement
of women, and that violence against
women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced
into subordinate positions, compared with
men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced
the historical and social context of gender-
based violence and developments in
advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks
delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A.
9262 and its Implementing Rules last
October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of
which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies
sanctioned the use of violence against
women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members
of the family under his control. I quote the
early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a
long history rooted in patriarchy – the
institutional rule of men. Women were seen
in virtually all societies to be naturally
inferior both physically and intellectually. In
ancient Western societies, women whether
slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated
as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas
allowed the husband to beat, or even kill,
his wife if she endangered his property right
over her. Judaism, Christianity and other
religions oriented towards the patriarchal
family strengthened the male dominated
structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition
of male control over women. Even the
eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his
commentaries as saying husband and wife
were one and that one was the husband.
However, in the late 1500s and through the
entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their
wives. Thus, common law developed the
rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to
beat their wives with a rod or stick no
thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal
recognition of these rights to chastise wives
or inflict corporeal punishment ceased.
126 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Even then, the preservation of the family
was given more importance than
preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence
in the United States followed that of the
English common law. In 1871, the Supreme
Court of Alabama became the first appellate
court to strike down the common law right
of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to
beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair,
choke her, spit in her face or kick her about
the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our
law... In person, the wife is entitled to the
same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy
movement became more organized. The
temperance leagues initiated it. These
leagues had a simple focus. They considered
the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of
wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and
picketed saloons, bars and their husbands'
other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette
movements, expanding the liberation
movement's agenda. They fought for
women's right to vote, to own property,
and more. Since then, the feminist
movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private
invisibility of the domestic violence to the
public gaze. They succeeded in transforming
the issue into an important public concern.
No less than the United States Supreme
Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this
country, approximately two million women
are the victims of severe assaults by their
male partners. In a 1985 survey, women
reported that nearly one of every eight
husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year. The [American Medical
Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of
these incidents discourages women from
reporting them, and because surveys
typically exclude the very poor, those who
do not speak English well, and women who
are homeless or in institutions or hospitals
when the survey is conducted. According to
the AMA, "researchers on family violence
agree that the true incidence of partner
violence is probably double the above
estimates; or four million severely assaulted
women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from
one-fifth to one-third of all women will be
physically assaulted by a partner or ex-
partner during their lifetime... Thus on an
average day in the United States, nearly
11,000 women are severely assaulted by
their male partners. Many of these
incidents involve sexual assault... In families
where wife beating takes place, moreover,
child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling
picture. Physical violence is only the most
visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse,
particularly forced social and economic
isolation of women, is also common.
127 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Many victims of domestic violence remain
with their abusers, perhaps because they
perceive no superior alternative...Many
abused women who find temporary refuge
in shelters return to their husbands, in large
part because they have no other source of
income... Returning to one's abuser can be
dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8
percent of all homicide victims in the United
States are killed by their spouses...Thirty
percent of female homicide victims are
killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's
struggle for equality was no less successful.
The United States Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the
equality of all human beings. In 1979, the
UN General Assembly adopted the
landmark Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.
World conferences on the role and rights of
women have been regularly held in Mexico
City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The
UN itself established a Commission on the
Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with
the half – and full – steps of all these
women's movements. No less than Section
14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution
mandates the State to recognize the role of
women in nation building and to ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. Our Senate has ratified
the CEDAW as well as the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March
8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled
"An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations
omitted)
Recently, the Philippine Commission on
Women presented comparative statistics on
violence against women across an eight-
year period from 2004 to August of 2011
with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first
among the different VAW categories since
its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on
Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
victims of violence. Cases

At the time of the presentation of Senate

Rape on violence997
Bill No. 2723, official statistics 927 659 837 811 770
against women and children show that –

x x x physical injuriesIncestuous
had the highest
38 46 26 22 28 27
number of cases at Rape 5,058 in 2002
representing 55.63% of total cases reported
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003,
there were 2,381 reported cases out of
Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167
4,354 cases which represent
Rape 54.31%. xxx
(T)he total number of women in especially
difficult circumstances served by the
Department of Social Acts Welfareof and
580 536 382 358 445 485
Development (DSWD) for the year 2002,
Lasciviousness
there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of
5,608 cases. xxx (T)herePhysical
are 1,091 DSWD
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498
cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases
Injuries
for the first semester of 2003. Female
violence comprised more than 90% of all
forms of abuse and violence and more than
Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54
90% of these reported cases were
Harassment
committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in
partners.73 RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285

128 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
 ever experienced domestic violence; and
319 223 199 182 220 208 374 constituted
women 213 89% of all those who
had experienced 4 or more incidents of
domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada
62 19 29 30 19 19 25 that spousal
show 15 violence by a woman
against a man is less likely to cause injury
than the other way around (18 percent
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 44 percent).
versus 128 Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less
likely to live in fear of violence at the hands
17 11 16 24 34 152 of190 62
their spouses, and much less likely to
experience sexual assault. In fact, many
cases of physical violence by a woman
against a spouse are in self-defense or the
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases

90 50 59 59 83 703 of183
violence and
155 abuse perpetrated against
men in the Philippines, the same cannot
render R.A. 9262 invalid.

6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 In15,104

*2011 report covers only from January to
August
Source: Philippine National Police – Women
and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates
may be obtained on domestic abuse and
violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low
and, perhaps, because many men will not
even attempt to report the situation. In the
United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so
four or five (or more) times, compared with
11% of the smaller number of men who had
129 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
a 1960 case
12,948
involving the violation of a
city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-
drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and
deposit in receptacles the manure emitted
or discharged by their vehicle-drawing
animals in any public highways, streets,
plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of
equal protection of laws as its application is
limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-
drawing animals and not to those animals,
although not utilized, but similarly pass
through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid
classification for the reason that, while
there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals
that also traverse the city roads, "but their
number must be negligible and their
appearance therein merely occasional,
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the
community."77 The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual
inequality is not violative of the right to
equal protection, for every classification of
persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the
law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through
prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes
against women are often treated differently
and less seriously than other crimes. This
was argued by then United States Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President,
chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil
rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S.
Congress' authority under the Commerce
and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed
that the widespread gender bias in the U.S.
has institutionalized historic prejudices
against victims of rape or domestic
violence, subjecting them to "double
victimization" – first at the hands of the
offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in
her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No.
2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in
the family, the police treat it as a private
matter and advise the parties to settle the
conflict themselves. Once the complainant
brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter
is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that
it might later be withdrawn. This lack of
response or reluctance to be involved by
130 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the police and prosecution reinforces the
escalating, recurring and often serious
nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have
exhibited prejudices and biases against our
women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011,
we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used
derogatory and irreverent language in
reference to the complainant in a petition
for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling
her as "only a live-in partner" and
presenting her as an "opportunist" and a
"mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship."
Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute,"
and accused her of being motivated by
"insatiable greed" and of absconding with
the contested property.81 Such remarks
betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack
of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address
the discrimination brought about by biases
and prejudices against women. As
emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, addressing or correcting
discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate
against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83
therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory
and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-
bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the
CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take
all appropriate measures "to modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of
men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customary
and all other practices which are based on
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm
shift changing the character of domestic
violence from a private affair to a public
offense will require the development of a
distinct mindset on the part of the police,
the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the
purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is
germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which
is to address violence committed against
women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2.Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby
declared that the State values the dignity of
women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family
and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert
efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the provisions
of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and
other international human rights
131 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines
ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently,
the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was
also ratified by the Philippines on October
6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that
State parties shall accord to women
equality with men before the law87 and shall
take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations on
the basis of equality of men and women.88
The Philippines likewise ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and
its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to
existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all
members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is
not limited to the existing conditions when
it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety
and security of women and their children
are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and
children who suffer violence and abuse.
Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that
include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is
sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or
her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause
the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
132 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or
omissions causing or likely to cause mental
or emotional suffering of the victim such as
but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical,
sexual or psychological abuse of a member
of the family to which the victim belongs, or
to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that
make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging
in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity,
except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined
in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of
deprivation of financial resources and
the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property
owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money
or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts
enumerated in the aforequoted provision
are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of
battery. The acts described here are also
found in the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women.90
Hence, the argument advanced by
petitioner that the definition of what
constitutes abuse removes the difference
between violent action and simple marital
tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC
that is vague and ambiguous that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the
innocent and the prohibited acts. They are
worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited, and
need not guess at its meaning nor differ in
its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that
phrases like "depriving or threatening to
deprive the woman or her child of a legal
right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital
infidelity," and "causing mental or
emotional anguish" are so vague that they
make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly
133 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention
that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or
father as the culprit. As defined above,
VAWC may likewise be committed "against
a woman with whom the person has or had
a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the
use of the gender-neutral word "person"
who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while
the law provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or
dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus,
in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the
parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan,
the victim, were held to be proper
respondents in the case filed by the latter
upon the allegation that they and their son
(Go-Tan's husband) had community of
design and purpose in tormenting her by
giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected
from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally
and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A.
9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of
all protections afforded by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the
basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the
husband is stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter
of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to
prevent further acts of violence against
women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard
the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is
broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator
to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator
from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the
children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure
their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for
protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if
134 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
further violence is to be prevented,"99 the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO
after raffle but before notice and hearing
when the life, limb or property of the victim
is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the
immediate and imminent danger of VAWC
or to prevent such violence, which is about
to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge
may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required not only
to verify the allegations in the petition, but
also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to
the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot,
therefore, be challenged as violative of the
right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be
enough to enable the defendant to abscond
or dispose of his property,102 in the same
way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required
before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests,103 among
which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO
is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise
order that notice be immediately given to
the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service.
Moreover, the court shall order that notice,
copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the
court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
effective for thirty (30) days from service on
the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court
will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the
respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5)
days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the
notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the
respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses
and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be
issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the
respondent of a petition for protection
order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Thus, the
fear of petitioner of being "stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a
matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened" is a mere product of an
overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's
135 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on
April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO
that was granted only two days earlier on
April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006,
petitioner filed a motion for the
modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial
court in its Order dated September 26,
2006, gave him five days (5) within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to
file the required comment arguing that it
would just be an "exercise in futility,"
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of
the questioned TPO was only for a limited
period (30 days) each time, and that he
could prevent the continued renewal of said
order if he can show sufficient cause
therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner
may not now be heard to complain that he
was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal
and exclusion of the respondent in the
VAWC case from the residence of the
victim, regardless of ownership of the
residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued
to the wife to claim any property as her
conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however,
does not by any stretch of the imagination
suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11.Reliefs available to the offended
party. -- The protection order shall include
any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent
from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of ownership of the residence,
either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are
violated. If the respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the
court shall direct a law enforcement agent
to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and
escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and
excluded from private respondent's
residence, regardless of ownership, only
temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the latter. Such removal and exclusion may
be permanent only where no property
rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property
and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner
seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-
of-the-mill arguments, instead of
encouraging mediation and counseling, the
law has done violence to the avowed policy
of the State to "protect and strengthen the
136 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
family as a basic autonomous social
institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC, the court shall not refer the case or any
issue thereof to a mediator. The reason
behind this provision is well-explained by
the Commentary on Section 311 of the
Model Code on Domestic and Family
Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering
or referring parties to mediation in a
proceeding for an order for protection.
Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily
reach consensual agreement about the
issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a
subject for compromise. A process which
involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is somehow
at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is
problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally
with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders
involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the
"Supreme Court and such other lower
courts as may be established by law" and,
thus, protests the delegation of power to
barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as
follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs);
Who May Issue and How. – Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong
Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist
from committing acts under Section 5 (a)
and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a
BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the
application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a
BPO, the application shall be acted upon by
any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO
is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by
the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective
for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangay official
to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-
lawyer advocate in any proceeding before
the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government.112 On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the
137 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
power to enforce and administer the laws.
It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted
provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child;
and (2) threatening to cause the woman or
her child physical harm. Such function of
the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty
under the Local Government Code to
"enforce all laws and ordinances," and to
"maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an
officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the
law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that
these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public
prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary
inquiry or proceeding "whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof," the
Punong Barangay must determine
reasonable ground to believe that an
imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about
to recur that would necessitate the issuance
of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly,
an executive, not a judicial, function. The
same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised
by petitioner that since barangay officials
and other law enforcement agencies are
required to extend assistance to victims of
violence and abuse, it would be very
unlikely that they would remain objective
and impartial, and that the chances of
acquittal are nil. As already stated,
assistance by barangay officials and other
law enforcement agencies is consistent with
their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's
observation that "the history of the
women's movement against domestic
violence shows that one of its most difficult
struggles was the fight against the violence
of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law
will not again be a hindrance to the struggle
of women for equality but will be its
fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should
be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review
on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

Conclusion SO ORDERED.

Before a statute or its provisions duly ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

challenged are voided, an unequivocal Associate Justice
breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated
in such a manner as to leave no doubt in
the mind of the Court. In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be beyond
reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case,
however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by
petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an
act of Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its plenary powers,
and passed laws with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting
what is right and advancing the welfare of
the majority.
138 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 229826, July 30, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v.PATRICIA CABRELLOS Y DELA
CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed
by accused-appellant Patricia Cabrellos y
Dela Cruz (Cabrellos) assailing the Decision2
dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02020,
which affirmed the Joint Judgment3 dated
February 25, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental, Branch
45 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 05-0163-A and
05-0162-A finding Cabrellos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11,
respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2)
Informations5 filed before the RTC charging
Cabrellos with violations of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory
portions of which read:
Crim. Case No. 05-0163-A
That on September 22, 2005 at about 12:45
in the afternoon at Barangay Iniban,
Ayungon, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and
139 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, without
lawful authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously SELL
and DELIVER to a poseur buyer
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride locally
known as Shabu, weighing 0.08 gram, a
dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.6
Crim. Case No. 05-0162-A
That on September 22, 2005 at 12:45 in the
afternoon, more or less, at Barangay Iniban,
Ayungon, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in her possession, control
and custody, 0.64 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally
known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, without
lawful authority.
Contrary to law.7
The prosecution alleged that on September
22, 2005 and acting upon a tip from a
confidential informant regarding Cabrellos's
alleged illegal drug activities in Ayungon,
Negros Oriental, the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency and the Provincial
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Group
organized a buy-bust team, with PO3 Allen
June Germodo (PO3 Germodo) acting as
poseur-buyer and PO2 Glenn Corsame (PO2
Corsame) as immediate back-up. The buy-
bust team, together with the informant,
then went to Cabrellos's house. Thereat,
the informant introduced PO3 Germodo as
a shabu buyer. After PO3 Germodo gave
Cabrellos the two (2) marked P500.00 bills,
Cabrellos took out two (2) plastic sachets
containing suspected shabu from her bag
and handed it over to PO3 Germodo. Upon
receipt of the sachets, PO3 Germodo placed
Cabrellos under arrest, with the rest of the
buy-bust team rushing to the scene. The
police officers searched Cabrellos's bag and
discovered seventeen (17) more sachets
containing suspected shabu therein. The
police officers then brought Cabrellos and
the seized items to the Ayungon Police
Station for the conduct of photography and
inventory of the seized items. However,
since only a barangay kagawad was present
at the Ayungon Police Station at that time,
the police officers brought Cabrellos and
the seized items to the Dumaguete Police
Station wherein they conducted a second
inventory, this time in the presence of a
representative each from the DOJ and the
media. Thereafter, the seized sachets were
brought to the crime laboratory where the
contents thereof were confirmed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. 8
In her defense, Cabrellos testified that she
was inside her house tending to her child
when suddenly, two (2) unidentified
persons came into their house looking for
her husband. When she told them that her
husband was not around, she was brought
to the police station for selling shabu, and
there, made to sign a document already
signed by a barangay official. She was
detained for three (3) months at the
Dumaguete Police Station before she was
transferred to Bais City Jail.9
140 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Judgment10 dated February 25,
2015, the RTC convicted Cabrellos of the
crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced
her as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No. 05-
0163-A, to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00; and (b) in Criminal Case No.
05-0162-A, to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years, and to pay a fine of
P300,000.00.11
The RTC found that the prosecution was
able to establish Cabrellos's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, considering that: (a) she
was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu
to the poseur-buyer; and (b) in the search
incidental to her arrest, she was discovered
to be in possession of seventeen (17) more
sachets of shabu. On the other hand, it did
not give credence to Cabrellos' bare denial
as it stood weak in the face of the detailed
and candid testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses.12
Aggrieved, Cabrellos appealed13 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 14 dated September 13, 2016,
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.15It held that
the testimonies of the police officers had
established the fact that Cabrellos was
caught in the act of selling illegal drugs, and
that in the course of her arrest, she was
found in possession of more sachets
containing illegal drugs. In this regard, the
CA ruled that the police officers
substantially complied with the chain of
custody requirement as the identity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were
duly established and preserved. 16
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not Cabrellos is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an
appeal in criminal cases opens the entire
case for review and, thus, it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned.17
"The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."18
In this case, Cabrellos was charged with
Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. In order to properly secure the
conviction of an accused charged with
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
141 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
thing sold and the payment.19 Meanwhile,
in instances wherein an accused is charged
with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
the prosecution must establish the
following elements to warrant his
conviction: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as
a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.20 In both instances, case law instructs
that it is essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous
drug itself forms an integral part of the
corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to
obviate any unnecessary doubt on the
identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain
of custody over the same and account for
each link in the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the
crime.21
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the
procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in
order to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value.22 Under the said section,
prior to its amendment by RA 10640,23 the
apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person
from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.24 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,25 the Court stressed
that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the
[DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had
tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs]
that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody."26
The Court, however, clarified that under
varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 may not always be possible.27
In fact, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now
crystallized into statutory law with the
passage of RA 1064028 – provide that the
said inventory and photography may be
conducted at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team in
instances of warrantless seizure, and that
non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under
justifiable grounds – will not render void
142 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and invalid the seizure and custody over
the seized items so long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the
29
apprehending officer or team. In other
words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure
laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
and its IRR does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the items as void
and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.30 In
People v. Almorfe,31the Court explained
that for the above-saving clause to apply,
the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved.32 Also, in People v. De Guzman,33
it was emphasized that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that
they even exist.34
After a judicious study of the case, the
Court finds that the police officers
committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby
putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs
allegedly seized from Cabrellos.
Initially, it would appear that the arresting
officers complied with the witness
requirement during inventory, as seen in
the Receipt of Property Seized35 dated
September 22, 2005 which contains the
signatures of the required witnesses, i.e., a
public elected official, a representative from
the DOJ, and a representative from the
media. However, no less than PO3Germodo
admitted in open court that they actually
conducted two (2) separate inventories in
different places and in the presence of
different witnesses. Pertinent portions of
his direct testimony read:
[Pros. Yuseff Cesar Ybañez, Jr.]: After you
were able to make the said marking, were
you able to take pictures with the accused
inside her house?
[PO3 Germodo]: No, sir. We only took
pictures during the inventory at the police
station of Ayungon.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, after you have prepared,
and signed of the properties seized and
gone with the markings of the property
seized, what did you do then, if any?
A: We conducted the inventory of the
confiscated items together with the
witness, the [B]rgy. Kagawad Raul Fausto
and he signed the inventory.
Q: And after Raul Fausto signed the
inventory, what happened then, if any?
A: Since there was no report from the
media [and] the Department of Justice, we
proceeded to Dumaguete City.
Q: Where did you proceed in Dumaguete
City?
A: In our office.
143 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Q: Where is your office located?
A: It is located at PNP compound, Locsin
St., Dumaguete City.
Q: After you arrived there, what happened
then?
A: I called the media representative and the
DOJ.
Q: And did they arrive, the media
representative and the DOJ representative?
A: Yes.
Q: After they arrived, what transpired at
your office?
A: We conduct (sic) again an inventory.
Q: After conducting the second inventory,
what did you do then, if any?
A: After the inventory we made a request
for PNP crime laboratory.36
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing testimony, it is clear
that the arresting officers conducted two
(2) separate inventories, both of which are
glaringly non compliant with the required
witnesses rule: (a) in the inventory
conducted at the Ayungon Police Station,
only a public elected official – Brgy.
Kagawad Raul Fausto – was present
thereat; and (b) on the other hand, the
inventory conducted at the Dumaguete
Police Station was witnessed only by
representatives from the DOJ and the
media. To make matters worse, the
arresting officers attempted to cover up
such fact by preparing a single inventory
sheet signed by the witnesses at different
times and places. Verily, the chain of
custody rule laid down by RA 9165 and its
IRR contemplates a situation where the
inventory conducted on the seized items is
witnessed by the required personalities at
the same time. The wordings of the law
leave no room for any piecemeal
compliance with the required witnesses
rule as what happened in this case.
Otherwise, the avowed purpose of the
required witnesses rule – which is to
prevent the evils of switching, planting, or
contamination of the corpus delicti resulting
in the tainting of its integrity and
evidentiary value – will be greatly
diminished or even completely negated.
At this point, it is well to note that the non-
compliance with the required witnesses
rule does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible.37 However, a justifiable
reason for such failure or a showing of any
genuine and sufficient effort to secure the
required witnesses under Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 must be adduced.38 In
People v. Umipang,39 the Court held that
the prosecution must show that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law
for "[a] sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable – without
so much as an explanation on whether
serious attempts were employed to look for
other representatives, given the
circumstances – is to be regarded as a
flimsy excuse."40 Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses,
are unacceptable as justified grounds for
non-compliance.41 These considerations
arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning
144 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest – to
prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing fully
well that they would have to strictly comply
with the set procedure prescribed in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such,
police officers are compelled not only to
state the reasons for their non-compliance,
but must in fact, also convince the Court
that they exerted earnest efforts to comply
with the mandated procedure, and that
under the given circumstance, their actions
were reasonable.42
To reiterate, PO3 Germodo admitted that
they had to re-do the inventory at the
Dumaguete Police Station for it to be
witnessed by the DOJ and media
representatives. However, the re-conduct
of the inventory at the Dumaguete Police
Station was no longer witnessed by the
public elected official who was left behind
at the Ayungon Police Station.
Unfortunately, no excuse was offered for
such mishap; and worse, they even tried to
trivialize the matter by making the required
witnesses sign a single inventory sheet
despite the fact that they witnessed the
conduct of two (2) separate inventories.
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to
provide justifiable grounds or show that
special circumstances exist which would
excuse their transgression, the Court is
constrained to conclude that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Cabrellos have
been compromised. It is settled that in a
prosecution for the Illegal Sale and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA
9165, the State carries the heavy burden of
proving not only the elements of the
offense, but also to prove the integrity of
the corpus delicti, failing in which, renders
the evidence for the State insufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.43 It is well-settled that
the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored
as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects.44 As such, since the
prosecution failed to provide justifiable
grounds for non-compliance with the
aforesaid provision, Cabrellos's acquittal is
perforce in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to
echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign
of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who
would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth.
But as demanding as this campaign may be,
it cannot be more so than the compulsions
of the Bill of Rights for the protection of
liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness
from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
145 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x
x.45
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly
reminded that they have the positive duty
to prove compliance with the procedure set
forth in Section 21 [, Article II] of RA 9165,
as amended. As such, they must have the
initiative to not only acknowledge but also
justify any perceived deviations from the
said procedure during the proceedings
before the trial court. Since compliance
with the procedure is determinative of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty
of the accused, the fact that any issue
regarding the same was not raised, or even
threshed out in the court/s below, would
not preclude the appellate court, including
this Court, from fully examining the records
of the case if only to ascertain whether the
procedure had been completely complied
with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons
exist to excuse any deviation. If no such
reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's
bounden duty to acquit the accused, and
perforce, overturn a conviction."46
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated September 13, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
02020 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Patricia
Cabrellos y Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is ordered to cause her
immediate release, unless she is being
lawfully held in custody for any other
reason.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. 212340, Aug 17, 2016 ]
PEOPLE v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT +
RESOLUTION
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS.GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1]
filed by accused-appellant Gerrjan Manago
y Acut (Manago) assailing the Decision[2]
dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution[3]
dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No.
01342, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated
March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 58 (RTC), in Criminal
Case No. CBU-79707, finding Manago guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II[5] of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165,[6] otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."
The Facts
146 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
On April 10, 2007, an Information[7] was
filed before the RTC, charging Manago of
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 16th day of March,
2007, at about 11:50 in the evening, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, and
without authority of law, did then and there
have in his possession and under his control
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
packet of white crystalline substance
weighing 5.85 grams containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride [sic], a
dangerous drug, without being authorized
by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
According to the prosecution, at around
9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3
Antonio Din (PO3 Din) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Mobile Patrol Group
was waiting to get a haircut at Jonas Borces
Beauty Parlor when two (2) persons
entered and declared a hold-up. PO3 Din
identified himself as a police officer and
exchanged gun shots with the two suspects.
After the shootout, one of the suspects
boarded a motorcycle, while the other
boarded a red Toyota Corolla. The plate
numbers of the vehicles were noted by PO3
Din.[9]
After the incident, PO3 Din received word
from Barangay Tanod Florentine Cano
(Cano),[10] that the robbery suspects were
last seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os. Thus,
S/Insp. George Ylanan (S/Insp. Ylanan)
conducted an investigation in the said
barangay, and discovered that before the
robbery incident, Manago told Cano that
three persons - namely, Rico Lumampas,
Arvin Cadastra, and Allan Sordiano - are his
employees in his roasted chicken business,
and they were to stay in Manago's house.
Further, upon verification of the getaway
vehicles with the Land Transportation
Office, the police officers found out that the
motorcycle was registered in Manago's
name, while the red Toyota Corolla was
registered in the name pf Zest-O
Corporation, where Manage worked as a
District Sales Manager.[11]
With all the foregoing information at hand,
the police officers, comprised of a team
including PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan,
conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1)
day after the robbery incident, or on March
16, 2007, by setting up a checkpoint in Sitio
Panagdait. At around 9:30 in the evening of
even date, the red Toyota Corolla, then
being driven by Manago, passed through
the checkpoint, prompting the police
officers to stop the vehicle. The police
officers then ordered Manago to disembark,
and thereafter, conducted a thorough
search of the vehicle. As the search
produced no contraband, the police officers
then frisked Manago, resulting in the
discovery of one (1) plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance
suspected to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers
seized the plastic pack, arrested Manago,
147 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
informed him of his constitutional rights,
and brought him and the plastic pack to
their headquarters. Upon reaching the
headquarters, S/Insp. Ylanan turned over
the seized plastic pack to PO3 Joel Taboada,
who in turn, prepared a request for a
laboratory examination of the same. SPO1
Felix Gabijan then delivered the said sachet
and request to Forensic Chemist Jude
Daniel Mendoza of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, who, after conducting an
examination, confirmed that the sachet
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.[12]
In his defense, Manago denied possessing
the plastic pack recovered by the police
officers. He claimed that at around 11:50 in
the evening of March 16, 2007, he was
about to start his vehicle and was on his
way home from the office when a pick-up
truck stopped in front of his car. Three (3)
police officers armed with long firearms
disembarked from the said track. One of the
officers knocked on the door of Manago's
vehicle and asked for his driver's license, to
which Manago complied. When the same
officer saw Manago's name on the license,
the former uttered "mao na ni (this is him)."
Manago was then ordered to sit at the back
of his car as the vehicle was driven by one
of the police officers directly to the Cebu
City Police Station. After arriving at the
police station, Manago was interrogated
about who the robbers were and to divulge
their whereabouts so that no criminal
charges would be filed against him. Manago
claimed that he requested for a phone call
with his lawyer, as well as a copy of the
warrant for his arrest, but both requests
went unheeded. After he was dispossessed
of his laptop, wallet, and two (2) mobile
phones, he was then photographed and
placed in a detention cell. Thereafter, he
was brought to the Cebu City Prosecutor's
Office where he was charged with, among
others, illegal possession of shabu.[13]
Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable
Cause and/or Motion for the Suppression of
Evidence,[14] contending, inter alia, that
there is neither probable cause nor prima
facie Evidence to conduct an arrest and
search on him; as such, the item seized torn
him, i.e., the plastic sachet containing
shabu, is inadmissible in evidence pursuant
to the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine.[15] However, in kn Order[16] dated
May 31, 2007, the RTC denied the said
motion. The RTC held that while (a) the
police officers, through PO3 Din, had no
personal knowledge of Manago's
involvement in the robbery as they had to
conduct in investigation to identify him as
the registered owner of the motorcycle and
(b) there was no in flagrante delicto arrest
as Manago was merely driving and gave no
indication that he was committing an
offense, the RTC nevertheless held that
there was a valid warrantless search of a
moving vehicle, considering that PO3 Din
had probable cause to believe that Manago
was part of the robbery, because the latter
was driving the getaway vehicle used in the
March 15, 2007 robbery incident.[17]
On July 12, 2007, Manago was arraigned
with the assistance of counsel and pleaded
not guilty to the charge against him.[18]
148 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
During the course of the trial, the contents
of the plastic sachet were re-examined by
the National Bureau of Investigation,
revealing that out of the 5.7158 grams of
white crystalline substance contained in the
sachet, only 0.3852 grams is
methamphetamine hydrochloride, while the
rest is potassium aluminum sulphate or
tawas, which is not a dangerous drug
substance. Thus, Manago applied for and
was granted bail.[19]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated March 23, 2009, the
RTC found Manago guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of possession of 0.3852
grams of shabu and accordingly, sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount
of P300,000.00.[21]
Echoing its earlier findings in its May 31,
2007 Order, the RTC found that the police
officers conducted a valid warrantless
search of a moving vehicle, considering that
PO3 Din positively identified the red Toyota
Corolla, then being driven by Manago, as
the getaway vehicle in the March 15, 2007
robbery incident. Thus, the item found in
the search, i.e., the plastic sachet containing
shabu obtained from Manago, is admissible
in evidence and is enough to sustain a
conviction against him for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.[22]
Manago moved for reconsideration[23] and
applied for bail pending appeal, which
were, however, both denied in an Omnibus
Order[24] dated May 12, 2009. Aggrieved,
Manago appealed his conviction before the
CA.[25]
The CA Proceedings
Upon Manago's motion to post bail, the CA
rendered a Resolution[26] dated August 13,
2010, allowing Manago to post bail in the
amount of P200,000.00, noting that the
quantity of the shabu seized from him was
only 0.3852 grams, thus bailable, and that
the Office of the Solicitor General did not
oppose Manago's motion.[27]
In a Decision[28] dated May 20, 2013, the CA
affirmed Manago „ conviction in toto. It
held that the police officers conducted a
valid hot pursuit operation against Manago,
considering that PO3 Din personally
identified him as the one driving the red
Toyota Corolla vehicle used in the March
15, 2007 robbery incident. As such, the CA
concluded that the warrantless arrest
conducted against Manago was valid, and
consequently, the plastic sachet seized from
him containing shabu is admissible in
evidence as it was done incidental to a
lawful arrest.[29]
Undaunted, Manago moved for
[30]
reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution[31] dated November 6, 2013;
hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not Manage's conviction for
149 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III[32] of the 1987
Constitution mandates that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on
the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within
the meaning of the said constitutional
provision. To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3 (2), Article III[33] of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such unreasonable searches and seizures
are deemed tainted and should be excluded
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree. In other words, evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.[34]
One of the recognized exceptions to the
need of a warrant before a search may be
effected is a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot
be reversed.[35]
A lawful arrest may be effected with or
without a warrant. With respect to the
latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should - as a general rule - be complied crime which had just been committed; and
with: (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped
from custody serving final judgment or
SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
temporarily confined during the pendency
— A peace officer or a private person may,
of his case or has escaped while being
without a warrant, arrest a person:
transferred from one confinement to
another.[36]
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to
committing, or is attempting to commit an
Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element
offense;
of personal knowledge must be coupled
with the element of immediacy; otherwise,
(b) When an offense has just been
the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly,
committed and he has probable cause to
the items yielded through the search
believe based on personal knowledge of
incidental thereto will be rendered
facts or circumstances that the person to be
inadmissible in consonance with the
arrested has committed it; and
exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.
In Pestilos v. Generoso,[37] the Court
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
explained the requirement of immediacy as
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
follows:
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined Based on these discussions, it appears that
while his case is pending, or has escaped the Court's appreciation of the elements
while being transferred from one that "the offense has just been committed"
confinement to another. and "personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) arrested; committed it" depended on the
above, the person arrested without a particular circumstances of the case.
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be However, we note that the element of
proceeded against in accordance with "personal knowledge of facts or
Section 7 of Rule 112. circumstance" under Section 5 (b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Under the foregoing provision, there are
requires clarification.
three (3) instances when warrantless
arrests may be lawfully effected. These are:
The phrase covers facts or, in the
(a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante
alternative, circumstances. According to the
delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where,
Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances are
based on personal knowledge of the
attendant or accompanying facts, events or
arresting officer, there is probable cause
conditions." Circumstances may pertain to
that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
events or actions within the actual
150 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
perception, personal evaluation or the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
observation of the police officer at the the police officer's determination of
scene of the crime. Thus, even though the probable cause would necessarily be
police officer has not seen someone limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
actually fleeing, he could still make a circumstances, gathered as they were
warrantless arrest if, based on his personal within a very limited period of time. The
evaluation of the circumstances at the same provision adds another safeguard
scene of the crime, he could determine the with the requirement of probable cause as
existence of probable cause that the person the standard for evaluating these facts of
sought to be arrested has committed the circumstances before the police officer
crime. However, the determination of could effect a valid warrantless arrest.[38]
probable cause and the gathering of facts or (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
circumstances should be made immediately
In this case, records reveal that at around
after the commission of the crime in order
9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3
to comply with the element of immediacy.
Din personally witnessed a robbery incident
while he was waiting for his turn to have a
In other words, the clincher in the element
haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor. After
of "personal knowledge of facts or
his brief shootout with the armed robbers,
circumstances" is the required element of
the latter fled using a motorcycle and a red
immediacy within which these facts or
Toyota Corolla. Through an investigation
circumstances should be gathered. This
and verification made by the police officers
required time element acts as a safeguard
headed by PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, they
to ensure that the police officers have
were able to: (a) find out that the armed
gathered the facts or perceived the
robbers were staying in Barangay Del Rio
circumstances within a very limited time
Pit-os; and (b) trace the getaway vehicles to
frame. This guarantees that the police
Manago. The next day, or on March 16,
officers would have no time to base their
2007, the police officers set up a checkpoint
probable cause finding on facts or
in Sitio Panagdait where, at around 9:30 in
circumstances obtained after an
the evening, the red Toyota Corolla being
exhaustive investigation.
driven by Manago passed by and was
intercepted by the police officers. The
The reason for the element of the
police officers then ordered Manago to
immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
disembark the car, and from there,
commission of the crime to the arrest
proceeded to search the vehicle and the
widens, the pieces of information gathered
body of Manago, which search yielded the
are prone to become contaminated and
plastic sachet containing shabu. Thereupon,
subjected to external factors,
they effected Manago's arrest.
interpretations and hearsay. On the other
hand, with the element of immediacy
The foregoing circumstances show that
imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
while the element of personal knowledge
151 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
under Section 5 (b) above was present -
given that PO3 Din actually saw the March In Caballes v. People,[39] the Court explained
15, 2007 robbery incident and even the concept of warrantless searches on
engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - moving vehicles:
the required element of immediacy was not
Highly regulated by the government, the
met. This is because, at the time the police
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
officers effected the warrantless arrest
expectation of privacy especially when its
upon Manago's person, investigation and
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
verification proceedings were already
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
conducted, which consequently yielded
probable cause that the occupant
sufficient information on the suspects of
committed a criminal activity. Thus, the
the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As the
rules governing search and seizure have
Court sees it, the information the police
over the years been steadily liberalized
officers had gathered therefrom would
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of
have been enough for them to secure the
the search on the basis of practicality. This
necessary warrants against the robbery
is so considering that before a warrant
suspects. However, they opted to conduct a
could be obtained, the place, things and
"hot pursuit" operation which - considering
persons to be searched must be described
the lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed
to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a
to meet the legal requirements therefor.
requirement which borders on the
Thus, there being no valid warrantless
impossible in the case of smuggling effected
arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the
by the use of a moving vehicle that can
CA erred in ruling that Manago was lawfully
transport contraband from one place to
arrested.
another with impunity. We might add that
a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
In view of the finding that there was no
justified on the ground that it is not
lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise
practicable to secure a warrant because
erred in ruling that the incidental search on
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In
the locality or jurisdiction in which the
fact, the said search was made even before
warrant must be sought. Searches without
he was arrested and thus, violated the
warrant of automobiles is also allowed for
cardinal rule on searches incidental to
the purpose of preventing violations of
lawful arrests that there first be a lawful
smuggling or immigration laws, provided
arrest before a search can be made.
such searches are made at borders or
"constructive borders" like checkpoints near
For another, the Court similarly finds the
the boundary lines of the State.[40]
RTC's ruling that the police officers
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
conducted a lawful warrantless search of a
moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota A variant of searching moving vehicles
Corolla untenable. without a warrant may entail the setup of
152 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
military or police checkpoints - as in this
case - which, based on jurisprudence, are
not illegal per se for as long as its necessity
is justified by the exigencies of public order
and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.[41] Case law further states that
routine inspections in checkpoints are not
regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable searches, and thus,
permissible, if limited to the following: (a)
where the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks
into a vehicle; (c) flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors; (d) where
the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search; (e) where the
inspection of the Vehicles is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection; and (e)
where the routine check is conducted in a
fixed area.[42]
It is well to clarify, however, that routine
inspections do not give police officers carte
blanche discretion to conduct warrantless
searches in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to
an extensive search - as opposed to a mere
routine inspection - such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as
long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.[43]
In the case at bar, it should be reiterated
that the police officers had already
conducted a thorough investigation and
verification proceedings, which yielded,
153 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
among others: (a) the identities of the
robbery suspects; (b) the place where they
reside; and (c) the ownership of the
getaway vehicles used in the robbery, i.e.,
the motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla.
As adverted to earlier, these pieces of
information were already enough for said
police officers to secure the necessary
warrants to accost the robbery suspects.
Consequently, there was no longer any
exigent circumstance that would have
justified the necessity of setting up the
checkpoint in this case for the purpose of
searching the subject vehicle. In addition, it
is well to point out that the checkpoint was
arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago,
who was already identified as the culprit of
the robbery incident. In this regard, it
cannot, therefore, be said that the
checkpoint was meant to conduct a
routinary and indiscriminate search of
moving vehicles. Rather, it was used as a
subterfuge to put into force the capture of
the fleeing suspect. Unfortunately, this
setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt
the legal requirement of - procuring a valid
search/arrest warrant given the
circumstances of this case. Hence, the
search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla
and on the person of its driver, Manago,
was unlawful.
In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and
the search incidental thereto, including that
of his moving vehicle were all unreasonable
and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu
seized from him is rendered inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule
under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
Manago must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from criminal liability.[44]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 20, 2013 and the
Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No.
01342 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant
Gerrjan Manago y Acut as hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165.

