CIVIL LAW BAR EXAM QUESTIONS 2018

Sidley and Sol were married with one (1) daughter, Solenn. Sedfrey and Sonia were another
couple with one son, Sonny. Sol and Sedfrey both perished in the same plane accident. Sidley
and Sonia met when the families of those who died sued the airlines and went through grief-
counseling sessions. Years later, Sidley and Sonia got married. At that time, Solenn was four (4)
years old and Sonny was five (5) years old. These two (2) were then brought up in the same
household. Fifteen (15) years later, Solenn and Sonny developed romantic feelings towards each
other, and eventually eloped. On their own and against their parents' wishes, they procured a
marriage license and got married in church.

(a) Is the marriage of Solenn and Sonny valid, voidable, or void? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The marriage of Solenn and Sonny is voidable.

Under Article 14 of the Family Code, in case either or both of the contracting parties are between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to
their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge
of them, in the order mentioned.

In the case at bar, Solenn is 19 years old while Sonny is 20 years old at the time of their
marriage. Since they fall between the ages of 18 and 21, parental consent is needed for them to
acquire a marriage license and to validate their marriage. However, since they procured a
marriage license and got married in church against their parents’ wishes, their marriage is merely
voidable. The lack of parental consent does not render the marriage automatically void. In other
words, their marriage is still valid until it is annulled by Court.

(b) If the marriage is defective, can the marriage be ratified by free cohabitation of the parties?
(2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

(b) Yes,
The absence of parental consent makes the marriage voidable. Under the law, such marriage
may be annulled unless the party attains the age of twenty-one and freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife (Article 45(1), NCC.
Hence, in this case the marriage between Solenn and Sonny being voidable for lack of parental
consent, is ratified by free cohabitation by the parties.

II

After finding out that his girlfriend Sandy was four (4) months pregnant, Sancho married Sandy.
Both were single and had never been in any serious relationship in the past. Prior to the
marriage, they agreed in a marriage settlement that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
shall govern their property relations during marriage. Shortly after the marriage, their daughter,
Shalimar, was born.

Before they met and got married, Sancho purchased a parcel of land on installment, under a
Contract of Sale, with the full purchase price payable in equal annual amortizations over a period
of ten (10) years, with no down payment, and secured by a mortgage on the land. The full
purchase price was PhP1 million, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. After paying the
fourth (4th) annual installment, Sancho and Sandy got married, and Sancho completed the
payments in the subsequent years from his salary as an accountant. The previous payments
were also paid out of his salary. During their marriage, Sandy also won PhP1 million in the lottery
and used it to purchase jewelry. When things didn't work out for the couple, they filed an action
for declaration of nullity of their marriage based on the psychological incapacity of both of them.
When the petition was granted, the parcel of land and the jewelry bought by Sandy were found to
be the only properties of the couple.

(a) What is the filiation status of Shalimar? (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

Shalimar is a legitimate child.

According to Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate.

Here, although Shalimar was conceived before the marriage, the facts provide that shortly after
their marriage, the baby was born. Applying the law to the case at bar, Shalimar’s filiation is
legitimate.

(b) What system of property relationship will be liquidated following the declaration of nullity of
their marriage? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The provision on Co-ownership of the Civil Code will apply.

Under the law, if the marriage is declared void under Art. 36, the provisions of the Family Code on
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties on absolute community or conjugal
partnership will not apply but rather Art. 147 or 148 depending on the presence or absence of a
legal impediment between them. In the case of Diño v. Diño (G.R. No. 178044, January 19,
2011), the SC ruled that Art. 50 of the FC and Section 19 of the Rules on Declaration of Nullity
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Arts. 40 and 45 of the FC. In short, Art. 50 of the FC does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Art. 36 of the FC which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

In this case, since there was no showing that Sancho and Sandy at the time of marriage were
under legal impediment to marry each other the Art. 147 of the Civil Code on the rules of Co-
Ownership will apply.

Therefore, the rules on Co-ownership of the Civil Code will apply.

(c) In the liquidation, who should get the parcel of land? The jewelry? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The parcel of land is an exclusive property of Sancho while the jewelry belongs to the conjugal
partnership.

As Regards to the parcel of land, the case of Lorenzo v. Nicolas provides that a parcel of land
which is a property purchased before the marriage and fully paid during the marriage remains to
be a separate property of either spouse. Likewise, Under Article 109 of the family code, those
properties brought to the marriage as his or her own and those which is purchased by the
exclusive money of the husband or wife remains exclusive property of the spouses. In this case,
Sancho who paid for the parcel of land in installment before marriage and was fully paid during
their marriage and such payment was also made out of his own salary and not from the conjugal
funds renders the said property as his exclusive property.
As regards to the jewelry, the law provides that those acquired by chance such as winnings in
gamblings and bettings will form part of the conjugal property. Similarly, properties acquired by
onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be
for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses belong to the conjugal partnership. In this case,
Sandy’s winnings of Php1,000,000 in the lottery formed part of the conjugal property. The jewelry
bought by Sandy is considered as conjugal property for the source of funds in purchasing the said
jewelry was taken from the conjugal funds which is the lottery winnings. Hence, the jewelry
belongs to the conjugal partnership.

