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BPI v.

Suarez Digest
G.R. No. 167750
March 15, 2010
Carpio, J.:

Facts:

1. Reynaldo Suarez is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current
account with petitioner in its Ermita branch. Sometime in 1997, respondent had a
client who wanted to buy several parcels of land in Tagaytay but the latter did not
want to deal directly with the owners of said land.

2. Suarez and his client entered into an agreement where the former will be the one
to purchase the lands. Both likewise agreed that the client would deposit money in
Suarez' BPI account and thereafter, he would issue the checks for the sellers.

3. The client deposited a check with BPI branch. Aware that a check has 3-days
clearing time, Suarez' assistant called the bank which confirmed that the said amount
had been credited to his account on that same day. Relying on this confirmation,
Suarez issued five (5) checks in the name of the sellers. Unfortunately, all checks
were dishonored due to insufficient funds. A penalty amounting P57,000 was also
debited from his account. The checks were dishonored despite the assurance by
RCBC, the drawee bank that the amount has been debited from the account of the
drawee.

4. On top of this, the bank noted on the checks 'DAIF' (drawn against insufficient fund)
and not 'DAUD'' (drawn against uncollected deposit). The bank offered to reverse
the penalty but denied Suarez claim for damages. Suarez rejected this offer hence
the case filed for damages.

5. The lower court ruled in favor of Suarez and awarded actual, moral, and exemplary
damages. BPI appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling. The
CA ruled that the bank was negligent in handling the accounts of the respondent
hence the latter's entitlement to damages. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner bank is liable for its negligence in handling the
respondent's account
1. No, BPI was not negligent because it was justified in dishonoring the checks for
lack of sufficient funds in Suarez account. There was no sufficient evidence to prove
that BPI conclusively confirmed the same-day crediting of the amount of the check to
Suarez account. While BPI has the discretion to disregard the 3-day clearing policy,
Suarez failed to prove his entitlement to such privilege.

2. The award of actual damages is without basis since BPI is justified in dishonoring
the checks for being drawn against uncollected deposit, hence BPI can rightfully
impose the said penalty charges against Suarez' account.

3. The award of moral damages has no basis because Suarez failed to prove that his
claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of the 'DAIF' on the
checks.

4. Suarez is however entitled to nominal damages due to BPI's failure to exercise the
diligence required as the bank's business is deemed to be affected with public
interest. The bank must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness and
should guard against injury attributableto negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez
therefore has the right to expect a high level of care and and diligence from BPI.
Allied Banking Corp. V. Lim Sio Wan

(2008)

FACTS:

Lim Sio Wan (deposited 1st money market) > Allied Bank > (pre-terminated and
withdrawn) Santos > (through forged indorsement of Lim Sio Wan deposited in FCC
account) Metrobank > (release in exchange of undertaking of reimbursement) FCC >
(through Santos, as officer of Producers bank, deposited money market) Producers
Bank

September 21, 1983: FCC had deposited a money market placement for P 2M with
Producers Bank

Santos was the money market trader assigned to handle FCC’s account

Such deposit is evidenced by Official Receipt and a Letter

When the placement matured, FCC demanded the payment of the proceeds of the
placement

November 14, 1983: Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied Banking Corporation (Allied)
a money market placement of P 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days

December 5, 1983: a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an
officer of Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s money
market placement, to issue a manager’s check representing the proceeds of the
placement, and to give the check to Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the
check. Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos

Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a manager’s check to
be issued

The bank issued Manager’s Check representing the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s money
market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee, cross-checked "For Payee’s
Account Only" and given to Santos

Allied manager’s check was deposited in the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation
(FCC) at Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), with the forged signature of
Lim Sio Wan as indorser
Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads: "All prior endorsements
and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed."

Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without checking
the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s purported indorsement.

amount on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC

December 9, 1983: Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market
placement to mature on January 9, 1984

December 14, 1983: upon the maturity date of the first money market placement,
Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it. She was then informed that the
placement had been pre-terminated upon her instructions which she denied

Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC against Allied to recover the proceeds of her first
money market placement

Allied filed a third party complaint against Metrobank and Santos

Metrobank filed a fourth party complainagainst FCC

FCC for its part filed a fifth party complaint against Producers Bank.

Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was no
longer connected with Producers Bank

May 15, 1984: Allied informed Metrobank that the signature on the check was forged

Metrobank withheld the amount represented by the check from FCC.

Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC after the FCC executed an
undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to reimburse
the amount

Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include Metrobank as a


party-defendant, along with Allied.

RTC : Allied Bank to pay Lim Sio Wan plus damages and atty. Fees Allied Bank’s
cross-claim against Metrobank is DISMISSED.
Metrobank’s third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is
DISMISSED

Filipinas Cement Corporation’s fourth-party complaint against Producer’s Bank is


DISMISSED

CA: Modified. Allied Banking Corporation to pay 60% and Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company 40%

ISSUE: W/N Allied should be solely liable to Lim Sio Wan.

HELD: YES. CA affirmed. Modified Porudcers Bank to reimburse Allied and


Metrobank.

Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code

Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing
acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount
of the same kind and quality.

Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.

bank deposit is in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum

money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit instruments


(involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with
each other but through a middle man or dealer in open market. In a money market
transaction, the investor is a lender who loans his money to a borrower through a
middleman or dealer.

Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement, is entitled to
payment upon her request, or upon maturity of the placement, or until the bank is
released from its obligation as debtor

GR: collecting bank which indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and
presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including the
forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should be held liable therefor

EX: when the issuance of the check itself was attended with negligence.
Allied negligent in issuing the manager’s check and in transmitting it to Santos
without even a written authorization

Allied did not even ask for the certificate evidencing the money market placement or
call up Lim Sio Wan at her residence or office to confirm her instructions.

Allied’s negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the resulting loss.

When Metrobank indorsed the check without verifying the authenticity of Lim Sio
Wan’s indorsement and when it accepted the check despite the fact that it was
cross-checked payable to payee’s account only contributed to the easier release of
Lim Sio Wan’s money and perpetuation of the fraud

Given the relative participation of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both
banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of the liabilities of
Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be upheld.

FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in the forgery of Lim
Sio Wan’s indorsement, can raise the real defense of forgery as against both banks

Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan

Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts ordered to
pay Lim Sio Wan
Associated Bank V. CA

(1996)

FACTS:

The Province of Tarlac maintains a current account with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) Tarlac Branch where the provincial funds are deposited.

Checks issued by the Province are signed by the Provincial Treasurer and
countersigned by the Provincial Auditor or the Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

A portion of the funds of the province is allocated to the Concepcion Emergency


Hospital drawn to the order of "Concepcion Emergency Hospital, Concepcion, Tarlac"
or "The Chief, Concepcion Emergency Hospital, Concepcion, Tarlac."

The checks are released by the Office of the Provincial Treasurer and received for the
hospital by its administrative officer and cashier.

January 1981:Upon post-audit by the Provincial Auditor, it was discovered that the
hospital did not receive several allotment checks

February 19, 1981: After the checks were examined, they learned that 30 checks of
P203,300 were encashed by Fausto Pangilinan, with the Associated Bank acting as
collecting bank.

Fausto Pangilinan administrative officer and cashier of payee hospital until his
retirement on February 28, 1978, collected the questioned checks from the office of
the Provincial Treasurer sought to encash the 1st check with Associated Bank Jesus
David, manager of Associated Bank refused and suggested that Pangilinan deposit
the check in his personal savings account with the same bank Pangilinan was able to
withdraw the money when the check was cleared and paid by the drawee bank, PNB.

PNB did not return the questioned checks within twenty-four hours, but several days
later

After forging the signature of Dr. Adena Canlas who was chief of the payee hospital,
Pangilinan followed the same procedure for the other checks.
All the checks bore the stamp of Associated Bank which reads "All prior
endorsements guaranteed ASSOCIATED BANK.

CA affrimed RTC: Associated to reimburse PNB and ordering PNB to pay Province of
Tarlac

ISSUE: W/N PNB and Associated Bank should be held liable

HELD: YES. PARTIALLY GRANTED. The collecting bank, Associated Bank, shall be liable
to PNB for 50% of P203,300

Sec. 23. FORGED SIGNATURE, EFFECT OF. — When a signature is forged or made
without authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly
inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or
to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or
under such signature unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right
is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.

