Risk Assessment Data Directory

Report No. 434 – 19

March 2010

Evacuation,
escape &
rescue
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
P ublications

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Contents
1.0 Scope and Definitions ........................................................... 1
1.1 Scope ............................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Definitions ....................................................................................................... 1
2.0 Summary of Recommended Methods and Data ....................... 2
2.1 Recommended Methods ................................................................................ 2
2.1.1 Application.................................................................................................................. 2
2.1.2 Generic Stages of EER .............................................................................................. 3
2.1.3 Evacuation Decision and its influence on EER Analysis ....................................... 6
2.1.4 Helicopter Evacuation................................................................................................ 7
2.1.5 TEMPSC Evacuation .................................................................................................. 7
2.1.6 Times and Failures Modes of Lifeboat Evacuation................................................. 7
2.1.7 Activity Undertaken to Improve TEMPSC Evacuation ............................................ 8
2.1.8 Bridge-Link Evacuation ............................................................................................. 9
2.1.9 Escape to Sea ............................................................................................................. 9
2.1.10 Rescue and Recovery ................................................................................................ 9
2.2 Recommended Data ..................................................................................... 10
2.2.1 Availability of Escape Routes to Muster Areas ..................................................... 10
2.2.2 Lifeboat Embarkation............................................................................................... 11
2.2.3 Lifeboat Evacuation ................................................................................................. 11
2.2.4 Frequency of Installation Evacuation..................................................................... 12
2.2.5 Probability of Evacuation Success......................................................................... 12
2.2.6 Escape by Sea Entry ................................................................................................ 13
2.2.7 Operability of Evacuation and Escape Methods under Various Accident
Circumstances.......................................................................................................... 13
2.2.8 Survival Times in Water........................................................................................... 15
3.0 Guidance on Use of Data ..................................................... 15
3.1 Availability of Escape Routes to Muster Areas.......................................... 15
3.2 Lifeboat Embarkation ................................................................................... 15
3.3 Lifeboat Evacuation...................................................................................... 16
3.4 Frequency of Installation Evacuation ......................................................... 16
3.5 Probability of Evacuation Success ............................................................. 16
3.6 Escape by Sea Entry..................................................................................... 16
3.7 Operability of Evacuation and Escape Method under Various Accident
Circumstances .............................................................................................. 16
3.8 Survival Times in Water ............................................................................... 16
3.9 Development of Offshore EER Arrangements ........................................... 17
3.9.1 Post PFEER Activity in the UK in Relation to Evacuation, Escape and Rescue 17
4.0 Review of Data Sources ....................................................... 19
5.0 Recommended Data Sources for Further Information ........... 19
6.0 References .......................................................................... 20

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Abbreviations:
ARRC Autonomous Rescue and Recovery Craft
DC Daughter Craft
DoE (UK) Department of Energy (no longer exists as such)
EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
EER Evacuation, Escape and Rescue
ERP Emergency Response Plan
ERRV Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel
ERRVA Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel Association
FRC Fast Rescue Craft
GEMEVAC Trade Name for Gondola System for Hibernia
H 2S Hydrogen Sulphide
HSE (UK) Health and Safety Executive
NPD Norway Petroleum Directorate
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
OREDA Offshore Reliability Data
OSC On-Scene Commander
PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response
PLB Personal Locator Beacon
POB People on Board
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
SAR Search And Rescue
SBV Standby Vessel
TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf

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1.0 Scope and Definitions

1.1 Scope
This data sheet provides Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) data and guidance for
Evacuation, Escape and Rescue (EER) from offshore installations as this has the
potential to be more significant in personnel risk terms compared to onshore
installations.
Total evacuations of installations are rare events and each has very different
circumstances. Thus, data relating to real EER events are sparse and QRA tends to rely
on detailed analysis of escalation scenarios and EER activities within each scenario.
This datasheet contains a number of example data rule sets and general guidance for
EER analysis.

Assuming personnel have survived the initial events, personnel EER from onshore
facilities tends to be less complex and of inherently lower risk. Qualitative analysis,
geared towards provision of suitable escape routes and appropriate rescue and medical
contingency planning, will normally be adequate. On some onshore facilities the
provisions of temporary shelters are required for sheltering from certain toxic gas
releases e.g. H2S. In addition some emergency procedures are required for remote
onshore facilities such as being overdue in desert, cold climate and jungle
environments.
The data presented is for North Sea and the user should seek local legislation for
guidance.
It is noted that maintenance activities on Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival
Craft (TEMPSC) in particular have been a source of risk. QRAs do not typically
distinguish this risk as part of EER analysis but take account of maintenance risk within
the general occupational risk category. Specific guidance on TEMPSC maintenance risk
is provided by the UK HSE in its SADIE (Safety Alert Database Information Exchange).

1.2 Definitions
The following definitions are based on those within the UK Prevention of Fire and
Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER) Regulations 1995 [1] .

Evacuation
Evacuation means the leaving of an installation and its vicinity, in an emergency, in a
systematic manner and without directly entering the sea. Successful evacuation will
result in persons being transferred to a place of safety, by which is meant a safe
onshore location, or a safe offshore location or marine vessel with suitable facilities.
Evacuation means may include helicopters, lifeboats and bridge-links.

Escape
Escape means the process of leaving the installation in an emergency when the
evacuation system has failed; it may involve entering the sea directly and is the ‘last
resort’ method of getting personnel off the installation.