(d) Is Shalimar entitled to payment of presumptive legitime? If yes, how much should be her
share and from where should this be taken? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Shalimar is not entitled to Presumptive Legitime. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code
that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the
Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of
the parties.

Ill

Silverio was a woman trapped in a man's body. He was born male and his birth certificate
indicated his gender as male, and his name as Silverio Stalon. When he reached the age of 21,
he had a sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, and, from then on, he lived as a female. On the
basis of his sex reassignment, he filed an action to have his first name changed to Shelley, and
his gender, to female. While he was following up his case with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
he met Sharon Stan, who also filed a similar action to change her first name to Shariff, and her
gender, from female to male.

Sharon was registered as a female upon birth. While growing up, she developed male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal hyperplasia ("CAH") which is a
condition where a person possesses both male and female characteristics. At puberty, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had greatly minimized, and she had no breast or menstrual
development. Alleging that for all intents and appearances, as well as mind and emotion, she had
become a male, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender should be
changed from female to male, and that her first name should be changed from Sharon to Shariff.

Silverio and Sharon fell in love and decided to marry. Realizing that their marriage will be frowned
upon in the Philippines, they travelled to Las Vegas, USA where they got married based on the
law of the place of celebration of the marriage. They, however, kept their Philippine citizenship.

(a) Is there any legal bases for the court to approve Silverio's petition for correction of entries in
his birth certificate? (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

No, there is no legal basis for the court to approve Silverio's petition for correction of entries in his
birth certificate.
In the case of Silverio vs Republic, GR No. 174689, October 22, 2007, a person’s first name
cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. The same jurisprudence also provides
that no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment.

In the case at bar, Silverio filed an action to have his first name changed to Shelley, and his
gender, to female on the basis of his sex reassignment.

Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.

Contributor: Pungos, Ruel R.

(b) Will your answer be the same in the case of Sharon's petition? (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

No, my answer would be different. There is a legal basis for the court to approve Sharon’s petition
for correction of entries in her birth certificate.

In the case of Republic vs. Cagandahan, the court ruled that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Further, the Court
held that sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive; it is at maturity that the gender of such persons is fixed.

Here, Sharon is suffering from congenital adrenal hyperplasia and is considered biologically
intersex. Thus, she can, at the age of majority, choose her gender and be able to correct the
entries of her birth certificate from female to male.

(c) Can the marriage of Silverio (Shelley) and Sharon (Shariff) be legally recognized as valid in
the Philippines? (2.5%)

Contributor: Paculba, John Philip S.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO, the marriage between Silverio (Shelley) and Sharon (Shariff) cannot be validly
recognized in the Philippines.
Under Article 15 of the New Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.

Article 1 of the Family Code defines Marriage as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life.
In the case of Silverio vs Republic, GR No. 174689, October 22, 2007, the High Court
ruled that the sex or gender at the time of birth shall be taken into account. Silverio is still, in the
eyes of the law, a man although because of artificial intervention, he now has the physiological
characteristics of a woman. The Supreme Court also ruled in the case of Republic vs Jennifer
Cagandahan, GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008 that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Jennifer here thinks of
himself as a male. It is at maturity that the gender of such person is fixed.
In view of the foregoing, the marriage between Silverio (Shelley) and Sharon (Shariff) in
the case at bar who are of the same sex is VOID. Sex reassignment of Silverio does not made
him of a woman in the eyes of the law whereas Sharon may validly claim being a male as here he
thinks of himself as a male and there is preponderant biological support for considering him as a
male. For a marriage to be valid, it must be between persons of opposite sexes.

IV

Severino died intestate, survived by his wife Saturnina, and legitimate children Soler, Sulpicio,
Segundo and the twins Sandro and Sandra. At the time of his death, the twins were only 11 years
of age, while all the older children were of age. He left only one property: a 5,000 sq. m. parcel of
land. After his death, the older siblings Soler, Sulpicio, and Segundo sold the land to Dr. Santos
for PhP500,000 with a right to repurchase, at the same price, within five (5) years from the date of
the sale. The deed of sale was signed only by the three (3) older siblings, and covered the entire
property. Before the five (5) years expired, Sole and Sulpicio tendered their respective shares of
PhP166,666 each to redeem the property. Since Segundo did not have the means because he
was still unemployed, Saturnina paid the remaining PhP166,666 to redeem the property. After the
property was redeemed from Dr. Santos, the three (3) older children and Saturnina, for herself
and on behalf of the twins who were still minors, sold the property to Dr. Sazon, in an absolute
sale, for PhP1 million. In representing the twins, Saturnina relied on the fact that she was the
natural guardian of her minor children.

(a) Was the first sale to Dr. Santos, and the subsequent repurchase, valid? (2.5%)

Yes ,the first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Santos by the brothers and co-owners Segundo,
Soler and Sulpicio was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land.

Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that [i]f a widow or widower and legitimate children or
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each
of the children. Further, Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
In this case, the death of the father resulted to a co-ownership between the children and the wife
wherein they inherited in their own rights and with equal shares as others. However, any
alienation or mortgage of the property will only be limited to the share of those who alienate thus
the first sale is valid with regards to Segundo, Soler and Sulpicio’s pro-indiviso shares to the
land.
With regards to the repurchase, it is valid.

As provided in jurisprudence, a co-owner who redeemed the property in its entirety did not make
her the owner of all of it. The property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption
did not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. But the one who redeemed had the
right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject
property for the amount due.

Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed the property for Segundo who had then acquired his pro-
indiviso share in the subject property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share
she redeemed. But she had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien
upon the property for the amount due until reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of retained
ownership over their pro-indiviso share.(NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs CA GR
162421 AUGUST 31, 2007)
(b) Was the second sale to Dr. Sazon valid? May the twins redeem their share after they reach
the age of majority? (2.5%)

The second sale was unenforceable as regards the share of the twins and the latter may redeem
their share upon reaching the age of majority.
Under the Article 326 of the Civil Code, when the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property,
subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. Futher, jurisprudence
also provides that a legal guardian only has plenary power of administration of the minor’s
property, not including the power of alienation, which needs judicial authority.
In this case, Saturnina was the twins’ legal guardian. However, when she sold the twins’ pro-
indiviso share in the subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so because the sale
needs judicial authority. As a consequence, the sale come under the purview of an unenforceable
contracts which includes those contracts entered into in the name of other person by one who
has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers.
The law provides further that legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner who did
not part with his pro-indiviso share in the property held in common.
As provided, the sale as to the undivided share of the twins was unenforceable for lack of
authority of Saturnina. They were not divested of their ownership thereto and could necessarily
redeem the property within 30 days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors.
If the twins could prove that they are exercising their right of redemption within 30 days from
notice, they may redeem the property.

Sol Soldivino, widow, passed away, leaving two (2) legitimate children: a 25- year old son,
Santino (whom she had not spoken to for five [5] years prior to her death since he attempted to
kill her at that time), and a 20-year-old daughter, Sara. She left an estate worth PhP8 million and
a will containing only one provision: that PhP1 million should be given to "the priest who officiated
at my wedding to my children's late father." Sara, together with two (2) of her friends, acted as an
attesting witness to the will.

On the assumption that the will is admitted for probate and that there are no debts, divide the
estate and indicate the heirs/legatees entitled to inherit, the amount that each of them will inherit,
and where (i.e., legitime/free portion/intestate share) their shares should be charged. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Contributor: Gesal Marie Arnoza

Santino and Sara will be entitled to 2 million pesos each on the ground that Article 888 says
that the legitime of legitimate children consists of one -half of the hereditary estate of the father
and mother.

They will also receive 1,500,000 pesos each since the will does not dispose all of the
remaining properties the testator. Hence, intestate succession with respect to the remaining
portion will apply (Article 960)

Santino cannot be disinherited because the law clearly provides that in order the
disinheritance to be effected, the cause thereof must be specified in a will (Art 916)
Here, the will does not mention anything regarding the disinheritance of Santino.
 The two witnesses are not entitled to any share of the inheritance because, generally devise or
legacy in favor of the witnesses of a will is void. (Article 823).

The priest can inherit the one million pesos because only a priest who heard the confession of
the testator during his last illness is incapable of succeeding (Article 1027).

The remaining 3 million pesos will be disposed of in accordance with the provisions on
intestate succession as herein above provided.

VI

Sammy and Santi are cousins who separately inherited two (2) adjoining lots from their
grandfather. Sammy is based overseas but wants to earn income from his inherited land, so he
asked a local contractor to build a row of apartments on his property which he could rent out. The
contractor sent him the plans and Sammy noticed that the construction encroached on a part of
Santi's land but he said nothing and gave approval to construct based on the plans submitted by
the local contractor. Santi, based locally, and who loved his cousin dearly, did not object even if
he knew of the encroachment since he was privy to the plans and visited the property regularly.
Later, the cousins had a falling out and Santi demanded that the portion of the apartments that
encroached on his land be demolished.

Can Santi successfully file legal action to require the demolition? (5%)

CONTRIBUTOR: Lezlee Amor Escalante

Suggested Answer:
No. Santi cannot file an action for demolition. Both parties are considered to have acted in good
faith, and demolition is not an available remedy to Santi.
One basic principle of accesion continua is that bad faith of one person neutralizes the bad faith
of another and both should be considered as having acted in good faith.
The second paragraph of Article 453 provides that “it is understood that there is bad faith on the
part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on
his part.” Thus, when one in possession of a property of another erects buildings and makes
another improvements thereon in bad faith, but with knowledge of the owner who does not object,
the case must be treated as if both parties had acted in good faith (Municipal of Oas vs. Roa,
7Phil 20.)
In the case at bar, it is clear that both parties were aware that there was encroachment. Sammy
received a copy of the plan where encroachment on Santi’s property is apparent. Santi, on the
other hand, gave an approval of the construction despite knowing that the construction will
encroach on his property. Therefore, since both have acted in bad faith, both should be
considered to have acted in good faith.
Thus, the applicable provision for Santi’s remedy is Article 448. Based on such, Santi has two
alternative rights: (1) to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting after payment to the
builder, planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper cases,
expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, incurred by the latter; or (2) to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, if the value of the land is not considerably more than
that of the building or the trees, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
Finally, Santi cannot refuse to exercise either option. In a situation where he refuses to exercise
any option, Sammy can compel him to make a choice between appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.

