Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Employee’s Compensation (Art. 166, LC): The State shall promote and develop a
tax-exempt employees’ compensation program whereby employees and their
dependents, in the event of work-connected disability or death, may promptly
secure adequate income benefit and medical related benefits.
Labor Relations (Art. 211, LC): To promote and emphasize the primacy of free
collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation
and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;
To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of
democracy and the promotion of social justice and development;
To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement;
1|Page
To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations
as union members and as employees;
To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement
of labor or industrial disputes;
To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and
To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes
affecting their rights, duties and welfare.
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the
employers and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through
collective bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall have the
power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and
conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code.
Worker’s representation and participation in policy and decision-making (Art. 255,
LC): The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right,
subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making processes of the
establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly
affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers
may form labor-management councils: Provided, that the representatives of the
workers in such labor-management councils shall be elected by at least the
majority of all employees in said establishment. (As amended by Section 22,
Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the
employers and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through
collective bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall have the
power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and
conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code.
Tripartism and tripartite conferences (Art. 275, LC): Tripartism in labor relations is
hereby declared a State policy. Towards this end, workers and employers shall, as
far as practicable, be represented in decision and policy-making bodies of the
government.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
may, from time to time, call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite conference
of representatives of government, workers and employers for the consideration
and adoption of voluntary codes of principles designed to promote industrial peace
based on social justice or to align labor movement relations with established
priorities in economic and social development. In calling such conference, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may consult with accredited representatives
of workers and employers. (As amended by Section 32, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989)
Articles1700, Civil Code: Nature of relationship between employer and employee:
It is not merely contractual. Their relation is impressed with public interest that
labor contracts entered into between them must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions,
collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. (Art. 1700, Civil Code)
B. Construction in favor of labor: Labor contracts are construed as how the parties
2|Page
intended it to be. But in case of doubt, it shall be construed in favor of the labor.
(Art. 1702, Civil Code)
The Labor Code shall be construed verba legis. But in case of doubt in its
implementation and interpretation, all doubts shall be construed in favor of labor.
(Art. 4, Labor Code)
I. Labor Standards
Answer: Yes. Section l(h), Rule III of the ECC Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, now considers cardio-vascular disease as compensable
occupational disease. Included in Annex "A" is cardio-vascular disease, which
covers myocardial infarction. However, it may be considered as compensable
occupational disease only when substantial evidence is adduced to prove any of
the following conditions:
a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there
must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain
by reason of the nature of his work;
b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient
severity and must be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs
of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship.
c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to
strain of work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the
performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable
to claim a causal relationship. (Barsolo vs. SSS, G.R. No. 187950, 11 January
2017)
Question: In what conditions can a seafarer claim for total and permanent
disability?
Answer: A seafarer can claim for total and permanent disability under the
following conditions:
a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness
to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and
there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary
total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;
3|Page
b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company
designated physician;
c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the
120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the
doctor chosen under Section 20-8(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;
d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially
permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly
with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as
well;
e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and
permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading;
f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not
compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the
third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and
declared him unfit to work;
g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently
disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently
disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to
perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods. (Status Maritime
Corporation vs. Doctolero, G.R. No. 198968, 18 January 2017)
Question: Who has the burden to prove that the injury was suffered during the
term of the contract?
Answer: The claimant has the burden. The three-day rule must be observed by all
those claiming disability benefits, including seafarers who disembarked upon the
completion of contract. Claimants for disability benefits must first discharge the
burden of proving, with substantial evidence, that their ailment was acquired
during the term of their contract. There must be a reasonable causal connection
between the ailment of seafarers and the work for which they have been
4|Page
contracted. (Scanmar Maritime Services Inc., vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 199977, 25
January 2017)
5|Page
should prevail. (Perea vs. Elburg Ship Management Philippines Inc., G.R. No.
206178, 09 August 2017)
Question: Does all injury/illness suffered during the term of the contract
compensable?
Answer: No. Permanent total or partial disability suffered by a seafarer during the
term of his contract must be caused by work-related illness or injury. In other
words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under said provision, it is not
sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him
permanently or partially disabled, but it must also be shown that there is a causal
connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had
been contracted for. (Doroteo vs. Philimare Inc., G.R. No. 184917, 13 March 2017)
(Philimare Inc. vs. Doroteo, G.R. No. 184932, 13 March 2017
Question: When can temporary disability be deemed as permanent disability?
Answer: The rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent
when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to
be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration.
(MST Marine Services (Philippines), Inc. vs. Asuncion, G.R. No. 211335, 27 March
2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
Let it be stressed that the seafarer's inability to resume his work after the lapse of
more than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness is not a
magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent
disability benefits in his favor. Both law and evidence must be on his side. (C.F.
Sharp Crew Management Inc., vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 208215, 19 April 2017)
The mere lapse of the 120-day period itself does not automatically warrant the
payment of permanent total disability benefits. (C.F. Sharp Crew Management
Inc., vs. Orbeta, G.R. No. 211111, 25 September 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
Under the law, a seafarer is declared to be on temporary total disability during the
120-day period within which he is unable to work. However, a temporary total
disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules, is considered as a total and permanent disability. This
exception pertains to a situation when the sickness “still requires medical
attendance beyond the 120 days but not to exceed 240 days” in which case, the
temporary total disability period is extended up to a maximum of 240 days.
6|Page
(Atienza vs. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., G.R. No. 191049, 07 August
2017)
Question: Can the heirs of a seafarer who committed suicide while onboard claim
his death benefits?
Answer: Under the POEA-SEC, the employer is generally liable for death
compensation benefits when a seafarer dies during the term of employment. This
rule, however, is not absolute. Part II, Section C (6) of the POEA-SEC exempts the
employer from liability if it can successfully prove that the seafarer's death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act
Since it is undisputed that seafarer's death happened during the term of the
employment contract, the burden rests on the employer to prove by substantial
evidence that seafarer's death was directly attibutable to his deliberate or willful
act. (Seapower Shipping Ent. Inc. vs. Heirs of Sabanal, G.R. No. 198544, 19 June
2017)
Question: Can honest mistake of the claimant in the giving accounts of their state
of health negate compensability?
Answer: No. As laypersons, seafarers cannot be expected to make completely
accurate accounts of their state of health. Unaware of the nuances of medical
conditions, they may, in good faith, make statements that tum out to be false.
These honest mistakes do not negate compensability for disability arising from
pre-existing illnesses shown to be aggravated by their working conditions.
However, when a seafarer's proper knowledge of pre-existing conditions and
intent to deceive an employer are established, compensability is negated.
(Manansala vs. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 208314, 23 August 2017)
7|Page
that Section 20(E) of the POEA-SEC refers to concealment of a pre-existing illness
or condition. This does not refer to a medical procedure undergone by a seafarer in
connection with an illness or condition already known to the employer. (Leoncio
vs. MST Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 230357, 06 December 2017)
Question: Will an ITF Agreement govern the death benefits claimed by Rosemary,
despite the terms provided for in the CBA and the POEA-SEC?
Answer: No. It is the CBA which must govern the claim for death benefits. The
entitlement to disability benefits of seafarers on overseas work is a matter
governed not only by medical findings, but also by law and contract. By contract,
the POEA-SEC and the CBA bind seafarers and their employers. An overriding
instrument, such as the instant ITF Agreement, also forms part of the covenants of
the parties to each other. Given that the ITF Agreement is not an overriding
instrument in this case, the Court may apply either the terms in a seafarer's
employment contract provided by the POEA-SEC or under the CBA, if such CBA
prevails over and is more beneficial to the employee, in the award of death
benefits. (Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Malicse, G.R. No. 200576, 20
November 2017)
II. POST-EMPLOYMENT
A. Employer-employee Relationship
8|Page
distributor does its distributorship business. (Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Puedan
et. Al, G.R. No. 220617, 30 January 2017)
Question: Does the control test require actual control of the employees?