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Means of escape cover items which assist with descent to the sea, such as life-rafts,
chute systems, ladders and individually controlled descent devices; and items in which
personnel can float on reaching the sea such as throw-over liferafts.
Rescue
In the PFEER regulations, this is normally addressed as ‘Recovery and Rescue’.
Recovery and rescue is the process of recovering of persons following their evacuation
or escape from the installation, and rescuing of persons near the installation and taking
such persons to a place of safety.
Place of safety means an onshore or safe offshore location or vessel where medical
treatment and other facilities for the care of survivors are available.
The recovery and rescue arrangements are:
• Facilities and services external to the installation, such as vessels, public sector and
commercially provided search and rescue facilities; and
• Facilities on the installation such as installation-based fast rescue craft.

2.0 Summary of Recommended Methods and Data

2.1 Recommended Methods
2.1.1 Application
All EER activities expose personnel to an element of risk. However, three broad classes
of EER can be distinguished:
• Routine Practice. These might be organized numerous times per year at an
installation to rehearse the procedures and use of the EER equipment. The timing
and conditions of such activities can to a large extent be controlled so that
personnel are not put at unnecessary risk. The risks stemming from routine practice
are not typically documented as part of a QRA. The risks are however appreciated
and the offshore and marine industries have undertaken activity to control these
risks, for the offshore industry the work done by the UK Step Change in Safety group
in relation to its guidance on the Loading of Lifeboats during drills [11] provides
effective guidance on risk control.
• Precautionary. For example, these might occur in the event of a drilling kick, an un-
ignited gas leak, a drifting ship nearby, a minor structural failure or threatening
platform movements in rough seas. Such an activity is not usually done under great
pressure, and there have historically been few fatalities in such events.
• Emergency. For example, these might occur in the event of an ignited blowout, leak
from process equipment, a collision or a structural collapse. Such activities are
usually performed with urgency. These are historically more likely to result in
fatalities.
In developing predictions about the frequency of EER activities, for a given installation,
influences will include, for instance, local environmental factors, the nature and extent
of processing facilities, and the intrinsic hazards of the process.
A multitude of variables can influence the outcome success of offshore EER activities.
In particular, the weather is an important factor. Should an emergency evacuation be
necessary during severe storm conditions, the risks of the EER activities are greater.

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As each installation has its own unique characteristics, it is necessary to model the EER
operation to give some basis for EER effectiveness. This can be done by using
computer models, manual calculation methods, or a combination of these.

2.1.2 Generic Stages of EER

Table 2.1 presents the stages of EER as a possible set of descriptions for use in EER
analysis. Figure 2.1 provides a basic flowchart for the key stages of offshore
emergency response as defined by the HSE in its guide for offshore EER HAZOP [8].
The situation may require evacuation, escape or a mix of both.
The stages of an EER are complex and need to be considered with care during a risk
assessment. The stages shown in Table 2.1 should be tailored for the particular
installation and its potential major accident scenarios.
Table 2.1 provides failure modes for evacuation but does not suggest the effects of
failure. It should be recognised that the various types of failure carry different levels of
risk for participants. An example is given in Section 2.2.5.

Figure 2.1 Basic EER Stages

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Table 2.1 Generic Stages of EER

Stage + Typical Specific Descriptions Possible Problems

Generic
Description
Alarm Detection system warns of an • Detection fails.
Appreciation of unsafe condition. Control room • Delay (any cause).
an incident. operator decides that there is an • Operator error.
emergency and starts emergency • Public Address System fails.
procedure. Using the public • Public Address System not heard.
address system, personnel are
told that there is an emergency.
Access Personnel become aware that they • Personnel do not hear alarms and
Movement from should leave their work area. They do not notice the hazard
immediate area move out of the immediate area. condition.
of the hazardous • Hazard condition incapacitates
condition. personnel before they can leave
the area.
• Escape routes blocked due to
hazard or other causes.
• Personnel ignore procedures and
do not escape.
• Escape routes not understood by
personnel.
Muster Personnel assemble in a • Environment within muster area
Personnel designated muster /refuge area. not tolerable due to accident
assemble in a effects i.e. smoke, heat.
place of refuge. • Problems in maintaining order
within muster/ refuge area
Egress Personnel move to the helideck or • Egress routes affected by the
Personnel move to TEMPSC boarding areas to hazard
from a muster/ await controlled embarkation • Helicopters unavailable
refuge area to a • Lack of control
point of • Personal survival equipment (e.g.
embarkation smoke hoods) unavailable
Evacuation Personnel leave the installation • Means unavailable (wholly or
using the primary and preferred partly)
means, helicopter, or using the • Uncontrolled situation resulting
primary mainstay means, in early departure, leaving others
TEMPSC. Some Operators • Means affected by hazard
consider crane system use • Means adversely affected by
allowing personnel to be lowered weather/ conditions
to attendant vessels as an • Insufficient capacity.
effective evacuation means. Use of • Failure during transfer/launch
Gondola type systems (GEMEVAC process.
Hibernia) • No vehicle at place where
personnel have gathered.
• Failure in the organisation or in
the judgment of leaders.
• Lifeboat or other vehicle
damaged by fire/explosion.
• Means of transfer damaged by
fire or explosion.
• Personnel injured by explosion
while awaiting order to evacuate.