SO ORDERED.

154 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
June 28, 2017 A.C.
No. 8371
SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and
DOMINGA SALONOY, vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN,
Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a
complaint1 filed by Spouses Gerardo
Montecillo and Dominga Salonoy
(complainants) against Atty. Eduardo Z.
Gatchalian (respondent) before the Office
of the Bar Confidant charging him of grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law
for being negligent in handling
complainants' case. In a Resolution2 dated
August 9, 2010, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
Complainants engaged the legal services of
respondent for an ejectment case in which
they were the defendants.3 After filing their
Answer to the complaint, complainants
received a notice from the court setting the
preliminary conference on March 25, 2009
at 8:30 in the morning. When complainants
went to respondent's office to confer with
him about it, the latter told them that he
did not receive the notice and that he could
not attend the preliminary conference due
to a conflict in his schedule. Complainants
expressed that they can attend the
conference even without him. He allegedly
advised them not to attend anymore as he
155 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
would arrange with the court for a new
schedule when he is available. 4
Complainants relied on respondent's advice
and did not attend the preliminary
conference anymore. Thereafter, they
found out that respondent not only failed to
attend the scheduled preliminary
conference, but also failed to take any steps
to have it cancelled or reset to another
date. They also learned that, contrary to
respondent's representation, he did receive
the notice setting the date of the
preliminary conference. Subsequently,
complainant received an Order 5 dated
March 25, 2009 that deemed the ejectment
case submitted for decision due to
complainants' failure to appear during the
preliminary conference. When they
approached respondent about it, he
belittled the matter and told them not to
worry as he would take care of it.6
Subsequently, the trial court issued a
Decision7 dated April 21, 2009 adverse to
the complainants. Respondent received it
on May 4, 2009 but failed to inform
complainants about the status of the case
as to enable them to prepare the next
course of action. Complainants learned
about the adverse ruling upon inquiring
with the trial court only on May 13, 2009, or
nine (9) days after respondent's receipt
thereof, when their period to appeal was
almost about to lapse. 8
Complainants went to respondent's office
wherein the latter prepared a Notice of
Appeal. Afterwards, complainants
terminated respondent's legal services and
engaged another lawyer to prepare their
Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal, the
ejectment case was remanded to the court
of origin.9
In sum, complainants assail respondent's
negligent and complacent handling of their
case. 10
In his Comment, 11 respondent contended
that when complainants informed him
about the scheduled preliminary
conference, he told them that he would be
unable to attend due to a conflict in
schedule, as he was committed to attend a
criminal case hearing in Quezon City.
Nevertheless, he instructed complainants to
attend the preliminary conference even
without his appearance and inform the
court about the conflict in schedule. He
denied having advised complainants not to
attend the preliminary hearing and belittled
the Order dated March 25, 2009. Finally, he
alleged that the Order dated March 25,
2009 was complainants' fault, due to their
failure to attend the preliminary
conference, and upon telling this to
complainants, they terminated his legal
services. 12
On June 22, 2011, while the case was
pending before the IBP, complainants filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
Complaint. 13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the IBP's Report and Recommendation14
dated August 29, 2013, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice
of law for six (6) months for breach of Rule
156 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). He explained that the
submission of the ejectment case for
resolution and the eventual adverse
decision against complainants were
attributable to respondent's negligence.
Knowing that he had a conflict in schedule,
respondent should have prepared and filed
an appropriate motion to cause the
cancellation and resetting of the scheduled
preliminary conference. Whether he
advised complainants to attend the
preliminary conference on March 25, 2009
or not is immaterial. What was relevant was
his course of action when confronted with a
conflict of schedule in his court
appearances. 15
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner
found complainants' version of facts more
in line with common experience as opposed
to respondent's version. Notably, there was
no cogent explanation why complainants
would dismiss his alleged instruction to
attend the conference without him. 16
In a Resolution17 dated August 9, 2014, the
IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted
and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but
was denied m a Resolution18 dated
September 23, 2016.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or
not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's
findings and recommendation.
Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his
clients with utmost diligence and
competence, and never neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him. 19 A lawyer owes
fidelity to the clients' cause20 and,
accordingly is expected to exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling
their affairs. 21 Consequently, he is expected
to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency, and to devote one's full
attention, skill, and competence to the case,
whether it is accepted for a fee or for free.
22
The relevant provisions of the CPR read
thus:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's
duties of competence and diligence include
not merely reviewing cases or giving sound
legal advice, but also consist of properly
representing a client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings and
conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging
their termination without waiting for the
client or the court to prod him to do so.23 A
lawyer's negligence in fulfilling these duties
subjects him to disciplinary action. 24
157 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that
respondent failed to exercise the diligence
required of lawyers in handling
complainants' case. Based on the records,
he failed to file the necessary motion to
postpone the hearing due to a conflict in his
schedule, and as a result, complainants lost
their opportunity to present their evidence
in the ejectment case. As complainants'
counsel in the ejectment case, respondent
was expected to exercise due diligence. He
should have been more circumspect in
preparing and filing the motion, considering
the serious consequence of failure to attend
the scheduled preliminary conference - i.e.
the defendant's failure to appear thereat
entitles the plaintiff to a judgment,25 as
what happened in this case.
The Court likewise finds respondent liable
for failing to immediately inform
complainants about the trial court's adverse
decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an
obligation to promptly apprise clients
regarding the status of a case as expressed
in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their
clients to ask for information but must
advise them without delay about matters
essential for them to avail of legal remedies.
In the present case, respondent failed to
immediately notify complainants about the
adverse decision of the trial court. Had the
complainants not inquired with the trial
court, they would have lost their
opportunity to appeal. For this reason,
respondent is also administratively liable for
negligence under Rule 18.04 of the CPR.
As regards the proper penalty, recent cases
show that in similar instances where
lawyers neglected their clients' affairs by
failing to attend hearings and/or failing to
update clients about court decisions, the
Court suspended them from the practice of
law for six (6) months. In Caranza V da.de
Saldivar v. Cabanes,26a lawyer was
suspended for failure to file a pretrial brief
and to attend the scheduled preliminary
conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,
27
a lawyer was likewise suspended for not
attending pre-trial, failing to inform clients
about the dismissal of their case, and failing
to file position papers. In Spouses Aranda v.
Elayda, 28 a lawyer suffered the same fate
when he failed to appear in a scheduled
hearing despite due notice, which resulted
in the submission of the case for decision.
Consistent with these cases, the Court
agrees with the IBP's recommendation to
suspend respondent from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z.
Gatchalian is found GUILTY of violating
Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective
from the finality of this Resolution, and is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this this Resolution be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
158 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
to be attached to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar.1âwphi1
Furthermore, let copies of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
February 15, 2017 G.R. No.
222541
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner
vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents
D E C I S I O N PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review
on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
May 29, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated
December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which
reversed the Decision4 dated April 23, 2014
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891
declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del
Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario
(Rachel) void on the ground of psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the
Family Code, as amended.6
The Facts
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met
Jose, then seventeen (17) years old,
sometime in December 1983 at a party in
Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very
soon, they became romantically involved.8
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to
Hongkong to work as a domestic helper.
During this period, Rachel allegedly
provided for Jose's tuition fees for his
college education. Rachel and Jose
eventually decided to get married on
December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony
held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were
blessed with a son, named Wesley, on
December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995,
they renewed their vows in a church
ceremony held in the Philippine
Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya.9
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to
work as domestic helper/caregiver and has
been working there ever since, only
returning to the Philippines every year for a
vacation. Through her efforts, she was able
to acquire a house and lot in Rufino Homes
Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.10
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11
for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891,
alleging that Jose was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital
obligations. In support of her petition,
Rachel claimed that: during their marriage,
Jose conspicuously tried to avoid
discharging his duties as husband and
father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot
tempered and violent; he punched her in
the shoulder a few days before their church
wedding, causing it to swell, when she
refused to pay for the transportation
expenses of his parents; he hit his own
159 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall
unconscious, which forced them to leave
Jose's parents' house where they were then
staying; and he even locked her out of their
house in the middle of the night sometime
in December 2007 when she fetched her
relatives from the bus terminal, which he
refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose
would represent himself as single, would
flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair
which she discovered when Jose mistakenly
sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A.
Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw mo
na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na
lang dito."12 Another text message read:
"Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo
na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On
one occasion, she, together with Wesley
and Beverly, caught Jose and the other
woman with their child inside their conjugal
dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose
would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy
between them as they slowly drifted
apart.13
Rachel, however, admitted that their
married life ran smoothly during its early
years, and it was only later in their marriage
that Jose started frequenting bars and
engaging in drinking sessions.14
Rachel also presented the testimonies of
Wesley15 and her sisters, Beverly and
Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which corroborated her
allegations, as well as the testimony17 of Dr.
Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared
the Psychological Report18 (Report) on
Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's
Report, which was primarily based on her
interview with Rachel and Wesley, stated
that Jose suffered from Antisocial
Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by:
(a) his lack of empathy and concern for
Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his
pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only
to his own fancies and comfort; (c) his
selfishness marked by his lack of depth
when it comes to his marital commitments;
and (d) his lack of remorse for his
shortcomings.19
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations
in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he
had dutifully performed all of his marital
and parental duties and obligations to his
family; (b) he had provided for his family's
financial and emotional needs; and (c) he
contributed to the building and
maintenance of their conjugal home. He
claimed that although they occasionally had
misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a
blissful relationship, pointing out that their
first major argument was when Rachel
decided to go to Hongkong to work; that
they continued to communicate through
mail during her stay overseas; and that he
remained supportive of Rachel and would
advise her to give her family the financial
aid that they need so long as she would not
sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied
the alleged extra-marital affair and having
laid hand on Rachel and their son.20 Jose
presented as well the testimony of Faustino
Rigos to support his allegations.21
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC
declared the marriage between Jose and
Rachel void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It relied on the findings and
testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's
160 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
APD interferes with his capacity to perform
his marital and paternal duties, as he in fact
even refused to take responsibility for his
actions, notwithstanding the overwhelming
evidence against him.23
Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his
alleged refusal to seek employment,
squandering of their money on vices,
violent nature, and infidelity are not the
serious, grave, and permanent
psychological condition that incapacitates
him to perform his marital obligations
required by Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. At most, they are personality
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility,
and unfaithfulness, which may be
considered as grounds for legal separation
under Article 5525 of the same code.26
The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA
reversed the ruling of the RTC,28 holding
that the totality of the evidence Rachel
presented was not enough to sustain a
finding that Jose is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the
CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his
refusal to seek employment, his act of
squandering their money on his vices, and
his temper and alleged propensity for
violence were not so grave and permanent
as to deprive him of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond sufficient to nullify the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code; at best, they showed that Jose was
irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally
immature which nonetheless do not
amount to the downright incapacity that
the law requires. Additionally, the CA
pointed out that the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity, its
incapacitating nature, and the incapacity
itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr.
Tayag's Report failed to show the relation
between Jose's "deprived childhood" and
"poor home condition," on one hand, and
grave and permanent psychological malady,
on the other. Finally, it observed that while
Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only
offered a general evaluation on the
supposed root cause of Jose's personality
disorder.30
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which
was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution32 dated December 1, 2015;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's
resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
reversing the RTC's finding of psychological
incapacity.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit. The policy of the
Constitution is to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic social institution,33
and marriage as the foundation of the
family.34 Because of this, the Constitution
decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. In this regard, psychological
incapacity as a ground to nullify the
marriage under Article 3635 of the Family
Code, as amended, should refer to the most
161 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.36 It should
refer to no less than a mental - not merely
physical - incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage, which, as provided under
Article 6837 of the Family Code, among
others,38 include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity, and render help and support.39 In
other words, it must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.40
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code must be characterized by:
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious
such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in
a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or otherwise the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.42
The Court laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 in Republic v.
Molina43(Molina) whose salient points are
footnoted below,44 that incorporated the
basic requirements the Court established in
Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines,
note, however, that an expert opinion is not
absolutely necessary and may be dispensed
with in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of the evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists
and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established.45 The
evidence need not necessarily come from
the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can
come from persons intimately related to
the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends,
who could clearly testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouse's condition at or about
the time of the marriage.46 In other words,
the Molina guidelines continue to apply but
its application calls for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity.47 To be clear,
however, the totality of the evidence must
still establish the characteristics that Santos
laid down: gravity, incurability, and juridical
antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared
that therein respondent's emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility could not be
equated with psychological incapacity as it
was not shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality
which make her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.49 In
Taring v. Taring,50 the Court emphasized
that "irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like,
do not by themselves warrant a finding of
162 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
psychological incapacity, as [these] may
only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal,
or neglect to undertake the obligations of
marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the
Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally
did not consider as tantamount to
psychological incapacity the emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual
promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders
invoked by the petitioning spouses in Pesca
v. Pesca,52Republic v. Encelan,53Republic v.
De Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to
name a few, and thus dismissed their
petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this
case and, thus, denies the petition. Based
on the totality of the evidence presented,
there exists insufficient factual or legal basis
to conclude that Jose's immaturity,
irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to
psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's
evidence merely showed that Jose: (1)
would often indulge in drinking sprees; (2)
tends to become violent when he gets
drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a
father to Wesley and as a husband to
Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3)
flirts openly and represented himself as
single; and (4) engaged in an extra-marital
affair with a bar girl who he brought to the
conjugal dwelling on several occasions.
Significantly, Rachel admitted that their
married life ran smoothly in its early years.
Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand,
simply summarized Rachel and Wesley's
narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD
and proceeded to conclude that Jose's
"personality flaw is deemed to be severe,
grave, and have become deeply embedded
within his adaptive systems since early
childhood years, thereby rendering such to
be a permanent component of his life [and]
[t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond
repair despite any form of intervention."56
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's
Report does not explain in detail how Jose's
APD could be characterized as grave, deeply
rooted in his childhood, and incurable
within the jurisprudential parameters for
establishing psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Report did not discuss the
concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers
from, i.e., its classification, cause,
symptoms, and cure, or show how and to
what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or
how and to what extent his alleged actions
and behavior correlate with his APD,
sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's
condition has no definite treatment, making
it incurable within the law's conception.
Neither did the Report specify the reasons
why and to what extent Jose's APD is
serious and grave, and how it incapacitated
him to understand and comply with his
marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the
Report hastily concluded that Jose had a
"deprived childhood" and "poor home
condition" that automatically resulted in his
APD equivalent to psychological incapacity
without, however, specifically identifying
the history of Jose's condition antedating
the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or
habits during his adolescent years that
could explain his behavior during the
marriage.
163 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally
assess or interview Jose to determine, at
the very least, his background that could
have given her a more accurate basis for
concluding that his APD is rooted in his
childhood or was already existing at the
inception of the marriage. To be sure,
established parameters do not require that
the expert witness personally examine the
party alleged to be suffering from
psychological incapacity provided
corroborating evidence are presented
sufficiently establishing the required legal
parameters.57 Considering that her Report
was based solely on Rachel's side whose
bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her
testimony deserved the application of a
more rigid and stringent standards which
the RTC failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when
taken together with the various
testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity
rise to the level of psychological incapacity
that would justify the nullification of the
parties' marriage. To reiterate and
emphasize, psychological incapacity must
be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of the marital
obligations; it is not enough that a party
prove that the other failed to meet the
responsibility and duty of a married
person.58 There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person -
an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage - which
must be linked with the manifestations of
the psychological incapacity.59
A final note. It is well to reiterate that
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended,
is not a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the grounds for divorce
manifest themselves;60 a marriage, no
matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and
void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient
evidence establishing psychological
incapacity within the context of Article 36,
the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the
Resolution dated December 1, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745
are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, is DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19,
2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE
M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ
REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA
V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
164 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity
as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and
HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR.,
in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former
Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former
Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO
III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH
ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2
taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
all of which assail the constitutionality of
the Pork Barrel System. Due to the
complexity of the subject matter, the Court
shall heretofore discuss the system‘s
conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional
challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of
American -English origin.3 Historically,
its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel
stuffed with pork to a multitude of
black slaves who would cast their
famished bodies into the porcine
feast to assuage their hunger with
morsels coming from the generosity
of their well-fed master.4 This
practice was later compared to the
actions of American legislators in
trying to direct federal budgets in
favor of their districts.5 While the
advent of refrigeration has made the
actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists
in reference to political bills that
"bring home the bacon" to a
legislator‘s district and constituents.6
In a more technical sense, "Pork
Barrel" refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely
or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district.7 Some
scholars on the subject further use it
to refer to legislative control of local
appropriations.8
165 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has
been commonly referred to as lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members
of the Legislature,9 although, as will
be later discussed, its usage would
evolve in reference to certain funds
of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in
the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of
1922, is considered11 as the earliest
form of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
in the Philippines since the utilization
of the funds appropriated therein
were subjected to post-enactment
legislator approval. Particularly, in the
area of fund release, Section 312
provides that the sums appropriated
for certain public works projects13
"shall be distributed x x x subject to
the approval of a joint committee
elected by the Senate and the House
of Representatives. "The committee
from each House may also authorize
one of its members to approve the
distribution made by the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications."14
Also, in the area of fund realignment,
the same section provides that the
said secretary, "with the approval of
said joint committee, or of the
authorized members thereof, may,
for the purposes of said distribution,
transfer unexpended portions of any
item of appropriation under this Act
to any other item hereunder."
 In 1950, it has been documented15
that post-enactment legislator
participation broadened from the
areas of fund release and realignment
to the area of project identification.
During that year, the mechanics of
the public works act was modified to
the extent that the discretion of
choosing projects was transferred
from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators. "For
the first time, the law carried a list of
projects selected by Members of
Congress, they ‘being the
representatives of the people, either
on their own account or by
consultation with local officials or civil
leaders.‘"16 During this period, the
pork barrel process commenced with
local government councils, civil
groups, and individuals appealing to
Congressmen or Senators for
projects. Petitions that were
accommodated formed part of a
legislator‘s allocation, and the
amount each legislator would
eventually get is determined in a
caucus convened by the majority. The
amount was then integrated into the
administration bill prepared by the
Department of Public Works and
Communications. Thereafter, the
Senate and the House of
Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was
signed into law by the President – the
Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s,
however, pork barrel legislation
reportedly ceased in view of the
166 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
stalemate between the House of
Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional
Pork Barrel" was apparently
discontinued in 1972 after Martial
Law was declared, an era when "one
man controlled the legislature,"19 the
reprieve was only temporary. By
1982, the Batasang Pambansa had
already introduced a new item in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA)
called the" Support for Local
Development Projects" (SLDP) under
the article on "National Aid to Local
Government Units". Based on
reports,20 it was under the SLDP that
the practice of giving lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators
began, with each assemblyman
receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter,
assemblymen would communicate
their project preferences to the
Ministry of Budget and Management
for approval. Then, the said ministry
would release the allocation papers
to the Ministry of Local Governments,
which would, in turn, issue the checks
to the city or municipal treasurers in
the assemblyman‘s locality. It has
been further reported that
"Congressional Pork Barrel" projects
under the SLDP also began to cover
not only public works projects, or so-
called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",21 or non-public works
projects such as those which would
fall under the categories of, among
 others, education, health and
livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino
Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power
Revolution in 1986 and the
restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was
revived in the form of the "Mindanao
Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund" which were
created with lump-sum
appropriations of ₱480 Million and
₱240 Million, respectively, for the
funding of development projects in
the Mindanao and Visayas areas in
1989. It has been documented23 that
the clamor raised by the Senators and
the Luzon legislators for a similar
funding, prompted the creation of
the "Countrywide Development
Fund" (CDF) which was integrated
into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial
funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small
local infrastructure and other priority
community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991
and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the
approval of the President, to be
released directly to the implementing
agencies but "subject to the
submission of the required list of
projects and activities."Although the
GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent
as to the amounts of allocations of
the individual legislators, as well as
167 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
their participation in the
identification of projects, it has been
reported26 that by 1992,
Representatives were receiving ₱12.5
Million each in CDF funds, while
Senators were receiving ₱18 Million
each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could
identify any kind of project, from
hard or infrastructure projects such
as roads, bridges, and buildings to
"soft projects" such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos)
Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the
GAA explicitly stated that the release
of CDF funds was to be made upon
the submission of the list of projects
and activities identified by, among
others, individual legislators. For the
first time, the 1993 CDF Article
included an allocation for the Vice-
President.29 As such, Representatives
were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in
CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million
each, and the Vice-President, ₱20
Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the
GAAs contained the same provisions
on project identification and fund
release as found in the 1993 CDF
Article. In addition, however, the
Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) was directed to
submit reports to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House
 Committee on Appropriations on the
releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article,
Members of Congress and the Vice-
President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned,
were directed to submit to the DBM
the list of 50% of projects to be
funded from their respective CDF
allocations which shall be duly
endorsed by (a) the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee
on Finance, in the case of the Senate,
and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of
the Committee on Appropriations, in
the case of the House of
Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted
within six (6) months thereafter. The
same article also stated that the
project list, which would be published
by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for
the release of funds" and that "no
funds appropriated herein shall be
disbursed for projects not included in
the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the
foregoing provisions regarding the
required lists and endorsements were
reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no
longer required as the list itself
sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone
form of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
at that time. Other forms of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" were
168 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
reportedly fashioned and inserted
into the GAA (called "Congressional
Insertions" or "CIs") in order to
perpetuate the ad ministration‘s
political agenda.37 It has been
articulated that since CIs "formed
part and parcel of the budgets of
executive departments, they were
not easily identifiable and were thus
harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the
lawmakers themselves as well as the
finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the
DBM, purportedly knew about the
insertions.38 Examples of these CIs
are the Department of Education
(DepEd) School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations,
the Public Works Fund, the El Niño
Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School
Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be
made upon prior consultation with
the representative of the legislative
district concerned.”40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct
how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada)
Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in
the GAA and replaced by three (3)
separate forms of CIs, namely, the
"Food Security Program Fund,"43 the
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program
Fund,"44 and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program
Fund,"45 all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior
 consultation" with the Member s of
Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the
"Priority Development Assistance
Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
The requirement of "prior
consultation with the respective
Representative of the District" before
PDAF funds were directly released to
the implementing agency concerned
was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF
Article. Moreover, realignment of
funds to any expense category was
expressly allowed, with the sole
condition that no amount shall be
used to fund personal services and
other personnel benefits.47 The
succeeding PDAF provisions remained
the same in view of the re-
enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the
year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo)
Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and
straightforward as it merely
contained a single special provision
ordering the release of the funds
directly to the implementing agency
or local government unit concerned,
without further qualifications. The
following year, 2003,50 the same
single provision was present, with
simply an expansion of purpose and
express authority to realign.
Nevertheless, the provisions in the
2003 budgets of the Department of
Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH)
and the DepEd52 required prior
169 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
consultation with Members of
Congress on the aspects of
implementation delegation and
project list submission, respectively.
In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-
enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided
that the PDAF shall be used "to fund
priority programs and projects under
the ten point agenda of the national
government and shall be released
directly to the implementing
agencies." It also introduced the
program menu concept,55 which is
essentially a list of general programs
and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. The 2005 GAA
was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence,
operated on the same bases. In
similar regard, the program menu
concept was consistently integrated
into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and
201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from
2002 to 2010 were silent with respect
to the specific amounts allocated for
the individual legislators, as well as
their participation in the proposal
and identification of PDAF projects to
be funded. In contrast to the PDAF
Articles, however, the provisions
under the DepEd School Building
Program and the DPWH budget,
similar to its predecessors, explicitly
required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress61
 anent certain aspects of project
implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era
that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental
organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government
projects were introduced. In the
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with
respect to the appropriation for
school buildings, NGOs were, by law,
encouraged to participate. For such
purpose, the law stated that "the
amount of at least ₱250 Million of
the ₱500 Million allotted for the
construction and completion of
school buildings shall be made
available to NGOs including the
Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven
track records in the construction of
public school buildings x x x."62 The
same allocation was made available
to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs
under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it
was in 2007 that the Government
Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB)
issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated
June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-
2007), amending the implementing
rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66
the Government Procurement
Reform Act, to include, as a form of
negotiated procurement,67 the
procedure whereby the Procuring
Entity68 (the implementing agency)
may enter into a memorandum of
170 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
agreement with an NGO, provided
that "an appropriation law or
ordinance earmarks an amount to be
specifically contracted out to
NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles
but similar to the CDF Articles, the
201170 PDAF Article included an
express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual
legislators and the Vice-President:
Representatives were given ₱70
Million each, broken down into ₱40
Million for "hard projects" and ₱30
Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200
Million was given to each Senator as
well as the Vice-President, with a
₱100 Million allocation each for
"hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a
provision on realignment of funds
was included, but with the
qualification that it may be allowed
only once. The same provision also
allowed the Secretaries of Education,
Health, Social Welfare and
Development, Interior and Local
Government, Environment and
Natural Resources, Energy, and Public
Works and Highways to realign PDAF
Funds, with the further conditions
that: (a) realignment is within the
same implementing unit and same
project category as the original
project, for infrastructure projects;
(b) allotment released has not yet
been obligated for the original scope
of work, and (c) the request for
 realignment is with the concurrence
of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF
Articles, it is stated that the
"identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard
or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list
requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would
choose and identify the project from
the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75
as well as fund realignment76 were
included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF
Articles; but the allocation for the
Vice-President, which was pegged at
₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had
been deleted. In addition, the 2013
PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if
they have the technical capability to
implement the projects.77 Legislators
were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for
assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative
district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator
of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the
House.78 Finally, any realignment of
PDAF funds, modification and
revision of project identification, as
well as requests for release of funds,
were all required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee
171 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, as the case
may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the
Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has
been typically associated with lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members
of Congress, the present cases and
the recent controversies on the
matter have, however, shown that
the term‘s usage has expanded to
include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya
Funds was created as a special fund
under Section 880 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos
recognized the need to set up a
special fund to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate
government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.82
Due to the energy-related activities of
the government in the Malampaya
natural gas field in Palawan, or the
"Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-
Power Project",83 the special fund
created under PD 910 has been
currently labeled as Malampaya
Funds.
 On the other hand the Presidential
Social Fund was created under
Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or
the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly
issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983.
More than two (2) years after, he
amended PD 1869 and accordingly
issued PD 1993 on October 31,
1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the
former law. As it stands, the
Presidential Social Fund has been
described as a special funding facility
managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff
through which the President provides
direct assistance to priority programs
and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the
share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of
88
PAGCOR.
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the
Philippines have increased
89
tremendously, owing in no small
part to previous Presidents who
reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in
order to gain congressional support.90
It was in 1996 when the first
controversy surrounding the "Pork
Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City
Representative Romeo Candazo
(Candazo), then an anonymous
source, "blew the lid on the huge
sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of
legislators in the form of kickbacks."91
172 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
He said that "the kickbacks were
‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure)
among legislators and ranged from a
low 19 percent to a high 52 percent
of the cost of each project, which
could be anything from dredging, rip
rapping, sphalting, concreting, and
construction of school buildings."92
"Other sources of kickbacks that
Candazo identified were public funds
intended for medicines and
textbooks. A few days later, the tale
of the money trail became the
banner story of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a
roasted pig."93 "The publication of the
stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of
certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6
Billion for a Congressman, sparked
public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several
concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF as enacted in
the 2004 GAA for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for
lack of "any pertinent evidentiary
support that illegal misuse of PDAF in
the form of kickbacks has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress," the petition
was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present
year, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe
into allegations that "the government
has been defrauded of some ₱10
Billion over the past 10 years by a
 syndicate using funds from the pork
barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of
ghost projects."96 The investigation
was spawned by sworn affidavits of
six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing
for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had
swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects"
using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs
for an entire decade. While the NGOs
were supposedly the ultimate
recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-
blowers declared that the money was
diverted into Napoles‘ private
accounts.97 Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation,
Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Also recommended to be charged in
the complaints are some of the
lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents
of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission
on Audit (CoA) released the results of
a three-year audit investigation99
covering the use of legislators' PDAF
from 2007 to 2009, or during the last
three (3) years of the Arroyo
administration. The purpose of the
173 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
audit was to determine the propriety
of releases of funds under PDAF and
the Various Infrastructures including
Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM,
the application of these funds and
the implementation of projects by
the appropriate implementing
agencies and several government-
owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).101 The total releases
covered by the audit amounted to
₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664
Billion in VILP, representing 58% and
32%, respectively, of the total PDAF
and VILP releases that were found to
have been made nationwide during
the audit period.102 Accordingly, the
Co A‘s findings contained in its Report
No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled
"Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP)," were made public,
the highlights of which are as
follows:103
● Amounts released for
projects identified by a
considerable number of
legislators significantly
exceeded their respective
allocations.
● Amounts were released for
projects outside of legislative
districts of sponsoring
members of the Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the
period exceeded the total
 amount appropriated under
the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were
constructed on private lots
without these having been
turned over to the
government.
● Significant amounts were
released to implementing
agencies without the latter‘s
endorsement and without
considering their mandated
functions, administrative and
technical capabilities to
implement projects.
● Implementation of most
livelihood projects was not
undertaken by the
implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs
endorsed by the proponent
legislators to which the Funds
were transferred.
● The funds were transferred
to the NGOs in spite of the
absence of any appropriation
law or ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were
not compliant with law and
regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs
entrusted with implementation
of seven hundred seventy two
(772) projects amount to
₱6.156 Billion were either
174 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
found questionable, or
submitted
questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to
liquidate in whole or in part
their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as
well as some implementing
agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects
were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel",