VII
Sydney, during her lifetime, was a successful lawyer. By her own choice, she remained
unmarried and devoted all her time to taking care of her nephew and two (2) nieces: Socrates,
Saffinia, and Sophia. She wrote a will giving all her properties remaining upon her death to the
three (3) of them. The will was admitted to probate during her lifetime. Later, she decided to make
a new will giving all her remaining properties only to the two (2) girls, Saffinia and Sophia. She
then tore up the previously probated will. The second will was presented for probate only after her
death. However, the probate court found the second will to be void for failure to comply with
formal requirements.

(a) Will the doctrine of dependent relative revocation apply? (2.5%) (BORCES)

No, the doctrine will not apply.

Under the law, the Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation applies only if it appears that the
testator intended his act of revocation to be conditioned on the making of a new will or on its
validity. Furthermore, Art. 828 in relation with Art. 830 (3) of the NCC allows physical revocation
by tearing if done by testator himself or by some other in his presence and express direction.
Physical destruction requires: (a) Corpus - evidence of physical destruction and (b) Animus -
capacity and intent to revoke.

Here, the doctrine does not lie since the testator's intent to revoke the prior will was not
dependent on the validity of the subsequent will so even if the second will was void and
insufficient as revocation, the prior will was still revoked because such revocation was not
dependent on the validity of the second will. Likewise, all elements required to effect physical
destruction was present, i.e., (1) there is actual tearing by Sydeny herself and (2) her intention to
revoke the previous will by making a subsequent one.

Hence, the doctrine does not find application.

(Diaz v. De Leon; Molo v. Molo)

(b) Will your answer be the same if the second will was found to be valid but both Saffinia and
Sophia renounce their inheritance? (2.5%)

Yes, my answer will be the same if the second will was found to be valid and Saffinia and Sophia
renounced their inheritance.

The law provides under Art 832 of the New civil code that, A revocation made in the subsequent
will shall take effect, even if the new will should become inoperative, by reason of (1) incapacity of
the heirs, devisees or legatees designated therein; or (2) renunciation or repudiation.

In the case, if Saffinia and Sophia renounced their inheritance the second will is considered valid
and binding because it is an exception to the doctrine of dependent relative revocation that a valid
though ineffective will can revoke a previous will.

CONTRIBUTOR: Cabrido, Leslie Mae

VIII

Sofronio was a married father of two when he had a brief fling with Sabrina, resulting in her
pregnancy and the birth of their son Sinforoso. Though his wife knew nothing of the affair,
Sofronio regretted it, but secretly provided child support for Sinforoso. Unfortunately, when
Sinforoso was 10 years old, Sofronio died. Only Sofronio's father, Salumbides, knew of Sabrina
and Sinforoso. For the purpose of providing support to Sinforoso, Salumbides gave Sabrina
usufructruary · rights over one of his properties - a house and lot - to last until Sinforoso reaches
the age of majority. Sabrina was given possession of the property on the basis of caucion
juratoria. Two (2) years after the creation of the usufruct, the house accidentally burned down,
and three (3) years thereafter, Sinforoso died before he could reach the age of 18.

Will the usufruct continue after the house has burned down? If yes, will it continue after
Sinforoso's death? (2.5%)

CONTRIBUTOR: Fortuna, Shannine C.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the usufruct will continue even after the house has burned down.

The law provides that as a general rule, the usufruct shall be terminated upon the loss of
the thing held in usufruct. However, as exception to such rule, the usufruct is not extinguished if
the thing held in usufruct is a building/house. The usufructuary shall have the right to make use of
the land and the materials left.

In this case, eventhough the house has accidentally burned down, it does not
automatically extinguish the usufructuary rights of Sabrina. Sabrina may still exercise her rights
as a usufructuary over the land and materials thereof.

However, the death of Sinfroso before reaching the age of majority will extinguish the
usufruct.

The law states that in cases where the usufruct is granted for the time that may elapse
before a third person attains a certain age, the usufruct shall subsist for the number of years
specified, even if the third person should die before the period expires. However, when such
usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of the third person, the
usufruct is extinguished upon the latter’s death.

Here, since Sabrina was given possession of the property on the basis of caucion
juratoria; or was given to pay for the support of Sinfroso, the latter’s death shall extinguish
Sabrina’s usufructuary rights over the property.

IX

Newlyweds Sam and Sienna had contracted with Sangria Hotel for their wedding reception. The
couple was so unhappy with the service, claiming, among other things, that there was an
unreasonable delay in the service of dinner and that certain items promised were unavailable.
The hotel claims that, while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was
occasioned by the sudden increase of guests to 450 from the guaranteed expected number of
350, as stated in the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract. In the action for damages for
breach of contract instituted by the couple, they claimed that the Banquet and Meeting Services
Contract was a contract of adhesion since they only provided the number of guests and chose the
menu. On the other hand, the hotel's defense was that the proximate cause of the complainant's
injury was the unexpected increase in their guests, and this was what set the chain of events that
resulted in the alleged inconveniences.