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Stage + Typical Specific Descriptions Possible Problems

Generic
Description
Escape Personnel leave the installation by • Access to controlled descent
controlled descent provisions, prov-isions hampered
ladders, stairs, chutes, personal • Hazard effects
descenders, davit launched • Debris in the water
liferafts, or uncontrollably by • Descent devices do not work
jumping
Rescue Personnel in the water or in • Adverse weather/ visibility
liferafts await external parties (air • Inadequate external support
and marine) to provide rescue. • Unavailable, inappropriate or
Those in the water are the first damaged personal survival
priority, next liferaft then TEMPSC equipment (lifejacket, survival
occupants. suit, etc)
• Personnel injury
• Those in water affected by cold,
heat or other effects of an
incident.
• Possible shark attack in tropical
waters.
Recovery to a Helicopter shuttles evacuees to • Adverse weather
Place of base/ship/nearby platform. • Lack of control on TEMPSC
Safety Lifeboat transfers evacuees to disembarkation
Personnel make helicopter then on to a place of • Accident during pick-up.
further transfer safety. Lifeboat transfers • Rescue vehicle suffers accident.
to arrive at shore evacuees to ship. Lifeboat • Ineffective support facilities on
or a place of reaches shore or another platform. recovery vessel
safety before Pick-up from liferaft and transfer
return to shore. to a place of safety. Those
immersed rescued from water and
transferred to a place of safety.
Those immersed arrive at, and are
then recovered to, a place of
safety.

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2.1.3 Evacuation Decision and its influence on EER Analysis

The decision on whether or not to evacuate the installation is made by a designated On-
Scene Commander (OSC), typically the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM). The
Emergency Response Teams would advise the OIM of the severity of the incident. In
most cases, the OIM would stand-by and wait for the response teams to control the
incident, and then return the installation to normal operations. Depending on the
severity of the event, the installation layout, the weather conditions, and the response
teams' capabilities, the OIM may choose to evacuate the installation.
The choices are:
• Remain on the installation until the incident is over. This may be adopted for small
incidents (e.g. false alarms, minor oil leaks etc), but these are not usually modelled
in a QRA. It may also be adopted for major incidents of short-duration (e.g. large
isolated process releases) where it is considered that staff in a muster/refuge area
are safer to remain onboard
• Evacuate non-essential personnel only. Incidents where a fire-party or other
essential crew can be left on the installation are considered to be precautionary
evacuations, and are often not modeled a QRA, since accident experience indicates
a very low level of fatality risk.
• Evacuate all personnel. This emergency evacuation is the only case typically
analysed in offshore QRA and is outlined in the evacuation model within Figure 2.2
that can be utilised as a basis for EER analysis.

Figure 2.2 EER Analysis Decision Model

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2.1.4 Helicopter Evacuation

Use of helicopter to evacuate is only possible in situations where both helicopter(s) and
helideck are available. Some potential major accident scenarios would make it very
dangerous to utilise helicopter transportation. Heat, smoke and flames from fires tend to
propagate upwards and can impair a helideck facility. Helicopter evacuation is often
more available for performing precautionary evacuations.
Any evaluation of helicopter options must include an assessment of:
• The time scale of the supposed incident.
• The possible timing of the incident in relation to the availability of helicopters and
crew (i.e. day or night).
• The defined evacuation plan i.e. to shore, ships or other installations.
• The possible problems in the access, mustering and loading process.

2.1.5 TEMPSC Evacuation

In the event that evacuation by helicopter is not possible, generally, evacuation will be
attempted by TEMPSC.
The critical features affecting the risks of evacuation by TEMPSC are:
• Availability of TEMPSC suitable for launch, given the event necessitating evacuation.
• The choice of which TEMPSC to use, if there is spare capacity.
• Time required to load and launch the TEMPSC compared to the time for the event to
escalate.
• The risk of an unsuccessful launch in the prevailing weather conditions.
• The risk of an accident during recovery of personnel to a place of safety (ERRV).

2.1.6 Times and Failures Modes of Lifeboat Evacuation

Table 2.2 presents a more detailed analysis of evacuation failure modes, which is drawn
from [2]. This provides a framework for discussion and analysis.
For analysis of existing installations, analysts should be able to use measured times
from trials and exercises in place of the typical times shown in the table.
The design of a TEMPSC to withstand physical effects due to an incident can also affect
the success of an evacuation.

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Table 2.2 Typical Tim es and Failure Modes for Evacuation of a North Sea
Installation by 40-person TEMPSC

Action Possible Problems

(with Indicative Duration)
Muster Effects of incident. Escape ways blocked or unusable.
Go to stations Alarm ignored or not observed by personnel. Problems of
Head Count command.
Order to abandon
(5 to 15 mins)
Prepare to launch Muster area exposed to heat or smoke. Craft damaged by
effects of incident. Engine defect. Gear stuck. Sea cocks
jammed. Craft damaged.
Embark Personnel injured. Premature descent. Access blocked.
(4 to 10 mins) Other delays.
Start to lower Release/cable/brakes jammed, craft hooked up on gear and
Descend under control to near various other mechanical defects. Craft hits structure due to
sea level wind. Premature release of craft from falls. Wires too short.
Final descent to sea Release fails. Craft damaged by effects of the incident (heat,
Release fire, blast, fire on sea).
(1 min)
Move away from installation Steer into structure. Blown back into structure. Tides
carries craft into structure. Mechanical failures. No pickup
means.
Stay intact while awaiting Craft not located. Craft sinks or capsizes before recovery.
pickup Injured person die before recovery. Excessive delay in
pickup leads to death or injury of personnel.
Personnel recovered Mistakes during recovery. Failure of mechanism.
successfully
Recovery unit reaches shore Helicopter or ship suffers failure.