GR A forged signature, whether it be that of the drawer or the payee, is wholly


inoperative and no one can gain title to the instrument through it.

A person whose signature to an instrument was forged was never a party and never
consented to the contract which allegedly gave rise to such instrument.

EX: where "a party against whom it is sought to enforce a right is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority."

Parties who warrant or admit the genuineness of the signature in question and those
who, by their acts, silence or negligence are estopped from setting up the defense of
forgery, are precluded from using this defense.

Indorsers, persons negotiating by delivery and acceptors are warrantors of the


genuineness of the signatures on the instrument

In bearer instruments, the signature of the payee or holder is unnecessary to pass


title to the instrument. Hence, when the indorsement is a forgery, only the person
whose signature is forged can raise the defense of forgery against a holder in due
course

In order instruments, the signature of its rightful holder (here, the payee hospital) is
essential to transfer title to the same instrument. When the holder's indorsement is
forged all parties prior to the forgery may raise the real defense of forgery against all
parties subsequent thereto.

An indorser of an order instrument warrants "that the instrument is genuine and in


all respects what it purports to be; that he has a good title to it; that all prior parties
had capacity to contract; and that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement
valid and subsisting

A collecting bank where a check is deposited and which indorses the check upon
presentment with the drawee bank = indorser

So even if the indorsement on the check deposited by the banks's client is forged, the
collecting bank is bound by his warranties as an indorser and cannot set up the
defense of forgery as against the drawee bank.

The bank on which a check is drawn, known as the drawee bank, is under strict
liability to pay the check to the order of the payee.

The drawer's instructions are reflected on the face and by the terms of the check.

Payment under a forged indorsement is not to the drawer's order. then is that the
drawee bank may not debit the drawer's account and is not entitled to
indemnification from the drawer. 25 The risk of loss must perforce fall on the drawee
bank.

GR: drawee bank may not debit the drawer's account and is not entitled to
indemnification from the drawer - risk of loss must perforce fall on the drawee bank

EX: if the drawee bank can prove a failure by the customer/drawer to exercise
ordinary care that substantially contributed to the making of the forged signature,
the drawer is precluded from asserting the forgery

If at the same time the drawee bank was also negligent to the point of substantially
contributing to the loss, then such loss from the forgery can be apportioned between
the negligent drawer and the negligent bank

In cases involving a forged check, where the drawer's signature is forged, the drawer
can recover from the drawee bank.

In cases involving checks with forged indorsements, the drawee bank canseek
reimbursement or a return of the amount it paid from the presentor bank or person
However, a drawee bank has the duty to promptly inform the presentor of the
forgery upon discovery. If the drawee bank delays in informing the presentor of the
forgery, thereby depriving said presentor of the right to recover from the forger, the
former is deemed negligent and can no longer recover from the presentor

Under Section 4(c) of CB Circular No. 580, items bearing a forged endorsement shall
be returned within twenty-Sour (24) hours after discovery of the forgery but in no
event beyond the period fixed or provided by law for filing of a legal action by the
returning bank. Section 23 of the PCHC Rules deleted the requirement that items
bearing a forged endorsement should be returned within twenty-four hours.

Since PNB did not return the questioned checks within twenty-four hours, but several
days later, Associated Bank alleges that PNB should be considered negligent and not
entitled to reimbursement of the amount it paid on the checks.

More importantly, by reason of the statutory warranty of a general indorser in


section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a collecting bank which indorses a
check bearing a forged indorsement and presents it to the drawee bank guarantees
all prior indorsements, including the forged indorsement

In this case, the checks were indorsed by the collecting bank (Associated Bank) to the
drawee bank (PNB)

The stamp guaranteeing prior indorsements is not an empty rubric which a bank
must fulfill for the sake of convenience

It is within the bank's discretion to receive a check for no banking institution would
consciously or deliberately accept a check bearing a forged indorsement. When a
check is deposited with the collecting bank, it takes a risk on its depositor.
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 136202 January 25, 2007