Answer: No. The control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control,
and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential that the employer
actually supervises the performance of duties by the employee. It is enough that
the former has a right to wield the power. (Lu vs. Enopia, G.R. No. 197899, 06
March 2017)
2. Kinds of Employment
9|Page
broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed (second category).
(UST vs. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, G.R. No. 184262, 24 April 2017)
B. Termination of Employment
Question: What are the requisites for a valid dismissal from employment?
Answer: To constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must
concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the
employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
(Reyes vs. Global Beer Below Zero, Inc., G.R. No. 222816, 04 October 2017)
Question: What are guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement
in dismissal cases?
10 | P a g e
Answer: In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the
hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
(a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or
written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit
evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some
other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by
the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company
rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over
the “hearing or conference” requirement in the implementing rules and
regulations. (Maula vs. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., G.R. No. 207838, 25
January 2017)
In illegal dismissal cases, while the burden is on the employer to prove that
dismissal was done for cause and with due process, the employee must first
establish the fact of dismissal through overt acts by the employer showing
intention to sever relations. (Mehitabel, Inc., vs. Alcuizar, G.R. No. 228701-02, 13
December 2017)
In dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee
was not terminated, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was legal. Resultantly, the
failure of the employer to discharge such burden would mean that the dismissal is
unjustified and thus, illegal. (Brown vs. Marswin Marketing, Inc., G.R. No. 206891,
15 March 2017, DEL CASTILLO J.)
Question: Does the technical rules of procedure strictly applies in labor cases?
Answer: No. The application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to
serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases. (Reyes vs.
Global Beer Below Zero, Inc., G.R. No. 222816, 04 October 2017)
11 | P a g e
or bad faith. (Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., vs. Cual, G.R. No. 207684, 17
July 2017)
C. Termination by Employee
12 | P a g e
Answer: In order to withstand the test of validity, resignations must be made
voluntarily and with the intention of relinquishing the office, coupled with an act
of relinquishment. Therefore, in order to determine whether the employees truly
intended to resign from their respective posts, we must take into consideration
the totality of circumstances in each particular case. (Grande vs. Philippine
Nautical Training College, G.R. No. 213137, 01 March 2017)
Question: When does the three (3)-year prescriptive period to claim for service
incentive leave commence?
Answer: The three (3)-year prescriptive period commences, not at the end of the
year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service
incentive leave, but from the time when the employer refuses to pay its monetary
equivalent after demand of commutation or upon termination of the employee's
services, as the case may be. (Rodriguez vs. Park N Ride Inc., G.R. No. 222980, 20
March 2017)
13 | P a g e
An employer who alleges an employee’s voluntary resignation bears the burden of
proving such allegation by clear, positive and convincing evidence. On the other
hand, an employee who works as a security guard carries the burden of proving
his allegation that he was placed on indefinite floating status, or was
constructively dismissed. (FCA Security and General Services, Inc. vs. Academia,
G.R. No. 189493, 02 August 2017)
D. Termination by Employer
1. Just Causes
Question: What are the characteristics of a valid termination on the ground of loss
of trust and confidence?
Answer: For an employer to validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, the employer must
observe the following guidelines:
(1) loss of confidence should not be simulated;
(2) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified;
(3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary; and
(4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in
bad faith. (Panaligan vs. PHYVITA Enterprises Corporation, G.R. No. 202086, 21
June 2017)
For loss of trust and confidence to be valid ground for termination, the employer
must establish that: (1) the employee holds a position of trust and confidence; and
(2) the act complained against justifies the loss of trust and confidence. Loss of
confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be
arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The fact
that an employer did not suffer pecuniary damage will not obliterate the
respondent's betrayal of trust and confidence reposed on him by his employer. (PJ
Lhuillier, Inc. vs. Camacho, G.R. No. 223073, 22 February 2017)
The employer must adduce proof of actual involvement in the alleged misconduct
for loss of trust and confidence to warrant the dismissal of fiduciary rank-and-file
employees. However, "mere existence of a basis for believing that the employee
has breached the trust and confidence of the employer" is sufficient for
managerial employees. (Bravo vs. Urios College, G.R. No. 198066, 07 June 2017)
14 | P a g e
Question: What are the two conditions that the employer must satisfy in order to
invoke loss of trust and confidence a valid just cause for dismissal?
Answer: Loss of trust and confidence is a just cause for dismissal. However, in
order for the employer to properly invoke this ground, the employer must satisfy
two conditions:
(1) the employer must show that the employee concerned holds a position of trust
and confidence; and
(2) the employer must establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust
and confidence. (Distribution & Control Products Inc., vs. Santos, G.R. No. 212616,
10 July 2017)
Question: What are the requisites in order to invoke willful disobedience as a valid
ground for dismissal?
Answer: Valid dismissal on the ground of willful disobedience requires the
concurrence of twin requisites:
(1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the
willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. (BDO
Unibank, Inc. vs. Nerbes, G.R. No. 208735, 19 July 2017)
Question: What are the requisites in order to invoke serious misconduct as a valid
ground for dismissal?
Answer: To constitute serious misconduct, the elements must concur: (1) the
misconduct must be serious, not merely trivial or unimportant; (2) it must relate
to the performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (3) it must have been
performed with wrongful intent. (Sterling Paper Products Enterprises vs. KMM-
KATIPUNAN, G.R. No. 221493, 02 August 2017)
15 | P a g e
could not have been validly terminated from work. (Fabricator Philippines, Inc. vs.
Estolas, G.R. No. 224308-09, 27 September 2017)
2. Authorized Causes
Question: What is the quantum of evidence to prove the selection criteria of the
employees to be terminated by a redundancy program?
Answer: The element of fair and reasonable criteria in the selection of the
employees to be dismissed as part of the application of a redundancy program
needs to be proven with substantial evidence. (Abbott Laboratories, Inc. vs.
Torralma, G.R. No. 229746, 11 October 2017)
3. Due Process
i. Twin-notice requirement
Question: Describe the due process requirement in order to have a valid dismissal
Answer: It is well settled that a valid dismissal necessitates compliance with
substantive and procedural requirements. Specifically, in Mantle Trading Services,
Inc. and/or Del Rosario v. NLRC, et al., the Court emphasized that (a) there should
be just and valid cause as provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code; and
(b) the employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
(Ortiz vs. DHL Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 183399, 20 March 2017)
16 | P a g e
the awards stemming from an illegal dismissal case does not constitute an
alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal
dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of the monetary consequences of
the dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability
of final judgments. (C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., vs.
Perez, G.R. No. 220506, 18 January 2017)
Question: What salary rate would be the basis of the computation of backwages?
Answer: The base figure in the determination of full backwages is fixed at the
salary rate received by the employee at the time he was illegally dismissed. The
award shall include the benefits and allowances regularly received by the
employee (such as the emergency living allowances and the 13th month pay) as of
the time of the illegal dismissal, as well as those granted under the CBA, if any.
(United Coconut Chemicals Inc. vs. Valmores, G.R. No. 201018, 12 July 2017)
F. Retirement
Question: In the grant of retirement benefits, should the employer first consult the
employee prior to his actual retirement?