whistle-blowers alleged that" at least
₱900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan
(CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of
this writing, in the process of
preparing "one consolidated report"
on the Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings
contained in the CoA Report and the
Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the
relevant procedural antecedents in
these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S.
Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the
Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for
Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition),
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently
restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon
and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their
respective capacities as the incumbent
Senate President and Speaker of the House
of Representatives, from further taking any
steps to enact legislation appropriating
funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in
whatever form and by whatever name it
may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco
Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez,
Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San
Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas,
Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated August 27,
2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual
"Pork Barrel System," presently embodied
in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being
acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and
175 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective
capacities as the incumbent Executive
Secretary, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), and
National Treasurer, or their agents, for
them to immediately cease any expenditure
under the aforesaid funds. Further, they
pray that the Court order the foregoing
respondents to release to the CoA and to
the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list
of legislators who have availed of their
PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project
or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto";
and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-
sum, discretionary funds, including the
proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds
and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x
from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x
project or activity and the recipient entities
or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."108 Also, they pray for the
"inclusion in budgetary deliberations with
the Congress of all presently off-budget,
lump-sum, discretionary funds including,
but not limited to, proceeds from the
Malampaya Funds and remittances from
the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner
Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno),
filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012
(Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the
PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from
releasing such funds to Members of
Congress and, instead, allow their release to
fund priority projects identified and
approved by the Local Development
Councils in consultation with the executive
departments, such as the DPWH, the
Department of Tourism, the Department of
Health, the Department of Transportation,
and Communication and the National
Economic Development Authority.111 The
Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as
UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a
Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all
cases; (b) requiring public respondents to
comment on the consolidated petitions; (c)
issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO)
enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the
Executive Secretary, or any of the persons
acting under their authority from releasing
(1) the remaining PDAF allocated to
Members of Congress under the GAA of
2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the
phrase "for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President"
pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for
the purpose of "financing energy resource
development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government‖ under the
same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on
October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Comment (Comment) of even date before
the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the
alternative, the partial lifting with respect to
educational and medical assistance
purposes, of the Court‘s September 10,
176 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
2013 TRO, and that the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a
Resolution of even date directing
petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of
Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies
to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated
September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on
October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply
dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply);
and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a
Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an
Advisory providing for the guidelines to be
observed by the parties for the Oral
Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013.
In view of the technicality of the issues
material to the present cases, incumbent
Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza
(Solicitor General) was directed to bring
with him during the Oral Arguments
representative/s from the DBM and
Congress who would be able to
competently and completely answer
questions related to, among others, the
budgeting process and its implementation.
Further, the CoA Chairperson was
appointed as amicus curiae and thereby
requested to appear before the Court
during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral
Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the
Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within a period of
seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013,
which the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined
during the Oral Arguments, the following
are the main issues for the Court‘s
resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised
in the consolidated petitions are matters of
policy not subject to judicial review; (c)
petitioners have legal standing to sue; and
(d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19,
1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766,
and 113888, entitled "Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114
(Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24,
2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers
Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar
the re-litigatio n of the issue of
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System"
under the principles of res judicata and
stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional
Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and
all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability
of legislative power; (c) checks and
177 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential
Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8
of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines"
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential
Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as
they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the
order that they have been stated. In
addition, the Court shall also tackle certain
ancillary issues as prompted by the present
cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional
litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing
to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law
states that the first two are the most
important119 and, therefore, shall be
discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case
Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power
operates only when there is an actual case
or controversy.120 This is embodied in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which pertinently states that
"judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case
or controversy is one which "involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related
to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions
raised for constitutional scrutiny are already
ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged
178 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite
that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through
advisory opinions, bereft as they are of
authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."124
or
Based on these principles, the Court finds
that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel
System." Also, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication
since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization –
such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910
for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential
Social Fund – are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the
notion that the issues related thereto had
been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case
becomes moot when there is no more
actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits.125 Differing from this
description, the Court observes that
respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose
for its resolution since said reform is geared
towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and
existing. Neither will the President‘s
declaration that he had already "abolished
the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot
precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority
to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or
nullification of a law may be done either by
Congress, through the passage of a
repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
Instructive on this point is the following
exchange between Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the
Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an
oath to faithfully execute the law,127
correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes,
Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot
refuse to implement the General
Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our
answer, Your Honor. In the case, for
example of the PDAF, the President has a
duty to execute the laws but in the face of
the outrage over PDAF, the President was
179 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
saying, "I am not sure that I will continue
the release of the soft projects," and that
started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not
that … (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the
President if there are anomalies in the
project, he has the power to stop the
releases in the meantime, to investigate,
and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book
6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x
x. So at most the President can suspend,
now if the President believes that the PDAF
is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to
implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor,
as we were trying to say in the specific case
of the PDAF because of the CoA Report,
because of the reported irregularities and
this Court can take judicial notice, even
outside, outside of the COA Report, you
have the report of the whistle-blowers, the
President was just exercising precisely the
duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct.
You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are
anomalies, you stop and investigate, and
prosecute, he has done that. But, does that
mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor
x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally
abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress
passes a law to repeal it, or this Court
declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power
to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases
supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness,
jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that
"the moot and academic‘ principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The
Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third,
when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is
clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners – they essentially allege grave
violations of the Constitution with respect
to, inter alia, the principles of separation of
powers, non-delegability of legislative
power, checks and balances, accountability
and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is
also apparent from the nature of the
interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system
within which significant amounts of public
funds have been and continue to be utilized
180 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and expended undoubtedly presents a
situation of exceptional character as well as
a matter of paramount public interest. The
present petitions, in fact, have been lodged
at a time when the system‘s flaws have
never before been magnified. To the Court‘s
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report,
the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers,
and the government‘s own recognition that
reforms are needed "to address the
reported abuses of the PDAF"130
demonstrates a prima facie pattern of
abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter. It is also by this
finding that the Court finds petitioners‘
claims as not merely theorized, speculative
or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made
by the CoA which is the constitutionally-
mandated audit arm of the government. In
Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case
wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s
disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF
funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude
to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is
tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's,
property. The exercise of its general audit
power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of
government.
It is the general policy of the Court to
sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, such as the CoA,
not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not
only respect but also finality when the
decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is
only when the CoA has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a
petition questioning its rulings. x x x.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating
the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems
the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to
be applicable largely due to the practical
need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s
constitutionality. As disclosed during the
Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson
estimates that thousands of notices of
disallowances will be issued by her office in
connection with the findings made in the
CoA Report. In this relation, Associate
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
(Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of
these would eventually find their way to the
courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling
need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public,
not just for the expeditious resolution of
181 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the anticipated disallowance cases, but
more importantly, so that the government
may be guided on how public funds should
be utilized in accordance with constitutional
principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth
exception is called for by the recognition
that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional
imprimatur, an affair of annual
133
occurrence. The relevance of the issues
before the Court does not cease with the
passage of a "PDAF -free budget for
2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations
throughout the course of history, lends a
semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that
"the same dog will just resurface wearing a
different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,136 the government had already
backtracked on a previous course of action
yet the Court used the "capable of
repetition but evading review" exception in
order "to prevent similar questions from re-
emerging."137 The situation similarly holds
true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of
issues underlying the manner in which
certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are
capable of repetition and hence, must not
evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question
Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies‖
carries the assurance that "the courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government."138
Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question
doctrine which, under the classic
formulation of Baker v. Carr,139 applies
when there is found, among others, "a
textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department," "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non- judicial discretion."
Cast against this light, respondents submit
that the "the political branches are in the
best position not only to perform budget-
related reforms but also to do them in
response to the specific demands of their
constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court
not to impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘
submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised
before the Court do not present political
but legal questions which are within its
province to resolve. A political question
refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality
of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal
one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
182 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Scrutinizing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that the
political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it
is an exercise of judicial power. More
importantly, the present Constitution has
not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially
makes it a duty to proceed therewith.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The
judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. It includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the
expanded concept of judicial power under
the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the
political question doctrine was explained as
follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution
has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore,
the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against
the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it
can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government. Clearly, the new provision
did not just grant the Court power of doing
nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when
the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments;
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature or the executive, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."144 To a great extent, the
Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms
undertaken by its co-equal branches of
government. But it is by constitutional force
that the Court must faithfully perform its
duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases
would not arrest or in any manner impede
the endeavors of the two other branches
but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of
change are erected on firm constitutional
grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of
the people that each great branch of
government, within its own sphere,
contributes its share towards achieving a
holistic and genuine solution to the
problems of society. For all these reasons,
the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea
for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
183 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
"The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a
person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in
their respective capacities as citizen-
taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they
"dutifully contribute to the coffers of the
National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers,
they possess the requisite standing to
question the validity of the existing "Pork
Barrel System" under which the taxes they
pay have been and continue to be utilized.
It is undeniable that petitioners, as
taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if
the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or
147
unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have
equally fulfilled the standing requirement
given that the issues they have raised may
be classified as matters "of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."148
The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during
the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves "not merely a systems
failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the
matters above-discussed, the seriousness of
the issues involved herein. Indeed, of
greater import than the damage caused by
the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have
sufficient locus standi to file the instant
cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter
adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et
movere (or simply, stare decisis which
means "follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled") are general
procedural law principles which both deal
with the effects of previous but factually
similar dispositions to subsequent cases.
For the cases at bar, the Court examines the
applicability of these principles in relation
to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the
judgment. The principle states that a
judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if,
between the first and second actions, there
exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.151 This
required identity is not, however, attendant
hereto since Philconsa and LAMP,
respectively involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and
2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar
call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of
184 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal
based on a procedural technicality – and,
thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in
that petitioners therein failed to present
any "convincing proof x x x showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds
to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole
discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary
support to demonstrate the illegal misuse
of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has
become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress." As
such, the Court up held, in view of the
presumption of constitutionality accorded
to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and
saw "no need to review or reverse the
standing pronouncements in the said case."
Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res
judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa
and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot
apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare
decisis is the doctrine created. The
principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of
the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that,
for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be doctrinally
applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds from
the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus,
where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a
constitutional challenge against a Pork
Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article,
was resolved by the Court. To properly
understand its context, petitioners‘
posturing was that "the power given to the
Members of Congress to propose and
identify projects and activities to be funded
by the CDF is an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, since said
power in an appropriation act is in
implementation of the law" and that "the
proposal and identification of the projects
do not involve the making of laws or the
repeal and amendment thereof, the only
function given to the Congress by the
Constitution."154 In deference to the
foregoing submissions, the Court reached
the following main conclusions: one, under
the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse,"
belongs to Congress; two, the power of
appropriation carries with it the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded
under the appropriation law and it can be
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it
to be; and, three, the proposals and
identifications made by Members of
Congress are merely recommendatory. At
once, it is apparent that the Philconsa
resolution was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically
on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to
Members of Congress. On the contrary, the
present cases call for a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation
185 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
between the CDF and PDAF Articles with
each other, formative as they are of the
entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b)
the intra-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF
or PDAF Article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification
but also to the areas of fund release and
realignment. The complexity of the issues
and the broader legal analyses herein
warranted may be, therefore, considered as
a powerful countervailing reason against a
wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the
Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies
which similarly countervail against a full
resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced
from the main conclusions of the case,
Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose
and identify of projects would be that the
said identification authority is but an aspect
of the power of appropriation which has
been constitutionally lodged in Congress.
From this premise, the contradictions may
be easily seen. If the authority to identify
projects is an aspect of appropriation and
the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in
Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is
Congress which should exercise such
authority, and not its individual Members;
(b) such authority must be exercised within
the prescribed procedure of law passage
and, hence, should not be exercised after
the GAA has already been passed; and (c)
such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has
the force of law and, hence, cannot be
merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s
Concurring Opinion in the same case sums
up the Philconsa quandary in this wise:
"Neither would it be objectionable for
Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for
such specific projects as it may be minded;
to give that authority, however, to the
individual members of Congress in
whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible." As the
Court now largely benefits from hindsight
and current findings on the matter, among
others, the CoA Report, the Court must
partially abandon its previous ruling in
Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-
enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the
same was merely recommendatory. This
postulate raises serious constitutional
inconsistencies which cannot be simply
excused on the ground that such
mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed
out that the recent case of Abakada Guro
Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has
effectively overturned Philconsa‘s
allowance of post-enactment legislator
participation in view of the separation of
powers principle. These constitutional
inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be
discussed in greater detail in the ensuing
section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the
said case was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any
controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in
186 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not
apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the
substantive issues of these cases, it must
first define the terms "Pork Barrel System,"
"Congressional Pork Barrel," and
"Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are
essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel
System" as the "collusion between the
Legislative and Executive branches of
government to accumulate lump-sum public
funds in their offices with unchecked
discretionary powers to determine its
distribution as political largesse."156 They
assert that the following elements make up
the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds
are allocated through the appropriations
process to an individual officer; (b) the
officer is given sole and broad discretion in
determining how the funds will be used or
expended; (c) the guidelines on how to
spend or use the funds in the appropriation
are either vague, overbroad or inexistent;
and (d) projects funded are intended to
benefit a definite constituency in a
particular part of the country and to help
the political careers of the disbursing official
by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They
further state that the Pork Barrel System is
comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary
public funds: first, the Congressional (or
Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as
the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential
(or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the
Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in
reference to its local concept and legal
history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel
System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which
lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The
Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of
lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel
which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators,
either individually or collectively organized
into committees, are able to effectively
control certain aspects of the fund’s
utilization through various post-enactment
measures and/or practices. In particular,
petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears
under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork
Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-
enactment measure that allows individual
legislators to wield a collective power;160
and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel
which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner of its
utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the
Court shall delimit the use of such term to
refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
187 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
With these definitions in mind, the Court
shall now proceed to discuss the
substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional
Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers
to the constitutional demarcation of the
three fundamental powers of government.
In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in
Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means
that the "Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the
163
government." To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress,164 belongs
the power to make laws; to the executive
branch of government, through the
President,165 belongs the power to enforce
laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court,166 belongs
the power to interpret laws. Because the
three great powers have been, by
constitutional design, ordained in this
respect, "each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus,
"the legislature has no authority to execute
or construe the law, the executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and
the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law."168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of
autonomy and independence stem from the
notion that the powers of government must
be divided to avoid concentration of these
powers in any one branch; the division, it is
hoped, would avoid any single branch from
lording its power over the other branches or
the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the
divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally
capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates. Lack of
independence would result in the inability
of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of
another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the
separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches
on the domain of another. US Supreme
Court decisions instruct that the principle of
separation of powers may be violated in
two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may
interfere impermissibly with the other’s
performance of its constitutionally assigned
function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine
may be violated when one branch assumes
a function that more properly is entrusted
to another."172 In other words, there is a
violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or
(b) assumption of another department‘s
functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as
primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally
assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. In
Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona,
Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of
budget execution "covers the various
188 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
operational aspects of budgeting" and
accordingly includes "the evaluation of
work and financial plans for individual
activities," the "regulation and release of
funds" as well as all "other related
activities" that comprise the budget
execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the
principle that the allocation of power in the
three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them.175
Thus, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and
prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any
other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative
branch of government, much more any of
its members, should not cross over the field
of implementing the national budget since,
as earlier stated, the same is properly the
domain of the Executive. Again, in
Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals
of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in
the exercise of its own judgment and
wisdom, formulates an appropriation act
precisely following the process established
by the Constitution, which specifies that no
money may be paid from the Treasury
except in accordance with an appropriation
made by law." Upon approval and passage
of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there
the Executive‘s role of implementing the
national budget begins. So as not to blur the
constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must "not concern it self with
details for implementation by the
Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were
definitively enunciated in Abakada where
the Court held that "from the moment the
law becomes effective, any provision of law
that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It
must be clarified, however, that since the
restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the
law," Congress may still exercise its
oversight function which is a mechanism of
checks and balances that the Constitution
itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress‘ role must be confined to mere
oversight. Any post-enactment-measure
allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional
basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions. As the
Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure
x x x should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.1âwphi1In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to
the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on
Congress‘ power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either of its
189 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of
confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws pursuant
to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the
Congressional Pork Barrel – among others,
the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the
assignment of responsibilities between the
political branches" as it is designed to allow
individual legislators to interfere "way past
the time it should have ceased" or,
particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179
They state that the findings and
recommendations in the CoA Report
provide "an illustration of how absolute and
definitive the power of legislators wield
over project implementation in complete
violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers."180 Further, they
point out that the Court in the Philconsa
case only allowed the CDF to exist on the
condition that individual legislators limited
their role to recommending projects and
not if they actually dictate their
implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the
separations of powers principle has not
been violated since the President maintains
"ultimate authority to control the execution
of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final
discretion to reject" the legislators‘
proposals.182 They maintain that the Court,
in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality
of the power of members of Congress to
propose and identify projects so long as
such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."183 As such, they claim
that "everything in the Special Provisions [of
the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa
framework, and hence, remains
184
constitutional."
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history,
the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the
authority of legislators to participate in the
post-enactment phases of project
implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through
project lists,185 prior consultations186 or
program menus187 – have been consistently
accorded post-enactment authority to
identify the projects they desire to be
funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators
to identify projects post-GAA may be
construed from the import of Special
Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second
paragraph of Special Provision 4. To
elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the
program menu feature which, as evinced
from past PDAF Articles, allows individual
legislators to identify PDAF projects for as
long as the identified project falls under a
general program listed in the said menu.
190 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that
the implementing agencies shall, within 90
days from the GAA is passed, submit to
Congress a more detailed priority list,
standard or design prepared and submitted
by implementing agencies from which the
legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to
identify PDAF projects outside his district
for as long as the representative of the
district concerned concurs in writing.
Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that
PDAF projects refer to "projects to be
identified by legislators"188 and thereunder
provides the allocation limit for the total
amount of projects identified by each
legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special
Provision 4 requires that any modification
and revision of the project identification
"shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be."
From the foregoing special provisions, it
cannot be seriously doubted that legislators
have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project
identification, legislators have also been
accorded post-enactment authority in the
areas of fund release and realignment.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to participate in the
area of fund release through congressional
committees is contained in Special Provision
5 which explicitly states that "all request for
release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by
House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be"; while their statutory
authority to participate in the area of fund
realignment is contained in: first ,
paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which
explicitly state s, among others, that "any
realignment of funds shall be submitted to
the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ;
and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special
Provision 4 which authorizes the
"Secretaries of Agriculture, Education,
Energy, Interior and Local Government,
Labor and Employment, Public Works and
Highways, Social Welfare and Development
and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve
realignment from one project/scope to
another within the allotment received from
this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the
request is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures
which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the
foregoing, legislators have been, in one
form or another, authorized to participate
in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various
operational aspects of budgeting," including
"the evaluation of work and financial plans
for individual activities" and the "regulation
191 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and release of funds" in violation of the
separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically
articulated in Abakada, cannot be
overstated – from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members
to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional.191 That the said
authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law.
Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is
merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents‘ reliance on the same falters
altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that
respondents have nonetheless failed to
substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only
of recommendatory import. Quite the
contrary, respondents – through the
statements of the Solicitor General during
the Oral Arguments – have admitted that
the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement
before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding
source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire
budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the
individual legislator’s identification of the
project, can the PDAF of the legislator be
utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot…
(interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should
have the identification of the project by the
individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of
identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
In the sense that if it is not done and then
there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of
specific instances when a project was
implemented without the identification by
the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know,
Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no
specific examples. I would doubt very much,
Your Honor, because to implement, there is
a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the
SARO and the NCA are triggered by an
identification from the legislator.
xxxx
192 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean
by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were
replying to a question, "How can a legislator
make sure that he is able to get PDAF
Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he
must identify, in that sense, Your Honor.
Otherwise, if he does not identify, he
cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his
district would not be able to have PDAF
Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the
Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any
form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
Corollary thereto, informal practices,
through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded
the same unconstitutional treatment. That
such informal practices do exist and have, in
fact, been constantly observed throughout
the years has not been substantially
disputed here. As pointed out by Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief
Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments
of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the
representative of both, the DBM and two
(2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the
initial thought that I have, after I had seen
the extent of this research made by my
staff, that neither the Executive nor
Congress frontally faced the question of
constitutional compatibility of how they
were engineering the budget process. In
fact, the words you have been using, as the
three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses
of Congress has also been using is surprise;
surprised that all of these things are now
surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the
2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in
one section all the past practice that had
been done since 1991. In a certain sense,
we should be thankful that they are all now
in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise
powers which they do not have, whether
through formal measures written into the
law or informal practices institutionalized in
government agencies, else the Executive
department be deprived of what the
Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers
principle,194 legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which
the Constitution has conferred the same. In
particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195 Based on this
provision, it is clear that only Congress,
193 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
acting as a bicameral body, and the people,
through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other. This premise
embodies the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a)
delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial
practice, are allowed to legislate on purely
local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-
grafted exceptions such as the authority of
the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or
other national emergency,197 or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development
program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability
should not be confused as a restriction to
delegate rule-making authority to
implementing agencies for the limited
purpose of either filling up the details of the
law for its enforcement (supplementary
rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring
the law into actual operation (contingent
rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment
and limitations of delegated rule-making
were explained in the case of People v.
Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of
the principle of separation of powers and is
an exception to the nondelegation of
legislative powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the
law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that
the rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it
has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that
the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle
of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which – as
settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress.201 That the power to appropriate
must be exercised only through legislation
is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." To understand what
constitutes an act of appropriation, the
194 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the
power of appropriation involves (a) the
setting apart by law of a certain sum from
the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate (a) how much from such
fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise
the exercise of the power of appropriation
as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow.
Thus, keeping with the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, the Court
hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as
well as all other forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of
government are intended to be kept
separate and distinct does not mean that
they are absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The
Constitution has also provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check
and balance would be the President’s
power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill
submitted to him by Congress for approval
through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto
power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which reads as
follows:
Sec. 27.x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills to the President, wherein he
may exercise his power of item-veto, forms
part of the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" for
law-passage as specified under the
Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the
final step in the law-making process is the
"submission of the bill to the President for
approval. Once approved, it takes effect as
law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto
power and its relevance as a check on the
legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained
that:206
The former Organic Act and the present
Constitution of the Philippines make the
Chief Executive an integral part of the law-
195 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
making power. His disapproval of a bill,
commonly known as a veto, is essentially a
legislative act. The questions presented to
the mind of the Chief Executive are
precisely the same as those the legislature
must determine in passing a bill, except that
his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the
power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant
of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to
enact laws; the Chief Executive has the
negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of
the Legislature. It follows that the Chief
Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that
authority he may not be confined to rules of
strict construction or hampered by the
unwise interference of the judiciary. The
courts will indulge every intendment in
favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the
same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally
passed by the Legislature. (Emphases
supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-
veto power rests on a variety of policy goals
such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207
impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature,
as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s
role in the budgetary process.208 In
Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, the US Supreme Court
characterized the President‘s item-power as
"a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against
the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of
any impulse unfriendly to the public good,
which may happen to influence a majority
of that body"; phrased differently, it is
meant to "increase the chances in favor of