Facts: A.A. Salazar Construction and Engineering Services filed an action for a sum of
money with damages against herein petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) on
December 5, 1991 before Branch 156 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
The complaint was later amended by substituting the name of Annabelle A. Salazar
as the real party in interest in place of A.A. Salazar Construction and Engineering
Services. Private respondent Salazar prayed for the recovery of the amount of Two
Hundred Sixty-Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Seven Pesos and Seventy Centavos
(P267,707.70) debited by petitioner BPI from her account. She likewise prayed for
damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner BPI, in its answer, alleged that on August 31,
1991, Julio R. Templonuevo, third-party defendant and herein also a private
respondent, demanded from the former payment of the amount of Two Hundred
Sixty-Seven Thousand, Six Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P
267,692.50) representing the aggregate value of three (3) checks, which were
allegedly payable to him, but which were deposited with the petitioner bank to
private respondent Salazar’s account (Account No. 0203-1187-67) without his
knowledge and corresponding endorsement. Accepting that Templonuevo’s claim
was a valid one, petitioner BPI froze Account No. 0201-0588-48 of A.A. Salazar and
Construction and Engineering Services, instead of Account No. 0203-1187-67 where
the checks were deposited, since this account was already closed by private
respondent Salazar or had an insufficient balance.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to the proceeds of the checks even
without prior indorsement.

Held: No. Section 49 of the Negotiable Instruments Law contemplates a situation


whereby the payee or indorsee delivers a negotiable instrument for value without
indorsing it, thus:

Transfer without indorsement; effect of– Where the holder of an instrument payable
to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the
transferee such title as the transferor had therein, and the transferee acquires in
addition, the right to have the indorsement of the transferor. But for the purpose of
determining whether the transferee is a holder in due course, the negotiation takes
effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made.

If instruments payable to named payees or to their order have not been indorsed in
blank, only such payees or their indorsees can be holders and entitled to receive
payment in their own right.

The presumption under Section 131(s) of the Rules of Court stating that a negotiable
instrument was given for a sufficient consideration will not inure to the benefit of
Salazar because the term “given” does not pertain merely to a transfer of physical
possession of the instrument. The phrase “given or indorsed” in the context of a
negotiable instrument refers to the manner in which such instrument may be
negotiated. Negotiable instruments are negotiated by “transfer to one person or
another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. If
payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery. If payable to order it is negotiated by
the indorsement completed by delivery.” The present case involves checks payable to
order. Not being a payee or indorsee of the checks, private respondent Salazar could
not be a holder thereof.

It is an exception to the general rule for a payee of an order instrument to transfer


the instrument without indorsement. Precisely because the situation is abnormal, it
is but fair to the maker and to prior holders to require possessors to prove without
the aid of an initial presumption in their favor, that they came into possession by
virtue of a legitimate transaction with the last holder.23 Salazar failed to discharge
this burden, and the return of the check proceeds to Templonuevo was therefore
warranted under the circumstances despite the fact that Templonuevo may not have
clearly demonstrated that he never authorized Salazar to deposit the checks or to
encash the same. Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner stamped on the back of
the checks the words: “All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements
guaranteed,” thereby making the assurance that it had ascertained the genuineness
of all prior endorsements. Having assumed the liability of a general indorser,
petitioner’s liability to the designated payee cannot be denied.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs Court of Appeals

L.C. Diaz and Company (LC Diaz), an accounting firm, has a savings account with
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (now called Solidbank Corporation).

On August 14, 1991, the firm’s messenger, a certain Ismael Calapre, deposited an
amount with the bank but due to a long line and the fact that he still needs to
deposit a certain amount in another bank, the messenger left the firm’s passbook
with a teller of Solidbank. But when the messenger returned, the passbook is already
missing. Apparently, the teller returned the passbook to someone else.

On August 15, 1991, LC Diaz made a formal request ordering Solidbank not to honor
any transaction concerning their account with them until the firm is able to acquire a
new passbook. It appears however that in the afternoon of August 14, 1991, the
amount of P300,000.00 was already withdrawn from the firm’s account.

LC Diaz demanded Solidbank to refund the said amount which the bank refused. LC
Diaz then sued Solidbank.

In its defense, Solidbank contends that under their banking rules, they are authorized
to honor withdrawals if presented with the passbook; that when the P300k was
withdrawn, the passbook was presented. Further, the withdrawer presented a
withdrawal slip which bore the signatures of the representatives of LC Diaz.