Answer: NO. Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after
reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former. We
already had the occasion to strike down the added requirement that an employer
must first consult its employee prior to retiring him, as this requirement unduly
constricts the exercise by management of its option to retire the said employee.
Due process only requires that notice of the employer's decision to retire an
employee be given to the employee. (Catotocan vs. Lourdes School of Quezon City,
G.R. No. 213486, 26 April 2017)
If the CBA also provides for retirement benefits, is there a need to invoke the
provision of the Labor Code on the grant of retirement benefits?
Answer: The determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is
still superiority in terms of benefits provided. Thus, even if there is an existing
CBA but the same does not provide for retirement benefits equal or superior to
that which is provided under Article 287 of the Labor Code, the latter will apply.
(PAL vs. Hassaram, G.R. No. 217730, 05 June 2017)
17 | P a g e
III. Social Welfare Legislation
Question: Should the GSIS include claimant’s first fourteen (14) years in
government service as a casual employee for the calculation of the latter’s
retirement benefits claim?
Answer: NO. Indubitably, compulsory coverage under the GSIS had previously and
consistently included regular and permanent employees, and expressly excluded
casual, substitute or temporary employees from its retirement insurance plan. A
permanent appointment is one issued to a person who has met the requirements
of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Service Act and the Rules. Here, the primordial reason why there were no
deductions during those fourteen (14) years was because the claimant was not yet
a GSIS member at that time. There was thus no legal obligation to pay the
premium as no basis for the remittance of the same existed. And since only
periods of service where premium payments were actually made and duly remitted
to the GSIS shall be included in the computation of retirement benefits, said
disputed period of fourteen (14) years must corollarily be removed from
claimant’s creditable service. (GSIS vs. Pauig, G.R. No. 210328, 30 January 2017)
Question: What should the claimant prove in order to claim compensation for
cerebro-vascular accident?
Answer: The claimant must prove the following:
(1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the
head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or
event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry;
(2) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the
course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and
(3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. (GSIS vs.
Esteves, G.R. No. 182297, 21 June 2017)
18 | P a g e
Question: What kind of fraud and misrepresentation can be a ground for
cancellation of union registration?
Answer: For fraud and misrepresentation to constitute grounds for cancellation of
union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of
a majority of union members. (De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc., vs. Bigkis
Manggawa sa De Ocampo, G.R. No. 192648, 15 March 2017)
19 | P a g e
participates in an illegal strike. (Ergonomic Systems Philippines, Inc., vs. Enaje,
G.R. No. 195163, 13 December 2017)
2. Assumption of Jurisdiction
B. Court of Appeals
Question: Is the decision of NLRC subject of Petition for Review under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court?
Answer: Yes. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the
NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (Talaroc vs. Arpaphil
Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 223731, 30 August 2017)
20 | P a g e
NLRC decision to the Supreme Court via Rule 65 have 60 days from the denial of
the motion for reconsideration to file their appeal. No extension of time to file the
petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding
fifteen (15) days. (Concejero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 223262, 11 September
2017)
In labor cases, this Court’s review power under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
involves the determination of the legal correctness of the CA Decision. This means
that this Court must ascertain whether the CA had properly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC Decision. Simply put,
in testing for legal correctness, this Court views the CA Decision in the same
context that the Rule 65 petition for certiorari it adjudicated was presented to that
court. It entails a limited review of the acts of the NLRC, viz., whether the NLRC
committed errors of jurisdiction. (TSM Shipping (Phils.) Inc. vs. De Chavez, G.R.
No. 198225, September 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
21 | P a g e
Answer: Yes. The Court held that the principle of immutability of judgment, or the
rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, the same can no longer
be altered or modified and the court's duty is only to order its execution, is not
absolute. One of its exceptions is when 143 there is a supervening event occurring
after the judgment becomes final and executory, which renders the decision
unenforceable. To note, a supervening event refers to facts that transpired after
judgment has become final and executory, or to new situation that developed after
the same attained finality. Supervening events include matters that the parties
were unaware of before or during trial as they were not yet existing during that
time. Similarly, supervening events transpired in this case after the NLRC Decision
became final and executory, which rendered its execution impossible and unjust.
(Edutch Movers Inc. vs. Lequin, G.R. No. 210032, 25 April 2017)
If the waiver or quitclaim is not valid, it will not bar the recovery of the full
measure of the worker’s right. But where it is shown that the waiver or quitclaim
was voluntarily signed with full understanding of the consequence, and the
consideration is sufficient and reasonable, then the waiver shall be valid and
binding.
22 | P a g e
to show by substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the
company against which he claims illegal dismissal." Corollary, he has the
burden to prove the elements of an employer-employee relationship, viz.:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control. JACK
VALENCIA v. CLASSIQUE VINYL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, JOHNNY CHANG
(Owner) and/or CANTINGAS MANPOWER SERVICES, G.R. No. 206390,
January 30, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.
A: No. In labor cases, strict adherence with the technical rules is not
required. This literal policy, however, should still conform with the
rudiments of equitable principles of law. For instance, belated submission of
evidence may only be allowed if the delay is adequately justified and the
evidence is clearly material to establish the party's cause. In the present
case, MORESCO II did not cite any reason why it had failed to file its
position paper or present its cause before the Labor Arbiter despite
sufficient notice and time given to do so. Only after an adverse decision was
rendered did it present its defense and rebut the evidence of Cagalawan by
alleging that his transfer was made in response to the letter-request of the
area manager of the Gingoog sub-office asking for additional personnel to
meet its collection quota. To our mind, however, the belated submission of
the said letter-request without any valid explanation casts doubt on its
credibility, especially so when the same is not a newly discovered evidence.
MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE (MORESCO II) v.
VIRGILIO M. CAGALAWAN, G.R. No. 175170, September 5, 2012, DEL
CASTILLO, J.
23 | P a g e
A: No. The consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. Narvasa positively declare, d that what
Dominador returned, and what he and co-warehouseman Dennis Zapanta
actually received from Dominador, was an untarnished (malinis) and unique
aluminum level. In other words, it did not contain any engraving nor bear
any dent, damage or scratch. This directly contradicted the claims of the
Fabrication Unit workers. DOMINADOR MALABUNGA, JR. v. CATHAY PACIFIC
STEEL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 198515, June 15, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
A: No. The Court will not hesitate to defend the worker’s constitutional right
to security of tenure. After all, the interest of the workers is paramount as
they are regarded with compassion under the policy of social justice. The
dismissal of Calibod, Laquio, Santander, and Montederamos was premature
and it defeated their right to security of tenure, while that of Saile has legal
basis for lack of the required qualification needed for continued practice of
teaching.
Pursuant to RA 7836 and DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998, effective
September 20, 2000, only holders of valid certificates of registration, valid
professional license, and valid special/temporary permits can engage in
teaching in both public and private schools. Clearly, Calibo et.al had until
September 19, 2000 to comply with the mandatory requirement to register
as professional teachers by taking and passing the LET. However, the law
still allows those who failed the licensure examination between the years
1996 to 2000 to continue teaching if they obtain temporary or special
permits as para-teachers. In other words, the law has provided a specific
timeframe within which the teachers could comply, and St. Mary’s has no
right to deny them of this privilege. (ST. MARY'S ACADEMY of DIPOLOG CITY
v. PALACIO, ET AL., G.R. No. 164913, September 8, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
24 | P a g e
A: No. Since the employment contracts of OFWs are perfected in the
Philippines, and following the principle of lex loci contractus, these
contracts are governed by our laws, primarily the Labor Code of the
Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations. Thus, even if a
Filipino is employed abroad, he or she is entitled to security of tenure,
among other constitutional rights. The new contract between ITM and
Dagasdas is void. The contract is in clear violation of Dagasdas’ right to
security of tenure. There is no clear justification for the dismissal of
Dagasdas other than the exercise of ITM's right to terminate him within the
probationary period without notice. To allow employers to reserve a right to
terminate employees without cause violates the guarantee of security of
tenure. RUTCHER DAGASDAS v. GRAND PLACEMENT AND GENERAL
SERVICES, G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.