(a) Does the doctrine of proximate cause apply in this case? (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

Contributor: RICHARD C. ABANGAN, JR.

No. The doctrine of proximate cause does not apply in this case.

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions
involving breach of contract (Spouses Guanico vs. Makati Shangri-lan Hotel and Resort, Inc.,
G.R. No. 190601, February 7, 2011).

Here, the action instituted by the couple Sam and Sienna is an action for damages for breach of
contract.

(b) Was the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract a contract of adhesion? If yes, is the
contract void? (2.5%)

Contributor: Stephanie L. Ambrosio

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Yes, the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract is a Contract of Adhesion and is not void.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-made form
of contract which the other party may accept or reject but which the latter cannot modify.
Contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se. The one who adheres to the contract is, in reality,
free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.

In this case, the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract is a contract of adhesion as they only
provided the number of guests and chose the menu leaving no authority on the part of the
spouses to bargain with the other terms and conditions already imposed in the contract. Such
contract is not void because it does not fall under Article 1409 of the Civil Code.

Sinclair and Steffi had an illicit relationship while Sinclair was married to another. The relationship
produced a daughter Sabina, who grew up with her mother. For most parts of Sabina's youth,
Steffi spent for her support and education. When Sabina was 21 years old, Sinclair's wife of many
years died. Sinclair and Steffi lost no time in legitimizing their relationship. After the 40-day
prayers for Sinclair's late wife, Sinclair and Steffi got married without a marriage license, claiming
that they have been cohabiting for the last 20 years.

After graduating from college, Sabina decided to enroll in law school. Sinclair said that he was not
willing to pay for her school fees since she was no longer a minor. Sinclair claimed that, if Sabina
wanted to be a lawyer, she had to work and spend for her law education.

(a) What is Sabina's filiation status? (2.5%)

(b) Is Sinclair legally required to finance Sabina's law education? (2.5%)

Suggested Answers:

a. Sabina is an illegitimate child of Sinclair.

Article 165 of the Family Code provides that children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are considered as illegitimate children. Furthermore, jurisprudence states that in order
for a valid marriage to prosper under the five-year cohabitation rule, it is a condition sine qua non
thereto that the man and the woman, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.

In this case, the Sabina is an illegitimate child of Sinclair for she was born while Sinclair
and Steffie had an illicit relationship. The subsequent marriage of Sinclair and Steffi likewise
cannot be considered valid for two reasons. One, the last 20 years of their cohabitation, Sinclair
is married to another and two, their marriage immediately celebrated after 40-day prayers for
Sinclair's late wife. Thus, it falls short of the requirements and such marriage cannot not make
Sabina as a legitimated child of Sinclair. She remains an illegitimate child .

Contributor: Mary Rose Gimang

b)

XI

Samantha sold all her business interest in a sole proprietorship to Sergio for the amount of PhP1
million. Under the sale agreement, Samantha was supposed to pay for all prior unpaid utility bills
incurred by the sole proprietorship. A month after the Contract to Sell was executed, Samantha
still had not paid the PhP50,000 electricity bills incurred prior to the sale. Since Sergio could not
operate the business without electricity and the utility company refused to restore electricity
services unless the unpaid bills were settled in full, Sergio had to pay the unpaid electricity bills.
When the date for payment arrived, Sergio only tendered PhP950,000 representing the full
purchase price, less the amount he paid for the unpaid utility bills. Samantha refused to accept
the tender on the ground that she was the one supposed to pay the bills and Sergio did not have
authorization to pay on her behalf.

(a) What is the effect of payment made by Sergio without the knowledge and consent of
Samantha? (2.5%)
Contributor : MORALDE

(b) Is Samantha guilty of mora accipiendi? (2.5%)

Contributor : DEMONTEVERDE
Suggested Answer:

a. The payment made by Sergio was valid even without the knowledge and consent of
Samantha. In Figuera v. Ang which has the same facts in this case, legal subrogation took place
despite the absence of knowledge and consent of the creditor.
There is legal subrogation when a person interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation pays, even without the knowledge of the debtor. There is compensation when
(1) each one of the debtors is bound principally, and that the debtor is at the same time a
principal creditor of the other; (2) both debts consist of a sum of money, or if the things
due be consumable, they be of the same kind and also of the same quality if the latter
has been stated; (3) both debts are due; (4) both debts are liquidated and demandable;
 and (5) there be no retention or controversy over both debts commenced by third persons
and communicated in due time to the debtor. When all these elements are present,
compensation takes effect by operation of law and extinguishes both debts to the
corresponding amount, even though both parties are without knowledge of the
compensation.
All the elements of legal compensation are present in this case. First, in the
assignment of business rights, Sergio stood as Samantha’s debtor for the consideration
amounting to ₱1 million. Sergio, on the other hand, became Samantha’s creditor for the
amount of ₱50, 000.00 through Sergio’s subrogation to the rights of Samantha’s creditors
against the latter. Second, both debts consist of a sum of money, which are both due,
liquidated, and demandable. Finally, neither party alleged that there was any claim raised
by third persons against said obligation. In effect, even without the knowledge and
consent of Samantha or Sergio, their obligation had already been extinguished.

b. Yes, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi or default on the part of the creditor.