the community against the passing of bad
laws, through haste, inadvertence, or
design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto
power, it necessarily follows that there
exists a proper "item" which may be the
object of the veto. An item, as defined in
the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the appropriation or of
the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US
Supreme Court characterized an item of
appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously
means an item which, in itself, is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law which happens to be put
into an appropriation bill. (Emphases
supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that
an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power
of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only
"general provisions" which provide for
parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an
item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence –
meaning an allocation of a specified singular
amount for a specified singular purpose,
otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This
196 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
treatment not only allows the item to be
consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures
that the President may discernibly veto the
same. Based on the foregoing formulation,
the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund
and the Intelligence Fund, being
appropriations which state a specified
amount for a specific purpose, would then
be considered as "line- item" appropriations
which are rightfully subject to item veto.
Likewise, it must be observed that an
appropriation may be validly apportioned
into component percentages or values;
however, it is crucial that each percentage
or value must be allocated for its own
corresponding purpose for such component
to be considered as a proper line-item.
Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even
have several related purposes that are by
accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE
(maintenance and other operating
expenses), in which case the related
purposes shall be deemed sufficiently
specific for the exercise of the President‘s
item veto power. Finally, special purpose
funds and discretionary funds would equally
square with the constitutional mechanism
of item-veto for as long as they follow the
rule on singular correspondence as herein
discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it
must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
"special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall
be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein." Meanwhile, with respect to
discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that
said funds "shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional
infirmity are appropriations which merely
provide for a singular lump-sum amount to
be tapped as a source of funding for
multiple purposes. Since such appropriation
type necessitates the further determination
of both the actual amount to be expended
and the actual purpose of the appropriation
which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it
cannot be said that the appropriation law
already indicates a "specific appropriation
of money‖ and hence, without a proper
line-item which the President may veto. As
a practical result, the President would then
be faced with the predicament of either
vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds
some of its purposes wasteful or
undesirable, or approving the entire
appropriation so as not to hinder some of
its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not
be amiss to state that such arrangement
also raises non-delegability issues
considering that the implementing
authority would still have to determine,
again, both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the
appropriation. Since the foregoing
determinations constitute the integral
aspects of the power to appropriate, the
implementing authority would, in effect, be
exercising legislative prerogatives in
197 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
violation of the principle of non-
delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the
current x x x system where the PDAF is a
lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s
identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA denies the President
the chance to veto that item later on."212
Accordingly, they submit that the "item
veto power of the President mandates that
appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain
that the text of the Constitution envisions a
process which is intended to meet the
demands of a modernizing economy and, as
such, lump-sum appropriations are essential
to financially address situations which are
barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted.
They argue that the decision of the
Congress to create some lump-sum
appropriations is constitutionally allowed
and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of
₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal
lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is
passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of
PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a
budget within a budget" which subverts the
prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power
of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
the above-described system forces the
President to decide between (a) accepting
the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment
of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment
legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally
flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation
above-characterized. In particular, the
lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would
be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending,
i.e., scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads,
flood control, etc. This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual
198 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
amounts and purposes of the appropriation
for further determination and, therefore,
does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President‘s
power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same
lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the
CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state
auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends
the adoption of a "line by line budget or
amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated,
the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as
well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of
similar operation, to be unconstitutional.
That such budgeting system provides for a
greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to
defeat what the Constitution requires.
Clearly, the first and essential truth of the
matter is that unconstitutional means do
not justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system
under which various forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel operate defies public
accountability as it renders Congress
incapable of checking itself or its Members.
In particular, they point out that the
Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each
legislator a direct, financial interest in the
smooth, speedy passing of the yearly
budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers"
into "financially-interested partners."219
They also claim that the system has an
effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in
self-perpetuation of elective officials."
Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the
power of impeachment" as such "funds are
indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the
decisions of senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that "public office is a public trust," is
an overarching reminder that every
instrumentality of government should
exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the
parameters of the people‘s trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes
accountability,221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are
designed to exact accountability from public
officers.
Among others, an accountability
mechanism with which the proper
expenditure of public funds may be checked
is the power of congressional oversight. As
mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional
oversight may be performed either through:
(a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘
power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of
223
confirmation; or (b) investigation and
monitoring of the implementation of laws
199 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that
certain features embedded in some forms
of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others
the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that
individual legislators are given post-
enactment roles in the implementation of
the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested "observers" when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law.
To a certain extent, the conduct of
oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of
post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of
the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in
the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another
office of government – renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of
their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely
agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator‘s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him
to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed,
while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a
legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this
area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-
election purposes is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a
case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the
possibility that the close operational
proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former‘s
post-enactment participation, may affect
the process of impeachment, this matter
largely borders on the domain of politics
and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As
such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment
features dilute congressional oversight and
violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, thus impairing public
accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of
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similar nature are deemed as
unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork
Barrel System enables politicians who are
members of political dynasties to
accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves
in power, in contravention of Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which
states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service,
and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the
foregoing provision is considered as not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase
"as may be defined by law." In this respect,
said provision does not, by and of itself,
provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies
guideline for legislative or executive
action.226 Therefore, since there appears to
be no standing law which crystallizes the
policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from
ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-
stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly
demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System
would be able to propagate political
dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is
principally stated in Section 25, Article II
and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different
local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization
and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA
7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein
the policy on local autonomy had been
more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2.Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain
201 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of
national goals. Toward this end, the State
shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process
of decentralization shall proceed from the
National Government to the local
government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to
require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and people‘s
organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the
Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy
of the State to empower local government
units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately,
become self-sustaining and effective
contributors to the national economy. As
explained by the Court in Philippine
Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress
the commitment of the Constitution to the
policy of local autonomy which is intended
to provide the needed impetus and
encouragement to the development of our
local political subdivisions as "self - reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson,
"Municipal corporations are the small
republics from which the great one derives
its strength." The vitalization of local
governments will enable their inhabitants
to fully exploit their resources and more
important, imbue them with a deepened
sense of involvement in public affairs as
members of the body politic. This objective
could be blunted by undue interference by
the national government in purely local
affairs which are best resolved by the
officials and inhabitants of such political
units. The decision we reach today
conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.229 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that
the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against
the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district
representatives, who are national officers,
to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development.230 The
Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an
attempt "to make equal the unequal" and
that "it is also a recognition that individual
members of Congress, far more than the
President and their congressional
colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable
about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given
each project."231 Drawing strength from this
pronouncement, previous legislators
justified its existence by stating that "the
202 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
relatively small projects implemented under
the Congressional Pork Barrel complement
and link the national development goals to
the countryside and grassroots as well as to
depressed areas which are overlooked by
central agencies which are preoccupied
with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his
August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition"
of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President
Aquino mentioned that the Congressional
Pork Barrel was originally established for a
worthy goal, which is to enable the
representatives to identify projects for
communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the
Court, however, finds an inherent defect in
the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of "making equal the
unequal." In particular, the Court observes
that the gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the
fact of office, without taking into account
the specific interests and peculiarities of the
district the legislator represents. In this
regard, the allocation/division limits are
clearly not based on genuine parameters of
equality, wherein economic or geographic
indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-
flung rural province which would be
relatively "underdeveloped" compared to
the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives – and in some years, even
the Vice-President – who do not represent
any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These
certainly are anathema to the Congressional
Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to
make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the
PDAF and CDF had become personal funds
under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole
account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of
legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs)
which are already legally mandated to
"assist the corresponding sanggunian in
setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are
essentially geared towards managing local
affairs,235 their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a
body. The undermining effect on local
autonomy caused by the post-enactment
authority conferred to the latter was
succinctly put by petitioners in the following
wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply
bypass the local development council and
initiate projects on his own, and even take
sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this
type of personality-driven project
identification has not only contributed little
to the overall development of the district,
but has even contributed to "further
203 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
weakening infrastructure planning and
coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are
authorized to intervene in purely local
matters and thereby subvert genuine local
autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as
all other similar forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional
Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to
the substantive issues involving the
Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential
Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of
PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now,
amended by PD 1993), which respectively
provide for the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have
the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from
the National Treasury. Petitioners submit
that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an
appropriation law since the "primary and
specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation
of an Energy Development Board and
Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard,
petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD
1869 is neither a valid appropriations law
since the allocation of the Presidential
Social Fund is merely incidental to the
"primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869
which is the amendment of the Franchise
and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such
funds are being used without any valid law
allowing for their proper appropriation in
violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the
contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution exists when a
provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate
or determinable240 amount of money and
(b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. These two minimum designations
of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation,"
which means "to allot, assign, set apart or
apply to a particular use or purpose," and
hence, if written into the law, demonstrate
that the legislative intent to appropriate
exists. As the Constitution "does not
provide or prescribe any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an
authorization or appropriation by Congress
shall be made, except that it be ‘made by
law,‘" an appropriation law may – according
to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the
intent to appropriate may be gleaned from
the same. As held in the case of Guingona,
Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution
that provides or prescribes any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which
an authorization or appropriation by
204 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Congress shall be made, except that it be
"made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other
words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by
past but subsisting legislations) as well as
expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms.
The Congressional authorization may be
embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of
laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public
purposes, such as the questioned decrees.
An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the language employed (In re
Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272),
whether in the past or in the present.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court
in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must
be money placed in a fund applicable to the
designated purpose. The word appropriate
means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose. An
appropriation in the sense of the
constitution means the setting apart a
portion of the public funds for a public
purpose. No particular form of words is
necessary for the purpose, if the intention
to appropriate is plainly manifested.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court
cannot sustain the argument that the
appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a
valid appropriation law to exist. To
reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of
money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the
legislative intent to appropriate becomes
apparent and, hence, already sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of an
"appropriation made by law" under
contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8.Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board
from any and all sources including receipts
from service contracts and agreements such
as application and processing fees,
signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from
concessionaires, representing unspent work
obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the
government share representing royalties,
rentals, production share on service
contracts and similar payments on the
exploration, development and exploitation
of energy resources, shall form part of a
Special Fund to be used to finance energy
resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government
and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President.
(Emphases supplied)
205 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12.Special Condition of Franchise. —
After deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share
of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of the Corporation from this
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall
be set aside and shall accrue to the General
Fund to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. (Emphases
supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-
mentioned principles, it may then be
concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910,
which creates a Special Fund comprised of
"all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
Energy Development Board from any and all
sources" (a determinable amount) "to be
used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" (a specified
public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, which
similarly sets aside, "after deducting five
(5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or
60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable
amount) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and x x
x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines" (also a
specified public purpose), are legal
appropriations under Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the
2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly
deemed as a legal appropriation under the
said constitutional provision precisely
because, as earlier stated, it contains post-
enactment measures which effectively
create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate
appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and
since they are made by individual legislators
after the GAA is passed, they occur outside
the law. As such, the Court observes that
the real appropriation made under the 2013
PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion
allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the
post-enactment determinations made by
the individual legislators which are, to
repeat, occurrences outside of the law.
Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not
constitute an "appropriation made by law"
since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes
individual legislators to appropriate in
violation of the non-delegability principle as
afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend
that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power since
the phrase "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President"
206 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will
be used."243 Respondents, on the other
hand, urged the Court to apply the principle
of ejusdem generis to the same section and
thus, construe the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" to refer only to
other purposes related "to energy resource
development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘
submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or
determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation
law must contain adequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-
making authority to the Executive245 either
for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of
the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into
actual operation, referred to as contingent
rule-making.246 There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-
making are indeed adequate. The first test
is called the "completeness test." Case law
states that a law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the
delegate. On the other hand, the second
test is called the "sufficient standard test."
Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.247 To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce
the legislative policy, and identify the
conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees
with petitioners that the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8
of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power insofar as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law. That the
subject phrase may be confined only to
"energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the
government" under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include
– or be restricted to – things akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by
three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy
resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government"
states a singular and general class and
hence, cannot be treated as a statutory
reference of specific things from which the
general phrase "for such other purposes"
207 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
may be limited; second, the said phrase also
exhausts the class it represents, namely
energy development programs of the
government;250 and, third, the Executive
department has, in fact, used the
Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents‘ own position
that it is limited only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government."251 Thus,
while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed
the completeness test since the policy of
energy development is clearly deducible
from its text, the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" under the same provision of
law should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it
must be underscored that the rest of
Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of
the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy
resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government,"
remains legally effective and subsisting.
Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned
phrase is but an assurance that the
Malampaya Funds would be used – as it
should be used – only in accordance with
the avowed purpose and intention of PD
910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been
amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the
parties‘ submissions on the same.252
Nevertheless, since the amendatory
provision may be readily examined under
the current parameters of discussion, the
Court proceeds to resolve its
constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used "to
first, finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and second, to
finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines."
The Court finds that while the second
indicated purpose adequately curtails the
authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration
purposes which arise from calamities, the
first indicated purpose, however, gives him
carte blanche authority to use the same
fund for any infrastructure project he may
so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law
does not supply a definition of "priority in
frastructure development projects" and
hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. To note,
the delimitation of a project as one of
"infrastructure" is too broad of a
classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. This may be
deduced from its lexicographic definition as
follows: "the underlying framework of a
system, especially public services and
facilities (such as highways, schools,
bridges, sewers, and water-systems)
needed to support commerce as well as
economic and residential development."253
In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority
208 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
infrastructure development projects" must
be stricken down as unconstitutional since –
similar to the above-assailed provision
under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they are
severable, all other provisions of Section 12
of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and
Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the
Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the
Court did so in the context of its
pronouncements made in this Decision –
petitioners equally pray that the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a)
"the complete schedule/list of legislators
who have availed of their PDAF and VILP
from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the
use of the funds, the project or activity and
the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use
Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from
the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and
the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork
Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded
on Section 28, Article II and Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public
interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy
to invoke the right to information is to file a
petition for mandamus. As explained in the
case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission:256
While the manner of examining public
records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford
access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the
constitutional right may be rendered
nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty,
209 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in
a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to
issue? In the case before Us, the public right
to be enforced and the concomitant duty of
the State are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of
the issuance of the writ of mandamus in
this case is, whether the information sought
by the petitioner is within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee. (Emphases
supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v.
Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been
clarified that the right to information does
not include the right to compel the
preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like." In the same case, it was
stressed that it is essential that the
"applicant has a well -defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded
and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required."
Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a
particular request for information. The
pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right
to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a
writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded
and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be clear and
specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768,
November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo
v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet
this standard, there being no duty on the
part of respondent to prepare the list
requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none
of the petitions are in the nature of
mandamus actions, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to establish a "a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right"
to be furnished by the Executive Secretary
and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF
Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use
Report. Neither did petitioners assert any
law or administrative issuance which would
form the bases of the latter‘s duty to
furnish them with the documents
requested. While petitioners pray that said
information be equally released to the CoA,
it must be pointed out that the CoA has not
been impleaded as a party to these cases
nor has it filed any petition before the Court
to be allowed access to or to compel the
release of any official document relevant to
the conduct of its audit investigations.
210 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
While the Court recognizes that the
information requested is a matter of
significant public concern, however, if only
to ensure that the parameters of disclosure
are properly foisted and so as not to unduly
hamper the equally important interests of
the government, it is constrained to deny
petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without
prejudice to a proper mandamus case which
they, or even the CoA, may choose to
pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial
herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to
be furnished with such schedule/list and
report and not in any way deny them, or
the general public, access to official
documents which are already existing and
of public record. Subject to reasonable
regulation and absent any valid statutory
prohibition, access to these documents
should not be proscribed. Thus, in
Valmonte, while the Court denied the
application for mandamus towards the
preparation of the list requested by
petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed
access to the documents sought for by the
latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s
reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to
the documents evidencing loans granted by
the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations
that the latter may promulgate relating to
the manner and hours of examination, to
the end that damage to or loss of the
records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the
custodian of the records may be prevented
and that the right of other persons entitled
to inspect the records may be insured
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at
p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil.
383, 387. The petition, as to the second and
third alternative acts sought to be done by
petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with
regard to the first act sought by petitioners,
i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names
of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same
treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in
Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court
"order the inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all
presently, off-budget, lump sum,
discretionary funds including but not limited
to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and
the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social
Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated
relief sought by petitioners covers a matter
which is generally left to the prerogative of
the political branches of government.
Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it
must equally deny their prayer on this
score.
211 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO;
Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from
the interpretation accorded by the DBM to
the concept of released funds. In response
to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that
enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF
allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued
Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September
27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which
pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded
under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been
issued by the DBM and such SARO has been
obligated by the implementing agencies
prior to the issuance of the TRO, may
continually be implemented and
disbursements thereto effected by the
agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM
authorized the continued implementation
and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as
they are: first, covered by a SARO; and,
second, that said SARO had been obligated
by the implementing agency concerned
prior to the issuance of the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing
circular, arguing that "the issuance of the
SARO does not yet involve the release of
funds under the PDAF, as release is only
triggered by the issuance of a Notice of
Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF
disbursements, even if covered by an
obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that
the subject TRO only covers "unreleased
and unobligated allotments." They explain
that once a SARO has been issued and
obligated by the implementing agency
concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the
same are already "beyond the reach of the
TRO because they cannot be considered as
‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this
is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by
the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the
issue of whether or not the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is
a matter rendered moot by the present
Decision. The unconstitutionality of the
2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has
the consequential effect of converting the
temporary injunction into a permanent one.
Hence, from the promulgation of this
Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF
funds for 2013, among others, is now
permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation
of the concept of "release" must,
nevertheless, be resolved as it has a
practical impact on the execution of the
current Decision. In particular, the Court
must resolve the issue of whether or not
PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at
the time this Decision is promulgated, may
still be disbursed following the DBM‘s
interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with
petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental
reason that funds covered by an obligated
212 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SARO are yet to be "released" under legal
contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the
DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific
authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given
amount during a specified period for the
purpose indicated. It shall cover
expenditures the release of which is subject
to compliance with specific laws or
regulations, or is subject to separate
approval or clearance by competent
authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned
that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
obligation and not the directive to pay.
Practically speaking, the SARO does not
have the direct and immediate effect of
placing public funds beyond the control of
the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO
may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual
release of funds. On the other hand, the
actual release of funds is brought about by
the issuance of the NCA,264 which is
subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As
may be determined from the statements of
the DBM representative during the Oral
Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation
issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your
Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies
to obligate or to enter into commitments.
The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go
signal to the treasury for us to be able to
pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in
the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA,
Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for
the authorized government-disbursing
banks to, therefore, pay the payees
depending on the projects or projects
covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that
SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to
instead submit that there are instances that
the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the
DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public
funds should not be treated as funds which
have been "released." In this respect,
therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF
funds which are only covered by obligated
SAROs, and without any corresponding
NCAs issued, must, at the time of this
Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and
consequently reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund.
Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF
Article, the funds appropriated pursuant
thereto cannot be disbursed even though
already obligated, else the Court sanctions
the dealing of funds coming from an
unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally
applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which
have been obligated but not released –
213 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
meaning, those merely covered by a SARO –
under the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD
910; and (b) funds sourced from the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
which were altogether declared by the
Court as unconstitutional. However, these
funds should not be reverted to the general
fund as afore-stated but instead,
respectively remain under the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be
utilized for their corresponding special
purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the
Court‘s pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF
Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all
other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions
similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and
for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development
projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, must only be treated
as prospective in effect in view of the
operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine
exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or
executive act, such act is presumed
constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be
properly enforced and complied with. As
explained in the recent case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San
Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine
merely "reflects awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or
not a legislative or executive measure is
valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of
nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there
be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication."267 "In the
language of an American Supreme Court
decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be
heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an
error which has persisted in the chronicles
of our history. In the final analysis, the
Court must strike down the Pork Barrel
System as unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it
operates. To recount, insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying
gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment
authority in vital areas of budget execution,
the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has
214 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are
able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly
violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power ; insofar as it has created a
system of budgeting wherein items are not
textualized into the appropriations bill, it
has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied
the President the power to veto items ;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of
congressional oversight by giving legislators
a stake in the affairs of budget execution,
an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system
has equally impaired public accountability ;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs
of purely local nature, despite the existence
of capable local institutions, it has likewise
subverted genuine local autonomy ; and
again, insofar as it has conferred to the
President the power to appropriate funds
intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may
deem fit as well as other public funds under
the broad classification of "priority
infrastructure development projects," it has
once more transgressed the principle of
non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the
rule of law, any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms
the Court has herein pointed out should
never again be adopted in any system of
governance, by any name or form, by any
semblance or similarity, by any influence or
effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a
system so constitutionally unsound has
monumentally endured, the Court urges the
people and its co-stewards in government
to look forward with the optimism of
change and the awareness of the past. At a
time of great civic unrest and vociferous
public debate, the Court fervently hopes
that its Decision today, while it may not
purge all the wrongs of society nor bring
back what has been lost, guides this nation
to the path forged by the Constitution so
that no one may heretofore detract from its
cause nor stray from its course. After all,
this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no
other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY
GRANTED. In view of the constitutional
violations discussed in this Decision, the
Court hereby declares as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013
PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past
and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws,
such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles
and the various Congressional Insertions,
which authorize/d legislators – whether
individually or collectively organized into
committees – to intervene, assume or
participate in any of the various post-
enactment stages of the budget execution,
such as but not limited to the areas of
project identification, modification and
revision of project identification, fund
release and/or fund realignment, unrelated
to the power of congressional oversight; (c)
all legal provisions of past and present
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the
previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the
various Congressional Insertions, which
215 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations
to legislators from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they
themselves determine; (d) all informal
practices of similar import and effect, which
the Court similarly deems to be acts of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases
(1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910
and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869,
as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1993, for both failing the sufficient standard
test in violation of the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary
injunction dated September 10, 2013 is
hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus,
the disbursement/release of the remaining
PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as
well as for all previous years, and the funds
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section
12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993,
which are, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash
Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether
obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The
remaining PDAF funds covered by this
permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to
the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund, while the funds under the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall
remain therein to be utilized for their
respective special purposes not otherwise
declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper
recourse and lack of proper substantiation,
the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer
seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or
the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the
public and the Commission on Audit
complete lists/schedules or detailed reports
related to the availments and utilization of
the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners‘ access to official documents
already available and of public record which
are related to these funds must, however,
not be prohibited but merely subjected to
the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or
any valid statutory prohibition on the same.
This denial is without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they or the
Commission on Audit may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to
order the inclusion of the funds subject of
these cases in the budgetary deliberations
of Congress as the same is a matter left to
the prerogative of the political branches of
government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all
prosecutorial organs of the government to,
within the bounds of reasonable dispatch,
216 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses
related to the irregular, improper and/or
unlawful disbursement/utilization of all
funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but
prospective in effect.SO ORDERED.
July 25, 2017 G.R.
No. 227757
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA,
REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE,
REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S.
VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C.
ALEJANO, Petitioners
vs.
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ,
MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARINAS,
and REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ,
Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
mandamus1 filed by petitioners
Representatives Teddy Brawner Baguilat,
Jr., (Rep. Baguilat), Edcel C. Lagman (Rep.
Lagman), Raul A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice,
Emmanuel A. Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin,
and Gary C. Alejano (collectively,
petitioners), all members of the House of
Representatives, essentially praying that
respondents Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez
(Speaker Alvarez), Majority Leader Rodolfo
C. Farifias (Rep. Fariñas), and
Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep.