6. Q: Maritess Martinez and her daughter, Jenilyn Martinez, were charged with
seven counts of Estafa before the RTC of Manila. On even date, appellant
together with her children Jenilyn Martinez and Julius Martinez, were also
charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.
Martinez maintains that she could not be convicted of Illegal Recruitment in
a large scale because she merely assisted complainants in their applications
with the recruitment agency. Is Martinez guilty of Illegal Recruitment in a
large scale?
A: Yes. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following
elements: (1) the person charged undertook any recruitment activity as
defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have the license or
the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and, (3)
accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or
as a group. These elements are obtaining in this case. Suffice it to say that
money is not material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering
that the definition of "illegal recruitment" under the law includes the phrase
"whether for profit or not." PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANGEL MATEO Y
JACINTO AND VICENTA LAPIZ Y MEDINA, G.R. No. 198012, April 22, 2015,
DEL CASTILLO, J.
25 | P a g e
8. Q: Olarte was deployed as a domestic helper to Hail, Saudi Arabia for a
contract term of two years. Per her employment contract, she was to serve
her employer, (Fahad) for a basic monthly salary of US$200.00. Fahad’s
information sheet, on the other hand, provides that there are two adults and
three children living in his household and that no disabled or sick person is
to be put under Olarte’s care.
Upon arriving in Fahad’s home, Olarte was surprised that there were four
children with one suffering from serious disability. She was paid her
monthly salary and her health condition deteriorated due to her work
conditions. She was maltreated but she finally escaped from her employer.
Olarte filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, attorney’s fees and
refund of placement fees against her foreign employer Fahad and
Nahas/PETRA/Royal Dream. Whether Royal Dream is solely responsible for
Olarte’s deployment?
9. Q: Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and
were assigned to SCIIs different clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and
Pigcaulan filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints for
underpayment of salaries and non-payment of overtime, holiday, rest day,
service incentive leave and 13th month pays. TheLabor Arbiter awarded
them their monetary claims and held that the payroll listings presented by
the respondents did not prove that Canoy and Pigcaulan were duly paid as
same were not signed by the latter or by any SCII officer. Is Canoy entitled
to payment of their monetary claims?
26 | P a g e
INVESTIGATION, INC. and/or RENE AMBY REYES, G.R. No. 173648, January
16, 2012, DEL CASTILLO, J.
10. Q: The late Delfin Dela Cruz was contracted for the position of oiler by
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., a local manning agent for and in
behalf of the latter’s principal, Tecto Belgium N.V. As required by law and by
the employment contract, Delfin underwent a Pre-Employment Medical
Examination (PEME) and was declared Fit for Sea Service. He immediately
embarked the vessel “Lady Hilde” while performing his regular duties on
board, he was hit by a metal board on his back. He, thereafter, requested
medical attention and was given medications and advised to be given light
duties for the rest of the week. He was eventually signed off but his health
deteriorated after two years.
Believing that he contracted the said disease during the time that he was on
board, he filed a complaint before the NLRC to claim payment for sickness
allowance and disability compensation.. During the pendency of the case.
Delfin passed away. Are the heirs of Delfin entitled to permanent disability
benefits and sickness allowance?
A: No, the petitioners are not entitled. First, the fact that Delfin passed his
PEME is of no moment in this case. The Pre-Employment Medical
Examination (PEME) merely determines whether one is “fit to work” at sea
or “fit for sea service,” it does not state the real state of health of an
applicant. In short, the “fit to work” declaration in the respondent’s PEME
cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment
prior to his deployment
Second, while Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA SEC demonstrates that the
1996 POEA SEC covers all injuries or illnesses occurring in the lifetime of
the employment contract, the seafarer still has to prove that his injury or
illness was acquired during the term of employment to support his claim for
disability benefits and sickness allowance. The burden of proving
entitlement to disability benefits lies on petitioners for whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his right to the
benefits by substantial evidence. Absent a showing thereof, any decision set
forth will only be based on unsubstantiated allegations. Thus, they must
establish that Delfin suffered or contracted his injury or illness which
resulted in his disability during the term of the employment contract. An
examination of the records, however, shows that petitioners failed to
discharge such burden. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DELFIN DELA CRUZ,
represented by his SPOUSE, CARMELITA DELACRUZ v. PHILIPPINE
TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., represented by MR. CARLOS C. SALINAS
and/or TECTO BELGIUM N.V., G.R. No. 196357, April 20, 2015, DEL
CASTILLO, J.
27 | P a g e
medical bills, causing his discharge from the hospital. Gazzingan filed a
complaint with the LA for non-payment or under payment of wages,
sickness allowance, disability benefits and reimbursement of medical
expenses and attorney’s fees. Whether the illness is work-related and
therefore compensable?
12. Q: New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA), for and on behalf of St.
Paul Maritime Corp. (SPMC) hired Simon Vincent Datayan II as deck cadet
on board Corona Infinity. Sometime thereafter the Master conducted an
emergency fire drill in which the crew participated. After that, a crew
meeting was held in which he was reprimanded for his poor performance.
Just before the meeting was concluded, Simon left and apparently jumped
overboard. The vessel retraced its course to where he fell. The Master also
informed the Japan Coast Guard about the incident. Simon was declared
missing and was presumed dead.
His father, Vincent, filed a complaint for death benefits and attorney’s fees
against NFMA, Taiyo Nippon Kisen Co., Ltd., and Angelina T. Rivera
contending that Simon’s death was due to the master’s negligence and
instruction in conducting the emergency fire drill at the time when the
water temperature was expected to cause hypothermia. Is Datayan entitled
to death benefits?
A: NO, the death of a seafarer during the term of his employment makes his
employer liable for death benefits. However, no compensation or benefits
shall arise in case of death of a seafarer resulting from his willful act,
provided that the employer could prove that such death is attributable to
the seafarer. The fact that Simon committed suicide is bolstered by the
suicide note that he executed. The suicide note is informative as to why
Simon committed suicide. He declined to join the party held prior to the drill
and was reprimanded for his poor performance in said drill. It can, thus, be
inferred from the note that he blamed himself for the difficulties he
assumed to have caused his colleagues. As such, to refute NFMA’ position
that Simon committed suicide, the burden of evidence shifts to Vincent.
NEW FILIPINO MARITIME AGENCIES, INC. TAIYO NIPPON KISEN CO., LTD.
and ANGELITA T. RIVERA v. VINCENT DATAYAN G.R. No. 202859, November
11, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
13. Q: Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. (WMS), for and in behalf of its foreign
principal Wallem Shipmanagement Ltd. (WSL), hired respondent Edwinito
28 | P a g e
Quillao as fitter aboard the vessel Crown Garnet for a period of 9 months.
He joined the vessel on October 4, 2008. In April 2009, he purportedly
noticed numbness and weakness of his left hand. Respondent stated that he
signed off from the vessel on July 13, 2009.