The following are the requisites of mora accipiendi as provided by law:

a.) offer of performance by a capacitated debtor;
b.) offer must be to comply with the prestation as it should be performed;
c.) refusal of the creditor without just cause.

Further, the law provides the effect of such default, that the expenses by debtor for
preservation of thing after delay is chargeable to creditor and the debtor may relieve
himself of obligation by consigning the thing.

In this case, Sergio’s offer to comply with the prestation was proper and justifiable by
virtue of the contract agreed upon. Consequently, when such obligation was fulfilled, the
delay of the other party begins. Lastly, the latter’s refusal was without just cause.

Hence, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi or default on the part of the creditor.

XII

Saachi opened a savings bank account with Shanghainese Bank. He made an initial deposit of
PhP100,000. Part of the bank opening forms that he was required to sign when he opened the
account was a Holdout Agreement which provided that, should he incur any liability or obligation
to the bank, the bank shall have the right to immediately and automatically take over his savings
account deposit. After he opened his deposit account, the Shanghainese Bank discovered a
scam wherein the funds in the account of another depositor in the bank was withdrawn by an
impostor. Shanghainese Bank suspected Saachi to be. the impostor, and filed a criminal case of
estafa against him. While the case was still pending with the Prosecutor's office, the bank took
over Saachi's savings deposit on the basis of the Holdout Agreement.

(a) What kind of contract is created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank?
(2.5%)
The contract created is a contract for simple loan.
In the case of Consolidated Bank and Trust Company V. CA, the Supreme Court ruled that,
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
on simple loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that fixed, savings, and
current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its
depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank
money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement
between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of
the parties.

In the case at bar, when saachi deposited 100,000 php with the bank, a contract for simple loan
has been entered into by saachi and the bank.

(b) In this case, did the bank have the right to take over Saachi's bank deposit? (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

No, the bank did not have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit.

The "Holdout Agreement" applies only if there is a valid and existing obligation arising from any of
the sources of obligation enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi-delict. In this case, the bank failed to show that Saachi had an
obligation to it under any law, contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. Although a criminal
case was filed by the bank against Saachi, this is not enough reason for the bank to effect the
Holdout Agreement as the case is still pending and no final judgment of conviction has been
rendered against Saachi. In fact, it is significant to note that at the time the bank took over
Saachi’s savings deposit, the criminal complaint had not yet been filed.

Source: Metropolitan Bank v. Rosales, G.R. No. 183204, 13 January 2014

XIV

Socorro is the registered owner of Lot A while Segunda is the registered owner of the adjoining
Lot B. Lot A is located at an elevated plateau of about 15 feet above the level of Lot B. Since
Socorro was allegedly removing portions of the land and cement that supported the adjoining
property, Segunda caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 50 sq. m. on Lot A's
Transfer Certificate of Title, asserting the existence of a legal easement.

(a) Does a legal easement in fact exist? If so, what kind? (2.5%)

Contributor: Manatad, Joseph Dave

Yes, an easement of lateral and subjacent support exist.

Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his
land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support
Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally
supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so
disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor’s land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the
pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable

In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of Segunda. It
was established that the properties of both parties adjoin each other. It was proven that Socorro
has been making excavations and diggings on the subject embankment and, unless restrained,
the continued excavation of the embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of the
house of Segunda to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the family dwelling.
(Castro v Monsod G.R. No. 183719)

(b) If a legal easement does in fact exist, is an annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the
servient estate proper? (2.5%)

No, the annotation of an adverse claim is not proper because it did not fall under the requisites for
registering an adverse claim.

Under the Law,The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of
Presidential Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Annotation is done to
apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve
and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice
to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the
dispute

In this case, In reality, what Segunda is claiming is a judicial recognition of the existence of the
easement of subjacent and lateral support over the 50 sq. m. portion of Soccorro’s property
covering the land support/embankment area. His reason for the annotation is only to prevent
petitioner from removing the embankment or from digging on the property for fear of soil erosion
that might weaken the foundation of the rear portion of his property which is adjacent to the
property of petitioner.

furthermore, Segunda should not file an adverse claim bt rather the same might be duly
annotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral
support.

CONTRIBUTOR: MARYJOY P. MONTERO

XV

Simon owned a townhouse that he rented out to Shannon, a flight attendant with Soleil Philippine
Airlines (SPA). They had no written contract but merely agreed on a three (3)-year lease.
Shannon had been using the townhouse as her base in Manila and had been paying rentals for
more than a year when she accepted a better job offer from Sing Airlines. This meant that
Singapore was going to be her new base and so she decided, without informing Simon, to
sublease the townhouse to Sylvia, an office clerk in SPA.

(a) Can Simon compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into writing? (2.5%)
No, Simon cannot compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into writing.