Suarez; collectively, respondents), also
members of the House of Representatives,
be compelled to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat
as the Minority Leader of the 17th Congress
of the House of Representatives; and (b)
petitioners as the legitimate members of
the Minority.
The Facts
The petition alleges that prior to the
opening of the 17th Congress on July 25,
2016, several news articles surfaced about
Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought
the adoption or anointment of President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the
"Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative
minority" in the House of Representatives
(or the House), and even purportedly
encamped himself in Davao shortly after
the May 2016 Elections to get the
endorsement of President Duterte and the
majority partisans. The petition further
claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election
as the Minority Leader, the supermajority
coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep.
Suarez some of its members to feign
membership in the Minority, and
thereafter, vote for him as the Minority
Leader.2
On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the
election of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader
Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep.
Atienza) had an interchange before the
Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the
following from the former: (a) all those who
217 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
vote for the winning Speaker shall belong
to the Majority and those who vote for the
other candidates shall belong to the
Minority; (b) those who abstain from
voting shall likewise be considered part of
the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader
shall be elected by the members of the
Minority.3Thereafter, the Elections for the
Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252
Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight
[(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)]
voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and
one [(l)] registering a no vote,"4 thus,
resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly
elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the 17th Congress.
Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing
tradition" of the House - where the
candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-
highest number of votes for Speakership
automatically becomes the Minority Leader
- Rep. Baguilat would be declared and
recognized as the Minority Leader.
However, despite numerous follow-ups
from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never
recognized as such.5
On August 1, 2016, one of the
"abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil
Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon), manifested
before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016,
those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez
(including the 21 "abstentionists")
convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the
Minority Leader.6 Thereafter, on August 15,
2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Farinas
moved for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as
the Minority Leader. This was opposed by
Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that
various "irregularities" attended Rep.
Suarez's election as Minority Leader,
particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a
member of the Majority as he voted for
Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to
the Minority was irregular; and (b) that the
"abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of
votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as
Minority Leader are supposed to be
considered independent members of the
House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part
of the Minority.7 However, Rep. Lagman's
opposition was overruled, and
consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially
recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition
for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat
should be recognized as the Minority
Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing
tradition" in the House where the candidate
who garnered the second (2nd)-highest
number of votes for Speakership
automatically becomes the Minority Leader;
and (b) the irregularities attending Rep.
Suarez's election to said Minority Leader
position.
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the
election of Minority Leader is an internal
matter to the House of Representatives.
Thus, absent any finding of violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion,
the Court cannot interfere with such
internal matters of a coequal branch of the
govemment.8 In the same vein, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of
Speaker Alvarez and Majority Leader
Farinas contends, inter alia, that the
election of Minority Leader is within the
exclusive realm of the House of
Representatives, which the Court cannot
218 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
intrude in pursuant to the principle of
separation of powers, as well as the political
question doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues
that the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the
House Minority Leader was not tainted with
any violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion and, thus, must be
sustained.9
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for resolution is whether
or not respondents may be compelled via a
writ of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep.
Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives; and (b)
petitioners as the only legitimate members
of the House Minority.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ
commanding a tribunal, corporation, board
or person to do the act required to be done
when it or he unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office or which such
other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course oflaw."10 In Special People,
Inc. Foundation v. Canda,11the Court
explained that the peremptory writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that
is issued only in extreme necessity, and the
ordinary course of procedure is powerless
to afford an adequate and speedy relief to
one who has a clear legal right to the
performance of the act to be compelled.12
After a judicious study of this case, the
Court finds that petitioners have no clear
legal right to the reliefs sought. Records
disclose that prior to the Speakership
Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting
Floor Leader Rep. Farinas responded to a
parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as
to who would elect the Minority Leader of
the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas
then articulated that: (a) all those who vote
for the winning Speaker shall belong to the
Majority and those who vote for other
candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b)
those who abstain from voting shall
likewise be considered part of the
Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall
be elected by the members of the
Minority.13 Thereafter, the election of the
Speaker of the House proceeded without
any objection from any member of
Congress, including herein petitioners.
Notably, the election of the Speaker of the
House is the essential and formative step
conducted at the first regular session of the
17th Congress to determine the
constituency of the Majority and Minority
(and later on, their respective leaders),
considering that the Majority would be
comprised of those who voted for the
winning Speaker and the Minority of those
who did not. The unobjected procession of
the House at this juncture is reflected in its
Journal No. 1 dated July 25, 2016,14 which,
based on case law, is conclusive15 as to
what transpired in Congress:
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF REP. ATIENZA
219 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Recognized by the Chair, Rep. Atienza
inquired as to who would elect the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives.
REMARKS OF REP. FARINAS
In reply, Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of
the Rules of the house on membership to
the Majority and the Minority. He explained
that the Members who voted for the
winning candidate for the Speaker shall
constitute the Majority and shall elect from
among themselves the Majority Leader.
while those who voted against the winning
Speaker or did not vote at all shall belong to
the Minority and would thereafter elect
their Minority Leader.
NOMINAL VOTING ON THE NOMINEES FOR
SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE
Thereafter, on motion of Rep. Farinas, there
being no objection, the Members
proceeded to the election of the Speaker of
the House of Representatives. The Presiding
Officer then directed Deputy Secretary
General Adasa to call the Roll for nominal
voting for the Speaker of the House and
requested each Member to state the name
of the candidate he or she will vote for.
The result of the voting was as follows:
For Rep. Pantaleon D. Alvarez:
xxxx
For Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr.
xxxx
For Rep. Danilo E. Suarez
xxxx
Abstained
xxxx
With 252 Members voting for Rep. Alvarez
(P.), eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven
voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and
one registering a no vote, the Presiding
Officer declared Rep. Alvarez (P.) as the duly
elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives for the 17th Congress.
COMMITTEE ON NOTIFICATION
On motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no
objection, the Body constituted a
committee composed of the following
Members to notify Rep. Alvarez (P.) of his
election as Speaker of the House of
Representatives and to escort the Speaker-
elect to the rostrum for his oath-taking:
Reps. Eric D. Singson, Mercedes K. Alvarez,
Fredenil "Fred" H. Castro, Raneo "Ranie" E.
Abu, Lucy T. Gomez, Nancy A. Catamco,
Elenita Milagros "Eileen" Ermita-Buhain,
Rose Marie "Baby" J. Arenas, Mylene J.
Garcia-Albano, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Marlyn
L. PrimiciasAgabas, Emmeline Aglipay-Villar,
Sarah Jane I. Elago and Victoria Isabel G.
Noel.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
The Presiding Officer motu proprio
suspended the session at 12:43p.m.16
After Speaker Alvarez took his oath of
office, he administered the oath of office to
220 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
all Members of the House of the 17th
Congress.17 On the same day, the Deputy
Speakers, and other officers of the House
(among others, the Majority Leader) were
elected and all took their respective oaths
of office.18
During his privilege speech delivered on July
26, 2016, which was a full day after all the
above-mentioned proceedings had already
been commenced and completed, Rep.
Lagman questioned Rep. Fariñas'
19
interpretation of the Rules. Aside from the
belated timing of Rep. Lagman's query, Rep.
Suarez aptly points out that the Journal for
that session does not indicate any motion
made, seconded and carried to correct the
entry in the Journal of the previous session
(July 25, 2016) pertinent to any recording
error that may have been made, as to
indicate that in fact, a protest or objection
was raised.20
Logically speaking, the foregoing
circumstances would show that the House
of Representatives had effectively adopted
Rep. Farinas' proposal anent the new rules
regarding the membership of the Minority,
as well as the process of determining who
the Minority Leader would be. More
significantly, this demonstrates the House's
deviation from the "legal bases" of
petitioners' claim for entitlement to the
reliefs sought before this Court, namely: (a)
the "long-standing tradition" of
automatically awarding the Minority
Leadership to the second placer in the
Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep. Baguilat;
and (b) the rule21 that those who abstained
in the Speakership Elections should be
deemed as independent Members of the
House of Representatives, and thus, they
could not have voted for a Minority Leader
in the person of Rep. Suarez.22 As will be
explained hereunder, the deviation by the
Lower House from the aforesaid rules is not
averse to the Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its
President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority
vote of all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall be elected
by a majority vote of its entire membership.
Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the
method and manner as to how these
officers are chosen is something within its
sole control.23 In the case of Defensor-
Santiago v. Guingona,24 which involved a
dispute on the rightful Senate Minority
Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-
2001), this Court observed that "[w]hile the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of
Representative,] it is, however, dead silent
on the manner of selecting the other
officers [of the Lower House]. All that the
Charter says is that ' [e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.' [As such], the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the
221 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the [House
of Representatives] itself, not by [the]
Court. "25
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI26
of the Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the sole authority to, inter
alia, "determine the rules of its
proceedings." These "legislative rules,
unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are
subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' Being merely matters of procedure,
their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body at will,
upon the concurrence of a majority [of the
House of Representatives]. "27 Hence, as a
general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority
to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul
of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound
to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
the Court from prying into the internal
workings of the [House of
28
Representatives]."
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies
an exception. While the Court in taking
jurisdiction over petitions questioning an
act of the political departments of
government, will not review the wisdom,
merits or propriety of such action, it will,
however, strike it down on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion.29 This stems from
the expanded concept of judicial power,
which, under Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, expressly "includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government." Case law decrees that "[t]he
foregoing text emphasizes the judicial
department's duty and power to strike
down grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of
government including Congress. It is an
innovation in our political law. As explained
by former Chief Justice Roberto
30
Concepcion:
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.31
Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and
authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate
cases, committed by any officer, agency,
instrumentality or department of the
government."32
However, as may be gleaned from the
circumstances as to how the House had
222 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
conducted the questioned proceedings and
its apparent deviation from its traditional
rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any
attending grave abuse of discretion which
would warrant its intrusion in this case. By
and large, this case concerns an internal
matter of a coequal, political branch of
government which, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, cannot be
judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise
would not only embroil this Court in the
realm of politics, but also lead to its own
breach of the separation of powers
doctrine.33 Verily, "[i]t would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of
a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void [only]
because [it] thinks [that] the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or
to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself."34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
July 26, 2017 G.R.
No. 219501
POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ALAN LA
MADRID PURISIMA, Petitioner
vs.
HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her
official capacity as the OMBUDSMAN OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 filed by petitioner former Police
Director General Alan La Madrid Purisima
(Purisima), assailing the Decision2 dated July
29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No.
138722, which affirmed the Order3 dated
December 3, 2014 issued by respondent
Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as
the Ombudsman, preventively suspending
Purisima during the pendency of the
consolidated cases against him before the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The Facts
In 2011,4 the Philippine National Police
(PNP) entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement5 (MOA) with WER FAST6
Documentary Agency, Inc. (WER FAST)
without going through any public bidding.
Under the MOA, the PNP undertook to
allow WER FAST to provide courier services
to deliver firearm licenses to gun owners.7
In turn, WER FAST agreed to donate
equipment for an online application system
223 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
for the renewal of firearm licenses.8 PCSupt.
Napoleon R. Estilles (Estilles), then Chief of
the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO)
under the Civil Security Group (CSG), signed
the MOA on behalf of the PNP. Based on
the records, the incumbent PNP Chief
approved the signing of the MOA on August
24, 2011.9
Subsequently, the PNP's Legal Service (LS)
was instructed to review the signed MOA
vis-a-vis a proposed revised MOA, noting
that the signed MOA had not been
implemented. In a Memorandum10 dated
August 7, 2012, the LS opined that the FEO
should first formulate rules for
accreditation, by which to evaluate any
company offering courier services, including
WER FAST. It further suggested that the
rules should include the qualifications of the
company to be accredited, the required
scope of courier services, the creation of an
accreditation committee, provisions on
strict confidentiality, disclaimer, and
grounds to terminate accreditation.11
Consequently, on November 19, 2012, the
FEO Courier Services Accreditation Board
(Accreditation Board) was constituted.12 In
an undated memorandum13 entitled "Policy
on Accreditation of FEO Courier Service"
(Accreditation Policy), then CSG Director
Police Director Gil Calaguio Meneses
(Meneses) laid down the criteria and
procedure for the accreditation of courier
service providers, as follows:
5. QUALIFICATIONS/CRITERIA FOR
ACCREDITATION
A Courier Service provided may be
accredited under the following conditions:
5.1 Applicant must be a local entity with
appropriate business permits and is duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)[;]
5.2 It has completed and submitted all its
reportorial requirements to the [SEC];
5.3 It has updated permits from [the local
government unit (LGU)] where its main
office is located[;]
5.4 It has paid all its income taxes for the
year, as duly certified by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR);
5.5 It must have secured clearances from
Directorate for Intelligence (DI)[;]
5.6 It must have an extensive network all
over the Philippines; and
5. 7 The application shall be made in the
name of the company represented by its
President or any of its key directors as duly
authorized in a board resolution for that
purpose.14 (Emphases supplied)
On December 18, 2012, Purisima was
appointed as PNP Chief.15 Thereafter, or on
February 12, 2013, Meneses issued a
Memorandum16 addressed to Purisima
(Meneses Memo), stating that the CSG has
accredited WER FAST as the courier service
to deliver the approved firearms license
cards to gun owners, and more importantly,
recommended that the delivery of license
cards via courier be made mandatory:
224 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
7. In compliance [with] the policy guidance
of the then TACDS, now the Chief, PNP, to
implement the delivery of the approved
firearms license cards to the addresses
supplied by the applicants, this office has
accredited WER FAST Documentation
Agency for the purpose, after complying
with all the documentary requirements
stipulated in the FEO Policy on
Accreditation.
RECOMMENDATION
8. Recommend that the delivery of firearms
licenses cards of gun owners to their
registered addresses, whether newly
purchased firearms or renewed firearm
licenses be made mandatory, to give force
and effect to this new intervention to
monitor and control firearms in the hands
of gun owners.
9. Approval of para 8 above.17 (Emphases
supplied)
Purisima approved this memorandum on
February 17, 2013.18 It was only more than
a month after the Meneses Memo was
issued, or on April 1, 2013, that the
Accreditation Board issued Resolution
Number 2013- 027,19 accrediting WER FAST
as a courier services provider to all FEO
clients relative to the licensing of firearms
(FEO Resolution).
The Proceedings Before the Ombudsman
In 2014, two (2) complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Purisima, WER FAST, and other PNP
officials relative to the PNP's directive for
gun owners to avail of the courier delivery
of firearm licenses via WER FAST. The first
complaint20 filed by a private complainant
charged Purisima, Estilles, and WER FAST of
violating Republic Act (RA) Nos. 6713,21
3019,22 7080,23 and 9184.24 He alleged,
among others, that: the MOA was not
procured through competitive bidding; it
was executed before WER FAST obtained its
SEC certificate of registration; WER FAST is
not authorized by the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
to deliver mails/ parcels to the public;
Purisima has close personal ties with WER
FAST's incorporator and high ranking
officer; Purisima made mandatory the use
of courier service for license delivery in
favor of WER FAST; and WER FAST was
inefficient in delivering the license cards.25
He later filed a Manifestation and Motion26
with attached Joint-Affidavit27 executed by
several PNP officials positively identifying
Purisima as the one who directed FEO-CSG
to accommodate WER FAST as the sole
courier delivery service of the firearms
license cards.28 Purisima filed his Counter-
Affidavit29 on July 25, 2014.
On October 9, 2014, the second complaint30
was filed by the Fact-Finding Investigation
Bureau (FFIB) - Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) against
several PNP officers involved in the MOA's
execution and WER FAST's accreditation as
a courier service provider. Attached to the
complaint were certifications from various
government agencies attesting that WER
FAST failed to meet the qualifications for
accreditation under the Accreditation
225 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Policy.31 As regards Purisima, FFIB-MOLEO
prayed that he be administratively charged
for gross negligence and/or gross neglect of
duty, with a prayer for preventive
suspension. It alleged that Purisima is
administratively liable "for approving the
recommendation of Meneses without
verifying or checking the records and
capability of [WER FAST]."32
Purisima requested33 for additional time to
file his counter-affidavit and was granted an
inextendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of the Order34 dated December 1,
2014.
On December 3, 2014, without waiting for
Purisima's counter-affidavit, the
Ombudsman issued the assailed
35
Order, which preventively suspended
Purisima and other PNP officers, for six (6)
months without pay.36
Purisima and another PNP official37 filed
their respective petitions for certiorari
before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722,38 which
were consolidated in a Resolution dated
January 30, 2015.39 While these
consolidated cases were pending before the
CA, Purisima resigned as PNP Chief40 and
the preventive suspension period had
lapsed.41
The CA Ruling
In a Decision42 dated July 29, 2015, the CA
dismissed the petitions and affirmed the
Ombudsman's assailed Order.1âwphi1 On
the procedural aspect, the CA held that the
petitions are moot in view of the lapse of
the six-month period of preventive
suspension. In particular, the CA noted that
Purisima received the Order on December
4, 2014. Counting from this date, his period
of preventive suspension lapsed on June 4,
2015. Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to
discuss the merits of the case.43
On the merits, the CA held that the
Ombudsman is authorized under Section 24
of RA 677044 to preventively suspend
without pay any public officer or employee
during the pendency of an investigation. It
added that the power to issue preventive
suspension order is undoubtedly a part of
the Ombudsman's investigatory and
disciplinary authority.45
The CA further held that the Ombudsman
did not gravely abuse her discretion in
preventively suspending Purisima for
irregularly accrediting WER FAST as courier
service provider, noting that the two (2)
requisites46 for the validity of a preventive
suspension order were present.47First, the
Ombudsman made a prior determination
that the evidence was strong based on the
documents submitted to them and the
following circumstances: (a) BIR certificate;
(b) Director of Intelligence certificate; and
(c) Department of Science and Technology
(DOST) certificate.48 Particularly, WER FAST
was accredited despite non-payment of
taxes for the years 2011 to 2013 as shown
by the BIR certification. The Director of
Intelligence likewise issued a certification
that it has not given clearances to WER
FAST. Additionally, WER FAST's business
permits for the years 2011 to 2012
indicated "consultancy" as its business,
while its Articles of Incorporation stated
226 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
that the corporation's primary purpose is to
act as a business consultant, engage in
providing assistance in documentation and
registration. The DOST Postal Regulation
Committee also issued a certification that it
has not accredited WER FAST as a courier
service provider. Notably, WER FAST had no
proven track record in courier service. It
even engaged the services of LBC Express,
Inc. precisely because the former lacked the
capacity to deliver firearms licenses.
Furthermore, it was not compliant with the
DOTC's paid-up capital requirement of
₱500,000.00 to be accredited to operate as
a courier service in two or more
administrative regions in the country. To
highlight, WER FAST was accredited by PNP
nationwide despite having a paid-up capital
of only ₱65,000.00.49Second, the charge
filed against Purisima was Gross Negligence
and/or Gross Neglect of Duty, which if
proven true, would constitute a ground for
his removal from public office.50 Thus, the
CA concluded that the concurrence of the
foregoing elements rendered the
preventive suspension order valid.
Aggrieved, Purisima filed the present
petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues before the Court are: (a) whether
or not the petition has been rendered moot
and academic; and, (b) if in the negative,
whether or not the CA correctly held that
the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her
discretion in preventively suspending
Purisima.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
I.
In Ombudsman v. Capulong51 (Capulong),
the Court ruled that a case questioning the
validity of a preventive suspension order is
not mooted by the supervening lifting of the
same:
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of
the preventive suspension order against
Capulong does not render the petition moot
and academic. It does not preclude the
courts from passing upon the validity of a
preventive suspension order, it being a
manifestation of its constitutionally
mandated power and authority to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
As held in Capulong, the Court, in the
exercise of its expanded judicial power, may
not be precluded from passing upon the
order's validity so as to determine whether
or not grave abuse of discretion attended
the issuance of the same. The result of a
finding of a grave abuse of discretion means
that the issuance is null and void from its
very inception, and thus, bars the same
from producing any legal effects. Indeed,
"[n]o legal rights can emanate from a
resolution that is null and void."52 As such, a
public officer improperly placed under
preventive suspension should be restored
to his original position, and accordingly,
should have earned his salaries as if he was
227 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
not preventively suspended for the
pertinent period.
"A case or issue is considered moot and
academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication
of the case or a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical value or use."53 In
Osmeña v. Social Security System of the
Phils.,54the Court explained the
consequence of a finding of mootness:
In such instance, there is no actual
substantial relief which a petitioner would
be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts
generally decline jurisdiction over such case
or dismiss it on the ground of mootness -
save when, among others, a compelling
constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public; or
when the case is capable of repetition yet
evading judicial review.55
In this case, since the propriety or
impropriety of Purisima's preventive
suspension would essentially determine his
entitlement to back salaries during the six-
month period therefor, the Court holds that
despite the lapse of the period of his
preventive suspension, there remains some
practical value or use in resolving his
petition assailing the Ombudsman's
December 3, 2014 Order. Thus, by the same
logic in Capulong, this case cannot be
considered as moot and academic so as to
obviate the Court from resolving its merits.
II.
The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to
issue a preventive suspension order under
Section 24 of RA 6770 when two (2)
conditions are met. These are: (a) the
evidence of guilt is strong based on the
Ombudsman's judgment; and (b) any of the
three (3) circumstances are present - (I) the
charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (2) the charges would warrant
removal from service; or (3) the
respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him. Section
24 reads:
Section 24.Preventive Suspension.- The
Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In this case, the Court need not belabor on
the presence of the second condition,
considering that (a) one of the charges
against Purisima is gross neglect of duty;
and (b) the criminal and administrative
charges (i.e., violations of RAs 6713, 3019,
7080, and 9184, as well as gross neglect of
duty) against Purisima, if proven, would
228 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
indeed warrant his removal from office.
Since Section 24 uses the disjunctive "or",56
then the presence of any of the three (3)
stated situations would be sufficient to
comply with this condition.
As regards the first condition, case law
states that the strength of the evidence is
left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the
evidence before her; hence, the deliberate
use of the words "in his judgment." In
Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto:57
The rule is that whether the evidence of
guilt is strong, as required in Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770, is left to the determination
of the Ombudsman by taking into account
the evidence before him. In the very words
of Section 24, the Ombudsman may
preventively suspend a public official
pending investigation if "in his judgment"
the evidence presented before him tends to
show that the official's guilt is strong and if
the further requisites enumerated in
Section 24 are present. The Court cannot
substitute its own judgment for that of the
Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion.58
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court's deference to the Ombudsman's
judgment regarding this condition not only
stems from its policy of non-interference
with the Ombudsman's exercise of her
prosecutorial and investigatory powers;59 it
is also a conscious recognition of the
preliminary nature and purpose of a
preventive suspension order. It is well-
established that:60
Preventive suspension is merely a
preventive measure, a preliminary step in
an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to
prevent the accused from using his position
and the powers and prerogatives of his
office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in
the prosecution of the case against him. If
after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his
suspension or removal, then he is
suspended, removed or dismissed.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being a preventive measure essentially
meant to ensure the proper course of a still
ongoing investigation, the Ombudsman
should thus be given ample discretion to
determine the strength of the preliminary
evidence presented before her and
thereafter, decide whether or not to issue
such order against a particular respondent.
In Buenaseda v. Flavier,61 this Court
explained:
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is
expressly authorized to recommend to the
appropriate official the discipline or
prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent
determination whether to recommend such
actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an
investigation. In turn, in order for him to
conduct such investigation in an expeditious
and efficient manner, he may need to
suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension
may arise from several causes, among
229 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
them, the danger of tampering or
destruction of evidence in the possession of
respondent; the intimidation of witnesses,
etc. The Ombudsman should be given the
discretion to decide when the persons
facing administrative charges should be
preventively suspended.62 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
However, as in any governmental power,
the Ombudsman's authority to preventively
suspend is not unlimited. When a complaint
is virtually bereft of any supporting
evidence or the evidence so cited is, on its
face, clearly inadmissible, then no
deference ought to be accorded. Under
these instances, the Ombudsman may be
said to have gravely abused her discretion
in finding that the first condition was met.
In the present case, the Ombudsman found
that the evidence of guilt against Purisima
was strong enough to place him under
preventive suspension. Said finding cannot
be said to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion as it was based on supporting
documentary evidence,63 none of which
were questioned to be
inadmissible.1avvphi1 For one, the
Ombudsman considered the PNP officials'
Joint Affidavit,64 expressing that Purisima
exerted pressure and coercion over his
subordinates to coordinate with WER FAST
in relation to the courier delivery service.
The Ombudsman also cited several
circumstances sourced from the
documentary evidence that should have
prodded Purisima to verify WER FAST' s
credentials and. capability to provide
courier services for the delivery of firearms
licenses before he insisted on the
implementation of the MOA. These
circumstances are: (a) the absence of a
public bidding before the MOA was
executed; (b) the absence of accreditation
from the Accreditation Board when
Purisima approved the Meneses Memo; (c)
the Meneses Memo failed to mention the
resolution supposedly accrediting WER
FAST; (d) the Accreditation Board
accredited WER FAST despite the latter's
lack of proof of compliance with the
Accreditation Policy; (e) WER FAST had no
proven track record in courier services and
lacked the capacity to deliver the firearms
licenses; (j) WER FAST failed to obtain the
DOTC's accreditation for authority to
operate courier services; and (g) WER
FAST's failure to donate the equipment for
the online system as stated in the MOA,
among others.65
Since both conditions for the issuance of a
preventive suspension order against
Purisima are present in this case, the Court
therefore holds that the Ombudsman acted
within her powers when she issued the
assailed December 3, 2014 Order. In
consequence, Purisima is not entitled to
back salaries during the period of his
preventive suspension.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that -
contrary to Purisima's stance - the
Ombudsman did not violate his right to due
process nor did she prejudge the case when
she issued the preventive suspension order
before he was able to file his counter-
affidavit for the second complaint.66
Lastimosa v. Ombudsman67already settles
that the Ombudsman may issue a
230 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
preventive suspension order prior to the
filing of an answer or counter-affidavit,
considering that the same is but a
preventive measure:
Prior notice and hearing is not required,
such suspension not being a penalty but
only a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia [(106
Phil. 1031, 1034 [1960])]:
In connection with the suspension of
petitioner before he could file his answer to
the administrative complaint, suffice it to
say that the suspension was not a
punishment or penalty for the acts of
dishonesty and misconduct in office, but
only as a preventive measure. Suspension is
a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the
charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed
or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is,
therefore, nothing improper in suspending
an officer pending his investigation and
before the charges against him are heard
and be given an opportunity to prove his
innocence.
xxxx
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier [(G.R. No.
106719, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA
645, 655)], however, whether the evidence
of guilt is strong is left to the determination
of the Ombudsman by taking into account
the evidence before him. A preliminary
hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving
capital offenses is not required. In rejecting
a similar argument as that made by
petitioner in this case, this Court said in that
case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the
disciplining authority is given the discretion
to decide when the evidence of guilt is
strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24
of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of
the Ombudsman on the basis of the
administrative complaint. x x x68 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, it should be borne in mind that
the issuance of a preventive suspension
order does not amount to a prejudgment of
the merits of the case.69 Neither is it a
demonstration of a public official's guilt as
such pronouncement can be done only
after trial on the merits.70
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated July 29, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138296 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 138722 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
June 5, 2017 G.R.
No. 211166
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee
vs
PORFERIO CULAS y RAGA, Accused-
Appellant
231 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Resolution1 dated July 18, 2014, the
Court adopted the Decision2 dated July 25,
2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR HC No. 00380 finding accused-
appellant Porferio Culas y Raga (accused-
appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Statutory Rape, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
July 25, 2013 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR HC No. 00380 and AFFIRMS said
Decision finding accused-appellant Porferio
Culas y Raga GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Statutory Rape under paragraph 1
(d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, with
MODIFICATIONS as to the amounts of civil
indemnity and damages awarded. Thus,
[accused-appellant] is ordered to pay the
following amounts: (a) ₱l 00,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) ₱l 00,000.00 as moral
damages; and (c) ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum on the
monetary awards from the dated of the
finality of this judgment until fully paid. 3
However, before an Entry of Judgment
could be issued in the instant case, the
Court received a Letter 4 dated September
16, 2014 from the Bureau of Corrections
informing the Court of accused-appellant's
death on February 8, 2014, as evidenced by
the Certificate of Death 5 attached thereto.
As will be explained hereunder, there is a
need to reconsider and set aside said
Resolution dated July 18, 2014 and enter a
new one dismissing the criminal case
against accused-appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence,
accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible
the criminal case against him.1âwphi1
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused,
to wit:
Article 89.How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
x x xx
In People v. Layag, 6the Court thoroughly
explained the effects of the death of an
accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as
follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we
summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability [,] as well as the civil liability [,]
based solely thereon.1âvvphi1 As opined by
232 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death
of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict.
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as
explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need
not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription. 7
Thus, upon accused-appellant's death
pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for the recovery of the civil liability
ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that accused-
appellant's civil liability in connection with
his acts against the victim, AAA, may be
based on sources other than delicts; in
which case, AAA may file a separate civil
action against the estate of accused-
appellant, as may be warranted by law and
procedural rules. 8
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET
ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated July 18,
2014 in connection with this case; (b)
DISMISS Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754
before the Regional Trial Court of Burauen,
Leyte, Branch 15 by reason of the death of
accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga;
and (c) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED
and TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
233 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
March 13, 2017 G.R.
No. 225608
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee vs.
ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL
ANGELES y DE JESUS, Accused-Appellants
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed
by accused-appellants Alberto Alejandro y
Rigor (Alejandro) and Joel Angeles y de
Jesus (Angeles; collectively, accused-
appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated
June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495, which affirmed
with modification the Joint Decision3 dated
August 20, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court
of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch
88 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96), 73-
SD(96), and 74-SD(96) convicting accused-
appellants of the crimes of Simple Rape and
Homicide, defined and penalized under
Articles 3354 and 249 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), respectively.
The Facts
On March 28, 1996, a total of three (3)
separate Informations were filed before the
R TC, each charging accused-appellants of
one (1) count of Simple Rape and one (1)
count of Homicide, viz.:5
Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January
1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the
morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Alejandro], with lewd design, by
means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge of one
[AAA6 ]gainst her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended
party. Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
That on or about the 5111 day of January
1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the
morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Angeles], with lewd design, by
means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge of one
AAA against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended
party.
Contrary to law.
Crim Case No. 74-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January
1996, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
234 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
accused [Alejandro and Angeles], together
with two (2) other persons whose identities
are still unknown (John Doe and Peter Doe),
conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, box, beat and stab one
[BBB] on the different parts of her body
with the use of a pointed instrument,
thereby causing her instantaneous death, to
the damage and prejudice of the said
victim.
Contrary to law.
Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not
guilty to the charges against him as stated
in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 74-
SD(96).7
While Angeles was still at large, the
prosecution sought for the amendment of
the Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 72-
SD(96) and 73- SD(96) to convey a
conspiracy between accused-appellants in
the rape cases against AAA. The R TC
allowed the amendment of the Information
in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) to include
Alejandro therein as a conspirator;
however, it disallowed the proposed
amendment in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96) to
include Angeles therein as conspirator on
the ground that Alejandro had already been
arraigned in the latter case.8 The amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
reads:
That on or about the 5th day of January
1996, at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning,
at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Angeles], with lewd design, and in
conspiracy with one ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y
RIGOR @ "JESUS'', by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with one [AAA]
against her will and consent, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.9
Eventually, Angeles was arrested and
arraigned in connection with Crim. Case
Nos. 73-SD(96) and 74-SD(96), to which he
pleaded not guilty. Alejandro was likewise
arraigned in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and
pleaded not guilty as well.10
The prosecution alleged that on December
12, 1995, AAA joined her co-worker for a
vacation in the province of Nueva Ecija as
they were both laid off from work, and they
stayed at the one-storey house of the
latter's 62- year old mother, BBB. Thereat,
AAA would sleep at the papag while BBB
slept on a mattress on the floor. At around
2:30 in the morning of January 5, 1996, AAA
awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for
mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed
on the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled
and stabbed to death by Alejandro and
Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached
AAA and restrained her arms, while
Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and
underwear down and started having carnal
knowledge of her. After Alejandro was
done, he switched places with Angeles and
the latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As
AAA was able to fight back by scratching
235 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Angeles' s back, Angeles punched her on
the left side of her face while Alejandro hit
her left jaw with a piece of wood. AAA then
lost consciousness and woke up in a
hospital, while BBB succumbed to her
injuries.11
At the hospital, the police officers
interviewed AAA and showed her several
mugshots in order for her to identify her
assailants. AAA was then able to recognize
Alejandro and Angeles from said mugshots
and positively identified them as the
perpetrators of the crime. Medical records
also revealed that AAA was indeed sexually
assaulted, while BBB died due to
"neurogenic shock" or severe pain
secondary to "multiple blunt injury and
fracture of the mandibular and facio-
maxillary bones."12
In his defense, Angeles denied the charges
against him and presented an alibi. He
averred that on the night before the
incident, he was at home with his wife and
slept as early as eight (8) o'clock in the
evening. Upon waking up at seven (7)
o'clock in the morning of the next day, he
was informed by his brother-in-law of BBB's
death. He further averred that his
relationship with BBB was like that of a
mother and son.13
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of
denial and alibi. He claimed that at around
nine (9) o'clock in the evening prior to the
incident, he went home and slept. As
testified by Noel Mendoza (Mendoza),
Alejandro's relative by affinity, he asked
Alejandro to help him irrigate the rice field,
but the latter declined. At around midnight,
Mendoza went to Alejandro's house to
personally fetch Alejandro, but considering
that the house was closed, Mendoza
peeped through a hole and there he saw
Alejandro soundly asleep. Alejandro further
claimed that he does not know both AAA
and Angeles until the filing of the charges
against him.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision15 dated August 20, 2013,
the RTC found accused-appellants guilty as
charged and, accordingly, sentenced them
as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96),
Alejandro was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered
to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96),
accused-appellants were each sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
each ordered to pay AAA the amounts of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and (c) in Crim. Case
No. 7 4-SD(96), accused-appellants were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and ordered to pay BBB's heirs
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the latter's death.16
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to AAA's
positive identification of accused-appellants
as the perpetrators of the crimes charged,
expressly noting that AAA had no ill motive
236 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
to falsely testify against them.1âwphi1 In
this light, the RTC found untenable accused-
appellants' defenses of denial and alibi,
considering too that they have failed to
show that it was physically impossible for
them to be at the crime scene when the
crimes against AAA and BBB were
committed.17
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed18
to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated June 3, 2015, the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling with the following
modifications: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-
SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Rape and,
accordingly, was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered
to pay AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96),
Alejandro was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Simple