Upon arrival in the Philippines on July 15, 2009, he was referred to the
company-designated physician Dr. Estrada. He underwent carpal tunnel
surgery on his left hand, and physical therapy (PT) sessions for his cervical
and lumbar condition. Because of complaint for low back pain, Dr. Estrada
advised respondent to defer PT sessions and seek the opinion of an
orthopedic specialist. He was also advised to continue his PT sessions until
March 15, 2010.
Respondent claimed for disability benefits. Dr. Estrada gave the respondent
a final disability rating of Grade 10 on March 12, 2010. In August 2011,
respondent consulted Dr. Runas, an independent orthopedic surgeon, who
opined that respondent "is not fit for further sea duty permanently in
whatever capacity with a status equivalent to Grade 8" Impediment.
Hence, respondent claims that he was entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits. Is Quillao is entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits?
A: No. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent has no
cause of action because the company-designated physician has not yet
issued an assessment on respondent's medical condition; moreover the
240-day maximum period for treatment has not yet lapsed. The records
clearly show that respondent was still undergoing treatment when he filed
the complaint on November 23, 2009 for disability benefits. And, it was only
a day after its filing that respondent requested from the company-
designated doctor the latter's assessment on his medical condition. In other
words, he filed the complaint within the 240-day period while he was still
under the care of Dr. Estrada and has not even consulted his doctor-of-
choice before instituting his complaint for disability benefits. Thus, the
complaint was premature. (WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,
REGINALDO A. OBEN AND WALLEM SHIPMANAGEMENT, LTD. v. EDWINITO
V. QUILLAO G.R. No. 202885, January 20, 2016, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
29 | P a g e
A: NO. If a seafarer dies after the termination of his contract of
employment, the Court can only commiserate with his heirs because it has
no alternative but to declare that his beneficiaries are not entitled to the
death benefits provided in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (SEC). (MEDLINE
MANAGEMENT INC. and GRECOMAR SHIPPING AGENCY v. GLICERIA
ROSLINDA and ARIEL ROSLINDA, G.R. No. 168715, September 15, 2010,
DEL CASTILLO, J.)
15. Q: Saso (Saso) was engaged by 88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc. (88 Aces)
as a fisherman on board the latter's fishing vessel in Taiwan. The
employment was for a period of 24 months. Not long after his deployment,
Saso figured in an accident on board the vessel. He was thereafter
repatriated and arrived in the country in crutches.
Saso claimed that upon his arrival in the Philippines, respondents
already left him on his own. He then filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a
Complaint for Disability Benefits, Reimbursement of Medical Expenses,
Sickness Allowance, Damages and Attorney's Fees against 88 Aces.
Questions:
(1) Whether or not the absence of post-employment
examination defeats Saso's right to claim for compensation
and benefits.
(2) Whether or not Saso is entitled to toted and permanent
disability benefits.
(3) Whether or not Saso's non-entitlement to total and
permanent disability benefit rules out his right to the other
benefits provided for by the POEA-SEC.
A: (1) NO. As per the portions of Section 20(B) of the 2000 Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC), the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician within three
working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to
do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period
is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply within the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the forfeiture of the right to
claim the above benefits. Saso's willingness to undergo a post-medical
examination despite being told by respondents to just shoulder his medical
expenses, contrary to the claim of respondents, is shown by the fact that on
the same day, he had himself medically examined in the Philippine
Orthopedic Center. Also, none other than respondents' own evidence
bolsters his allegation. One of their evidence was an acknowledgment
receipt showing that respondents reimbursed Saso for the medical expenses
he incurred the same date that he claims to have reported to the office of 88
Aces for post-medical examination.
(2) NO. As the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the POEA SEC
operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the
company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to
exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally
unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is
declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
30 | P a g e
company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is
defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable
Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such
declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention,
then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a
maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within
this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The
seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical condition.
Unfortunately for Saso, none of the above instances justifies his claim
for total and permanent disability benefits. As may be recalled, he filed his
Complaint after a mere 105 days from his repatriation. Clearly, the 120-day
period had not yet lapsed at that time. Moreover, the company-designated
physician had not yet issued any declaration as to his fitness or disability.
(3) NO. Where a seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the
term of his contract, the employer under the POEA-SEC has three separate
and distinct liabilities to the former, to wit: (1) provide, at its cost, for the
medical treatment of the repatriated seafarer for the illness or injury that
he suffered on board the vessel until the seafarer is declared fit to work or
the degree of his disability is finally determined by the company-designated
physician, conditioned upon the 3-day mandatory reporting requirement;
(2) provide the seafarer with sickness allowance that is equivalent to his
basic wage until the seafarer is declared fit to work or the degree of his
permanent disability is determined by the designated physician within the
period of 120 days or 240 days as the case may be; and, (3) once a finding
of permanent total or partial disability is made within the aforementioned
period, to pay the seafarer disability benefits for his permanent total or
partial disability caused by the work-related illness or injury.
While Saso is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits,
this does not rule out his right to the other benefits provided for under the
POEA-SEC such as reimbursement for medical expenses, sickness allowance
and benefit for partial disability caused by a work-related injury. However,
before the Court dwells on Saso's entitlement to the said benefits, it must
first be emphasized that the company-designated physician already issued
an assessment of Saso's injury as Impediment Grade 13. (MARK ANTHONY
SASO v. 88 ACES MARITIME SERVICE, INC. AND/OR CARMENCITA A.
SARREAL AND LIN WEN YU, G.R. No. 211638, October 07, 2015, DEL
CASTILLO, J.)
31 | P a g e
contracting it; that there was no evidence that his illness was caused by the
food being served on the vessel; and, that no causal connection was
established between Demetrio's work as chief cook and his gastric or
stomach cancer. Is Demetrio entitled to disability benefits?
32 | P a g e
MANOLO T. GACUTA v. HENRY C. HARO, G.R. No. 206522, April 18, 2016, DEL
CASTILLO, J.
33 | P a g e
CA added that respondent’s illness was work-related. Whether or not the
illness is compensable and consequently, whether the respondent is entitled
to permanent disability benefits?
34 | P a g e
Pursuant to Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract, the parties should have secured the opinion of a third doctor
jointly appointed by them, whose decision shall be final and binding.
However, this procedure was not observed, and instead, respondent went
on to file his labor complaint. Such misstep should prove costly for him.
(MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC./A.P. MOLLER A/S, v. ROMMEL RENE O.
JALECO, G.R. No. 201945, September 21, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
21. Q: TSM Shipping Phils., for and in behalf of its foreign principal,
Dampskibsselskabet Norden A/S (DNAS), hired Louie Patiño as seaman for
the vessel Nord Nightingale. while working on board the vessel, Louie
injured. After extensive treatments and examinations, Dr. Cruz made his
interim assessment of Louie's disability under the POEA - Standard
Employment Contract at Grade 10, or loss of grasping power for small
objects of one hand.
Louie then filed on September 8, 2010 a complaint with the NLRC
against TSM for total and permanent disability benefits damages, and
attorney's fees. Louie consulted Dr. Escutin,an independent physician, who
assessed him to have permanent disability unfit for sea duty in whatever
capacity as a seaman.
Louie prayed for permanent total disability benefits in the sum of
US$80,000 under the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the
Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement (AMOSUP CBA) The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of Louie. On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the LA that
Louie is entitled to permanent total disability benefits but held that he
cannot claim benefits under the CBA there being no evidence that he was a
member of AMOSUP. It, thus, awarded him of total and permanent disability
benefits in the amount of US$60,000 under the POEA-SEC. The CA affirmed
NLRC’s decision. Is Louie entitled to total and permanent disability
compensation?