2.1.7 Activity Undertaken to Improve TEMPSC Evacuation

The offshore oil and gas industry has seen efforts to improve the design, hardware and
management of EER issues. Such improvements will achieve a reduction in risk for
personnel. For example, TEMPSC design and operations improvement studies have
covered:
• Assessment of Onload and Offload release mechanisms, to reduce the chance of
premature erroneous release.
• Improved Clearance / Offset of TEMPSC from installations
• TEMPSC mounted at right angles to the structure or at its corners so as to allow a
straight course away from the structure, also creating reduced wind and marine
loads which would tend to bring the craft closer to the installation
• Improved vessel maneuverability, some adopting use of bow thrusters.
• Better visibility for TEMPSC Coxswain
• Better maintenance of TEMPSC launch mechanisms.
• More consideration given to the practicalities of recovering personnel from TEMPSC.
• Improved impact resistance of TEMPSC
• Development of Freefall TEMPSC

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• Development of the Preferred Orientation and Direction (PrOD) system to translate

craft orientation in descent to an optimal heading and then translate descent
potential energy into forward thrust.
Currently additional effort is being applied to the safety of Freefall TEMPSC in relation to
issues associated with increased average offshore worker mass and its effect on craft
load distribution, canopy strength etc. Increased mass effects are also being addressed
for conventional davit fall TEMPSC.

2.1.8 Bridge-Link Evacuation

This essentially relates to an evacuation from an adjacent installation e.g. a drilling
platform which is connected to the central platform by a bridge within a large
production complex. If personnel are able to reach the central platform where
evacuation normally takes place, the potential evacuation means where warranted are
either by helicopter or TEMPSC as discussed above.

2.1.9 Escape to Sea

Events that lead to the need for evacuation of the installation may also impair the means
of evacuation or access to them. In such a case, personnel will have to leave the
installation using escape means e.g. liferafts.
The critical features of escape to the sea are:
• Availability of means of escape to the sea, such as ladders, scrambling nets, ropes
and personal escape equipment. These may be impaired by the event requiring the
evacuation.
• The reliability of the available means of escape, which is typically expressed in
terms of the fatality rate among people using it.

2.1.10 Rescue and Recovery

The purpose of the rescue and recovery arrangements is to ensure prompt recovery to a
place of safety of personnel evacuating by TEMPSC, or entering the water during
escape or because of a man overboard (MOB) incident, (Note MOB not typically
assessed in QRA). This is normally achieved through arrangements with ‘local’ search
and rescue (SAR) helicopters and standby vessels/ Emergency Response and Rescue
Vessels (ERRV) as specified by the installation’s Emergency Response Plan (ERP).
The critical features affecting the risks of rescue and recovery are:
• Location of the SAR helicopter.
• Response / launch times for the SAR helicopter and SBV/ERRV.
• Speed of the SAR helicopter and SBV/ERRV.
• Capacity of the SAR helicopter and SBV/ERRV.
• The time taken to rescue people from the sea, compared to their survival time in the
prevailing conditions. This depends on the availability of suitable rescue craft, their
reliability and performance in the rescue task, the environmental conditions
affecting survival times and rescue performance, and the clothing and survival
equipment used by the people in the water.

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• The potential for accidents involving rescue vessels and helicopters.

2.2 Recommended Data

The following sub-sections discuss the data and rule sets utilised in the EER analysis.
There is little or no further update on the EER data used by the industry, hence the data
and rule sets presented in the report are mainly adopted from OGP member database
1996, unless otherwise stated. The industry focus has been on making practical
improvements in hardware rather than enhancing the nature and basis of EER analysis.
Such practical improvements have been highlighted for TEMPSC evacuation in Section
2.1.7 and for other general EER activity in Section 3.9.
The rule sets describe the adopted principles in the EER analysis and may be further
developed in conjunction with the installation specific EER arrangements. The rule set
will ensure consistent approach and provide a guideline on industry best practice for
EER analysis.
Note that much of the data set out in the following sub-sections has been provided by
OGP members, in which case it should be taken as indicating the type of data required
at each stage and values typically used, rather than definitive recommended values.

2.2.1 Availability of Escape Routes to Muster Areas

Table 2.3 provides sample rule sets that may be developed to assess the availability of
escape routes to muster areas exposed to heat radiation and smoke effects.

Table 2.3 Sam ple Rule Sets for Criteria of Im passability of Escape Routes
due to Heat Radiation and Sm oke

If the underside structure of a route formed by cladding and plate, is still intact, the escape
route is impassible if heat radiation level at the underside of the escape route exceeds 37.5
2
kW/m .
A route, separated from heat effects to the side by a clad wall but having a grated floor, is
2
impassable if the heat radiation level on other side of the clad wall is more than 12.5 kW/m .
2
Less than 5 kW/m will cause pain in 15 to 20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds’ exposure
[12].
2
Greater than 6 kW/m will cause pain within approximately 10 seconds; rapid escape only is
possible [12].
An unprotected route is impassable if the smoke concentration is higher than 2.3%.

In addition, many companies adopt smoke obscuration criteria such that routes
are deemed to be blocked if the visibility is less than 10 m. It is noted also that
many companies provide escape packs with smoke hoods, although little credit
is adopted for using smoke hoods for the access (immediate escape) stage as
they are located typically in accommodation areas for limited use in aiding
helicopter or TEMPSC boarding.

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2.2.2 Lifeboat Embarkation

Table 2.4 provides sample rule sets that may be developed to assess the inoperability of
lifeboat embarkation areas due to heat radiation and explosion effects.