Rape, while Angeles was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of the same crime, and accordingly, were
separately sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count of Simple Rape; and (c) in Crim.
Case No. 74- SD(96), accused-appellants
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Homicide and, accordingly, were each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
ordered to solidarily pay BBB's heirs the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P525,000.00 as temperate damages. In
addition, accused-appellants are likewise
ordered to pay legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on all monetary awards
from date of finality of judgment until fully
paid.20
It held that the prosecution had proven
beyond reasonable doubt accused-
appellants' complicity to the crimes
charged, as they were positively identified
by AAA who had an unobstructed view of
their appearance when said crimes were
being committed. It likewise found the
existence of conspiracy in the commission
of said crimes, considering that accused-
appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing and
mauling BBB, resulting in her death; and (b)
took turns in having carnal knowledge of
AAA without her consent, while the other
restrained her arms to prevent her from
resisting.21
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not accused-appellants are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
aforesaid crimes.
The Court's Ruling
237 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
At the outset, the Court notes that during
the pendency of the instant appeal,
Alejandro filed a Motion to Withdraw
Appeal22 dated January 19, 2017, stating
that despite knowing the full consequences
of the filing of said motion, he still desires
to have his appeal withdrawn. In view
thereof, the Court hereby grants said
motion, and accordingly, deems the case
closed and terminated as to him. Thus,
what is left before the Court is the
resolution of Angeles's appeal.
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the
entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."23
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court
deems it proper to modify accused-
appellants' convictions, as will be explained
hereunder.
Article 249 of the RPC states:
Article 249.Homicide.- Any person who, not
falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another without the attendance of
any of the circumstances enumerated in the
next preceeding article, shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and punished by
reclusion temporal.
"To successfully prosecute the crime of
homicide, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed
that person without any justifying
circumstance; (3) that the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4)
that the killing was not attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances of murder, or
by that of parricide or infanticide.
Moreover, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim without
medical intervention or attendance."24
On the other hand, pertinent portions of
Article 335 of the RPC (the controlling
provision as the rapes were committed
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No.
[RA] 835325 in 1997) read:
Article 335.When and how rape is
committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years
of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
238 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
"Under this provision, the elements of Rape
are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (b) said carnal knowledge
was accomplished through the use of force
or intimidation; or the victim was deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
when the victim was under twelve (12)
years of age or demented. The provision
also states that if the act is committed
either with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two (2) or more persons, the crime will
be Qualified Rape, necessitating the
imposition of a higher penalty."26
In this case, both the RTC and the CA were
one in giving credence to AAA's positive
identification that accused-appellants
conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB,
resulting in the latter's death; and that
thereafter, Angeles proceeded to rape her
while Alejandro restrained her arms to
prevent her from resisting. Absent any
cogent reason to the contrary, the Court
defer to the findings of fact of both courts
and, thereby, upholds Angeles's conviction
for Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and
Homicide in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), given
that the elements of said crimes square
with the established incidents. In People v.
Antonio:27
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's
factual findings, especially its assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect and binding upon
this Court, particularly when affirmed by
the [CA]. This Court has repeatedly
recognized that the trial court is in the best
position to assess the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies because of
its unique position of having observed that
elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses' deportment on the stand
while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts. Only the
trial judge can observe the furtive glance,
blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or
the scant or full realization of an oath.
These are significant factors in evaluating
the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of
unearthing the truth. The appellate courts
will generally not disturb such findings
unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case.28
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court
deems it appropriate to modify Angeles's
conviction in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), as
ruled by the CA. As adverted to earlier, the
CA convicted Angeles for two (2) counts of
Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
alone, ratiocinating that "Angeles must be
held liable for two (2) counts of simple rape
in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) for raping AAA
and for aiding (or conspiring with) Alejandro
in raping her."29
The CA erred on this matter.
The accusatory portion of the amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
states that "[Angeles], with lewd designs,
and in conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by
means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
239 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
feloniously had carnal knowledge of one
[AAA] against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended
party."30 Plainly, the wording of the
amended Information reveals that it
charged accused-appellants with only one
(1) count of Rape. As such, it was error for
the CA to convict Angeles with two (2)
counts. Thus, Angeles must be convicted
with one (1) count of Rape in relation to
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96).
On a related matter, since the Information
in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to
be amended to include Alejandro as a co-
accused and that accused-appellants were
convicted of such charge, the Court deems
it proper to upgrade the conviction in said
case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As
adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC
states that if the rape is committed under
certain circumstances, such as when it was
committed by two (2) or more persons, the
crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this
instance. Notably, this will no longer affect
Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his
appeal prior to the promulgation of this
decision.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one
(1) count of Qualified Rape and one (1)
count of Homicide.
Anent the proper penalties to be imposed
on Angeles, the CA correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in connection
with Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), and the
penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, as regards Crim. Case No. 74-
SD(96).
Finally, in line with existing jurisprudence,
the Court deems it proper to adjust the
award of damages as follows: (a) in Crim.
Case No. 73-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to
pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(b) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), Angeles is
ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of judgment
until fully paid.31
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Alberto
Alejandro y Rigor's Motion to Withdraw
Appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED as to
him.
On the other hand, the appeal of accused-
appellant Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles)
is DENIED. The Decision dated June 3, 2015
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06495 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as to him, as follows:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-
appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Rape defined and penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly,
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
240 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages,
with legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum on all monetary awards
from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-
appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum on all monetary awards from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191667 April
17, 2013
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 is the March 26, 2010 Decision2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 89732 which affirmed with modification
the April 10, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch
31, declaring inter alia the nullity of the loan
agreements entered into by petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the
Municipality of Agoo, La Union
(Municipality).
The Facts
From 2005 to 2006, the Municipality’s
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed certain
resolutions to implement a multi-phased
plan (Redevelopment Plan) to redevelop the
Agoo Public Plaza (Agoo Plaza) where the
Imelda Garden and Jose Rizal Monument
were situated.
To finance phase 1 of the said plan, the SB
initially passed Resolution No. 68-20054 on
April 19, 2005, authorizing then Mayor
Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor Eriguel) to obtain a
loan from Land Bank and incidental thereto,
mortgage a 2,323.75 square meter lot
situated at the southeastern portion of the
Agoo Plaza (Plaza Lot) as collateral. To serve
as additional security, it further authorized
the assignment of a portion of its internal
revenue allotment (IRA) and the monthly
income from the proposed project in favor
of Land Bank.5 The foregoing terms were
confirmed, approved and ratified on
October 4, 2005 through Resolution No.
139-2005.6 Consequently, on November 21,
2005, Land Bank extended a ₱4,000,000.00
loan in favor of the Municipality (First
Loan),7 the proceeds of which were used to
241 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
construct ten (10) kiosks at the northern
and southern portions of the Imelda
Garden. After completion, these kiosks
were rented out.8
On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution
No. 58-2006,9 approving the construction of
a commercial center on the Plaza Lot as part
of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan. To
finance the project, Mayor Eriguel was
again authorized to obtain a loan from Land
Bank, posting as well the same securities as
that of the First Loan. All previous
representations and warranties of Mayor
Eriguel related to the negotiation and
obtention of the new loan10 were ratified on
September 5, 2006 through Resolution No.
128-2006.11 In consequence, Land Bank
granted a second loan in favor of the
Municipality on October 20, 2006 in the
principal amount of ₱28,000,000.00
(Second Loan).12
Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan,
the construction of the commercial center
at the Agoo Plaza was vehemently objected
to by some residents of the Municipality.
Led by respondent Eduardo Cacayuran
(Cacayuran), these residents claimed that
the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a
commercial center, as funded by the
proceeds from the First and Second Loans
(Subject Loans), were "highly irregular,
violative of the law, and detrimental to
public interests, and will result to wanton
desecration of the said historical and public
park."13 The foregoing was embodied in a
Manifesto,14 launched through a signature
campaign conducted by the residents and
Cacayuran.
In addition, Cacayuran wrote a letter15 During the pendency of the proceedings,
dated December 8, 2006 addressed to the construction of the commercial center
Mayor Eriguel, Vice Mayor Antonio Eslao was completed and the said structure later
(Vice Mayor Eslao), and the members of the became known as the Agoo’s People Center
SB namely, Violeta Laroya-Balbin, Jaime (APC).
Boado, Jr., Rogelio De Vera, James Dy,
Crisogono Colubong, Ricardo Fronda, On May 8, 2007, the SB passed Municipal
Josephus Komiya, Erwina Eriguel, Felizardo Ordinance No. 02-2007,20 declaring the area
Villanueva, and Gerard Mamuyac where the APC stood as patrimonial
(Implicated Officers), expressing the property of the Municipality.
growing public clamor against the
conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a The Ruling of the RTC
commercial center. He then requested the
In its Decision dated April 10, 2007,21 the
foregoing officers to furnish him certified
RTC ruled in favor of Cacayuran, declaring
copies of various documents related to the
the nullity of the Subject Loans.22 It found
aforementioned conversion including,
that the resolutions approving the said
among others, the resolutions approving
loans were passed in a highly irregular
the Redevelopment Plan as well as the loan
manner and thus, ultra vires; as such, the
agreements for the sake of public
Municipality is not bound by the same.23
information and transparency.
Moreover, it found that the Plaza Lot is
Unable to get any response, Cacayuran, proscribed from collateralization given its
invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a nature as property for public use.24
Complaint16 against the Implicated Officers
Aggrieved, Land Bank filed its Notice of
and Land Bank, assailing, among others, the
Appeal on April 23, 2007.25 On the other
validity of the Subject Loans on the ground
hand, the Implicated Officers’ appeal was
that the Plaza Lot used as collateral thereof
deemed abandoned and dismissed for their
is property of public dominion and
failure to file an appellants’ brief despite
therefore, beyond the commerce of man.17
due notice.26 In this regard, only Land
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss dated Bank’s appeal was given due course by the
December 27, 2006,18 the Implicated CA.
Officers and Land Bank filed their respective
Ruling of the CA
Answers.
In its Decision dated March 26, 2010,27 the
For its part, Land Bank claimed that it is not
CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s
privy to the Implicated Officers’ acts of
ruling, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao from any
destroying the Agoo Plaza. It further
personal liability arising from the Subject
asserted that Cacayuran did not have a
Loans.28
cause of action against it since he was not
privy to any of the Subject Loans.19
242 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
It held, among others, that: (1) Cacayuran
had locus standi to file his complaint,
considering that (a) he was born, raised and
a bona fide resident of the Municipality;
and (b) the issue at hand involved public
interest of transcendental importance;29 (2)
Resolution Nos. 68-2005, 139-2005, 58-
2006, 128-2006 and all other related
resolutions (Subject Resolutions) were
invalidly passed due to the SB’s non-
compliance with certain sections of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the "Local Government Code of 1991"
(LGC); (3) the Plaza Lot, which served as
collateral for the Subject Loans, is property
of public dominion and thus, cannot be
appropriated either by the State or by
private persons;30 and (4) the Subject Loans
are ultra vires because they were
transacted without proper authority and
their collateralization constituted improper
disbursement of public funds.
Dissatisfied, Land Bank filed the instant
petition.
Issues Before the Court
The following issues have been raised for
the Court’s resolution: (1) whether
Cacayuran has standing to sue; (2) whether
the Subject Resolutions were validly passed;
and (3) whether the Subject Loans are ultra
vires.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
A. Cacayuran’s standing to sue
243 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Land Bank claims that Cacayuran did not
have any standing to contest the
construction of the APC as it was funded
through the proceeds coming from the
Subject Loans and not from public funds.
Besides, Cacayuran was not even a party to
any of the Subject Loans and is thus,
precluded from questioning the same.
The argument is untenable.
It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is
allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is wastage
of public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person
suing as a taxpayer, however, must show
that the act complained of directly involves
the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation. In other words, for a
taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites
must be met namely, (1) public funds
derived from taxation are disbursed by a
political subdivision or instrumentality and
in doing so, a law is violated or some
irregularity is committed; and (2) the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged
act.31
Records reveal that the foregoing requisites
are present in the instant case.
First, although the construction of the APC
would be primarily sourced from the
proceeds of the Subject Loans, which Land
Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there
is no denying that public funds derived from
taxation are bound to be expended as the
Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as
a security for the foregoing loans. Needless
to state, the Municipality’s IRA, which
serves as the local government unit’s just
share in the national taxes,32 is in the nature
of public funds derived from taxation. The
Court believes, however, that although
these funds may be posted as a security, its
collateralization should only be deemed
effective during the incumbency of the
public officers who approved the same, else
those who succeed them be effectively
deprived of its use.
In any event, it is observed that the
proceeds from the Subject Loans had
already been converted into public funds by
the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds
coming from private sources become
impressed with the characteristics of public
funds when they are under official
custody.33
Accordingly, the first requisite has been
clearly met.
Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the
Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected
by the conversion of the Agoo Plaza which
was funded by the proceeds of the Subject
Loans. It is well-settled that public plazas
are properties for public use34 and
therefore, belongs to the public dominion.35
As such, it can be used by anybody and no
one can exercise over it the rights of a
private owner.36 In this light, Cacayuran had
a direct interest in ensuring that the Agoo
Plaza would not be exploited for
commercial purposes through the APC’s
construction. Moreover, Cacayuran need
not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to
proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v.
244 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Lara, it has been held that a taxpayer need
not be a party to the contract to challenge
its validity; as long as taxes are involved,
people have a right to question contracts
entered into by the government.37
Therefore, as the above-stated requisites
obtain in this case, Cacayuran has standing
to file the instant suit.
B. Validity of the Subject Resolutions
Land Bank avers that the Subject
Resolutions provided ample authority for
Mayor Eriguel to contract the Subject
Loans. It posits that Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of
the LGC merely requires that the municipal
mayor be authorized by the SB concerned
and that such authorization need not be
embodied in an ordinance.38
A careful perusal of Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of
the LGC shows that while the authorization
of the municipal mayor need not be in the
form of an ordinance, the obligation which
the said local executive is authorized to
enter into must be made pursuant to a law
or ordinance, viz:
Sec. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers,
Duties, Functions and Compensation. -
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical
governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang
bayan, represent the municipality in all its
business transactions and sign on its behalf
all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and
such other documents made pursuant to
law or ordinance; (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the present case, while Mayor Eriguel’s
authorization to contract the Subject Loans
was not contained – as it need not be
contained – in the form of an ordinance, the
said loans and even the Redevelopment
Plan itself were not approved pursuant to
any law or ordinance but through mere
resolutions. The distinction between
ordinances and resolutions is well-
perceived. While ordinances are laws and
possess a general and permanent character,
resolutions are merely declarations of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter and are temporary in
nature.39 As opposed to ordinances, "no
rights can be conferred by and be inferred
from a resolution."40 In this accord, it
cannot be denied that the SB violated
Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether.
Noticeably, the passage of the Subject
Resolutions was also tainted with other
irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s failure to
submit the Subject Resolutions to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for
its review contrary to Section 56 of the
LGC;41 and (2) the lack of publication and
posting in contravention of Section 59 of
the LGC.42
In fine, Land Bank cannot rely on the
Subject Resolutions as basis to validate the
Subject Loans.
245 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
C. Ultra vires nature of the Subject
Loans
Neither can Land Bank claim that the
Subject Loans do not constitute ultra vires
acts of the officers who approved the same.
Generally, an ultra vires act is one
committed outside the object for which a
corporation is created as defined by the law
of its organization and therefore beyond
the powers conferred upon it by law.43
There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts.
As held in Middletown Policemen's
Benevolent Association v. Township of
Middletown:44
There is a distinction between an act utterly
beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal
corporation and the irregular exercise of a
basic power under the legislative grant in
matters not in themselves jurisdictional.
The former are ultra vires in the primary
sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in
a secondary sense which does not preclude
ratification or the application of the
doctrine of estoppel in the interest of
equity and essential justice. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In other words, an act which is outside of
the municipality’s jurisdiction is considered
as a void ultra vires act, while an act
attended only by an irregularity but remains
within the municipality’s power is
considered as an ultra vires act subject to
ratification and/or validation. To the former
belongs municipal contracts which (a) are
entered into beyond the express, implied or
inherent powers of the local government
unit; and (b) do not comply with the
substantive requirements of law e.g., when
expenditure of public funds is to be made,
there must be an actual appropriation and
certificate of availability of funds; while to
the latter belongs those which (a) are
entered into by the improper department,
board, officer of agent; and (b)do not
comply with the formal requirements of a
written contract e.g., the Statute of
Frauds.45
Applying these principles to the case at bar,
it is clear that the Subject Loans belong to
the first class of ultra vires acts deemed as
void.
Records disclose that the said loans were
executed by the Municipality for the
purpose of funding the conversion of the
Agoo Plaza into a commercial center
pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan.
However, the conversion of the said plaza is
beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction
considering the property’s nature as one for
public use and thereby, forming part of the
public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be
the object of appropriation either by the
State or by private persons.46 Nor can it be
the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking.47 In Villanueva v. Castañeda,
Jr.,48 citing Espiritu v. Municipal Council of
Pozorrubio,49 the Court pronounced that:
x x x Town plazas are properties of public
dominion, to be devoted to public use and
to be made available to the public in
general. They are outside the commerce of
man and cannot be disposed of or even
leased by the municipality to private
parties.1âwphi1
246 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In this relation, Article 1409(1) of the Civil
Code provides that a contract whose
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy is
considered void50 and as such, creates no
rights or obligations or any juridical
relations.51 Consequently, given the
unlawful purpose behind the Subject Loans
which is to fund the commercialization of
the Agoo Plaza pursuant to the
Redevelopment Plan, they are considered
as ultra vires in the primary sense thus,
rendering them void and in effect, non-
binding on the Municipality.
At this juncture, it is equally observed that
the land on which the Agoo Plaza is situated
cannot be converted into patrimonial
property – as the SB tried to when it passed
Municipal Ordinance No. 02-200752 –
absent any express grant by the national
government.53 As public land used for public
use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to
and is subject to the administration and
control of the Republic of the Philippines.54
Hence, without the said grant, the
Municipality has no right to claim it as
patrimonial property.
Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans
cannot bind the Municipality for being ultra
vires, the officers who authorized the
passage of the Subject Resolutions are
personally liable. Case law states that public
officials can be held personally accountable
for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they
have acted ultra vires,55 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the March 26, 2010 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No.
89732 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
March 15, 2017 G.R.
No. 224834
JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner
vs
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED,
VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST
PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN
KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE
SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and
HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as Director and
Shareholder of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 224871
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED,
VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST
PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY,
as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select
Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C.
YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder
of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc.,
Petitioners,
vs.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE,
RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-
CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M.
247 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C.
MIGALLOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions1 for
review on certiorari are the Decision2 dated
February 15, 2016 and the Resolution3
dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which
reversed the Resolution4 dated August 24,
2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE
NO. 15-234 and, accordingly, reinstated the
case and remanded the same to the court a
quo for further proceedings after payment
of the proper legal fees.
The Facts
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory
Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited,
Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap
Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own
capacities, minority stockholders of Alliance
Select Foods International, Inc. (Alliance),
with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a
member of Alliance's Board of Directors.5 As
per Alliance's by-laws, its Annual
Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every
June 15.6 However, in a Special Board of
Directors Meeting held at three (3) o'clock
in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board
of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's
objections, passed a Board Resolution
indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM
pending complete subscription to its Stock
Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares
with total value of ₱l Billion which was
earlier approved in a Board Resolution
passed on February 17, 2015. As per
Alliance's Disclosure dated May 29, 2015
filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange,
such postponement was made "to give the
stockholders of [Alliance] better
representation in the annual meeting, after
taking into consideration their subscription
to the [SRO] of [Alliance]."7 This prompted
Harvest All, et al. to file the instant
Complaint (with Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)8
involving an intra-corporate controversy
against Alliance, and its other Board
members, namely, George E. Sycip,
Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See, Mary
Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin
M. Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos
(Alliance Board). In said complaint, Harvest
All, et al. principally claimed that the
subscription to the new shares through the
SRO cannot be made a condition precedent
to the exercise by the current stockholders
of their right to vote in the 2015 ASM;
otherwise, they will be deprived of their full
voting rights proportionate to their existing
shareholdings.9 Thus, Harvest All, et al.,
prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of
nullity of the Board Resolution dated May
29, 2015 indefinitely postponing the 2015
ASM, as well as the Board Resolution dated
February 17, 2015 approving the SR0.10 The
Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest
All, et al. with filing fees amounting to
₱8,860.00 which they paid accordingly.11
Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an
Amended Complaint:12(a) deleting its prayer
to declare null and void the Board
248 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Resolution dated February 17, 2015
approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed
that the Alliance Board be enjoined from
implementing and carrying out the SRO
prior to and as a condition for the holding of
the 2015 ASM.13
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of
Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct
filing fees. It argued that the latter should
have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing
fees based on the SRO which was valued at
Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did
not mention such capital infusion in their
prayers and, as such, were only made to
pay the measly sum of ₱8,860.00. On the
other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintained
that they paid the correct filing fees,
considering that the subject of their
complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM
and not a claim on the aforesaid value of
the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed
out that they simply relied on the
assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no
intention to defraud the government.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated August 24, 2015, the
RTC dismissed the instant complaint for lack
of jurisdiction due to Harvest All, et al.'s
failure to pay the correct filing fees.16 Citing
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC,17 and the Court's
pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. (Lu),18
the RTC found that the basis for the
computation of filing fees should have been
the ₱l Billion value of the SRO, it being the
property in litigation. As such, Harvest All,
et al. should have paid filing fees in the
amount of more or less ₱20 Million and not
just ₱5,860.00. In this regard, the RTC also
found that Harvest All, et al.'s payment of
incorrect filing fees was done in bad faith
and with clear intent to defraud the
government, considering that: (a) when the
issue on correct filing fees was first raised
during the hearing on the application for
TRO, Harvest All, et al. never manifested
their willingness to abide by the Rules by
paying additional filing fees when so
required; (b) despite Harvest All, et al.'s
admission in their complaint that the SRO
was valued at Pl Billion, they chose to keep
mum on the meager assessment made by
the Clerk of Court; and (c) while Harvest All,
et al. made mention of the SRO in the body
of their complaint, they failed to indicate
the same in their prayer, thus, preventing
the Clerk of Court from making the correct
assessment of filing fees.19
Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed20 to
the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated February 15, 2016, the
CA reversed the RTC's order of dismissal
and, accordingly, reinstated the case and
remanded the same to the court a quo for
further proceedings after payment of the
proper legal fees.22 Also citing Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the CA held that the
prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate
controversies always involve a property in
litigation. Consequently, it agreed with the
RTC's finding that the basis for the
computation of filing fees should have been
the ₱l Billion value of the SRO and, thus,
249 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Harvest All, et al. should have paid filing
fees in the amount of more or less ₱20
Million and not just ₱5,860.00.23 However,
in the absence of contrary evidence, the CA
held that Harvest All, et al. were not in bad
faith and had no intention of defrauding the
government, as they merely relied in the
assessment of the Clerk of Court. Thus, in
the interest of substantial justice, the CA
ordered the reinstatement of Harvest All, et
al.' s complaint and the remand of the same
to the RTC for further proceedings,
provided that they pay the correct filing
fees.24
The parties moved for reconsideration,25
which were, however, denied in a
Resolution26 dated May 25, 2016. Hence,
these consolidated petitions.
The IssueBefore the Court
The primordial issues raised for the Court's
resolution are: (a) whether or not Harvest
All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees for their
complaint, as the same should have been
based on the Pl Billion value of the SRO; and
(b) if Harvest All, et al. indeed paid
insufficient filing fees, whether or not such
act was made in good faith and without any
intent to defraud the government.
The Court's Ruling
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied,
while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is
partly granted.
I.
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling
that the correct filing fees for Harvest All, et
al.'s complaint should be based on the Pl
Billion value of the SRO - and, thus,
essentially holding that such complaint was
capable of pecuniary estimation - both the
RTC and the CA heavily relied on the
Court's pronouncement in Lu.In Lu, the
Court mentioned that in view of A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which
introduced Section 21 (k)27 to Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, it seemed that "an intra-
corporate controversy always involves a
property in litigation" and that "there can
be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated."28
However, after a careful reading of Lu, it
appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly
pointed out29 that the foregoing statements
were in the nature of an obiter dictum.
To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia,
that the case involving an intra-corporate
controversy instituted therein, i.e.,
declaration of nullity of share issuance, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
thus, the correct docket fees were paid.30
Despite such pronouncement, the Court still
went on to say that had the complaint
therein been filed during the effectivity of
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would have
ruled otherwise because the amendments
brought about by the same "seem to imply
that there can be no case of intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject
matter cannot be estimated,"31viz.:
250 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The new Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-
2-04-SC (July 20, 2004), expressly provides
that "[f]or petitions for insolvency or other
cases involving intra-corporate
controversies, the fees prescribed under
Section 7 (a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is
that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7
thereof was omitted from the reference.
Said paragraph refers to docket fees for
filing "[a]ctions where the value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated" and
"all other actions not involving property."
By referring the computation of such docket
fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes that
an intra-corporate controversy always
involves a property in litigation, the value of
which is always the basis for computing the
applicable filing fees. The latest
amendments seem to imply that there can
be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere
inspection of corporate books.
If the complaint were filed today, one could
safely find refuge in the express
phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141
that paragraph (a) alone applies.
In the present case, however, the original
Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000
during which time Section 7, without
qualification, was the applicable provision.
Even the Amended Complaint was filed on
March 31, 2003 during which time the
applicable rule expressed that paragraphs
(a) and (b) 1 & 3 shall be the basis for
computing the filing fees in intra-corporate
cases, recognizing that there could be an
intra-corporate controversy where the
value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated, such as an action for inspection
of corporate books. The immediate
illustration shows that no mistake can even
be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in
the assessment of the docket fees.32
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an
intra-corporate controversy always involves
a property in litigation" and that "there can
be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated" are clearly non-
determinative of the antecedents involved
in that case and, hence, cannot be
controlling jurisprudence to bind our courts
when it adjudicates similar cases upon the
principle of stare decisis. As it is evident,
these passages in Lu only constitute an
opinion delivered by the Court as a "by the
way" in relation to a hypothetical scenario
(i.e., if the complaint was filed during the
effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which it
was not) different from the actual case
before it.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,33
the Court had the opportunity to define an
obiter dictum and discuss its legal effects as
follows:
[An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made,
or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause by the way, that is,
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon the question before him, or upon a
point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced
by way of illustration, or analogy or
251 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
argument. It does not embody the
resolution or determination of the court,
and is made without argument, or full
consideration of the point. It lacks the force
of an adjudication, being a mere expression
of an opinion with no binding force for
purposes of res judicata."34(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, therefore, the courts a
quo erred in applying the case of Lu.
II.
In any event, the Court finds that the obiter
dictum stated in Lu was actually incorrect.
This is because depending on the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought, an
intra-corporate controversy may involve a
subject matter which is either capable or
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In Cabrera v. Francisco,35 the Court laid
down the parameters in determining
whether an action is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation or not:
In determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance
would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst
[I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts).36
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
This case is a precise illustration as to how
an intra-corporate controversy may be
classified as an action whose subject matter
is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A
cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s
Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals
that its main purpose is to have Alliance
hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the
corporation's bylaws, or at the time when
Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize,
so that their voting interest with the
corporation would somehow be preserved.
Thus, Harvest All, et al. sought for the
nullity of the Alliance Board Resolution
passed on May 29, 2015 which indefinitely
postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM
pending completion of subscription to the
SR0.37 Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer
for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief
of holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in
the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of
sum of money. The mere mention of
Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion
cannot transform the nature of Harvest All,
et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary
estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All,
et al. do not claim ownership of, or much
less entitlement to, the shares subject of
the SRO; and (b) such mention was merely
narrative or descriptive in order to
emphasize the severe dilution that their
252 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
voting interest as minority shareholders
would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be
held after the SRO was completed. If, in the
end, a sum of money or anything capable of
pecuniary estimation would be recovered
by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint,
then it would simply be the consequence of
their principal action.
Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action
was one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
At this juncture, it should be mentioned
that the Court passed A.M. No. 04-02-04-
SC38 dated October 5, 2016, which
introduced amendments to the schedule of
legal fees to be collected in various
commercial cases, including those involving
intra-corporate controversies. Pertinent
portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read:
RESOLUTION
xxxx
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
effective 16 August 2004, incorporated the
equitable schedule of legal fees prescribed
for petitions for rehabilitation under Section
21 (i) thereof and, furthermore, provided
under Section 21(k) thereof that the fees
prescribed under Section 7(a) of the said
rule shall apply to petitions for insolvency or
other cases involving intra-corporate
controversies;
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to
ADOPT a new schedule of filing fees as
follows:
xxxx
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised
Rules of Court is hereby DELETED as the
fees covering petitions for insolvency are
already provided for in this Resolution. As
for cases involving intra-corporate
controversies, the applicable fees shall be
those provided under Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1),
or 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules
of Court depending on the nature of the
action.
xxxx
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15)
days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
national circulation. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) is directed to
circularize the same upon its effectivity.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Verily, the deletion of Section 21 (k) of Rule
141 and in lieu thereof, the application of
Section 7 (a) [fees for actions where the
value of the subject matter can be
determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for
actions where the value of the subject
matter cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3)
[fees for all other actions not involving
property] of the same Rule to cases
involving intra-corporate controversies for
the determination of the correct filing fees,
as the case may be, serves a dual purpose:
on the one hand, the amendments
concretize the Court's recognition that the
253 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
subject matter of an intra-corporate
controversy may or may not be capable of
pecuniary estimation; and on the other
hand, they were also made to correct the
anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu
obiter dictum) implying that all intra-
corporate cases involved a subject matter
which is deemed capable of pecuniary
estimation.
While the Court is not unaware that the
amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-
04-SC dated October 5, 2016 only came
after the filing of the complaint subject of
this case, such amendments may
nevertheless be given retroactive effect so
as to make them applicable to the
resolution of the instant consolidated
petitions as they merely pertained to a
procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not
substantive law. In Tan, Jr. v. CA,39 the Court
thoroughly explained the retroactive
effectivity of procedural rules, viz.:
The general rule that statutes are
prospective and not retroactive does not
ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has
been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal
sense, is one which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under laws, or
creates a new obligation and imposes a new
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect
of transactions or considerations already
past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes
relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation
of rights already existing, do not come
within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes." The
general rule against giving statutes
retroactive operation whose effect is to
impair the obligations of contract or to
disturb vested rights does not prevent the
application of statutes to proceedings
pending at the time of their enactment
where they neither create new nor take
away vested rights. A new statute which
deals with procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions - those which have
accrued or are pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage.1âwphi1 Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The fact that procedural
statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor
is the retroactive application of procedural
statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. It has been held that "a
person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure."40 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, and having
classified Harvest All, et al.'s action as one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
254 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be
made to pay the appropriate docket fees in
accordance with the applicable fees
provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141
[fees for all other actions not involving
property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in
conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC
dated October 5, 2016. The matter is
therefore remanded to the R TC in order:
(a) to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s
payment of filing fees in the amount of
₱8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk
of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance
with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;
(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of
₱8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest,
et al.' s payment of any discrepancy within a
period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and
after such payment, proceed with the
regular proceedings of the case with
dispatch; or
(c) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of
₱8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed
with the regular proceedings of the case
with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No.
224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R.
No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the
Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 159 for further
proceedings as stated in the final paragraph
of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO BUGAAY
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE AND LUCY BUGAAY,
Associate Justice SPOUSES ALICIA
BUGAAY AND FELIPE
BARCELONA, CONEY
CONIE BUGAAY, JOEY
GATAN, LYDIA
NENITA GONZALES, BUGAAY, SPOUSES
SPOUSES GENEROSA G.R. No. 173008 LUZVIMINDA BUGAAY
GONZALES AND AND REY PAGATPATAN
RODOLFO FERRER, AND BELEN BUGAAY,
SPOUSES FELIPE Present: Respondents.
GONZALES AND
CAROLINA SANTIAGO,
SPOUSES LOLITA VELASCO, JR., J., x-------------------------------------------------------------
GONZALES AND -----------------------x
GERMOGENES Chairperson,
DECISION
GARLITOS, SPOUSES PERALTA,
DOLORES GONZALES PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
AND FRANCISCO ABAD,
Assailed in this Petition for Review on
COSTIN, SPOUSES
MENDOZA, and Certiorari under Rule 45 is the Decision1 of
CONCHITA GONZALES
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 23,
AND JONATHAN PERLAS-
2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91381 as well as the
CLAVE, AND SPOUSES BERNABE,JJ.
Resolution2 dated June 2, 2006 dismissing
BEATRIZ GONZALES
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The
AND ROMY CORTES,
CA reversed and set aside the assailed
REPRESENTED BY THEIR
Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, dated
AND CO-PETITIONER
April 13, 2005 and August 8, 2005,
NENITA GONZALES,
Promulgated:
Petitioners,