A: NO. The Louie failed to prove that he is covered by the AMOSUP CBA
hence his entitlement to disability benefits is governed by the POEA-SEC
and relevant labor laws, which are deemed written in his contract of
employment.
The rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent
when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period,
declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to
make such declaration.
The Court has held that non-observance of the requirement to have the
conflicting assessments determined by a third doctor would mean that the
assessment of the company-designated physician prevails. TSM SHIPPING
PHILS., INC. and/or DAMPSKIBSSELSKABET NORDEN A/S. and/or CAPT.
CASTILLO v. LOUIE PATIÑO, G.R. No. 210289, March 20, 2017, DEL
CASTILLO, J.
35 | P a g e
When the ship reached to Japan, Calo was diagnosed with suspected renal
and/or ureter calculus and was declared unfit for work. Accordingly, Calo
was repatriated and was refereed to Dr. Cruz diagnosed Calo with a stone in
his left kidney. Calo consulted Dr. Vicaldo who claims that Calo was unfit for
work and that the illness was caused by Calo’s work as seaman.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Calo suffered permanent disability
entitling him for disability benefits. NLRC reversed the decision arguing that
it permanent disability should be determined by Dr. Cruz who was the
company-designated physician and not Dr. Vicaldo. CA sought the reversal
of the Decision of the NLRC, arguing that Dr. Cruz’s findings are not
conclusive. Is Calo entitled to disability benefits?
36 | P a g e
of his disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation, as the
case may be. If after the lapse of the 120/240-day period the seafarer
remains incapacitated and the company-designated physician has not yet
declared him fit to work or determined his degree of disability, the seafarer
is deemed totally and permanently disabled. (MAGSAYSAY MARITIME
CORPORATION v. RODEL A. CRUZ, GR No. 204769, June 06, 2016, DEL
CASTILLO, J.)
24. Q: Respondent hired petitioner as 2nd Assistant Engineer for nine months
aboard its vessel M/V Morelos. Before his embarkation on he was declared
medically fit to work. Petitioner complained of chest pain. He was confined
to a hospital in Mexico and was diagnosed with hypertensive crisis and high
blood pressure. Upon his expatriation , he was exmined by Dr. Nicomedes
Cruz, the company-designated physician, and treated him since then.
At a later time, petitioner consulted Dr. Mapapala of Jose Reyes
Memorial Medical Center and diagnosed him with Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease.
Dr. Cruz issued a certification declaring petitioner fit to work.
Unconvinced, petitioner consulted Dr. Rodrigo Guanlao from the Philippine
Heart Center who diagnosed him with Ischemic Heart Disease, and also
declared him unfit to work in any capacity.
Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of disability benefits,
sickness allowance, attorney’s fees, and moral damages. The Labor Arbiter
ruled in favor of petitioner and awarded to the latter the remainder of his
sickness allowanceIs petitioner entitled to receive permanent disability
benefits?
25. Q: Pastor was repatriated was given a specific diagnosis as to his ailment
by the company-designated physician, Dr. Abesamis. Thereafter, he
continuously received medical treatment from Dr. Abesamis. He did not
37 | P a g e
arrive at a definite assessment of respondent’s fitness to work or a
declaration of the existence of a permanent disability before the expiration
of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period. If the company-
designated physician failed to arrive a definite assessment of the seafarer’s
fitness within the period required, is the seafarer entitled to benefits?
26. Q: Can Article 280 of the Labor Code (that hired party perform functions
necessary and desirable to the business operation of the hiring party) be
used as a yardstick for determining the existence of an employment
relationship?
A: No. Article 280 is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an
employment relationship because it merely distinguishes between two kinds
of employees, i.e., regular employees and casual employees, for purposes of
determining their rights to certain benefits, such as to join or form a union,
or to security of tenure. Article 280 does not apply where the existence of
an employment relationship is in dispute. (Valeroso vs. Skycable
Corporation, 2016)
27. Q: Hired party was engaged in the marketing rela estates, appointed as
marketing director for several years. Hired party is performing tasks, which
is subject to company rules, regulations, code of ethics, and periodic
evaluation. However, the contract conspicuously provides that “no
employer- employee relationship exists between” Hiring Party and the hired
party, as well as his sales agents. Is there an employer-employee
relationship?
38 | P a g e
As long as the level of control does not interfere with the means and
methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks, the rules imposed by the
hiring party on the hired party do not amount to the labor law concept of
control that is indicative of employer-employee relationship. (Royal Homes
marketing vs. Alcantara, 2014)
A: A project employee under Article 280 (now Article 294) of the Labor
Code, as amended, is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee.
31.Q: Hired party is being made to sign employment contracts for a fixed
period as project employees, but never ceased to work for the hiring party
for several years. Is hired party a regular employee?
39 | P a g e
indeed necessary and desirable in the usual business of hiring party, the
same were distinct, separate, and identifiable from the other projects or
contracts services.
The repeated and successive rehiring of hired party as project-based
employees does not also by and of it qualify them as regular employees.
Jurisprudence states that length of service (through rehiring) is not the
controlling determinant of the employment tenure of project- based
employees but, as earlier mentioned, whether the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking, with its completion having been
determined at the time of their engagement. Stated otherwise the rule that
employees initially hired on a temporary basis may become permanent
employees by reason of their length of service is not applicable to project-
based employees. (Herma Shipyard vs. Oliveros, 2017)
A: A floating status can ripen into constructive dismissal only when it goes
beyond the six-month period allowed by law.
33. Q: A security guard, petitioner was suspended from not wearing uniform
while on duty. His retirement certification indicates that he was terminated
by his agency. Was the security guard illegally dismissed by his security
agency?
34. Q: Miss Q was hired as a private high school teacher on probationary basis
for three consecutive school years. Thereafter, the school did not renew
Miss Q’s contract. Was Miss Q illegally dismissed?
A: Yes. The completion of the three-year probationary period requirement of
teaching personnel are governed by Article 281 of the Labor code and
supplemented by Section 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools. Here, reasonable standard as proper guidelines for performance
evaluation is necessary to be communicated and given to the teaching
personnel not only as evidence but also serves as its right to due process. In
this case, the absence of the proof that there are standards provided and
communicated to the teaching personnel violated its right to due process,
hence, dismissal is illegal. (CSR vs. Rojo, 2013)
40 | P a g e
A: A contractor is deemed to be a labor-only contractor if the following elements
are present: (i) the contractor does not have substantial capital or investment to
actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility;
and (ii) the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the
principal.
36. Q: In a pending case, the contractor did not overcome the presumption that
it is a labor-only contractor, as it did not submit conclusive evidence of
financial capability, failed to show that it possessed substantial investment
as required by the elements, and hired personnel were performing activities
directly related to the main business of the principal. What is the status of
the contractor’s hired personnel?
37. Q: Who bears the burden of proof to prove that employee was not
terminated or dismissed or dismissal was legal?
A: The employer bears the burden. The employer cannot simply discharge
such burden by its plain assertion that it did not dismiss the employee; and
it is highly absurd if the employer will escape liability by its mere claim that
the employee abandoned his or her work. In fine, where there is no clear
and valid cause for termination, the law treats it as a case of illegal
dismissal.
39. Q: What does the employee need to prove, in relation to its alleged
dismissal?