Table 2.4 Sam ple Rule Sets for Criteria of Inoperability of Lifeboat
Em barkation Areas due to Heat Radiation and Explosion Effects

Any jet fire impact (with or without water sprays operating).

Any pool fire impact (without water sprays operating).
Any explosion impact with an overpressure higher than 0.2 bar [12].
Permanent damage to the supporting structure.
2
A heat radiation level of more than 12.5 kW/m to the underside or outside of the embarkation
area.

2.2.3 Lifeboat Evacuation

Table 2.5 shows the probabilities of success for TEMPSC evacuation based on
computer model predictions.

Table 2.5 Probabilities of Success 1 for TEMPSC Evacuation (Com puter

Model Predictions)
2
Wind (Beaufort Force ) (m/s) Davit-Launched Free-Fall
[2],[6] [OGP Member]
Calm (0-3) (0 - 5 m/s) 0.8 0.95
Moderate (4-6) (5 - 14 m/s) 0.6 0.9
Gale (7-9) (14 - 24 m/s) 0.1 0.75
Storm (>9) (> 24 m/s) 0.05 0.4
Notes:
1. “Success”, in this context, is achieved when no fatalities occur during the TEMPSC
evacuation event. Thus 100% of the personnel on board the TEMPSC will be safely
transported away from the installation and potentially to shore. As a rule of thumb it is
commonly assumed in QRA that 50% of the occupants of a failed TEMPSC will become
evacuation phase fatalities and the remaining 50% are immersed with the potential to suffer
rescue and recovery phase risk.
2. Beaufort refers to the Beaufort Wind Scale, an internationally recognized system of
describing observed effects of winds of different velocities. Winds are grouped into speed
categories from 1 to 12 and area referred to as Force 1, Force 2, etc.
The Computer Model was the Escape model as documented within [6] developed by
Technica, now part of DNV and is available within the NEPTUNE Software toolkit,
upgraded as ESCAPE III to cater for mobile unit motion dynamics.
It is noted that the probability of successful TEMPSC evacuation is strongly influenced
by the facility layout. As a result of the research conducted in developing the ESCAPE
model and by the associated D.En Guidance, installation designers and facility
operators created greater clearance distances between TEMPSC and structures that
could be impacted on descent and in offset sea level clearances to minimize the
potential to be swept back towards the facility once released. By remounting new and
existing TEMPSC from a parallel/side on mount to a perpendicular/end-on mount this
reduced the wind loading on descent which could cause platform collisions and offered

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the ability to drive more quickly away (without a need to turn) when seaborne reducing
the swept back collision potential.
In addition, OREDA-92 [7] includes some recorded failure incident and failure rate data
for davit launched TEMPSC.

2.2.4 Frequency of Installation Evacuation

Table 2.6 shows the frequency of partial/total evacuation for the Northern North Sea.

Table 2.6 Frequency of Partial/Total Evacuation (Northern North Sea)

-3
Survival Craft Evacuation 3.0 × 10 per installation year [2]
-3
Helicopter Evacuation 7.5 × 10 per installation year [2]
Over a 25 year installation life, this implies a 7.5% probability that there will be a TEMPSC
evacuation and 19% probability of an evacuation by helicopter.

2.2.5 Probability of Evacuation Success

The actual success rates at each stage of the process of EER for a defined group of
personnel can be translated into an overall success rate. Stages of EER and associated
probabilities of personnel acting as described may be defined as follows:
• identifying alarm = P1
• making local escape (access stage) = P2
• reaching muster/refuge place = P3
• effecting evacuation or escape (from muster/refuge away from installation) = P4
• reaching place of safety = P5

As an example, consider escape of 5 people working in a process area in which there is

a rapidly developing fire. It is assumed that evacuation is by TEMPSC. Weather
conditions may be any of those observed at this location. There is a good back-up
organization to recover personnel after they have transferred to TEMPSC. (Source: OGP
member).
• P1 = 0.95 (Visual and thorough alarm system)
• P2 = 0.80 (Fire effects may overcome personnel)
• P3 = 0.98 (Good escape routes unlikely to be blocked)
• P4 = 0.85 (to include allowance for possibility of becoming trapped at the
muster/refuge place. Also includes derivation for TEMPSC launching weighted for
different weather conditions)
• P5 = 0.90 (Emergency organization for the installation retrieves personnel. Success
is good except in poor weather)
Overall Success = (P1 × P2 × P3 × P4 × P5) = (0.95 × 0.80 × 0.98 × 0.85 × 0.90) = 0.57 for
the 5 people in the area where the incident takes place. Note that the chance can be
improved to 0.74 (P1 × P2 × P3) if people can stay on the installation.

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2.2.6 Escape by Sea Entry

Table 2.7 provides a sample rule set for the probability of immediate fatality due to
jumping to the sea from a North Sea deck (a lower deck where staff could be expected
to routinely work).

Table 2.7 Sam ple Rule Set for Im m ediate Fatality Probability due to
Jum ping to Sea from a North Sea Lower Deck

Fatality Probability 0.1

Source: Sample extract from a typical Rule Set document of an OGP member.
Note: Does not allow for use of tertiary devices, such as rope ladders etc., or for distance to sea.

Table 2.8 provides sample rule set that may be developed to assess the probability of
fatality upon entering the sea to escape in the North Sea.