February 22, 2012

- versus -

255 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
respectively, in Civil Case No. 16815, In their Amended Complaint4 for
denying the demurrer to evidence filed by Partition and Annulment of Documents with
herein respondents and instead dismissed Damages dated February5, 1991 against
petitioners' complaint. Enrico, Consolacion and the respondents,
petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the only
surviving children of the Spouses Ayad are
The Facts
Enrico and Consolacion, and that during the
Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned several
The deceased spouses Bartolome
agricultural as well as residential properties.
Ayad and Marcelina Tejada (Spouses Ayad)
had five (5) children: Enrico, Encarnacion,
Petitioners averred that in 1987,
Consolacion, Maximiano and Mariano. The
Enrico executed fraudulent documents
latter, who was single, predeceased his
covering all the properties owned by the
parents on December 4, 1943. Marcelina
Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and
died in September 1950 followed by
respondents, completely disregarding their
Bartolome much later on February 17,
rights. Thus, they prayed, among others, for
1964.
the partition of the Spouses Ayad's estate,
the nullification of the documents executed
Enrico has remained single.
by Enrico, and the award of actual, moral
Encarnacion died on April 8, 1966 and is
and exemplary damages, as well as
survived by her children, Nenita Gonzales,
attorney's fees.
Generosa Gonzales, Felipe Gonzales, Lolita
Gonzales, Dolores Gonzales, Conchita
As affirmative defenses5, Enrico,
Gonzales and Beatriz Gonzales, the
Consolacion and respondents claimed that
petitioners in this case. Consolacion,
petitioners had long obtained their advance
meanwhile, was married to the late Imigdio
inheritance from the estate of the Spouses
Bugaay. Their children are Mariano Bugaay,
Ayad, and that the properties sought to be
Alicia Bugaay, Amelita Bugaay, Rodolfo
partitioned are now individually titled in
Bugaay, Letecia Bugaay, Lydia Bugaay,
respondents' names.
Luzviminda Bugaay and Belen Bugaay,
respondents herein. Maximiano died single
After due proceedings, the RTC
and without issue on August 20, 1986. The
rendered a Decision6 dated November 24,
spouses of petitioners, except Nenita, a
widow, and those of the respondents,
except Lydia and Belen, were joined as
parties in this case.

256 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
1995, awarding one-fourth () pro-indiviso
share of the estate each to Enrico,
Maximiano, Encarnacion and Consolacion as
the heirs of the Spouses Ayad, excluding
Mariano who predeceased them. It likewise
declared the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition executed by Enrico
and respondents, as well as all other
documents and muniments of title in their
names, as null and void. It also directed the
parties to submit a project of partition
within 30 days from finality of the Decision.
On December, 13, 1995,7
respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial from the
said Decision. On November 7, 1996, the
RTC, through Judge Eugenio Ramos, issued
an Order which reads: in the event that
within a period of one (1) month from
today, they have not yet settled the case, it
is understood that the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial is
submitted for resolution without any
further hearing.8
Without resolving the foregoing
motion, the RTC, noting the failure of the
parties to submit a project of partition,
issued a writ of execution9 on February 17,
257 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
2003 giving them a period of 15 days within
which to submit their nominees for
commissioner, who will partition the
subject estate.
Subsequently, the RTC, through then
Acting Presiding Judge Emilio V. Angeles,
discovered the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial and set
the same for hearing. In the Order10 dated
August 29, 2003, Judge Angeles granted
respondents' motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial for the specific purpose of
receiving and offering for admission the
documents referred to by the
11
[respondents].
However, instead of presenting the
documents adverted to, consisting of the
documents sought to be annulled,
respondents demurred12 to petitioners'
evidence on December 6, 2004 which the
RTC, this time through Presiding Judge
Dionisio C. Sison, denied in the Order13
dated April 13, 2005 as well as respondents'
motion for reconsideration in the August 8,
2005 Order.14

Aggrieved, respondents elevated
their case to the CA through a petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in denying
their demurrer notwithstanding petitioners'
failure to present the documents sought to
be annulled. On March 23, 2006, the CA
rendered the assailed Decision reversing
and setting aside the Orders of the RTC
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly,
the assailed Orders of the
trial court dated April 13,
2006 and August 8, 2005
are hereby both SET
ASIDE and in lieu thereof,
another Order is hereby
issued DISMISSING the
Complaint, as amended.
No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
In dismissing the Amended
Complaint, the appellate court ratiocinated
in the following manner:
In the light of the
foregoing where no
258 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
sufficient evidence was
presented to grant the
reliefs being prayed for
in the complaint, more
particularly the absence
of the documents sought
to be annulled as well as
the properties sought to
be partitioned, common
sense dictates that the
case should have been
dismissed outright by the
trial court to avoid
unnecessary waste of
time, money and
16
efforts.
Subsequently, the CA denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration in
its Resolution17 dated June 2, 2006.
The Issues
In this petition for review, petitioners
question whether the CA's dismissal of the
Amended Complaint was in accordance
with law, rules of procedure and
jurisprudence.
The Ruling of the Court
The RTC Orders assailed before the
CA basically involved the propriety of filing a
demurrer to evidence after a Decision had
been rendered in the case.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SECTION 1.Demurrer
to evidence. - After the
plaintiff has completed
the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal
on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he
shall have the right to
present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on
appeal the order of
dismissal was reversed
he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to
present evidence.
The Court has previously explained
the nature of a demurrer to evidence in the
case of Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
Santiago18 as follows:
A demurrer to
evidence is a motion to
dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence
259 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and is presented after
the plaintiff rests his
case. It is an objection by
one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that
the evidence which his
adversary produced is
insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not,
to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The
evidence contemplated
by the rule on demurrer
is that which pertains to
the merits of the case.
In passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is
merely required to ascertain whether there
is competent or sufficient proof to sustain
the judgment.19 Being considered a motion
to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence
must clearly be filed before the court
renders its judgment.
In this case, respondents demurred to
petitioners' evidence after the RTC
promulgated its Decision. While
respondents' motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial was granted, it was for the
sole purpose of receiving and offering for
admission the documents not presented at
the trial. As respondents never complied
with the directive but instead filed a
demurrer to evidence, their motion should
be deemed abandoned. Consequently, the
RTC's original Decision stands.
Accordingly, the CA committed
reversible error in granting the demurrer
and dismissing the Amended Complaint a
quo for insufficiency of evidence. The
demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer
an available remedy to respondents and
should not have been granted, as the RTC
had correctly done.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE and the
Orders of the RTC denying respondents'
demurrer are REINSTATED. The Decision of
the RTC dated November 24, 1995 STANDS.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner,
v.SPOUSES RAMON AND ANNABELLE
SABADO, Respondents.
DECISION
260 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 filed by petitioner Philippine
Veterans Bank (petitioner) assailing the
Decision2 dated October 29, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated April 20, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
135922, which reversed and set-aside the
Decision4 dated November 28, 2013 and the
Order5 dated April 28, 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 98 (RTC)
in SCA Case No. 13-1290 and ordered that
Haus Talk Project Managers, Inc. (HTPMI)
be impleaded as an indispensable party to
the unlawful detainer case against
respondents spouses Ramon and Annabelle
Sabado (respondents).
The Facts
On May 3, 2007, HTPMI and respondents
entered into a Contract to Sell6 whereby
HTPMI agreed to sell a real property located
at Lot 26, Block 1, Eastview Homes,
Barangay Balimbing, Antipolo City (subject
property) to respondents. In consideration
therefor, respondents paid HTPMI the total
amount of P869,400.00, consisting of a
P174,400.00 downpayment and the balance
of P695,000.00 payable in 120 equal
monthly instalments. The parties further
agreed that respondents' failure to pay any
amount within the stipulated period of time
shall mean the forfeiture of the
downpayment and any other payments
made in connection thereto, as well as the
cancellation and rescission of the Contract
to Sell in accordance with law.7 Shortly
thereafter, or on August 16, 2007, HTPMI
executed a Deed of Assignment8 in favor of
petitioner assigning, among others, its
rights and interests as seller in the aforesaid
Contract to Sell with respondents, including
the right to collect payments and execute
any act or deed necessary to enforce
compliance therewith.9
On October 14, 2009, petitioner, through a
Notice of Cancellation by Notarial Act,10
cancelled or rescinded respondents'
Contract to Sell due to the latter's failure to
pay their outstanding obligations
thereunder. Consequently, petitioner
demanded that respondents vacate the
subject property, but to no avail. Thus,
petitioner was constrained to file the
Complaint11 dated August 20, 2010 for
ejectment or unlawful detainer against
respondents before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Antipolo City, Branch 1
(MTCC), docketed as SCA Case No. 093-10.12
In their defense,13 respondents argued that
petitioner is not the real party in interest to
institute such complaint, since ownership
over the subject property remained with
HTPMI. They expounded that under the
Deed of Assignment, only the rights and
interests pertaining to the receivables
under the Contract to Sell were
assigned/transferred to petitioner and not
the ownership or the right to the possession
of the subject property.14
The MTCC Ruling
In a Decision15 dated April 3, 2013, the
MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner and,
accordingly, ordered respondents to vacate
the subject property, and pay petitioner the
261 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
amounts of P661,919.47 as rent arrears
from July 31, 2008 up to July 31, 2010,
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, including
costs of suit.16
The MTCC held that by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment, petitioner was subrogated to
the rights of HTPMI under the Contract to
Sell and, hence, is a real party in interest
entitled to institute the instant suit against
respondents for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Contract to Sell.
Further, the MTCC found petitioner's claim
for compensation in the form of rental just
and equitable, pointing out that the same is
necessary to prevent respondents from
unjustly enriching themselves at petitioner's
expense. Finally, the MTCC awarded
petitioner attorney's fees and costs of suit
since it was compelled to litigate the instant
complaint.17
Aggrieved, respondents appealed18 to the
RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated November 28, 2013,
the RTC affirmed the MTCC's ruling in
toto.20 It ruled that by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment executed by HTPMI in
petitioner's favor, the latter acquired not
only the right to collect the balance of the
purchase price of the subject property, but
also all the rights of the assignor, including
the right to sue in its own name as the legal
assignee.21
Respondents moved for reconsideration,22
which was, however, denied in an Order23
dated April 28, 2014. Undaunted, they
elevated the case to the CA.24
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated October 29, 2015, the
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling,
and accordingly: (a) remanded the case to
the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded
therein; and (b) directed the MTCC to
proceed with the trial of the case with
dispatch.26 Initially, it upheld petitioner's
right as real party in interest to file the
instant suit as HTPMI's assignee. However,
since legal title to the subject property was
retained by HTPMI pursuant to the
provisions of the Deed of Assignment, the
latter is not only a real party in interest, but
also an indispensible party which should
have been impleaded as a plaintiff thereon
and without which no final determination
can be had in the present case.27
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for
28
reconsideration, which was, however,
denied in a Resolution29 dated April 20,
2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue is whether or not the
CA correctly ruled that HTPMI is an
indispensable party to petitioner's
ejectment suit against respondents and,
thus, must be impleaded therein.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
262 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
mandates that all indispensable parties
should be joined in a suit,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 7.Compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties. - Parties in interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.
Case law defines an indispensable party as
"one whose interest will be affected by the
court's action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the case
can be had. The party's interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief
sought are so inextricably intertwined with
the other parties' that his legal presence as
a party to the proceeding is an absolute
necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable."30 "Thus, the
absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and
void, for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to
those present."31 In Regner v. Logarta,32 the
Court laid down the parameters in
determining whether or not one is an
indispensable party,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An indispensable party is a party who has x
x x an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made, in his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest, a party who has not
only an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy, but also has an interest of
such nature that a final decree cannot be
made without affecting his interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition
that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered that
an indispensable party is a person in whose
absence there cannot be a determination
between the parties already before the
court which is effective, complete, or
equitable. Further, an indispensable party is
one who must be included in an action
before it may properly go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party,
however, if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is separable from the
interest of the other parties, so that it will
not necessarily be directly or injuriously
affected by a decree which does complete
justice between them. Also, a person is not
an indispensable party if his presence would
merely permit complete relief between him
and those already parties to the action, or if
he has no interest in the subject matter of
the action. It is not a sufficient reason to
declare a person to be an indispensable
party that his presence will avoid multiple
litigation.33 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Guided by the foregoing parameters and as
will be explained hereunder, the CA erred in
holding that HTPMI is an indispensable
party to the ejectment suit filed by
petitioner against respondents.
Under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI
assigned its rights - save for the right of
ownership - to petitioner under the
Contract to Sell:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS TO SELL.
By this assignment, the ASSIGNEE hereby
acquires all rights of the ASSIGNOR under
263 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the Contracts to Sell and under the law,
including the right to endorse any and all
terms and conditions of the Contracts to
Sell and the right to collect the amounts
due thereunder from the purchaser of the
Property. The ASSIGNOR for this purpose
hereby names, constitutes and appoints
the ASSIGNEE [as its] attorney-in-fact to
execute any act and deed necessary in the
exercise of all these rights.
Notwithstanding the assignment of the
Contracts to Sell and the Receivables
thereunder to the ASSIGNEE, the legal title
to the Property and obligations of the
ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell,
including the obligation to complete the
development of the property and the
warranties of a builder under the law, shall
remain the ASSIGNOR'S. x x x.34 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Verily, HTPMI's assignment of rights to
petitioner must be deemed to include the
rights to collect payments from
respondents, and in the event of the latter's
default, to cancel or rescind the Contract to
Sell, and resultantly, recover actual
possession over the subject property, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
b) the [respondents] herein agree to
perform and undertake the [HTPMI]
Payment Plan with the following terms:
i) Downpayment x x x of ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS ONLY (P174,400.00) to be
paid within twelve (12) months after
payments [sic] of the reservation. Failure to
pay two (2) consecutive monthly
installments will mean cancellation of this
contract and forfeiture of all payments.
Discount terms shall be based on [HTPMI]
Agreed Payment Plan.
x x x x
iii) Failure to pay any amount within the
stimulated [sic] period of time shall mean
forfeiture of the down payment and any
other payments made and the Contract to
Sell shall be cancelled and rescinded in
accordance with law.35 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees
with the findings of the courts a quo that
petitioner had the right to institute the
instant suit against respondents.
However, the Court cannot subscribe to the
CA's conclusion that since HTPMI retained
ownership over the subject property
pursuant to the Deed of Assignment, it is an
indispensable party to the case. As adverted
to earlier, an indispensable party is one who
has an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy which is inseparable from the
interest of the other parties, and that a final
adjudication cannot be made without
affecting such interest. Here, the only issue
in the instant unlawful detainer suit is who
between the litigating parties has the better
right to possess de facto the subject
property.36 Thus, HTPMI's interest in the
subject property, as one holding legal title
thereto, is completely separable from
petitioner's rights under the Contract to
Sell, which include the cancellation or
rescission of such contract and resultantly,
the recovery of actual possession of the
264 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
subject property by virtue of this case.
Hence, the courts can certainly proceed to
determine who between petitioner and
respondents have a better right to the
possession of the subject property and
complete relief can be had even without
HTPMI's participation.
In sum, both the MTCC and the RTC are
correct in ruling on the merits of the instant
unlawful detainer case even without the
participation of HTPMI.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29,
2015 and the Resolution dated April 20,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 135922 are hereby REVERSED and SET-
ASIDE. The Decision dated November 28,
2013 and the Order dated April 28, 2014 of
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 98 in SCA Case No. 13-1290,
affirming in toto the Decision dated April 3,
2013 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Antipolo City, Branch 1 in SCA Case No. 093-
10, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,*(Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and
Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