The RTC ruled in favor of Solidbank. It found LC Diaz to be negligent in handling its
passbook. The loss of the P300k was not the result of Solidbank’s negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA used the
rules on quasi-delict (Article 2176 of the Civil Code).

ISSUE: Whether or not the relations between Solidbank and LC Diaz, the depositor, is
governed by quasi-delict in determining the liability of Solidbank.

HELD: No. Solidbank is liable for the loss of the P300k but it’s liability is grounded on
culpa contractual.

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code on simple loan (Article 1980, Civil Code). There is a debtor-creditor
relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the
depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees
to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the bank
and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the
parties.

Under their contract, it is the duty of LC Diaz to secure its passbook. However, this
duty is also applicable to Solidbank when it gains possession of said passbook which
it did when the messenger left it to the bank’s possession through the bank’s teller.
The act of the teller returning the passbook to someone else other than Calapre, the
firm’s authorized messenger, is a clear breach of contract. Such negligence binds the
bank under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility.

No contract of trust between bank and depositor

The Supreme Court emphasized that the contractual relation between the bank and
the depositor is that of a simple loan. This is despite the wording of Section 2 of
Republic Act 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) which states that the State
recognizes the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity
and performance.” That “the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship.”

This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “high
standards of integrity and performance” is deemed written into every deposit
agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking
requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a
family.

However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the
contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust
agreement, whether express or implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is
failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of trust.

In short, the General Banking Act simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of
integrity and performance in complying with its obligations under the contract of
simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank debtors under a similar contract of
simple loan. The General Banking Law in no way modified Article 1980 of the Civil
Code.
Cesario Ursua vs Court of Appeals

In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then
asked him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the
Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that because the law firm’s messenger, a certain
Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman. Before going to the Ombudsman,
Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he feels uncomfortable asking for a
copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told
him than he can go there as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal his true
identity.

At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”.
When he was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”.
However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario
Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua.
Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as
amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cesario Ursua’s conviction is proper.

HELD: No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict
application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity –
something which could not have been intended by the lawmakers.

Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to
use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized.
Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used
habitually and publicly in business transactions without prior authorization by
competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the name “Oscar Perez” once, it
was not used in a business transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of
Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was
not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he
was requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the
complaint is a public record open to the public.

In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about
when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not
warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed;
there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the
law is to punish evils defined therein.
PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA
G.R. No. 164368-69
April 2, 2009

FACTS:

An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent
Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was
likewise filed. The Amended Information reads: “…to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he
acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the President, represents himself
as JOSE VELARDE in several transactions and use and employ the said alias Jose
Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in
signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was not public
despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February
2000 (YES, not public)

2. Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was allowable under
banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142; (YES,
allowable when the act was committed)

3. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting
the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the
alias Jose Velarde by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000; (Not limitative
[procedural question])

4. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
departing from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of
Appeals and forcing its application to the instant case. (NO)

HELD:

The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling


Ursua definition of an alias: a name or names used by a person or intended to be
used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his
real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute
name authorized by a competent authority. There must be a sign or indication that
the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name,
and there must be habituality. The repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot
be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.

Following the doctrine of stare decisis, we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the
crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed.

The court found no merit in the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred when it
resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.
First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order. Second, in the
earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the
Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider
any evidence aliened.

What is the coverage of the indictment? (Regarding the limitative coverage)

The court found no merit on the argument of the People that the Sandiganbayan
abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information to
Estrada's use of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000, considering that there
were other transactions covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto.

The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the
complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the
offense.

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February
4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus
plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on
another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the
Information could have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the
alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent
thereto would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the
on or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or
subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary
consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and the THERETO that
referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would
have been very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples
present interpretation) had the Information simply used AND instead of OR to
separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various
dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed.
Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case
has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple
transactions on several separate days that the People claims would result in surprise
and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the
single day mentioned in the Information.

The issues of publicity, and the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405, and R.A. No.
9160

The rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity
does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. The use of the alias, to be considered
public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to
become generally known, in other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be
manifest.

The enactment of R.A. No. 9160 clearly manifests that prior to its enactment,
numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions,
whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an
indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained
without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post
facto laws.

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