Table 2.8 Sam ple Rule Set for Fatality Probability Upon Entering the Sea to
Escape (North Sea Data)

Stand-by vessel status Probability

of fatality
No stand-by vessel present
Averaged over all weather conditions 0.8
Stand-by vessel(s) present.
Calm Weather (Wind 0 to 5 m/s)
No or Low Fire Effects at Sea Level 0.06
High Fire Effects at Sea Level 0.15
Moderate Weather (Wind 5 to 12 m/s) 0.22
Severe Weather (Wind >12 m/s) 0.92
Source: Sample extract from a typical Rule Set document of an OGP member.
Notes:
• Probabilities cover full scope of evacuation: entering sea; remaining at sea surface; rescue.
• Personnel making a sea entry expected to be wearing survival suit and life-jacket.
• Data do not differentiate sea temperature effects on personnel survival rate. In reality,
personnel survival time immersed in sea, depends on local sea temperatures and generic
human endurance times.

2.2.7 Operability of Evacuation and Escape Methods under Various Accident

Circumstances
Table 2.9 shows the operability ratings of evacuation and escape methods under
various accident circumstances.
Table 2.10 shows the historical success rates for a number of evacuation and escape
methods.

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Table 2.9 Operability Ratings of Evacuation / Escape Methods Under

Various Accident Circum stances: Hazards, Evacuation Tim e, W eather

Types of Hazard Evacuation Time Weather

Evacuation/Escape Radiant Gas/H 2 < 15 < 60 < 180 Calm Mod Severe
means Heat S/ mins mins mins
Smoke
Preferred Helicopter 2 2 2/2 8/2 9/9 9 9 5
Evacuation Bridge 5 5 9/9 9/9 9/9 9 9 7
Direct Marine 5 5 2/2 9/5 9/9 9 8 3
TEMPSC Protected
9 9 9/7 9/9 N/A 9 6 1
Evacuation Access
Unprotected
3 3 7/7 9/9 N/A 9 6 1
Access
Liferaft,
Escape to
Ropes, Jump 2 2 8/8 N/A N/A 3 2 0
Sea means
etc.
Source: OGP member.
Notes
Ratings: Lowest = 0, Highest = 9. These ratings are based on how operable the various methods
of evacuation / escape are expected to be under different accident circumstances of hazard,
evacuation time and weather. A N/A mark indicates that alternative methods of evacuation /
escape would be used in these circumstances. Two marks are given for the evacuation times
based on the separate cases of total People on Board (PoB) = 20 and total PoB = 200 respectively
(i.e. 8 / 2 refers to 8 for a 20 man installation, 2 for a 200 man installation).

Table 2.10 Evacuation and Escape Success Rates

Types of Evacuation/Escape Historical

Success Rates
1
Preferred Helicopter Low
Evacuation Bridge High
2
Direct Marine N/A
TEMPSC Protected Access N/A
Evacuation Unprotected Access
Low

Escape to Liferafts, Ropes,

Low
Sea means Jumping etc.
Source: OGP member.
Notes
Ranking Categories: High / Medium / Low
1. Helicopters have not generally been available in time for emergency evacuations.
2. No data, as these are more recent developments and are not widely deployed offshore as
yet e.g. Hibernia GEMEVAC.

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2.2.8 Survival Times in Water

Table 2.11 shows the survival time in water adopted in the North Sea. These values do
not account for times for injured staff where injured survival times in summer are 85%
of those not injured and in winter 60%.

Table 2.11 Survival Tim es (m inutes) in W ater [9]

Sea State: Calm Moderate Rough

Category Summer Winter Summer Winter Summer Winter
Lifejacket and Survival Suit 180 120 165 60 120 100
Lifejacket / No Survival Suit 75 45 30 30 15 15
Insulated Immersion Suit
180 180 180 180 180 180
with Buoyancy
Lifejacket / leaking survival
150 75 60 30 30 15
suit
Lifejacket/ leaking survival
suit with thermal immersion 150 180 60 80 180 60
garment during winter
No Lifejacket/No Survival
20 10 15 10 10 5
Suit

Survival times can be extended for warmer water environments with the following rough
guidance, depending on a variety of factors such as body type, clothing etc:
• 70° to 80°F (21° to 27°C): 3 hours to indefinitely
• 60° to 70°F (16° to 21°C): 2 to 40 hours
• 50° to 60°F (10° to 16°C): 1 to 6 hours
In warmer water factors other than hypothermia may become more important.

3.0 Guidance on Use of Data

The following sub-sections provide guidance on use of data presented in Section 2.2.1
to 2.2.7.

3.1 Availability of Escape Routes to Muster Areas

The criteria shown in Table 2.3 are samples of rule sets that can be used to evaluate the
number of fatalities to personnel trapped in a fire area over an extended period due to
effects from a fire of long duration. The criteria may be considered conservative when
escape is possible within a few minutes after the start of a fire. Rule sets should be
developed specific to the circumstances.
The Vulnerability of Humans datasheet provides data complementary to that given in
Section 2.2.

3.2 Lifeboat Embarkation

Similar to the above, the rule set for inoperability of TEMPSC embarkation areas should
be developed specific to the installation circumstances.

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3.3 Lifeboat Evacuation

The various references in Table 2.5 give a range of predictions for the success rate of
TEMPSC evacuation. These data figures are not precise, but give an indication that
launching of TEMPSC does not guarantee safe evacuation.
The outlines of the various ways in which the TEMPSC evacuation process can fail are
as indicated in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.
TEMPSC evacuation success data are generally predictions based on North Sea
experience of davit launched TEMPSC. Installations in other areas may use craft which
are not davit launched TEMPSC. This could affect the success rate for evacuation.