A: Yes. Within the context of said policy, it can be said that since petitioner
continued to work for CCBPI until June 2004, this should necessarily mean
that he was clear of daily cash and check accountabilities, including those
transactions covered by the charges against him. If not, the company
cashier would not have issued the required clearance and petitioner would
41 | P a g e
have been required to settle these shortages as soon as they were incurred.
Indeed, he would not have been allowed to leave company premises until
they were settled in accordance with company policy. And he would not
have been allowed to report for work the following day. (Garza vs. Coca
Cola Bottlers, 2014)
42 | P a g e
alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in
fact, intended to sever his or her employment.
A: Yes, when Ang tore the respondents’ time cards to pieces, he virtually
removed them from Virose’s payroll and erased all vestiges of respondents’
employment; respondents were effectively dismissed from work. The act
may be considered an outright – not only symbolic – termination of the
parties’ employment relationship; the “last straw that finally broke the
camel’s back”, as respondents put it in their Position Paper. In addition,
such tearing of respondents’ time cards confirms petitioner’s vindictive
nature and oppressive conduct, as well as his reckless disregard for
respondents’ rights. (Vicente Ang vs. San Joaquin, Jr. and Fernandez, 2013)
43 | P a g e
A: Yes. Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay’ and
other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to
dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may,
likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could
foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. In
cases of a transfer of an employee, the rule is settled that the employer is
charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid
and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity and that the
transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. If
the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s transfer
shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. (Ico vs. Systems
Technology Institute, 2014)
52. Q: In the employment contract, the respondents indicated that they have
the prerogative to assign the petitioner in any of its branch schools as
necessity demands. Petitioner instructor was given administrative functions
as head of education in one of the school’s branch. The instructor was
aware of the temporary nature of his work assignment. Is the transfer of
petitioner to one of the respondent’s school branches or tie-up schools
constitute constructive dismissal?
53. Q: Petitioners tendered their resignation. They were then given their
separation pay and other benefits. After which, they executed Release and
Quitclaims and then issued Separation Clearances. Almost 15 months after
their severance from employment, petitioners filed separate Complaints for
illegal dismissal, which were consolidated. Petitioners insist that they were
not given any choice but to resign after respondents informed them of the
impending closure of the branch and that they would not receive any
separation pay if the closure would precede their resignation. Were the
petitioners illegally dismissed?
44 | P a g e
A: No. Petitioners voluntarily resigned from employment. It appears that
petitioners, on their own volition, decided to resign from their positions
after being informed of the management’s decision that the Cebu branch
would eventually be manned by a mere skeletal force. As proven by the
email correspondences presented, petitioners were fully aware and had, in
fact, acknowledged that Cebu branch has been incurring losses and were
already unprofitable to operate. The employees who voluntarily resigned
and executed quitclaims are barred from instituting an action or claim
against their employer.
Justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light
of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine, “Although we
are committed to protect the working class, it behooves us to uphold the
rights of management too if only to serve the interest of fair play. As applied
in this case, the employees who voluntarily resigned and executed
quitclaims are barred from instituting an action or claim against their
employer. (Auza vs. MOL Philippines, 2012)
54. Q: Iladan executed a resignation letter in her own handwriting. She also
accepted the amount of P35,000.00 as financial assistance and executed an
Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and an Agreement, as settlement
and waiver of any cause of action against respondents. The affidavit of
waiver and the settlement were acknowledged/subscribed before Labor
Attache Romulo on August 6, 2009, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate. Is there a voluntary resignation?
A: Yes. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of
relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged
resignation must be considered in determining whether in fact, he or she
intended to sever from his or her employment. Absent any extant and clear
proof of the alleged coercion and threats Iladan allegedly received from
respondents that led her to terminate her employment relations with
respondents, it can be concluded that Iladan resigned voluntarily. (Iladan
vs. La Suerte International, 2016)
A: Yes. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, it
must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly
established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly
and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. In addition, loss of
trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the
employers’ arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion. (Manila Electric vs.
Beltran, 2012)
56. Q: Is a selling teller a position of trust and confidence? If so, may he or she
be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence?
45 | P a g e
custody of the employer's money or property; b) the employee committed a
willful breach of trust based on clearly established facts; and, c) such loss of
trust relates to the employee's performance of duties. In fine, there must be
actual breach of duty on the part of the employee to justify his or her
dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. (JULIETA STA. ANA
v. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 208459, February 15, 2017, First
Division, DEL CASTILLO, J)
57. Q: What are the requisites for an employer to terminate the services of its
employee for the latter's misconduct or wilful disobedience of the lawful
orders of the employer or its representatives?
46 | P a g e
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge." (EQUITABLE
PCI BANK (Now Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc.) vs. CASTOR A. DOMPOR, G.R.
Nos. 163293 & 163297, December 8, 2010, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
A: Yes. His position is imbued with trust and confidence because it involves
handling of money and failure to collect the proper fare from riding public
constitutes a grave offense which justifies his dismissal. (JERRY MAPILI v.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC./NATIVIDAD NICSE, G.R. No. 172506,
July 27, 2011, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
60. Q: What are the requisites for an employee to be dismissed on the ground
of gross neglect of duty?
47 | P a g e
A: Misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For
serious misconduct to justify dismissal under the law, (a) it must be
serious, (b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c)
must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer. (NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA KEIHIN (NLMK-
OLALIA-KMU) v. KEIHIN PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 171115,
August 9, 2010, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
62. Q: Does the mere filing of a criminal case justify the dismissal of an
employee on the ground of serious misconduct? How about an acquittal?
48 | P a g e
retrenched employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the Code;
(4) the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench in good faith; and (5)
the employer uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
retrenched or retained. The losses must be supported by sufficient and
convincing evidence. The normal method of discharging this is by the
submission of financial statements duly audited by independent external
auditors. (LAMBERT PAWNBROKERS and JEWELRY CORPORATION v. HELEN
BINAMIRA, G.R. No. 170464, 12 July 2010, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
A: Redundancy, on the other hand, exists when the service capability of the
workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of
the enterprise. A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any
number of factors, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of
business, dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by
the company, or phasing out of a service activity previously undertaken by
the business. Under these conditions, the employer has no legal obligation
to keep in its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation
of its business. For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid,
the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice
served on both the employees and the DOLE at least one month prior to the
intended date of termination of employment; (2) payment of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service; (3) good
faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable
criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and
accordingly abolished. (LAMBERT PAWNBROKERS and JEWELRY
CORPORATION v. HELEN BINAMIRA, G.R. No. 170464, 12 July 2010, First
Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
66. Q: May the employer still be held liable for damages even if the employee is
dismissed for cause,?
49 | P a g e
a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as in this case, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and conduct a
hearing. The first written notice is intended to apprise the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which the employer seeks her dismissal;
while the second is intended to inform the employee of the employer's
decision to terminate him. The employer bears the burden of proving
compliance with the above two-notice requirement. (ROWENA A. SANTOS v.
INTEGRATED PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. AND KATHERYN TANTIANSU, G.R. No.
204620, July 11, 2016, Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
67. Q: May an employee who entered into a compromise agreement rescind the
same?