Under Article 1403(2)(e) of the New Civil Code, an agreement that does not comply with the
Statute of Frauds shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same be in writing, such as an
agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year. However, when a verbal contract has
already been completed, executed or partially consummated, its enforceability will not be barred
by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement.

In the case at bar, the lease agreement between Simon and Shannon was already executed
since the latter had been using the townhouse as her base in Manila and had been paying rentals
for more than a year.
Therefore, Simon cannot compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into writing since
Statute of Frauds does not apply.

(b) Does the sublease without Simon's knowledge and consent constitute a ground for
terminating the lease? (2.5%)

Contributor: Bulanon, Jannet A.

Suggested Answer:

No, the sublease without Simon’s knowledge and consent is not a ground for terminating the
lease.

Under Article 1650, in the contract of lease of things where there is no express prohibition, the
lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part without prejudice to his responsibility for
the performance of the contract toward the lessor.

In this case, there was no written agreement between Simon and Shannon that clearly express
the prohibition on sublease. They merely agreed on a three-year lease. In the absence of such
express prohibition, Shannon can sublease the townhouse.

Hence, Simon’s lack of consent on the sublease can’t be a ground to terminate the lease.

XVI

Selena was a single 18-year old when she got pregnant and gave birth to Suri. She then left to
work as a caregiver in Canada, leaving Suri with her parents in the Philippines. Selena, now 34
years old and a permanent resident in Canada, met and married Sam who is a 24-year old
Canadian citizen who works as a movie star in Canada. Sam's parents are of Filipino ancestry
but had become Canadian citizens before Sam was born. Wanting Suri to have all the
advantages of a legitimate child, Selena and Sam decided to adopt her. Sam's parents, already
opposed to the marriage of their son to someone significantly older, vehemently objected to the
adoption. They argued that Sam was not old enough and that the requisite age gap required by
the Inter-Country Adoption Act between Sam as adopter and Suri as adoptee was not met.

Are Sam's parents correct? (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:
Yes, Sam’s parents are correct only with respect to the age requirement but not as to the
requisite age gap.

Under the Inter Country Adoption Act, to be qualified as an adopter, he/she is at least
twenty-seven (27) years of age and is at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be
adopted at the time of the filing of the application, unless the applicant is the parent by nature of
the child to be adopted or is the spouse of such parent by nature.

In the case at bar, the requisite age gap is not necessary for it falls under one of the
exception -- Sam being the spouse of Selena who is the biological mother of Suri. On the other
hand, Sam lacks the age qualification as the law requires that the adopter must be 27 years of
age at the time of the application.
XVII

Sofia and Semuel, both unmarried, lived together for many years in the Philippines and begot
three children. While Sofia stayed in the Philippines with the children, Semuel went abroad to
work and became a naturalized German citizen. He met someone in Germany whom he wanted
to marry. Semuel thereafter came home and filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for partition ofthe common properties acquired during his union with Sofia in the Philippines. The
properties acquired during the union consisted of a house and lot in Cavite worth PhP2 million,
and some personal properties, including cash in bank amounting to PhP1 million. All these
properties were acquired using Samuel's salaries and wages since Sofia was a stay-at-home
mother. In retaliation, Sofia filed an action, on behalf of their minor children, for support.

(a) How should the properties be partitioned? (2.5%)

Contributor: Janine Fabe

Suggested Answer:

All the properties should be partitioned into equal shares between Sofia and Semuel .

Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

In the case at bar, it has not been shown that Sofia and Semuel suffered any impediment to
marry each other. All the properties acquired during their cohabitation including the house and lot
and cash in bank shall be presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts even if Sofia
was just a stay-at-home mother. Since the properties are co-owned by them, it should be
partitioned into equal shares between Sofia and Semuel.

(b) Should Semuel be required to support the minor children? (2.5%)

Yes. Semuel can be required to give support to the minor children. Under the law, illegitimate
children are still entitled to support as long as they are recognized by the father. The law also
provides that Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with the law. The obligation to give
support is considered demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same
needs it for maintenance but it shall only be paid from the date of judicial or extra-judicial
demand.

Here, Sofia and Semuel, both unmarried, lived together for many years in the Philippines and
begot three children. This implies that Semuel had recognized the children and provides for them
especially that Sofia is a stay-at-home mother. Although Semuel has decided to marry someone
else, he is still obliged to support his 3 minor children in accordance with law.

XVIII

Shasha purchased an airline ticket from Sea Airlines (SAL) covering Manila-Bangkok- Hanoi-
Manila. The ticket was exclusively endorsable to Siam Airlines (SMA). The contract of air
transportation was between Shasha and SAL, with the latter endorsing to SMA the Hanoi-Manila
segment of the journey. All her flights were confirmed by SAL before she left Manila. Shasha took
the flight from Manila to Bangkok on board SAL using the ticket. When she arrived in Bangkok,
she went to the SAL ticket counter and confirmed her return trip from Hanoi to Manila on board
SMA Flight No. SA 888. On the date of her return trip, she checked in for SMA Flight No. SA 888,
boarded the plane, and before she could even settle in on her assigned seat, she was off-loaded
and treated rudely by the crew. She lost her luggage and missed an important business meeting.
She thereafter filed a complaint solely against SAL and argued that it was solidarily liable with
SMA for the damages she suffered since the latter was only an agent of the former.