3.4 Frequency of Installation Evacuation

Table 2.6 shows the predicted frequency of having to evacuate an installation is derived
from generic information. Some installations may never have an evacuation, others may
have several over their lifetime.
Helicopter evacuation might not be achievable until some hours after the initiating
event. Fire, smoke and gas presence can prevent the use of helicopter. For such cases,
TEMPSC and bridge transfer (for bridge linked platforms) provide further alternative
means of evacuation.

3.5 Probability of Evacuation Success

The probabilities presented are based on typical OGP member database. Any
probabilities used should be scrutinised and developed specific to the installation
evacuation arrangement and facilities.

3.6 Escape by Sea Entry

There are insufficient data on the use of liferafts to give reliable figures for the
probability of fatality when these devices are available. The probabilities presented in
Table 2.7 and 2.8 are sample extract from typical rule sets document of OGP member
database. Similar to the above, probabilities used should be scrutinised and developed
specific to the installation escape arrangement and facilities.

3.7 Operability of Evacuation and Escape Method under Various Accident

Circumstances
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 are provided to aid estimates of EER systems effectiveness under
different accident circumstances. The data is qualitative estimate of the applicability and
success rates for different types of EER equipment.

3.8 Survival Times in Water

The survival times are taken from HSE Offshore Technology Report OTO 95 038 [9].
Survival times may be multiplied by 0.6667 to give a factor of safety as suggested in
guidance PBN 97/20 of HSE for demonstration of good prospect.

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All of these references date from the late 1980s/early 1990s. There has been little
subsequent development in this area, as explained by the following brief account.

Prior to the PFEER (Offshore Installations (Prevention Of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response)) Regulations 1995 in the UK, a significant degree of EER analysis
was performed associated with the Piper Alpha Disaster report by Lord Cullen which
required EER Analysis as a “forthwith” study in advance of the Safety Case Regulations
which were enacted in 1993 (Updated in 2005 [10]). Much of the new numerical analysis
work was performed at this time building on the earlier DEn ESCAPE work involving
Technica.
The PFEER Regulations set out more firm requirements on emergency response issues,
principal among which was the requirement to demonstrate a good prospect of rescue
and recovery. The Regulations enabled the possibility of Standby Vessel sharing. A lot
of industry application was then devoted to demonstrating “good prospect”, particularly
in cases of SBV sharing. Post PFEER many SBV sharing studies were performed using
analysis methods developed before PFEER. Industry activity then drifted away from
numerical risk methods and focused more on the practicalities of effective rescue and
recovery. Section 2.3 gives a more detailed account of activity observed post PFEER in
the UK.

3.9 Development of Offshore EER Arrangements

Whatever offshore evacuation technique is used, two areas have been developed to
improve the success of EER, principally stemming from Lord Cullen’s report on the
Piper Alpha Disaster. Firstly there is the development of concept, specification and
performance of Temporary Refuges. Secondly, there is increased allowance for human
factors, comprising command, control, human behaviour and ergonomics in the design
of equipment, procedures etc with significant efforts given to training emergency
command teams in simulated exercises. Much work has been done in these areas and
there is continuous focus from operators and regulators.
A number of innovative EER systems are in various stages of development. Several
systems have been adopted by operators as risk reduction measures and best available
means for EER. Examples of these innovative systems can generally be grouped into
the following categories:
• TEMPSC assist systems
• Individual Escape Devices
• Multiple Personnel Escape Devices
Levels of operational testing and experience for each particular system vary. Due to
these systems’ relatively limited usage within the industry, there are little or no data
currently available.

3.9.1 Post PFEER Activity in the UK in Relation to Evacuation, Escape and

Rescue
It became obvious that a good prospect of rescue and recovery required the ability to
deploy resources quickly enough to recover people before survival times were
exhausted. Therefore effort was applied from two sides to this survival challenge:
• To improve survival times in water, and

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• To deploy new and different resources to get to people in the water more quickly.

3.9.1.1 Improving Survival Times

It became obvious that survival time was linked to the type of survival suits being worn.
Zips and worn seals compromised suits and caused ingress of water, which reduced
survival times, so new suits were developed and additional training provided to reduce
such problems.
The problems of incompatibility between various survival suits and lifejacket
combinations became more obvious and efforts were applied to demonstrate effective
combinations, with many companies performing mannequin water tests at sea.
The survival time was additionally tackled with the widespread adoption of thermal
immersion garment liners worn within survival suits in defined weather/sea conditions
to enhance the “good prospect”.
More recently, led by several companies from the mid 1990s, there has been the
adoption of rebreather technology to enhance personnel’s ability to survive helicopter
ditching scenarios. This addresses the human response to cold water immersion, which
induces breathing and water ingress if submerged. The rebreather allows breathing to
take place drawing in previously expelled breath to facilitate submerged escape from
the aircraft.

3.9.1.2 Reducing Recovery Times

As an aid to faster recovery of personnel from the water, the use of personnel locator
beacons (PLB), previously limited to TEMPSC, Helicopter and Liferafts, was adopted by
many companies whose associated support response fast rescue craft had provisions
to track the PLB signal. When using PLBs, it important to ensure that when activated
these devices do not interfere with helicopter EPIRB signals.
On the deployment of resources side, advances began with better systems of
recovering personnel from the sea. Lessons learned on earlier emergency situations
prompted:
• The development of devices such as the Jason’s Cradle, Dacon Scoop
• The development of Caley davits for FRC quick recovery in rough weather with an
inbuilt heave compensation device
• Lower freeboard, and better illuminated and defined SBV rescue zones.