68. A: A compromise agreement, once approved, has the effect of res judicata
between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent,
forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion. A judgment upon
compromise is therefore not appealable, immediately executory, and can be
enforced by a writ of execution. However, this broad precept enunciated
under Article 2037 of the Civil Code has been qualified by Article 2041 of the
same Code which recognizes the right of an aggrieved party to either (1)
enforce the compromise by a writ of execution, or (2) regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand, upon the other party’s failure or refusal
to abide by the compromise. In a plethora of cases, the Court has
recognized the option of rescinding a compromise agreement due to non-
compliance with its terms. (REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL
AYSON, IVY CABARLE, NOEL JAMILI, MARITES HULAR, ROLITO AZUCENA,
RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL, AGUSTIN ESTRE, MARILOU SAGUN,
and ENRIQUE LEDESMA, JR. v. NAPAR CONTRACTING & ALLIED SERVICES,
50 | P a g e
NORMAN LACSAMANA, JONAS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and PHILLIP YOUNG,
G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015, Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
69. Q: May respondents collect their wages during the period between the
Labor Arbiter’s order or reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC
Resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter?
51 | P a g e
A: Yes. In the absence of an express or implied prohibition against it,
collection of both retirement benefits and separation pay upon severance
from employment is allowed. This is grounded on the social justice policy
that doubts should always be resolved in favor of labor rights. In Aquino v.
National Labor Relations Commission, citing Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company v. Court of Appeals and University of the East v. Hon. Minister of
Labor, the Court held that an employee is entitled to recover both
separation pay and retirement benefits in the absence of a specific
prohibition in the Retirement Plan or CBA. Concomitantly, the Court ruled
that an employee's right to receive separation pay in addition to retirement
benefits depends upon the provisions of the company's Retirement Plan
and/or CBA. (GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES, INC. and REMEGIO M. RAMOS vs.
MARINA L. ANGUS, G.R. No. 185449, November 12, 2014, Second Division,
DEL CASTILLO, J.)
52 | P a g e
INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, G.R. No. 196102,
November 26, 2014, Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
53 | P a g e
77. Q: May grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of a
CBA be resolved without a grievance machinery?
A: No. Under Article 260 of the Labor Code, grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the parties’ CBA should be resolved in
accordance with the grievance procedure embodied therein. It also provides
that all unsettled grievances shall be automatically referred for voluntary
arbitration as prescribed in the CBA. Every CBA shall provide a grievance
machinery to which all disputes arising from its implementation or
interpretation will be subjected to compulsory negotiations. This essential
feature of a CBA provides the parties with a simple, inexpensive and
expedient system of finding reasonable and acceptable solutions to disputes
and helps in the attainment of a sound and stable industrial peace. (CARLOS
L. OCTAVIO v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT),
G.R. No. 175492, February 27, 2013, Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
78. Q: May a claim for SSS contributions be determined by the Labor Arbiter?
A: Yes. The Court holds that as between the parties, Article 217 (a) (4) of
the Labor Code is applicable. Said provision bestows upon the Labor Arbiter
original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations. The observation that the matter of SSS
contributions necessarily flowed from the employer-employee relationship
between the parties is correct; thus, petitioners’ claims should have been
referred to the labor tribunals. In this connection, it noteworthy to state
that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided
by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code. (AMECOS
INNOVATIONS, INC. AND ANTONIO F. MATEO vs. ELIZA R. LOPEZ, G.R. No.
178055, July 2, 2014, Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
79. Q: Does the fact that the parties involved in a controversy are stockholders
place the dispute within the jurisdiction of the SEC?
A: No. The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all
stockholders or that the parties involved are the stockholders and the
corporation does not necessarily place the dispute within the ambit of the
jurisdiction of the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court). The better policy to
be followed in determining jurisdiction over a case should be to consider
concurrent factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the
nature of the question that is subject of their controversy. The incidents of
the relationship must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the controversy itself is intra-corporate. The controversy must not
only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must
as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate
regulatory rules of the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are
merely incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if
the relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate controversy exists.
The two-tier test was adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution Inc.
v. Court of Appeals: To determine whether a case involves an intra-
corporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches of
the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases,
two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties, and
54 | P a g e
(2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. The
first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate
or partnership relations between any or all of the parties and the
corporation, partnership, or association of which they are not stockholders,
members or associates, between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or
association and the State insofar as it concerns the individual franchises.
The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be
intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation. (RENATO
REAL v. SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or KIICHI ABE, G.R. No. 168757,
January 19, 2011, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
A: Section 223 of the Labor Code, and Sections 4 and 6 of the Revised Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC highlight the importance of posting a cash or
surety bond in the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC from the Labor
Arbiter’s judgment involving a monetary award. In Ramirez v. CA, this Court
held that “under the Rules, appeals involving monetary awards are
perfected only upon compliance with the following mandatory requisites,
namely: 1) payment of the appeal fees; 2) filing of the memorandum of
appeal; and 3) payment of the required cash or surety bond.” Notably,
however, under Section 6, Rule VI of the said Rules, the bond may be
55 | P a g e
reduced albeit only on meritorious grounds and upon posting of a partial
bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. It is not a
matter of right on the part of the movant, but lies within the sound
discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds. In Nicol v.
Footjoy Industrial Corporation it was discussed that: “[T]he bond
requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been and may be
relaxed in meritorious cases. These cases include instances in which 1)
there was substantial compliance with the Rules; 2) surrounding facts and
circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond; 3) a
liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the
desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits; or 4) the
appellants, at the very least exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by
posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.” Thus, the NLRC is
not precluded from conducting preliminary determination of the merits of a
motion to reduce bond. (UNIVERSITY PLANS INCORPORATED v. BELINDA P.
SOLANO, TERRY A. LAMUG, GLENDA S. BELGA, MELBA S. ALVAREZ,⃰ WELMA
R. NAMATA, MARIETTA D. BACHO and MANOLO L. CENIDO, G.R. No. 170416,
June 22, 2011, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
82. Q: Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over the claims of a contractor against
the principal?
83. Q: Is the Court precluded from examine and admit evidence, even if
presented only on appeal before the NLRC, if only to dispense substantial
justice?
A: Yes. Rules of procedure and evidence should not be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense in labor cases in order that technicalities would not
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and
obligations of the parties. (ISLAND OVERSEAS TRANSPORT CORPORATION
v. ARMANDO M. BEJA, G.R. No. 203115, December 7, 2015, Second Division,
DEL CASTILLO, J.)
84. Q: Does the Bureau of Labor have jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-
union disputes?
A: Yes. Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the
Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union
and intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification
of election of union and workers’ association officers. (ATTY. ALLAN S.
56 | P a g e
MONTAÑO v. ATTY. ERNESTO C. VERCELES, ATTY. ALLAN S. MONTAÑO v.
ATTY. ERNESTO C. VERCELES)
86. Q: Southeastern Shipping hired Federico to work on board its ship. While on
board the vessel, he complained of having a sore throat and on and off fever
with chills. He also developed a soft mass on the left side of his neck. He
was given medication. On March 30, 1998, he arrived in the Philippines and
was diagnosed with Hodgkin’s disease. He filed a complaint against
petitioners before the arbitration branch of the NLRC claiming entitlement
to disability benefits, loss of earning capacity, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees. During the pendency of the case, Federico
died, and his wife, Evelyn substituted him. Thus the claim was converted
into a claim for death benefits. Are the heirs entitled to death benefits?
A: No. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the
employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits, but if a
seaman dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his
beneficiaries are not entitled to death benefits. As held in Gau Sheng Phils.,
Inc. v. Joaquin, Hermogenes v. Oseo Shipping Services, Inc., Prudential
Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita, and Klaveness Maritime
Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of Allas, in order to avail of death benefits, the
death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the
employment contract. (SOUTHEASTERN SHIPPING, SOUTHEASTERN
SHIPPING GROUP, LTD. vs. NAVARRA, JR., G.R. No. 167678, June 22, 2010,
First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.)
57 | P a g e