August 23, 2017 G.R.
No. 222711
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, represented by its
President, JANET C. LEY, Petitioner,
vs.
MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, doing business
265 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
under the name and style "LOLA TABA
LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA
SEASIDE,", Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Orders dated June 15,
20152 and January 27, 20163 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch
75 (Valenzuela-RTC) in Civil Case No. 40-V-
12, which dismissed petitioner Ley
Construction and Development
Corporation's (as represented by its
President, Janet C. Ley; petitioner)
complaint for collection of sum of money
and damages, without prejudice, on the
ground of improper venue.
The Facts
On March 13, 2012, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money
and Damages4 against respondent Marvin
Medel Sedano (respondent), doing business
under the name and style "Lola Taha Lalo
Pata Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside," before
the Valenzuela-RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 40-V-12. In its complaint, petitioner
alleged that on January 14, 2005, it leased5
a 50,000-square meter (sq.m.) parcel of
land located at Financial Center Area, Pasay
City (now, Lot 5-A Diosdado Macapagal
Boulevard, Pasay City) from respondent
third-party defendant, the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC).6
On September 11, 2006, petitioner
subleased7 the 14,659.80-sq.m. portion
thereof to respondent for a term often (10)
years beginning November 15, 2005, for a
monthly rent of ₱1,174,780.00, subject to a
ten percent (10%) increase beginning on the
third year and every year thereafter (lease
contract).8 Respondent allegedly failed to
pay the rent due for the period August 2011
to December 2011, amounting to a total of
P8,828,025.46, and despite demands,9
refused to settle his obligations;10 hence,
the complaint.
In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint,11
respondent countered that he religiously
paid rent to petitioner until PNCC
demanded12 that the rent be paid directly
to it, in view of the petitioner's eviction
from the subject property by virtue of a
court order.13 Thus, during the period from
August 2011 until December 2011, he
remitted the rentals to PNCC.14 Should he
be found liable to petitioner, respondent
maintained that the RTC should hold PNCC
liable to reimburse to him the amounts he
paid as rentals; hence, the third-party
complaint.15
Respondent likewise pointed out that the
venue was improperly laid since Section
2116 of the lease contract provides that
"[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection
with this case shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive
of all others."17 Hence, the complaint
should be dismissed on the ground of
improper venue.
Finally, respondent argued that he paid
petitioner the amounts of ₱3,518,352.00 as
deposit and advance rentals under the lease
contract, and that he made a ₱400,000.00
overpayment, all of which amounts were
266 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
not liquidated or credited to respondent
during the subsistence of the lease contract.
Thus, respondent interposed a
counterclaim, seeking petitioner to
reimburse the said amounts to him, and to
pay him moral and exemplary damages,
including litigation expenses, in view of
petitioner's filing of such baseless suit.18
In its Comment/Opposition19 to
respondent's affirmative defense of
improper venue, petitioner argued that
Section 21 of the lease contract is not a
stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on
jurisdiction which is void.20 This is because
such stipulation deprives other courts, i.e.,
the Municipal Trial Courts, of jurisdiction
over cases which, under the law, are within
its exclusive original jurisdiction, such as an
action for unlawful detainer.21 Petitioner
further posited that respondent had already
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
Valenzuela-RTC and had waived any
objections on venue, since he sought
affirmative reliefs from the said court when
he asked several times for additional time
to file his responsive pleading, set-up
counterclaims against petitioner, and
impleaded PNCC as a third-party
defendant.22
Meanwhile, in its Answer to Third Party
Complaint with Counterclaim,23 PNCC
contended that respondent has no cause of
action against it, since he acknowledged
PNCC’s right to receive rent, as evidenced
by his direct payment thereof to PNCC.24
Respondent also entered into a contract of
lease with PNCC after learning that
petitioner had been evicted from the
premises by virtue of a court ruling.25
The Valenzuela-RTC Ruling
In an Order26 dated June 15, 2015, the
Valenzuela-RTC granted respondent's
motion and dismissed the complaint on the
ground of improper venue. It held that
Section 21 of the lease contract between
petitioner and respondent is void insofar as
it limits the filing of cases with the R TC of
Pasay City, even when the subject matter
jurisdiction over the case is with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts.27 However, with
respect to the filing of cases cognizable by
the RTCs, the stipulation validly limits the
venue to the RTC of Pasay City.28 Since
petitioner's complaint is one for collection
of sum of money in an amount that is
within the jurisdiction of the R TC,
petitioner should have filed the case with
the RTC of Pasay City.29
The Valenzuela-RTC also found no merit in
petitioner's claim that respondent waived
his right to question the venue when he
filed several motions for extension of time
to file his answer. It pointed out that
improper venue was among the defenses
raised in respondent's Answer. As such, it
was timely raised and, therefore, not
waived.30
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for
reconsiderationwhich was, however, denied
by the Valenzuela-RTC in its Order32 dated
January 27, 2016; hence, the present
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
267 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the Valenzuela-RTC erred in
ruling that venue was improperly laid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1.Venue of real actions. - Actions
affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be
commenced and tried in the municipal trial
court of the municipality or city wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated.
Section 2.Venue of personal actions. -All
other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Section 3.Venue of actions against
nonresidents. - If any of the defendants
does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff, or any
property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced
and tried in the court of the place where
the plaintiff resides, or where the property
or any portion thereof is situated or found.
Section 4.When Rule not applicable. - This
Rule shall not apply -
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or
law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed
in writing before the filing of the action on
the exclusive venue thereof. (Emphases
supplied)
Based on these provisions, the venue for
personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie
with the court which has jurisdiction where
the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.33 As an exception,
parties may, through a written instrument,
restrict the filing of said actions in a certain
exclusive venue.34 In Briones v. Court of
Appeals,35 the Court explained:
Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be
filed only in the place agreed upon, or
merely permissive in that the parties may
file their suit not only in the place agreed
upon but also in the places fixed by law. As
in any other agreement, what is essential is
the ascertainment of the intention of the
parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue,
jurisprudence instructs that it must be
shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In
the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for
268 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
this purpose any other venue," "shall only"
preceding the designation of venue, "to the
exclusion of the other courts," or words of
similar import, the stipulation should be
deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to
the specified place.36
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v.
Tecson,37 the Court held that an exclusive
venue stipulation is valid and binding,
provided that: (a) the stipulation on the
chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in
intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by the
parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into
before the filing of the suit.38
After a thorough study of the case, the
Court is convinced that all these elements
are present and that the questioned
stipulation in the lease contract, i.e., Section
21 thereof, is a valid venue stipulation that
limits the venue of the cases to the courts
of Pasay City. It states:
21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or
violate any terms and conditions of this
lease contract, it shall be liable for
damages.1âwphi1All actions or case[s]
filed in connection with this lease shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, exclusive of all others.39 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
The above provision clearly shows the
parties' intention to limit the place where
actions or cases arising from a violation of
the terms and conditions of the contract of
lease may be instituted. This is evident from
the use of the phrase "exclusive of all
others" and the specification of the locality
of Pasay City as the place where such cases
may be filed.
Notably, the fact that this stipulation
generalizes that all actions or cases of the
aforementioned kind shall be filed with the
RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all
other courts, does not mean that the same
is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the
jurisdiction of all other courts. It is
fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred
by law and not subject to stipulation of the
parties.40 Hence, following the rule that the
law is deemed written into every contract,41
the said stipulation should not be construed
as a stipulation on jurisdiction but rather,
one which merely limits venue. Moreover,
"[t]he parties are charged with knowledge
of the existing law at the time they enter
into the contract and at the time it is to
become operative."42 Thus, without any
clear showing in the contract that the
parties intended otherwise, the questioned
stipulation should be considered as a
stipulation on venue (and not on
jurisdiction), consistent with the basic
principles of procedural law.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner's
action was one for collection of sum of
money in an amount43 that falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.44 Since the
lease contract already provided that all
actions or cases involving the breach
thereof should be filed with the RTC of
Pasay City, and that petitioner’s complaint
purporting the said breach fell within the
RTC's exclusive original jurisdiction, the
latter should have then followed the
contractual stipulation and filed its
complaint before the RTC of Pasay City.
269 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
However, it is undeniable that petitioner
filed its complaint with the Valenzuela-RTC;
hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the
ground of improper venue, without
prejudice, however, to its refiling in the
proper court.
That respondent had filed several motions
for extension of time to file a responsive
pleading, or that he interposed a
counterclaim or third-party complaint in his
answer does not necessarily mean that he
waived the affirmative defense of improper
venue. The prevailing rule on objections to
improper venue is that the same must be
raised at the earliest opportunity, as in an
answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it
is deemed waived.45 Here, respondent
timely raised the ground of improper venue
since it was one of the affirmative defenses
raised in his Answer with Third-Party
Complaint.46 As such, it cannot be said that
he had waived the same.
Further, it should be pointed out that the
case of Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc.
v. Yatco (Pantranco)47 cited in the instant
petition48 should not apply to this case,
considering that the invocation of the
ground of improper venue therein was not
based on a contractual stipulation, but
rather on respondent Elpidio O. Dizon's
alleged violation of the Rules of Court, as he
filed his case for damages before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV (Quezon
City), despite testifying that he was actually
a resident of Dagupan City. In that case, the
Court ruled that the filing of a counterclaim
and third party-complaint, and additionally,
the introduction of evidence of petitioner
Pantranco (respondent in the case for
damages) after the denial of its motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue,
"necessarily implied a submission to the
jurisdiction of [the trial court therein], and,
accordingly, a waiver of such right as
Pantranco may have had to object to the
venue, upon the ground that it had been
improperly laid."49 The rationale for the
Pantranco ruling is that a party cannot
invoke a violation of a rule on venue against
his counter-party, when he himself is bound
by the same rule, but nonetheless, seeks his
own relief and in so doing, violates it.
In contrast, the counterclaim of respondent
was alleged to be a compulsory
counterclaim,50 which he was prompted to
file only because of petitioner's complaint
for collection of sum of money, else the
same would be barred.51 In fact, his
counterclaim only sought reimbursement of
his overpayment to petitioner in the
amount of ₱400,000.00, as well as damages
for the filing of a purported baseless suit.
Thus, his counterclaim is not covered by the
venue stipulation, since he is not asserting a
violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease contract, but rather an independent
right which arose only because of the
complaint. The same goes for his third-party
complaint, whereby he only pleaded that
the rental payments remitted to PNCC for
the period August 2011 to December 2011
be reimbursed to him in the event that
petitioner's complaint is found to be
meritorious. Since his counterclaim and
third-party complaint are not covered by
the venue stipulation, respondent had,
therefore, every right to invoke the same
whilst raising the ground of improper venue
270 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
against petitioner's complaint, which action
was, on the contrary, covered by the
stipulation. Thus, there is no inconsistency
in respondent's posturing, which perforce
precludes the application of the Pantranco
ruling, as well as negates the supposition
that he had waived the defense of improper
venue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the Orders dated June 15, 2015
and January 27, 2016 of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 in Civil
Case No. 40-V-12 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
July 24, 2017 G.R.
No. 223610
CONCHITA S. UY, CHRISTINE UY DY, SYLVIA
UY SY, JANE UY TAN, JAMES LYNDON S. UY,
IRENE S. UY,* ERICSON S. UY, JOHANNA S.
UY, and JEDNATHAN S. UY, Petitioners
vs.
CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, substituted by his
heirs PAULITA MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO,
CESAR DEL CASTILLO, A VITO DEL
CASTILLO, NILA C. DUENAS, NIDA C.
LATOSA, LORNA C. BERNARDO, GIL DEL
CASTILLO, LIZA C. GUNGOB, ALMA DEL
CASTILLO, and GEMMA DEL CASTILLO,
Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1filed by petitioner Conchita S. Uy
(Conchita) and her children, petitioners
Christine Uy Dy, Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan,
James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy, Ericson S.
Uy (Ericson), Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan
S. Uy (Uy siblings; collectively, petitioners),
assailing the Decision2 dated May 26, 2015
and the Resolution3 dated February 22,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R.
SP No. 07120, which affirmed the twin
Orders4 dated December 9, 2011 and the
Order5 dated May 1 7, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55
(RTC) in Civil Case No. MAN-2797, denying
petitioners' Omnibus Motion,6 motion to
quash the writ of execution,7 and their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.8
The Facts
The present case is an offshoot of an action9
for quieting of title, reconveyance,
damages, and attorney's fees involving a
parcel of land, known as Lot 791 and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 29129,10 filed by Crispulo Del Castillo
(Crispulo) against Jaime Uy (Jaime) and his
wife, Conchita, on November 12, 1996,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2797
(Quieting of Title Case ).11 However, since
Jaime had died six (6) years earlier in
1990,12 Crispulo amended his complaint13
and imp leaded Jaime's children, i.e., the Uy
siblings, as defendants.14 Meanwhile,
Crispulo died15 during the pendency of the
action and hence, was substituted by his
heirs, respondents Paulita Manalad-Del
Castillo, Cesar Del Castillo, Avito Del
271 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Castillo, Nila C. Duenas, Nida C. Latosa,
Loma C. Bernardo, Gil Del Castillo, Liza C.
Gungob, Alma Del Castillo, and Gemma Del
Castillo (respondents).16
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a
Decision17 dated April 4, 2003 (RTC
Decision) in respondents' favor, and
accordingly: (a) declared them as the true
and lawful owners of Lot 791; (b) nullified
Original Certificate of Title No. 576,18 as well
as TCT No. 29129; and (c) ordered
petitioners to pay respondents moral
damages and litigation costs in the amount
of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's
fees equivalent to twenty-five percent
(25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791.19
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the
CA,20 and subsequently, to the Court, but
the same were denied for lack of merit.21
The ruling became final and executory on
April 8, 2010, thus, prompting the Court to
issue an Entry of Judgment22 dated May 4,
2010.
On August 17, 2010, respondents filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,23
manifesting therein that since the zonal
value of Lot 791 at that time was ₱3,500.00
per square meter (sqm.) and that Lot 791
covers an area of 15,758 sqm., the total
zonal value of Lot 791 was
24
₱55,153,000.00. Hence, the attorney's
fees, computed at twenty-five percent
(25%) thereof, should be pegged at
₱13,788,250.00.25
Acting on the said motion, the RTC
ordered26 petitioners to file their comment
or opposition thereto, which they failed to
comply.27 Accordingly, in an Order28 dated
November 22, 2010, the RTC granted the
motion and ordered the issuance of a writ
of execution. On December 13, 2010, a Writ
of Execution29 was issued, to which the
sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment30
seeking to levy petitioners' properties in an
amount sufficient to cover for the
₱13,788,250.00 as attorney's fees and
₱20,000.00 each as moral damages and
litigation costs.
Threatened by the Notice of Garnishment,
petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion31
praying that the writ of execution be
quashed and set aside, and that a hearing
be conducted to re-compute the attorney's
fees.32 Petitioners maintained that the Writ
of Execution is invalid because it altered the
terms of the RTC Decision which did not
state that the zonal value mentioned
therein referred to the zonal value of the
property at the time of execution.33 Before
the RTC could act upon petitioners'
Omnibus Motion, they filed a Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution on Jurisdictional
Ground(s) (motion to quash),34 claiming
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Uy
siblings in the Quieting of Title Case as they
were never served with summons in
relation thereto.35
The RTC Proceedings
On December 9, 2011, the RTC issued two
(2) orders: (a) one granting petitioners'
Omnibus Motion, nullifying the Notice of
Garnishment, and setting a hearing to
determine the proper computation of the
award for attorney's fees;36 and (b) another
denying their motion to quash, since they
272 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
never raised such jurisdictional issue in the
proceedings a quo.37
On January 20, 2012, a hearing was
conducted for the determination of
attorney's fees.38 Thereafter, the parties
were ordered to submit their respective
position papers,39 to which respondents
complied with,40 presenting the following
alternative options upon which to base the
computation of attorney's fees: (a)
₱3,387,970.00, equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791
in 1996, the year when the Quieting of Title
Case was filed; (b) ₱ll,424,550.00,
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of
the zonal value of Lot 791 in 2003, the year
when the RTC rendered its Decision in the
same case; or (c) ₱15,758,000.00,
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of
the zonal value of Lot 791 in 2010, the year
when the RTC Decision became final and
executory.41
On the other hand, instead of filing the
required position paper, petitioners filed a
Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration42
of the RTC's December 9, 2011 twin Orders.
In said motion, petitioners contended that
the RTC failed to definitely rule on the
validity of the writ of execution, and that it
erred in holding that the RTC Decision was
already final and executory despite the
absence of summons on the Uy siblings.43
In an Order44 dated May 17, 2012, the RTC:
(a) pegged the attorney's fees at
₱3,387,970.00,45 using the zonal value of
Lot 791 in 1996, the year when the Quieting
of Title Case was instituted, it being the
computation least onerous to petitioners;
and (b) denied petitioners' Consolidated
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari46with the CA, assailing the RTC's
twin Orders dated December 9, 2011 and
the Order dated May 17, 2012. Petitioners
argued that instead of just declaring the
Notice of Garnishment void, the RTC should
have also declared the writ of execution
void because the Uy siblings were never
served with summons; and like the Notice
of Garnishment, the Writ of Execution also
altered the terms of the RTC Decision.
Petitioners further added that the writ of
execution was void because it made them
liable beyond their inheritance from Jaime.
They maintain that the estate of Jaime
should instead be held liable for the
adjudged amount and that respondents
should have brought their claim against the
estate, in accordance with Section 20, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court.47
The CA Ruling
48
In a Decision dated May 26, 2015, the CA
affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC. The
CA found no merit in the claim that the Uy
siblings were never served with summons,
pointing out that in a Garnishment which expressly sought to levy
49
Manifestation/Motion dated November
26, 1997, their counsel in the trial
proceedings, Atty. Alan C. Trinidad (Atty.
Trinidad), stated that petitioners received
the summons with a copy of the amended
complaint.50 It likewise refused to give
credence to petitioners' denial of Atty.
Trinidad's representation, observing that
one of the Uy siblings, Ericson, even
273 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
testified in court with the former's
assistance, and that none of them showed
any concern or apprehension before the
court, which they would have if indeed Atty.
Trinidad was not authorized to represent
them.51
Anent petitioners' argument that they
cannot be held personally liable with their
separate property for Jaime's liability and
that respondents should have filed a claim
against Jaime's estate in accordance with
Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
CA held that such provision only applies to
contractual money claims and not when the
subject matter is some other relief and the
collection of any amount is merely
incidental thereto, such as by way of
damages, as in this case.52 Besides,
petitioners had all the opportunity to raise
such perceived error when they elevated
the case to the CA and to this Court, but
they did not.53 Following the principle of
finality of judgment, the CA can no longer
entertain such assignment of errors.54
With respect to the validity of the writ of
execution, the CA ruled that since the Writ
of Execution made express reference to the
RTC Decision without adding anything else,
the same was valid, unlike the Notice of
₱13,788,250.00 in attorney's fees and, in
the process, exceeded the purview of the
said Decision.55
Undaunted, petitioners moved for
reconsideration,56
which was, however,
denied by the CA in its Resolution57 dated
February 22, 2016; hence, the present
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the CA correctly upheld the
twin Orders dated December 9, 2011 and
the Order dated May 17, 2012 of the RTC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it is well to reiterate that
petitioners are resisting compliance with
the ruling in the Quieting of Title Case, on
the grounds that: (a) they were never
served with summons in relation thereto;
and (b) they were merely impleaded as
substitutes to Jaime therein, and as such,
respondents should have proceeded against
his estate instead, pursuant to Section 20,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. However, a
judicious review of the records would reveal
that such contentions are untenable, as will
be discussed hereunder.
Anent petitioners' claim that they were
never served with summons, the CA
correctly pointed out that in the November
26, 1997 Manifestation/Motion,58
petitioners, through their counsel, Atty.
Trinidad, explicitly stated, among others,
that they "received the Summons with a
copy of the Second Amended Complaint"
and that "the Answer earlier filed serves as
the Answer to the Second Amended
Complaint."59 Having admitted the
foregoing, petitioners cannot now assert
otherwise. "It is settled that judicial
admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case are
274 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
conclusive and do not require further
evidence to prove them. They are legally
binding on the party making it, except when
it is shown that they have been made
through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was actually made, neither of
which was shown to exist in this case."60
Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not
receive summons for the amended
complaint, they were nonetheless deemed
to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's
jurisdiction by filing an Answer61 to the
amended complaint and actively
62
participating in the case. In fact, one of
the petitioners and Uy siblings, Ericson, was
presented as a witness for the defense.63
Moreover, petitioners appealed the adverse
RTC ruling in the Quieting of Title Case all
the way to the Court. It is settled that the
active participation of the party against
whom the action was brought, is
tantamount to an invocation of the court's
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case, and such will bar said
party from later on impugning the court's
jurisdiction.64 After all, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in civil cases is
obtained either by a valid service of
summons upon him or by his voluntary
submission to the court's authority.65
In this regard, petitioners cannot also deny
Atty. Trinidad's authority to represent
them. As mentioned earlier, one of the
petitioners, Ericson, even testified with the
assistance of Atty. Trinidad.66 Indeed, if
Atty. Trinidad was not authorized to
represent them, the natural reaction for
petitioners was to exhibit concern. Based
on the records, however, there is no
indication that any of the petitioners or
Ericson made even the slightest objections
to Atty. Trinidad's representation. This only
confirms the CA's finding that such denial
was a mere afterthought and a desperate
attempt to undo a final and executory
judgment against them.67
As to petitioners' contention that
respondents should have proceeded against
Jaime's estate pursuant to Section 20, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, it is well to point out
that based on the records, the Uy siblings
were not merely substituted in Jaime's
place as defendant; rather, they were imp
leaded in their personal capacities. Under
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
substitution of parties takes place when the
party to the action dies pending the
resolution of the case and the claim is not
extinguished, viz.:
Section 16.Death of party; duty of counsel.-
Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it
shall be the duty of his counsel to inform
the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with his duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed
to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear
275 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the
counsel for the deceased party, or if the one
so named shall fail to appear within the
specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time to
procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased
and the latter shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. (Emphases supplied)
Here, Jaime died on March 4, 1990,68 or six
(6) years be(ore private respondents filed
the Quieting of Title Case.1âwphi1Thus,
after Conchita filed an Answer69 informing
the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the
complaint was amended70 to implead the
Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules of Court
provisions on substitution upon the death
of a party do not apply and the Uy siblings
were not merely substituted in place of
Jaime in the Quieting of Title Case. Instead,
they were impleaded in their personal
capacities.71 In this regard, petitioners'
argument that they cannot be held
solidarily liable for the satisfaction of any
monetary judgment or award must
necessarily fail.72
In this light, petitioners can no longer
invoke Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Section 20.Action and contractual money
claims. - When the action is for recovery of
money arising from contract, express or
implied, and the defendant dies before
entry of final judgment in the court in which
the action was pending at the time of such
death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry
of final judgment. A favorable judgment
obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided
in these Rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of a deceased person. (Emphasis
supplied)
A cursory reading of the foregoing provision
readily shows that like Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, it applies in cases where
the defendant dies while the case is
pending and not before the case was even
filed in court, as in this case.
At this point, the Court notes that if
petitioners truly believed that Jaime's
estate is the proper party to the Quieting of
Title Case, they could and should have
raised the lack of cause of action against
them at the earliest opportunity. Obviously,
they did not do so; instead, they actively
participated in the case, adopted the
answer earlier filed by Conchita, and even
litigated the case all the way to the Court.
Petitioners cannot now question the final
and executory judgment in the Quieting of
Title Case because it happened to be
adverse to them.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly
held that "a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law, and whether it be made by the
276 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. This principle, known as
the doctrine of immutability of judgment,
has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk
of occasional errors, which is precisely why
courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious
perception that the rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for
an indefinite period of time. As such, it is
not regarded as a mere technicality to be
easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of
public policy which must be faithfully
complied."73 However, this doctrine "is not
a hard and fast rule as the Court has the
power and prerogative to relax the same in
order to serve the demands of substantial
justice considering: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances; (c)
the merits of the case; (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; and (j) that the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby."74
In this case, a punctilious examination of
the records, especially the Amended
Complaint75 in the Quieting of Title Case
reveals that the disputed Lot 791 was
covered by TCT No. 29129 in the names of
Jaime and Conchita. Thus, while the Uy
siblings were indeed impleaded in their
personal capacities, the fact remains that
they are merely succeeding to Jaime's
interest in the said lot and title. As
successors-heirs, they cannot be personally
bound to respond to the decedent's
obligations beyond their distributive
shares.76 Verily, this is a special or a
compelling circumstance which would
necessitate the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, so as to
somehow limit the liability of the Uy siblings
in the payment of the monetary awards in
favor of respondents in the Quieting of Title
Case - i.e., moral damages and litigation
costs in the amount of ₱20,000.00 each, as
well as attorney's fees, equivalent to
twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal
value of Lot 79177 - within the value of their
inherited shares, notwithstanding the
finality of the ruling therein.
In sum, while the courts a quo correctly
ruled that the Uy siblings may be held
answerable to the monetary awards in the
Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot
exceed whatever value they inherited from
their late father, Jaime. For this purpose,
the RTC is tasked to ensure that the
satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the
judgment in the Quieting of Title Case will
not result in the payment by the Uy siblings
of an amount exceeding their inheritance
from Jaime. After all, the other party, i.e.,
respondents, shall not be unjustly
prejudiced by the same since Jaime's
spouse, Conchita, is still alive and the rest of
the monetary awards may be applied
against her, if need be.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
May 26, 2015 and the Resolution dated
277 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 07120 are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION limiting the adjudged
monetary liability of petitioners Christine Uy
Dy, Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James Lyndon
S. Uy, Irene S. Uy, Ericson S. Uy, Johanna S.
Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy to the total value
of their inheritance from Jaime Uy.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
March 14, 2018 G.R.
No. 208651
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee
vs.
ROMEO ANTIDO y LANTAYAN a.k.a.
ROMEO ANTIGO y LANTAYAN alias "JON-
JON", Accused-Appellant
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Resolution1 dated April 7, 2014, the
Court affirmed the Decision2 dated
December 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04602 finding
accused-appellant Romeo Antido y
Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan
alias "Jon-Jon" (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
December 7, 2012 Decision of the CA in
CAG. R. CR-HC No. 04602 and AFFIRMS said
Decision finding accusedappellant Romeo
Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y
Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
punishable under paragraph 1 of Article
266-A in relation to paragraph 5 of Article
266-B, under RA 8353. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay private
complainant the following amounts: (a)
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and (c)
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
consistent with existingjurisprudence.3
However, it appears that before the
promulgation of the said Resolution,
accused-appellant had already died on
December 28, 2013, as evidenced by his
Certificate of Death.4
As will be explained hereunder, there is a
need to reconsider and set aside the April 7,
2014 Resolution and enter a new one
dismissing the criminal case against
accused-appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence,
accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible
the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by
the death of the accused, to wit:
278 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Article 89.How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment[.]
In People v. Culas,5 the Court thoroughly
explained the effects of the death of an
accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as
follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we
summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability[,] as well as the
civil liability[,] based solely
thereon.1âwphi1 As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death
of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or
omission:
 a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as
explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to
Section l, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate
of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party
need not fear a forfeiture of his right
to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during
the prosecution of the criminal action
and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation
of right by prescription.6
279 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Thus, upon accused-appellant's death
pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for the recovery of the civil liability
ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that accused-
appellant's civil liability in connection with
his acts against the victim, AAA,7 may be
based on sources other than delicts; in
which case, AAA may file a separate civil
action against the estate of accused-
appellant, as may be warranted by law and
procedural rules.8
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a)SET
ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated April 7,
2014 in connection with this case;
(b)DISMISS Criminal Case No. 03-212115
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 29 by reason of the death of
accused-appellant Romeo Antido y
Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan
alias "Jon-Jon"; and (c) DECLARE the instant
case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 180969*, September 11, 2017
NOEL NAVAJA,Petitioner, v.HON. MANUEL
A. DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF
JAGNA & GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, JAGNA,
BOHOL, AND ATTY. EDGAR BORJE,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
280 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 26,
2007 and the Resolution3 dated November
12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR. SP. No. 02354, which affirmed the
Order4 dated September 21, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch
50 (RTC) in Sp. Civil Action No. 0357, and
accordingly, sustained the denial of
petitioner Noel Navaja's (petitioner) motion
to quash filed before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez,
Jagna, Bohol (MCTC-Jagna).
The Facts
The instant case is an offshoot of a
preliminary investigation proceeding
initiated by DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT)
before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in
Tagbilaran City, charging its then-Regional
Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana Lou B.
Navaja (Ana Navaja), of the crime of
falsification of a Private Document,
docketed as I.S. Case No. 04-1238.5 In the
course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms.
Marilyn Magsigay (Ms. Magsigay), a
material witness for DKT, was subpoenaed
to appear in a hearing before the OPP-
Bohol on March 15, 2004 in order to shed
light on the official receipt allegedly falsified
by Ana Navaja.6 On March 9, 2004,
petitioner, who is Ana Navaja's husband,
allegedly went to Ms. Magsigay's workplace
in Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and told her
that as per instruction from Ana Navaja's
lawyer, Atty. Orwen Bonghanoy (Atty.
Bonghanoy), her attendance in the
scheduled hearing is no longer needed
(March 9, 2004 incident).7 Thus, Ms.
Magsigay no longer attended the scheduled
March 15, 2004 hearing where petitioner
and Atty. Bonghanoy presented an affidavit
purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay and
notarized by a certain Atty. Rolando Grapa
(Atty. Grapa) in Cebu City, supporting Ana
Navaja's counter-affidavit (March 15, 2004
incident).8 Resultantly, I.S. Case No. 04-1238
was dismissed.9
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Edgar Borje
(Atty. Borje), DKT's counsel, found out from
Ms. Magsigay herself that: (a) she would
have attended the scheduled March 15,
2004 hearing were it not for the
misrepresentation of petitioner that her
presence therein was no longer required;
(b) she was merely told by her superior in
Garden Cafe to sign the affidavit and that
she did not personally prepare the same;
and (c) she could not have gone to Cebu to
have it notarized before Atty. Grapa as she
was at work on that day.10 This prompted
Atty. Borje to file the following criminal
complaints before the OPP-Bohol and the
City Prosecution Office of Tagbilaran City:
the first one,11 charging petitioner of
Obstruction of Justice, specifically, for
violation of Section 1 (a) of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 182912 in connection with
the March 9, 2004 incident; and the second
one,13 charging petitioner and Atty.
Bonghanoy of Obstruction of Justice as well,
specifically, for violation of Section 1 (f) of
the same law in connection with the March
15, 2004 incident.14 After due proceedings,
separate Informations were filed. The case
relating to the March 9, 2004 incident was
filed before the MCTC-Jagna,15 while that
relating to the March 15, 2004 incident was
281 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Tagbilaran City, Bohol (MTCC-
Tagbilaran).16
Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss/Quash Information (Motion to
Quash)17 before the MCTC-Jagna, principally
arguing that the charge of violation of
Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 pending before it
should have been absorbed by the charge
of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law
pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran,
considering that: (a) the case pending
before the latter court was filed first; (b) the
criminal cases filed before the MCTC-Jagna
and MTCC-Tagbilaran arose from a single
preliminary investigation proceeding,
involving the same set of facts and
circumstances, and flowed from a single
alleged criminal intent, which is to obstruct
the investigation of I.S. Case No. 04-1238;
and (c) to allow separate prosecutions of
the foregoing cases would be tantamount
to a violation of his right to double
jeopardy.18
The MCTC-Jagna Ruling
In an Order19 dated November 2, 2005, the
MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to
Quash. It held that petitioner had no right
to invoke the processes of the court, since
at the time he filed said motion, the MCTC-
Jagna has yet to acquire jurisdiction over his
person.
On reconsideration, the MCTC-Jagna issued
a Resolution20 dated January 24, 2006
upholding the denial of the Motion to
Quash. It ruled that in the criminal case
before it, petitioner is being charged with
violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829, an
offense separate and distinct from violation
of Section 1 (f) of the same law, which is
pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran. As
such, said offenses may be prosecuted
independently from each other.21
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated22 his case to
the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order23 dated September 21, 2006,
the RTC denied the petition, thereby,
affirming the MCTC-Jagna Ruling. It held
that the criminal cases pending before the
MCTC-Jagna for violation of Section 1 (a) of
PD 1829 and MTCC-Tagbilaran for violation
of Section 1 (f) of the same law are two (2)
separate offenses, considering that: (a) the
case in MCTC-Jagna has only one (1)
accused, i.e., petitioner, while the one
pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran has
two (2), i.e., petitioner and Atty.
Bonghanoy; and (b) the places of
commission are different, as the March 9,
2004 incident happened in Jagna, Bohol,
while the March 15, 2004 incident occurred
in Tagbilaran City, Bohol. Further, the RTC
opined that while both offenses arose from
substantially the same set of facts, each
crime involves some important act which is
not an essential element of the other.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the
CA.25
The CA Ruling
In a Decision26 dated June 26, 2007, the CA
affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that
282 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
petitioner allegedly committed several acts
which constitute violations of different
provisions of PD 1829, namely: (a) the
March 9, 2004 incident where he prevented
Ms. Magsigay from attending the scheduled
hearing in I.S. Case No. 04-1238 by means
of deceit and misrepresentation, which is a
violation of Section 1 (a) of the law; and (b)
the March 15, 2004 incident where he,
along with Atty. Bonghanoy, submitted a
purported spurious affidavit of Ms.
Magsigay in the scheduled hearing in I.S.
Case No. 04-1238, which is a violation of
Section 1 (f) of the same law. Moreover, the
CA pointed out that the foregoing acts were
committed in distinct places and locations.
As such, there is more than enough basis to
try petitioner for two (2) separate crimes
under two (2) distinct Informations.27
Unperturbed, petitioner moved for
reconsideration,28 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution29 dated November
12, 2007; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the CA correctly ruled that
petitioner may be separately tried for
different acts constituting violations of PD
1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a)
and (f) of the same law allegedly committed
during the pendency of a single proceeding.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes
the acts constituting the crime of
obstruction of justice, the pertinent
portions of which read:
Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or
willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or
delays the apprehension of suspects and
the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the
following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying
in any criminal proceeding or from
reporting the commission of any
offense or the identity of any
offender/s by means of bribery,
misrepresentation, deceit,
intimidation, force or threats;
xxxx
(f) making, presenting or using any
record, document, paper or object
with knowledge of its falsity and with
intent to affect the course or
outcome of the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases;
xxxx
The elements of the crime are: (a) that the
accused committed any of the acts listed
under Section 1 of PD 1829; and (b) that
such commission was done for the purpose
of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or
delaying the successful investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases.30
In this case, two (2) separate Informations
283 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an
Information dated September 22, 2004
charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of
PD 1829 before the MCTC-Jagna for
allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from
appearing and testifying in a preliminary
investigation hearing;31 and (b) an
Information dated August 27, 2004 charging
him of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same
law before the MTCC-Tagbilaran for
allegedly presenting a false affidavit.32
While the Informations pertain to acts that
were done days apart and in different
locations, the Court holds that petitioner
should only be charged and held liable for a
single violation of PD 1829. This is because
the alleged acts, albeit separate, were
motivated by a single criminal impulse - that
is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary
investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-
1238, which was, in fact, eventually
dismissed by the OPP-Bohol.33 The
foregoing conclusion is premised on the
principle of delito continuado, which
envisages a single crime committed through
a series of acts arising from one criminal
intent or resolution.34 In Santiago v.
Garchitorena,35 the Court explained the
principle of delito continuado as follows:
According to Cuello Calon, for delito
continuado to exist there should be a
plurality of acts performed during a period
of time; unity of penal provision violated;
and unity of criminal intent or purpose,
which means that two or more violations
of the same penal provisions are united in
one and the same intent or resolution
leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal,
p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630,
1987 ed).
Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a
delito continuadoconsists of several crimes
but in reality there is only one crime in the
mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on
the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102;
Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law,
p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a
series of acts arising from one criminal
intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed.
pp. 53-54).
x x x x
The concept of delito continuado although
an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has
been applied to crimes penalized under
special laws, e.g. violation of [Republic Act]
No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for
services rendered following up claims for
war veteran's benefits x x x.
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code,
the Code shall be supplementary to special
laws, unless the latter provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the
Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes
36
punished under special laws. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
In ruling that the acts imputed to petitioner
are deemed separate crimes and thus, may
be tried separately, the CA cited the case of
Regis v. People (Regis),37 wherein it was
held that the malversation committed
through falsification of document
performed on different dates constitute
284 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
independent offenses which must be
punished separately.38 However, a closer
perusal of Regis shows that its factual
milieu is not on all fours with the instant
case. In Regis, the accused, then municipal
treasurer of Pinamungahan, Cebu, signed
payrolls on two (2) different dates, i.e., April
30, 1931 and May 2, 1931, making it appear
that certain workers worked as laborers in a
municipal project when in truth, there were
no such workers and that he and his co-
accused misappropriated the payroll
amounts to themselves. The Court ruled
that the accused may be held liable for two
(2) separate crimes, considering that when
the accused committed the first act
constituting malversation committed
through falsification of document, it did not
appear that he was already predisposed to
committing the second act constituting the
same crime.39 Clearly, when the accused in
Regis falsified the payroll of April 30, 1931,
and later, the payroll of May 2, 1931, he -
though committing similar acts - could not
be said to have been motivated by a single
criminal impulse as he was working towards
discernibly distinct criminal objectives.
In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly
preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing
and testifying in a preliminary investigation
proceeding and offering in evidence a false
affidavit were clearly motivated by a single
criminal impulse in order to realize only one
criminal objective, which is to obstruct or
impede the preliminary investigation
proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus,
applying the principle of delito continuado,
petitioner should only be charged with one
(1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may
be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-
Magsigay was allegedly prevented from Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise,
appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04- petitioner will be unduly exposed to double
1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where jeopardy, which the Court cannot
petitioner allegedly presented a false countenance.
affidavit in the same case.40 However, since
he was already charged - and in fact, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
convicted in a Judgment41 dated July 3, Decision dated June 26, 2007 and the
2007 - in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in Resolution dated November 12, 2007 of the
MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP. No. 02354
events that transpired in Jagna, Bohol are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
should only be deemed as a partial Accordingly, Criminal Case No. 2878
execution of petitioner's single criminal pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial
design. The Court's pronouncement in Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna,
Gamboa v. CA42 is instructive on this matter, Bohol is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
to wit:
Apart and isolated from this plurality of .
crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as
"delito continuado'" or "continuous crime."
This is a single crime consisting of a series of
acts arising from a single criminal resolution
or intent not susceptible of division. For
Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being
unity of purpose and of right violated,
commits diverse acts, each of which,
although of a delictual character, merely
constitutes a partial execution of a single
particular delict, such concurrence or
delictual acts is called a "delito continuado."
In order that it may exist, there should be
"plurality of acts performed separately
during a period of time; unity of penal
provision infringed upon or violated and
unity of criminal intent and purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the
same penal provision are united in one and
the same intent leading to the perpetration
of the same criminal purpose or aim."43

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