(a) Should either, or both, SAL and SMA be held liable for damages that Shasha suffered? (2.5%)

Contributor: Ana Hannesa S. Apellido

Suggested Answer:

Both SMA and SAL are liable for the damages suffered by Shasha.

Jurisprudence provides that the emotional harm suffered by a complainant as a result of having
been unreasonably and unjustly prevented from boarding the plane should be distinguished from
the actual damages which resulted from the same incident. Further,
under the Civil Code provisions on tort, such emotional harm gives rise to compensation or
damages where gross negligence or malice is proven.

In the case at bar, both SMA and SAL were guilty of gross negligence in subjecting the petitioner
to "humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear and distress." (GR No.
149547, Philippine Airlines Inc. v Hon. Adriano Savillo, July 4, 2008)

(b) Assuming that one is an agent of the other, is the agency coupled with interest? (2.5%)

Contributor: Niña Viola Lacida

Suggested Answer:

Yes, the agency is coupled with interest. There exist a contract of agency coupled with interest if
a bilateral contract depends upon the agency. (G.R. No. 156015. August 11, 2005)

In the case at bar, the agency may be deemed an agency coupled with an interest because the
agency between SMA and SLA is the a necessary means of fulfilling the obligation in transporting
passengers. In such case, the contract of carriage is dependent on the agency.

XIX

Sebastian, who has a pending assessment from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), was
required to post a bond. He entered into an agreement with Solid Surety Company (SSC) for SSC
to issue a bond in favor of the BIR to secure payment of his taxes, if found to be due. In
consideration of the issuance of the bond, he executed an Indemnity Agreement with SSC
whereby he agreed to indemnify the latter in the event that he was found liable to pay the tax. The
BIR eventually decided against Sebastian, and judicially commenced action against both
Sebastian and SSC to recover Sebastian's unpaid taxes. Simultaneously, BIR also initiated action
to foreclose on the bond. Even before paying the BIR, SSC sought indemnity from Sebastian on
the basis of the Indemnity Agreement. Sebastian refused to pay since SSC had not paid the BIR
anything yet, and alleged that the provision in the Indemnity Agreement which allowed SSC to
recover from him, by mere demand, even if it (SSC) had not yet paid the creditor, was void for
being contrary to law and public policy.

Can Sebastian legally refuse to pay SSC? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Sebastian can legally refuse to pay SSC

The New Civil Code provides that when the acquisition of rights or the existence of obligation is
made to depend upon the fulfillment of the condition, the condition is suspensive. If the
suspensive condition is fulfilled, the obligation arises. If the suspensive condition does not take
place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.

Here, the obligation of Sebastion to pay SSC is subject to a suspensive condition if the BIR finds
him liable for payment of tax and that SSC would pay the BIR under the indemnity agreement
executed by them. The obligation of Sebastian to indemnify SSC is conditioned upon the
payment of the latter to the BIR under the indemnity agreeement. SSC does not acquire a right
until the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.

Hence, Sebastan can refuse payment to SSC

XX

Simeon was returning to Manila after spending a weekend with his parents in Sariaya, Quezon.
He boarded a bus operated by the Sabbit Bus Line (SBL) on August 30, 2013. In the middle of
the journey, the bus collided with a truck coming from the opposite direction, which was
overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck. Though the driver of the SBL bus tried to avoid the
truck, a mishap occurred as the truck hit the left side of the bus. As a result of the accident,
Simeon suffered a fractured leg and was unable to report for work for one week. He sued SBL for
actual and moral damages. SBL raised the defense that it was the driver of the truck who was at
fault, and that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.

(a) Is SBL liable for actual damages? Moral damages? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, SBL is liable for actual damages but not for moral damages as there was absence of a
wrongful act/omission, fraud or bad faith on the part of the bus driver.

In Filipinas (Pre-Fab Bldg.) Systems Inc v MRT Development GR 167829-30, actual damages are
such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position in which
he had been before he was injured. As for moral damages, Art. 2217 of the NCC provides moral
damages as including physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shocks, social humiliation, and similar injury.

In the case at bar, SBL is liable for the expenses incurred by the victim due to a fractured leg and
for the unearned income for one week which will serve as actual damages. As for moral
damages, SBL is not liable as it was not acting in bad faith. It even tried to avoid the bus.

Further, Art.1759 of the NCC provides that the liability of the common carriers does not cease
upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees. Thus, SBL's defense will not stand.

(b) Will SBL be liable to pay interest if it is required to pay damages, and delays in the payment of
the judgment award? What is the rate of interest, and from when should the interest start
running? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, SBL is liable to pay interest if it is required to pay damages, and delays in the payment
of the judgment award.

In Dario Nakar vs Galety Frames, the Supreme Court modified the guidelines laid down in
Eastern Shipping Lines vs CA wherein it states that when the judgment of the court awarding a
sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be 6% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.