A SBV code of practice was developed to harmonise the specification of SBVs, outlining
different classes of vessel essentially related to the POB on the installations they are
attending. This was then developed more recently as the Emergency Response Rescue
Vessel (ERRV) code.
The specifications of equipment and manning requirements were developed to ensure
effective resources could be available to rescue, recover, attend survivors and crew the
vessels effectively.
With respect to SBV, the industry began to increase the number, capacity, reliability,
endurance and speed of fast rescue craft. From the mid 1990s, fast rescue craft began
to develop towards the “daughter craft” (DC) principle. These craft were larger, had
canopies and could operate somewhat independently of the SBV for defined periods.

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This enabled more distant deployments and enabled closer support for example for
helicopter operations between local facilities, greater support under shared SBV
circumstances e.g. over the side work close in support. DC have greater weather
limitations than FRC as their weight makes rough weather recovery a problem, limiting
their deployment to moderate seas.
Also from the late 1990s, BP and various partners began to advance the Jigsaw concept
that would provide good prospects of rescue and recovery by a more focused
deployment of higher specification SBV and offshore based Search and Rescue (SAR)
helicopter provisions (essentially equipped with forward looking Infrared systems, for
the location of those immersed, and winch recovery provisions). The Jigsaw vessels are
equipped with Autonomous Rescue and Recovery Craft (ARRC). These are essentially
vessels that can be deployed using dual davits, which have a Rigid Inflatable Boat basis
but with large cabs over 2 decks allowing comfortable autonomous operations and
effective recovery capabilities.

3.9.1.3 Non UK Developments

Away from the UKCS and the North Sea, newer work has been applied in the field of
Emergency Response towards colder and ice oilfield environments. The Terra Nova
development demonstrated the need to keep TEMPSCs in warmed garage facilities to
ensure quick, effective use. The Sakhalin developments have demonstrated the need for
new thinking in relation to evacuating onto full or partial sea ice cover. More recently the
Kashagan development in the northern Caspian Sea, icebound in winter, has required
creative solutions for emergency response arrangements, also influenced by significant
potential for high concentration H2S situations.

4.0 Review of Data Sources

The principal source of the data presented in Section 2.2 is the data published by OGP.
References [4], [4] and [6] include a useful overview of offshore EER, including fatality
assessment, as well as evacuation modeling (helicopters, lifeboats, bridge, sea entry).
OREDA-92 [7] includes some recorded failure incident and failure rate data for
conventional davit launched life boats.
The Vulnerability of Humans datasheet provides data complementary to that discussed in
Section 2.2.
Most of the data presented are generally based on the North Sea experience.
Installations in other areas operating in different environmental conditions and
operating standards may be subjected to area specific data.

5.0 Recommended Data Sources for Further Information

There are limited data available for use in EER analysis, however, a number of
organisations provide guidance on EER best practice through their websites, within the
UK this includes the Oil and Gas UK (formerly known as UKOOA), the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) UK, Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel Association (ERRVA)
UK, and The Step Change in Safety group. For Norway the Norwegian Petroleum
Services Authority (PSA) (formerly the NPD) provides guidelines. For other offshore
sectors local authorities can be referred to such Transport Canada, Mineral

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Management Services (US), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (US), US

Coast Guard, and in general the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

6.0 References

[1] HSE, 1995. Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response on Offshore
Installations. Not yet available electronically in full; link to summary information:
(http://www.hsebooks.com/Books/product/product.asp?catalog%5Fname=HSEBoo
ks&category%5Fname=&product%5Fid=2788)
[2] Sykes, K, 1986. Summary of conclusions drawn from reports produced by, or made
available to, the Emergency Evacuation of Offshore Installations Steering Group,
MaTSU.
[3] Technica, 1988. Escape II - Risk Assessment of Emergency Evacuation from Offshore
Installations, OTH 88 8285, London: HMSO, ISBN 0 11 412920 7.
[4] Robertson, D, 1987. Escape III - The Evaluation of Survival Craft Availability in
Platform Evacuation, Intl. Offshore Safety Conference, London.
[5] Department of Energy, 1988. Comparative Safety Evaluation of Arrangements for
Accommodating Personnel Offshore, Section 9 + Appendix 7.
[6] Technica, 1983. Risk Assessment of Emergency Evacuation from Offshore Installation,
Report F 158, prepared for DoE.
[7] DNV Technica, 1993. OREDA-92, Offshore Reliability Data Handbook, 2nd ed.,
ISBN 82 515 0188 1.
[8] HSE, 1995. A Methodology for Hazard Identification on EER Assessments, RM
Consultants Ltd, OTH 95 466.
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/othhtm/400-499/oth466.htm
[9] HSE, 1995. Review of Probable Survival Times for Immersion in the North Sea,
OTO 95 038. http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/otopdf/1995/oto95038.pdf
[10] The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005, SI2005/3117, Norwich: The
Stationery Office, ISBN 0 11 073610 9.
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2005/20053117.htm
[11] (UK) Step Change in Safety, 2003. Loading of Lifeboats during Drills - Guidance.
http://stepchangeinsafety.net/ResourceFiles/Lifeboat%20Loading%20Guidance%20
Final%20Copy.pdf
[12] International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, 2009. Vulnerability of Humans,
DNV Report no. 32335833/14, rev 2.

20 ©OGP
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